

REVISITING A BIG BROTHER'S RELATIONSHIP IN THE CONTEXT OF SOUTH AFRICA AND LESOTHO

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ABSTRACT

This article seeks to apprehend and highlight South Africa (SA) and Lesotho's ties looking at political, economic and diplomatic relations at both a bilateral and multilateral level. We see Lesotho as a country that needs to be politically reformed due to the ever reoccurring political instabilities that have plagued the country over the years. As such, this article uses thematic content analysis and critical discourse approach in their broadest form, to evaluate Pretoria's (the administrative capital of South Africa) mediation efforts in Lesotho, by comparatively assessing and appraising the 1998 Lesotho constitutional crisis and the 2014 attempted coup.

keywords: Bilateral Relation , Diplomatic, Diplomatic Relations,, Historical Ties

1. INTRODUCTION

In geographical terms, Lesotho and SA are inseparable (Rosenberg & Veisfelder, 2013). This is to say that Lesotho could be confused as one of SA's provinces. Lesotho is located right directly within SA. Furthermore, the ruling African National Congress's (ANC) military wing, uMkhonto weSizwe (MK) organised its guerrilla units in Lesotho during the heydays of apartheid. Considering its geographical proximity to SA, many MK operations and ANC secret meeting were held in Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola, among others. To a reasonable extent, it can be firmly stated that Lesotho played a very important role in the an-

ti-apartheid straggle by providing the SA's freedom fighters with a safe space to organise and manage cross-border attacks against the white minority rule (Holland, 1989:102).

For Cobbe (2014), the economies of SA and Lesotho are interdependent, with the latter providing a strategic resource to the former in the form of labour, skills and water. Ashton (2012:10) points out that more than 30% of Lesotho's economically active population are employed in South African mines. Ashton (2012:11) adds that about 50% of the income of Lesotho's rural households comes from family members employed in SA. Matlosa (2006) argues that the remittance constitutes

about 30% of the country's per capita Gross National Product (GNP). Therefore, economically, Lesotho receives disproportionate amount of its annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) directly from SA. Based on the findings of Ashton (2012:10), it can be argued that

Lesotho is profoundly reliant on SA for the supply of food, fuel, goods and services and linking infrastructure to the world. Rosenberg and Veisfelder (2013:200) state that South African companies dominate the business landscape in Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS). This economic reality makes the South African business fraternity to rely on the BLNS. Lesotho and SA's strong political ties should largely be understood within the context of closer relationship between politics and economics. The post-apartheid government's re-admission in the international stage paved a way for Pretoria to actively engage with the world and the African continent in particular.

According to Selinyane (2011) Pretoria's foreign policy was tested shortly after its re-admission into the global community when it had to deal with the re-occurring political conflicts which occurred in the neighbouring Lesotho.

It is against this backdrop that this article focuses on Pretoria's political, economic and diplomatic relations with Maseru since the year 1994 to date, at both the bilateral and multilateral level. Despite this periodisation, the article carries a historical sensibility in order to

marry the past and present moment. Primarily, this article aims to evaluate Pretoria's mediation efforts in Lesotho with specific reference to the 1998 Lesotho constitutional crisis and the 2014 attempted coup.

2. HISTORICAL TIES

Traditionally, when the Union of South Africa was established in 1910, three protectorates were established and excluded from the union (Rosenberg & Veisfelder, 2013:100). The protectorates included Bechuanaland, Swaziland and Basotho-land. It was envisaged that they would be incorporated later when a proper native policy was approved by the British government (Umesh, 1992:204). Rosenberg and Veisfelder (2013:107) contemplates that the relationship between the ANC and the people of Lesotho dates back to the formation of the South African Native National Congress (SANNC) in 1912. The political activities of the banned ANC inside SA had an impact on political developments in Lesotho and this laid the solid foundation for future cooperation.

For instance, the founder of the Basutoland African Congress (BAC) in Lesotho was Ntsu Mokhehle (later became a Prime minister of the country), who studied at the University of Fort Hare in the 1950s. He was a former member of the ANC Youth League (ANCYL). After the banning of the ANC in SA in 1960, the party moved to establish structures outside the country. Some of its members, together with those of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC),

fled the heavy handed state crack-down on political activists and went to Lesotho (Ellis & Sechaba, 1992: 180). Therefore, the presence of the ANC in Lesotho dates back to the early 1960s. However, the political relationship was strengthened after 1976 June student uprising in Soweto when hundreds of youth fled to Lesotho for political asylum (Morrow, Maaba & Pulumani, 2004:37).

