GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY (GNU) AS A STRATEGY FOR DEMOCRACY IN ZIMBABWE

by

RUTENDO DAPHNE TUMBARE

Dissertation

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

in the

FACULTY OF HUMANITIES

(School of Social Sciences)

at the

UNIVERSITY OF LIMPOPO

SUPERVISOR: Mr G. Matheba

CO-SUPERVISOR: Dr A.V Dhliwayo

2014

ACRONYMS

GNU - Government of National Unity

GNUs - Governments of National Unity

UN - United Nations

SADC - Southern African Development Community

ZANU PF - Zimbabwean African National Union-Patriotic Front

MDC - Movement for Democratic Change

ZCTU - Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions

GPA - Global Political Agreement

AU - African Union

PNU - Party of National Unity

ODM - Orange Democratic Movement

CODESA - Convention for a Democratic South Africa

IGNU - Interim Government of National Unity

MDC-T - Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai

MDC-M - Movement for Democratic Change-Mutambara

IBAHRI - International Bar Association's Human Rights Institute

CISOMM - Civil Society Monitoring Mechanism

AG - Attorney General

NSC - National Security Council

COPAC - Constitution Parliamentary Affairs Select Committee

FDI - Foreign Direct Investment

NP - National Party

IFP - Inkatha Freedom Party

FPTP - First-past-the-post

MMP - Mixed member proportional

NEPAD - The New Partnership for Africa's Development

APRM - African Peer Review Mechanism

ACDEG - African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance

SADC PGGDE - SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections

OAU - Organisation of African Unity

IMF - International Monetary Fund

AR - African Renaissance

LPA - Lagos Plan of Action

IIAG - Ibrahim Index of African Governance

OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

APSA - African Peace and Security Architecture

PSC - Peace and Security Council

PRC - Permanent Representatives' Council

ASF - African Standby Force

EWS - Continental Early Warning System

ZEC - Zimbabwe Electoral Commission

ZHRC - Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission

JSC - Judicial Service Commission

ZGC - Zimbabwe Gender Commission

ZMC - Zimbabwe Media Commission

NPRC - National Peace and Reconciliation Commission

IDASA - Institute for Democracy in Africa

ZLHR - Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights

MISA - Media Institute of Southern Africa

POSA - Public Order Security Act

AIPPA - Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act

UL – University of Limpopo

USD - United States Dollar

ABSTRACT

Debate on GNU centres around whether or not as a tool/plan/strategy it promotes, cultivates and fosters democracy in situations where there is lack there-of. In other words does a GNU create the conditions or environment necessary for the establishment of democracy? Various studies have shown that GNU is popular as a conflict-resolution tool and that in countries where it has been employed, it has resulted in the successful cessation of violent conflict. This study explores GNU to find out how successful it was in democratic entrenchment in Zimbabwe. It revealed through interviews and secondary sources that in Zimbabwe GNU managed to bring together antagonistic political contenders to work together for the restoration of peace and democracy and nation-building. GNU did not however, guarantee permanent solution of the crisis. In other words there were other significant issues which could not simply be resolved through a GNU. Finally the study further explored the different reasons for GNU inability to resolve those issues in Zimbabwe.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation hereby submitted to the University of Limpopo, for the degree of Master of Arts in International Politics has not previously been submitted by me for a degree at this or any other university; that it is my work in design and in execution, and that all material contained herein has been duly acknowledged.

Tumbare R.D. (Miss)   22 September 2014

DEDICATION

This effort is dedicated to my mum and daddy. I am just but a reflection of who they really are-persons of integrity, honesty, great love, sound values and principles. Because you stand for what is right and just, this research is otherwise your gift to me and I am grateful.

.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE

1. INTRODUCTION

This study is about government of national unity (GNU) as a strategy for democracy. Zimbabwe will be the main referral point. Government of National Unity in situations of political conflict has become common in Africa. It is used as a strategy for creating an environment conducive for democracy. In Kenya, GNU was proffered by the former United Nations (UN) Secretary General Kofi Annan for conflict resolution following the December 2007 disputed Presidential elections. In Rwanda, GNU was employed to end the conflict between the Hutus and Tutsis after the genocide in the early 1990s. Former South African President Thabo Mbeki employed it for resolving the Zimbabwean crisis after being appointed mediator in 2007 by the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

To what extent is this strategy successful when used in situations of political crisis? Does it ultimately foster and cultivate democracy? This study seeks to investigate the effectiveness of GNU as a tool for democracy. It asks to what extent the GNU in Zimbabwe has created conditions favourable for democracy?

1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

In order to explore the effectiveness or otherwise of GNU, one has to traverse the history of conflict in Zimbabwe and the conditions that ultimately led to the creation of GNU in that country.

After its first elections in 1980 Zimbabwe held subsequent elections thereby creating the impression of a nation immersed in democracy (Matyszak 2010: ix).The elections were, however, won consistently by President Robert Mugabe and his party, the Zimbabwean African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU PF). Against a backdrop of imploding economy, increasing political and media repression and massive corruption, the authenticity of the "victories" started to be questioned more so by the late 1990s, when the quality and accessibility of basic services such as education and primary health care had plummeted dramatically. The cost of living rose sharply while much of the land lay fallow (Coltard 2008: 44). Thus Fanon's (1968) dictum that post-colonial liberation is nothing but neo-colonialism began to ring true to many Zimbabweans.

Inevitably, the consequent disillusionment led to the formation of a new political party in 1999, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led by former leader of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and later Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai. MDC quickly gained popularity as it vowed to restore democracy and revive the haemorraging economy (Chimbga 2011: 12). In the 2000 parliamentary elections ZANU PF lost seats to MDC for the first time in its history (Coady and Solomon 2012: 3).

Upon realising the potential of the MDC, ZANU PF began to resort to violence, repression and intimidation to gain votes and support (Zimbabwe Elections Support Network Report 2002: 14). Election-related violence and repression became a regular feature of Zimbabwe's political landscape (CommonWealth Observer Group 2002: 9).

By 2005 the security situation had deteriorated to such an extent that UN was forced to intervene. UN looked into 'Operation *Murambatsvina*' in particular. Officially also known as 'Operation Restore Order' was an exercise implemented by the Zimbabwean government and was allegedly aimed at getting rid of illegal housing structures in the country's urban areas. A report compiled by Mrs Anna Tibaijuka later revealed that an estimated 700,000 people had directly lost their homes and sources of livelihood, while another 2.4 million had indirectly been affected by the operation. These included women and children who were without access to food, water, sanitation, health facilities and other services (Tibaijuka 2005: 32)

'Operation *Murambatsvina*' also drove many into exile, more so if they were suspected to be MDC supporters. For its part, MDC believed that "the operation was designed to destroy the party's urban-support- base and relocate people to the rural areas where they would be under the sway of ruling party-aligned chiefs" (Sokwanele Report 2005: 23).

Following the abduction and near fatal torture of Morgan Tsvangirai on 11 March 2007, SADC appointed Thabo Mbeki to facilitate talks aimed at resolving the crisis.

Mbeki's intervention did not significantly lessen the power which ZANU PF had over State institutions. Such vexatious laws as the Electoral Act, Broadcasting Services

Act, Public Order and Security Act were not amended sufficiently to reflect the broader interests of Zimbabweans.

In the run-up to the March 2008 Presidential elections, violence against ZANU PF opponents escalated once again. The announcement of election results was inexplicably delayed. When they were eventually released [after the MDC filed a petition to the High Court] there was no outright winner. Constitutionally this necessitated a Presidential election run-off (Zimbabwe Peace Project 2009:11). According to the Electoral Act [Chapter 2:13] Section 110 (3) and (4), the re-run had to be conducted within twenty one days, which in this case was not going to happen, as the results had been delayed by thirty three days already (Zimbabwe Peace Project 2009: 12). The re-run was scheduled for 27 May 2008.

Sections of the security establishment in the meanwhile had indicated that they were not going to recognise or support any other candidate but Mugabe as winner. The period leading to the run-off date was once again characterised by apparent state sponsored violence and gross human rights abuses (SITO Report 2008: 19).

It was this atmosphere that forced Tsvangirai to withdraw from the race. Threats to his life were so serious that he sought asylum in the Dutch Embassy in Harare. More than two hundred MDC supporters were killed, others gang raped, while a thousand more were forced to flee (Zimbabwe Peace Project 2009: 14).

Mugabe went on to compete in his one-man race. Given that the run-off did not break the political impasse, Mbeki was once again called to help conflicting parties to find an amicable solution. After prolonged and acrimonious talks, he convinced the leaders of a political settlement in the form of the Global Political Agreement (GPA). This led to the creation of a government of national unity. It was intended to be the tool to transport Zimbabwe from its undemocratic past into a new democratic dispensation. Matyszak (2010: 32) argues however that GNUs are just a truce, merely meant to suspend hostilities for a short period.

1.3 RESEARCH PROBLEM

Experience in Africa suggests that governments are being tailor-made to serve the needs of the ruling elites rather than the masses. By contrast democracy is the government of the people by the people and for the people. Democracy thus

connotes a "system of rule of law not individuals" (Hilla University for Humanistic Studies 2004).

Initially it was hoped that the GPA would break the political impasse and lead to democracy. Amongst others it called for a people-driven constitution, referendum, free media, respect for human rights, rule of law, depoliticisation of state institutions and resuscitation of the economy.

During its life was a lot of controversy surrounding the GNU and whether or not it had been successful in implementing the GPA. ZANU PF blamed the MDC for being a stumbling block in the path to establishment of democracy by amongst others failing to convince the West to lift up economic sanctions. MDC on the other hand accused ZANU PF of hampering progress by not honouring the letter and spirit of GPA (Zondi and Bhengu 2011:13-15). Besides these political parties, other observers, for example academics and regional bodies, were sceptical about the wisdom or otherwise of a Zimbabwean GNU. There was no consensus as to whether GNU had fulfilled its mandate or had simply remained what most critics suggested it would be, a betrayal of the will of the people. As Chigora and Guzura (2011: 23) put it, "a government of national unity elevates the state above the will of the people; it is antithetical to democracy."

This study will therefore delve into GNU and explore its successes and failures in the implementation of GPA and establishment of democracy in Zimbabwe. It will endeavour to establish the extent to which the GNU enhanced democratisation in Zimbabwe. It will help to determine whether GNU was the right tool for the establishment of democracy in Zimbabwe or not.

1.4 LITERATURE REVIEW

1.4.1 Democracy

The term democracy is derived from the Greek words '*kratos*' and *'demos'* which means rule/power and people respectively (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997: 10). Loosely translated the word democracy means rule by the people. For Saward (1998:7) it refers to "a political act" implying that it can be interpreted to mean and suit the interests of the one who defines it. Ober (2008: 3) concurs when he states

that, democracy has come to mean very different things to different people. However there are some generally agreed principles that govern democracy.

According to Heywood (2007: 72) these have to do with the general will or collective will, rather than individual will. Most conceptions of democracy are based on the principle of 'government by the people', meaning the people get to govern themselves when they participate in crucial decision-making that shapes their lives and determines the fate of their society. This participation can either be direct or indirect.

Direct democracy involves the unmediated and continuous participation of citizens in the tasks of government. This can be achieved through a form of governance by a mass meeting as seen in ancient Athens and in more modern societies through the use of the referendum. This form of democracy is also referred to as classical democracy (Heywood 2007: 73). However, the advent of the enlarged modern political community made direct democracy impossible to implement (Gitonga, 1987:12) and necessitated a new kind of democracy, known as representative democracy (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997: 11).

In indirect or representative democracy regular citizen participation is infrequent and is limited to the process of voting every few years. The public do not exercise power themselves; rather they choose who will rule on their behalf (Heywood 2007: 74). They elect officials to make political decisions, formulate laws and administer programmes on their behalf (Menocal, 2007: 1). The elected officials are expected to work according to rules, procedures and regulations established by the people (Gitonga, 1987: 11). This, therefore, means that the people are exercising their power through representatives or agents of their choice. However representative democracy does have its setbacks. Due to its reliance on elections as a method of legitimising the representatives, very often, dictators and single-party regimes have sought popular support by using elections to "claim the mantle of democracy" (Bureau of International Information Programs, ud:1). Consequently, the rights of the elite are upheld at the expense of those of the poor and the marginalised (Garman, 2010: 3). In this regard representative democracy has the inclination to become rule of the elite/politician rather than rule of the people.

Due to the ambiguity of the concept, there are a number of models of democracy, each offering its own version of popular rule. Classical democrats believe in the participation of citizens in issues of governance. This in Ancient Athens was ensured through public and mass meetings in which at least 500 citizens participated (Heywood 2007: 76). However, this model would not be applicable today as it could disenfranchise women who make up the bulk of the population. In that regard it could not entirely be regarded as a form of democracy as it restricted citizen participation.

Supported by early liberals like John Locke, protective democracy on the other hand focused more on the protection of citizen's inalienable rights from possible encroachment by government rather than citizen involvement. However, the right to property ownership and voting which are fundamental in this model restricted it to the elite who in any case were the property owners (Heywood 2007: 77-78).

Developmental democracy allows for the inclusion of individuals and community at large in issues of governance and at the same time attempts to develop the individual by allowing participation in public affairs regardless of social standing (Heywood 2007: 78). John Stuart Mill supported developmental democracy as it ensured personal development. In this case he advocated for universal franchise which left out the illiterate; those he believed were not knowledgeable and reasonable enough to participate in public affairs (Heywood 2007: 79).

A more sustainable and universal definition of democracy could be that of deliberative democracy or parliamentary democracy for it allows contestation of ideas/views, leading to clarity on the basis of disagreement. That way deliberative democracy brings people into accord with one another. Some people will have misunderstood relevant facts or might not have seen the likely consequence of proposed policies. Once there is clarity through deliberation, negotiation and compromise, all involved are likely to reconsider, thus bringing about accord (Davis 1999: 162). Sustein (2001: 117) compliments the deliberative stance by suggesting that democracy should not simply be the rule of the majority, or high responsiveness to popular will, but rather a combination of political accountability and a high degree of reflectiveness and a general commitment to reason-giving.

Although there continues to be controversy about which is the most desirable form of democracy, much of contemporary debate revolves around how democracy works in practice and what democratisation implies (Heywood 1997: 81). This reflects the fact that there is broad acceptance of a particular model of democracy generally termed liberal (deliberative/parliamentary) democracy. Despite the existence of competing tendencies within liberal democracy, certain central features are clear;

- A political system for choosing and replacing the government through free and fair elections,
- the active participation of the people as citizens in politics and civic life,
- protection of human rights, and
- rule of law in which the laws and procedures apply equally to all citizens (Hilla University for Humanistic Studies lecture in 2004).

For Matheba (2000: 2) we could add, democracy connotes, "periodic elections, multipartyism, pluralism, civil liberties, division of power, free mass media, apolitical army and free enterprise system."

To Zuern (2009: 586) democracy should not be viewed as an end it-self but a means or an instrument to bring about a certain end. For him there are four basic ends/goals of democracy namely;

- accountable rulers,
- actively participating citizens,
- open society, and
- social justice.

Likoti in Sharamo and Ayangafac (2011: 14) argues that for democracy to flower, certain conducive (ideal) conditions should prevail. These include peace, people-centered development, low levels of violence, development of political contestation, co-operation that cuts across subcultures, acceptance of electoral outcomes, political trust, a belief in compromise and the legitimacy of democratic institutions. As such Przeworski (in Shapiro and Hacker-Cordon (eds) (1999: 33) concurs and adds that democracy really is a set of rules that provides for resolution of conflict without bloodshed. Popper (1962: 21) summed these arguments by saying that it is only in a democracy that citizens are able to dismiss government from office without violence.

In light of the above, elections are important tools of democracy. They are central to transforming conflict situations, establishing democratic regimes and achieving peace (Zubairu 2011: 235). Elections validate political authority by legitimising it.

In the West achieving democracy through free and fair elections has been buttressed further by, inter alia, separating government powers, granting parliament oversight role over the executive and allowing for critical public opinion (Hensley 2001: 90).

Nonetheless it is important to note that by themselves elections do not guarantee democracy. Elections can be both a source of peace as well as conflict. To this end Matlosa (2011: 6) described them as "double-edged". Reeler in Matyszak (2010: vii) argued that the primary mechanism for thwarting progress towards democracy has too frequently been elections. The presence or absence of democracy has too frequently been judged by the number of 'free and fair' elections that any given country has held which led Diamond (2008: 12) to lament about the "fallacy of electoralism". Very often dictators and single-party regimes use elections for the accreditation of their illegitimacy. It is only when the quality of the electoral process is observed that elections can assist in entrenching democracy (Matlosa 2011: 5).

Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Neto (2000: 40) rightly sum it when they argue that open political competition on its own cannot truly be democracy until and unless one party has surrendered power to another upon losing a national election.