Complementary to this, Ferguson (2003:75) points out that Lesotho government made special provision for the education of all young South African refugees in schools within their borders. Furthermore, 25% of scholarships from the Lesotho government's coffers were offered to South African refugees for university education. Lesotho also provided a safe passage for refugees leaving the country (Morrow, *et al.*, 2004: 40). In the early 1980s, MK mounted numerous attacks in SA from neighbouring states such as Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho (Janet: 2012:120). According to the former President of SA, the late Nelson Mandela, the threads of history, language and daily experience hold Lesotho and SA's people so closely that the bond goes beyond friendship and alliance (Mandela, 1995).

These sentiments were echoed during Mandela's state visit to Maseru in 1995. Thus, from the above mentioned sentiments, Lesotho and SA are politically close. In addition, the South African President Jacob Zuma and Tom Thabane's (Lesotho's former Prime Minister) relationship cannot be put out

of the equation. Earlier in 2004, Zuma introduced Thabane to Atul Gupta (a key member of the prominent Indian business empire in SA) which subsequently led to the appointment of Atul as a special advisor to the presidency of Lesotho (Meintjies, 2014). It is within this context that the close ties Zuma's family has with the Guptas signifies that Zuma and Thabane's relationship goes beyond the political relationship.

3. SOUTH AFRICA AND LESOTHO'S ECONOMIC RELATIONS

3.1. The case of the Joint Bilateral Commission for Cooperation (JBCC)

South Africa and Lesotho enjoy healthy economic relations and have already established the SA-Lesotho JBCC, which was signed in April 2001 by then President Thabo Mbeki in Lesotho (BuaNews, 2001). According to Ferguson (2003:174) the JBCC constitutes an important basis for strengthening relations between the two countries. Ferguson (2003:170) highlights that areas for possible cooperation under which the desired results can be achieved are listed in the JBCC agreement. The areas listed includes; mutual economic integration, political, social, cultural, humanitarian co-operation, science and technology, good governance, peace and security and facilitating the movement of persons, goods and services. Therefore, the key objective of JBCC is to promote economic integration between the two states, with the aim of uplifting Lesotho from her current status of least developed country (LDC) to the developing coun-

try (Steinberg, 2005:7).

According to the Presidency of South Africa (2014) in August 2010, President Zuma visited Lesotho. Moreover, the Lesotho's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Relations (2013) affirms that the overall strategic objective of the August 2010 visit was to pursue the consolidation of the African Agenda which aims to further strengthen the bilateral political, economic and social relations between African countries. The state visit took place after the Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) of JBCC between the two countries which was held at Maseru in April 2010 (Lesotho's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Relations, 2013). The SOM reviewed progress on the implementation of identified bilateral projects between the two countries. The outcome of the visit culminated into Zuma signing a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on economic cooperation between SA and Lesotho (The Presidency of South Africa, 2014). With regard to the aforementioned, Rosenberg and Veisfelder (2013: 23) indicates that a further MoU on economic cooperation signed between the two countries lacked authenticity. Rosenberg and Veisfelder (2013: 25) further assert that the JBCC has been dysfunctional for the past nine years. For Lekhetho (2014: 2), the dysfunctionality among others includes cross-border passenger and cargo transport for Lesotho's exports, small business and medium enterprises (SMEs), study permits and work permits, which formed part of the important JBCC areas. Therefore, Lekhetho (2014: 6) argues that the JBCC has lost

its robustness compared to its launch by Mbeki. Equally important, Pretoria's foreign policy with regard to Lesotho is primarily anchored on economic grounds

3.2. Southern African Customs Union (SACU)

SACU dates back to June 29, 1910, when South Africa, Basutoland, Swaziland and Bechuanaland signed the customs union agreement (CUA) of 1910. Draper and Dube (2010) content that only Britain and SA were involved in the 1910 negotiations which resulted in the 1910 SACU agreement. The 1910 SACU agreement lasted until the British Protectorates received independence in the mid-1960s. It was then renegotiated with the apartheid government, culminating in the 1969 SACU agreement (Hermann, *et al.*, 2013:332).

Furthermore, the 1969 SACU agreement effectively ensured that throughout the sanctions period three Frontline States (FLS) (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) continued to depend on SA for their imports and to a lesser extent their exports. Kirk and Stern (2003:56) point out that the agreement also included a revenue sharing formula for the division of customs and revenue collected in the union. The FLS received a significant proportion of their government revenue through this formula.

Moreover, when Namibia became independent from SA in 1990 it became a SACU member in its own right. However, by then, it was evident that the

1969 SACU agreement had almost run its course. Equally important, Mongardini, Benicio, Fontaine, Pastor and Verdier (2010:37) argue that the 1969 SACU agreement was tarnished by its connection to the apartheid regime. Therefore, the agreement in question ought to be reviewed as the political circumstances permitted in SA. The review process began prior to the first general democratic and inclusive elections in SA which were held in April 1994 (Rosenberg & Veisfelder, 2013:112).

In October 2002 following a protracted and acrimonious negotiation process, the five SACU member states signed a comprehensive, far reaching revised SACU agreement (Mongardini, *et al.*, 2010:47). The most noticeable feature of the SACU 2002 agreement is that it revised considerably the revenue sharing formula among SACU nations. The 2002 SACU formula consists of the customs component, an excise component and a development component (Grynberg & Motswapong, 2010). The revenue obtained from SACU's common external tariff plays a crucial role in advancing economic development and preserving political stability in the Southern African region (Matlosa, 2006).

In addition, the revenue makes up approximately 50% of Swaziland and Lesotho's budget revenues and 30% and 17% of the budget revenues of Namibia and Botswana respectively (Draper & Dube, 2010). Tafirenyika (2011) contemplates that the 2002 SACU agreement meant that customs revenues

will be distributed according to intra SACU imports, which implies that SA will provide considerable compensation to the BLNS states for trade benefits, the so called polarisation effects that flow to SA. The excise component of the revenue sharing formula is determined according to the size of each of the SACU member states (Kirk & Stern, 2003).

Nevertheless, a troubling feature of this customs union is that Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland have signed an interim economic partnership agreement (IEPA) with the European Union (EU), much to the disappointment of SA and Namibia (Draper & Dube, 2010). Apparently, SA and Namibia have strict reservations about some of the provisions of IEPA and had subsequently refused to sign the agreement. Complementary to this, Draper and Dube (2010) opined that implementation of the IEPA negotiations with the EU would undermine the customs union. Thus, according to Mongardini, *et al.*, (2010: 27) SA and Namibia would need to enforce border controls to prevent leakage of IEPA goods into their markets.

It is understandable that SA could also decide to go its own way on trade issues since SACU's common negotiating mechanism would have failed (Tafirenyika, 2011). The outcome is this might lead to SACU's ultimate dissolution. Subsequently, the signing of the IEPA by Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland can be viewed as a demonstration of their sovereignty and their resentment of SA's dominance in the

customs union. Hence, it should be noted that an abrupt withdrawal from SACU by SA would effectively create a failing state in Lesotho and Swaziland with all the associated economic, social and political fall-out (Rosenberg & Veisfelder, 2013:120).

3.3. Lesotho Highland Water Project Treaty (LHWPT)

Shortly after conducting a *coup d'état* in 1986, the military government in Lesotho unilaterally signed the LHWPT of 1986 with then apartheid regime of SA (Mashinini, 2010). Thus, central to this treaty is the agreement that Lesotho would sell water from its mountain areas to the SA in return for financial gain. Similarly, Cobbe (2014) maintains that the LHWP treaty proposed to create a profound economic, environmental, social and political ramification in Lesotho and between Lesotho and SA.

Swain (2004) claims that the LHWP is the largest bi-national infrastructure project between Lesotho and SA. The LHWP consists of dams, reservoirs, transfer tunnels and a hydroelectric power station. The project has four phases but initially only phase one was completed in 2004 while phase two is in progress (Mashinini, 2010). In addition, phase one of the LHWP included the construction of the Katse Dam, completed in 1997 and the Muela Hydroelectric Power Station, inaugurated in 1999 (Cobbe, 2014). The Mohale Dam was completed in 2003, also as part of phase one, which was celebrated with an official inauguration ceremony in 2004. On the other hand, Phase