In the light of the above Ake (1993: 38) argued for African democracy. He stated that, "democratization is not something that one people does for another. People must do it for themselves or it does not happen." He further argued that

> the process towards democracy must be shaped by the singular reality that those whose democratic participation is at issue are the ordinary people of Africa...If, however, African democracy follows the line of least resistance to Western liberalism, it will achieve only the democracy of alienation(1993: 240).

By this Ake called for a shift from abstract political rights and for a stress on economic rights. Whereas Western liberal democracy emphasises political rights, he proposed a shift to social and economic rights, from economic inequality to acceptance of economic intervention and redistribution of economic wealth. While scholars like him argued that the redress of economic and social rights will inevitably

8

lead to greater legal and political rights, the West by contrast argues that redress of political rights will inevitably lead to greater social and economic rights. It is apparent that Ake's ideas on democracy are subsumed within the universal principles of democracy mentioned earlier thus we can safely conclude that African democracy is not radically different from Western democracy.

Whether under African or Western democracy, power is usually decentralised and government decisions are a result of negotiation and deliberation by various stakeholders or what Davis (1999: 157) terms "deliberating groups." No single element/organ of the state holds all sovereign power. An elected government is simply the official representative of voters made possible by an environment characterised by, inter alia, free press and multiple parties. In other words all stakeholders are legitimate actors in the political process.

1.4.2 GNU vs Coalition government

Government of National Unity (GNU) is a power-sharing government made up of different and opposing political parties as a strategy for addressing conflict.

According to Mapuva (2010: 249) "GNU denotes a system where two political foes come to a consensus to bury the hatchet and work together." It has been seen to work best in countries polarised by political strife. GNU unites people of different ethnic groups, tribes and political ideologies to work together for the common good of the nation (Mapuva 2010: 250). As such GNU is a political tool that could be employed to suspend hostilities in times of disagreement, thereby bringing about a truce (Matyaszak 2010: 37).

Chigora and Guzura (2011: 21) reiterated Mapuva by opining that at a very basic level "GNU is a coalition government, designed specifically to accommodate all participating political players in governmental structures". This includes, the civil service, cabinet, diplomatic posts and so on. Conflict arose from the exclusion of key political players in structures and processes of national governance. The assumption therefore is that the participation of other stakeholders will diminish the potential for conflict and enhance prospects for national stability, integration and development.

GNUs are often a result of mediation efforts following grievances over election results. They are arrangements that seek to manage conflict by bringing opposing

parties together with the aim of quelling violence and establishing acceptable solutions to disputing parties (Maina 2011: 2).

Following the 2007 Kenyan Presidential elections, violence broke out in various parts of the country and led to the death of 1220 people, 3600 injuries and internally displaced 300 000 people (OHCR Report, 2008).The former United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Anan, mediated in this conflict under the auspices of the African Union (AU). This mediation ended the conflict through a political agreement. The latter led to the formation of a GNU with Mwai Kibaki of the Party of National Unity (PNU) as President and Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) as Prime Minister of Kenya respectively.

In 2008 a similar agreement was reached after election dispute in Zimbabwe. Mediation efforts by the former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki brought political opponents, ZANU PF and MDC, to the negotiations table. The outcome was the GPA of 15 September 2008 which resulted in the GNU (Maina 2011: 4).

It is important to note that while recent examples of GNUs came out of election disputes this has not always been the case. Power sharing is a longstanding conflict resolution strategy. In South Africa, for example, GNU was formed immediately after the end of apartheid. Another example is that of Liberia's Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU). The latter was established with a clear mandate of bringing about political transition in July 1997 (Maina 2011: 2). In 1978-79 there was a similar arrangement (the so-called Zimbabwe-Rhodesia) which was essentially a union of the Ian Smith regime and the so-called progressive nationalists led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa. While it did not last for long, this government did however pave the way for the Lancaster House negotiations, which culminated in Zimbabwe's independence (Chigora and Guzura 2011: 20).

GNU is thus a broad coalition government comprising of major political parties usually formed in times of crisis (Dzimiri 2011: 12). It is not voter-initiated but rather imposed due to some political imperatives of the day.

GNUs are different from coalition governments in principle and intent. While a GNU may arise out of dispute for power, coalitions by contrast arise and comprise of several political parties brought together by a realisation that certain goals cannot be

achieved while working separately. In other words, though such political parties may have obtained some electoral support it may not be enough to assure self - sustainability.

Whether done before or after elections, Oyugi (2006: 1) argues that coalitions (whether in Presidential, Parliamentary or Mixed systems) are usually a manifestation of the absence of a dominant party capable of controlling the majority in a legislative assembly. This then forces political parties to enter into alliances in the hope that in so doing they will stand a better chance of winning and constituting a working majority in parliament. It is thus a formal agreement between two or more parties that involves a cross-party distribution of ministerial portfolios (Heywood 2007: 288). A GNU is unelected while a coalition is elected. In light of the above, the unelected nature of a GNU does not discredit it as a form of government. Given the unusual circumstances under which they are formed, GNUs are preceded by a political logjam. In this study, a GNU refers to a transitional government consisting of major contestants following disputed elections.

1.5 DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

Given the contentious nature of certain key terms, their meaning and definition will be clarified for the purposes of this study.

1.5.1 Democracy

Democracy is where power is decentralised and government decisions are a result of negotiation and deliberation amongst various stakeholders including the citizenry (Zubairu 2011: 235). Credible elections determine winners and losers.

1.5.2 Government of National Unity (GNU)

GNU refers to a transitional government consisting of major contestants following disputed elections (Maina 2012: 2).

1.6 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

1.6.1 Aim

The aim of the study is to assess whether or not GNU as a strategy has been successful in creating conditions propitious for democracy in Zimbabwe.

1.6.2 Objectives

The objectives of the study are:

- To investigate the usefulness of GNU as a tool for fostering democracy in Zimbabwe,

- To explore how GNU has or not alleviated the political crisis in Zimbabwe, and

- To assess the successes or failures of GNU in Zimbabwe.

1.7 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. Was the formation of the GNU the panacea to the political ills of Zimbabwe?
2. Has the GNU been successful in fulfilling its mandate of creating conditions conducive for democracy in Zimbabwe?
3. What is the relationship between the GNU and democracy, if any?

1.7.1 Assumption

Events in Zimbabwe suggested that the GNU was essentially elite-driven, thus, unlikely to breakdown the political logjam in that country and establish conditions necessary for democracy.

1.7.2 Theoretical Framework

The study employs a utilitarian theory to explore and analyse the research problem. The theory dates back to the days of Aristotle and John Locke but in the 1730s Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) made far-reaching inputs and laid its basic tenets "of greatest good for the greater number". John Stuart Mill (1808 – 1873) developed the theory further to distinguish between the quantity and quality of good (Richards 1999: 1).

The underlying principles of the theory are embedded in the philosophical and moral claim that the 'greatest good/happiness should be for the greatest number of people.' It holds that the moral worth of an action is determined by its resulting outcome. As such, lying is not bad but useful if it is going to save the lives of the greatest number of people (Richards 1999: 2).

Bentham's notion held that a decision should bring about the greatest good for the greatest number. He was concerned with the aggregate value of good. If the outcome of a decision benefits the greatest number then the means is justified (Lotito 2002: 35). Bentham's ideas are premised on the notion that the end justifies the means (thus Machiavellian in nature). They are implicitly quantitative as well.

The theory has been criticised for being partial in that it disregards the minority [for the simple reason that the greatest number implies majority]. Scholars like Ryan (2010: 425) have also accused Bentham of simple-mindedness for his theory has, "too few thoughts and feelings to match the world as it really is."

Though Mill agreed with Bentham he differed with him in his conception of the nature of "good". Whereas Bentham's "good" was quantitative in nature for Mill good was "qualitative". For him (Mill) the greatest good is relative in that, quantity is never better than quality. The majority, he argued, might prefer a 'good' that is not necessarily rational. Thus he advocated for deliberation on quality regardless of the greatest number involved. Implicitly this suggested that to assess the utility value of a decision or action, one had to consider whether the outcome was the best possible (Lotito 2002: 37).

According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, utilitarianism is an effort to provide an answer to the practical question "what ought a man to do"? The answer should then be "he ought to act so as to produce the best consequence possible." This suggests that utilitarianism should be a guide for government action and code of conduct. For instance, at government level "what ought the government to do?" the answer should be "select policies which would reduce the overall harm" (www.webs.wofford.edu). It is clear then that the notion can be stretched to broader issues of governance. In this vein one might conclude that as a political strategy GNU should be investigated on the quality of its outcomes. Thus the utility value of a GNU should be based on the outcome of issues that it is meant to address.

Though utilitarianism should be identified with the achievement and satisfaction of the goals and desires people have, Mill would add that provided that those are rational.

Critics might argue that GNU finds resonance with the elitist theory propagated by well-renowned American scholar, Wright Mills, because of its tendency to accommodate opposing political contenders while disregarding the electorate. In his theory Mills (1956: 274) argued that government exemplifies the elite in that power is held by a small group of people. To understand democracy, Mills further opined that one has to realise that the masses in actual fact wield very little power.

He argued that functionally power lies in the hands of a triumvirate of elites and groups spread across economic, political and military institutions. He claimed that they govern and make decisions for everyone in a nation-state. They are deemed to know what is good and beneficial for the masses by virtue of their position and resources at their command. Whereas the elites are informed, sensible and considerate, the masses by contrast are ill-informed, apathetic and intolerant (Mills 1956: 274).

Elitism applies to the Zimbabwean GNU because the masses there were never consulted about the suitability of that form of government for their country. In GNU the voice of ordinary Zimbabweans did not seem to matter and their participation was limited. But its utilitarian value derives from the fact that GNU was meant to end hostilities and politically motivated violence which impacted more on the citizenry than the political elites. Achieving peace and stability is thus ultimately for the greatest good of all Zimbabweans.

Be that as it may, theories employed for this study are not without their limitations. For example as earlier noted, utilitarianism tends to be simplistic in its explanation of how decisions can be rationalised. Again utilitarianism as a theory has rather conflicting elements. While theorists like Bentham argue that the utility value of an action is determined by the number of people it benefits, Mill argues that the rationality of an action is more critical than the number of people benefiting from it. For the purposes of this study both approaches by Bentham and Mill will be employed because as earlier highlighted achieving peace and stability is ultimately for the greatest good of all Zimbabweans.

1.8 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN

1.8.1 Methodology

Against the back drop of utilitarianism as a theoretical and methodological guide, this study uses the qualitative research method to explore the GNU and expatiate on its employment as a tool for democracy in countries where it is lacking. The study seeks to establish how Zimbabweans perceive the GNU and their attitudes towards it. In particular it seeks to establish how useful or effective the GNU was as a tool for entrenching democracy in Zimbabwe. That is to say did GNU manage to establish an environment conducive for democracy?

Utilitarianism is premised on the notion that the worth of an action/decision, namely the GNU, can be determined by its outcome. If the outcome of an action results in the greater good, then its use is justified (Lotito 2002: 35). The study seeks to assess to what extent the GNU has achieved or not achieved the set outcomes.

1.8.2 Research design

Research design is a blueprint or plan for conducting a study and it describes how, where and when data are to be collected and analysed. The design is thus, the logical sequence that connects the empirical data to a study's initial research questions and ultimately to its conclusions (Burns and Grove 2003:195, Parahoo 1997: 142 and Creswell 2007: 42). The procedure in this study will be an exploratory single case study of GNU in Zimbabwe.

Case study is a research strategy which focuses on understanding the dynamics present within single settings. It tries to illuminate on a decision or a set of decisions; why they were taken, how they were implemented and with what result. In other words it is an empirical inquiry that investigates or explores a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context (Yin 2003: 33). The current study tries to illuminate, investigate and explore the GNU in Zimbabwe as a strategy for establishing conditions favourable for democracy.

According to Yin (2003: 34) the purpose of exploratory case studies is to gain insight into a situation, person or community. The intention is not to produce statistical data but to build a foundation of general ideas and tentative theories that can be explored later with more precise and complex research design (Grinnell 1993: 119, Bless and Higson-Smith 1995: 142).

Case study does have the limitation of providing insight on one theme or idea and cannot be used to represent a wider population. Of significance however, is the appreciation that the case study which is the Zimbabwean GNU in this instance does not represent a sample. Its goal is to expand and generalise theories and not to enumerate frequencies. In other words the case study method does a generalising as opposed to particularising analysis (Yin 2003: 34).

1.8.3 Population and Sampling

1.8.3.1 Population

Burns and Grove (2003: 213) defined population as all the elements that meet the criteria for inclusion in a study, while Babbie (2002: 109) referred to the population sample as that group which is viewed as the most appropriate for data collection.

In light of this study this refers to that group of people or organisations that have knowledge or information about political trends in Zimbabwe such that they are familiar with the current political developments of that country. In other words these are people or organisations that will be selected mainly for their expertise and closeness to the selected topic of GNU and democracy. The population will include persons or organisations identified as being knowledgeable, passionate or actively involved in the political matters of Zimbabwe regardless of being citizens or non-citizens and regardless of being situated in or outside the country.

Due to inadequate resources and time constraints only those people or organisations within the proximity of the researcher will be targeted. This means those in areas around the Limpopo Province of South Africa and the Manicaland and Harare Provinces of Zimbabwe. These will include members of parliament, ministers, human rights lawyers, academics, political analysts, state institutions and non-partisan organisations especially from civil society. For lessening bias and creating relative balance, data will also be collected from ordinary Zimbabweans.

Ordinary Zimbabweans refer to that group of people selected by virtue of being citizens of Zimbabwe regardless of their in-depth knowledge of political developments in the country. Ordinary Zimbabweans will however be limited to the migrant population in the Mankweng Township area of Limpopo as these are

geographically closer to the researcher. Given that their legal status can be potentially sensitive, permission to interview and interact with was sought from the local office of the Department of Home Affairs. Cognisant of the fact that not all of them may have entered SA legally and for their personal safety in Zimbabwe as well, the study took every possible precaution not to expose them to any harm.

1.8.3.2 Sampling process

Burns and Grove (2003: 31) defined sampling as a process of selecting a group of people, events, or behaviour with which to conduct a study. The study employed a purposeful sampling method. The goal with these samples is however not to produce a representative sample but rather to reflect diversity.

Qualitative samples are purposive because of the need to explore GNU and obtain the most relevant information. Parahoo (1997: 232) describes purposive sampling as "a method of sampling where the researcher deliberately chooses who to include in the study based on their ability to provide necessary data." Qualitative samples for that reason will consist of "key-informants" as they are "information rich" (Lodico, Spaulding and Voegtle 2010). The term key-informants refer to persons who have specialist knowledge, are passionate about political trends or actively involved in the political developments of the Zimbabwean GNU. These will assist the researcher to gain insight into the GNU.

They will be drawn from civil society and state institutions and will include two Members of Parliament, two Cabinet Ministers, two political analysts, two human rights lawyers, two academics and two students of Political Science and its related disciplines. To limit bias and partisanship, an equal number of key informants will be interviewed or sampled from all political parties in the GNU. Thus both a ZANU PF member of parliament and an MDC member of parliament will be interviewed. Likewise two ministers, each from ZANU PF and MDC respectively will be interviewed. Three organisations represented by relevant persons will also be interviewed. Extra effort will be made to find neutral but informative sources by including within the sample, key informants such as non-partisan organisations for example, the Institute for Democracy in Africa (IDASA) and Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights.

Purposeful sampling will also be used for ordinary Zimbabweans. This sample consists of Zimbabweans living in Mankweng, Limpopo. The purpose of obtaining data from these is to capture their views and attitudes accordingly. The legal standing of respondents and their immigration status in SA will neither be questioned nor interfered with, as doing so is beyond the purpose of this study.

1.8.3.4 Sample size

Holloway and Wheeler (2002: 128) assert that in qualitative research sample size does not influence the quality or importance of the study and that there are no guidelines in determining sample size. Qualitative researchers do not normally know the number of people in the research beforehand; the sample may change in size and type during research. Sampling will go on until saturation had been achieved, namely when no new information is generated (Holloway 1997: 142).

1.8.4 Data Collection

1.8.4.1 Anticipated problems during data collection

According to Polit et al (2001: 235) personal characteristics of participants may influence their responses to questions resulting in social desirability, extremeness and acquiescence. Explanation of the purpose of the study as well assurances of confidentiality will be useful in reducing the above traits.

Before actual interviews the researcher will practise how to use a tape recorder in order to prevent and minimise problems in the collection and capture of data.

Reflexivity, according to Parahoo (1997: 292), is a continuous process whereby researchers reflect on their preconceived values and those of the participants. It helps researchers to self-monitor as well as reduce bias while increasing objectivity. To avoid bias and prejudice the researcher will (1) avoid asking leading questions and (2) maintain an open approach during interviews and while analysing the findings.