two includes a pump storage scheme to generate 1 200 megawatts (MW) of energy and associated transmission lines (Wentworth, 2013). It is expected that the pump storage scheme will start generating electricity in January 2018 (Rosenberg & Veisfelder, 2013). Moreover, Cobbe (2014) outlines that the estimated costs of the pump storage scheme in 2010 were R7 600 million and will be borne by Lesotho. Lesotho sought a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) from Eskom and other large users in the region for the excess power that could be generated. Hence, the construction of Muela and Katse dams and related infrastructure will guarantee the desired level of water availability in Gauteng and the Vaal River water supply region in the most cost-effective manner. Mashinini (2010) asserted that in parallel with water conservation measures in the Vaal River, the LHWP phase two will influence the improvement of water quality and curb illegal water use. Furthermore, Phase two water delivery is expected to function from June 2020. The new phase will be funded off-budget. The foregoing means that funds will be borrowed from financial markets.

Similarly, Wentworth (2013:4) is of the view that, for Lesotho, the LHWP is a multi-purpose project and is widely seen as an opportunity to exploit its huge water reserves. Wentworth (2013:7) states that Lesotho will benefit from the royalty income paid by SA in return for water exports. With regard to benefits, Cobbe (2014) adds that Lesotho will further benefit from hydro-electric generation for con-

sumption, substituting imported power from SA. Wentworth (2013:7) contends that other benefits include provision of water for irrigation purposes and accompanying improvements in infrastructure. Therefore, for Pretoria, the LHWP serves a strategic importance as Gauteng relies predominantly on the project's success. As a result, Pretoria's engagements with Maseru are highly influenced by the LHWP.

4. SADC-SA ENGAGEMENTS IN LESOTHO

4.1. The 1998 constitutional crisis in Lesotho and SADC-SA's military intervention

During the 1998 general elections in Lesotho, the ruling Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) won 79 of the 80 available seats for the national parliament (Likoti, 2007). Contradictory to the findings by observers, opposition parties complained that the elections were rigged. Selinyane (2011) contends that this overshadowed the validity of the elections outcome. It is important to mention that the 1998 elections took place against the background of deep tensions and bitterness between the Basotho Congress Party (BCP) and the LCD (Lodge *et al.*, 2002). Moreover, Kabemba (2003) points out that eight months before the elections, Mokhehle, the former leader of the BCP, who was also Lesotho's Prime Minister from 1993 to 1998, led a splinter group that created the LCD.

Following the disputed victory by the LCD, the government and opposition

parties requested SA to assist in settling the dispute. The disputing parties appeared committed to whatever outcome to arise from SA's mediation efforts. Subsequently, SA invited Botswana and Zimbabwe as part of the SADC Troika to form a mediation team, under the leadership of the South African High Court Judge, Chief Justice Pius Langa, to audit the election results (Makoa, 2004).

However, Matlosa and Sello (2006:10) state that before the mediation team had started with their investigation; supporters of the opposition parties had staged mass demonstrations and demanded that the monarch dissolves the newly formed government. The protests impacted on the functioning of the country's administration. Matlosa and Sello (2006:13) assert that all the speculation and rumours about the outcomes of the Langa Commission Report (LCR) intensified the tensions as security forces were divided in their support for the new government.

In addition, Matlosa and Sello (2006:13) posit that the tense situation escalated into a political crisis. In addition, the army chief gave orders that tear-gas could be used to disperse the demonstrating crowds. However, this act put the country further into crisis, as a contingent of troops aimed their ammunition at fellow soldiers, who then rescinded (Likoti, 2007). The division within the army was apparent. As explained by Likoti (2007), there were serious fears that conflict could arise between the factions of the army. Furthermore, there were also concerns

that the continued protest by the opposition parties could worsen these tensions. The situation was getting out of hand and government was not in control of the country. Civil disorder engulfed the streets of the capital city and gun-wielding opposition supporters effectively took over the capital, preventing civil servants getting to work, hijacking vehicles and closing down Radio Lesotho (Kabemba, 2003).

At the invitation of Prime Minister Paka-litha Mosisili, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) entered Lesotho on 22 September 1998 (Selinyane, 2011). Nelson Mandela, the President of South Africa between 1994 and 1999, authorised 700 South African troops, supported by Botswana, to intervene in Lesotho in order to maintain law and order.