1.8.4.2 Data Collection Process

Interviews and document analysis will be used in data collection. An interview refers to an occasion for constructing, not merely discovering or conveying information

(Nieuwenhuis, 2007: 87). Interviews have the advantage of engaging the participants on a deeper and active mental level while questionnaires or surveys tend to result in participants remaining detached, apathetic and answering questions in the most perfunctory way. For this reason, open-ended questions in the form of an interview guide will be used to solicit opinions and obtain information. Interviews will be conducted in a language comfortable for the participant.

A tape recorder will be used to capture responses. These will in turn be transcribed and later coded into relevant themes to form a research portfolio. Participants will be also asked to corroborate their responses thus ensuring trustworthiness of the findings. Mindful of the security situation in Zimbabwe, use of a tape recorder will be discontinued in cases where participants are uncomfortable with the method. Written Notes will be taken in such instances. As mentioned earlier the legal standing of respondents and their status in SA will neither be questioned nor interfered with, as doing so will be beyond the scope of this study.

1.8.5 Data Analysis

The collected data will be analysed using thematic content analysis (TCA). The latter is an interpretive process in which data are systematically searched for patterns to provide an illuminating description of the phenomenon (Tesch 1990: 1). This results in the development of meaningful themes without explicitly generating theory.

Under TCA meanings from extracted statements will be formulated then clustered into themes to provide full meaning of perceptions and experiences. This approach will aid in addressing the aims and objectives of the study and provide rich insights into Zimbabwean GNU.

1.8.6 Ethical Considerations

Participants will be informed of the aim and how their contributions will aid achieve the objectives of the study. Participants will also be informed of their right to withdraw whenever they deem it necessary. The researcher will not engage in activities that neither threaten the physical nor emotional wellbeing of participants, hence the use of pseudo names to ensure anonymity.

The researcher will seek permission to interact with Zimbabwean migrants from the Department of Home Affairs in Polokwane. All responses will be strictly confidential. Honesty and integrity will be displayed throughout the study. During interviews in both SA and Zimbabwe and for personal safety reasons, the researcher will carry at all times a letter in her person duly signed by relevant University of Limpopo (UL) authorities   about her status and purpose of the study.

CHAPTER TWO

2. INTRODUCTION

Following the violent and disastrous 2008 elections, SADC intervened to find lasting peace in Zimbabwe. That intervention led to a Global Political Agreement (GPA). The latter is essentially a power-sharing arrangement in terms of which a new government of national unity was created. In turn GNU was mandated to initiate a national process that would eventually culminate in a new constitution; henceforth signaling a new peaceful and democratic era for Zimbabwe. This process was supported and endorsed by the AU and other international organisations.

It is against this background that this Chapter analyses the 2008 GPA and the extent to which GNU implemented it. In essence the Chapter seeks to establish whether the GNU in Zimbabwe was a panacea to the country's political ills in particular.

2.1 Background to GNU

From 2000 to 2005 all parliamentary and presidential elections were held under repressive legislative measures. They were all blighted by intimidation and violence, as well as extensive voting irregularities. Thus one cannot claim that they were free and fair.

An opposition party in the form of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was born around this time and immediately began to participate in elections. However, violence did not abate. In fact it intensified and so did well-documented cases of electoral fraud by ZANU-PF (Masamvu, Sims and Mirell 2010: 8).

In November 2005 the MDC split into two factions, the contention being whether or not to boycott the Senate elections. The main faction, led by Tsvangirai, was referred to as MDC-T while the other, led by Arthur Mutambara, was MDC-M.

A report by the International Bar Association's Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI) (2011:11) mentioned that from 2005, the government's domestic policies, such as the forcible clearing of slum areas through Operation Murambatsvina, displaced an estimated 700,000 people from their homes and fanned widespread domestic opposition, particularly in urban areas.

From then on politically inspired violence intensified, targeting MDC and its supporters in particular. Tsvangirai himself was not spared either. In 2005 he was detained for several days. When he came out of police custody he had sustained various injuries, including a fractured skull. Another well-known incident was that of Sekai Holland, a 66-year-old grandmother and MDC activist, who suffered multiple fractures in police custody and was unable to walk for months (Allamok, Egyesult and Congress, 2008: 603).

It was at this time that regional and international organisations stepped into the Zimbabwean fray to quell those political temperatures (IBAHRI, 2011: 12).This intervention led to the GPA and the subsequent GNU. At this point an exploration of Mbeki and the role he played in the formation of the GNU is necessary as it can lead to an understanding of the some of the challenges within GNU.

2.1.2 Mbeki's quiet diplomacy vis a vis formation of GNU

While it was clear that a fair mediator was critical in aiding the end of antagonism between political parties in Zimbabwe and proffering a solution to the crisis in that country, Thabo Mbeki in his role as facilitator and his foreign policy for the Zimbabwean situation was found wanting. Critics argue that way before he facilitated talks which led to GNU in Zimbabwe, Thabo Mbeki had long shown signs of how he was pro-ZANU PF and anti-MDC.

In his open letter to the ANC in December 2003 Mbeki explicitly revealed his stance and unwavering support for the Mugabe-led government when he writes, "In his book Diplomacy, Dr Henry Kissinger discusses the place of the issue of human rights in

the East–West struggle during the Cold War. He writes that Reagan and his advisers invoked (human rights) to try to undermine the Soviet system. It is clear that some within Zimbabwe and elsewhere in the world, including our country, are following the example set by 'Reagan and his advisers', to 'treat human rights as a tool' for overthrowing the government of Zimbabwe and rebuilding Zimbabwe as they wish. In modern parlance, this is called regime change" (Matyszak 2010: 1). In that regard quiet diplomacy happened to be the strongest option for the South African government and Mbeki in so far as the Zimbabwean crisis was concerned. Mbeki 's quiet diplomacy reflected a combination of factors among which was Mbeki's penchant for avoiding confrontation and his attempt to, as much as possible, "fudge both issues and their solutions"(Matheba in Jacques and Lesetedi (eds) 2005: 85).

This approach by Mbeki generated a lot of debate and won him many harsh critics. They argued that by failing to call Mugabe to order by way of asking him to relinquish power to the opposition leader Tsvangirai, Mbeki went contrary to the such principles of the AU Constitutive Act which discourage the usurp of power and violation of rights of citizens (Matheba in Jacques and Lesetedi (eds) 2005: 86). Throughout his term as facilitator of dialogue Mbeki refused to address and speak out against abuses and crimes against humanity. Instead he chose to call on 'all parties' to refrain from violence even when there is clear documentation showing that the violence is perpetrated almost exclusively by ZANU(PF) supporters (Matyszak 2010: 2). Furthermore he blocked any criticism or proposed actions against Zimbabwe in international forums citing that the Zimbabwe issue must be resolved 'by Zimbabweans'.

It was such conduct by Mbeki that players within the GNU were constantly at loggerheads and bickering. While MDC felt the political ground on which GNU operated was uneven right from the beginning, ZANU PF felt that it was the country's sovereign right to deal with its problems and not rely on external players. It should also be noted that while Mbeki's quiet diplomacy was not without its detractors it was however, essentially a containment strategy whose major preoccupation was to get belligerents to settle their differences by entering into a peace pact for the benefit of the citizenry rather than political contenders (Landsberg in Venter and Landsberg (eds) 2006: 262).

2.2 GPA and GNU

GPA essentially sought to resolve the intractable political governance issues and other pressing economic problems bedeviling Zimbabwe. In a way the intention was to cultivate a new culture of tolerance and democracy in the country. Towards this end, all principal players pledged to "work together to create a genuine, viable, permanent, sustainable and nationally acceptable solution…and chart (a) new political direction for the country" (GPA Preamble).

The GPA laid out a framework for a new inclusive government and constitution, a roadmap for the GNU. It addressed procedural and substantive dimensions of governance, including the *modus operandi* of achieving the set objectives. GPA set out a framework for an inclusive government that would create an environment conducive for free and fair elections. Although GPA had its limitations, it was nevertheless a potential solution to political and economic problems bedeviling Zimbabwe (Civil Society Monitoring Mechanism CISOMM 2009). While it provided a framework for success it was not clear whether GNU as an implementing agency could realise its vision and mission.

2.3 GNU - restructuring of government

Article 20 of GPA stated that the parties acknowledged that they have an obligation to establish a framework of working together in an inclusive government; accepting that the formation of such a government will have to be approached with great sensitivity, flexibility and willingness to compromise; recognising that the formation of such a government would express the hopes and aspirations of Zimbabweans (Biti, 2010: 20). In light of this, GNU should create conditions for returning Zimbabwe to stability and prosperity, based on gender parity, particularly the need to appoint women to strategic Cabinet posts.

2.3.1 Composition of GNU government – The Executive

Under Article 20 of GPA, President Robert Mugabe retained the Executive Presidency (head of State and Government) and portfolios of Commander–in-Chief of the armed forces and chair of Cabinet. Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T) became Prime Minister while Arthur Mutambara (MDC-M) became Deputy Prime Minister. GPA

awarded 16 Cabinet positions to the two MDC formations, while ZANU PF got 15 seats. The executive powers of GNU lie in the President, the Prime Minister and Cabinet (Biti, 2008: 21). The President was therefore required to consult the Prime Minister on all appointments to public office that she/he made. Cabinet includes ministers drawn from all main parties.

Article 20 dealt with probably the most contentious aspect of the GPA. There are two common types of government in modern democracies, namely presidential and parliamentary system. The presidential system is a system whereby an executive branch exists. The head of Executive, President, is also head of State and commander in chief of the armed forces. There is normally a separate election for the President, meaning he/she is directly elected by the people and is head of government. Cabinet is responsible to the President and not the legislature.

By contrast a Parliamentary democracy is characterised by lack of a clear-cut separation of powers between legislative and executive arms of government. In this system there is a clear differentiation between head of government, usually a Prime Minister and a ceremonial head of state who is normally a President. The latter performs largely ceremonial functions. In the case of Zimbabwe GPA introduced a system of government which was closer to what political scientist Maurice Duverger termed semi-presidential (Chimbga 2008: 11).

In France, in instances where the Prime Minister and the President are from different political parties, the Prime Minister directs domestic policy while the president is in charge of foreign policy. Therefore what emerges is a semi-presidential executive where both President and Prime Minister exercise executive powers (Chimbga 2008: 12). In Russia, the Prime Minister nominates cabinet and implements domestic policy while the President directs foreign policy and determines the objectives of both foreign and domestic policy.

In Zimbabwe by contrast, while GPA provided that the Prime Minister shall have executive authority, the actual exercise of this authority was difficult to understand. There was no clear government function outlined as the executive preserve of the Prime Minister either in domestic or foreign policy. The Prime Minister headed and supervised a Council of Ministers which in essence does not differ significantly from

Cabinet (Chimbga 2008: 13). The President was only required to consult the Prime Minister in certain matters, which functionally diluted his/her powers *vis a vis* President. Effectively this lack of precise Prime Minister's role worked out in favour of the President who could subjectively interpret the clauses and act as he/she wished.

Amongst the concerns which GNU had to grapple with was how the judiciary and legislative branches of government became enmeshed with partisan politics. Under ZANU PF rule, distinct boundaries between various arms of government became blurred. Under Mugabe, the judiciary's reputation for independence from the executive branch was compromised. The executive refashioned the courts to conform to its dictates. For example, the office of the Attorney General (AG), according to Hodzi, was using its prosecutorial powers selectively (2011: 5). The constitutional responsibilities of the AG and the fact that he/she was a Presidential appointment and at times held several positions within political party ranks reflects an obvious conflict of interest which neither guaranteed his/her impartiality nor independence in the execution of his/her duties (Hodzi 2011: 6).

GPA, in creating GNU, necessitated the expansion of government. This enlarged government could not be sustained by the economy for long. It was unwieldy as it was cantankerous. For instance Robert Mugabe refused to swear an MDC Cabinet member-designate, Roy Bennet, to become a full member of the Executive (www.zimbabwesituation.com/aug152012.html/#5z).

2.4 Challenges facing the GNU

Years after the signing of GPA, Zimbabwe remained in crisis. The political environment was gravely polarised and was largely characterised by a resurgence of violence, arrests, intimidation and hate speech. According to the IBAHRI Report (2011: 7), the formation of an all-inclusive government, did not make "hard-line elements within the ZANU-PF wish to share power with their political opponents. They continued to usurp power and used their control of state apparatuses in a blatantly partisan way. It became obvious that if political intolerance persisted, free and fair elections would be elusive and democracy entrenchment negated.

2.4.1 Unilateral executive appointments

One of the most contentious issues that confronted GNU was allocation of cabinet, ambassadorial and judicial posts, as well as provincial governorships, which the President undertook unilaterally. The most well-known cases in this regard were those of Gideon Gono and Johannes Tomana as Governor of Reserve Bank and Attorney General respectively. Conferring executive powers on one element was tantamount to murdering unity within GNU.

2.4.2 The Indigenisation Bill

The Minister of Indigenisation Saviour Kasukuwere made headlines about his policy of transferring majority shareholding in all foreign-owned enterprises to Zimbabweans. Though well-intentioned, this policy was condemned by various people, including the Governor of the Reserve Bank. Critics alleged that indigenisation would discourage foreign investment and alienate business. Some further reasoned that the policy could breed further corruption, more so in view of the land invasions and their chaotic aftermaths.

2.4.3 Persistent human rights violations

Another major obstacle was failure by GNU to create an environment where there was respect for human rights and the rule of law. Politically motivated violence was regularly reported as well as unabating land invasions. State security forces that work with proxy forces and surrogates were responsible for the wanton campaign of fear and intimidation. As a result an estimated 300 lives were lost while more than 15,000 human rights violations took place since 2007 onwards. The perpetrators were still at large even though they were known and thought to be ZANU-PF's militia (Mutisi, 2011: 4).

2.4.4 Security sector reform

Though GPA provided for security sector reform, no major reforms came about. A National Security Council (NSC) was created but it was dysfunctional and there was no effective civilian oversight. The security forces remained under tight control of the President and ZANU-PF controlled ministries. ZANU-PF claimed that the security issue was 'off limits' and instructed its negotiators not to deliberate on it as mandated by GPA. The central concern of MDC and large sectors of civil society was that the

security sector continued to undermine both GPA and GNU. In the event that MDC were to win elections, they were worried that the security forces would prevent transfer of power to them (Schneider, 2011:4). Members of the security forces continued to entrench themselves in partisan politics. Lack of far-reaching security sector reform, coupled with the unbridled corruption over the Marange diamond revenue and the opaque indigenisation programme, remained hotly contentious political issues under GNU (www.kubatana.net).

2.4.5 A New Constitution

GPA recognised the "…fundamental right of the Zimbabwean people to make a constitution by themselves and for themselves" It further spelled out a procedure for drafting a new constitution.

At the same time GPA acknowledged the 'Kariba Constitution' which according to the IBAHRI Report was drafted in 2007. That constitution was heavily criticised by civil society groups for "granting the executive unchecked power."

In light of the disquiet over the Kariba Constitution, GPA outlined the process by which a new constitution was to be written. The aim was to avoid as much as possible all the pitfalls and mistakes of the "Kariba Constitution" making process. Thus GPA exhorted that the process should include (1) consultation of Zimbabweans at all levels, (2) followed by further deliberations in a multiparty Constitution Parliamentary Affairs Select Committee (COPAC) and (3) after the parliamentary process, the final step would be a referendum for final approval by the people.

There were considerable delays in the timeframes set out by GPA. COPAC was not established until April 2009, and the constitutional outreach process only started in June 2010 after widely-publicised disputes about funding, including the allowances of COPAC members. The constitutional outreach programme was completed in January 2011 and a target date of 30 September 2011 was set for the referendum. Disappointingly a year passed before a referendum could be held. COPAC set

October 2012 as referendum date while SADC proposed June 2013 as a timetable for parliamentary and presidential elections (www.newzimbabwe.com).

During her visit the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay was told that the general elections would be held without fail in 2012 even without a new constitution. Although not in keeping with the letter and spirit of the GPA, this decision would be necessitated by the slow pace of writing up the constitution (Zimdiaspora 24 May 2012). President Mugabe was quoted as having said that elections "must take place with or without a new constitution …If others don't want to have an election then they are free not to participate" (www.kubatana.net).

In spite of significant strides, there was grave fallout and disagreement among major players over the draft constitution. While the two MDC factions endorsed it, ZANU PF refused to accept it (http://www.dailynews.co.zw). Following the ZANU-PF's marathon politburo meeting of 8 August 2012, the party maintained that it could not accept the document without revision. The party thus had begun pushing hard for amendments despite having agreed and signed the draft on the 18th of July 2012 (www.swradioafrica.com). In so doing, *The Independent* alleged, ZANU PF was virtually re-writing the draft constitution in its own image. Its intention was to overhaul chapters and clauses it disagreed with, in order to restore lost Presidential powers (www.theindependent.co.zw). Gwinyai Dzinesa, a senior researcher at the Institute of Security Studies in South Africa, argued however that perhaps it would be better if the draft constitution were taken to the people to determine whether it truly reflected their will or not (www.thenewage.co.za).