This occupation lasted for seven months from September 1998 to May 1999 (Hadebe, 2012:11). Hadebe (2012:14) asserts that the 1998 military intervention by SA was motivated by realist interests rather than humanitarian intentions. Hadebe (2012:14) further reasons that the military intervention was motivated by SA's fear that the deteriorating political situation in Lesotho would impact on the supply of fresh water to the Gauteng province. Realists argue that anarchy forces states to act in certain ways because they can rely on no-one but themselves (Donnelly, 2000: 11). Therefore, anarchy forces them to act in such ways, to defend their own self-interest. However, it is important to state that Pretoria's decisions are influenced by

many factors. Notably,

LHWP is one. However, it should be stressed that Pretoria was still in the process of transforming SA's identity from a pariah state to a respected international player at the time when it led a SADC mediation team in Lesotho (Landsberg, 2010:30). On the other hand, individuals and other non-state actors guide and direct the interactions of the states. Moreover, it is important to state that during the year 1998, SA was a young democracy trying to position itself continentally and internationally as well as compete with other nation states such as Zimbabwe for leadership in the Southern African region.

It is against this backdrop that the 1998 military intervention in Lesotho should be seen as a desperate measure by Pretoria to promote democracy, peace, security and stability in Lesotho as a way to demonstrate its willingness and ability to lead in the Southern African region.

5. THE 2014 ATTEMPTED COUP IN MAS-ERU AND SADC-SA'S MEDIATION EFFORTS

The events in August and early September 2014 in Lesotho come against the backdrop of increasing internal strife within the governing coalition, which consists of the All Basotho Convention (ABC), LCD and BNP. The fallout between Prime Minister Thabane and his deputy, Mothetjoa Metsing led to fears that the coalition would collapse. Thabane feared that Metsing would insti-

tute a vote of no confidence against him with a view of ousting him from his position as Prime Minister. As a result, in early June 2014, Thabane responded to this situation by abrogating Parliament for nine months. The abrogation was accepted by King Letsie III, who is a non-executive monarch and has been largely silent throughout the current crisis. Notwithstanding all of the above, the LCD, after its fall-out with Thabane's ABC, had signed an alliance agreement with the Democratic Congress (DC) in July 2014 with the eye on forming a new government (Motsamai, 2014). Nonetheless, this could only happen once the Parliament suspension is lifted. It is important to note that the DC won 48 seats in the 120 seat Parliament following the May 2012 elections. It was thought that Mosisili could regain power with Metsing as his deputy if Thabane were ousted by Parliament.

Fabricius (2014) highlights that tensions in Lesotho mounted following the announcement of Lieutenant-General Tladi Kamoli's dismissal as chief of the army and Lieutenant-General Maaparankoe Mahao as a replacement. These tensions mounted despite attempts by SADC to intervene. Kamoli's dismissal seems to have triggered the violence of 30 August 2014. Motsamai (2014) states that division and political infighting between the different factions not only created a constitutional crisis paralysing government but also persists despite the earlier regional mediation efforts. Most troubling is the fact that the security forces are involved in the unfolding power struggle

in the coalition government (Powell, 2014). Apart from the visible division within the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF), it also seems as though the LDF and the Lesotho police stand on different sides of the political divide. It is worth noting that clearly, there is a major security sector problem in Lesotho.

Prior to the appointment of Cyril Ramaphosa as the facilitator for the SADC mediation team, the mediation process for the conflict under review was led by Namibia. The intervention was influenced by Lesotho's Prime Minister's claims that a *coup d'état* was under way in his country. SADC assisted Lesotho by sending an observer team and a facilitator. It was clear that SADC was not going to send troops to placate the army, as was requested by Prime Minister Thabane (Louw-Vaudran, 2014). SADC clearly favoured a political solution apparently echoing statement of the Secretary General of the United Nations (UN) Ban Ki-moon. Ban Ki-moon voiced a concern of a military takeover in Lesotho. In this regard, he urged all parties to resolve their differences peacefully for a lasting resolution (United Nations News Centre, 2014). Apparently, Lesotho's Prime Minister Thabane called on SA and SADC to send peacekeeping troops to his country, after claiming that the army had seized power in a coup (South African Press Association, 2014). It is worth noting that Pretoria responded with a statement. The statement reaffirmed that the South African government fully support the African Union's (AU) position on the unconstitutional change of governments on

the continent. In this context, the South African government and SADC will not tolerate any unconstitutional change of government in the region and continent (Fabricius, 2014).