It remained to be seen how SADC would react to these developments. The June 2012 Luanda, Angola, Extraordinary Summit urged Zimbabwean parties to finalise the constitution-making process and subject it to a referendum. They further urged parties to develop an implementation mechanism with time-frames for the full implementation of the roadmap to elections (www.thenewage.co.za).

2.4.6 The Economy

Critics said that it was not out of reason or kindness that ZANU PF agreed to the GNU arrangement. It did so in the hope that through Tsvangirai, who was regarded as a puppet of the West, the country's economy, would rebound. They had hoped

that he would lure foreign direct investment (FDI) and resuscitate the economy. They had also hoped that Tsvangirai would convince the international community to lift the economic sanctions on Zimbabwe as well as the individual travel bans on Mugabe and other ZANU PF top officials (www.allafrica.com).

It has to be said that Zimbabwe's economy improved marginally after the installation of GNU. However, economic challenges still persisted and continued to undermine political stability. These include the lack of predictable rules of doing business and the absence of cordial working relations between government and the private sector. Zimbabwe is a country ready to fulfil its potential but this potential cannot be realised because of corruption and inefficiency (www.fingaz.org)

Like neighbouring Botswana, Zimbabwe is endowed with mineral resources which can boost trade and investment and thrust the country on the road to development. But unlike its neighbour where prosperity is shared more broadly among its citizens, Zimbabwe can do better in utilising its economic potential and mineral endowment to accelerate the development of all its citizens and not just the political elite.

A critical factor in the failure of economic development in Zimbabwe was the lack of transparency and accountability. For example, though diamond mining is booming at Marange and Chiadzwa, the national Treasury was receiving only a negligible amount in taxes. Much of the revenue from there was pilfered by those who believed that Zimbabwe belongs to them (www.hrw.org)

The only way around the problem was to construct broad-based relations among Zimbabweans which would then bring about fundamental political changes. There can be no true democracy without economic development.

2.5 GNU Evaluated

It is undeniable that GPA brought about significant changes. It managed to pull Zimbabwe from the political turmoil and fuelled hope for democracy. A draft constitution as well as the reform of repressive laws was testimony to its limited success. In addition, harassment of opposition members decreased substantially since the signing (Schneider 2011).

There was noticeable change within the economic terrain as well. Fiscal sanity was restored while hyperinflation was drastically reduced from a high of 230 million per cent in 2008. Inflation is now estimated at 3%. A great variety of basic commodities are available in most retail shops, while commendable economic growth was recorded (Mutisi 2011: 13).

GNU was however not successful in convincing the international community, the West in particular, to lift economic sanctions and travel bans on certain government officials. Sanctions were employed by ZANU PF to vilify its partners in GNU. They were also not helping to ease the economic burden of many poor Zimbabweans. In fact GNU remained largely dysfunctional because of them.

2.6 Is GNU a panacea to Africa's political ills? Zimbabwe and Kenya GNU compared

Critics are unhappy about GNUs since they allow those who would have lost an election to remain in power. A general comparison of GNUs in contemporary Africa (SA, Kenya and Zimbabwe in particular) is pertinent for understanding the abovementioned argument.

Attaining peace and reconciliation after disputed elections was a rationale for GNU in Zimbabwe and Kenya. Ethnic violence arose after the disputed Presidential elections which many claimed Raila Odinga had won at the expense of incumbent President Mwai Kibaki in 2007. Efforts at peace-making were led by former UN Secretary General Koffi Annan.

In Zimbabwe similar efforts were led by Thabo Mbeki at the behest of SADC. GNU in South Africa was a result of the magnanimous efforts of President Nelson Mandela. These were intended to bring about peace and reconciliation after centuries of racial strife and animosity. In this regard he extended an invitation to the National Party (NP) and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) to rule with him in a new African National Congress (ANC)-led government.

A brief look at the historical background of GNUs amongst the three countries reveals that the Zimbabwean case and Kenya were almost similar in principle. Whereas in these two countries GNU came after massacres from disputed elections,

in SA by contrast, it emanated from a reasonably stable political environment. After the 1994 elections GNU participants NP and IFP were effectively minority parties and lacked political support to upset the political applecart. But Mandela however saw virtue in sharing power with them.

In Zimbabwe and Kenya participants in GNU initially wanted unfettered absolute power (Auittery 2009: 27). The work of GNUs in both countries was characterised by allegations of rampant corruption and mistrust. Odinga and Kibaki did not trust each other and the same can be said about Tsvangirai and Mugabe.

The size of government in both countries was worrying. The Zimbabwean government comprised of 309 members (www.electionguide.org), while Kenya's was made up of 220 members (www.bbc.co.uk). Since each and every member of the executive was entitled to certain privileges and benefits, this had huge financial implications which these struggling economies could ill-afford. GNUs in both countries failed to fully implement the mandate of their respective founding documents. Political actors within those GNUs were trying to discredit each other and accused one another of unwillingness to cooperate. There were reports of persisting violence in Kenya, thereby revealing that GNU failed to calm the tribal and ethnic clashes in that country (www.allafrica.com).

In Zimbabwe political parties were still bickering over the draft constitution and other important matters even when the end of the life-span of the GNU was imminent.

One of the problems in Zimbabwe stemmed from a majoritarian, winner-takes-all system. The majoritarian system used led to a majority government which did not listen to the voice of the minority. Government was centralised and its authority rested on a rigid constitution with a pliant national assembly (legislature).

The electoral system was pragmatically problematic. From independence in 1966 Lesotho used the majoritarian first-past-the-post (FPTP) system to elect public representatives until the political upheavals of the mid-1990s. After the 1998 elections, the winner-take-all electoral method convinced the opposition that the only way to be heard was through violence. The violence that ensued revealed the growing uneasiness within that polity about the exclusive character of the FPTP. Consequently then Prime Minister, Pakalitha Mosisili, saw it expedient to invite

SADC to intervene to resolve that impasse and ease political tension. The consequence of that intervention led, among others, to the adoption of a more enlightened electoral system (Neethling 2000: 2). A mixed member proportional (MMP) system (also referred to as the mixed method model) has since been adopted to elect parliament in that country (Likoti 2009).

Mixed member proportional encompasses elements of both majoritarian and proportional representation and allows smaller parties to have a voice in government. According to Hague and Harrop (2007: 17) MMP works in such a way that the choices expressed by voters are used to elect representatives using two different systems. The proportional representation system is used to compensate for the disproportionality in results from the majoritarian system. MMP incorporates the good elements of both systems and thereby promotes inclusivity rather than exclusivity. The model is not without its limitations, though. For example, it cannot create consensus around national issues. But on the strength of MMP, Lesotho now enjoys relative political stability.

Though the experiences of Lesotho cannot be replicated, Zimbabwe's political turbulence can perhaps be eased by, among others, electoral reforms that foster inclusivity and democracy (Matlosa, 2004: 95).

2.7 Conclusion

In this Chapter it has been argued that GNU has managed to bring about a number of positive changes in Zimbabwe. But as a tool for fostering democracy in particular, GNU has not been an unqualified success.

CHAPTER THREE

3. INTRODUCTION

This Chapter seeks to explore democracy, specifically as it relates to the case-study. In this regard regional and international guidelines and best practices on democracy will be explored to possibly help Zimbabwe out of its current political turmoil. For this reason, the study will lay bare a number of AU and other documents on democracy.

Though at independence Zimbabwe attempted to institutionalise democracy, some three decades later, mainly due to a series of deleterious decisions and the conduct of the ruling party, political tolerance and freedom remain elusive in that country (Olaleye 2006: 1).

To better appreciate and understand the democracy deficit in Zimbabwe or how far behind the country has gone in frustrating the ideals enshrined in several regional and international policy documents to which it subscribes or has done so in the past, this Chapter will analyse the AU Constitutive Act, The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) and SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (SADC PGGDE). Collectively these instruments postulate that democracy is more than periodic elections. For it to take

root, democracy requires the creation of State institutions that ensure that there are free and fair electoral practices, accountability, inclusiveness, transparency, gender equality, tolerance and respect for diversity (Olaleye 2006: 1).

Taken together we can argue that these instruments provide AU member-states with broad guidelines or normative framework on democracy. On its own and by itself this framework cannot suffice unless these states create matching national institutions to cultivate democracy. Thus for democracy to flower in Africa matching institutions should be created and safeguarded to entrench it. It is for this reason that the relevant governing institutions in Zimbabwe will be evaluated particularly to determine whether in their current state they are suitable for cultivating democracy in the country. At the same time the study will analyse how various elements of civil society can assist in creating a culture of political tolerance.

3.1 Normative Framework for democracy

Essentially this refers to a body of ideas, aims and objectives which guide the AU in its quest to create a new governance ethos in Africa. For this purpose the study commences by exploring the AU Constitutive Act.

3.1.2 AU and its Constitutive Act

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was not formed in a vacuum. Its founding was the culmination of a long struggle by Pan Africanists, a struggle which goes back to the 19th Century. Since the last century African leaders both in the Diaspora and in the continent begun to view the continent as a composite 'whole' instead of 'fragmented pieces'. They also began to discuss continental development as opposed to piecemeal development in specific countries or specific regions of the continent. These views of the continent were slowly incorporated into the nationalist struggle and received their clearest articulation during the struggle for independence. The Pan-African Congress, which was held in Manchester in 1945 brought together African nationalist leaders as well as leaders from the Diaspora, gave the clearest expression of Africa's vision in the following terms:

a) to achieve independence from colonial rule throughout the continent so that Africans can rule themselves democratically;

b) to achieve continental unity so that Africa can (i) bring about faster economic growth and development to catch up with the industrialised countries, and (ii) be strong within the international system.

This Pan African vision was popularised at the sub-regional level as nationalists mobilised peasants and workers for the struggle against colonial rule. Most if not all nationalist movements achieved their independence on the basis of this vision (Bujra 2002:2).

When the OAU was created in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 1963, the Pan African vision was incorporated into its Charter. Indeed this vision became the subject of heated debates at the 1963 meeting. The famous debates centered on a crucial element of African vision; whether political unity of the continent should

- be realised immediately, or
- be a long term objective to be achieved through the creation and consolidation of independent nation states first and then built up through sub-regional building blocks (Bujra 2002: 4).

The founding OAU Summit adopted the gradual approach of strengthening the new states, but retaining the aspirations for continental unity as a driving ideology of OAU. The Charter of the OAU was therefore essentially "designed to protect the fragile sovereignty recently achieved by African states, and to help those still under colonial or racist rule to achieve sovereign independence" (Abdul Mohammed 2002 in Bujra 2002: 108). These were the two most important objectives that drove the OAU, from its inception in 1963 to 1975.

During this period the OAU was concerned with;

- inter-state conflicts that were taking place at the time, and
- with political support for eradicating racist and minority rule in Southern Africa (Bujra 2002:116).

While the first concern involved mediation and diplomatic intervention by the OAU itself, the second required and led to the creation of the OAU Liberation Committee

which in subsequent years provided liberation movements with logistical, diplomatic and financial support (Bujra 2002:9). Strengthening the new states was the paramount objective of the OAU. Non-interference in the internal affairs of member-states also became a rallying cry. But uncritically adhering to the non-interference principle, many African leaders turned a blind eye to human rights abuses, corruption and bad governance. The rise in the number of dysfunctional states around the 1990s could be attributed to that self-serving policy attitude.

The principle of non-interference and of equality of all member states meant that OAU was "driven by the lowest common denominator", particularly of catering to the wishes of the weakest and most undemocratic states. While "sovereignty", according to Abdul Mohammed was "fetishized" (2008: 61), for President Nyerere, OAU became "a talking Club of Heads of States" (Adejo 2001: 131). This observation derived from the fact that African states were at the same time fragmenting further along ideological lines; Marxist (pro- Soviet) or capitalist (pro-Western) respectively. The immediate post-independence period was also characterised by dwindling economies and dim economic prospects.

Western powers, driven by Cold War imperatives, worked hard and utilised various instruments, to dissuade African countries which followed the "socialist" model of development. Following the demise of the Soviet Union, capitalist triumphalism grew in strength and capacity. This enabled imperialism to re-assert its control over the post-Cold War world, including Africa (Fukuyama 2006: 41).

Under pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and other imperialist institutions, the ruling classes in Africa privatised state assets to grow the economy and fight poverty. But the noble objectives of these neo-liberal policies did not yield expected results. While billions of dollars were earned to repay debts owed to western creditors, indispensable social services like education, health and housing were sacrificed on the altar of economic austerity (Folusu 2002: 71). Poverty deepened just as regional economic integration stalled.

When sustaining the OAU itself became a challenge (Adejo 2001: 131) and deepening poverty coupled with marginalisation in global affairs finally dawned, there was a call for collective reappraisal and introspection on the continent. The doctrine

of non-interference began to give way to the policy of non-indifference, that is, recognition of an obligation not to ignore the plight of one's neighbours (Herbert and Gruzd 2008: 4).

After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 a new generation of leaders called for forward-looking initiatives for the democratisation of Africa. African leaders felt that the many problems the continent was confronted with required a fresh start under a new and different organisation. This new approach included building partnerships between governments and all segments of civil society, in particular women, youth and the private sector, as well as strengthening governance institutions and providing them with the necessary powers and resources to enable them to discharge their respective mandates effectively (Pre-amble of AU Constitutive Act).

Henceforth they pledged that the continental organisation would introduce a new ethos of respect for human rights, of popular participation and transparency in the management of public affairs (Aning and Danso 2011: 178). They were thus generally in agreement on the need to promote democracy, good governance, sustainable development and greater integration of African economies.

Inspired by a number of developments around the world, the AU Constitutive Act entered into force on 26 May 2001, heralding the start of a new political culture in Africa. Determined to craft a fresh image, the AU enacted a number of far-reaching principles whose principal purpose was to promote good governance, social justice and to reject unconstitutional changes of government, as well as protect the human rights of people (AU Constitutive Act, Article 4).

Among the most controversial of these principles and contrary to its predecessor's stance, is intervention in the internal affairs of a member-state. Such intervention is however not willful and arbitrary. The Act stipulates that AU can invoke intervention on the strength of the Assembly resolution, especially in grave circumstances such as genocide, gross abuse of human rights and other crimes against humanity. Obviously such intervention will be undertaken when the government of a state has (1) collapsed and is incapable of preventing such atrocities or (2) is culpable in perpetrating them. These principles distinguish the AU from the OAU. AU/SADC intervention in Zimbabwe should thus be seen against this backdrop.

Intervention can manifest itself in any of the following three ways, namely;

- prevention;
- mediation, and
- peace – building (www.carnegiecouncil.org)

SADC intervention in Zimbabwe embraces all three.

As a supranational body meant to promote, inter alia, integration and sustainable human development (Adejo 2001: 123), in 2006 the AU introduced an additional instrument at deepening democracy in Africa. The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance highlights that commitment to good governance.

It proclaims that for democracy to be realised member states have to respect, protect and promote the rights and freedoms of people as well as popular participation (www.africa-union.org). Popular participation is the fundamental right to fully and effectively participate in decisions that affect peoples' lives at all levels and at all times (Article 10: 19). In this view democracy and development flourishes best under conditions of peace, where there are institutionalised and effective mechanisms for conflict prevention and management. The ACDEG principles encapsulate the vision of the OAU, in essence the letter and spirit of OAU has not been discarded.

ACDEG vision of democracy is characterised by;

- a system of government that is representative,
- regular transparent, free and fair elections,
- citizen participation in public affairs,
- condemnation and rejection of acts of corruption and impunity,
- condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments, and
- political pluralism which recognises the role, rights and responsibilities of legally constituted parties, including opposition political parties which have a status under national law (ACDEG Principles).

AU member-states, including Zimbabwe, are thus obliged to internalise these ACDEG principles and mainstream them in their national legislation. Politicisation of state institutions, repressive media laws and centralisation of power, including rampant corruption, are some attributes which Zimbabwe is well-known for.

Unfortunately these are not in keeping with the letter and spirit of the AU Constitutive Act and ACDEG. These manifestations of bad governance do little in cultivating and deepening democracy in the country.

3.1.3 NEPAD and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)

The inauguration of a new continental organisation to replace the defunct OAU in July 2002 was soon followed by the adoption of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). This development symbolised a growing optimism in Africa. The initiative was born out of a desire to revive a marginalised continent, which for a long time had been ravaged by exploitation, oppression and hunger. Nepad sought to put the continent on track towards sustainable growth and development (Akokpari et al (eds) 2008: 25).

The launch of AU and adoption of NEPAD as a strategy for African development and integration in the 21st century is but a revival of early forms of Pan-Africanism, an ideology founded by the likes of W.E.B du Bois and Marcus Garvey in the Americas and continental African proponents like Leopold Sedar Senghor, Jomo Kenyatta and Kwame Nkrumah. This early Pan-African generation laid the foundation for political independence and the liberation of people of African descent elsewhere. The re-emergence of Pan-Africanism under the aegis of 'African Renaissance' (AR) provided a new beginning for the much-needed regeneration and re-birth of Africa (Akokpari et al (eds) 2008: 25).

According to Thabo Mbeki, AR sought the "establishment of genuine and stable democracies in Africa, in which systems of governance will flourish because they derive their authority and legitimacy from the will of the people" (1995). By nature the AR vision resists all forms of tyranny, rejects charity and seeks to uproot corruption among Africans (Mbeki 1995).

Besides Mbeki, other well-known leaders who championed AR were Nigeria's Olusegun Obasanjo, Senegal's Abdoulaye Wade, Algeria's Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Mozambique's Joachim Chissano and Mali's Alpha Oumar Konaré. These and others committed to change the conditions of Africa by addressing poverty and underdevelopment. They recognised that there can be no development in Africa without peace and security, good governance and international cooperation. That AR

inspired AU formation and NEPAD adoption cannot be gainsaid (Akokpari et al (eds) 2008: 208).

For Anyang' Nyong'o et al (eds) (2002: 32) democracy is synonymous with accountability. Practically this means periodic and competitive elections and the opportunity to select public representatives of choice, rule of law, healthy respect of citizens' rights and supremacy of the constitution. Similarly NEPAD acknowledges that economic growth and development is impossible in the absence of democracy, respect for human rights, peace and good governance. It undertakes to respect the global standards of democracy; core among which are political pluralism, allowing for the existence of several political parties and workers' unions, and fair, open and democratic elections periodically organised to enable people to choose their leaders freely (NEPAD Framework 2001: 17)

Critiques of NEPAD have argued however, that the inclusion of external powers in Africa's development plan will heighten the control that the West has on Africa (Bujra 2002:1). Whereas NEPAD argues for massive injections of FDI, previous development strategies as the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) emphasised greater intra-African economic cooperation and industrialisation (Akokpari et al (eds) 2009: 214).

Debates over NEPAD's approach to development and democracy are fierce in Zimbabwe, too. Many within the ruling ZANU PF are calling for total independence and non-reliance on the West. Needless to say there can be no development without peace, security and international cooperation (Akokpari et al (eds) 2009: 208).

According to Loots (2006:16) NEPAD aims to shift focus from liberation politics to economic development. In this regard it argues that political stability and prosperity depend, among others, on good governance. To confront and improve on the latter NEPAD pioneered the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).

APRM is a framework that encourages African countries to undergo public scrutiny by peers, the general populace and civil society. For individual member-states its primary purpose is to encourage adoption of policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth and sustainable development. Furthermore APRM seeks to accelerate sub-regional and continental economic integration. This is to be achieved through the sharing of experiences and the

adoption of best practices, including identifying deficiencies and assessing the need for capacity building (NEPAD Secretariat 2003: 1).

Akokpari et al (eds) 2009: 252) further assert that APRM seeks to help governments to evaluate themselves and ensure that their policies and practices conform to political, economic and corporate governance values, codes and standards contained in ACDEG and other AU policy documents as the Declaration on Democracy, Economic and Corporate Governance and Socio-Economic Development. Essentially it is an instrument for self-monitoring by participating governments.

The process is officially divided into five broad stages,

- preparation and self-assessment
- base review, which is essentially a first country review and can last up to 18 months after a country becomes a member of the APRM;
- periodic review that takes place every two to four years;
- any time review which a member country may, for its own reasons request outside the framework of the periodically mandated reviews when there are signs of impending political and economic crisis, and
- after continuous periodic monitoring the state becomes legible for a subsequent review after which its base documents are officially and publicly tabled to sub-regional and regional institutions and finally availed to the public (Herbert and Grutz 2008: 17).

Given that ascension to APRM is voluntary, there is no guarantee that countries will live up its tenets. There is no guarantee either that after being peer-reviewed member-states will uphold its exhortations.

To be sure, African governments should become serious about APRM, as they should about good governance generally. Industrialized powers, the European Union (EU) and USA in particular, have invoked APRM and human rights violations in Zimbabwe to impose travel and other bans on Mugabe and other senior government officials. They are also dismayed that AU has not taken similar action against the Mugabe regime. Zimbabwe has, so far, not availed itself for peer review. As a sovereign nation no one can force it to do so even though there is clear need for

some sort of intervention there. The fact that GPA was at work in that country was encouraging. APRM encourages good democratic behaviour (Akokpari et al (eds) 2009: 221).

Individual Africans like Mo Ibrahim, in establishing the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, have taken concrete and remarkable action at popularising the aims and objectives of NEPAD and APRM in Africa. The initiative has managed to successfully invest in governance and leadership to catalyse Africa's transformation. By providing tools and advocating for progressive leadership and responsible management, the Foundation works to bring about meaningful change in Africa (www.moibrahimfoundation.org).

The Foundation focuses on highlighting examples of successful leadership and providing opportunities to enhance leadership in Africa. It also focuses on promoting results-orientated approach to policy-making and bringing together diverse stakeholders to improve the quality of governance. Pertinent to this study are the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) and African leadership programmes. It achieves this through the foundation's core programmes like the IIAG and Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership to mention but a few (www.moibrahimfoundation.org).

IIAG is a composite index constructed to provide a statistical measure of governance performance on the continent. As governance is not measurable directly there are certain indicators that when assessed, a country should meet. These include such over-arching dimensions as;

- Safety and rule of law (rule of law, accountability, personal safety and national security),
- Participation and human rights (participation, rights and gender),
- Sustainable economic opportunity (public management, business environment, infrastructure and rural sector), and
- Human development (welfare, education and health) (www.moibrahimfoundation.org).

The Ibrahim Prize for African leadership is intended to highlight exceptional role models for the continent as well as celebrate excellence in African leadership. It

recognises and celebrates African leaders who have developed their countries, lifted people out of poverty and paved the way for future prosperity and success. It also ensures that Africa continues to benefit from the experience and expertise of exceptional leaders when they leave national office, by enabling them to continue in other public roles. The criteria for winning the prize includes being a former African Executive Head of State or Government who was democratically elected, served only their constitutionally mandated term, exuded exceptional leadership and left office without being forced to do so.

To date the winners of the prize include Former Presidents; Joaquim Alberto Chissano of Mozambique, Festus Gontebanye Mogae of Botswana, Pedro de Verona Rodrigues Pires of Cape Verde and an honorary award given to Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela of South Africa. These leaders amongst other things have promoted and helped restore peace and calm in times of conflict, tirelessly worked to promote democracy, peace and development in their countries and around the world and have implemented policies that engendered economic progress (www.moibrahimfoundation.org).

While political governance has improved in Africa over the last 12 years, in Zimbabwe the opposite has happened. To this extent the country has now come to occupy high rank in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)'s index of fragile states (OECD Fragile States 2013:1 7). States are fragile when they lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations. Indicators of fragility include but not limited to;

- Undernourishment of the population,
- the state is unable to provide basic education,
- high levels of criminality,
- lack of state control over its territory(authority),
- absence of free, fair and regular electoral processes; and
- conflict and instability(OECD 2013:2).

According to Maphosa (2012: 2) fragile states are countries that lack essential capacity and/or will to fulfill four critical government responsibilities; (1) fostering an

43

environment conducive for stable and equitable economic growth, (2) establishing and maintaining legitimate, transparent and accountable political institutions, (3) securing their population from violent conflict and (4) meeting the basic human needs for their population.

Zimbabwe has become a prime example of a fragile state as it has failed to deliver on many aspects relating to human security as generally understood and has declined in many respects due to poor governance. There has however been slight improvement since the establishment of GNU in 2008 (www.moibrahimfoundation.org).

3.1.4 The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

Another normative framework aimed at promoting and entrenching democracy is the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). APSA was created out of the AR spirit to deal with conflict, its resolution and management. Its core organs and structures are;

- the Peace and Security Council (PSC);
- the Permanent Representatives' Council (PRC);
- the African Standby Force (ASF);
- the Continental Early Warning System (EWS), and
- the regional brigades.

Together these provide guidelines on how to address, respond and resolve conflict situations and maintain peace (Dersso 2011: 118-122).

Of significance to the study is the work of PSC which is the central organ of APSA and coordinates the work of all other elements of the architecture. Amongst other things the PSC is mandated to;

- promote peace, security and stability,

- anticipate and prevent conflicts,

- combat terrorism on the continent,

- develop a common defense policy for Africa, and

- promote democratic practices, good governance and respect for human rights (Vines 2013: 97).

Since 2002 AU has suspended a number of member-states and imposed sanctions on others following wars, coups and unconstitutional changes of government (Vines 2013: 93). These efforts were geared at inculcating respect for human rights and good governance.

Though APSA is holistic in its approach to peace and security, it would however be naive to think that it will resolve all African conflicts at the same time.

3.1.5. SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (SADC PGGDE)

The objectives of the 1992 Windhoek Treaty which established SADC commit member-states to promote common political values which lead to peace and stability in the region(SADC PGGDE:1). Article 4 of that Treaty stipulates that human rights, democracy and rule of law are the principles guiding its members.

Furthermore SADC adopted another document which enunciated principles and guidelines for democratic elections in the region. This document echoes in many ways the AU Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa (SADC PGGDE: 2).

In summary SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections champion;

- full participation of citizens in the political process,

- freedom of association,

- political tolerance,

- regular intervals for elections as provided for by respective National Constitutions,

- equal opportunity for all political parties to access State media,

- equal opportunity to exercise the right to vote and be voted for,

- independence of the Judiciary and impartiality of electoral institutions,

- voter education, and

- acceptance and respect of election results proclaimed free and fair by competent national electoral authorities and by all political parties (SADC PGGDDE 2004: 2).

In a functional democracy competitive elections should perform a corrective and empowering function and serve to remove corrupt, unresponsive and ineffectual leaders. Zimbabwean elections have over the years been manipulated to further the interests of incumbents rather than those of the people.

3.2 Ake on democracy

In Chapter 1 there was reference to Ake and his ideas of democracy. His perspective is that democracy must be organic, in other words, bottom up and not top down. This also means that it should uphold economic rights, accommodate cultural diversity premised on popular participation.

When it was originally conceived neo-liberalism sought to create national wealth by empowering individual citizens with political rights. Wealth so created would filter down to others so that everyone becomes better off in the end. This approach was influenced by experiences as the French Revolution which put a premium on liberty, equality and fraternity (so-called first generation human rights) and the American Revolution which emphasised constitutionalism and rule of law (neo-liberalism). An essential principle of the neo-liberal democratic tradition is the freedom of the individual manifesting in freedom of speech, equal opportunity and civic equality (Crowder 2002: 112). The sanctity of free and equal individuals extends to the economic sphere. Neo-liberals oppose proposals that limit individual rights in the name of collective rights (Langlois and Soltan (eds) 2009: 27). These noble proclamations were however not carried overseas when Western Europe colonized

much of the world, including Africa. Thus it is common knowledge that colonialism deprived indigenous people of their rights and thereby bequeathed to the continent fragile national economies.

Ake's conception of democracy should be understood against that backdrop. He emphasised economic rights for the simple reason that neo-liberalism has done little to alleviate poverty and arrest the marginalisation of the African masses. He argued for a bottom up approach in national wealth creation (1993: 213). For him African democracy is about communality; a sharing of the burdens and rewards of community membership. It is this communalism which defines freedom and peoples' location in society (Ake 1993: 243).

The economic rights approach that he advocated took its cue from the 1917 Russian Revolution and Marxism in particular. In essence Marxist communism is about equitable ownership and distribution of the means of production. Though Ake was influenced by Marxist-Leninism, he retained his faith in African communalism. That was so because Africa is pre-dominantly communal and her cultural idiom is radically different (1993: 239). It should be noted that communalism does not necessarily translate into wholesale nationalisation of the means of production as orthodox Marxist-Leninism contends. Instead it calls for the curb of the excesses of capitalism and individualism. These must be discouraged as they give rise to class distinctions where extreme wealth resides side by side with extreme poverty.

At the moment most states in Africa understand democracy in conventional terms of (1) multi-party elections, (2) free press and (3) rule of law, among other elements. Economic growth would in this sense emanate from better governance and a political environment which guarantees human rights and the rule of law (Ake 1993: 242). These precepts are essentially no different from neo-liberal conception of democracy though much of the difference is in approach.

Given that the desire for material improvement is fuelling democratisation in Africa, Ake argued for some state intervention to drive that process. That process should emphasise social and economic rights rather than abstract legal and political rights. In other words there has to be less tolerance of economic inequality and acceptance of state intervention in the interest of growth and redistribution of economic wealth.

For him democracy implies better management of development projects and assurance that rewards are more evenly distributed. Emanating from the above it is safe to suggest that a link exists between Ake's call for greater economic integration of the masses and the utilitarianism principle that the greatest good/happiness should be for the greatest number of people.

Much as African societies are communal, they are also not impervious to international best practices. Likewise they should observe universal democratic ideals as;

- periodic free and fair elections;
- respect of human rights;
- accountable and transparent government system;
- rule of law;
- citizen participation government decision making processes, and
- free media amongst others (www.photo.state.gov).

3.3 The New Normative Framework

The normative framework refers to a body of new norms and institutions which post-GNU Zimbabwe should adopt and create to achieve democracy. In this study it is argued that in as much as the new normative framework should be informed by that country's culture and norms, international guidelines and practices cannot be ignored, especially since Zimbabwe is now part of the global community. In voluntarily joining global, continental and regional organisations and accenting to commensurate treaties, the country pledged that it is a worthy world citizen, to be judged and evaluated by relevant norms and expectations.

3.3.1 The Constitution

As a codified document spelling out the duties, powers and functions of the various institutions of government as well as regulating relations between the State and the individual citizen, the constitution should be enthused by a bill of rights. Without the latter it is possible that those relations could deteriorate into tyranny (Heywood 2007:

316). By design the constitution should become a foundation for stability, predictability and guide all government decisions and actions.

The GNU has helped lay the foundation for the establishment of an effective and efficient institutional framework. Under its auspices some of the contentious sections of the Constitution have been reviewed and recast to accord with international best practices and norms.

For instance, the Presidential term of office is now limited and she/he no longer has power to veto legislation. She/he will not be able to unilaterally appoint provincial governors. Provinces will henceforth choose their governors/premiers. The new constitution obliges the police and military to be impartial and not to "further the interests of any political party or cause." A beefed-up constitutional court with powers over all other courts will, among others, deal with abuse of power while a new peace and reconciliation commission has been set up (http://www.washingtonpost.com).

3.3.2 Government

The three divisions of government namely; the executive, legislature and judiciary should have distinct roles. Ideally there should be strict separation amongst these branches of government, complimented by a system of checks and balances. The new institutional framework should guard against the concentration of power on a single division so as to prevent its abuse.

3.3.3 Bodies supporting democracy

In addition to a new constitution and strict division of government powers there has to be other impartial and independent bodies established to cultivate democracy. Under GNU auspices this requirement has been fulfilled to some degree with the creation of bodies like the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC), Judicial Services Commission (JSC), Zimbabwe Gender Commission (ZGC) etc. The mandate of these democracy supporting bodies include among others the following;

a) to support and entrench human rights and democracy;
b) to protect the sovereignty and interests of the people;
c) to promote constitutionalism;
d) to promote transparency and accountability in public institutions, and

e) to secure the observance of democratic values and principles by the State and all institutions and agencies of government and government-controlled entities (COPAC Draft Constitution)

Essentially these bodies are independent and are not subject to the direction or control of anyone. Their members are supposed to be non-partisan and impartial.

For this institutional framework to work, political parties, including elements of civil society, must be steeped in democracy. In other words democracy is not possible unless there is political will to realize it. Lack or absence of commitment and will by political parties and government creates a hostile environment that exacerbate and threaten the security and stability of both the individual and State. In accepting democracy, political actors should realise that the outcomes of democratic processes are binding on everyone (Likoti 2011: 13).

3.4 Chapter Conclusion

The Chapter was aimed at laying bare regional and other international best practices on democracy in effort to identify gaps in Zimbabwe's governance credentials. From the foregoing it became apparent that the country has not lived up to the democracy ethos enunciated in various policy documents analysed in the Chapter. Though GNU has made some strides in institutionalising democracy, much ground still has to be covered.

The Chapter also explored Ake's ideas on democracy to find common ground between African and Western democracy. After exploring him, it became evident that neo-liberal democracy fell short of promoting development in Africa. But like him and the theoretical framework adopted in this study we hold the view that the greatest good/happiness should accrue to most Zimbabweans not just the elite.

In Zimbabwe GNU did not succeed in institutionalising neo-liberal democracy, neither did that government repeal all repressive laws nor introduced far-reaching electoral reforms. Much still needs to be done in bringing about economic policies that promote economic development for the general population and the country as informed from the greatest good/happiness for the greatest number of people principle.