Consequently, SADC mediation efforts led by Ramaphosa culminated into the signing of Maseru Facilitation Declaration Agreement (MFDA) (SAPA, 2014). The MFDA made a provision that Parliament must be dissolved at the beginning of December 2014 to prepare for the national general elections which were held at the end of February 2015 (Baloyi, 2014). Furthermore, Ramaphosa and SADC observer team efforts in solving Lesotho's political crisis has also resulted in the signing of the Maseru Security Accord (MSA). The MSA was signed by Lieutenant-General Tladi Kamoli, Lieutenant-General Maaparankoe Mahao and Commissioner Khotatso Tsooana. The MSA aimed to promote harmonious relations between the leadership, officers and members of both the LDF and the Lesotho Mounted Police Service (LMPS) (Baloyi, 2014).

According to Ramaphosa the security accord further provides the leaders to do everything in their power to actively prevent, discourage and ensure that no further confrontations or hostilities are caused and occur between members and units of the LDF and the LMPS (SAPA, 2014). As agreed in the MFDA, the reconvening of Lesotho's Parliament by His Majesty, King Letsie III took place on Friday, 17th October 2014 (Jordan, 2014). During the reconvening of Parliament in Lesotho, three

South African Police Service (SAPS) armoured vehicles were parked outside the Parliament building during the ceremony (Motsamai, 2014). Therefore, this can be seen as a sign of the strategic role that Pretoria has played in restoring law and order in Lesotho.

It is important to note that, SADC has yet demonstrated its confidence in Pretoria by choosing Ramaphosa as the facilitator in Lesotho and re-election of President Zuma to chair the SADC organ for politics and defence Troika (DIRCO, 2014). SA's dominance and peace keeping efforts are further demonstrated by the deployment of 140 members of the SAPS to Lesotho to ensure long term political and security stability (SA news, 2014). It is worth noting that this should not be seen as a desperate measure to protect the LHWP.

In fact, it should also be seen as a commitment by SA to bring peace and security in Lesotho as envisaged by DIRCO. There is no gainsaying that stability in Lesotho is of strategic importance to Pretoria. Looking at this from a personal level, the deployment of the SAPS can be seen as Zuma's silent response to Thabane's demands but at the same time ensuring that the LHWP is secured. This can be dubbed as a well-calculated strategic move by Pretoria. SA's mediation success so far demonstrates its maturity in terms of dealing with conflicts in the SADC region as opposed to the unpredictable 1998 military intervention.

6. CONCLUSION

The empirical study of this article has established that in the context of the relationship between SA and Lesotho, the agency is moved from Maseru to Pretoria. This means that the relations between SA and Lesotho are largely dictated by the strategic interests of the former. In other words, the relationship between SA and Lesotho can best be understood when located in the context of SA's foreign policy in the SADC region and Africa as whole. Based on the foregoing, it is not far-fetched to state that Lesotho does not have a clear and solid foreign policy that defines how it relates to SA. In the final analysis, it is observed that Lesotho and SA have cordial bilateral relations. Their bilateral relations are also completed through close collaboration within existing regional cooperation frameworks such as SADC and SACU.

It has been clearly shown that Pretoria-Maseru relations are more grounded on economic and political grounds. Historically, the Pretoria-Maseru relations demonstrate that Lesotho was supposed to be another province of SA. In economic terms, Lesotho depends entirely on SA considering its over dependence on SACU and that its borders are completely surrounded by SA. On the other hand, SA relies on Lesotho for the supply of water to the water strained Gauteng Province.

Lesotho and SA commonalities do not end only with language, geography and culture, but their political history is inextricably intertwined. Thus, Leso-

tho and SA relations can best be described as immemorial. In addition to this, it has been illustrated that even after Lesotho and SA have strengthened ties, border control still remains a sore point between the two countries. Looking at Lesotho's over dependence on SA, incorporating Lesotho for political reasons is not feasible but could be considered in future.

Subsequently, the 1998 coup and the 2014 attempted coup share a similar pattern of a division between the security forces. Pretoria has been hugely criticised for its military intervention during the 1998 Lesotho constitutional crisis. However, the 2014 attempted coup has seen Pretoria using a different approach and successfully mediating and stabilising the Lesotho crisis. Pretoria opted for a political resolution rather than a militant resolution. Therefore, a clear demonstration of her maturity in her policy approaches with regard to the promotion of peace, security and stability in the Southern African region.

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