Chapter 4 discusses the findings and analyses the data.

CHAPTER 4

4. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

This Chapter discusses the findings of the study. A total of 25 in-depth interviews were conducted. Fifteen of the respondents were key-informants. The term key-informants refer to persons who have specialist knowledge, are passionate about political trends or actively involved in the political developments of the Zimbabwean GNU. The other ten were ordinary Zimbabweans and these refer to citizens selected regardless of their in-depth knowledge of political developments in the country. Interviews for both groups were conducted over a period of three months. Interviews for key-informants had to be pre-scheduled to fit within their busy work schedules, hence the extended time span. Key-informants included two Members of Parliament, two Cabinet Ministers, two political analysts, two human rights lawyers, two academics from the University of Limpopo and University of Venda and two students

of Political Science and its related disciplines from the academic institutions mentioned above. Three organisations were also interviewed. These were the Institute for Democracy in Africa, Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights and Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA).

4.2 GNU - a threat or an opportunity?

Respondents had the following to say about the GNU;

4.2.1 Ordinary Zimbabweans

One respondent commented;

> Tiri kungonzwa kuti Mugabe naTsvangirai vazofunga kubatana kuti vachitonga nyika iyi vari pamwe. Isu zvekubatana kwavo hatizive hedu kuti vakabatanirei asi hazvisiri izvo zvatanga tichida isu. Tsvangirai atengesa nyika uyezve handiwoni pane tarisiro yekuti vaviri ava [Tsvangirai na Mugabe] vachatanga kugadzirisa nyika kuti idzokore pakare paya. Tsvangirai atovawo muZANU PF uya…[we are just hearing that Mugabe and Tsvangirai decided to become united and rule this country together. Why they decided to do this, we don't know but it is not what we wanted. Tsvangirai has sold the cause and I don't see any hope of these two (Tsvangirai and Mugabe) ever taking the country back to where it used to be. Tsvangirai is now also a ZANU PF supporter] (Respondent 23:2012).

Another echoed the same sentiments but had strong views about the GNU;

> Tsvangirai na President vedu vakabatana kuitira kuti nyika ifambire mberi. Tsvangirai awona kuti iye neMDC vanga vakarasika ende baba Mugabe vatenda kushanda pamwe chete navo kuti vavaratidze gwara remusangano…Nyika ino haife yakadzokera kumabhunu ende iye zvino manje hatichatya nekuti Tsvangirai apinda muforo manje. Adzoka kumusha ende futi awoneswa chiedza. [Tsvangirai and our President have united so that the country moves forward. Tsvangirai has realised that he and the MDC were lost. Our father (President Mugabe) has agreed to work with them so that he can show them the true way of the party (ZANU PF). This country will never again be ruled by white people. Now we can sleep easy knowing that Tsvangirai has come home. He has been found. He has been shown the light (Respondent 18:2012).

4.2.2 Key-informants

Five (5) out of the fifteen (15) key-informants believed that the GNU was necessary, as it was the only way of bringing peace and calm to a violence-ridden nation. Respondent 14 believes that the international community, SADC in particular, played a big role by preferring the GNU over other methods. The respondent went on to say had it not been for the GNU a civil war would probably have broken out and given the controversial 2008 poll, violence could have deteriorated. GNU thus became a handy tool to preempt that possibility. Respondent 11 also argued that the GNU was for the good of all political parties because it brought conflicting political contenders, ZANU PF and MDC, together.

Eight (8) out of the fifteen (15) key-informants were of the view that its establishment only served to further marginalize the will of the people. Effectively, they argued, GNU legitimised an illegitimate government and thus heightened injustice. These respondents opined that the GNU is undemocratic and exacerbates instability and cultivates an undemocratic culture. According to Respondent 1 the GNU reflects a system of government which undermines the voice of the people and their universal suffrage because GNU was never decided upon by the people. He emphasised this by further stating that GPA was between political parties and it left out other significant players like civil society organs.

Those who argued against the GNU being employed following the 2008 contentious elections highlighted that the GNU was now a habit in Africa. Respondent 6 pointed out that other options which do not necessarily disregard the electorate could have been employed. For example an Independent Electoral Commission and/or the constitutional court could have presided over the dispute. Respondent 3 concurred by adding that if these bodies had been impartial and reliable, the stalemate could have been avoided. Respondent 3 highlighted that from a legal perspective election events culminating in the inception of the GNU and the delay in announcing results had no legal basis. Furthermore, the conduct displayed by ZEC was in breach of the Electoral Act. For example, the issue of who was supposed to wear the presidential hat pending the run-off election was violated. He believes that all these and other like issues could have been pointed out and let justice take its course. These two respondents' observations indicated the gaps in Zimbabwe's institutional framework, particularly the justice system.

4.3 Democracy-conducive environment.

The bone of contention since the inception of the GNU has been whether or not it has fulfilled its mandate of creating conditions propitious for democracy in Zimbabwe.

4.3.1 Ordinary Zimbabweans

The coming together of the main political players in the GNU brought relative peace, less politically motivated violence and economic stability. In this regard all of the respondents were of the opinion that the GNU had performed well.

4.3.2 Key-informants

All respondents unanimously agreed that the GNU has to be applauded for the dramatic decline in political violence, for the rejuvenation of a devastated economy, for some institutional reforms as well as the easing somewhat of the tense relationship between the MDC and ZANU PF.

Seven (7) out of the fifteen (15) respondents were of the view that for the period it has been in office GNU has under-achieved and under-performed. They are of the opinion that there remain a lot of unresolved and far-reaching political problems. Respondent 9 highlighted that the crisis is fundamentally about the use of state power. In particular he mentioned how there are no clear boundaries between the branches of government and how the army and police have been used by the ZANU PF against those who support the MDC. The GNU was mandated to bring about far-reaching reforms but failed. Hence Respondent 9 has observed that;

> Due to its weak foundation the GNU has failed to reform the security sector thus rendering the GPA ineffective. Yes, the new constitution binds the police and military to be impartial and not to further the interests of any political party but you know what sister? The state security personnel here in Zimbabwe are politicians in uniform. Their attitudes have not been reformed, do you know what the eeeh… this man…the Army Chief of staff, Major-General Martin Chedondo, has been on record saying?…soldiers are not apolitical. Only mercenaries are apolitical. I mean what does that tell us about the state of our public institutions post GNU? So you see…eeeeh… the executive power vested in the president of our country coupled with the lack of political will by his longtime loyalists in the police and military to radically transform public institutions of this country pushes us back to square one… (Respondent 9: 2012).

Reiterating the observation made by respondent 9, respondent 12 had this to say;

> The GPA, signed in 2008 was intended to provide a foundation for response to the multiple political and economic crises, but it has become a battleground for control of the country's future. ZANU-PF's ability, in partnership with the unreformed securocrats, to thwart a democratic transfer of power remains intact. The state media is still heavily unbalanced, and the criminal justice system continues to be used as a weapon against ZANU-PF opponents, in particular the MDC-T (Respondent 12: 2012).

The respondents went on to argue that such a political landscape where security forces are still immensely engrossed in the country's party politics does not augur well for the upcoming elections.

In addition to security sector reform the GPA mandated GNU to create favourable conditions for credible elections. Eight (8) of the responses concerning elections revealed ambivalence and even worse insecurity;

> You see the reasons why the GNU has failed? The reasons go back to the failure of elections in Zimbabwe. ZANU PF lost the election but could not accept defeat. So if it failed to accept defeat can it then accept an equal standing to that of the MDC, can they be at par as political parties? What you see with the GNU is now eh eh… there is this serious political ideological incompatibility between the two. MDC says ZANU PF is doing this and ZANU PF says MDC is doing that. So in the end very little gets done in levelling the elections playing field. And with this kind of attitude clearly that shall be the day when ZANU PF accepts losing in an election. (Respondent 11:2012).

Respondent 12 highlighted that in preparation for the next election, very little if anything has been done to ensure that credible and peaceful elections take place;

> The SADC roadmap to elections provides a very good description of a desirable political environment and some election-related pre-requisites like a new constitution and revision of the electoral act. That said, the GNU has not put in place binding measures which will ensure that politically-motivated violence, intimidation, torture and violation of fundamental human rights do not happen again in the next election (Respondent 12:2012).

Respondent 2 opined that GNU had initiated amendments to the Constitution, Electoral Act and some repressive laws such as the Public Order Security Act (POSA) and Broadcasting Services Act. However, these remain cosmetic. Respondent 9 was concerned with the fact that the Chairperson of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, an autonomous body, is still a Presidential appointment and that little regard has been given to the process of this person's appointment. He/she pointed to the fact that there is no guarantee that the way in which ZEC manipulated the electoral process in favour of ZANU PF in 2008 will not be repeated in the next election. Respondent 12 voiced the same concern by further highlighting that GNU had failed to reinforce impartiality within the Independent Commissions established by the new constitution. These include Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission, Judicial Services Commission, Zimbabwe Gender Commission, Zimbabwe Media Commission and the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission.

Other Respondents drew attention to the critical issue of media reform. They are of the opinion that media has a very crucial role to play in the entrenchment of democracy. In Respondent 5's words the media "either makes or breaks a nation". The GNU has not managed to open media space hence true democracy cannot be realised under such conditions. To this end one respondent stated;

> When we talk of democracy and the media, the media here in Zimbabwe and anywhere else in the world should assume the role of informing citizens on matters of public policy by presenting and debating alternatives. This should be done in all languages that make up the language structure of the state. The gogos and old madhalas[elderly] there in the depths of Nyanga and Honde need to know what government is doing and why it is doing what it is doing, They don't need to be told this by the politicians themselves when they come and entice the masses with lies and propaganda just before an election as they normally do, but by an independent and objective body which is the media in this case, and this should be done throughout their term of office. The information which citizens get from

55

the media empowers them to exercise their rights and to make informed choices. Therefore the media should be allowed ample room to maneuver without favour, fear or discrimination. This refers to both state and private media, mind you. The media is supposed to be the independent watch dog which makes sure that politicians, government, civil society, churches and all other institutions serve the interests of the public; if not then it is also the responsibility of that very same media to expose the hoodwinkers (Respondent 7:2012)

In the same vein, Respondent 2 decried the fact that repressive laws such, as the infamous Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), are still active.

Another matter of great concern was the economy of the country. For Respondent 10, the use of the United States Dollar (USD) in Zimbabwe is unsustainable as America can at any time stop the country from using its currency. This may have serious repercussions for the economy, in particular, and the people in general. He/she went on to state that added to the precarious currency situation, corruption and nepotism are rife. For instance the contentious Chiadzwa diamonds and the license to mine the area are still issued on political party basis. Failure by GNU to address these matters spells disaster.

Respondent 3 reiterated the argument that GNU was underperforming. The respondent pointed out that crucial matters such as GNU mandated land audit have not been dealt with and as such there is no certainty as to how the land question will be resolved and what government will do to ensure its productivity.

Nonetheless other respondents had a different view regarding GNU and its success in fostering democracy. Respondent 13 pointed out that the question is not so much in GNU democratising the nation but its intended purpose of making functional a deadlock situation.

I think the GNU has brought some kind of normality to politics in Zimbabwe though it has not addressed some of the challenges; it has brought normality as we see the integration of ZANU-PF and MDC forming this so-called GNU. Actually what we see here, the challenge in Zimbabwe is not lack of GNU, the challenge in Zimbabwe is the undemocratic nature of political governance system, especially the ZANU-PF-led governance style which has restricted governance, democracy and suppressed fundamental human freedoms. That is the major challenge in Zimbabwe. But now when we argue pragmatically we say the GNU pragmatically solved some of these challenges. It's about that which works and GNU has been it (Respondent 13:2013)

Respondent 15 reiterated the sentiments of respondent 13 and had this to say;

First we must know who the key actors are in this arrangement, ZANU-PF and the MDC which are diametrically opposed structures. MDC being progressive in orientation, ZANU-PF is more of an orthodox form of political party, especially the so-called revolutionary regimes, so what we see here with the GNU is more a marriage of

They further emphasised that GNU has managed to bring about marked changes which would have probably remained elusive. For example, Respondent 13 pointed out that it was under the auspices of the GNU that actors agreed to introduce for the first time in the history of Zimbabwe an independent prosecuting authority. It was also under the auspices of the GNU that the new rules for elections and a series of Independent Commissions were put in place. Not only this but respondent 15 stressed that GNU has managed to alter trends in the governance style previously experienced in Zimbabwe;

> …we can credit the GNU for the constitutional reform, since Independence this is the only case where we see ZANU PF and opposition agreeing that there is a need for constitutional reform. For the first time we have seen ZANU PF committing itself to the attainment of peace. It [GNU] instilled sense of responsibility and obligation on the part of ZANU PF. It was also after this [establishment of GNU] that we see SADC blatantly saying ZANU PF you must honour your commitments and obligations. It should be noted however that opposition has not been victims in this approach for they entered into the agreement willingly though with a lot of compromise (Respondent 15:2013).

All these developments, they concurred, created space for further debate around issues of democracy and governance in the country. They mentioned that GNU has also been an opportunity for opposition to be acknowledged and tolerated which was not the case previously.

It is also interesting to note that within the same group of key-informants, there are those who argued for the continuation of GNU if it means calm and stability. They argued power sharing arrangement does away with strife and animosity, no one feels left out and cooperation and space for deliberation in decision-making is created. In this vein respondent 14 opined;

> GNU is still very useful in Zimbabwe. It has been highly effective because it has allowed for the creation of a platform for deliberating policy. One might argue that it is the political elite only who are key players in these deliberations but you should realise our country has a representative system of government. ZANU PF and MDC are carrying the mandate of the people they represent. The masses are involved because at the end of the day, it is the same ZANU PF and MDC who go back to their respective constituencies and explain their decisions as well as give the people feedback (2012).

4.4 SADC and role in GNU

While SADC facilitated the formation of GNU, the extent of its role in ensuring that GNU performs is another contentious issue.

4.4.1 Ordinary Zimbabweans

Ordinary Zimbabweans credited the organisation for bringing relative peace and stability. For 8 out of the 10 respondents the availability of food stocks in supermarkets was the most important achievement. As one respondent pointed out;

> Shamwari GNU iyi yabatsira, tanga tanzwa nematemba nebulgar, kuzoti sadza rekenya hatichatauri. Inini ndinotowona sekuti GNU yakakonzera kuti zviro zvidzoke futi pamashelf mumasitoro umu nekuti 2007-2008 zvinhu zvanga zvakaoma wena, ende kungowuya kwakaita GNU zvinhu zvakabva zvavamo futi mumasitoro… (chuckles) inini hangu kutaura shuwa chaiyo chaiyo, to be honest GNU ndinonyanya kuibhigira lumo. Saka kana iri SADC yakaita kuti pave neGNU then iii kubva yakaita hayo SADC yachoyo nekuti nzara warume, tanga tazwa ngenzara [My friend GNU really helped, I had had enough of eating kapenta, bulgar and yellow sadza. I think GNU was responsible for food stocks being available on the shelves again because since 2007-2008 things were really hard and with the emergence of GNU these were suddenly available… (chuckles). Personally I applaud GNU for the availability of food stocks so if you are telling me that it's SADC which helped establish GNU then we really must thank SADC because the hunger issue was really getting to us] (Respondent 20:2012).

Two of the respondents felt that SADC cannot walk away as yet as more work in encouraging and making sure that political parties conduct peaceful and credible elections had to be done,

> If you say that it is SADC who helped to create a GNU, then perhaps they can also help to make sure that maelections are done in a peaceful manner, that MDC neZANU PF vanorespecter maoutcomes emaelections acho achaitwa. Nekuti we want a government which can deliver and which we can hold accountable [If its SADC which initiated GNU then perhaps SADC should also see to it that measures are put in place that will allow for peaceful elections and that the MDC and ZANU PF accept election outcomes. We want a government which can deliver and which we can demand accountability from] (Respondent 21: 2012).

4.4.2 Key-informants

All of the respondents agreed that it was the SADC-led mediation which resulted in political compromise by antagonists, by way of agreeing to form the inclusive government. SADC can thus be commended for fostering progress. In this vein Respondent 1 averred that;

> External support is important for the creation of an environment where democracy, peace, security and development can thrive. If it was not for SADC we can only start to imagine where the country [Zimbabwe] would be today. Also the role played by individual member states in supporting Zimbabwe during its time of crisis is very important. South Africa was very supportive. It displayed good neighbourliness and also it was in South Africa's best interests to support Zimbabwe because not helping the country would mean the impact and implication of the political unrest in Zimbabwe would also be felt by South Africa itself (Respondent 1: 2012).

Some respondents agreed that the SADC-initiated GNU was a positive approach to conflict resolution. They are convinced that by proffering GNU, SADC demonstrated that relying on home-grown methods is better than adopting Western initiatives. Isolating Zimbabwe and imposing sanctions, as USA and EU did, was decried by these respondents. Respondent 8 expressed these sentiments as follows;

> SADC exercised its duty to assist and not a duty to interfere, which is quite commendable and in support of the principle of national sovereignty… (2012).

SADC intervention was however found wanting in some respects. Three (3) out of the fifteen (15) respondents pointed out that SADC did not address the root causes of the crisis and that it could have performed better in ensuring that GNU fulfilled its mandate. According to Respondent 4;

> …the main mistake SADC made was that it did not establish impartial structures and mechanisms to effectively monitor and evaluate the implementation of the GPA, which it had so carefully helped to negotiate. SADC I guess relied also on the Joint Operation Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) to do its own monitoring for them and yet the very JOMIC is comprised of members from the inclusive arrangement. So you see now there is no independent body which was put in place to monitor GNU and its implementation of the GPA. Apart from this there is very little if any interaction between SADC and JOMIC, this sole GNU monitoring body… (2012).

Respondent 11 echoed these sentiments by stating that;

> SADC used GNU as a preventive initiative and it should be commended for that because it shows a slight commitment to R2P by SADC leadership. However, the regional body lacks a definite punitive approach in the event of non-compliance. Consequently, ZANU-PF's continued resort to violence is again encouraged by the absence of punitive modalities for non-compliance to the SADC political road map. Zuma should have considered referring the Zimbabwe issue straight to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in all the events of non-compliance… (2012).

Two (2) of the respondents felt differently about the extent to which SADC could exercise its advisory and facilitative role. As respondent 9 put it,

> SADC played a crucial role, it's just that challenges abound. In International Relations, International organisations are limited by certain challenges. In the case of SADC you must understand that it is not a police force. Therefore it has serious limitations in terms of how it can use cohesion to push for some of its wishes. The international system is anarchic from a state-centric perspective; we mean that we don't have a central government. SADC is not Central Government of Africa. It just provides a framework among member states. Its role was never to impose democracy or conflict resolution on Zimbabwe. It was to facilitate, so that there is no animosity …it has managed to do just that, Tsvangirai and Mugabe have found each other (2012).

4.5 Democracy in Zimbabwe – The dream

The final theme which emerged from the interviews was for democracy to dawn in Zimbabwe. What face should this dream have, particularly in the post-GNU period?

4.5.1 Ordinary Zimbabweans:

All the respondents defined democracy in broad terms. Respondent 23 believes that democracy should be the right to vote in free and fair elections as well as acceptance and respect of election results. Respondent 19 stated that democracy is the delivery of basic services to the people regardless of political affiliation. The respondents stressed that the government should put people first and not abuse state resources. Furthermore, this Respondent stated;

> When a country has a democracy its people do not suffer from hunger, poverty, cholera and so on. When there is democracy in a country povo [the masses] do not suffer because of lack of health services, education, and things like food, while members of parliament and ministers, their wives and children are busy flying to Dubai to access those things….(2012).

Others pointed to the fact that when a country is liberated and not under colonialism then it is democratic. Democracy is equated with the exercise of such rights as free association and free speech. To this end Respondent 25 commented;

> I can say here muno muZimbabwe mune democracy because we are free to do want we want and go where we want because patime yataitongwa nevarungu vanhu vaitolimitwa kwekufambira, nyangwe kwekugara. Even mabasa chaiwo there are some jobs aingonzi aya ndeevarungu, iwewe munhu mutema wanga usingatombodi kuwonekwa kana pamabasa iwawo. Manje now munhu ukangoitawo mabook ako then you can get any job you want…eeeh plus kupihwa minda kwakaitwa vanhu kunoreva kuti munhu you can do your own things uchizviitirawo mari yako so…

> [I can say there is democracy in Zimbabwe because people are free to go where they want and also do what they want which was not the case in colonial Zimbabwe when people were restricted from moving and living in certain areas. There are some jobs which were regarded as white-only jobs and black people would not be allowed to do these. Its different now because as long as you have an education you can get the job…eeh and also because of the land redistribution black people can now do projects which earn them money](Respondent 25).

4.5.2 Key-informants

Interviews with key informants revealed that democracy has no single definition. It is an ambiguous concept but should be people-specific.

In Respondent no. 5's words;

> Democracy is all about governance. The big question then is governance by who, for who and for what? Uum…it is governance of the people by the people and for the people. It is about a bottom up approach to governance. The bottom up approach regards rule of law and that is good governance. Bad governance on the other hand disregards the rule of law and largely concentrates on a top down approach. Good governance in democracy is about observing rule of law and by that I mean…uum…the observance of fundamental human freedoms and the application of the constitution (Respondent 5:2012).

According to Respondent 9 democracy is a political system wherein the people elect representatives to serve the people's goals and interests in government or parliament. He/she also highlighted that it is most important for representatives to realise that they receive their mandate from the people and that they should be answerable to those people as well.

Other respondents pointed out that the elections are the most important yardstick of democracy. Respondents 3, 4, 5 and 8 emphasised that the quality of the election process is critical because pre-election, election and post-election events and processes have a bearing and determine whether a country is democratic or not. Respondent 4 further highlighted that countries are moving away from describing elections as free and fair more towards using words as "credible and transparent" in describing them. He/she went on to say that although elections are integral they do not guarantee democracy because in recent times they have been an instrument for affirming repressive governments.

> In essence, elections are an important, but not the only ingredient for the institutionalisation of a culture of democracy and peace. Therefore, the GNU should realise that democracy requires peace…critical as they are, elections are not tantamount to democracy, nor are they automatically a guarantor of peace, security and stability (Respondent 4:2012).

The same respondents emphasised that for a very long time elections in Zimbabwe were simply a matter of going through the motions, as the country was but a de facto one-party state. Respondent 5 mentioned that the emergence of an opposition party has however brought hope and potential for the development of democracy.

Similarly Respondent 9 opined that elections are a form of check and balance because they afford voters the opportunity to remove public representatives from office whenever they deem necessary. He/she went on to point out that under current circumstances in the country, underperforming Ministers were re-deployed. He/she concluded by saying that such practices rob voters of their right to good governance and tarnishes the image of government.

Respondent 15 highlighted that popular participation was another indicator of democracy because it opens space for debate, allowing those who did not vote to give input. However, Respondent 5 went on to point out that Zimbabwe's current electoral system does not allow for the minority view to be heard or represented.

He/she emphasised that popular participation is an exercise that should happen all the time.

For Respondent 1 democracy is not only about the right to choose a government but also about freedom from abject poverty and economic deprivation.

> GNU has an almost insurmountable task because as it stands democracy in Zimbabwe has been compromised because there are some serious socio-economic problems which the government was unable to solve... (Respondent 1: 2012).

Other respondents spoke of the need for public institutions which are apolitical and non-partisan. According to Respondent 11 there is no separation of government powers in Zimbabwe because the state and ZANU PF are virtually the same. A free media was also mentioned as important to democracy. Respondents argued that the media, whether state or private, is supposed to be the independent watch-dog which makes sure politicians, government, civil society, churches and all other institutions serve the interests of the public. To this end Respondent 7 commented;

> The information which citizens get from the media empowers them to exercise their rights and to make informed choices. Therefore the media should be allowed ample room to maneuver without favour, fear or discrimination (Respondent 7: 2012).

Several respondents argued that media space in Zimbabwe is yet to be opened so that it is accessible to everyone including, opposition parties.

4.6 Chapter Conclusion

From the preceding findings, the formation of a GNU in the country evoked varied reactions. While 48% of the 25 respondents welcomed the GNU for bringing end to political violence, 36% are of the view that its formation only temporarily arrested the conflict. Another 16% are of the view that GNU should never have been formed in the first place. For them it undermined democracy and usurped their right to vote.

It emerged from eleven of the fifteen (i.e. 73%) key informants that in order for peace to prevail and for democracy to be cultivated, the GNU had to ensure that the issues that it initially set out to tackle are addressed before the end of its term. These outstanding issues include, among others, establishing an environment conducive

for credible elections, far-reaching security and judicial sector reforms and increased agricultural productivity.

Two of the twenty-five (i.e. 8%) key-informants argued that SADC should not be held responsible for GNU's failures. They argued that SADC's role was limited to facilitation and advisory; it was not a police force. Had it not been for SADC's facilitation, Zimbabwe could never have had those limited reforms. For them GNU had kick-started the democratisation process.

The interviews also revealed that the respondents were desirous of democracy in Zimbabwe. It showed that respondents believed that credible elections are important, together with acceptance of election results. Some opined that in a functional democracy the elected representatives should prove their worth by ensuring increased socio-economic development of the people. The majority (72%) argued that democracy should connote the removal of ineffectual leaders by the people when and if the people deem it necessary. Media independence was emphasised including the nonpartisan role of public institutions.

From these findings several recommendations can be made. These are discussed in Chapter 5.

4.6.1 Limitations of the study

Like many research studies, this one has its own limitations. The first of these stems from the time period in which it took place. As evident throughout, much of the research was carried out before the 2013 elections. To complicate matters further, the GNU succeeded in bringing about certain constitutional amendments which greatly improved the political situation in that country. That and the thawing of relations between ZANU-PF and MDC meant the style and language of this analogy had to be adjusted accordingly. The second limitation arose from the research paradigm and sample size. Given that qualitative research is subjective in nature, the

findings could be disputed as complete objectivity is arguable. The sample of twenty-five (25) cannot be representative of the 13 million strong Zimbabwean nation.

In postscript we can say that in 2013 Zimbabwe went to the polls and though the outcome was disputed by MDC, USA and EU, AU and SADC however accepted the outcome. With the 2013 elections came the end of GPA and GNU, formally ceased to exist. Though EU dropped economic sanctions imposed during the heydays of violence, the majority of the people continue to endure a poor performing economy as foreign direct investment is not pouring into the country. These shortcomings are however counterbalanced by the findings and recommendations highlighted in this Chapter and the next.

CHAPTER FIVE

5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Conclusion

Chapter 1 stated that the aim of the study is to assess whether or not GNU as a strategy has been successful in creating conditions propitious for democracy in Zimbabwe.

As such the objectives of the study were;

- To investigate the usefulness of GNU as a tool for fostering democracy in Zimbabwe,

- To explore how GNU has or not alleviated the political crisis in Zimbabwe, and

- To assess the successes or failures of GNU in Zimbabwe.

Research questions emanating from the aim and objectives of the study were;

1. Was the formation of the GNU the panacea to the political ills of Zimbabwe?
2. Has the GNU been successful in fulfilling its mandate of creating conditions conducive for democracy in Zimbabwe?
3. What is the relationship between the GNU and democracy, if any?

Chapter 1 explained and analysed the political background of post-independence Zimbabwe and how elections have been carried out since then. The climax of violence was in the 2007-2008 election. Afterwards a SADC-initiated GNU was installed in 2009.

Chapter 2 revealed that GNU was aimed at addressing critical political concerns, bringing peace and restoring some measure of economic order. Included here were such issues as security sector reform, drafting and adopting a new constitution and depoliticising of state institutions.

Chapter 3 highlighted and briefly discussed some international and regional guidelines on democracy. These were discussed to better appreciate and understand the democracy deficit in Zimbabwe or how far behind the country has gone in frustrating the ideals enshrined in several regional and international policy documents to which it subscribes or has done so in the past and as such to possibly help Zimbabwe out of its current political turmoil. Among them were the AU Constitutive Act, African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) and SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (SADC PGGDE).

Chapter 4 nonetheless, holds information emanating from interviews which reveals that ordinary Zimbabweans lack in-depth knowledge about the SADC-initiated GNU, reasons for its formation and how it worked in practice. They were not in a position to

hold it accountable against its set objectives. Regardless, most respondents were happy with the relative peace and the arrested economic meltdown which the GNU managed to bring about.

There is a general consensus amongst the key-informants that, there has been a significant decline in human rights abuses, politically-motivated violence, and blatant abuse of power by security agents, intimidation and harassment of opposition. But, measures which would ensure that peaceful and credible elections are held have not been put in place by the GNU.

Though GNU has helped to establish oversight institutions which are supposed to support democracy, it has however failed to guarantee their independence since the process of appointing them is still contentious. It is a well-considered contention of this study that the process should be as transparent as it should be impartial. People serving in those democracy supporting institutions should have (1) requisite experience, (2) commensurate qualifications and (3) unblemished criminal record. Finally they should be persons of high social standing and of high integrity in the eyes of the Zimbabwean public, among other things.

The study has also established that the GNU has failed to sufficiently free media space to allow the media to fulfill its responsibility of being society's watchdog. This has been evidenced by the draconian laws as the AIPPA which are still in the statute books.

There is a common view amongst respondents that elections are an integral part of democracy and that there can be no democracy without free and fair [credible] elections. The 2008 Zimbabwean elections as explored in Chapters 1 and 2 demonstrated that they were and could be held under inappropriate circumstances. From the literature and field research conducted, there is no ample evidence that GNU has established essential conditions conducive for credible elections.

The study has established that the GNU relegated civil society organs, community leaders and ordinary citizens to the margins, thereby turning government into the exclusive domain of main political parties. There was also no visible security sector reform, just as the justice sector was left untouched.

Though international and regional bodies played a role in resolving the Zimbabwean crisis, SADC's impact was softened by its lack of influence. The absence and lack of monitoring mechanisms by SADC also contributed towards the slow pace of reforms in Zimbabwe.

Notwithstanding the above-mentioned concerns, the achievements of the GNU were commendable. The GNU presided over some legislative reforms and the cessation of violence which easily could have led to an outbreak of a civil war. It has also managed to create some political stability, potentially allowing political actors to address issues plaguing the state.

Research interviews and the literature surveyed for this study demonstrated that the GNU has laid some foundation for democracy in Zimbabwe.

5.2 Recommendations

The GNU should put in place measures guaranteeing far-reaching institutional reforms. These should include the demilitarisation of politics and depoliticisation of the security forces in Zimbabwe, as their influence is overly expansive, permeating the judiciary and electoral processes.

The endemic culture of violence should be terminated as it compromises efforts at national healing and reconciliation.

SADC should find ways and means of ensuring that its mediation efforts are not undermined by any member-state. Such measures will help embolden its mediation efforts in member-states enveloped by political crisis.

Zimbabwe should avail itself to the various normative frameworks and guidelines at good governance and democracy explored in this study. Of cardinal relevance is the APRM, which allows SADC member-states to learn of the best practices available in the region. That way the country will improve its good governance credentials and thereby bridge the gap between policy and implementation.

When employed as a conflict resolution strategy, the GNU should seek to be inclusive of all stakeholders. Elements of civil society, community leaders and other groups should be roped into government structures as far as possible.

Political education and maturity in Africa should henceforth also mean that it is incumbent upon opposition leaders to gracefully concede defeat in free and fair elections. Such defeat should be construed as an opportunity for them to re-strategise and re-energise for the next elections.

REFERENCES

Ake, C. 1993. 'The Unique Case of African Democracy' *International Affairs* 69(2).

Ake, C. 1996. *Democracy and Development in Africa.* Washington DC: Brookings Institution.

Adejo, A.M. 2001. 'From OAU to AU: New Wine in Old Bottles?' *African Journal of International Affairs (AJIA)* 4(1).

Akokpari, J. Ndinga-Muvumba A. and Murithi, T. 2008. *The African Union and it's Institutions.* Auckland Park: Fanele.

Allamok, E. Egyesult, V. and Congress, N.L. 2008. 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices' Vol 1. US Government Printers.

Aning, K. and Danso, F.K. 2011. 'Exploring Collaborative Ventures with the European Union and United Nations', in R.D. Sharamo, & C. Ayangafac, (eds.), 'The State of human security in Africa: An assessment of institutional preparedness'. *Institute for Security Studies* 185.

Anyang' Nyong'o, P. Ghimazion, A. and Lamba, D. (eds.), 2002. *Nepad: A New Path?* Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation.

Auittery, M. 2009. 'Essay for and against coalition governments'. accessed 13 March 2012, from www.preservearticles.com.

Babbie, E.R. 2002. *The Basics of Social Research*. 2nd ed., USA: Wadsworth.

Bentham, J. 1957. 'An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation', in A.I. Melden (ed.), *Ethical Theories*. 2nd ed., Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall.

Bless, C. and Higson-Smith, C. 1995. *Fundamentals of Social Research Methods: An African Perspective*. 2nd ed. Lansdowne: Juta.

Biti, T. 2010. 'The 2010 National Budget Statement' presented before parliament of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Parliament House, 15 November 2009.

Bratton, M. and van de Wale, N. 1997. *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bujra, A. 2002. 'Africa: Transition from the OAU to the AU'. Lecture delivered at ACARTSOD Tripoli, Libya on 23 September 2002, accessed 5 December from, http://www.dpmf.org/meetings/From-OAU-AU.html.

Bureau of International Information Programs, US Department of State, ud. 'Democracy in Brief', accessed 5 July 2013, from http://isinfo.state.gov.

Burns, N. and Grove, S.K. 2003. *Understanding nursing research*, 3rd ed., Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Company.

Chimbga, D. 2011. 'Crimes against humanity: seeking accountability for gross violations of human rights committed during the election period in Zimbabwe in

2008'. MA thesis, Dept. of International Human Rights Law, Notre Dame Law School.

Chigora, P. and Guzura, T. 2011. 'The politics of the Government of National Unity (GNU) and power sharing in Zimbabwe: Challenges and prospects for democracy'. *African Journal of History and Culture* 3(2), pp. 20-26.

Civil Society Monitoring Mechanism CISOMM 2009, 'Annual Review of the Performance of The Inclusive Government of Zimbabwe'. February 2009-February 2010.

Coady, A. and Solomon, H. 2012. 'Responding to the Zimbabwe Crisis: Examining the role of preventive diplomacy in multi-track approaches toward Zimbabwe, 2000-2009'. *Journal of Middle Eastern and African Studies* 3(1).

Coltart, D. 2000. 'A Decade of Suffering in Zimbabwe, Economic Collapse and Political Repression under Robert Mugabe'. *CATO Institute 2008,* accessed 12 August 2011, from http://www.cato.org//pub/dpa/dpa5.pdf.

Constitutive Act establishing the African Union, accessed 18 October 2012, from www.africa-union.org

COPAC Draft Constitution, accessed 11 February 2013, from www.veritas.org.zw.

Corbin, J. and Strauss, A. 1998. *Basic Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques.* Newbury Park CA: Sage Publications.

Creswell, J.W. 2007. *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design*. London: Sage.

Crowder, G. 2002. *Liberalism and Value Pluralism*. London: Continuum.

Davis, R. 1999. *The Web of Politics: The Internet's Impact on the American Political System*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Diamond, L. 2008. 'Is the Third Wave of Democratization Over?', accessed 12 May 2012, from www.arizona.edu/...Diamond_1996.pdf...

Dersso, A.S. 2011. The African Standby Force: Its role and potential as one of the AU's response mechanisms' in R.D. Sharamo, and C. Ayangafac, (eds.), 'The State

of human security in Africa: An assessment of institutional preparedness'. *Institute for Security Studies* 185.

Dzimiri, P. 2011. 'Application of the 'Responsibility to Protect' norm in the international community's response to the humanitarian crises in Zimbabwe and Darfur'. PhD thesis, Dept. of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria.

Encyclopaedia Britannica, 'The nature of utilitarianism', accessed 13 September 2012, from

http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/620682/utilitarianism/68605/The-nature-of-utilitarianism.

Folusu, F. 2002. 'The African Union (AU): The Dawn of a Bright Future?'. *Socialist Democracy*. accessed 12 November 2012, from http://www.socialistalternative.org.

Fukuyama, F. 2006. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Free Press.

Garman, A. 2010. 'South Africa's 'bifurcated' public sphere: A danger to democracy and to media freedom'. Paper presented at the Media, Democracy and Transformation since 1994: An Assessment Conference, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa, 16-18 October.

Gitonga, A.K. 1987. 'The Meaning and Foundations of Democracy' in W.O. Oyugi, A.O. Odhiambo, M. Chege and A.K. Gitonga, (eds.). *Democratic Theory and Practice in Africa.* Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers Ltd.

Global Political Agreement, accessed 11 March 2011, from www.kubatana.net.

Grinnell, R.M. 1993. *Social Work Research and Evaluation*. 4th ed. Itasca: Peacock.

Herbert, R. and Gruzd, S. 2008. *The African Peer Review Mechanism: Lessons from the Pioneers.* Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs.

Hensley, T.R. (ed.), 2001. *The Boundaries of Freedom of Expression and Order in American Democracy.* Kent Ohio: Kent State University Press.

Heywood, A. 2007. *Politics*. 3rd ed., New York: Palgrave.

Hilla University for Humanistic Studies, Lecture on 21 January 2004, 'What is Democracy?', accessed 03 March 2011, from www.What-is-Democracy.htm.

Hodzi, O. 2011. *'Reforming the Criminal Justice System in Zimbabwe: Lessons from Kenya'.* MA thesis, Dept. of Management and Law, University of Kenya.

Holloway, I. 1997. *Basic Concepts for Qualitative Research*. Oxford: Blackwell Science Ltd.

Holloway, I. and Wheeler, S. 2002. *Qualitative Research in Nursing*. 2nd ed., Oxford: Blackwell Science Ltd.

http://www.dailynews.co.zw/index.php/news/34-news/11173--mdc-endorses-draft-constitution.html, accessed 17 August 2012.

http://www.electionguide.org/country.php?ID=240, accessed 11 September 2012.

http://www.kubatana.net/html/archive/demgg/120705ciz.asp?orgcode=CRI001&year=0&range_start=1, accessed 6 August 2102.

http://www.washingtonpost.com, accessed 17 March 2013.

International Bar Association's Human Rights Institute IBAHRI, 2011. 'Fact-Finding Mission Report on Rule of Law in Zimbabwe'.

Kotz, D.M. and Weir, F. 1997. *Revolution from Above: The Demise of the Soviet System.* New York: Routledge.

Landsberg, C. 2006. 'Foreign policy-making and implementation in post-settlement South Africa' in A. Venter and C. Landsberg. (eds.). Government and Politics in the new South Africa. 3rd ed. Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers.

Langlois, J.A. and Soltan, E.K. (eds.). 2009. *Global Democracy and its Difficulties*. New York: Routledge.

Lodico, M.G. Spaulding, D.T. and Voegtle, K.H. 2010. *Methods in Educational Research: From Theory to Practice.* California: John Wiley and Sons.

Loots, E. 2006. 'Road Map for Africa's Recovery: Challenges and Recommendations for Structural Reform'. *Africa Insight* 36(3 & 4).

Likoti, J.F. 2011. 'Election Processes and Future African Security Threats' in R.D. Sharamo, and C. Ayangafac, (eds.). 'The State of Human Security in Africa: An Assessment of Institutional Preparedness'. *Institute for Security Studies* 185.

Likoti, J.F. 2009. 'The 2007 General Election in Lesotho: The Application and the Challenges of the Electoral System'. *African Quarterly* 10(4).

Lotito, C. 2002. 'On the Utility of Bentham and Mill' accessed 13 September 2012, from http://groups.drew.edu/philoso/Archives/Lotito/On%20the%20utility%.

Maina, G. 2011. 'Mediating to Governments of National Unity - A Conflict Transformative Approach'. *The African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)*, accessed 22 April 2013, from www.accord.org.za.

Mapuva, J. 2010. 'Government of National Unity as a Conflict Prevention Strategy: A Case Study of Zimbabwe and Kenya'. *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa* 12(6).

Masamvu, S. Sims, B.M. and Mirell, H. 2010. 'Restrictive Measures and Zimbabwe: Political Implications, Economic Impact and a Way Forward'. Research Paper for An African Democracy Institute IDASA.

Matheba, G. 2000. 'South Africa in a globalising world; role of civil society'. Paper prepared for the Organisation for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (Ossrea) 6th Congress, Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, 24-28 April.

Matheba, G. 2005. 'Thabo Mbeki's Conundrum: Revisiting South Africa Foreign Policy Towards Zimbabwe'. In G. Jacques and G.N. Lesetedi (eds.), *The New Partnership for Africa's Development: Debates, Opportunities and Challenges*. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa.

Matlosa, K. 2011. 'Elections, Democracy and Peace in Southern Africa: Is there a causal link?'. Paper presented at the High Level Regional Meeting On Elections Integrity And Security In Eastern And Southern Africa, Sandton Convention Centre, Johannesburg, South Africa, 7 –9th December.

Matlosa, K. 2004. 'Electoral System Design and Conflict Mitigation: The Case of Lesotho'. *International IDEA* 22 (14).

Matyszak, D. 2010. *Law, Politics and Zimbabwe's 'Unity' Government*. Harare: The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS).

Mbeki, T. 1995. 'Africa's Time Has Come'. Address to the Corporate Council on Africa's Attracting Capital to Africa Summit, Virginia, USA, 19-22 April 1995.

Menocal, A.R. 2007. 'Analysing the relationship between democracy and development: Defining basic concepts and assessing key linkages'. Background note (1) prepared for the Wilton Park Conference on Democracy and Development, 23-25 October.

Mills, C.W. 1956. *The Power Elite.* Great Britain: Oxford University Press.

Mill, J.S. 1957. 'Utilitarianism', in A.I. Melden (ed.). *Ethical Theories.* 2nd ed. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall.

Mohammed, A. 2008. 'Towards an Effective African Union: Participation, Institutions and Leadership' in S. Adejumobi and O. Adebayo (eds.). *The African Union and New Strategies for Development in Africa.* New York: Cambria Press.

Mutisi, M. 2011. 'Beyond the signature: Appraisal of the Zimbabwe Global Political Agreement (GPA) and Implications for Intervention'. *The African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes ACCORD*, accessed 11 November 2012, from www.accord.org.za.

Neethling, T. 2000. 'Conditions for Successful Entry and Exit: An Assessment of SADC Allied Operations in Lesotho'. *Boundaries of Peace Support Operations* Monograph 44.

NEPAD, 'Framework October 2001', accessed 12 November 2012, from

www.nepad.org/nepad/knowledge/doc/1767/nepad-framework-document.

NEPAD, 'Objectives, Standards, Criteria and Indicators for the African Peer Review Mechanism', Draft 8, 2003. Midrand: NEPAD Secretariat.

Nieuwenhuis, J. 2007. 'Qualitative research resign and data gathering techniques', in K. Maree, (ed.), *First steps in Research.* 1st ed., Pretoria: Van Schaik.

Ober, J. 2008. 'The original meaning of "democracy": Capacity to do things, not majority rule'. *Constellations* 15(1), pp.3-8.

'OECD - Fragile states 2013: Resource flows and trends in a shifting world', accessed 4 February 2013, from www4.carleton.ca/cifp/app/serve.php/1245.pdf.

Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCR) Report, 2008, 'OHCR Fact finding mission to Kenya', Geneva, 6 – 28 February 2008.

Olaleye, W. (ed.), 2006. 'Negotiating the Impasse: Challenges and prospects for democratization in Zimbabwe'. Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) Research Report 9.

Oyugi, W.O. 2006. 'Coalition Politics and Coalition Governments in Africa'. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 24(1).

Parahoo, K. 1997. *Research: Principles, Process and Issues*. London: Palgrave Macmillan Limited.

Polit, D.F., Beck, C.T. and Hungler, B.P. 2001. *Essentials of nursing research: Methods, appraisal and utilization*. Philadelphia: Lippincott.

Popper, K. 1962. *The Open Society and its Enemies*. London: Routledge and Kegal Paul.

Przeworsk, A. Alvarez, M. Cheibub, J. and Neto, F. 2000. *Democracy and Development.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Przeworski, A. 1999. 'Minimalist conception of democracy: a defense'. in I. Shapiro and C. Hacker-Cordon, (eds.), *Democracy's Value*. Great Britain: Cambridge University Press.

Reeler, T. 2010. 'Foreword', in D. Matyszak, *Law, Politics and Zimbabwe's 'Unity' Government*. Harare: The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS).

Richards, S.A. 1999. 'Utilitarianism (Part 1): Introduction, Bentham and Mill'. accessed 13 September 2011, from www.webs.wofford.edu.

Ryan, A. 2010. 'Happiness and Political Theory'. *Social Research* 77(2). pp.421-440.

Rodney, W. 1972. *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House.

SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, accessed 12 January 2012, from www.eisa.org.za/PDF/sadcpf.pdf.

Saward, M. 1998. *The Terms of Democracy*. Oxford: Polity.

Schneider, M.L. 2011. 'Resistance and Denial'. accessed 12 July 2012, from www.crisisgroup.org/publicationtypes.

SITO Report, 2008, 'What happened in the Presidential election?' accessed 5 August 2012, from

www.kubatana.net/docs/elec/idasa_what_happened_pres_elec_080512.pdf.

Sokwanele Report, 2005, 'Operation Murambatsvina', An Overview and Summary'. accessed 12 January 2012, from

www.sokwanele.com/articles/sokwanele/opmuramb.

Sustein, C.R. 2001. *Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Tesch, R. 1990. *Qualitative Research: Analysis Types and Software Tools*. Abingdon: Routledge Falmer.

The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), accessed 10 October 2012, from www.african-union.org.

'The Least Developed Countries Report 2011'. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), accessed 2 February 2013, from www.unctad.org.

The Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group, 2002, 'The Parliamentary Elections in Zimbabwe 24-25 June 2000', accessed 4 April 2012, from http://www.thecommonwealth.org.

Tibaijuka, A.K. 2005. 'Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabwe to assess the Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina', accessed 11 August 2011, from

http://ww2.unhabitat.org/documents/ZimbabweReport.pdf.

Vines, A. 2013. 'A decade of African Peace and Security Architecture'. *International Affairs* 89(1). Blackwell Publishing.

www.allafrica.com, accessed 19 October 2012.

www.bbcnews.co.uk, accessed 11 September 2012.

www.carnegiecouncil.org, accessed 21 May 2012.

www.electionguide.org, accessed 5 June 2012.

www.hrw.org/print/reports/2009/06/26/diamonds-rough, accessed 31 July 2012.

www.fingaz.org, accessed 19 October 2012.

www.kubatana.net/documnets, accessed 14 May 2011.

www.moibrahimfoundation.org, accessed 19 December 2012.

www.newzimbabwe.com, accessed 14 May 2011.

www.photo.state.gov, accessed 21 October 2011.

www.swradioafrica.com, accessed 12 June 2011.

www.theindependent.co.zw, accessed 17 May 2012.

www.thenewage.co.za, accessed 21 November 2012.

www.voanews.com, accessed 13 September 2012.

www.zimbabwesituation.com/aug152012.html/#5z, accessed 15 August 2012.

Yin, R. 2003. *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. 3rd ed., Los Angeles: Sage.

Zeurn, E. 2009. 'Democratization as liberation: Competing African Perspectives on Democracy'. *Democratization* 16(3), pp.588-603.

Zimbabwe Elections Support Network Report, 2002, accessed 20 October 2011, from www.kubatana.net.docs.

Zimbabwe Government, 2004. *Electoral Act*. Chapter 2: 13, Sections 110(3) & 110(4), Harare: Government Printers.

Zimbabwe Peace Project, 2009. 'Human Rights Violence Report'. September 8 2009, accessed 20 October 2011, from

http://www.kubatana.net/docs/hr/zpp_hrviol_report_0809.pdf.

Zondi, E. and Bhengu, M. 2011. 'The SADC Facilitation and Democratic Transition in Zimbabwe: A Report', accessed 04 January 2013, from

www.igd.org.za/.../167-the-sadc-facilitation-and-democratic-transition-in-zimb.

Zubairu, W. 2011. 'Elections as a strategy for democratization and conflict transformation?: Liberal Peace and the 1996 Elections in Sierra Leone'. *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations* 5(4). pp. 229-244.

ANNEXURE: INTERVIEW GUIDE

Good day. My name is ....I am an MA (Political Science) candidate at the University of Limpopo, South Africa. I do not represent the government or any political organisation. This work is purely academic. I am carrying out research for the purposes of my study. My research focuses on GNU in Zimbabwe, particularly whether it contributed towards democratic entrenchment in the country. The purpose of this interview is to gather information for the study. Your responses will be strictly confidential. I kindly request your participation. You are however under no obligation to participate. The information you give me will be treated in the utmost confidence. I will not require your name, I.D number, immigration status or contact details at any

point in the interview. The Interview will take about 45 minutes. Your participation will be greatly appreciated.

Interview Details

i.   Date.......

ii.   Time.......

iii.   Start Time........   End Time.......

iv.   Duration..........

v.   Interview Language..........

vi.   Place.......

Demographic Information

1.   Sex of respondent.......

2.   Profession......

3.   Brief organisational background helps determine the credentials of the organisation thus validate the credibility of the source......

Questions on Democracy and GNU

1. Describe your understanding of democracy?

i.   Tenets of democracy

ii.   The criteria for deciding whether Zimbabwe is democratic or not?

iii.   The role of elections in democracy

iv.   The role of the media in democracy?

2. What is your position on the formation of a GNU and what is its mandate?

3. How does GNU promote democracy in Zimbabwe?

4. What are the positive attributes that you have noticed of GNU to date?

5. What are the negative attributes of GNU to date?

6. To what extent has GNU lived up to the GPA expectations/its mandate?

7. To what extent has GNU met the expectations of Zimbabweans?

8. What do you perceive to be the reason(s) behind the GNU's seemingly discordant nature?

9. What is the impact of SADC's role in the performance of GNU?

10. Do you think Zimbabwe GNU has performed any better than GNU in any other country, for example Kenya, Rwanda etc?

11. How do you see the future of GNU?

12. What are your recommendations regarding the future and performance of the

    GNU?

13. What are your hopes for Zimbabwe after GNU?

THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION