An Afrocentric Critique of the United States of America’s foreign policy towards Africa: The case studies of Ghana and Tanzania, 1990-2014

by

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(School of Social Sciences)

at the

University of Limpopo

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Co-supervisor: Prof. T. Sodi
Declaration

Student no: 201324973

I, Kgothatso Brucely Shai declare that An Afrocentric critique of the United States of America’s foreign policy towards Africa: The case studies of Ghana and Tanzania, 1990-2014 is my own work and that all sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

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Signature                                      Date

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Dedication

This study is dedicated to my late matrimonial grandmother, Mafiri “Nkakaile” Lewele for being there for me at all times.
Abstract

The United States of America’s (US) foreign policy towards Africa has been the subject for debate. This is partly because the country’s relationship with African countries is not consistent. By and large, such relations are shaped by a number of factors which include political orientation and material resources. Within this context, the present study uses case studies from two different parts of Africa to tease out US foreign policy towards Africa. This explorative study uses Ghana and the United Republic of Tanzania (hereafter referred to as Tanzania) as test cases to compare and critique the post-Cold War foreign policy of the US towards Africa. It does this by first analysing and constructing the theoretical material on the three pillars of the US Africa policy (oil, democracy and security) and subsequently, contemporaneously locating the US relationship with Ghana and Tanzania. Largely, the study carries a historical sensibility as it traces the US relationship with Ghana and Tanzania from as far as the colonial era. History is crucial in this regard because the past provides a sound basis for understanding the present and future. To add, in International Politics theory holds sway and history is used as a laboratory.

In this thesis, the researcher proposes Afrocentricity as an alternative theoretical paradigm crucial in understanding US foreign policy towards Africa. As it shall be seen, such a paradigm (theoretical lens) remains critical in highlighting the peculiarity of the US relationship with Ghana and Tanzania. It is envisaged that a deeper understanding of the US foreign policy towards Ghana and Tanzania is achievable when its analysis and interpretation is located within a broader continental context of Africa. To realise the purpose of this study, the researcher relies methodologically on interdisciplinary critical discourse and conversations in their widest forms.

With reference to the test cases for this study, the agenda for democratic consolidation features prominently on both of them while oil is only applicable to Ghana in this regard. In contrast, Tanzania distinguishes itself both as a victim of terrorism and equally so as a strategic partner on the US anti-terrorism efforts in East Africa. Yet, oil in West Africa’s Ghana is important for the US both as an economic resource and a strategic energy source during wartime periods. Overall,
the ‘differential’ foreign policy towards individual African states is also a significant observation which dispels the myth of a universal US foreign policy framework.

**Keywords:** Africa, Afrocentricity, democracy, East Africa, foreign policy, Ghana, oil, security, Tanzania, United States of America, West Africa.
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>Africa Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGOA</td>
<td>African Growth and Opportunity Act</td>
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<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>AOOPIG</td>
<td>African Oil Policy Initiative Group</td>
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<td>APRM</td>
<td>African Peer Review Mechanism</td>
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<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCGA</td>
<td>Chicago Council on Global Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Chama Cha Mapinduzi</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>Convention People’s Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Center for Strategic and International Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisations</td>
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<td>CSR</td>
<td>Corporate Social Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>Deputy Director General</td>
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<tr>
<td>DHRF</td>
<td>Democracy and Human Rights Funds</td>
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<tr>
<td>DME</td>
<td>Department of Minerals and Energy</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWASBRIG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Standby Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>EISA</td>
<td>Electoral Institute of Southern Africa</td>
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<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>European Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus</td>
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<td>HPI</td>
<td>Human Poverty Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>HSRC</td>
<td>Human Sciences Research Council</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development</td>
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<td>Abbr</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGD</td>
<td>Institute of Global Dialogue</td>
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<tr>
<td>IIASA</td>
<td>International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISS</td>
<td>Institute of Security Studies</td>
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<td>ISS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Syria</td>
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<tr>
<td>KANU</td>
<td>Kenya African National Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCA</td>
<td>Millennium Challenge Account</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCC</td>
<td>Millennium Challenge Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Alignment Movement</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>NIHSS</td>
<td>National Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences</td>
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<td>NRF</td>
<td>National Research Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
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<td>PEPFAR</td>
<td>President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFG</td>
<td>Partnership for Growth</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAAPAM</td>
<td>South African Association of Public Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAIRR</td>
<td>South African Institute of Race Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA-YSSP</td>
<td>Southern African Young Scientists Summer Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANU</td>
<td>Tanganyika African National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRALAC</td>
<td>Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUT</td>
<td>Tshwane University of Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UFS</td>
<td>University of Free State</td>
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<tr>
<td>UHRA</td>
<td>Uganda Human Rights Activists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UL</td>
<td>University of Limpopo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNISA</td>
<td>University of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URCS</td>
<td>Uganda Rural Community Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIS</td>
<td>United States Informational Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<tr>
<td>WAC</td>
<td>World Affairs Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTC</td>
<td>World Trade Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZANU-PF</td>
<td>Zimbabwean African National Union-Patriotic Front</td>
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Section A (General Perspectives)

Chapter 1
Contextual Orientation of the Study

1.1. Identification of the research theme

The involvement, both directly and indirectly of the United States of America (USA), (hereafter referred to as the US), in Africa is a contested terrain amongst academics and practitioners of international relations and diplomacy. However, there is an agreement that the unequal relations between the US and Africa is not a recent development; it is rather a historical one. The existing literature on Africa-US relations delineates that Africa and the US have a shared past, though not common. Overall, America’s relations with Africa date back to the 1600s. For example, in 1619 a Dutch ship sold twenty Africans in the British North American colonies, who were captured in Angola, as slaves (Ogot, 1999:1-11). In this context, the study purposively refers to the entire Africa, but the example it cites is either Southern or West Africa. It could well be that the history of the relations between America with other African regions such as North Africa dates back to 1500s (Akinwo, 2015). Besides, this is not European history. It is mainly European history as it relates to transatlantic slave trade. Nevertheless, the conflation of the European and American history in the foregoing narrative should be understood within the context that Britain was at the centre of historical and cultural ties between Africa and the US. In both Africa and America, Britain maintained colonies and primarily linked to this research, London is the former metropole of both Ghana and Tanzania.¹ The two countries have been arbitrarily identified as test cases for this study for convenience and control purpose because there are other African states that are central to the US foreign policy on the continent including South Africa and Egypt. Besides not being country case studies, Egypt and South Africa fall beyond the sub-regional scope of this study, which is East Africa and West Africa.

¹ Until the year 1916, Tanzania was a German colony of Tanganyika and it changed its status at the end of the First World War with the confiscation of German colonies. Tanganyika and Zanzibar merged in 1964 to give rise to Tanzania.
Mwakikagile’s (2007:90) qualms with the fact that the Americans “took Africans away in chains and colonised them on the American soil where they worked for more than three hundred years without being paid a penny” partly explains why both the US and Africa were at the centre of the history of slavery. It is therefore not surprising that the US currently prides itself with a small, but significant segment of the population of African-Americans. This historical and demographic reality is articulated by Susan Rice (1999: 4) when she argues that approximately twelve percent of the American population trace their cultural and genealogical roots from the African continent.\(^2\) Ghana and Tanzania are the ancestral homes of the fair component of Africans who reside in the US and in the recent past (Akinwo, 2015; Shwanai, 2015), Barack Obama led Washington has been more involved with both Accra and Dodoma, capital cities for Ghana and Tanzania, respectively, among other African states than in any other period (Walker, 2013). The Obama’s snubbing of both Kenya and Nigeria as described by the mainstream media in favour of Ghana and Tanzania in his first and second Africa official visit is emblematic of the change of focus of the US engagement with West Africa and East Africa (Kariuki, 2013).

Despite the well recorded and widely documented US-Africa shared history, there is no general agreement among academics and opinion makers about the real motivations and effects of Washington’s foreign policy towards Africa. To add salt to the wound, scholars are at pains to bridge the widening chasm on the evolving debate as to whether the election of any US administration since the end of the Second Great Imperialist War (1939-1945) to date, represented an agency of change or continuity in the foreign policy of the US towards Africa (Banjo, 2010: 141-143). This can be attributed to the complex set of various antagonistic actors involved in the making and implementation of foreign policy in the US. This includes the President, Congress, civil society formations, interests groups and secret societies, among others. According to H. Ouyang as cited by Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedi (2005: 28), civil society generally plays a supplementary role to the “functions performed by political parties in a democracy”.

\(^2\) Susan Rice served under President Bill Clinton as an Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs towards the end of 1997 till 2001.
The contested viewpoints on the debate about the US foreign policy towards Africa may also have to do with competing perceptions about the continent among politicians, analysts and academics. In order to develop a good, clear and coherent foreign policy, the US needs mutual understanding and closer cooperation between the Congress and President and also with the African leaders (Hamilton, 2004: 18-19). This position is not empirically unrealistic because the President is the chief foreign policy maker in the US but his power is conditioned by the Congress which was given more power by the Constitution on matters of foreign affairs. The mutual understanding of the American and African leaders is also crucial in this regard because the latter preside over the countries that are at the receiving end of the US foreign policy. At the domestic level, the two chambers of the Congress, the House and Senate are often dominated by different political parties and racial groups. This is a development that often stifles cooperation with the presidency on issues of national importance, including foreign policy (Shank, 1993: 300-305).

However, in the contemporary period, a pattern of using pivotal states such as Ghana and Tanzania as regional enforcers of the US foreign policy in Africa can be observed. This has been especially the case since the days of Bill Clinton’s term of office and it was later concretised under the leadership of his successor, George W. Bush and the current president Barack Obama. While much of the literature on foreign affairs indicates that there is no radical break of the past in the foreign policy of the US in Africa, Washington’s post-Cold War engagement in this continent was mainly characterised by the subcontracting of its foreign policy to local clients including Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia and South Africa (United States, 2002: 11). Kenya and Ethiopia shared the responsibility for East Africa and the Horn of Africa. Nigeria and South Africa were assigned West Africa and Southern Africa, respectively. This process or pattern of foreign policy formulation and execution is what is termed “regionalising” in this study.

It is argued that geo-strategic and economic calculations of the Obama administration have prevailed the demotion of Nigeria and Kenya in favour of Ghana and Tanzania as on the ground agencies of the US foreign policy in their respective

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3 Pivotal states are “countries whose fate determines the survival and success of the surrounding region and ultimately the stability of the international system” (Chase, Hill & Kennedy, 1996: 33).
regions. While South Africa is on top of all these countries mentioned above in terms of economic and political strength, it is a fact that the recent re-orientation of the US praxis with West Africa and East Africa cannot be ignored and it necessitates a serious attention from scholars and other professionals working in the area of US’s international relations and foreign policy analysis.

According to Schraeder (1994: 2), throughout the time US policies towards Africa could best be described as those of “…indifference at worst and neglect at best…”. Given the dynamics of US politics, the important point to take away here, is the acknowledgement that regime change in the US has often brought about changes at rhetorical level without action. On the other hand, successive American governments under various political parties tended to compromise their interests in Africa in favour of other regions including the Middle East and their engagement on the continent was tailored on ad hoc measures often triggered by a crisis situation (Posen & Ross, 1996/7: 50-53). This view is shared and well captured in an editorial headlined: “[T]he neglected continent” (Baron, 2007). To begin with, during the colonial era, US-Africa relations were conducted mainly under the tutelage of Britain as highlighted above. This fact brought about confusing and conflicting policy positions of Washington towards Africa due to the struggle among American politicians to either develop an independent foreign policy on Africa or relate to it through the strategic framework of Britain. The joint US-British involvement in Africa was also responsible for the shattering of the hopes of Africans especially in relation to America’s contribution to their (Africans) liberation.

Commenting on the US foreign policy towards Africa on the eve of independence from colonialism and to development in relation to the above, Hans Morgenthau (1955: 319) noted that “[T]he metropolitan governments stand between American interests and the satisfaction of those interests, and that satisfaction is dependent not only upon the wisdom of American policies but also, and primarily, upon the wisdom of the metropolitan governments”. While this evaluation was made five decades ago, it has been brought back to light as both a truth and fact by James N. Kariuki’s (2013) account of the reasons why Barack Obama skipped Kenya in his African itinerary in 2013.
It is noted that during Africa’s struggle for independence, America did not identify itself with the cause of Africa, despite the claim that it is a “saviour nation” (Moss, 1995: 190). This happened to the disappointment of many Africans due to the generally accepted view that America did not have a hand in the legacy of the Berlin Conference of 1884 (Tofa & Tofa, 2011: 333-334). As such, the US would tacitly or naturally qualify as the probable ally of the African independence nationalist movements such as the Convention People’s Party (CPP) of Ghana, Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and Kenya African National Union (KANU), among others. Although, the US sympathised with the colonial powers (Britain in particular). This should be understood within the context that the US did not take part in the partition of Africa, but it also colonised the African bodies before 1884 by virtue of engaging in the illicit trade of human capital in what came to be known as slavery. This premise suggests that the US benefitted from slavery which laid a precedent for formal colonialism and it is sensible for her to align with Britain during the anti-colonial conflicts and related struggles. While emphasising this expedient socio-historical development, Morgenthau (1955: 319) also wrote that “…it is inevitable that the objectives of American policy will at times be at variance with those of the metropolitan nations, that at times they will coincide by accident rather than in view of their intrinsic identity, and that more frequently they will be identical in appearances and short run objectives rather than in their ultimate goals”. In relation to the above-stated fact, W.T.R. Fox and A.B. Fox as cited by Obiozor (1992: 6), state that what brought the US and Britain together in the twentieth century is largely, the crisis in global politics. The position taken here relates to the steady withdrawal of the former colonial powers such as Britain from their dominions in both Asia and Africa, especially in the period between the 1940s and 1960s.

Likewise, in the post-1948 era, the US failed to develop an unambiguous, coherent and independent policy on Africa. Its policy was essentially based on security considerations of the communist East and capitalist West rivalry. The main goal of the US Africa policy during the Cold War was the containment of the spread of communism (Nye, 1997: 98-129). To this end, Washington’s foreign policy machinery was preoccupied with security concerns and also aimed at the protection and preservation of Africa’s mineral riches for their own benefit. Morgenthau (1955: 318) notes that the continued interest of the US in the economic stability of its
European traditional allies and friends such as Britain, France and Portugal, among others, tacitly implied that Washington would also like to see their uninterrupted access to the economic riches of Africa and whose flow into their countries would be disturbed by decolonisation. It is in this context that:

... Europeans (and Americans) have regarded Africa’s place in global affairs as ‘magnificent cake’ of natural resources from flowers and ostrich feathers to oil, diamonds and uranium- and a dauntingly complex human and geophysical chess and try on a wide variety of hare-brained ideas (Swatuk, 2004: 3).

As such, since the founding of the Republic in 1789, US policy on Africa was practically characterised by “benign neglect” (Schraeder, 1994: 2). Except for the Cold War period (1945-1990), the US policy was viewed to be mainly driven by events and/or political developments on the continent and as such it was just but a reactionary policy based on ad hoc measures (Rothchild & Keller, 2006: 251).

History has it that there were no major shifts of US policy on Africa overtime. Even during Jimmy Carter’s presidency that was seen as pro-African, Picard and Groelsma (1989: 227-228) pointed out that, change was only on rhetorical positions and such were not advanced to have an effect on the substance of Washington’s foreign policy towards Africa. Based on the foregoing, the literature on ‘neglect’ as the centre piece of the US foreign policy towards Africa gained prominence in 1994 when Washington adopted a position of inaction while genocide was happening in Rwanda. Since then the literature has attracted a lot of competing explanations and this research subscribes to the literature on ‘indifference’.

It is argued that the literature on the policy of ‘neglect’ ignores the fact that the foreign policies of various administrations in the US are often inclined by various factors. For instance, in terms of Africa’s foreign policy, George Bush Sr. was on the finishing line of the work laid by his predecessor, President Ronald Reagan who was more concerned with Cold War security calculations. He had a very limited period to introduce radical foreign policy reforms as he only presided for no more than two years in the post-Cold War era. The administration of George W. Bush Jr.’s major foreign policy goal in Africa was the war against terrorism following the September
11, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington DC and it was also oil inclined. It is important to highlight that it is often argued in certain quarters that Bush Jr’s foreign policy and its underlying politics of oil was a continuation of his father’s foreign policy that became a mere guideline when he was untimely dislodged from the presidential office in 1993 by Democratic Party candidate, Bill Clinton. On the other hand, some observers argue that the Republication Party president Bush Jr’s implementation of African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a brainchild of his predecessor, Clinton, and Obama’s persistence over it is evident of Clinton’s legacy on the foreign policy of the presidencies of both Bush Jr and Obama in so far as Africa is concerned (Shoba, et al., 2013: 1-2). On the basis of this, it can be argued that there has not been any fundamental shift on the economic dimension of the US foreign policy on Africa from Clinton to Obama era. On the other hand, a literature study of Bill Clinton’s speeches and government documents on foreign affairs produced during his term of office reveals an emphasis on democracy, good governance and human rights issues in Africa (Vines and Cargill, 2010: 63-64). Despite presiding in the post-Cold War era, Clinton was often seen by some in Africa to be emulating the Cold War US President and his comrade, Jimmy Carter of the Democratic Party in terms of his open and critical stance against autocratic governments on the continent.

The cross cutting of key foreign policy niche areas across various Presidencies in the US filters through the veil of the plague of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to the successive inaugurations of George W. Bush Sr, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush Jr and Barack Obama who presided over Washington and/or the White House in the post-Cold War era, and the complex and secretive nature of foreign policy processes has presented both the scholarly and popular literature with ideological and philosophical contestations as briefly explained in the discussion above (Roskin, et al., 2010: 15-19). Interestingly, both the Bush(es) come from the Republican Party and Clinton and Obama are the outstanding members of the Democratic Party. Their diverse political membership and ideological alignment present a rare opportunity for this study to go beyond personalities in the analysis of the US foreign policy, but also reflect critically on the role and influence of both the Republican Party and the Democratic Party on foreign policy matters irrespective of who is in the presidency. This is an interesting case because unlike Afrocentricity, the mainstream
International Relations theories of Realism (and Marxism) and Idealism have downplayed the importance of political parties on foreign policy issues while placing an emphasis on the centrality of states on such matters (Nganje, 2012: 8-9). Additionally, the test cases for this study, Ghana and Tanzania have been identified in 2011 for a Partnership for Growth (PFG) by the US along with other two non-African states, El-Salvador and the Phillipines. PFG is recorded in the fact sheet of the US Department of State (2011) as “a partnership between the US and a select group of countries to accelerate and sustain broad-based economic growth by putting into practice the principles of President Obama’s September 2010 Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development”. The principles in question are outlined by the US State Department as follows:

- Country ownership and partnership;
- High-level political leadership and commitment to development progress;
- Rigorous, evidence-based joint analysis on constraints to growth conducted by integrated teams of U.S. Government and PFG country officials;
- Joint decision-making on where to focus and prioritize resources;
- Use of a broad range of tools, including catalytic policy change, institutional reform, aid, diplomatic engagement, and other ‘non-assistance’ policy tools;
- Transparency, mutual accountability and fact-based monitoring and evaluation (Ibid).

Even though this study highlights some of the significant events in the history of US-Africa relations before the end of the Cold War, the year 1990 is used as a starting point in this research. It marked the official demise of the Stalinist Soviet Empire and the rise of the US as the sole superpower in the world. It also served as a watershed moment in the democratisation of Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa which was later to have an impact on US-Africa relations. It is crucial to point out that while the year 1990 has been chosen as a starting point for this research, the need to situate the analysis in a historical context of the evolution of the US foreign policy has at times compelled the researcher to reflect critically on the pre-1990 era and select major developments that have had far-reaching influence on the content and direction of the post-Cold War US foreign
policy towards Africa and its ultimate consequences for both Washington and the African states, Ghana and Tanzania in particular. This research ends in the year 2014. This year was marked by the hosting of the US-Africa Summit in Washington, D.C. This summit has provided an arena for dialoguing and enhancement of mutual understanding between the US President and the collective of the majority of his African counterparts.\(^4\) Albeit, the period between 1990 and 2014 was carefully selected to encompass the four US presidents in order to enhance the understanding of the differing or similar policy traits to US-Africa relations. While it is periodically untimely to reflect on post-2012 developments in this study because Obama’s 2\(^{nd}\) term as the President is in the middle, it is necessarily tempting but factually and politically correct to briefly touch on the major highlights of the 2013 extended Africa visit by Obama and the subsequent US-Africa Summit in the year 2014.

This should be understood in part, within the context that Obama, just like his predecessor, George W. Bush Jr, has not been very clear about Africa policy during his first term of office as the President of the US. But this is no surprise because Africa has also seldom featured in his electioneering speeches and other communiques in the run-up to the 2008 Presidential polls in the US. To a certain extent, therefore, the 2013 extended African visit by Obama is evident of the renewed interest of the US engagement in Africa. Even though the foregoing narrative represents a kind of a break from the conventionally time and region bound historical and political scholarship, this study follows the advice that social scientists “stand to benefit by transgressing those boundaries and can cast new and revealing light on issues that time and region bound historians [and political scientists] may have missed” (Hall, 2007: 82).

It is against this background that this study aims to use the Afrocentric paradigm as a theoretical lens to critique the post-Cold War US foreign policy towards Africa, particularly in Ghana and Tanzania. Emphasis is placed on the general trends of US policy on Africa, while using its relations with Ghana and Tanzania in particular, to

\(^4\) For a variety of reasons which are beyond the scope of this study, the heads of states and governments of Central African Republic (CAR), Eritrea, Sudan, Zimbabwe and Western Sahara were not invited to the US-Africa Summit, 4-6 August 2014 in Washington D.C.
determine if its engagement at country level is indifferent or not. Owing to the fact that US’s interests vary with countries, Ghana and Tanzania are used as test cases in this study. This is also partly informed by the researcher’s desire to analyse the general notion among many Eurocentric and American academics to treat Africa as an equivalent of a single country or polity, with complete disregard of its vastness, diversity and the fact that it is composed of fifty four independent nation states.

1.2. Problem statement

The US Africa policy has not really changed in a very long time and its philosophy or guiding principle has been based on exploitation of Africa’s natural resources (Ilesanmi, 2014; Matthews, 2014; Zondi, 2016). There are observable inconsistencies in the application of standards in US foreign policy towards Africa especially in the areas of trade, democracy and security. For example, US’s relations with Ghana and Tanzania reflect that Washington’s strategic goals (based on security and commercial interests) trumps its rhetorical support for the promotion of democracy and the rule of law as a foreign policy objective (Schraeder, 1998; Van de Walle, 2009). However, this discourse is often partially understood due to the lack of an Afrocentric perspective on the existing literature in this area.

1.3. Operational definition of concepts

This study is anchored on the concepts of Foreign Policy and Afrocentric Critique. Due to their varying roles in academy and their subsequent competing explanations, this section briefly explains their meaning in the context of this study.

1.3.1. Foreign policy

In their scholarly treatise on International Relations, Goldstein and Pevehouse (2011: 78) explain foreign policy as the strategy that a government uses in its interactions in the international arena. In this research the word “engagement” is used interchangeably with “foreign policy” and it simply denotes the nature of practice and conduct of one’s country’s international affairs in the political, security and socio-economic arena with intent to protect and preserve its national interests.
1.3.2. Afrocentric critique

It is an analysis which is based on the precepts of Afrocentricity as articulated by scholars such as Asante (2003) and is purported to be predominantly African. Its main elements include grounding, orientation and perspective; which constitute the analytical categories of Afrocentricity. In contrast, the precepts of main International Relations theories (Realism, Idealism and Marxism) are predominantly Western (Chilisa, 2012). Despite the difference between the Afrocentric critique and other perspectives, an analysis based on Afrocentricity also draws from the progressive ideas of main International Relations theories.

1.4. Purpose of the study

1.4.1. Aim of the study

The aim of this study is to critique the post-Cold War US foreign policy towards Africa, particularly in Ghana and Tanzania using an Afrocentric perspective.

1.4.2. Objectives of the study

This study seeks to achieve the following objectives:

- to give a critical detail of the areas of divergence and convergence between the US foreign policy and the national interests of Ghana and Tanzania,
- to examine the role of the US in the democratisation of Ghana and Tanzania,
- to investigate the security concerns of the US in Africa and the views of Africans in this regard,
- to explore the constancy and/ or shift in the US Africa policy by identifying the dominant patterns of Washington’s involvement in Africa since the end of the Cold War,
- to comparatively reflect on the economic, political and security dimensions of the US policy in Ghana and Tanzania.
1.5. Major research questions

The five central questions that are grappled with in this thesis are:

- To what extent do the goals and objectives of the US foreign policy (mis)fit the national interests of select African states?
- Why does the US view Ghana and Tanzania as indispensable political allies in West Africa and East Africa, respectively?
- Is it factual for the US to consider Africa as a major threat to its national security?
- How did the US change or continue its foreign policy towards West and East Africa since the year 1990?
- What are the peculiar features for the inter-state relations of the US with African states, Ghana and Tanzania in particular?

1.6. Organisation of the Study

This study is divided into two sections:

Section A (General Perspectives)

The six chapters of this section focus on trends that shape the US foreign policy in Africa in general. It also examines theoretical debates put forward by contemporary scholars of International Relations regarding economic, political and security dimensions of the US policy. Equally important, this section also reflects on the step by step procedure in carrying out this study and also outlines the rationale for choosing certain research techniques over others.

Chapter 1: Contextual Orientation of the Study

This chapter introduces the context and background of the study thereby giving an outline of its aim and objectives, problem statement and chapter breakdown. It also encompasses the justification of the study and clarity about operational concepts.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

This chapter is representative of the critical review of related literature in the subject of the US foreign policy in general and in Africa in particular. It also pays particular attention to the theoretical orientation that underpins this study.

Chapter 3: Research Methodology

This chapter is a discussion of the research design, data collection and analysis methods and the sampling of this study. A motivation for the choice and relevance of each of the above is advanced. Equally important, critical issues of ethics in this research and concerns surrounding reliability, validity and objectivity of its findings are addressed.

Chapter 4: African Oil as a Bolster of America’s Economic Prosperity

This chapter looks critically at the claim that the recent discovery of oil in Africa is a magnet for the renewed US engagement on the continent. It also adds voice to the debate by detailing areas of convergence and divergence between the interests of the US and Africa in the energy sector.

Chapter 5: US’s Promotion of Democracy in Africa

This chapter provides a systematic analysis of the relevance and influence of the US model of democracy in Africa. It also explores the US commitment to democracy promotion in Africa, as one of the cornerstones of its foreign policy.

Chapter 6: The US Security Concerns in Africa

This chapter provides an overview of the national security challenges facing the US within the context of its engagement in Africa. It also demonstrates the reactions of the US to African security threats (real or imagined) to its national well-being.
Section B (Case Studies)

With the exception of the concluding chapter, this section consists of two chapters in the main, based on the relationship between the US and two of the four Partnership for Growth countries: Ghana and Tanzania (The White House, 2013). A close appraisal of the bilateral relationship between the US and these countries serve to concretise the arguments regarding the general orientation of the US policy in Africa as detailed in the previous section.

Chapter 7: The US Foreign Policy Towards West Africa: Ghana in Focus

This chapter is an analysis of the relationship between the US and Ghana.

Chapter 8: The US Foreign Policy Towards East Africa: Tanzania in Focus

This chapter evaluates the relationship between Washington and Dodoma within a historical context.

Chapter 9: General Conclusion(s)

This chapter provides a summary of the findings, significance of the study and implications for theory and practice. It also dwells on the limitations of the study and lastly, it puts forward recommendations for policy consideration and future studies.

In line with the organisation of the study as outlined above, the next chapter provides a critical review of the published literature related to the US foreign policy towards Africa. A detailed description of the choice and justification of the theoretical framework of this study also forms part of this chapter on literature review because it constitutes part of the process. In this chapter, the researcher attempts to adopt the periodization approach to categorise his literature review into three epochs.
Chapter 2
Literature Review

2.1. Introduction


Besides sharpening the conceptual framework of this study, it must be noted that the following critical review of literature is categorised into three historical periods. However, it does not necessarily follow the above sequential listing of the scholars whose works have been reviewed. Therefore, the organisation of this section is determined by periodisation method as opposed to alphabetical order of the authors’ surnames and/or the sequential listing of the latter. While every effort is made to stick to periodisation, it is demonstrably clear from the critical literature review below that certain key policy issues overlap across the stipulated epochs and therefore their categorisation in one part of this section or the other may be awkward.

The first part of the literature review addresses conceptual issues: Foreign Policy and Regionalising. This is followed by the review of the US foreign policy before

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5 In the context of this study, Public Administration is subsumed as a sub-field of Political Science being fully conscious of the contestation of the technocrats and administrators who seek to elevate their discipline to the position of independent and stand-alone field of study.
the end of the Cold War in 1990. This is done for obvious reasons that have been explained in detail above in the background to this study. The third part looks at the US foreign policy since the end of the Cold War till September 11 attacks in New York and Washington DC. The fourth and last part of the literature review focuses on the subject of study since the bombing of US major cities in 2001. This human catastrophe has been largely and widely attributed to the thought and action of the late Osama Bin Laden led Al-Qaeda network.

The purpose of the critical literature review on this section of the study dictated that it be limited to the works of scholars. In order to construct a formidable bridge along which flows multivariate functions of literature review in this research; this section of the study inhabits Jerry Willington’s and et al account of its purpose. Just like Ridley (2008: 16-28), Willington and et al (2005: 73) summarily outlines the purpose of literature review as to:

- Define what the field of study is, by identifying the theories, research, and ideas with which the study connects;
- Establish what research has been done which relates to the field of study;
- Consider what theories, concepts and models have been used and applied in the field of study;
- Identify and discuss methods and approaches that have been used by other researchers; and
- Identify the ‘gaps’ or further contribution that the present piece of research will make.

With the exception of few texts that were considered for their conceptual and theoretical relevance to this study, by and large, much of the literature reviewed here addresses the subject of the US foreign policy at a country, regional, continental and global levels. Central to this study, it is important to note that the critical review of scholarly literature in this section penetrates the propagandistic discourse as it delves into the three niche areas of the US foreign policy in Africa: democracy promotion, access to oil resources, and establishment and maintenance of peace, security and development.
2.2. Conceptual framework

The following section discusses the concepts “Foreign Policy” and “Regionalising” in detail:

2.2.1. Foreign Policy

Some scholars term it “international relations policy” while others call it “foreign relations policy”. This means that foreign policy provides an official framework that guide how one country’s international relations and cooperation is managed. Some politicians and analysts have qualms with the usage of the word “foreign”, arguing that it ignores the fact that foreign policy is rooted from within the country (national level) and presents it as if it’s farfetched idea that has got nothing to do with overall domestic policies of the country. Instead, they propose that better ways of explaining and understanding the domestication of foreign policy need to be explored. In the end, the study is not concerned with providing a universally acceptable definition of what is called foreign policy, but it deduces that the essence of varying descriptors ranging from foreign policy, foreign relations policy to international relations policy is common. The only not-so-important matter is the question of semantics.

Scott and Garrison (2012: 138) observe that “international policies affect relations between or among nations, such as trade, war, educational exchanges, disaster relief efforts and so on.” Bearing this in mind, it is important to note that foreign policy is not done by a single person as opposed to the tendency among analysts and opinion makers to pin such policies with the labels of the president who presided over the administration that conceived or adopted them. It is not uncommon to find descriptors such as “Obama’s Africa policy” and the “foreign policy of George W. Bush” in the literature of History and Politics. But such assertions can be misleading to a layman in the field of International Relations and History because in theory and practice, foreign policy is made by a conglomeration of people who come into play when making decisions concerning such matters. Such people or groups include the Head of State (President), the Secretary of the State, Department of State and other departments concerned with foreign policy (e.g. Defence, Secret Services) and
parliament. These people occupy active and varying roles in foreign policy making and implementation of any state, either from first world or third world. Yet, there are non-governmental formations from the private sector and the civil society which (i.e. Trans Africa (2015), Trilateral Commission (2015) and etc) also influence foreign policy processes in one way or the other. But the composite of the above mentioned government institutional groups are formally and primarily mandated to conceive and execute foreign policy in the best interests of their states (Viotti and Kaupi (2010)).

Meanwhile, it is not uncommon for students of International Relations to confuse foreign policy, diplomacy and international relations. The three concepts are different, but they are intrinsically linked. In this study diplomacy is viewed as an instrument of foreign policy and is therefore, understood as the art craft and practice of negotiating between and among representatives of different states in the international political and economic system. Its main function is to facilitate international relations as a practice and phenomena as opposed to the discipline. In the spirit and context for the support of the above A. Du Plessis as cited by Dlomo (2010: 3) asserts that diplomacy “is the master institution of international relations and represents a pacific approach to the management of international relations in pursuit of order and justice; within a foreign policy context”. Du Plessis (as cited by Dlomo, 2010: 3) adds that diplomacy is also “a political instrument with which to maximise the national interest of states and to pursue foreign policy goals and objectives”.

The usage of lower case (ir) and capital letters (IR) in writing is used to draw a distinction between the practice and academic discipline of international relations. In certain institutions of high learning such as the University of Limpopo, this academic field is also called International Politics, a narrow field that is concerned with the explanation and understanding of the political relations between states. It is argued that this is a clear indication of the distinction between International Relations and International Politics since the former is thoughtful and critical of relations between states in areas of war, trade, cultural diplomacy, social relief and foreign aid, just to name but a few. This list underpins the interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity of International Relations as an academic discipline as it transcends across political, economic, social and cultural matters. This supposition is buttressed by Viotti and
Kauppi (2010) when they aver that “despite the adjective international, the field is concerned with much more than relations between or among states. Other actors, such as international organisations, and terrorist groups, are all part of what could more correctly be termed world or global politics”. While Viotti and Kaupi’s (2010) definition correctly puts International Relations as a field of enquiry into context, the persistent use of the term “politics” as it is the case with “International Politics” and “World Politics” as the equivalents of IR is devoid of the honest appreciation of the multi-dimension and complex character of this field.

2.2.2. Regionalising

For the purpose of this study, the concept “regionalising” denotes the emerging American pattern of identifying and (ab)using of pivotal African states such as Ghana and Tanzania as the launching pads of US foreign policy on the continent. This process is also explained in certain quotas as the subcontracting of US foreign policy to regional powers and/or client states (Sylvan, 2013). This definition is totally distinct, but related to Ndlovu’s (2007: 1) explanation of “Regionalising” who alludes that it is a “situation whereby the states within the same region come together and deal with insecurities that prevail within their respective region, without any interference by any outside state or organisation”. The latter views “regionalising” from the perspective of regional integration efforts in Africa’s five regions that are aimed at fostering military cooperation among the member states in order to quash violent conflicts and restore peace and security in their respective regions while guarding against all forms of subversion of the sovereignty of the Africans by the Europeans and Americans. While this model also seeks to instil a self-help approach among African states in line with the popular slogan of “African solutions, for African problems”, “regionalising” in this study it is viewed as presenting an avenue for tacit and negotiated collaboration, and to a certain extent, forced cooperation between the US and Africa, particularly with Ghana and Tanzania (Khoza, 2007: 3).

It is particularly concerning that the model of “regionalising” in the context of the African security architecture is narrow in focus as it is limited to military affairs. In contrast, “regionalising” as used in this study includes like-minded activities in a military context in addition to a broader package of political, diplomatic and socio-
economic cooperation among the countries involved. What is common about the two identical versions of “regionalising” is regional focus. While the individual member states in any version of “regionalising” shares the responsibility in their areas of operation, the similarity about the two models of regionalising is the concentration on the leadership of regional powers such as South Africa, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Kenya and of late, Ghana and Tanzania (Gilfillan, 2013). It is important to note that Ndlovu’s (2007) version of regionalising is limited to intra and inter-regional cooperation as in the case of Southern Africa, Eastern Africa and/or Western Africa, within the context of the African security architecture flag-shipped by the African Standby Force (ASF). In the context of this study as discussed above, regionalising is intrinsically linked to the international world, as it is projected as a pattern or means of US engagement in Africa in the political and social-economic arena. At the end, it can be deduced that Ndlovu’s (2007) version of “regionalising” is primarily interested in regional alliances among African states. In contrast, its conceptualisation in this research reinforces the need for international (US) and regional alliances (Ghana and Tanzania).

2.3. Revising the US foreign policy towards Africa during the Cold War

The current research has drawn largely from Picard and Groelsma’s (1989) contribution in a book titled *South Africa in Southern Africa: Domestic Change and International Conflict*. In the chapter titled “Beyond Constructive Engagement: US Foreign Policy Towards Southern Africa”, Picard and Groelsma (1989: 226-227) put the US foreign policy towards Southern Africa into historical perspective. More importantly, the two authors probe the US foreign policy under different American presidencies since 1948 to 1990. They argue that since 1948 the US foreign policy in Southern Africa was mainly determined by East-West rivalry which was influenced by the Cold War. As a result, the US regional policy in Africa, the Southern region in particular, was indicative of Washington’s global strategy of containment. As a point of departure, Picard and Groelsma (1989) contend that it would be short-sightedness to ignore the influence of the regional political developments of the Southern African states on the foreign policy direction of the US.
Picard and Groelsma (1989: 228) further contend that during the Cold War, the US foreign policy was consistent irrespective of who was at the helm of the presidency. They reject the claim that Jimmy Carter’s term of office brought about fundamental change of the US foreign policy approach towards Africa. Instead, they argue that the substance of the US foreign policy did not change and changes under Carter’s administration were on rhetorical positions. Unlike other US Presidents, Carter openly condemned the white minority regimes in Southern Africa and called them to embrace democratic majority rule that should involve the full participation by Black nationalists. Though their chapter’s primary focus was on Southern Africa especially during the Cold War, it is argued that this work is fairly relevant to this study. Its scope, Southern Africa is an integral part of the continent under the current study. Although the chapter is devoted to the Southern Africa region, it also mentions, in passing the US’ involvement in countries such as Senegal in West Africa. It is argued that the synergies between Picard and Groelsma’s (1989) work and the current study would not compromise the originality and quality of the latter. Hence, the two studies completely look at different epochs (Cold War era and the post-Cold War era). It is further argued that the shift of the balance of power in the international system in the late 1980s and early 1990s qualifies this study to investigate the US engagement in Africa in the light of the post-Cold War developments. These developments include the shifting of power from the US to China and India, the upsurge of some parts of the old Russia, the surge of Muslim culture in Africa and the US intolerance of such cultures, the emergence of the Russian Mafia and so many others not mentioned here.

In contrast, it can also be argued that the researcher’s case studies, Tanzania and Ghana, sub-regionally, East and West Africa cast Southern Africa’s (and ultimately, Picard and Groelsma’s (1989) work relevance to this study pretty questionable. This can be understood in part from the fact that Southern Africa is neither West Africa nor East Africa. The US may have different policy objectives in the various sub-regions/ countries of Africa. For example, while its main policy objective in the East and Horn of Africa might be to prevent the sub-region from becoming terrorists’ hotbed, it cannot be said that the US pursues the same objectives in Southern Africa.
Equally important, the premise that the "in passing" mention of Senegal in the cited literature consolidates the moderate relevance of Picard and Groelsma’s (1989) work in this study cannot be spared from criticism. Hence, Senegal does not represent the entire West Africa and it is not even one of the case studies of the current research. In overall, the citation of the literature which is outside selected case studies in this review section must be understood within the context that being developing African countries, Senegal and to certain extent South Africa has unequal relations with the US. Then Ghana and Tanzania, given similar circumstances, by extrapolation, also have unequal relations with the US. It is simple logic. However, in social science research approximation/extrapolation is not always a welcome idea. This is because of the dynamic nature of social phenomena. Circumstances, ideas and events change.

Obiozor (1992) conducted a research for his doctoral thesis that was later converted into a book under the title, *Uneasy Friendship: Nigerian-American Relations*. This book is in fact, a study of the dynamics of the links between Nigeria and the US from 1960 to 1983. It is not an oversimplification to argue that this study projects the nature of the relationship between a developing and/or African state and the major power, Nigeria and the US respectively, in this regard. The book is more relevant to this study as it seeks to probe the complexities of the engagement of the US in Africa using Nigeria to depict the reasons for America’s interest in certain African regimes or the lack of interest, thereof in others. Of outmost importance in this book is chapter six as it locates the relationship between Nigeria and the US in a broader US policy on Africa (Obiozor, 1992: 170-199). Although, Obiozor’s (1992) work and the current research are analogous there is no temptation to reproduce his work. Hence, Obiozor’s (1992) work transcended a twenty four years period that fall within the ambit of the Cold War era. The bipolar world system between 1945 and 1990 gave way to a uni-multipolar world, dominated by the US as a result of the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, the Cold War period challenges were replaced by post-Cold War ones (Rubinstein, 1994: xiii). This does not imply that the 1990 shift of global power relations rendered Obiozor’s (1992) work useless. The key issue is that such a change of the posture of the international system...
necessitated a new approach, thinking and analysis informed by evolving post-Cold War global developments.

Contextually, Obiozor (1992: 211) stated that the main lesson for the study of the relations between Nigeria and the US is that Washington is not ready for active or progressive partnership with Nigeria or any other African state. Given the unequal power relations between Nigeria and the US, it seems difficult for Abuja to engage Washington in a competitive political interaction except in areas where its national interests are clearly involved and/or such could happen in a mutually beneficial economic relationship. Obiozor (1992) also observed that America’s foreign policy approach to Nigeria and Africa as a whole was indifferent throughout the time and what often changed are rhetorical positions without concrete action. For him (Obiozor, 1992: 10), American foreign policy can be succinctly summarized through this caption:

[the US had] an interest in the evolution of Africa in a manner not inimical to our democratic type of government, the exclusion of influences unfriendly to our way of life, the hope of having access to the raw materials of that continent, especially to safeguard our minimum need; to increase our trade with all African countries, and to exercise a moral leadership as benefits our honourable traditions.

Based on the literature, it can be concluded that during the Cold War the US-eclipsed false capitalism-democracy dichotomy was used as eco-political checkmate to arrest, defeat and exterminate communism in Africa and the world at large. Besides being a political and economic ideology, the US sought to fight against the spread of communism that aspired to create a society in which communalism/collectivism is a norm as opposed to the American-rooted individualism.

2.4. Post-Cold War US Africa policy orientation

The following discussion is based on the US foreign policy towards Africa after the year 1990. This discussion addresses two main themes: The US theoretical construct the practice of democracy in Africa and global and regional perspectives of the US policy towards West Africa.
2.4.1. The American theoretical position on Africa’s democratisation

Moss’s (1995: 189-209) article, “US Policy and Democratisation in Africa: The Limits of Liberal Universalism” is relatively, a fair contribution to the study of the influence and involvement of the US on Africa. It fits well with the current study as it looks at one of the pillars of America’s foreign policy to Africa: Promotion of democracy and human rights. The author interrogates the role of the US in the process of democratisation in Africa as part of its global strategy to spread its values and influence across the globe. This is arguably, the global policy objective of the US. But it is not new. The present global political and economic system was largely created by the US with the assistance of its European traditional allies, particularly Britain and France. As such, it is based on American and European values.

Essentially, Moss argues that the US model of democracy is not practical and achievable in the African context because the two regions have completely different historical, social and structural conditions. This research argues that Moss’s assertion is not only a personal view, but it is an objective finding. In other words, democracy imposed from outside cannot hold and as such, it can only be sustained if it is domestically brewed. While this may be true, it is important to note that systems often borrow from others for purposes of self-enhancement and reinvention. Generally speaking, Moss observes that democracy is a good form of government. However, the notion of ‘one size fits all” does not apply. To this end, it is irrational for the US to force through their form of democracy on the African political elites.

The salient weakness in this article is that some of the facts are obsolete. For example, the claim that since the implosion of the Soviet Union security considerations is no longer a priority for America’s foreign policy towards Africa (Moss, 1995: 193). This study argues that this claim was relatively true in the pre-September 11, 2001 attacks and since this event, Washington has reconsidered its foreign policy goals and priorities in Africa and elsewhere to include the containment of terrorism which is viewed as a major threat to the national
security of the US. In addition to the September 11 attacks, the rise of Brics (Brazil, Russia, China, India and South Africa) as well, certainly qualifies this research to appraise the US involvement in Africa (Redwood, 2005: 31-46). As such, the current study would give an account of the logic and illogicality of the US policy in Africa from in the post-Cold War era.

2.4.2. Global and regional perspectives on US policy towards West Africa

Raphael and Stokes (2011: 903-921) comprehensively discuss the post-Cold War US foreign policy towards West Africa and situate it within a global context. The two authors blatantly ignore the increasing significance of the recent oil discoveries in Ghana (one of the case studies of the current study) to the US energy, economic and security strategy, by consistently making use of both Nigeria and Angola (considered as key states of US partnership in West Africa) as test cases for their observation and to draw lessons in passing. In overall they concur with other scholars of International Relations that West Africa’s oil riches are strategically important to the National Security of the US (Klare & Volman, 2006: 609-628). It is argued that the Arab Spring of the year 2011 enhanced West Africa’s increasing importance to the US because the political upheavals in North Africa and Middle East at the time disrupted the flow of oil from these regions to the US and thereby elevating the position of diversification of petroleum resources across the world to the top of the agenda of US policy makers.

While this position is valid, its currency is of concern because at the time of writing the wave of revolution was relatively calm in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya and it was “usual business” in terms of oil trading in North Africa. This supposition is not applicable to the Middle East which is still experiencing continuous political upheavals in countries such as Iran and Syria. According to Raphael and Stokes most of the oil produced in West Africa is cheap to refine and has less sulphur content and this is a situation that has served as a pull factor of US engagement in this region.
It is argued that the regional political climate and atmosphere of West Africa is likely to have a qualitative effect in terms of how the US relate to individual countries in that region, including Ghana and also how Washington engages with them as a collective in the form of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Aligned to the period of focus of this research (post-Cold War era), Raphael and Stokes (2011) maintain that the strategic importance of West Africa in terms of US Energy-economic-security strategy praxis dates back to the end of the Cold War and there have been notable continuities in terms of the approaches of successive presidencies since then up to date. For example, “Clinton’s 1998 National Security Strategy, which made it clear that a key US priority in the region was unhampered access to oil and other vital natural resources” only gained momentum with the rise of George Bush’s presidency and it still serve as a driver of the foreign policy of the Obama administration towards West Africa and Africa as a whole (Raphael & Stokes, 2011: 907). This is a clear indication of the points of convergence and continuities of the foreign policies of Clinton, Bush Jr, and Obama. Raphael and Stokes contend that what is new is the recent intention of Obama to lessen US dependence on foreign oil sources.

That the security of West Africa’s energy sector still stands as the primary interest of the Washington is tantamount to the unmasking of the nexus between the US military strategy, energy strategy and security strategy. The derivations of military, energy and economy are the composite tenets of the emerging policy and academic conceptualisation of security (Newman, 2001: 239-247). The position of the researcher is that Raphael and Stokes’s claim that the energy-economy-security praxis date back to the end of the Cold War is wanting. In terms of energy, oil was discovered in Nigeria in the 1950s. Economically, the US has been trading with Nigeria and other West African countries since the colonial time. Security wise, the US has always considered West Africa to be of strategic importance. During the Cold War, it used Liberia to checkmate communist influence. It also wanted a defence pact with Nigeria at independence.

While geographical reasons informed the omission of South Africa which is situated in Southern Africa in the article whose primacy is West Africa, Raphael
and Stokes (2011) identify Nigeria and Angola as the key partners of the US engagement in West Africa and Africa as a whole (United States Diplomatic Mission to South Africa, 2010). It must be pointed out that at the time of writing there were visible signs that the relationship between Washington and Abuja was no longer cosy. Consequently, the latter was gradually losing its status of being Washington's geo-strategic partner in West Africa in favour of Accra (Campbell, 2010: 5). Hence, Nigeria was widely reported to be embedded with rampant corruption, deteriorating infrastructure and shallow legislative framework while its rival, Ghana recently conducted peaceful, transparent and credible elections and this is an occurrence that gained the latter labels such as “paragon of African democracy” and the “best model of democracy in Africa by the Americans” (Tattersall, 2009). However, the sustainability, effectiveness and efficiency of the much lauded political and economic governance framework of Ghana still have to stand a test of time.

Despite the richness and relevance of the literature consulted by both Raphael and Stokes during the writing of their article as demonstrated by their bibliography, it is clear that two authors’ conscious or unconscious decision to allow their egoistical feelings to influence their thinking and analysis has compromised their work’s integrity and dependability in many ways. For instance, they state that historically, the protection and defence of the US economic and energy interests was tied to its overall policy to Europe and its functionaries had fallen under the auspices of the US European Command (EUCOM). This must be understood within the context of the long standing and historic joint American-British engagement in Africa as explained in the background of this study and as reinforced by scholars such as Morgenthau (1955), Karioki (2013) and Campbell (2010).

Contextually, Raphael and Stokes (2011: 908) observe that the 2007 metamorphosis of EUCOM to African Command (AFRICOM) as a central command structure of all US military activities was propelled by the fact that the former had devoted much of its time and resources in Africa than Europe since its establishment. In this sense, Raphael and Stokes’s analysis project a false link between economic stability, poverty reduction conflict resolution and
infrastructure development as the mixed bag of the key pillars of the US foreign policy towards Africa. It is argued that the analysis of Raphael and Stokes is a simplest attempt at unpacking the context of the nexus between the US military, energy and economic strategy as the legislative feeders of its broader foreign policy towards West Africa, Africa and the world at large. While regarding both Raphael and Stokes as American apologists would not take the argument too far, it is argued that their analysis of the relationship between economic stability, poverty reduction, and conflict resolution and infrastructure development is mediocratic. Ironically, the US benefits extensively from the gas, mineral and oil riches of Africa by taking advantage of the latter’s vulnerabilities that ranges from poor infrastructure, negative records of investments and the general economic structural deficits. Therefore, the US stands to benefit less under the reversal of the aforementioned plethora of economic ills than at the moment.

Arguably, if the US had good intentions about Africa’s security without being clouded by its selfish interests that are often expressed in liberal and diplomatic terms, Washington could have mounted more financial, logistical and capacity training support to existing conflict resolution mechanisms in Africa rather than persisting on the lonely path towards the suspicious establishment of a foreign military force in a form of AFRICOM on the continent. This is not to say that several US-mounted capacity building projects- joint military agreements on counter terrorism on the continent are not significant for the maintenance of peace and security in Africa and elsewhere (Maina, 2005). Nevertheless, the Washington creation of the false link between economic stability, poverty reduction, conflict resolution and infrastructure building finds expression in Raphael and Stokes’s (2011: 909) analysis. But this propagation of half-truths should be understood within the context of the widening gap between governance theory and policy practice as articulated by scholars such as Gampi Matheba (2012, 1-4).

At a theoretical level, Raphael and Stokes struggle to strike a balance in employing realism and liberalism in their article. As a result, they wrongly conclude that the competition between the US and China over Africa’s gas, mineral and oil resources has no potential to escalate into an interstate conflict
that reminisce the Cold War between the US and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) between 1945 and 1990. They base their argument on the notion that the US is not interested in pursuing a more mercantilist form of economic nationalism (Turok, 2013: 5). It is argued that the US-China rivalry in Africa has potential to replay the Cold War on the African soil. This possibility cannot be ruled out completely because by nature politics is the art of the possible and countries would do anything possible to realise their foreign policy goals and objectives, irrespective of the limits of the use of force (Herholdt & Mononela, 1996: 324-326).

This makes a lot of sense in so far as AFRICOM and the overall militarisation of the US foreign policy is concerned (Walker & Seegers, 2012: 22-39). If the US was able to attack Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya for its selfish interests, the room for Washington’s desire to pursue policies of expansionism and neo-imperialism in Africa, Asia, Middle East and other parts of the World may place it at loggerheads with Beijing. However, direct conflict is unlikely because their estimated neck and neck economic and military strength means an unnecessary and prolonged warfare which is neither in the interests of the US nor China. This was the clear case of the Cold War between Washington and Moscow which have never directly confronted each other in combat. Whatever happens, Cold War or “hot war”, Africa would be at the receiving end of the Sino-American race just like in a situation where two great elephants fight and the grass suffers the most.

While the cause of lower domestic consumption of oil in Africa is not explained, the article under review is also silent about the effects of releasing more global market-directed oil on the West Africans and their localities in so far as economic and social development is concerned. It is noted by Raphael and Stokes (2011: 906) that “…lack of significant industrialisation in the region [ensures] that most of the additional oil will be released onto world markets”.

This partly explains dwarfed levels of growth and development of the manufacturing sector in West Africa. It is argued that the above conforms to the broader picture of retarded levels of growth and development of the
manufacturing infrastructure in both oil and non-oil sectors (includes gas and minerals) in West Africa and Africa at large. While this is bad news for the Africans, it constitutes “good music” for the American and European planners who ply on this type of Africa’s structural weaknesses to continuously exploit African gas, mineral and petroleum resources for the selfish interests of their countries: energy and economic security. At the end, this situation will push Africa further into the periphery in terms of economic growth and development.

While political and economic instabilities in West Africa and other regions of Africa are attributed to internal factors, Raphael and Stokes fall short in appreciating the reality of the role and influence of external forces in the brewing, outbreak and escalation of violent conflicts on the continent. Based on this and other analytical shortcomings of Raphael and Stokes as pointed above, it appears that their article was written for an American, European and Chinese audience. The litany of their subjective expressions in their analysis and writing needs to be re-viewed with African lenses and re-written with an African pen as it is evident in their article that the cause of the US foreign policy is more advanced at the expense of the effects on the African people, individual states and their collective, Africa. In the final analysis, this article does not adequately acknowledge the role and influence of the Clinton administration in laying a solid foundation for the post-Cold War US foreign policy. Instead, its authors give rough and patchy attention to the Clinton administration, in favour of the leadership of both Bush and Obama. Despite this, this article is a good starter of doing ideological critical reading and analysis.

2.5. American Foreign Policy since September 2011

The review below is centred on three key themes: The security dimension of the US foreign policy in a global context, US engagement in the North Africa and Middle East and the implications of Obama Presidency on the US foreign policy towards Africa.
2.5.1. Globalising and militarising US foreign policy after the 9/11 attacks

Hall’s (2005) book, *American Global Strategy and the “War on Terrorism”* is a fair orientation to the debate on the US engagement on the world stage. The book provides a critical analysis to the evolving US approach to terrorism and other national security threats from the perspective of the September 11, 2001 attacks. According to Hall (2005: v), America did not have global strategy overtime and its foreign policy took the form of *ad hoc* measures. This research, however, contends that it is in fact an understatement to argue that the US did not have a foreign policy. In its relations with central Asia, the Persian Gulf, the Far East, Africa and the world as a whole, what Washington decided to do or not to do is a policy, using Reynolds’ (1994) definition. According to Reynolds (1994: 39) foreign policy refers to “the range of actions taken by varying sections of the government of a state in its relations with other bodies similarly acting on the international stage, supposedly in order to advance national interests”. In the context of this perspective, the US did not have a coherent foreign policy in its engagement with other countries especially in Africa. F.J. William as cited by Hall (2005, 3-5, 147) proclaimed that “[t]he inconsistency of American foreign policy is not an accident but an expression of two distinct sides of American character”. This includes the morality of descent instincts and the morality of self-assurance.

Although, the book focuses on the Middle East, as it is viewed as the epitome of terrorism, the author gives the international dimension of terrorism. The book is relevant for this study because it gives an exposition of the framework of America’s foreign policy and this is also useful to the understanding of the US engagement in Africa. Furthermore, this book has a positive impact to the on-going research because it provides useful insights into how the US approaches major security issues as they arise, especially in the 21st century. It should be noted that Hall (2005: 147) gives snapshots of America’s treatment of some African states and Africa as a whole. For example, it is observed in this text that the former US Secretary of State (2005-2009), Condoleezza Rice pronounced that Washington intends to stand with the ‘oppressed people’ of Zimbabwe. By and large, this is an indication of Washington’s readiness to confront the so called “outposts of tyranny” in Africa. However, Rice’s pronouncement was
politically correct because the US and her European allies imposed economic sanctions on Zimbabwe. The sanctions did nothing to correct what was seen to be poor political and economic governance, instead they worsened its negative effects on the ordinary people while the political elites, their families and friends continued to live large despite their country’s isolation in the international system. In the case of Zimbabwe, Rice’s label of “oppressed people” can befit the people who voted for a change of regime in previous elections\(^6\) and whose wishes were thwarted by either election rigging or any other unacceptable conduct related to the polls.

It should be noted that the nature of oppression in a liberated country like Zimbabwe is often complex. The researcher argues that the nature of oppression in Zimbabwe can best be described as elitist tyranny.\(^7\) However, Rice’s thesis of “oppressed people” serves to criminalize and marginalize the political leadership in Zimbabwe and draw disgruntled Zimbabweans, Africans and the international community to support Washington’s hostile policy towards Harare. Hence, there are other African countries like Swaziland whose political space is not liberalised, but it is no main concern for Washington. The inconsistent and selective approach of the US when dealing with other countries bears testimony to its hypocritical foreign policy (Mutambara, 2008: 21). For example, while the political governance of Botswana has been in crisis since Gaborone’s decision to reject the internally much-lauded African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), the US has consistently projected this country as a paragon of democracy in Africa. Ironically, Mashupye H. Maserumule (2011: 12-13) wrote that in contrast to the much published forceful Zimbabwean land seizures that date back to the year 2000, in Botswana “The San community was (violently) displaced from its ancestral land and dumped in a “place of death”. Despite the plethora of socio-economic problems ranging from chronic diseases, filthy settlements and deteriorating levels of education, the US and its traditional European allies are silent about this inhumane and evil policy consequence presided by a government that claims the status of being a best model of democracy in Africa.

\(^6\) This includes the Zimbabwe parliamentary elections of 2000 and the 2008 harmonised general elections.

\(^7\) For the purpose of this research, elitist tyranny refers to the repression of the majority or a fair component of the population of a particular country by its political elite.
While publicly condemning the sorry state of political and economic government in Zimbabwe since the year 2000, the US chose the path of deafening silence while downplaying the crisis of governance in Botswana, particularly in so far as the case of the San as discussed above is concerned.

Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedi (2005: 28) place the foregoing debate in context and note that “[G]iven the overlap in the functions of interest groups and political parties, the two normally work together in a democratic system. However, such a working relationship does not obtain in Botswana prior to, during or after elections”. As many observers have argued, Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedi (2005: 31) emphatically maintain that “[I]nterest group politics is not yet the norm in Botswana’s democracy”. The cauldron of the political and socio-economic ailments in Botswana as discussed above raises key questions relating to the US foreign policy towards Botswana, Zimbabwe and other African states with regard to the criteria and its selective application in the assessment of the state of democracy in Africa and the world at large.

Despite the sorry state of affairs, it is argued that the US’s silent stance towards Gaborone should be understood within the context that the post-colonial Botswana has retained the political climate of the heydays of colonialism by not effecting any radical changes in the political and socio-economic relations of its citizenry, both of African and European descent. Interestingly, around 2007 and 2008 Botswana’s name was also punted within the political and diplomatic circles of the US and Africa as would be headquarters of the controversial US military force, the AFRICOM in the continent despite the widespread condemnation of such an unpopular initiative across the major parts of Africa. Nevertheless, this speculation never came to pass and eventually Djibouti was crowned with the status of the host country of AFRICOM headquarters, a move that is viewed as an attempt by the US to undermine the sovereignty of the Africans (Mountain, 2012). No matter the credibility of the sources of the reports about Botswana being a possible host of headquarters of AFRICOM on the continent, what this speculation serves is to flash highlights on the closeness of Washington and Gaborone and the complex, secretive and reciprocal characteristic of their engagement.
Hall (2005: 12) also looks briefly at the relations between the US and Zimbabwe. This is complemented by an analysis of the alleged linkage by the US between the Al-Qaeda network and Kenya, Tanzania, Sudan and perhaps, Somalia. This kind of information is critical to the understanding of the noble principles and motives of the US’s involvement in African affairs especially in the post-September 11 era. Unlike other countries mentioned here, Zimbabwe does not feature well in the connections of Al-Qaeda. However, Zimbabwe is a failing state and according to the American policy makers, it is prone to become a fertile breeding and training ground for future terrorists which is of course a speculation (Christopher, 1993: 36-37). Sadly, Hall suffers from the drought of culturally appropriate and realistic interpretation of the African situation. His conceptualisation reduces Zimbabweans (Africans) to a consciousness of oppression, pain and suffering while deliberately suppressing the consciousness of victory that analyse and shape Zimbabwe beyond the political and economic upheavals of proverbial yesterday.

The two books by Obiozor (1992) and Hall (2005) treat two divergent themes regarding the US foreign relations in two completely different regions and circumstances. Despite this, there are synergies between the two books. Interestingly, in comparative terms, Obiozor (1992) claims that the US relies on the advice of its traditional ally, Britain, before it engages in any exercise in Africa as was the case in Zimbabwe since the year 2000 controversial land reform programme in that country. As a point of departure, Hall (2005: 15) noted significant differences and divisions between the US and Europe (which includes Britain) on which strategy and tactics to apply to different states in Africa and elsewhere. In this regard, it is safe to say that the two conflicting views on America deepen the thrust of this research and serve as a stimulus for future research on the subject.

2.5.2. Revisiting the US engagement in North Africa and Middle East

On the other hand, Dimitrova’s (2013) paper titled “Obama’s Foreign Policy: Between Pragmatic Realism and Smart Diplomacy?” had served as a precursor
for the current study and so many others to come. Though brief, Dimitrova’s (2013) paper uses North Africa and the Middle East to advance his arguments that Obama’s foreign policy cannot be seen as a representation of obvious continuity or complete change from his predecessors’ foreign policy. According to him, the Bush doctrine invoked a total militarisation of the US foreign policy to protect, preserve and defend Washington’s interests while the Obama doctrine is underscored by the three “Ds”, meaning a blend of diplomacy, development and defense. He concludes that the Obama administration strives to strike the balance between the hard power and soft power as it was the case in Libya in 2011 and this mixed fraction qualifies it as very complex.

2.5.3. Obama and the US Africa policy

In an anthology titled America and the Changed World: A Question of Leadership, Alex Vines and Tom Cargill (2010) made a contribution in a form of a chapter that addresses the US foreign policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa under Barack Obama’s presidency in contrast to his predecessor, George W. Bush. According to Vines and Cargill (2010), the Bush administration has enhanced the consciousness of Africa’s significance to the US within the political circles. This is a status which was hardly acknowledged before 1990 and if it was to be cusped then, the scaling of its value would be limited to the Cold War formulae. Therefore, the Obama administration is bound to be more involved in the continent in ways that carries “the sorts of post-colonial echoes” (Vines & Cargill, 2010: 49). “Post-colonial echoes” are characteristic of the representation of facts that are not diluted or distorted by direct colonial interests of foreign powers as it was the case before the wave of independence veered across Africa in the late 1950s and early 1960s. However, it manifests itself in the form of a selfish exploitation of African mineral, gas and petroleum resources without necessarily assuming the total political control of the host countries. This is a posture that would betray Obama’s African heritage given his ancestral links to Kenya. Despite this, the two authors maintain that Obama has inherited several policies of George W. Bush, including a foreign policy towards sub-Saharan Africa. As such, it is presumptuous of any analyst to expect an immediate revolutionary shift in terms of the US approach towards Africa. At the centre of the US foreign policy
Vines and Cargill (2010) identify the following as the drivers of the US foreign policy towards sub-Saharan Africa: Military security, energy security and the political support of the African countries in the United Nations (UN).

Using the cases of Nigeria, Angola and South Africa, they conclude that the Obama-led US have pursued different approaches towards each country depending on its varied security and strategic interests. It seems that Vines and Cargill’s chapter was written to defend George Bush. For example, they wrote that George Bush has made a remarkable progress in the areas of HIV/AIDS and democratisation in Africa and this was complemented by increasing foreign aid towards well-functioning democracies. Equally important, it is noted that one of the flagships of Bush’s policy towards Africa, Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) has facilitated the signing of at least $4.5 billion in aid agreements with African states. The above two claims have not been justified as they do not cite African state beneficiaries and it leaves the reader at the risk of making guesses, that can be misleading. This is a pitfall in this chapter that renders it less-informative, but it remains educative. Nevertheless, it must be noted that hand-outs to Africa breed an expectation of more hand-outs. Many times money from foreign aid schemes like those hinted above do not go where it is supposed to and many projects are not sustainable. These are some of the negative results of the American foreign policy on Africa. It appears that the underlying motive of the US is to keep Africa subservient because a strong and united Africa will be threatening to its hegemony.

While the researcher considers this chapter as an authority for the current study, it is argued that its research and writing was done prematurely. It was done at the time when Obama had not stayed up to a year in office as the President of the US. It is argued that although one year analysis makes a lot of sense for an immediate policy-orientated advocacy and advice, it is unfair on the part of the new leadership when considering the stringent requirement critical and robust requirements of an academic study. To this end, the current researcher used a full first term of office as a basis of appraising Obama’s foreign policy towards Africa in contrast to his predecessors, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush in particular. While Vines and Cargill used Angola, Nigeria and South Africa as case
studies, the current research adapts two completely different case studies, Tanzania and Ghana. It is argued that Vines and Cargill were perhaps over-ambitious, wanting to do more in a limited time and space. Three case studies for a chapter about the study of this nature constitute an injustice to the research topic addressed.

In the context of the inner workings of the US foreign policy team, this chapter has helped the current study to find its bearings in an oscillating political and economic landscape of the US. As the title of another anthology where the material from this chapter appears, *The Obama Moment: European and American Perspectives* retorts, the analysis and critique of the Vines and Cargill (2010) lack the centrality of African interests, values and perspectives (Vasconcelos & Zaborowski, 2009: 213-225). For example, their analysis of the AFRICOM as the instrument of the US policy on Africa is ideologically aligned to Washington. In their words they (Vines & Cargill, 2010: 53) note that, “[W]hile AFRICOM is an indication that the United States perceives African security within a more strategic framework, its implementation and the public relations surrounding it have been extremely poor”. However, a sober analysis of African politics effectively lay to rest such an unpopular and controversial American notion. The key issue was not how AFRICOM was paraded, but the manner in which it was conceptualised naturally presented it with a crisis of legitimacy even before it was officially launched in 2008.

By act or conduct, Vines and Cargill (2010) use a vile language by virtue of referring to African countries including Somalia who were facing kerf power situations as “failed states”. This conceptualisation of the situation of lawlessness in Somalia and Zimbabwe is slightly misleading and is not good enough for the humanist view of Africa (Asante, 2003). It creates a sense of hopelessness about Somalia and other African countries in more or less similar situations. In contrast, “failing states” as a concept acknowledge the on-going efforts to bring stability, security and development in such countries and in sum, waves the conscious of victory in the future. In giving credence to the thesis that reject corrupt and violent language of the oppressor (Europe and the US) Asante (2003: 41) strongly warns that “If we (Africans) allow others to box us into their concepts, then we will
always talk and act like them”. This expression fits well with the supposition advanced earlier that, some aid particularly from the US may not be benevolent at all.

2.6. US’s direct engagement with West and East Africa

The review below looks at Ghana and Tanzania as the strategic partners US in West and East Africa.

2.6.1. Ghana in focus

The overall idea behind McCaskie’s (2008) journal article entitled “The United States, Ghana and Oil: Global and Local Perspectives” was to analyse the place and role of the newly found oil in Ghana on the link between military and energy dimensions of the US foreign policy. The missing link in this article is the absence of explicitly stated theoretical and philosophical constructs of its analytical category. According to McCaskie (2008), following the September 11, 2001 attacks in the US, military issues have overshadowed energy security as the initial focal point of Bush Jr’s Presidency. However, military and energy security are not exclusive when one considers the popular view that the US seeks to align the establishment of AFRICOM along the Gulf of Guinea. This analysis could be understood within the context that the US discreetly desires to watch and thwart any possibility of China dominating Ghana’s oil sector. Closely related to this study, the discourse on competition between the US and China for Africa’s extractive industry is more relevant to Ghana than Tanzania. Unlike Ghana, Tanzania does not produce any of the lucrative minerals and oil in the context of international market trade.

For McCaskie (2008), though small Ghana’s status as a strategic supplier of oil to the US is elevated by the fact that Nigeria is not wholly reliable as a source of oil due to old exploration and drilling infrastructure and community violence in some of the oil-rich regions (i.e. Niger Delta). To this end, Ghana stands to fill a possible vacuum that could be left by minimal disruptions to oil supply from Nigeria. McCaskie (2008) further argues that small and independent American oil
companies are interested in new oil discoveries, such as those in Ghana as opposed to the unsafe and politically unpredictable ‘ancestral land’ of Nigeria. Against this background, the US based Anadarko Petroleum Company and Kosmos Energy have dominated the exploration and drilling activities of oil in Ghana since it was discovered in the year 2007. Unfortunately, the tendency of great powers such as the US and their international companies for courting corrupt oil exporting states poses a great risk of reducing Ghana’s oil find to a ‘curse’ (McCaskie, 2008: 322). The possibility of Ghana’s oil find not being a blessing to its people can be explained by the general proclivity of African elites to be self-serving and submissive to global pressures.

2.6.2. Tanzania in focus

In his journal article entitled “Markets and Morality: American Relations with Tanzania”, Waters (2006) argues that Tanzania has never featured on a priority list for US’s official friends and allies. The overall idea behind this argument is the fact that US’s foreign policy machinery places a high premium on market economics than anything else. Unfortunately, Tanzania is poor and its economy is largely agrarian. This economic position means that Tanzania could not offer a sufficient and capable lucrative middle class required by the US market for purchasing American products.

In Waters’s (2006) view, the loose foundation for US-Tanzania's relations is Dodoma’s claim for a moral and humanitarian upper hand amidst the most unstable regions of Central and East Africa. Hence, US and other global players sympathise and maintain good relations with Tanzania because Dodoma has established herself as the ‘honest broker’ for mediating conflicts between various factions within its unruly neighbours (i.e. Rwanda, Burundi and Somalia). To add, Tanzania receives a lot of refugees resulting from conflicts across the continent. This humanitarian role dates back to olden days when Tanzania adopted a defiant policy of “non-alignment during the Cold War; but provided a sanctuary to the cadres who waged the liberation struggle against colonialism and apartheid in Southern Africa (Chachage, 2005).
Nevertheless, Waters (2006) notes that the US maintains a minimal level of engagement with Tanzania aid programs such as AGOA, Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) and President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). Whereas AGOA and MCA are designed for established market economies such as South Africa and Ghana, Waters (2006) proffers that the best explanation for the inclusion of Tanzania is that Dodoma and Washington share goals such as disease control, nature conservation, education and political stability. Nonetheless, the sharing of goals surrounding public health is a debatable issue since the US endorses it in order to secure a healthy and cheap productive force from Tanzania. On the hand, such a support could be deemed within the Tanzanian circles as based on the generous desire of the US to help the sick.

In the same line of reasoning, the US commitment to good governance and stability is questionable if one considers the role of Washington in engineering regime change in countries such as Libya (2011) and Iraq (2003) and this regime change’s resultant economic and political upheavals (Matheba, 2011). The confusion that was brought to Africa through European imperialism and currently maintained through colonially (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013) was aptly captured by Vilakazi (2002: 2) when he stated that:

The prevailing African [nation] states, is an implant from the European countries whose colony each African country was. The present post-colonial state in Africa did not grow organically out of the body of Africa. It is an implant on the African body; hence the grotesque features some, or many of the elements of contemporary African state and contemporary political parties in Africa, which are also implants of the African body. The African body is rejecting many of these elements of the Western state.

Flowing from the above, it is clear that the tendency to impose some of the properties of Western polity on the contemporary African body is currently persisted by the US. The rejection of this foreign imposition is politically and morally correct (Ramose, 2002). Hence, institutions purely founded on their guiding principles often fail to provide lasting solutions to the political and socio-economic challenges faced by Africa. The foregoing should be understood within the context that such institutions’ genetic identity often does not dovetail with the political, cultural and socio-economic values and realities of Africa (Khapoya,
Despite the relevance of Waters’s (2006) work to this study, like all intellectual productions, it has its strengths and weaknesses. For example, this article lacks some of the essential elements that are common to scientific works. The missing elements in Waters’s (2006) work include the theoretical framework that guided its analysis and the research methods used to conduct his study. The failure to back up the conclusive facts and statistics (GNP, GDP, projected population growth and etc) used in the article with merely a few credible citations or evidence of research constitute a self-inflicted injury on its wellbeing within the domain of scholarship.

Furthermore, Waters (2006) notes that since the September 11, 2001 attacks in the US, security issues dominate the collective of American officials. This is a discourse which is downplayed by the majority of ordinary Tanzanians since the 1998 attacks in Dar es Salaam are gradually erased in their collective memories and very few of them lived on this small city during that catastrophic year. Despite the frustrations and polarised views between American officials and Tanzanians over Tanzania’s security landscape, Waters (2006: 51) concludes that “person-to-person relationships between Americans and Tanzania are often quite good”.

2.7. US-Africa affairs: The past, present and future

Historically, the study of African issues in International Politics was not an academic priority (Carpenter, 1955: 225; Mckay, 1955: 295-300). Most American and Eurocentric scholars of History and International Relations shaped their studies with the intent to justify foreign intervention in Africa. Most of their studies were foregrounded on the subtle racist notion that Africa is an arena of action and not a key player in its relations with the US (Makgetlaneng, 2008). Those Africanist-American scholars who tried to advance radical and progressive perspectives of the US engagement in Africa were often undermined and not taken seriously because of
their alignment with certain African political leaders such as Kwame Nkruma (Ghana) and policies such as *ujamaa* (Tanzania) that was later considered as a total *fiasco*. This has resulted in the predominance of negative views and/or ideas about Africa and its relations with Western powers, the US in particular. It has also shaped public opinion on the very same issue, in favour of Western interests, in this case the US at the expense of African states.

To this end, recent academic discourse on the US engagement in Africa is tainted with misinterpretations, misunderstandings as well as conflicting and confusing views. For instance, both the intellectual community and the general public are polarised in terms of whether Barack Obama represents change or continuity in terms of the US foreign policy towards Africa. This discourse is becoming more heated because the election of an African-American, President Barack Obama in 2008 has raised high hopes among the Africans for a more active and pro-Africa US foreign policy (Burns, 2013). The polarised views of the intellectual community and the general public have also contributed to a lack of appreciation of African realities by American policy makers in their links with African states. The correctness of this position is well sampled by the following historically rich statement which is centred on an overall US foreign policy towards Africa: “The US has tended to opt in virtually all respects for the policies of the metropolitan powers, however modified and qualified in detail, and it has subordinated its long range interest in the autonomous development of the native population to short range considerations of strategy and expediency” (Morgenthau, 1955: 321).

The reality is that the missing link in most studies of the US foreign policy towards Africa is the absence of an Afrocentric voice and this is a misnomer that contributes negatively to the lack of comprehensive understanding of this discourse. Existing studies are often based on the clumsy pronouncements of American government officials while ignoring reflections of the Africans, who are at the receiving end of the

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8 During the period of his presidency in Ghana, Kwame Nkruma was disliked and unfairly treated in the capitalist, Eurocentric and American academic and political circles because he represented the antithesis of their systems through his Marxist and pan-African ideals. To make matters worse, since 1964 when Ghana officially became a one party state, Nkruma practically espoused personal rule in defiance of the American and European model of democracy (Kofi, 2005: 415-428).

9 *Ujamaa* was one of the economic policies implemented in independent Tanzania under Julius Nyerere. This policy was crafted along the lines of African traditional modes of living.
Washington’s policies towards their continent. To address the lack of comprehensive understanding and adequate attention, both African and American scholars and practitioners of diplomacy must fairly articulate what motivates Africa’s importance to the US. Furthermore, comprehensive awareness of African affairs must be prioritised if the US is to play a positive role in Africa.

Interestingly, the mainstream media across the globe have recently begun to offer optimistic insights about Africa but more still need to be done (Netshitenzhe, 2013: 20-21). Despite the setbacks, they acknowledge that Africa of today and proverbial tomorrow is and will be different from that one of the 19th century. While this is just a drop in the ocean considering that African archives are flooded with distortion and falsification of historical facts about the mother continent, it is a step in the right direction. Be that as it may, It remains to be seen as to whether the recent positive reporting of Africa by the Western and/or international media is to have any qualitative effect on the thinking and understanding of the US foreign policy towards Africa.

2.8. Theoretical perspectives

Most of the literature in International Relations is informed by three mainstream theories in International Relations, namely: Realism, Idealism and Marxism. The theories of Realism, Idealism and Marxism have been very useful in the analysis of the behaviour of individuals, states and other actors in the international system. While the usefulness of the three theories in the study of foreign policy is documented, it is quite impossible to indicate which one is more important than the other. While Marxism (also read as economic nationalism) remains an authoritative school of thought in the social sciences, it is argued that its influence on International Relations scholarship have been diluted by realism. This should be understood within the context of the general belief that Karl Marx had followed realist principles way before critical realism gained the required recognition of a theory within the academic circles (Ehrbar, 2013). To this end, post-1990 George Bush Sr., Bill Clinton, George W. Bush Jr. and Barack Obama may have either used the aspects of either realism or idealism or the combination of both, in conceiving and executing their various foreign policies towards Africa.
Contextually, Milam (1992) considers Marxism as an off-shoot of Afrocentric research. The alleged repose between Marxism and Afrocentric research downplays the reality that the former (Marxism) has been conceptualised within the European setup and as such, it tends to simplify or overlook the economic ramifications of White supremacy on non-Whites in Africa and elsewhere (Milam, 1992). In challenging and dismissing the universalisation of the below listed principles of realism and idealism, Dunn (2004: 149) has unequivocally observed that “African experiences indicate a far more complicated picture of current international relations”. In other words, scholarship on matters that have a bearing on Africa cannot be complete without it benefiting from the lens of African evidence (Dunn, 2004).

2.8.1. Realism

The theory of realism subscribes to the following key principles:

- The international system is anarchic.
- Sovereign states are the principal actors in the international system.
- States are rational actors acting in their national interests.
- The overriding goal of each state is its own security and survival; and
- State survival is guaranteed best by power, principally military in character (McGowan & Nel, 2006: 26-30).

Given amount and volume of texts and authors of realism, a historic conundrum facing scholars have been to determine if there is a unified theory of realism or many. The latter debate is based on three classifications which include: classical realism as advocated by scholars such as Thucydides, Michiavelli, Morgenthau, structural realism as propagated by Rousseau, Waltz, Mearsheimer and neo-classical realism as pioneered by Zakaria (Dunne & Schmidt, 2008: 96). Notwithstanding all of the above, this study stands with Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt who assert that the core values of statism, survival and self-help features across all the strands of realism (Dunne & Schmidt, 2008: 92-95).
2.8.2. Idealism

Unlike realism which regards the ‘international’ as an anarchic realm, idealism (also called liberalism) seeks to project values of order, liberty, justice, and tolerance in international relations (Dunne, 2008: 111). Idealists further claim that:

- Absolute gains can be made through cooperation and interdependence—thus peace can be achieved.
- The international system presents plenty of opportunities for cooperation and broader notions of power.
- State preferences, rather than state capabilities are the primary determinants of state behaviour; and
- Interaction between states is not limited to political (high politics), but also economic (low politics) (McGowan & Nel, 2006: 30-33).

2.9. Theoretical framework: Afrocentricity

The theories of realism and idealism have been overused in the field of International Relations as compared to Marxism and the emerging theory of Afrocentricity (Moloi-Mvulane, 2012; Institute of Global Dialogue, 2013; Shai & Molapo, 2015). While the researcher uses Afrocentricity in this study, realism [and Marxism] and idealism are presented as popular theories in the field of International Relations. Quick browsing of the contemporary literature on Afrocentricity attests that it has received more attention, mainly from the scholars of philosophy, psychology, linguistics and literary studies. As a result, this study is an attempt to afford it space for application in the field of International Relations especially in the area of the US foreign policy towards Africa. To achieve this, the researcher has drawn theoretical and philosophical insights from the existing body of Afrocentric literature to deconstruct the current discourse on US Africa policy and to construct an alternative perspective in this regard.
The scientific integrity, validity and relevance of Afrocentricity in probing complex social phenomena is contested. One of the criticisms levelled against Afrocentricity is that its founding father, Molefi Kete Asante was not born in Africa. Therefore, his theory can not be considered as African. Despite this anti-Afrocentricity sentiment and others not mentioned here, it must be noted that there is no theory which is perfect. After all, scholarship is all about the contestation of ideas (Maserumule, 2016). It is on this basis that the researcher opted for the retention of Afrocentricity as a theoretical lens for the current study despite such criticisms.

There is no gainsaying that when used with other approaches it is likely to provide a qualitatively new picture of US foreign policy compared to a study that is purely underpinned by Eurocentric frameworks (Asante, 2003; Maserumule, 2015). This should be understood within the context that Afrocentricity as articulated by Molefi Kete Asante, Ama Mazama, Danjuma Sinue Modupe and Adisa A. Alkebulan admits and embraces the progressive ideas of other frameworks including realism and idealism, while aiming for African development. Adding his voice to the foregoing analysis Syed H. Alatas (as cited by Chilisa, 2012: 24) concurs that “no society can develop by inventing everything on its own. When something is found effective and useful, it is desirable that is should be adapted and assimilated, whether it be an artefact or an attitude of mind”.

Categorically Asante as cited by Modupe (2003: 62-63) conceptualised and explained three elements of the Afrocentric framework as follows:

- **Grounding** is the process of learning that is centred on the Africans, their, history, culture and continent.
- **Orientation** “is having and pursuing intellectual interest in the African and the formation of a psychological identity direction, based upon that interest, in the direction toward Africa”.
- **Perspective** denotes self-awareness of viewing and affecting the world in a manner that prioritise the African interests and which is suggestive of the quality, kind and amount of the above mentioned two elements.
Emerging from the above, it is safe to argue that the three elements of Afrocentricity fit in the current study. Hence, most of the previous studies in this area have been immersed in purely Euro-American knowledge systems; which have been wrongly presented as universally applicable (Maserumule, 2015). In the process, indigenous African knowledge systems were marginalised in the evolution of International Relations as both a praxis and academic discipline (Mvulane-Moloi, 2012; Maserumule, 2015). It is within this context that the current study uses Afrocentricity to reverse this epistemic injustice by un-muting the silent voices of Afrocentric scholars. Hence, the integration of theoretical and worldviews has a potential to produce the social reality, which is cognisant and respectful of the diversity, transdisciplinarity and interdisciplinarity of theoretical and worldviews (Hoppers, 2002).

2.10. The nexus between Realism, Idealism and Afrocentricity

The fusion of the progressive ideals of predominantly Western frameworks such as realism and idealism with predominantly African philosophical perspective is also called African critical theory (Modupe, 2003: 64). African critical theory seeks to invoke a change or transformation, rather than a mere explanation and understanding of the phenomena explored. To this end, an Afrocentric enquiry should reorganise the frame of reference to ensure that Africans, their culture, ideals and history preoccupy analysis, synthesis, critique and correction. In his seminal work on Afrocentricity as a theory of social change, Asante (2003: 56) notes that

Afrocentricity can stand its ground among any ideology or religion. Your Afrocentricity will emerge in the presence of other ideologies because it is from you. It is a truth, even though it may not be their truth.

The invocation of the above expression in this section of the study does not in any way suggest that Afrocentricity is an ideology. Even if it can be considered in certain circles as an ideology; herein it is employed as a theoretical paradigm and guiding tool to study US-Africa relations using Ghana and Tanzania as country case studies. It is important to note that ideologies are derived on theories and in the same vein, theories are reinforced by ideologies. Equally important, the introduction of the
mainstream International Relations theories (realism and idealism) and their link to Afrocentricity in this section of the study was aimed at showing the differences between them.

2.11. Conclusion

Flowing from the above, it is clear that there is wide body of literature on the US foreign policy in Africa. The review above addressed conceptual issues of this study in detail. It also paid attention to the US foreign policy at the global, continental (Africa) and bilateral level (Ghana and Tanzania). This review has also drawn a distinction between Afrocentricity from the mainstream theories of International Relations (Realism and idealism). Furthermore, it hinted a sound justification for the choice of the former (Afrocentricity) as the theoretical framework for this study. However, a key lesson drawn from this literature review exercise is the difficulty of getting sufficient and up to date academic literature on the US foreign policy towards the two case studies (Ghana and Tanzania). It would appear that central to the limitations of the existing body of literature accessed by the researcher on the current research theme has been the absence of an Afrocentric perspective. As such, it was observed that the current study is probably the first one to compare and critique the post-Cold War US foreign policy towards Ghana and Tanzania from an Afrocentric perspective.

The next chapter deals with the research methodology and design of this study within an Afrocentric context. Among other aspects, this chapter entails the strategies for data collection and analysis; and it also advances the rationale for their choice as the most effective techniques in handling a research of this nature.
Chapter 3
Research Methodology

3.1. Introduction

The faculty of social sciences is made up of three main research paradigms, namely: qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods. This study is located within the qualitative research methodology. Specifically, it employed the Afrocentric research methodology. Hence, Afrocentric research methodology enables in-depth and detailed analyses within the context of a limited number of persons, but reduces the potential generalisation of the findings (Mafisa & Mtati, 2009: 7).

However, this study is critical of the mainstream research paradigms in social sciences due their location within the Western world view. Inasmuch as the Afrocentric paradigm is generally considered as a re-enforcer of qualitative research methodology, it is introduced in this study as an alternative to the dominant research paradigms, which are largely rooted within a Euro-American world view. The competing narratives about the dominance and location of mainstream research paradigms is well-captured by Scheurich and Young (1997: 9) who correctly assert that “dominant epistemologies are a product of White social history”. Nonetheless, the Afrocentric research methodology and qualitative research methodology have shared characteristics in that both of them “assume that people employ interpretive schemes which must be understood and that the character of the local context must be articulated” (Mkabela, 2005: 188; Owusu-Ansah & Mji, 2013: 3). The foregoing argument is backed up by Mkabela (2005) who notes that the principles underpinning the Afrocentric research methodology and qualitative research methodology are common. However, the Afrocentric research methodology is driven by the ideals, interests and needs of Africa and people of African descent across the globe; but it is colour blind (Asante, 1990; Welsing, 2015).

Flowing from the above, Mkabela (2005: 184) outlines the aims of the Afrocentric paradigm as follows:

- To ensure development of an African-centred perspective
To ensure that ethics are culturally defined; and have an indigenous African code
To create guidelines and ensure genuine incorporation of indigenous African views in such documents
To ensure research methods and styles are culturally acceptable.

In order to make this study Africa-centred and African in orientation, the researcher toggles between dislocation, location and relocation of his findings from scientific perceptual space to collaborative intellectual immersion between the researcher and the researched (Baugh & Guion, 2016). In the quest to restore epistemic justice in International Relations and academy at large, this study embraces the referential subjectivity of Afrocentric knowledge systems; which has been rejected by the deeply-rooted racist, Eurocentric narrative. In other words, the researcher has occupied a central position during the operationalisation of this study in relation to the respondents. However, the colossal shaping of this study process by the researcher was not done at the expense of the actual reflections of its participants.

Contributing to the debate on research paradigms, Holloway (1997: 1) wrote that qualitative research “is a type of social analysis that looks into how people understand and make sense of their experiences and the world in which they live”. This expression is evident of the complexity of social research and the difficulty of reaching objectivity in a paradigm which puts the empathy of respondents first. Notwithstanding the fact that this study is largely empirical, the researcher takes caution of Hall’s (2007: 93) warning that binary branding of social science methodologies (subjective or objective and empirical or non-empirical) risks the polarisation of “practices of inquiry that share substantive interests, and that may share more common ground methodologically than the distinctions would suggest”.

In recognition of the foregoing discussion about Afrocentric research methodology and research methodology in general, this chapter attempts to describe the research design of the current study. It also provides brief
reflections about the sampling procedure and methods of data collection and analysis in this study. Lastly, the researcher delves into issues of reliability, validity and objectivity of his research findings, before a discussion of major ethical issues which were considered during the process of this study.

3.2. Research design

A term that is often confused with research methodology, research design denotes a detailed or step-by-step plan on how one seeks to carry out a study in order to answer his/her research questions. Welman et al (2005: 21) define research design as a plan according to which researchers investigate information from the participants and collect information from them. This study uses illustrative case study method as a research design with the intention of illustrating the US foreign policy towards resource rich African countries such as Ghana and Tanzania. Along other qualitative research methods, case studies have been found by Baugh and Guion (2016) as efficient for use in diverse subjects such as International Politics. Hence, case studies “allow researchers to access those factors that describe the everyday experiences of diverse cultures” (Baugh & Guion, 2016: 8). As cited by Platt (2007: 103), Robert K. Yin defines case study as “an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context”. In her list of the advantages of this design, Burnett (2009: 117) submits that case studies are comparable.

The value of the case study method in this research emanates from its aptitude “to obtain rich data with high validity whilst situating and interpreting data within their wider context” (Connell, et al., 2013). This propensity is also providing an enabling atmosphere wherein the theoretical framework of this study can be tested with freedom. Numerous criticisms have been levelled against this approach by some social scientists (Platt, 2007: 110). But such appears to be relatively baseless because it does not acknowledge the fact that case study relies upon the clarity of theoretical reasoning instead of the representation of the case. Despite the few nostalgic criticisms including the claims that case study method is not scientific and its findings are not necessarily generalisable, the cross-usage of numerous techniques in data collection and analysis as outlined below is very important as it enhances the credibility, dependability and confirmability of the findings and limited
chances of generalisation (Shenton, 2004). The point towards the deeper understanding of the importance of cross usage of numerous techniques in qualitative research of this nature was reinforced by Morse and Richards (2002: 70) when they advised that:

...an interesting research question will usually require several strategies for making data. Relying on one technique may produce homogenous data, which are highly unlikely to provide enough sources of understanding and ways of looking at a situation or problem.

The above observation was also captured by Burnett (2009: 117) who noted that case studies can also be used with other methods. The correctness of this assertion is unblemished in so far as it relates to analysis given the fact that the researcher would have to make cross references to the literature as the study proceeds. While the use of literature review as a data collection method, an inclusive and innovative process also known as document study is highly commended by specialists in policy analysis and historical research, its application is not very clear due to the cohabitation of data collection and analysis in qualitative studies of this nature (Morse & Richards, 2002: 1).

Flowing from the above, the researcher demonstrates and elaborates the nature of the problem of this study analytically, qualitatively and empirically. Despite the empirical elements of this study, the researcher shares the Afrocentrists' argument in favour of “pluralism in philosophical views without hierarchy” (Mkabela, 2005: 180). To this end, the study's descriptive approach features the selection of three key American foreign policy issues from the theoretical material in section A of this study, namely: access to oil resources, democracy and security promotion and apply these to the two cases (Ghana and Tanzania) in Section B. It is granted in the literature on US foreign policy that the above mentioned key foreign policy issues underpin her economic, political and/or security interests in Africa. Therefore, this study is not concerned about the quantification of fieldwork results, but it makes a contribution in terms of recording of case information and qualitative analysis.
3.3. Sources of data

For the purpose of this Afrocentric study, two sources of data were used. Primary information was collected through the review of newspapers, Afrocentric political magazines, official government communiqués, speeches, autobiographies, electronic correspondences, declassified official records and raw research data (if available) gathered for a different purpose (Lotter, et al., 2013). Supplementary primary information was obtained through unstructured and interactive interviews with key informants. Academics and researchers based in Gauteng and Limpopo province of South Africa were given preference. Equally important, African diplomats based in Pretoria, especially those representing Ghana and Tanzania were consulted. The third and last leg of primary respondents includes American and African diplomats and other people with exceptional interest in the subject of foreign policy analysis, in so far as African-American relations are concerned. Notwithstanding the claimed expert nature of this study, the researcher has also considered the views of non-political academics from Ghana and Tanzania based in South African universities, particularly in Limpopo and Gauteng provinces. In overall, it is worth reiterating that the key informants of this study were drawn from the US, Ghana, Tanzania, South Africa, Angola, Ethiopia, Kenya, Republic of Djibouti, Swaziland and Austria (see table 1: summary of the sample in this chapter). Contextually, key informant interviews were carried out between July 2013 and February 2016.

Secondary sources consulted included conference papers, journal articles (mainly from International Relations and History), books, periodicals and monographs. This information was mainly sourced from the libraries and documentation centres of the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA), Institute of Global Dialogue (IGD), Institute of Security Studies (ISS), Tanzanian and Ghanaian embassies in South Africa, Universities of Limpopo and Venda. While the application of literature review as both a tool for data collection and rigorous content analysis may seem cumbersome to those who are new to research

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There is no scholarly consensus as to whether newspapers and magazines constitute a primary or secondary source. However, their credence as primary sources is weighed on the basis of currency. For more details on this debate see, University of Pittsburg (2013).
and scholarship in government and politics, Morse and Richards (2002: 1, 129) note that in qualitative research “collecting data is not a process separate from analysing data”. However, the multi-usage of literature review as a research tool was complemented by consultations and unstructured, interactive interviews/dialogue. To add to the above, this study heeded Milam’s (1992: 13) advice that “Afrocentric researchers pay attention to symbols, affect, instinct, intuition and imagery as multiple ways of knowing”.

3.4. Sampling

Babbie (1998: 111) defines sampling as “any procedure for selecting units of observation”. Hereunder, a distinction for this study’s sampling technique and size is established.

3.4.1. Sampling technique

This study used purposive and convenience sampling because of the widely-held view among Afrocentricists and qualitative research experts at large that a best instance or its equivalent opposite is easy to explore. This is squarely alluded to by Morse and Richards (2002: 173) who argue that “when sampling, qualitative researchers maximise access to the phenomenon they are studying and select cases in which it is most evident”. It should be noted that in this study the location of the participants and any research outputs produced before it, took precedence over the topic and data generated.

It is also sensible to use purposive and convenience sampling in this study because it is easier to identify the people who are well-grounded on the subject of the US foreign policy towards Africa. Through literature review, it is also feasible to identify and locate reputable Afrocentric scholars in Political Science and History who gave valuable inputs to this study.
3.4.2. Sample size

To this end, the population of this research included academics and researchers, American and African diplomats and other people with special interest on the subject of foreign policy analysis and Afrocentric Studies. Academics and researchers in the field of Politics, History and related disciplines and African and American diplomats are considered as expert participants with a crispy understanding and experience about US foreign policy issues in Africa. Therefore, participants in this study were purposively and conveniently selected until saturation level was reached. At the end, the total number of participants for this study was 39 and they were in an age range of 18 to 65 years. Out of this 39, 34 were males while 5 represented females. These participants were drawn from different stakeholders related to the subject of enquiry. The sample of this study could be summarily tabulated as follows:

Table 1: Summary of the sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academics (25)</th>
<th>Diplomats (13)</th>
<th>Politicians (1)</th>
<th>Total (39)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa (23)</td>
<td>Ghana (2)</td>
<td>Swaziland (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya (1)</td>
<td>Tanzania (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria (1)</td>
<td>US (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Africa (6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Angola (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethiopia (1)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Republic of Djibouti (1)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The selection of academics and researchers as participants in this study was partly guided by the researcher’s desire to minimise bias by weighting interview results against what has been officially and academically documented and his self-knowledge and values before the study took off.

There is no doubt that most of the studies by academics in the realm of International Relations are well grounded in knowledge about the theoretical aspects of the study of foreign policy. Their arguments are often well-placed in a broader context of the recent policy and academic discourse without necessarily
turning a blind eye towards specificities in critically synthesising the issues at hand. Whereas some of the seasoned diplomats have had a privilege of engaging in a rigorous study of the varying theoretical approaches to the study of International Relations and foreign policy analysis in particular, it is common knowledge within the political and diplomatic circles that their strength is comparatively drawn from the emphasis on the practical aspect of international relations and diplomacy.

Since the study takes the shape of comparative case methodology, preference was given to Ghanaians and Tanzanians from the diplomatic front in order to enable the researcher to advance a nuanced discussion relating to specificities about Ghana and Tanzania. Unfortunately, it became apparent during fieldwork exercise of this research that diplomats do not deviate from the official government position. This challenge became obvious when one of the senior American diplomats approached to participate in the study declined as follows:

It is probably inappropriate for an active US diplomat to honestly and objectively participate in your study. Hence, foreign policy making is not a democratic or human right practice. It cannot be studied in the same manner as we study democracy and human rights. It is a hard-core national interest calculation with very little or no normative reasoning.

The above expression should be understood within the context that the thrust of this study flashes the key and burning issues that directly affect diplomats, particularly those representing the US. They have passion, spiritual and other forms of connection with the issues tackled in this study. They are also primarily interested and concerned with the discourse because they deal with daily practicalities and realities of the cause and effect of the US foreign policy towards Africa, in their countries (Ghana and Tanzania) in particular. Above all, the refusal to participate in an Afrocentric study by some of the American diplomats should also be understood within the context that the main idea of the US foreign policy is the maintenance of white supremacy in economics, politics and other spheres of life throughout the world (Dhliwayo, 2016). Therefore, any possibility for the Americans (of blood) to contribute towards the success of an Afrocentric research project is self-defeating. Hence, the findings of Afrocentric studies of this nature possess the possibility and
desirability to dislodge white supremacy in patterns of thought and political economy at the national, international and global level (Welsing, 2015). As cited by Milam (1992: 9), James B. Stewart takes the foregoing argument to another level when he articulates that “Eurocentrism [inclusive of Americans] is plagued by an inherent predisposition toward control and domination that produces attempts to create hierarchical rather than cooperative relationships with other peoples”.

Equally significant, drawing from the high level inter-marriages of the knowledge and experience of both academics and diplomats has enriched the potential of this study to introduce new and refreshing insights on the research theme. In the process, the researcher has appreciated in thought and action that Afrocentrists borrow things that are congruent to African values and positions (Dhliwayo, 2016). Equally, the researcher has embraced Afrocentricity’s propagation that “all non-Afrocentric knowledge which may be traced in origins to Eurocentrism should be discarded”.

Based on the foregoing narration of the motivations of the typology and justification for using purposive and convenience sampling of the target population, it is clear that the researcher intended to bridge the widening gap between the practice and theories of International Relations in explaining and understanding foreign policy issues (Moloi-Mvulane, 2012). This is achieved through a means of blending critical and robust synthesis of the personal accounts of academics, African and American diplomats and other people with special interest on the subject on the research theme.

Despite the importance and the very correct application of the above innovative and creative means of critical synthesis, the inclusion of the American diplomats in sampling can be contested even though the study is primarily concerned about researching, explaining and understanding the international policy of their country towards another continent, Africa with specific reference to Ghana and Tanzania. However, this position is a heavily diluted and libertine as it is wrongly based on the simple fact of the European origins of the American diplomats. To this end, the researcher holds the participation of the American diplomats in this study in high esteem because their views, presumably positioned in parallel with those of
the Africans will assist in adding value and credence to the relevance of discourse analysis in this research. Besides this, it is worth noting that Afrocentric sampling does not have colour preference and it is germane to the Afrocentric paradigm whose key is “a kind of collective perspective on history and reality” (Milam, 1992: 10).

Contextually, it must be pointed out that the careful decision to draw the sample of this study from diversified population with unique characteristics as outlined above was influenced by the difficulty of conceptualising foreign policy issues for an ordinary person. As a sub-discipline of International Relations, Foreign Policy Analysis mainly deals with issues that are not so conventional and straightforward for laymen. In fact, foreign policy is often misconceived domestically as dealing with issues that are very remote from the local people. That is why there are recently calls within academic and policy circles vowing for the domestication of foreign policy. This is a process of rooting foreign policy from overall domestic policy framework of a country. When used effectively and efficiently, public diplomacy would conscientise the local population about the pillars of the foreign policy of their country and its true meaning and relevance to their lives. Based on the above, it can be concluded that it is uncommon for African ordinaries not to have a fair grasp of the US foreign policy towards their countries since they are also not well-orientated about the foreign policy of their own countries.

3.5. Data collection methods

Taking note of the popular criticism about shallow knowledge of cases that is often directed towards those scholars who heavily rely on secondary data in their scientific analysis and writing, this research has diffused this notion through the use of primary sources, primary documents and oral informants in particular (Platt, 2007). In other words, this study employed dual sets of data collection methods in order to enhance the credibility and dependability of its findings (Shenton, 2004).
3.5.1. Unstructured and interactive interviews

Unstructured and interactive interviews with participants that are based in South Africa took the form of one to one session. Where a face to face interview with the South Africa based participants and others outside the country was not possible, electronic correspondence (i.e. skype, telephone and email) was explored. Most of the interviews for this study were conducted between July 2013 and February 2016. Unstructured and interactive interviews were chosen because of their ability to draw more data from the key respondents without unnecessary limitations. Additionally, unstructured and interactive interviews were selected because they provide a broader context of the study (Gay, 1992: 231). Key participants were asked open-ended questions on “US engagement in Africa” with a view to solicit their perceptions on this matter. Depending on the availability and accessibility of each and every respondent the interviews took the form of face-to-face conversations and electronic correspondence between the researcher and the respondents. Face-to-face, unstructured and interactive interviews are preferable because they allow the researcher to make immediate follow up questions for clarity from the respondents in terms of the meaning and context of their expressions. As recommended by de Vos (2002: 301), the researcher also strove to get the participant to do the following during the interview process:

- Open up and express ideas.
- Express ideas clearly.
- Explain and elaborate on ideas.
- Focus on issues at hand rather than wander to unrelated topics.

The following extracts from fieldwork personal correspondences reinforce the expert nature of this study and they also capture some of the views of the potential participants in this study:

i) I have nothing to contribute to the debates since I don’t work on the countries you have mentioned [Participant 1 from the University of Witwatersrand].
ii) Make sure that you consult very knowledgeable persons [Participant 2 from the University of Pretoria]

iii) Diplomacy is a very secretive field. I am not quite sure if our foreign counterparts will provide you with accurate information, especially when discussing the US affairs [Participant 3 from South Africa’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO)].

iv) In the case of the US, it is very difficult to know who the diplomat is and who is not. Some US government officials disguise as diplomats while in reality, they are the members of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). To this end, they have the propensity to misinform and mis-educate their audience provided such conduct serves the selfish interests of the US. You can blame them because this is their job [Participant 4, formally from South Africa’s Departments of Defence and Home Affairs].

Despite all of the above, it is important to emphasise that the researcher took advantage of the proximity of the embassies of US, Ghana and Tanzania in Pretoria for the purpose of fieldwork. Generally, the participants for this study were interviewed during office hours and at their work stations. In the same breath, electronic correspondence was explored as an alternative avenue of engagement between the researcher and the respondents for the convenience of both parties. This data collection technique minimised chances of intruding into the busy schedules of some of the participants while allowing them to respond to the questions at the time that is convenient for them. Electronic correspondence is also advantageous because it enables the researcher to quote (where permission is granted) the respondents in instances where paraphrasing of their responses may reduce or compromise the essence of the points that they are advancing. The vulnerability of written electronic correspondence is the ambiguity of some of the responses. Where possible, the researcher sought clarity by means of a telephone call, something that translated into a form of telephonic interview. In overall, figure 1 (see p.61) demonstrates the circular nature of data collection in an Afrocentric setting. This figure (1) also reinforces the conviction that there is a synergy between Afrocentric data collection methods and to a larger extent, reinforces cooperation and collective responsibility, oneness,
corporateness and interdependence, togetherness, solidarity, spiritualism and circularity as the canons of African value systems (Mazama, 2001).

Put yet in another way, the circular pattern of Afrocentric data collection methods is a direct attack and dismissal of the dominant research methodologies. Hence, the latter is rooted in a Eurocentric worldview and its epistemic location is closely tied to Euro-American value systems including “materialism and individualism and its negative view of human beings” (Mazama, 2001: 401), competition, separateness and independence and ordinality (Carrol, 2008: 10). Moreover, the axiological basis for the Afrocentric worldview is founded on cooperation and collective responsibility and other African value systems mentioned above. These are the attributes that have distinguished the Afrocentric worldview’s axiological basis from those of Euro-American worldview. The latter’s axiological basis is anchored on competition, materialism and other Euro-American value systems highlighted above (Carrol, 2008: 6, 10-13).

Figure 1: The circular method of data collection (adapted from Mkabela, 2005: 185).
3.5.2. Document study

In addition to unstructured and interactive interviews, the researcher embarked on an in-depth study of official, academic and popular literature in order to understand the trends relating to US foreign policy towards Africa; with a specific reference to Ghana and Tanzania (De Vos, 2002). This exercise is recommended in critical enquiries of this nature as it has a potential “to enrich the amount of data to be analysed” (Mabelebele, 2008: 40). In this context, the researcher classified and used both primary and secondary sources. The adopted criterion used to classify these sources was borrowed from De Vos (2002). According to De Vos (2002: 322) “primary sources are seen as the original written material of the author’s own experiences and observations, while secondary sources consist of material that is derived from someone else as the original source”.

3.6. Data analysis

An appraisal of information collected from primary and secondary sources relating to US foreign policy in general and its focus on Africa (continental context) using Ghana and Tanzania (country case studies) was based on certain criteria. For example, the selection of cases of study was guided by their inclusion as the designated African beneficiaries for the US’s Partnership for Growth (US Department of State, 2011), position, status and role in their respective regions, West Africa (Ghana) and East Africa (Tanzania) (Chase, Hill & Kennedy, 1996; Mitchell, 1998). The assessment of US foreign policy in Africa, particularly in Ghana and Tanzania, was done on the basis of the extent to which it reflects the economic, political and security dimensions of Washington’s engagement in West Africa and East Africa and to a certain extent, Africa at large. Analysis of the extent to which US foreign policy towards Ghana and Tanzania and Africa at large was also done on the basis of its official guiding principles (Shai, 2010) and by the application of Afrocentricity (Asante, 2003; Chilisa, 2012).

Accordingly, Milam (1992: 22-23) summarises the fundamental principles of the Afrocentric research methodology as follows:

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Afrocentricity offers a new paradigm of social theory and social science which represents a major departure from critical theory, feminist theory, constructivism, and naturalistic inquiry. It also provides a unique lens for analysing all forms of oppression at the same time and with the same degree of commitment, among them race, gender, and class. Critical theory, Marxist, and Feminist paradigms are valued for their contribution to the intersecting issues of oppression. Knowledge which is inherently Eurocentric is abandoned. All knowledge, whether it comes from traditional disciplines or from Black, African, and African-American Studies, must be scrutinised for Eurocentric bias. If necessary, Afrocentric knowledge starts from scratch. New Afrocentric research must be located in the culture, ideals, religion, history, etc. of the African and African-Diasporan peoples. All research must be grounded in the ideals of the African and African-Diasporan peoples through orientation and location to Afrocentricity. Scientific principles of empiricism are exchanged for an idiographic and interpretivist approach which recognises the holistic, subjective, phenomenological, and collective nature of human consciousness. There is no desire to predict or explain, only to explore the metaphors, patterns, contexts, and processes of subjective knowledge. The researcher/scholar is equally an activist/practitioner who is accountable both to disciplinary peers and larger communities. S/he is responsible for the ethical design, conduct, analysis, dissemination, and presentation of research for social and economic development. The life of the researcher/ activist is interwoven with her or his research agenda. There is no artificial separation between roles, as there is no barrier between the academic and the larger community, and there is no separation between researchers and respondents. Researchers are actively engaged in a political work which takes many forms, but is ultimately accountable to the people they are trying to help. Replicability, integrity, and trustworthiness are critical to the validity of research findings. Afrocentric researchers must incorporate the principles for
qualitative techniques found in constructivism, naturalistic enquiry, and interpretivism in their data gathering and analysis.

- If the paradigm of Afrocentrism is to emerge, then contradictions which are evident in the core literature need to be recognised as critical moments in the development of competing assumptions about radical sociology and social science. As Asante and others push Afrocentricity to the cutting edge of radical social science, the tensions and confusion over the changing discipline of Black, African-American, and African Studies must be valued as a necessary kind of dissonance.

The aforementioned emerging principles of the Afrocentric research methodology have largely served as the referent criteria for guiding the analysis of data in this research. This was done in line with the two methodological techniques recommended by Asante (as cited by Reviere, 2001: 715, 722), introspection and retrospection. According to Riviere (2001: 722) “Introspection is concerned principally with the implementation of the Afrocentric method, whereas retrospection is concerned with the interpretation of the data from the enquiry”.

Meanwhile, the success of this project was mainly dependent on continuous literature review and discourse analysis given the impracticality of obtaining sufficient primary information from the field by interview, especially with the American government officials. In terms of the US diplomatic protocol, all embassy personnel with the exception of the Spokesperson/ Political Chief are prohibited from participating in critical enquiries of this nature. Due to the higher level of secrecy involved in diplomacy, other embassies (including those of Ghana and Tanzania in South Africa and elsewhere) are no exception to this rule. Therefore, the researcher analysed written text (particularly US foreign policy documents, academic and popular publications on the research theme) and interview results to primarily answer the research question of this study. In this regard, the following three steps in discourse analysis as elucidated by Norman Fairclough (as cited by Horvath, 2014) were applied:

- **Description** focused on the formal properties of the text.

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11 This is based on the personal experience of the researcher that dates back to the year 2006 when he was doing research on the same subject as part of his Honours and Master’s degree studies.
• **Interpretation** centred on the nexus between text and interaction. This entails the viewing of a text as an outcome of the production process and as a resource in interpretation.

• **Explanation** examined the link between interaction and social context - with the social determination of the production and interpretation processes, and their social effects.

The emerging discourse from the steps outlined above was complemented by the synthesis of available interview results through thematic analysis. The debate about discourse analysis is very extensive and making just literature review in this area is inconceivable, except drawing few influential citations. According to Lynch (2007: 499) ‘discourse analysis’ is an umbrella term for several social scientific methods linked with critical theory, cultural and political studies and related disciplines. In a quest to legitimate the common and shared objective of discourse studies, Van Dijk (2001: 352) explains discourse analysis as an “analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in social and political context”. To a certain extent, Van Dijk’s (2001) account of discourse studies suggests that conversation analysis can be understood as an extension of discourse analysis. Given the thick description proffered discourse analysis, there is no gainsaying that the latter “is an alternative method, designed for descriptive adequacy, if not objectivity” (Lynch, 2007: 502). While analysis has been done in some of the texts (secondary) reviewed, Michael Lynch (2007: 512) takes the argument further by acknowledging that irrespective of whether such an analysis (un)fits the aims of the professional analyst, “the latter analyst cannot be indifferent to it”. Contextually, Van Dijk (2001: 353) outlines the following as the fundamental features of discourse analysis:

• It must be better than other studies in order to gain recognition,

• It must be centred on social and political issues, rather than current paradigms,

• Empirically adequate analysis of social problems must be multi-disciplinary,
• Explains discourse structures in terms of properties of social interaction, and
• The primary focus is on the ways discourse structures enact, confirm, reproduce, or challenge relations of power and dominance in society.

Besides surveying the existing literature in this field to avoid the replication of existing arguments and to also, sharpen the theoretical framework of this research as mentioned above, the place and role of literature review in this section of the study is that of a data collection technique. Also denominated as document study (including newspapers), literature review is understood by Mabelebele (2008: 40) as having a huge potential to enrich the amount of data to be analysed. In the same line of reasoning, Leedy and Ormrod (2013: 51) enunciated that:

Those who have conducted research before you belong to a community of scholars, each of whom has journeyed into the unknown to bring back an insight, a truth, [and] a point of light. What they have recorded of their journeys and findings will make it easier for you to explore the unknown: to help you also discover an insight, a truth, or a point of light.

Unlike the literature review which is often presented in chapter two of many studies, its explained objective and continuous integration in the discussion chapters of this research is given more value and currency by the interview results. When interpreting the findings, Diana Ridley (2008: 151) succinctly articulates the point above as follows: “[I][t is important to point out how your work either supports or contradicts related previous work in your field”. Contextually, primary and secondary data for this study was integrated by identifying consistency and variation from the major themes emerging from the discourse.

3.7. Dependability, credibility and conformability

The evolving academic discourse about the application and relevance of easily exploitable concepts such as reliability, validity and objectivity in conducting scientific enquiry has been the shared hotbed between qualitative research scholars and purely natural scientists since time immemorial. Since then, this heated debate has
been joined by Afrocentric qualitative scholars and has been compounded by the Afrocentric proposition that good/evil is contextual as it is the truth and its opposite. This line of argument also echoes the researcher’s Afrocentric theoretical and philosophical perspective that views natural sciences and orthodox Western science as not good enough and adequate to provide explanation and understanding of humanist viewpoints. This argument has been elevated by Owusu-Ansah and Mji (2013:1) who contend that “knowledge or science, and its methods of investigation, cannot be divorced from a people’s history, cultural context and worldview”. While Asante (2003: 12) posits that Afrocentrists study every thought, action, behaviour and value and when found to be contradictory with the African culture and history it is dispensed; its application in this research does not necessarily imply that whatever system that is contradictory to African values is of no use to Africa. However, given the historic purpose and mission of Afrocentricity as highlighted earlier, caution should be taken at all times not to deny Afrocentric studies with an opportunity to borrow and/or draw from non-Afrocentric schools of thought while doing away with every system that is cancerous to the moral and humanist fabric of the African society. While recognising that Africa cannot be an island onto itself and in line with the acknowledgement of the spirit of valuing the diversity of Afrocentricity, it is argued that this continent stands to gain from borrowing certain things from other parts of the world including Europe and America.

Notwithstanding the above controversies and others relating to established, but contested standards of doing scientific social research, it is argued that the triangulation of qualitative research paradigm based-discourse analysis and interviews and the cross-pollination of progressive ideals of identified Western paradigms (realism and idealism in particular) with Afrocentric paradigm in this research has enhanced the dependability (reliability), credibility (validity) and conformability (objectivity) of its findings (Shenton, 2004). In line with the application of discourse analysis in this research, Lynch (2007: 508) explains the reversed road of objectivity to conformability as follows:

Criticisms of efforts by social scientists to stabilise vernacular language for purposes of developing conceptual schemes and operationalising ordinary words as variables and concepts, convinced some social scientists to turn away from the ambitions of objective social science and to focus instead on situated uses of discourse.
It is envisaged that the infusion of Afrocentricity in this study has boosted its credence and status in the academic community and elevated the researcher’s understanding of many viewpoints about the US foreign policy towards Africa. This premise is informed by the theoretical proposition that Afrocentricity values the diversity of opinions (Asante, 2003: 12).

Based on the Afrocentric nature of this study, it is emphasised that objectivity does not find expression in this research. Hence, objectivity rejects the possibility and desirability of contextual truth. For this research and other Afrocentric studies, what is predominantly purported as the objectivity traditional social scientists is in fact the collective subjectivity of the Europeans and Americans (Reviere (2001: 716, Dhliwayo, 2016)). As such, Owusu-Ansah and Mji (2013: 4) advocate that “research that claims to objective and neutral is inadequate if it does not challenge the social oppression”. In the same breath, Reviere (2001: 714) articulates that “objectivity is an impossible standard to which to hold researchers; rather, researchers should be judged on the fairness and honesty of their work”. Given the epistemic location of this researcher, Afrocentric paradigm; it is openly laid out that he is committed to the application of a particular line of thought with a motive of liberating Africans, people of African descent and Africa from the vestiges of coloniality (including poverty and underdevelopment) and to marshal them towards meaningful progress and development (Maserumule, 2015). According to Reviere (2001: 710), the foregoing argument is to say that “the researcher is expected to examine and to place in the foreground of the enquiry any and all subjectivities or societal baggage that would otherwise remain hidden and, hence, covertly influence research activity”.

Transferability, dependability and confirmability of these findings of this research was enhanced by subjecting the draft study to a review by self-identified Afrocentric scholars. These scholars were primarily sought of checking and verifying if this enquiry and its findings have conformed to the principles of the Afrocentric research methodology as outlined above. In trying to theorise quality assurance criteria Afrocentric scholarship, Reviere (2001: 720) has invoked that “the Afrocentrist must strive for the encouragement and maintenance of harmonious relationships between groups”. While Reviere’s (2001: 720) invocation is an essential test for the credibility
and transferability of Afrocentric studies; it is safe to state that traditional Euro-American studies are starved of such important element.

3.9. Ethical considerations

Babbie (1998: 438) notes that being ethical refers to an act of conforming to the standards of conduct for a professional community and/or social grouping. This explanation implies that what is (un)ethical for a particular social grouping may not be the case for the other. To this end, the operationalisation of this study has conformed to the following ethical principles:

3.9.1. Permission to conduct the study

The commencement of this study was preceded by the application and granting of the clearance certificate by Turffloop Ethics and Research Committee (TREC), University of Limpopo. The ethical clearance certificate of this study is attached herein, under annexure 3.

3.9.2. Academic fraud

According to Alkebulan (2007: 414) “research must address the needs of African people for it to be relevant” and acceptable in terms of the ethical and function dimension of Afrocentric research. To this end, this research envisages the provision of a true sense of African destiny that is based on honest facts of history and personal experience of the Africans.

3.9.3. Informed consent and voluntary participation

In parallel to this, the operationalisation of this research had followed informed consent rules. The purpose of the study and the right to terminate participation in the interviews conducted was clearly explained to the respondents. The participants were also informed in advance that participation in this research has no financial rewards for them as the respondents and were also assured that the gathered data will not be passed to a third party or used elsewhere except for the purpose of this study.
3.9.4. Confidentiality and anonymity

Where direct quotes are employed or the respondent is cited in whatever form, the researcher conceived and used pseudonyms as references during the write-up phase of the study. In the case indirect citations or pseudonyms are used, the researcher refrained from using identifiable characteristics that may be used to relate or trace the respondent. But if the participants sought identification, such was observed in kind. Since this is not a secretive study, the foregoing summarily implies that the researcher asked the respondents if they wished to have their identities known or want to remain anonymous when reporting the findings of this study.

3.9.5. No harm to the participants

While the researcher upholds the centrality and considerable importance of adhering to the above ethical principles in research, it goes without saying that the nature of this study does not pose any threat to ethics. This can still be contested in the light of the possibility that some of the respondents can feel victimised by some of the questions since this is a political study. The weight of this argument depends on where one is standing but it makes more sense in an environment that is poisoned with a high level of political intolerance and censorship. This loophole has been taken care of by the careful selection of the respondents who are politically and intellectually matured. These respondents have a grip on foreign policy issues and academic research in general. As a result, they clearly understand that the motive of the study is not to provoke sensitivities but to generate a better understanding of the US foreign policy towards Africa. It is argued that it is generally acceptable political discourse to discuss foreign policy matters in an academic context in so far as diplomats and academics are concerned.

Above most of the traditional ethical principles discussed above, the researcher has also considered the following Afrocentric ethics as pointed out by Mkabela (2005: 186):

- An appreciation of the importance of all individuals in the research group
• An understanding that research is part of a very complex (community) whole
• The respect of heritage authority
• The inclusion of elders and cultural committees in the research process
• An understanding of the interconnectedness of all things (including the spiritual) and a required long term perspective in dealing with research issues
• Researchers must act in an appropriate and respectful way to maintain the harmony and balance of the group (community).

3.10. Conclusion

The foregoing chapter has made a clear distinction between research methodology and design and also discussed the meaning of each of them for this study. This chapter has also identified data collection, analysis and sampling methods of this study and advanced the reasons for their choice. Equally important, critical issues of ethics in this research and concerns surrounding reliability, validity and objectivity of its findings have been addressed. Contextually, the epistemic location (Afrocentric paradigm) of this study permits the cross-following of both empirical and non-empirical methods. In other words and for the purpose of this study, the binary logic of knowledge production is dismissed theoretically and philosophically (Asante, 2003; Chilisa, 2012; Maserumule (2011). Finally, the researcher’s decision to triangulate both interview results and written data seeks to show that the spoken and written text are not linear and there is a long-standing close relationship between them (Buthelezi, 2015).

The subsequent chapter addresses the nature of the relationship between the US and oil producing African countries in its broadest form. Central to this chapter is the quest to understand the extent to which this relationship has been mutually or distinctively beneficial. This chapter is meant to provide a broader context for understanding the nature of the relationship between the US and Ghana, an African oil producing country.
Chapter 4

African Oil as a Bolster of America’s Economic Prosperity

4.1. Introduction

Oil is generally viewed as a significant and scarce resource in the international market system due to rapid industrialisation in the world. To concretise the preceding statement, Makube (2008: 1) notes that oil is strategically important to any economy both as a ‘fuel and a feedstock in the production process of chemical products’. Its significance gained centrality in the partnership between oil exporting countries and oil importing countries. It has also redefined the geopolitical, geo-economic and geo-strategic calculations of the stronger economies in their dealings with the developing world. For instance, oil supply is one of the critical areas in the relationship between oil-producing African countries and the US (Goldwyn & Ebel, 2004: 6-22). However, the politics around oil resources in Africa and the world at large has attracted much interest and analysis from academics, businessmen, media, political and energy analysts. This is due to the fact that much of the citizens of all oil-rich African countries live under extreme poverty levels and their economies are underdeveloped (Keay, 2002: 1). For instance, it is recorded in Aircapedia (2009) that in the year 2007 the oil rich Angola and Nigeria were ranked fourteenth (14th) and nineteenth (19th), respectively in terms of Human Poverty Index (HPI). Broadly, in 2006 the Human Development Index (HDI) of Nigeria was 0.448 and this figure had placed this country at one hundred and fifty eight (158th) position out of one hundred and seventy seven (177) countries ranked. Much like Nigeria, in 2006 Angola’s HDI was 0.439 and this has positioned it on number one hundred and sixty one (161) out of one hundred and seventy seven (177) countries with data (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2006). On the other hand, the standard of living of most oil importing countries in the West, such as the US, is high (Wikepedia, 2009). It is important to note that most of the oil companies operating in Africa are

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12 An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the Southern African Young Scientists Summer Programme (SA-YSSP) final colloquium in the University of Free State, Bloemfontein, 21 February 2014 and also published in the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis’s (IIASA) Scientific Update (2014).

13 It is on record that both the US and Canada rank very high in terms of HDI and in 2006 available data appropriated them at number fifteen (15) and three (3), respectively (Wikepedia, 2009).
mainly from the West-US, Canada, Britain, Italy and France. These companies include Chevron-Texaco, Exxon-Mobil, Shell, ENI, McMoran, among others.

While the dominance of the petro industry in Africa by Western companies is apparent, the effect of this industry to the well-being of ordinary citizens in Africa remains a doubt. It is against this backdrop that this chapter aims to assess the involvement of the US in what scholars have termed, “new scramble for Africa”. Furthermore, this chapter will examine the extent to which Africa’s oil wealth is a ‘curse’ or ‘blessing’ to its people. Most of the academic literature on this subject builds on the thesis of a ‘resource curse’. ‘Resource curse refers to the ironic situation of countries with abundance of resources, but registering retarded levels of socio-economic growth and development. In this context, this chapter tests the probability that Africa’s oil wealth is a terrain for shared or competing interests between her and the US. It goes without saying that the challenges facing oil exporting countries and oil importing countries are different. As such, policy contradictions are imminent between the US and African and other oil producing countries in the international economic system. This relates especially to questions of whether the US’s security or African development is a priority for Africa’s oil.

In this chapter, Afrocentricity explains the history of resources exploitation and the relationship between resource-producing African countries and Western countries. This theoretical locus was found relevant for this chapter and study as a whole because it helps in understanding the nature of exploitation in the unequal relationship between Western countries and resource-rich African countries. Similarly, Marxism accounts for the nature of exploitation between individuals and nations. It is also important to note that this chapter specifically addresses the research question number 1 of this study: To what extent do the goals and objectives of the US foreign policy (mis)fit the national interests of select African states?

4.2. US, Africa’s oil endowments and the world market

Africa is one of the continents that are rich in oil resources. This fact was corroborated by Desire (2007: 1) when he postulated that Africa has significant oil
[and gas] reserves in the world. The presence of both gas and oil wealth in Africa makes the continent pivotal in international economic relations. As such, the US and other industrialised countries stand to benefit from the exploitation of Africa’s oil. The foregoing postulation is advanced against the backdrop of assurances by some of the officials of the Obama Administration to the contrary. The minority view among the American government officials is that oil from overseas countries is less strategic for the economic and energy security of the US. They argue that one of the grand ideals of the Obama Administration is to ensure that the US becomes a self-dependent and self-sustainable producer of oil for its domestic consumption. While the ideals oil self-dependence and sustainability have been popularised under the reign of Obama, it is submitted in this research that the US has always had rich oil reserves. But for strategic reasons, the successive US administrations in the post-Cold War era and prior to that, have been happy to exploit the oil sources of other countries (Mabizela, 2015). In addition to the above, the unpopular and dismissive narrative about the less strategic significance of Africa to the US economic and energy security among the diplomatic circles is emotive. It fails to capture the dominant realities of the competition for oil and gas in Africa and the position of the US in this regard (Xu, 2008). Thus, Dolan (2009: 2) correctly believes that the US pursues energy in Africa for two manifold reasons: (i) meeting rising domestic consumer and commercial demands for oil and natural gas and (ii) maximising American power and influence within the international system.

In Africa proven oil reserves are located in Libya, Nigeria, Algeria, Angola, Sudan and new discoveries have been made in Cameroon, Ghana and Mauritania. With the exception of the three countries mentioned here, other countries mentioned above have attracted at least forty eight percent (48%) of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Libya and Nigeria accounted for approximately sixty six percent (66%) of Africa’s oil export, at least until the Arab Spring caught with the former in the year 2011 (United Nations (UN), 2007).

As such, Africa is fast becoming a strategic continent of the future due to its oil supplies. Its energy resources have attracted the involvement of big powers such as the US, Britain, China, among others. Makube (2008: 7) further argues that the US is interested in the continent as a ‘cheap and reliable alternative to the increasingly
volatile Persian Gulf’. Velempini and Solomon (2008: 3) wrote that the US receives twelve percent (12%) of its oil imports from Africa and this is set to increase to twenty five percent (25%) in the year 2015. Globally, it is estimated that West Africa alone will be responsible for one fifth of the world’s oil supply (Ibid). Another scholar, Fikreyesus (2012: 1) exponentially enforced the foregoing prediction when he wrote that in the year 2008 the US ‘imported about sixteen percent (16%) of its oil from the Gulf of Guinea and this figure is likely to increase to twenty five percent (25%) by the [year] 2015’.

4.3. African oil trade: The reversal of fortunes

Emmanuel Wallenstein’s World Systems Theory gives a detailed analysis of the trade relations between the industrialised countries and the developing countries. For him, international relations are conducted within the broader capitalist framework that facilitates (naturally) the movement of goods and services from the periphery (developing countries) to the core (industrialised countries) (Hobden & Jones, 2005: 231-234). As a Marxist theory, World Systems Theory would argue that the involvement of the US in Africa’s oil fields represents a second wave of the scramble for Africa by a country that did not directly benefit from colonialism or did not have or gain any colonies during the partition of Africa (1884-1885). Given this, Adam Habib (2007) equates the nineteenth (19th) century scramble for Africa with the current wave of the scramble for Africa. While the analogy for linking the 19th century scramble of Africa and the current one is befitting, it is argued that US involvement in Africa’s resource sector may not be worse as compared to China.

Unlike its Western counterparts such as Britain and the US, Beijing does not have strong moral convictions to condemn authoritarianism in Africa. From an economic point of view, China has also been attractive to African states simply because of its unblemished record on promotion and support for the principle of ‘non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states’ as a guiding operational framework for the conduct of international relations. However, the under-current of Beijing’s economic engagement in Africa is the worst. In fact, it is worse than even the 1st wave of the ‘scramble for Africa’. Hence, when China’s government or companies invests in the extractive industry of African countries such as Ghana and Tanzania, among others;
it largely uses labour and products from China (Umejesi, 2014). This practice ensures that maximum economic dividends are repatriated to China. The very tendency and strategy was used during the building of the African Union (AU) headquarters in Ethiopia.

In this context, Beijing’s economic engagement with Africa has short term benefits for this continent, but in the long run it would hurt. Africa runs the risk of trading its economic sovereignty to China. Unfortunately, the undercurrent of Chinese political and economic engagement in Africa is simply dismissed by the majority of African ruling elites as a true reflection of the anti-Chinese sentiments veering across the globe. The above defence position of the governments of Africa should be understood within the context that normally, the ruling elites (hierarchy) collude with the oil companies (individualism) from China and elsewhere for their self-enrichment at the expense of their people and communities (egalitarianism) (Umejesi & Thompson, 2015). To Bromley (2005: 227-228), the current international capitalist system is equivalent to:

[A] world of many states, in which each state – including the United States increasingly has to reckon its national interest in the light of the common interests of all states. This does not mean that states do not compete against one another but it does mean that they also cooperate in common endeavours in order to manage a wider framework in which their economies can compete.

In his book, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, Rodney (1973: 149) bears testimony that the original scramble for Africa fuelled European development and retarded Africa’s development prospects. The above relates to the fact that at the time, Africa was stripped off its mineral, energy and agricultural resources without compensation. Meanwhile, what at first appeared to be a legitimate commerce between the African states and Western powers assumed more worrying implications due to the unfair trade rules that has further pushed the former to the periphery of the international economic system in favour of the industrialised countries.
4.4. The US and the new scramble for Africa

According to the African Oil Policy Initiative Group (AOPIG, 2008), ‘African oil is not an end but a means: a means to both greater US energy security and more rapid African development’. Contrary to AOPIG’s position, this research advances the Marxist theory that argues that the involvement of the US in Africa’s oil fields is similar to the original scramble and what is different is only, the political and economic climate in which it is taking place. The national interests of the US would be prioritised in their dealings with African oil exporting countries and the continent as a whole. What emerges here is that in every relationship, either bilateral or multilateral, each state seeks to prioritise its national interests regardless of its political or economic position in the world. Therefore, the US uses its political leverage to maximise its interests in its engagement with the African states on issues of trade and other economic sectors (Mutheiwana, 2009).

It is also not wise for Africa to have any high and unrealistic expectations from any US administration at any point in time. After all, the performance of any US administration is not judged in terms of its more often self-imposed humanitarian and moral responsibilities in Africa and elsewhere, but on how it best serve the interests of its domestic populace (Mamaila, 2008: 22). The truth of the matter is that the development of Africa is secondary for the US and if it happens, it would be accidental. Lending credence to this view, the extant literature on resources and development in Africa shows that foreign investment pattern in transport infrastructure of the African oil exporting countries such as Nigeria was not organised to link the communities of the host countries and promoting other local interests (Onuoha, 2008: 29). But it was developed to facilitate the transportation of oil exports to the US and other major players in the oil sector such as China. Therefore, it is hypocritical to think that both Africa and the US can benefit from African oil especially under the tutelage of the current trade rules in the international system. The advocates of the World Systems Theory would argue that any suggestion of how African oil could be used to mutually benefit both Africa and the US is like advising America on how best to use Africa to solve its domestic problems. An important point

14 For a comprehensive analysis of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), see Keet (2002).
to note is that colonialism did more harm than good to Africa, and Africans should be careful about the current wave of the scramble of the continent’s energy resources (Boahen, 2003: 327-333).

In analysing the US’s participation in the new scramble for Africa, it is important not to see Africans (or Americans) as homogenous- i.e. microcosms of African and American national interest, respectively (Thompson, 2013). With the haemorrhaging development crisis in the majority of the resource-rich African countries, it important to also consider the roles of the local elites in patronage networks as well as self-enrichment schemes in terms of the African oil producers (Adejuwon, 2014: 21-37).

4.5. The dichotomy of Africa’s oil as a curse viz. blessing

A historical conundrum faced with economists, political scientists, historians, and development practitioners is whether oil extraction particularly in Africa lead to a shared economic growth and development due to a ‘resource blessing’ or it would result into a ‘resource curse’? In the case of Africa, the key challenge is that the oil wealth did not benefit the people who are legally entitled to the resource (Mbachu, 2008). This can be attributed partly to corruption, illegal trading, uneven development policies and unfair international trade rules. In response to this misnomer, the Africa Policy Advisory Panel warranted that as Africa begins to contribute more oil to world markets, ‘the US must use its limited leverage to press governments to become transparent, spend their revenues for the betterment of their people, and respect human rights and the rule of law’ (Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2004). Admittedly, this is a logical option that is in line with the spirit of the new economic partnership for Africa’s development. However, it does not nurse specific strategic interests of the US and it is quite a sour pill to be swallowed by the policy making and implementation machinery of Washington. It is hardly surprising when the US often puts a blind eye on despotic regimes especially in areas where American democratic demands are likely to jeopardise its oil entrenched economic interests. This explains the reason why the American government officials seldom tackled the longest reigning presidents in Africa such as the late Muammar Ghadaffi who led Libya for close to three decades, Obiang Nguema Mbasongo (leader of Equatorial Guinea since 1979), Omar Bongo (has been in power in Gabon since
December 1967 till his death in 2009) and Paul Biya (ruled Cameroon for no less than three decades) (Ankomah, 2008: 8).\(^{15}\) It must be noted that no written history of the politics of oil in Africa would be complete without mentioning Libya, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon because they counted among the major oil exporting countries in the world. As such, if the US is serious about the need to diversify its energy resources, it is bound to court this ‘dictators club’ because it is relatively receptive to the US foreign policy. This is symbolic of the replay of the Cold War era when the US propped up autocratic regimes to be used as geo-strategic and geo-political bulwarks in a fight against the encroachment of communism in Africa. Additionally, others were used as springboards or rather geo-economic bulwarks, to safeguard and preserve African mineral, oil and gas wealth for exploitation by the West (Shai, 2008). This practice stunted the development of Africa as petrodollars were used to prolong a civil war in Angola, fuelled a cycle of conflict in Nigeria and maintained and sustained authoritarian regimes in Gabon and Cameroon (Obi, 1999: 40-58).

The association of the US with the ‘dictators club’ or some of the authoritarian African oil exporting countries leaves many questions unanswered especially with regard to its commitment to the promotion of democracy around the world. The answer to this question is that, it is not the responsibility of the US to establish and strengthen democratic institutions in Africa. This is the primary task of the Africans themselves and it goes well with the popular expression ‘African solutions for African problems’.\(^{16}\) If the democratisation of Africa counters American economic interests, Africans might as well forget about the positive contribution of the US to their political and economic emancipation. Mabale (2008) echoed this sentiment ‘there is no person [nation] that can eat out of morality’. This means that in the face of competing economic interests in the international system, the US would put more focus on its realist foreign policy priorities and provide limited support to the less important liberal foreign policy priorities in Africa. Some observers view American capitalism as the circus of the US foreign policy (Westad, 2007: 27-28). In their view, only through the

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\(^{15}\) The US opted to shun Muammar Ghadaffi in the year 2011 upon realising that he was losing his grip in power. This move was a means of preparing itself to maintain a certain level of influence during the transition period and to ensure that its economic interests in the petro industry are secure in post-Ghadaffi era.

\(^{16}\) For global insights on the adage of “African solutions for African problems”, see Petlane (2009).
understanding of growing economic role of the US in the world can the political aspects of its external relations be grasped. In terms of opinion surveys conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA) as cited by Drezner (2008: 16), the promotion of democracy as the principle of the US foreign policy has gained less than forty (40%) percent public support from the year 1990 to 2006. What can be deduced from this survey is that liberal policy goals can be easily stated, but are very difficult to implement.

Closely associated with the failure of the US to help democracy thrive in some of the African oil exporting countries, it has become fashionable for academics to state that Washington has failed to ensure that Africans benefit from the oil revenues generated by their governments. The application of double standards with regard to the US commitment to the promotion of democracy in Africa has denied Africans access to better living conditions. For instance, President Paul Biya [mis]used the oil proceeds of Cameroon to fund his unnecessary and expensive travels and prolonged stays in luxurious hotel(s) in Switzerland while his people were languishing in extreme poverty and underdevelopment (fatalism) (Achu, 2009; Umejesi & Thompson, 2015: 791-811). In the midst of this dire situation, the US has turned a blind eye to poor political and economic governance in Cameroon and it was ‘business as usual’ in regard to oil trading and other commercial exchanges between the two countries. This must be understood as an end-result of the failure of the US to reconcile its goal of promoting democracy and the rule of law with its economic diplomacy. All of the above is well captured in CCGA’s study of Public Opinion and Foreign Policy wherein it is reported that the domestic support for the promotion of human rights abroad declined drastically from fifty eight percent (58%) in 1990 to forty seven percent (47%) and twenty eight percent (28%) in 2002 and 2006, respectively (Drezner, 2008: 16).

The scrutiny of the growth and development performance of democratic states shows that democracy does not necessarily bring about economic development; instead it provides an enabling environment for development. In spite of this, this research argues that it is not the primary task of the US administration to create enabling conditions where Africans can live a better life. And it is no surprise that throughout the post-Cold War era, the improvement of the living standards of the
poor nations nodded not more than forty one percent (41%) of public support as one of the American foreign policy goals (Ibid). Therefore, Africans themselves must primarily lead the struggle to put in place accountable and transparent regimes. This is essential if oil revenues are to be used for the development of the people (Africans in particular), instead of entrenching dictatorships for the benefit of the few ruling political elites and their cronies. For its part, the US should help the African states to review current natural resource legislations to adequately reflect and accommodate the interests of the masses. This can be complemented by whittling down of loan guarantees and subsequent imposition of diplomatic pressures including sanctions to states that do not adhere to good business practices in oil trading.

As observed from the above, it is quite difficult to find convincing evidence to wholly blame the US for the impoverished situations of the oil-producing African countries. This argument should be tied to the overall dependence on natural resources. The global comparative perspective reveals that the presence of natural resources in Botswana and Norway have not cursed the people, yet the US is actively trading with this countries. To a limited extent, the resource curse argument fits well in the description, explanation and interpretation of the extract of Africa except for Norway and Botswana. For example, Norway is the second largest exporter of oil in the world (Saudi Arabia being the biggest) yet it does not suffer the curse. According to Michael Watts (cited by Thompson, 2013) the fact that Norway is ‘a stable democracy and it was never colonised’ has provided an enabling environment for her to combat the ‘resource curse’. While the argumentation of the importance of the stability of the democracy of Norway in preventing the ‘resource curse’ is evident, it is incorrect that Norway was never a colony. Norway was the colony of Sweden at least until the early 1900s (Thompson, 2013). And of course, the US also used to be a colony and with a mightily exploited resource – sugar. So there is certainly some more sorting out needed on this ‘resource curse’ front. It is argued that it is all to do with whether a country can get itself into the ‘feasibility space’ for democracy and of course, the African elites are no help there. Undoubtedly, the US and other trading partners of African countries have a responsibility of promoting sound governance in Africa, as a way of enhancing conducive trading environment. In the long run, it is in the best interest of the US for African nations to be developed and become self-reliant. This will enhance the capacity of African nations to buy products from the US.
As such, the US should pursue policies that do not result in internal conflicts, such as resource related wars.

4.6. The neo-colonial orientation of the African oil-based economies

There is an extensive literature on the political and economic impact of oil on inter-African relations and international relations at large. Despite the centrality of oil on the economies of the countries that export it, it is essential to comprehend that globally the impact of its receipts has been controversial. In Africa for instance, new oil discoveries have increased the economic growth of the respective countries including Mauritania and Ghana. Unfortunately, the pace of economic growth in African oil exporting countries is not parallel to their level of socio-economic development. In part this is related to the lack of progressive change with respect to overcoming the colonial structure and orientation of their economies (Matlhako, 2010). For as long as the systematic structural defects that characterised the colonial economy and structure in much of the former colonies persist, overcoming the legacies of the past gets stubbornly passed on the post-colonial state which reproduces the similar, if not worse social and other relations of production. These ultimately numb growth and development, if not skewing it in a certain direction that is not suitable for the political economy of the African states. Regardless of all of the above, there is certainly no doubt that domestic leadership is mainly responsible for the Human Poverty Index (HPI) for their respective countries. Hence, domestic leadership commonly has a legitimate mandate for internal management of resources and earnings.

4.7. American oil companies and corporate social responsibility

There is an area that has also caught the attention of environmentalists, geologists and nature conservationists. This relates to the environmental impact of oil refineries. According to De Oliveira (2007: 17), the extraction of oil in Africa was having damaging consequences. This is especially the case in the most productive oil provinces like Niger Delta where oil exploration brought about long term negative results including environmental degradation, disturbance of the ecosystem and health hazards to the local population.
The above situation has been worsened by the need of oil companies to increase production and profit, without being considerate of how such process would affect the population of the areas surrounding the oil refineries or drilling installations (Nwonwo, 2007). Emphatically, companies who are active in oil explorations in Africa include American oil giants such as Exxon-Mobil and Chevron-Texaco. Litvin (2009: 68-69) pointed out that even though there is scant commitment to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in the international system, CSR is more of the province of big corporations as opposed to small or infant companies. Of course, with the presence of American oil giants, the fact that the Niger Delta and Sudan (Darfur) is still characterised by unending conflict and heightened violence is a reflection of major issues underlying the limits of CSR. Given the perceived threats to environmental sustainability - key to development, African oil producing countries have not been able to meaningfully engage with their partners in the petroleum industry, including the American oil giants. Studies show that the success of African oil exporting countries is delayed and withheld by their overdependence on foreign technology and finance (De Oliveira, 2007: 55-57). Whereas foreign technology and finance was deemed necessary to address challenges of Africa’s technical incapacity on exploration, transportation and refinery, this premise has also subjected this continent’s oil rich countries to a disadvantaged position in the area of contractual negotiations.

4.8. The strategic importance of Africa’s oil to the US

Politically, the US oil companies were at an advantage because most of Africa’s oil exporting countries are not members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The US was also trying to persuade Nigeria and Angola to terminate their membership of OPEC. The concealed goal of this American proposition was to break or weaken the solidarity of OPEC to its Arab member states that are in a political struggle with both Jerusalem and Washington. Although Nigeria and Angola did not surrender their OPEC membership, the US suggestion represents a desperate diplomatic move by the world’s only remaining superpower to gain a total control of Africa’s oil reserves. To substantiate the above, Molapo (2007: 7) aptly reminds us that ‘[B]usiness interests can best be secured through a
complicated diplomatic strategy’. Equally true, most of Africa’s oil reserves are in the proximity of the East coast of the US and this makes the transportation of this high valued commodity cheap for the American oil companies. This fact does not imply that oil transportation costs from Latin America to the US are high than those from Africa to the US. In fact, Africa is treated as an alternative oil trading partner of the US because of Washington’s hostile relations with its backyard oil exporting countries such as Venezuela and Bolivia. Velempini and Solomon (2007: 7) note that the problem of Washington lies over the leftist tide sweeping around Latin America. The case in point was the harsh rhetoric used by leader of Venezuela (the late Hugo Chavez) in his description or rejection of the economic system of the US. Indeed, Chavez proclaimed that the 2008 world financial and food crisis is resemblance of the failure of capitalism and discouraged other countries not to take a cue from the US in governing their economies (Ellsworth, 2008). In the similar note, this study echoes that internationally communism has failed and now, capitalism is in crisis. As, it is important for African states and other global players to chat an alternative economic development path. To this end, the phrase ‘wasted opportunities’ sums up Washington’s views of Latin America (Westad, 2007: 23). It is argued that the heated conflicting views between the US and Venezuela are inevitable and should be understood within the context of the clash of civilisations in the 21st century.

Undoubtedly, African oil is of high quality as compared to oil from Latin America and the Middle East region. It has no or less sulphur content (Carson, 2004: 5). The lack of sulphur content makes its extraction cost-effective. In addition to the high quality of oil in West Africa, its reserves are abundant. The mention of West Africa does not denote that it is the only region with sulphur-free oil or the sole oil reserves region that is strategically important for the US.  

17 Other regions such as Central North and Southern Africa have their fair share of the oil exports to the US. In addition to Nigeria (West Africa) for instance, Algeria (North Africa) and Angola (Southern Africa) are considered as strategic countries to quench America’s increasing energy needs (Makube, 2008: 8). Notably, West Africa supplies fifteen percent (15%) of American oil imports (Vieth, 2003). It is important to note that oil extraction is one sector wherein American companies have invested a lot. Meanwhile, political stability

17 Most of Africa’s oil reserves are located in West Africa or what is called the “Gulf of Guinea”.
is crucial for investments to thrive. Unfortunately, most of the African oil exporting countries are not politically stable and this situation has negatively affected the production and supply of oil to the US and other trading partners. Political unrests in oil producing African states are linked to Sudan, Libya, Angola and Nigeria. However, for America, Africa is relatively stable as compared to the politically radical and religiously turbulent Middle East region. Carson (2004: 5) affirmed that many oil analysts forecast that with the increasing turbulence in the Middle East, African crude oil will become an even more prized commodity.

As part of the US desire to diversify its oil sources, in the past Washington unsuccessfully tried to impose its currency as the only legitimate medium of trade for oil in the international market system. The failure was due to the resistance by OPEC member states. This move was aimed at diluting the power of the OPEC countries. While, OPEC is dominated by the Arab countries who prefer using oil price as a weapon against the US thereby showing solidarity with the victims of US’s war on terror. Saddam Hussein of Iraq was one of the ardent opponents of the introduction of the US dollar in oil trading and it is alleged this was one of the concealed reasons for his ousting by British-American coalition forces in the year 2003 (Kornegay, 2003: 3-7). As such, Africans need to be cautious about the involvement of the US in the new scramble for Africa’s oil resources to avoid becoming another ‘Iraq’ or a hottest bed for American oil interests.\footnote{Saddam Hussein was deposed in the year 2003 by the joint British and American coalition forces as part of the invasion of Iraq under the pretext of eradicating weapons of mass destruction and liberating the Iraqis from the bondages of dictatorship.} Very close to the need of the US to increase and diversify its oil resources, Washington sought to use Africa as a means of price stabilisation in the global oil market through the conclusion of AGOA with countries such as Angola, Gabon and Nigeria (Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (TRALAC), 2009).

There is an unfounded perception within certain quarters that since the end of the Cold War, Africa has lost its strategic significance to the foreign policy of the US due to the disappearance of a communist threat in the continent following the collapse of the Soviet empire in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Menasveta, 2003). The reality is that African oil is significant for the energy policy of the US. It is central for the
maintenance of the US dominance of the international political economy especially in
an era that ushered in the alarming rise of the economy of China and featured
Beijing in the new scramble for Africa (Hong, 2007). The US-led war on terror has
reinforced the centrality of African oil in America’s foreign policy on Africa (Plaut,
2004: 2-3). Hence, the US has placed strategic military programmes alongside the
Gulf of Guinea where oil reserves are bountiful. In essence, this is meant to boost
the domestic security forces of African oil exporting countries in their quest to protect
oil drilling installations and the workers of American oil companies.

Compared to other regions, most of Africa’s oil is produced off-shore. The US is
happy with off-shore mining and drilling because its navy operates everywhere in the
seas and as such, it is effectively able to extend security to its economic interests
based on oil production.

4.9. Conclusion

It is safe to conclude that since 1990 and with the September 11 attacks, Africa
assumed a new strategic position in the foreign policy of the US. Africa is fast
becoming an alternative supplier of oil to the US in the light of the volatile Middle
East conflict and the souring relations between Washington and the oil exporting
Arab League. This research has shown that in the past, African oil was not used
effectively to develop the population of the oil exporting countries due to corruption,
illegal trading and poor macro-economic management among key reasons. Instead,
it was used to sustain and maintain authoritarian regimes and fuel conflicts and civil
wars. The US has done very little to improve the situation due to the limits imposed
by its (selfish) national interests. At times, some of the abnormalities in the affairs of
African oil exporting countries were blessed or graced by the US in order to
guarantee their availability as key components of its energy security. This shows that
the US leadership did not have the interest of the Africans at heart and cannot be
entrusted with the responsibility to engineer Africa’s economic development and
growth. It is inferred that currently, there are no visible points of convergence
between policy goals of African states and the US especially in the context of oil
politics. As such, African states should develop a coherent strategy or common
approach to protect their national interests and priorities from being eroded by US oil
interests. Part of the engagement of Africa with the US is a need for the African citizens to see where the money generated from oil exports is going. This is to say that Africa’s oil can be of high benefit to its people if its resources are properly and effectively managed.

Despite invisible points of convergence between the policy goals of African and the US; the analysis of this chapter and study at large has it that it is not farfetched to state that the US and Africa have more shared than competing interests in the natural resources sector. This implies that natural resource endowments of African countries (such as oil and gas) could be mutually beneficial to both the US and oil producing countries. However, the role of the US and its multinational oil producing companies in environmental degradation, grievance construction, corruption and agitation in oil-rich communities such as Nigeria’s Niger Delta does not benefit ordinary people. This chapter contends that all natural resources are endowments for the development of nations where they are found. In the final analysis, this chapter acknowledges the roles of Western imperialism towards the underdevelopment of resource rich African countries. But it asserts that the ‘curse of leadership’ is central to the problems of Africa.

The following chapter explores the US strategy of promoting democracy in Africa. It also raises key questions regarding the US’s faithfulness or lack thereof, to good governance in general, using observable experiences and lessons of African states. The logic behind this chapter was to provide a general context for benchmarking the influence of the US in the establishment and promotion of democracy in both Ghana and Tanzania.
5.1. Introduction

In 1990 the Cold War ended with the collapse of the USSR and the US emerged as a sole superpower in the world. As the “winner” of the Cold War, the post-Cold War period has seen the US intensifying its strategy to gain more influence in Africa, a former battleground for several superpower proxy wars. The US embarked on a drive to spread its ideology of liberal democracy in Africa. This became clear in 1993 when Bill Clinton announced a shift from a policy of containment to a policy of enlargement. The policy of enlargement was meant to help free undemocratic states and strengthen those that were in transition as a way of enlarging the free world. To this end, Washington prescribed models of democracy and governance for Africa. It is at this time that the wave of democratisation swept the shores of Africa (Ostheimer, 2006). Before 1990, African dictators were able to prevail by taking advantage of the psychosis of the Cold War.

However, the post-Cold War uni-multi polar system presented the US with a “blank cheque” to dominate Africa’s political institutions and systems. This idea was captured by Thomas (2005: 658) who argues that the common feature of the democratic transition of the 1980s and 1990s was the establishment of formal democratic institutions based on Western style of democracy. Despite its imperfections, the idea of liberal democracy has effectively gained ascendancy in the post-Cold War era. Research shows that since 1990, many African states have moved away from authoritarian regimes to embrace multi-party system of government (Carson, 2004: 2). This does not necessarily mean that these states are democratic in a true sense of the word (Chingombe, 2010).

The extent of the positive role, if there is any, of the US in the maturing of African democracies remains a contested issue within the scholarly community. What appears clear, however, is that the US has severally shown a proclivity for funding

19 An earlier version of this chapter was co-published (with Iroanya RO) in the Journal of Public Administration, Vol 49 (3), September 2014.
both its allies and their enemies across the board and this contradiction has often produced political instabilities instead of stable democratic environments (Holmes, 2008: 4). It is in the context of the above that this chapter provides an analysis of the relevance and influence of the US model of democracy in Africa. The chapter also explores the US commitment to the promotion of democracy in Africa, as one of the cornerstones of its foreign policy. Above all, this chapter adds rigour to the study’s response to research question number 1: To what extent do the goals and objectives of the US foreign policy (mis)fit the national interests of select African states?

5.2. Conceptualising and contextualising democracy

Conceptualizing democracy is not a straight forward exercise. The term has been used to describe different kinds of political governance, over and over again, that it appears to have lost exact definition. One-party states, for example, with limited political participation, and commonly described as authoritarian in certain politico-philosophical reasoning, claim to be democratic as well as multi-party states with wider political participation in governance. Generally, the concept of democracy is derived from the Greek word “demos” which means people. Thus, several political thinkers place people at the core of its definition. In this regard, Abraham Lincoln described democracy as “government of the people, for the people and by the people”. Thus, democracy is a system of governance in which the people are directly or indirectly involved in the affairs of their state. Democracy encompasses ideas and principles regarding freedom as well as customs, traditions and means of upholding freedom in politically organised societies. The concept acknowledges the exercise of power and responsibility by adult citizens; the recognition of majority rule; periodic election and commitment to values such as tolerance, co-operation and compromise.

There is a perception among American politicians that the US model of democracy is the best, but it is not the only viable form. As Hall (2005: 162) states, contemporary political scientists such as F. Fukuyama have strongly argued that there is no alternative ideology that could really pose a challenge to liberal democracy in the struggle for eco-political development. This Western-influenced thinking prompted a suggestion by Moss (1995: 189) that the US should be pushing for and supporting
political reforms in Africa to establish democracy. It is not surprising that some Political Science scholars expect the US to lead the process of externalising democracy because it has been widely claimed within the American political circles that the protection of individual rights and freedom are America’s founding ideals (McKenna, 1994: 18-22). For example, Kellerhals, Jr. (2006: 1) assumes that the US “seeks to help others find their own toward democracy”.

In contrast to the above stated views, there are alternatives to the US version of democracy (Matlosa, Prah, Chiroro & Toulou, 2008). These alternatives reject the notion that fundamental freedoms, the essential element of any working democracy, are uniquely American values. It is suggested that fundamental freedoms are inherent in all human beings and should be treated as natural human values. With regard to the legitimacy of the US version of democracy, it is contended that the export of American democratic model to Africa is a dilemma. We argue that any form of governance system is valid as long as it fits well with the historical, structural and socio-economic conditions of the society which practices it. This argument is not new and it is justified historically and philosophically by Wamba-dia-Wamba (cited in Ramose, 2002: 103) when he contended that

the content of democratisation is determined by modes of politics. Its content is shaped by the dominant mode of politics. The transition must, therefore, be redefined in terms of the change from the mode of politics in crisis towards a new mode of politics.

This is necessary because several African countries that tie democracy to free market/economic policies have not been able to realise stated goals of their poverty alleviation programs. Liberal economic policies may have affected the realisation of developmental goal in young African democracies, no doubt, but it cannot be totally blamed for that. There are other socio-political, cultural and economic factors that are equally responsible for non-realisation of stated goals.

It must be noted that the US involvement in the democratisation of Africa has been without sufficient consideration of the political culture of the continent as discussed above. Literally, the US’s commitment to democracy in Africa is high on rhetoric and hard on reality. This is a position that is often disputed by the US diplomats who argue that the democratisation of Africa has been the policy of the US since the
1950s. They concede that there were certainly bad situations during the Cold War where both the US and USSR propped up dictators ... “but not since 1990” (Bevlyn, 2010). However, American Research findings on the US foreign policy have indicated that democracy promotion is not the vital interest of the US, but it is secondary to it (Drezner 2008: 16). This view has gained strength in the post-Cold War era because there is no visible powerful expansionist state, with a feasible political system that is capable of substituting democracy as a way of organising human society. Across the US, the support for this noble foreign policy goal was at a range of 28% in the year 1990, but it was to decline to 25% in 1994 when Bill Clinton was the main man in the White House (Drezner, 2008). This support became even worse when similar studies were conducted between 2004 and 2006, respectively.

It is argued that the support for the promotion of democracy in overseas countries declined because of the failure of communism in USSR, deaths of many Americans during the battle of Mogadishu (Somalia) in 1993 and during the US led war against Iraq in 2003 (Pauly & Lansford, 2005:124). These three factors summarily explain the declining commitment of the US to democracy under the leadership of George Bush Sr., Bill Clinton and George Bush Jr. The above is also emphatic of the value attached to American lives by the realist persistence in its foreign policy formulation and implementation processes (Roskin, 1994: 5). Despite this, the US has supported bilateral and multilateral efforts to promote democracy and human rights in Africa and elsewhere (Epstein, 2007:18). This commitment varies from one country to the other depending, arguably, on the national interests of the US at stake.

However, at the bilateral level, the US support for democratic governance entails the provision of aid to support election procedures, good governance practices and enhancement of legal and security systems (Shai, 2009: 54-55). For instance, President George W. Bush’s MCA was designed to support countries that were making remarkable progress towards democratic and economic reform (Maphunye, 2008). For years, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has also been party to the US mission to spread democracy in Africa and the developing world at large. At the multilateral level, the US has contributed immensely to global efforts to establish and consolidate democracy through the international cooperation frameworks such as the UNDP, UN Democracy Fund, World Bank and
the AU (Epstein, 2007: 22). This study argues that while political aid is necessary for nurturing and consolidation of emerging democracies, the so called “good governance” is non-existent. It is something that has been coined by the West in relation to Africa and other developing countries as part of their prerequisites to financial assistance (Mahosi, 2009).

Hearn (1999: 2) observes that South Africa forms part of the new generation of African countries that are against any form of authoritarian rule and instead have embraced “open government and open economies in productive partnerships with the West”. This brings this research to the conclusion that the US channels through its strategic African partners some foreign aid that play an important role in establishing, reinforcing and maintaining democratic principles and institutions in various African states. Contrary to Hearn’s (1999) argument, it is argued that at times the partnership that South Africa together with other African states had with the West was counterproductive. For example, the US’s decision to maintain closer relations with despotic regimes in both Libya and Egypt until the year 2011 is a betrayal of the oppressed masses in both countries as it weakens its ability to press for a freedom agenda in Africa. In the eyes of the US, authoritarian rule refers symbolically; to the type of government that does not allow the influence of the US-sponsored organisations in domestic policy making. It also refers to regimes that are not subordinates of the US in the conduct of international relations. Nevertheless, at times, the US-supported democratic initiatives in Africa became a success. This idea is seconded by Travis (2006:7) thus:

In South Africa, foreign aid has largely succeeded in promoting a stable society, most apparent during the five year transition period following the end of apartheid in 1994.

Other success stories of the US-supported democratic initiatives in Africa include few countries such as Ghana, Namibia and Tanzania among others (Carson, 2010). In each of these cases, the US worked with African countries (and partners in the world) to ensure peaceful transitions of power, the promotion of women throughout national governments and free and fair elections (Bevlyn, 2010). Nonetheless, democracy in Africa is still in its infant stage and not to mention South Africa and other African states touted for being committed to democracy and the rule of law, US supported initiatives in the area of governance would take some time to root
themselves. From Cape to Cairo, there are limited cases if any in which the US can claim a success story (Chingombe, 2010).

5.3. The tenets of democracy

Regardless of any model of democracy, the notion of this practice features two important pillars. That is the freedom of expression and fair, open and good governance. To add, Prah (2008: 22) notes that the essential drivers for the process of democratisation ranges from “religious freedom, secularism, tolerance and the rule of law”. For these fundamental principles of democracy to find true and honest expression in a particular country is not simply based on proclamation. But their strength and sustainability depends on the political and institutional instruments that are availed for the purpose of ensuring their full realisation (Sebola & Tsheola, 2016). While the US only promotes liberal democracy, the truth of the matter is that it does not make similar democratic demands on African countries. During the period under review, the US has been tolerant of poor governance record in Tanzania (especially in the Zanzibar region) as compared to Ghana. This must be understood within the context of the fact that until the discovery of Ghanaian oil resources in 2008 and the recent violent activities of Boko Haram in West Africa, Accra was not a strategic partner to the US. Yet, Tanzania has been a strategic partner of the US in East Africa for a while following the activities committed by Al-Qaeda network against the American interests in this region. What can be deduced from the above is that the US does not find anything wrong in courting a state with a tainted governance record, as long as such a state is key for the protection of American interests.

5.4. Washington and the challenges of democracy in Africa

The US’ commitment to the promotion of democracy in Africa leaves much to be desired. The role of the US in this regard has been rather controversial. In most cases and at some point Washington was the epitome of all the evil dictatorships in Africa as long it safeguarded the national interests of the US. Taking this general point further, Jennings (2008: 2) stipulates that “there is scant US commitment to global democracy when its economic and military interests are relevant”. This can
best be understood by retrospectively looking forward at the US-Africa relations from the 1980s. It should be remembered that the US did not support any nationalist independence movements in Africa nor train any member of the military wing of the liberation movements who fought against colonial powers (Mutambara, 2008: 21). However, the end of the Cold War laid a precedent for America’s renewed interest in Africa’s political institutions and processes (McKenna, 1994:1). It is hardly surprizing, therefore, that in pursuing its foreign policy towards Africa, Washington found itself responsible for the birth and/or sustainability of some authoritarian regimes. For example, Swaziland is a non-party state but there are no regular American democratic demands in that country as compared to Zimbabwe (Rankhumise, 2007: 11-12). This can be attributed to the fact that the US has limited interests in Swaziland and the prevailing status quo in Swaziland does not pose any serious threat to its national interests in Southern Africa and Africa at large. In the first place, Swaziland is a small country with limited political influence in Southern Africa and Africa at large and it is economically deprived. Economically, there is very little if there is any that the US can benefit from Swaziland. Moreover, the rights and interests of the White minority in Swaziland are respected and observed and the Americans are happy because the Swazi Englishmen are the descendants of their “distant cousins” in Britain (Chavez, 2010).

As previously noted the US gives a cold shoulder to the popularly elected democratic regimes such as Zimbabwe (under President Robert Mugabe) and post-1993 Kenya (under Arap Moi) which were not friendly or accommodative to its foreign policies. In Zimbabwe for example, along with Britain, the US has openly denounced the Mugabe Administration. To add to this, the Bush Administration explicitly advocated and discreetly supported regime change in that country in favour of Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led opposition. According to Chingombe (2010), there is no doubt that the US supported regime change openly as their kin (white farmers) were the main losers when land reform programme kick started in Zimbabwe in 2000 and most of them opted for MDC as their political home. However, the US has unsuccessfully taken advantage of the resultant economic crisis in Zimbabwe to bring about regime Change.
In relation to the foregoing analysis, the US foreign policy towards Africa reflects a combination of the blend of liberalism and realism, which mixes generosity with self-interest (Jackson, 2003). It is in this context that in pursuing its foreign policy goal, the promotion of democracy and human rights, the US often applies double standards. These are some of the dictates of the anarchical international system that forces states to behave as selfish actors and always put their national interest first, with little or no regard of how such a policy would affect its external environment (McGowan, 2002). This variation is best reflected by Lord Palmer who is often paraphrased as having said that in international relations, “there are no permanent friends or permanent enemies, only permanent interests” (cited in Benyi, 2009). This expression also gives an account of the changing circumstances that make the US to switch the social identity (from adversaries to allies, vice versa) of certain states from time to time in its engagement in Africa.

More significantly, it is on record that the US worked tirelessly for the downfall of Charles Taylor (former President of Liberia) and Al-Bashir (President of Sudan). Taylor succumbed to global pressure and stepped down as President of Liberia in 2006 and this was viewed as a victory for the US imperialism and neo-colonialism (Ankomah, 2009: 8). To the disappointment of the Americans, their efforts to push for regime change in Sudan have failed and Al-Bashir is still the head of the state of Sudan. Both Taylor and Al-Bashir are seasoned dictators peddled with serious war crimes in their respective countries. Even though regime change was necessary in those countries, it is myopic for such transition to be engineered from the US. Though the particularities of regime change agenda differs from one country to the other, in a real sense externally engineered regime change programs constitute a violation of the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states and it also undermines the right of the people of those states to self-determination as enshrined in both the Constitutive Act of the AU and the UN Charter (Rannenyen, 2009: 48).

However, it is not surprising that the primary motive for engineering the downfall of both leaders (Al-Bashir and Taylor) prioritized the oil-based national interests of the US at the expense of regional peace and security in Central and West Africa. This is a further indication of Washington’s lack of political sensitivity on African governing
institutions and processes. Arguably, peace never returned to Liberia under Taylor’s entire reign and worse he allegedly provided military support to the rebel forces in Sierra Leone in exchange for diamonds (Wikepedia, 2010). This situation rendered the whole of West Africa unstable and, by implication, threatened a region that official estimates suggest will supply 20% of the US oil imports in the near future.

Although Taylor and Al-Bashir were somewhat authoritarian, in accordance with traditional norms of international relations, it is not fitting to topple them through perpetuation of the racialisation of international criminal justice. The work of the International Criminal Court (ICC) gives an impressive picture of its abuse by the major powers, including US and its allies. This is incorrect because Africa does not have a monopoly on dictatorship and criminality; and, there are existing African regional and continental cooperation frameworks that are competent and capable to address problems of this nature.

While it is true that indigenous regional organisations such as the AU and Southern African Development Community (SADC) are capacitated to react to military coup d’états, long ruling dictators and political conflicts, it is not easy to project their level competency and capability when one looks at challenges lying ahead of them in the case of Zimbabwe, Libya, Guinea, Cameroon and others. However, the decision by the West, and the US in particular, to overlook and undermine the AU and regional bodies such as ECOWAS and Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGAD) to deal with African challenges to democracy and the rule of law is questionable. This paper contends that the mandate of the AU and its regional partners is often superseded and hijacked by international organisations that are often manipulated and used as instruments of the foreign policies of the West. It is also true that at times the AU and other regional bodies ask for the assistance of international organisations as was the case in Darfur (Sudan), when the AU peacekeeping force was not up to the task before the UN joined it in the year 2007 (Maake, 2009: 38).

Contextually, the underlying motive for the penchant to remove both Taylor and Al-Bashir from office has little to do with democratization and the rule of law. If democracy is also about what the people say and think about their leaders, would it
be safe, to argue that Taylor was persecuted by the US and its supporters even when he had the support of Liberians? Would the people of Darfur and South Sudan, claim same for Al-Bashir in Sudan? Economic interest cannot be ruled out of US intentions to remove Al-Bashir, however, the atrocities committed by his government and previous ones in Sudan against non-Arabs are well documented. It seems like, in Sharife’s (2009: 27) opinion, “the primary motive underpinning the cries of genocide is to seek control of Sudan’s oil or to ensure the breakaway of South Sudan and Darfur or alternatively, to instigate a regime change that will impose a US-friendly government at the helm”. This explains some of the characteristics of the US imperialist expansion in the post-Cold War era.

More importantly, American-backed removal and subsequent-trial of Taylor was not only about accountability and the rule of law, but primarily about huge political considerations and stakes in Liberia, Sierra Leone and to a limited extend, Mano River region (including Guinea). Under Taylor, the US interests in the Mano River region were not safe or perceived to be safe. At the helm of leaders backed by the West, the removal of Taylor from power to large extent helped in the resolution of the Liberian crisis. Although this ensured peace and stability in the country and region, it is also argued that it equally guaranteed the safety and protection of American interests in Liberia and West Africa as a whole. Ironically, the fact that in the past, the US created and supported ruthless dictators and rebels alike, including the apartheid regime (South Africa) and Jonas Savimbi (Angola), respectively shows it cannot be trusted too, in its commitment to the establishment and protection of democratic institutions and processes (Wafawarova, 2008).

Equally important, currently, there are no American democratic demands from Angola and Cameroon when it is clear that these countries are far behind with regard to the process of democratization. Instead, authoritarianism in Angola along with Gabon and Cameroon has been compensated by the US with listing among countries eligible for AGOA (United States of America, 2010). This reflects Washington’s hypocritical posture and it suggests that the US’s involvement in these countries was an obstacle to democratization. It also suggests that the US’s strategic interests serve as a yardstick to determine whether there should be democratic demands or not. This study argues that the exclusion of African authoritarian states
in AGOA (as happened lately in the case of Swaziland) and other business opportunities would go a long way in pushing them to introduce meaningful political reforms. Bringing them on board would do nothing except to boost their economic muscle that would in turn help them to entrench political power at the expense of the wider population.

5.5. Democracy and economic hypocrisy

This study argues that the democratization of Africa is not America’s priority and where it happens successfully, it is by accident. There is a general tendency on the part of the US to criminalize and demonize African governance institutions as undemocratic, non-transparent and unaccountable with the intention to optimize its national interests. According to Mutambara (2008:21), “what is more criminal is trying to hide this motive behind lofty ideals of democracy, freedom and good governance”. The key issue is that the US mainly supports the establishment of democracy in areas where its national interests are at risk. As such the change of regime under the guise of democracy guarantees the safety of its national interests as outlined above. Dobrainsky (1989:155) reminds us that “a world of democracy engenders an international environment most conducive to US political, economic and cultural interests”. This should be understood within the context of the false ideological triangle between democracy, capitalism and Christianity.

Despite historical realities that neither contradict nor correspond with Dobrainsky (1989), the US has a tendency of injecting political aid to bring about regime change in some African states. This hidden mission is well reflected in Zimbabwean African National Union-Patriotic Front’s (ZANU-PF) slogan “Vote ZANU-PF to defeat regime change”. Both American and African democracy and human rights advocacy Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have been instrumental in executing the strategy of unseating certain regimes in Africa in the name of freedom and democracy. Such concerns have been raised recently in both Zimbabwe and Sudan. In other words, some of the democracy and human rights organisations were used by Washington to achieve the concealed goals of its foreign policy. It is for this reason that certain African heads of states like Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and Al-Bashir of Sudan have treated some of the international NGOs harshly and at times
shut down their offices, because it is alleged that they produce and provide intelligence reports for their host government’s enemies.

While political and economic liberalism are intertwined, trends in the international system indicate that economic liberalism is dominating the mental strata of the American policy makers (Ravenhill, 2005: 19-22). Hence, African oil producing countries with very limited people-centred democracies were often condoned and supported by the US due to its economic interests in them (Haley, 2008). This position indicates that economic interests are the primary issues in the US Africa policy and that issues associated with democratisation such as transparency, the rule of law, liberalised political space are secondary. As a result, Presidents such as Meles Zenawi (Ethiopia) and Yoweri Museveni (Uganda) were often praised as a new crop of progressive African leaders by Washington due to their commitment to their neo-liberal agenda (Richburg, 1999: 8). The result was that their oppressive policies were to be ignored.

The usefulness of the US foreign aid in promoting democracy in Africa cannot be understated. However, this does not leave out the fact that the same foreign aid was also used to transgress democratic institutions and processes in favour of the goals crafted by the White House. In South Africa and Ghana, for instance, USAID was the significant actor in the promotion of democracy and transition. In the period between 1985 and 1993 it provided $338 million in aid to South Africa which was mainly dispensed to anti-apartheid groups such as the African National Congress (ANC) (Hearn, 1999: 8). It was also used to boost voter education programmes in the run up to the 1994 general elections as well as strengthen civil society- the key component of a democratic state. The overall influence of the US in Africa has shaped the nature and content of the continent’s democratisation process negatively, with a few exceptions like South Africa and Benin. Funding both friends and enemies could be the reason for the mixed result.

A key challenge of extrapolating an unshakable conclusion in regard to the above is that, there are no clear-cut causal links between the US support for democratisation in specific African countries and so called “success” for democratization in those countries. But there are a number of countries throughout the continent where US
support for democratization and democratic transitions has been evident, especially in such cases as Nigeria’s transition from military to civilian rule and post-civil war democratization in Mozambique to name a few. But in most cases democratization is not clear cut and may be linked more to post-conflict settlements as much as to democracy *per se* (Josephs, 2010). Moreover, the US is also supporting countries like Rwanda that are hardly examples of liberal democracy but fall more on the “tyranny-authoritarian” side of the spectrum.

While it may sound accusatory and simplistic to argue that the contribution of the US to the democratization of Africa has being negative, in a nuanced view, it has brought about mixed results. For example, in the civil society domain, which is central to the expansion of democracy in Africa and the world at large, it is suggested that the US foreign aid has helped to make the dream of public participation in state affairs a reality. Prominent national advocacy Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in Africa such as Uganda Human Rights Activists (UHRA) and the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) among others, have been receiving funding from the US that were used to organise symposiums to open up debates about crucial political and economic policy issues pertaining to their respective countries (Hearn, 1999:6-9). These kinds of activities are reflective of the US efforts to support the agenda for broadening the society’s participation in public policy formulation. Fox (1996: 206) argues that “it is about opening up public space in which governance takes place for previously excluded non-state actors”. However, the above perception is not true because even in countries that are classified as democratic there are still structural disparities between the rich and the poor. The gap between the rich and the poor is also widening daily in terms of political participation and decision making in higher decision making organs of the government. It is easily stated from a cursory review of the print media on a daily basis that there is a general consensus that there is a widening rich poor gap in Africa, particularly in countries such as South Africa, Kenya and Nigeria. To the extent that this is linked to political participation, this seems evident in the unrests occurring in these countries at various local levels. Often referred to as ‘service delivery’ protests, including expressions of xenophobia (South Africa) and election related violence (Kenya and Nigeria) reflect certain alienation at the grassroots level from decision making process.
According to Robinson (1996: 356), despite the popular belief that the political system's role is to establish and enforce compromise between conflicting interests of various groups in society, public policy remains the product of the elite group. The elite group makes policies for the people. As such, the elite shape mass opinion more than masses shape elite opinion. Little or no consultation is done with the most downtrodden people for whom some policies are directly affecting. So there is little or no public participation in the process of policy development.

To worsen the situation, the US donor agencies have a tendency of not funding the popular sectors of the society, but rather strengthen the new Black elite committed to the promotion of limited form of democracy characterized by regular elections and liberal economic policies in Africa. As a result, no substantive changes in government really took place in some of the African states moving away from authoritarian to democratic forms of government. Some countries such as Nigeria and Kenya have changed from military/authoritarian to civilian rule, but their governments have largely drawn their membership from the same elite and shares similar values with previous generations of oligarchy (Thomas, 2005: 658).

From the above it is clear that there is a tendency within the American government circles to project a dichotomy between economic interests and democratic objectives. This is reflected in the public statements by some American leaders claiming that liberal democracy is a precondition for any meaningful economic development (Frazer, 2008). This is not true and it is misleading to expect Africa to adopt the US model of democracy with the hope of economic growth and development. In this context, the notion of “one size fits all” is irrelevant because there are authoritarian regimes such as China that are doing very well economically than an orthodox democrat would imagine. Moss wrote that the Clinton administration accepted this argument with regard to the “Asian Tigers”, not Africa (Moss, 1995: 202). The reason behind this inconsistency lies in the drivers of the US policy towards individual countries, region or continent.

Nevertheless, the 2008 global economic crisis bears testimony to the fact that capitalism is in a dilemma and previous moves to tie it to democracy were simply
ideological. Mamaila (2008) strongly argues that the US is the champion of “unfettered capitalism” but it does not practice it. He continues to indicate that this was evident in October 2008 when the US embarked upon the socialist path thereby nationalising the major banks with a rescue package amounting to $700 billion. It is therefore, appropriate for Africa to have a flexible approach to capitalism or liberalism and adopt a form of democracy or governance that fits well with its material conditions. Contextually, democracy cannot bring about economic development in Africa, but it can provide enabling conditions for economic progress. On the other hand, globally, stable democracies are found in areas where the standard of living of the citizens is relatively fair (Spogard & James, 2010). As such, it would make more sense for the US to support the home-brewed economic development strategies and political systems for Africa, instead of following the aphorism “do as I say not as I do”. This would help to preserve democratic gains that Africa has made in the past two decades. Another point worth making is the fact that the negative nexus between democracy and capitalism is not obvious. Just like political systems, there are no perfect economic systems. If the foregoing argument is anything to go by, it is safe to argue that capitalism is not bad on its own and it does not necessarily negates democratic gains. Instead, what is wrong about capitalism is that its contemporaneity produces imperialist tendencies.

In Johnson’s (1991: 14) view, “America’s economic assistance to Europe in the aftermath of the Second Great Imperialist War helped cement the Western democracies…” This implies that the level of the impact of the US on the democratisation of Eastern Europe has been more of supportive than leading the process. In a similar vein, the establishment, nurturing and consolidation of democracy in Africa is a major priority of the US (Josephs, 2010). But realistically, democratisation in African countries cannot be stage-managed from outside by the US or any other external power. Thus, where democratisation is ‘successful’, it is not really coincidental as much as an outcome reflecting the balance of democratic forces in the country in question. Here, the US would be supportive but would be unlikely to exert major intervention to bring such outcomes about.
5.6. Conclusion

It is myopic to argue that there is only one political way of organising human society. It is also illogical to tie a knot between democracy and economic development and export it to Africa as the previous US administrations have done. However, the influence of the US in the democratization of Africa has brought about mixed results. In some cases, it has groomed and trained dictators and rebels alike. On the other hand, it has backed processes and institutions that ushered in democracy in certain African states. The US foreign aid remained among good components of political development in Africa. It should be noted however that its positive role was negated when it was provided in order to sustain a political course that undermined positive political and socio-economic relations in Africa.

The inconsistency of the US pressure for democracy invalidates any assumptions or claims of universality. Equally true, Africa is not a single country, but a diverse continent with fifty four nation states completely with different political cultures to the US. Any analysis of democracy or governance in each country should be treated on the basis of its merits and demerits. As such, it is short-sighted to conclude that democracy can be exported from the US to Africa. Liberal democracy cannot work effectively in areas where the moral roots and cultural norms are different. To be successful, genuine democracy should be domestically brewed in accordance with the material and historical conditions of the society concerned and not imposed from outside.

The ensuing chapter articulates the main issues about the US National Security Strategy (2010, 2012) in relation to Africa. The objective is to unravel the myth that Africa is a threat to the US national security and the reality about its dismissed importance to Washington within the context of the current international discourse on security. The reason for this chapter is to provide a wider context for understanding the security dimension of the US foreign policy as it relates to both Ghana and Tanzania.
Chapter 6
The US Security Concerns in Africa

6.1. Introduction

The dominant view of the current studies is that the end of the Cold War has inaugurated the new security paradigm. The chief tenet of their argument is that during the Cold War security was defined in military terms, the main referent in this case being the state. Security was then understood as the ability of the state to protect and defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity against the external threats or foreign aggression, which was summarily known as national security (Maake, 2009: 7-8). The size of the army or arsenal was central to the capacity and capability to justify its continued existence within the anarchic community of nation states. The premise that the post-Cold War era saw more intra-state than inter-state conflicts necessitated a redefinition of security (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2008). The need for this reconsideration was also driven by the fact that despite their various sources, a common thing about conflicts (both inter-state and intra-state) is the extent to which they affect civilians and the mushrooming of non-military security threats such as chronic diseases and natural disasters, among others.

The redefinition of the term established a nexus between peace, security and development, and according to Rankhumise and Shai (2007) “a myriad of factors became responsible for ensuring the safe and secure survival of all biological, natural and material entities within states, between states and within communities of states”. The intersection of the diverse range of political and socio-economic issues produced what is known as human security. As cited by Mpangala and Lwehabura (2005: 42), Alkire views human security as meaning “… to safeguard the vital core of all human lives from critical pervasive threats, in a way that is consistent with long-term human fulfilment”. This definition resonates well with the aphorism that ‘development is a precondition for security’ and that there cannot be development without security. In the same vein, Libya’s former president, the late Muammar

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20 An earlier version of this chapter was published in a book entitled Peace and Security for African Development (2012), as part of the proceedings of the sixth annual AISA Young Graduates and Scholars (AYGS) Conference, Boksburg, South Africa, 23-26 March 2011.
Gaddafi, articulated that “[w]ithout political stability, no strategic program of economic transformation can be implemented” (Retriver, 2009).

While acknowledging that human security is a mixed bag which considers a calculable number of varied factors, this study is premised on the less-acknowledged or known proposition that human security is not a new concept at all together. Hence, according to Fell (2006: 2), “households have always been concerned with human security and the evolution of Western states was closely tied with the desire of the groups of people to ensure their own human security”. Based on these facts, it is not incorrect to state that human security entails some of the aspects of national security. Having observed this, this research concurs with Fell’s thesis and adds that the content of both traditional and modern security is more or less the same and the only notable shift is from a state being a referent to an individual. This implies that the introduction of the concept of human security by both academics and policy makers is an indirect acceptance that the traditional security discourse has failed to offer solutions to security challenges in the post-Cold War era and human security is an alternative to it.

Against this backdrop, this chapter scrutinises the challenges to the theoretical analysis of human security. It seeks to bridge the gap between academics, political analysts and policy makers in contextualising the post-Cold War US Africa policy. Using African critical theory, this chapter also seeks to unpack the reasons for the militarisation or securitisation of US–Africa relations within the context of the internationalised war on terror. In consideration of this background, it is safe to note that this chapter addresses research question number 3: Is it factual for the US to consider Africa as a major threat to its national security?

6.2. Africa’s security environment: a critical analysis of the pessimistic view from Washington

The US views the security landscape of Africa from two vintage points: a threat and an opportunity. However, the thesis of the threat has been openly and much advanced by American officials to the detriment of the positive view: opportunity. The
qualification of Africa as an opportunity for the security of the US, however, represents a point of convergence between the leaderships of both sides of the world. Given the dividends of positive public diplomacy, this notion is tacitly beneficial to each other (both the US and Africa). This is in view of the fact that America stands to benefit from peace, stability and development in the continent. The lack of peace, stability and development in Africa equates to ‘lost opportunities’ for the economic and energy security of the US as alluded to earlier.

However, Ndhambi (2016) cautions that “Africa is not a major security threat to the US. Africa does not operate as a homogenous group. It consist of 54 independent nation states, some very tiny and non-viable economically and militarily. It is therefore, even farfetched for the US to can begin to view Africa as a security threat”. However, Ndhami’s position does not invalidate the fact that the lack of human security in certain African states constitutes an eminent threat to US national security. Former Assistant Secretary of African Affairs Susan Rice (1999/2000: 68) rightly asserts that, analytically, “if Africa succeeds, we all, Africans and Americans, stand to benefit … [but if] … Africa fails, we will all pay the price”.

The repose between Ndhambi and Rice’s analysis is extremely important because, in the words of Makhanikhe “the US has the highest military capabilities. Even if we can combine all of the African military resources in one basket, we cannot match that of the US. However, it is undeniable that the US economy is sustained by continuous access to mineral and oil resources that are mainly found in the African continent”. As the US will always find an excuse (security threat) of penetrating the continent especially those countries with the resources they need. Consistent with the forgoing conversation, Makhanikhe (2016) observes that “the US is using the war on terror to penetrate each country that has the resources that she want in Africa on the pretence that those countries are threatening the US’s security”.

Despite its rich mineral-energy complex, Africa is known internationally as a continent ravaged by poverty, chronic illnesses, bad governance, unending violent conflicts and other social ills. This perception has been strengthened by historic and

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21 For a comprehensive analysis of diplomacy, see Morgenthau (1987: 146-150, 529-560).
biased international media reporting of Africa that has reduced the continent to a hell with no potential to better itself.\textsuperscript{22} The many social ills of the African continent, coupled with its marginalisation and vilification by the West has led to the deterioration in the moral fibre of African society. While some of these problems have historical roots and can be linked to colonialism, it is clear that despite an increase in the number of independent African states, with South Africa as the last country to obtain independence from white settler rule in 1994, overall the continent has registered slow progress in social and economic development (AISA, 2009). Africans do not have a monopoly over this concern, but they share it with the continent’s international partners including the US, as indicated above. This view should be understood within the context of the interconnectedness of the world as a global village (Coker, 2009). In fact, consecutive US administrations ranging from President George Bush Sr to President George W. Bush Jr have viewed Africa’s dire situation as a serious security threat for the US, and powerfully stated that Washington should develop a careful security relationship with the mother continent.

Inasmuch as there has been a shift towards positivity in terms of reporting about Africa by the international media by producing the “Africa rising” narrative, it should be borne in mind that old ways of thinking and seeing Africa die hard (Ankomah, 2015: 8-9). Such old baggage will continue to have a certain level of influence on the foreign policies of Western countries towards the African states.

Reacting to the projected image of Africa as posing a serious national security threat to the US, Bond (2007: 4) wrote that “Bill Clinton broke new ground by forcefully applying free market policies to Africa and, often unnoticed, by placing Africa on the US foreign policy map by casting it as a transnational security threat”. Ironically, certain public commentators have praised Clinton for championing pro-Africa foreign policies and went on to state that his term of office actually marked a shift in terms of the US policy toward Africa. The reality has, however, been sobering (United States of America, 2008). On the basis of this, other writers like Drezner (2005: 429) conclude that “…the distinction between rhetoric and action needs to be stressed”.

After leaving office, Clinton was often praised by African-American officials of the Bush administration for having conceived the much-lauded AGOA that was to be implemented as of 2004 by the government of the day. This can be attributed to the fact that the rhetoric behind AGOA (2009) prophesied the promising future of Africa’s development under the newly established trade regime between the US and certain African states. It is important to note that the envisaged level of economic and social progress in Africa is intricately intertwined with the US national security as outlined in detail hereunder. Unfortunately, AGOA’s prescribed liberal policies signed in economic growth for its beneficiaries but could not be used to service their populations fairly because they prohibited them, for example, from acquiring lowest cost drugs for their people, making health care service a luxury only for the employed and the wealthy (Shai, 2015). As the American pharmaceutical business community’s legal battle with the South African government indicates, the US and its Western counterparts are engaged in Africa in a form of economic neo-colonialism, and its unique features have reversed the little democratic gains achieved after independence.23 Similarly, it further eroded any prospects of Africa’s development, thus imposing serious limits on the economic security of African states. Key aspects of AGOA such as privatisation have partly contributed to increasing levels of unemployment and poverty in certain African states such as South Africa, among others (Minter & Booker, 2002). Put simply, the deliberate neglect of the contribution of the external factors in the fermentation of security threats in Africa have created a superficial divide between fact and fiction in the understanding of the US–Africa policy and its national security strategy. Raphala (2016) adds clarity to this policy confusion when he states that:

The US is still looking at Africa using the Cold War era lenses. The US continues to seek strategic allies in every region in Africa. It is still all about the sphere of influence with the Americans. The US also looks at the major players in the region and build close relationships with them. In East Africa, we can see this through the close relations the US has with Kenya and Tanzania and in West Africa, Nigeria and Ghana. All these four countries are blessed with mineral resources which the US continues to benefit from.

23 For more information on the US’s legal battle against South Africa over Pretoria’s decision to legislate the domestic production of generic HIV/AIDS drugs, see Hink (2009).
What can be deduced from the above expression is continuity in terms of the content of the foreign policy of the US towards Africa. Ndambí (2016) adds clarity to this understanding of the evolution of the US foreign policy. According to him (Ndambí) the Obama presidency is increasingly challenged by new players in the African continent, such as China and India. The US “can no longer claim to be a sole dominant player in Africa and the international system. As such, Obama policy has sought to re-assert US influence in the continent due to the growing influence of competitor powers” (Ndambí, 2016).

Back to the central focus of this section, Rice addressed the World Affairs Council (WAC) in Washington during Clinton’s term of office and strongly stated that “[o]ur first interest in Africa, as elsewhere, is defending our own national security and protecting Americans in the United States and abroad’ (Uganda Rural Community Support, 2009). This statement should be understood in the context that America is the only remaining superpower in the world with a huge population density, and its nationals are to be found at any corner of the African continent. Irrespective of their location at any point in time, their citizenship still entitles them to full protection by their government (US Department of State, 2004: 193). In many instances when conflict erupts in Africa or elsewhere, the first step for the US has been to evacuate its nationals to a place of safety before anything else. Few academics and policy analysts would disagree that the protection of the Americans beyond its territorial borders requires cooperation with friends, allies and alliances, hence the centrality and significance of African states to America’s quest for security. When discussing the realities surrounding the security challenges facing the Americans in Africa, Ndambí (2016) argues that the US engages in the continent primarily for containing and eliminating terror groups such as Boko Haram and Al-shabaab. This agenda is advanced “by giving aid and training to targeted countries, protecting American business and political interests”.

Linking Rice’s statement to what less-critical Africans may describe as the unintended negative consequences of AGOA, this research questions if America can be entrusted with the responsibility to come up with solutions for African problems to its own disadvantage. *Realpolitik* shows that in international relations the first national interest of each state is its security and survival, and the primary client in
this regard is its population (Danzinger, 1997: 312). Flowing from this school of thought, it can be concluded that AGOA is a diplomatic strategy to lobby African states to open their markets to American products and companies in return for preferential treatment on the New York Stock Exchange. Contrary to the normative assumption that AGOA promotes fair trade between the African states and the US with equitable benefits for both, it seems as if this is untruthful since key actors in this regime are unequal partners in the first place (Le Cordeur, 2016). Similarly, the prescription of international specialisation for the African states makes them more vulnerable to international price fluctuations, further holding them down as compared to the diverse economies of developed countries, including the US. Behind the blind language of free trade, Stewart (2003: 15) argues that “there could be high social and political costs if smaller, weaker economies are opened up fully to international competition”. It is within this continuum that the US indirectly contributed to Africa’s insecurity, which had come to haunt its own national security.

One of the key arguments advanced by both Bush presidents and Clinton to justify the perception – real or perceived – of Africa as a security risk to the US has been linked to its level of poverty and HIV/AIDS infection rates. Booker and Colgan (2004: 1) explain that the “HIV/AIDS pandemic remains the greatest challenge facing Africa, and the greatest global threat to human security…”. While the whole of Africa is a victim of HIV/AIDS, Islam-dominated countries such as Sudan are less affected. There is no gainsaying that HIV/AIDS retards economic development in Africa and this in turn contributes to the impoverishment of the affected populations. This is also having a negative impact on the national security of the US because Africa serves as a source of cheap labour for that country. Unfortunately, HIV/AIDS cuts short the lives of potential African immigrants. Recent studies show that in most African countries, including Ghana and Tanzania, the most productive sectors of the economy are the hardest hit by the scourge of HIV/AIDS, and this is a concern for America because some of the victims were likely to contribute to its “brain gain” (Economic Commission for Africa, 2009). The combination of African cheap labour and “brain gain” is very important for the sustainability of America’s economic security. Drawing upon the above postulation by Booker and Colgan, it is clear that the US is not immune to the global implications of the African emergencies.
Notwithstanding the causal relationship between the spread of HIV/AIDS and poverty in Africa, there is widespread recognition that some of the conflicts in Africa are rooted in poverty. Fundamentally, there is also a link between the level of poverty and HIV infection rates in Africa. The January 2008 socio-political unrest in Kenya and the May 2008 xenophobic pogroms in South Africa can be properly diagnosed using the first analysis, based on conflicts and poverty (Shai & Mothibi, 2015). It is well documented that in both man-made disasters the perpetrators had largely lost confidence in the capacity, capability or will of government institutions to address their problems and then acted, as the saying goes, as desperate people resorting to desperate solutions.

According to Maitland (2008), frustration-aggression explanations and arguments about deprivation are relevant in discussing the relationship between poverty and conflict in Africa. This assertion has been adopted by the US over time in conceiving its National Security Strategies and overall foreign policy on Africa. In a speech on the theme of “The National Security Implications of Global Poverty”, Rice (2009) emphasises that “… global poverty is far more solely a humanitarian concern. … over the long term, it can threaten US national security”. She argues that poverty substantially contributes to the outbreak of infectious diseases such as tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS. There is logic in this analysis because the process of globalisation confirms that the US cannot be immune to the security challenges facing the continent and their manifestations. It is therefore argued that if a global and effective HIV/AIDS strategy is not forged and implemented, this would have far reaching consequences for the national security of all countries in the world, including the US and African states.

Gradually, soldiers in the American army might be hit by AIDS, or the prevalence of HIV/AIDS on the continent may negatively affect the US recruitment drive for African mercenaries for other wars like that in Iraq (2003). Given the above considerations, the largely pessimistic view of Africa as an immeasurable threat to the national security of the US is morally, historically, economically and philosophically incorrect. Even though the argument has some elements of truth, the key issue is that those who attempted to project this view became more superficial and in the end created
an impression that security (looking at either both internal threats and those exported from the US to Africa) is not a concern for Africa, and the US has a monopoly over it.

Rice’s assertions give the sobering analysis that impoverished zones serve as fertile breeding and training grounds for future terrorists. She also claims that Al-Qaeda and other terrorist networks take advantage of the impoverished situation of the Africans to recruit them to fight against Western civilisation in exchange for huge sums of money and promises of better lives after the attacks. This analysis has proven to be more effectual, especially in impoverished Islamic societies where ideology is fundamental to their existing tensions with the Christian-dominated West. Equally significant, when poor Africans look at the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in comparison to their situation, they naturally develop a hatred that makes them would-be terrorists or their accomplices (Le Pere, 2008: 2-3). This should be understood within the context of the natural animosity between the rich and the poor. It is also important to note that a large component of African populations is made up of the youth, mainly unemployed, who can be easily recruited by the terrorists (Gavin, 2008: 24-29).

Extending this analysis, Rice links poverty in Africa and elsewhere to environmental hazards such as desertification and deforestation. The poverty of Africans is characterised by a shortage of electricity and over-reliance on timber as the main source of national income which in some countries poses a long-term security threat to the US and the world at large. Environmental scientists and the advocates of nature conservation note that the cutting down of trees in one part of the world (Africa) causes adverse climate changes with long-term effects for the entire globe (Turton, 2006: 29-31). It is therefore important for the US and the industrialised world to help make poverty a thing of the past in Africa. More development assistance and the revision of the current trade rules should be at the centre of any possible global poverty eradication initiative or intervention. In other words, it is not only the perpetrator (Africa) that would suffer in the long run, but human kind as whole, and this can be explained through what is popularly known as the “tragedy of the commons”.

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24 The US strongly believes that there are terrorist cells in African countries such as Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, South Africa, Kenya and Tanzania, among others.
Moreover, many causes of environmental degradation in Africa are veld fires and land clearing for agriculture. This calls for the US and the international community to partner with Africa to prevent the unintended consequences of these practices. These are the key environmental issues in world politics that need to be taken into consideration if the challenges of global warming are to be addressed amicably. While the industrialised countries are engaged in a blame game over climate change in Africa, the irony is that the current pattern of the trade partnership between the industrialised countries (including the US) and the African states is prone to serious environmental hazards. This pattern inhibits African economies from diversifying, and foreign companies are also actively involved in unhealthy oil exploration and mining activities in Africa (Omotola, 2006: 10-11). In the light of the foregoing, it is argued that an analysis of the security discourse between the US and Africa cannot be limited to concerns over environmental sustainability.

Hypothetically, the nature of the economic involvement (both direct and indirect) of the US contributes to the undermining of Africa’s economic sovereignty, and to a certain extent it negatively affects the capacity of African states to deliver human security to their populations. At the fundamental level, Raphala (2016) also spoke to the very issues when he articulated that:

Apart from accessing mineral, oil and gas resources from African countries, the US also enjoy influencing local policies. She (US) also continues to enjoy monitoring the progress these countries are making. There are a lot of benefits that the US government and private companies are enjoying in Africa. With China penetrating Africa aggressively, it is wise for the US to maintain its hold on African nation states. This is because China is fast becoming a serious competitor to the US in Africa. Therefore, for the US to continue to enjoy all the benefits associated with its relations with African states, it should redirect its focus in these countries.

As reflected above, it is argued that the current race between Washington and Beijing has inclined the US under Obama to continue to show a great deal of interest in Africa. As Makhanikhe (2016) further argues, “Obama has visited Africa more than any other continent during his term in office. Obama’s approach to the US-Africa
relations is diplomatic as compared to Bush who was radical”. In a nutshell, the US has shown strong interest in Africa since the Cold War and that has not changed.

Contextually, this research emphasises that the crux of environmental degradation is not limited to environmental sustainability. The AU Commissioner for Rural Economy and Agriculture, Rhoda Peace Tumusiime argues that “commodities produced in Africa are meant for companies in the west” (Africa News, 2009). The above discussion passively highlights the fact that the current trends in US–Africa Agri-Business relations are characterised by an imbalance between cash crops and food crops (the basis of African food security which has resulted in food insecurity in the African continent). In addition, traditional analysis on the subject reduces the causes of food insecurity in Africa to the effects of global warming and other related environmental problems such deforestation, neglecting the influence of external forces and the dictates of the painful trade relations between Africa and the developed countries, the US in particular. Given the interrelationship between various forms of security or insecurity in Africa, it becomes clear that the prevalence of famine and hunger on the continent can possibly lead the affected groups to join organise criminal syndicates.\(^{25}\) In addition, Rice (2009: 65) claims that “Americans lose over $2 billion annually to African white-collar crime syndicates, mostly from financial schemes, including insurance, credit card, and advance fee fraud scams”.

To support this, Nigeria, Africa’s Western regional power and also defined as a pivotal state in terms of the US foreign policy, is classified as number five internationally as a source of counterfeit US currency (Ibid). This should be understood within the continuum of the long-established truism that crime and poverty in Africa have a causal relationship.

As a central feature of poverty, food insecurity in Africa has an international dimension. For instance, under the AGOA trading framework and the US-supported International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank’s adjustment programmes, African states are discouraged from subsidising the agricultural sector (generally the backbone of their economies) and this indirectly contributes to a shortage of food on the continent (Zitha, 2010). This situation also denies the African states an

\(^{25}\) Human security embraces economic security, environmental security, food security, personal security and national security.
opportunity to compete with their American and European counterparts on equal terms, trading on products that they have excelled in their production. The irony is that in the US and Europe, the agricultural sector is heavily subsidised, and more controversial is the fact that their countries still receive agricultural imports from the African continent. Extremely worrisome has been the fact that the US has turned the problem of food insecurity in Africa into a trade opportunity, as it currently exports expensive food products to African states such as Uganda, Niger and Angola, among others (TRALAC, 2010). While other African states have shown improvement in terms of food production, part of that is often imported by the US at fairly lower prices, given the unfair advantage of Washington over international trade rules (Rannenyeni, 2010). It is argued that the US is able to manipulate the African economies given the slow progress of economic integration in Africa and lower levels of intra-trade in the continent (Shai, 2015). These are some of the common features of the global apartheid in the international trading system that directly affect the way in which the US positions itself within the complexities and dynamics of the lapsed security environment in Africa in relation to the war on terror.

6.3. September 11 attacks and their effect on US policy in Africa

On the 11 September 2001, the US was struck by massive terrorist attacks resulting in the collapse of the Pentagon and the World Trade Center. To date, there is no definitive account of the causes and the results of this surprise attack on the US. According to the US intelligence authorities, Osama Bin Laden was behind the attacks. However, the main question is whether a single individual can be a real threat to the national security of the superpower such as the US. This simply means that Bin Laden was the suspected mastermind, not the sole or real attacker. The evolving policy discourse within American government circles shows the reminiscent failure of the US security machinery to uncover the root causes of the attacks. It is argued, however, that the US was fully aware of the underlying causes of the September 11 attacks, but sought to ignore them in favour of concealed political agenda that serves the interests of its ruling and business elite. An important thing to note about the September 11 attacks is that the ‘potential’ or US-fabricated terrorist threat in Africa has served as an impetus for Washington’s renewed interest in Africa (Carmody, 2005: 96-120). As will be seen later, terrorism did not become a new
phenomenon or threat to Africa after the September 11 attacks, as was acknowledged by the Clinton administration (Masindi, 2010). Moens (2004: 124) reinforces this idea by referring to the testimony of the Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks in 2004 (Washington DC) when he inferred that there was a “stunning continuity” on the part of Clinton and Bush regarding their approach to counterterrorism.

Moens (2004) continues to reinforce his argument by historically referring to the pre-September 11 incident when he wrote that the Secretary of State, Colin Powell, explained before the Congress in early 2001 that embassy protection against terrorist attacks, such as had occurred in East Africa in 1998, was one of his top priorities. Pre-September 11, he still referred to terrorists as “criminals” because their activities apparently did not happen on American soil. However, research shows that the threat of terrorist attacks was not a thorny issue for American pundits and politicians until the year 1998. The admissibility of the seriousness of the terrorist threat to the US by American politicians, especially during the second term of Bill Clinton and under the reign of George Bush Jr, can be explained on two fronts. Firstly, protection against terrorist attacks consistently registered more than 70 per cent of public support as a foreign policy priority in the period between 1998 and 2006. Secondly, and equally important, the desire to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction also recorded more than 70 per cent support from public opinion surveys as a foreign policy priority during the same period (Drezner, 2005: 16).

Although language experts identify and distinguish between terrorism and crime, it would appear that the two are at times treated interchangeably by the US in the current policy discourse on international security. Central to the national security discourse of the US, drug trafficking is among the prevalent threats emanating from or going through Africa (Fisher-Thompson, 2002: 29). Even though drug trafficking is criminal in nature and can be prosecuted, a related and important consideration is that terrorism has a criminal dimension as well, although there are difficulties in prosecuting its suspects due to lack of a generally agreed definition of what constitutes “terrorism” (Iroanya, 2007: 64-65). Beside the simplicity of the dichotomy that exists in the application of the two terms (crime and terrorism) on human security, the US has also identified “rogue states” as well as failed states in Africa as
threats to its security within the context of the war against terrorism (Fisher-Thompson, 2002: 28-29). Rice (2009: 65) has clearly articulated that:

[A]ll transnational threats from arms flows to drug flows are most difficult to combat where national institutions are weakest and where people are poorest and conflicts most enduring. We need strong, democratic, economically viable partners in Africa. Only such partners can be relied upon to invest in healthcare to stem disease, to foster environmentally sustainable development, to apprehend terrorists and drug traffickers ….

It is important to point out that failing states do not necessarily constitute a cauldron of security threats, but their weak institutions make them susceptible to terrorist networks and drug syndicates within their borders (Fisher-Thompson, 2002: 29).

A particularly important aspect about failing or ‘failed’ statehood is the inability of the state to safeguard the inhabitants of its territorial jurisdiction. The monopoly on the use of force and the exclusive control over resources is either severely restricted or entirely absent (Maitland, 2008: 6-7). Meanwhile, the state is nevertheless able to function in at least one of the two areas. Failing states do not have total control of their territory and they are mainly characterised by armed regional conflicts where armed groups occupy and control certain regions. However, these states still deliver basic services to the majority of the population and still enjoy some degree of legitimacy (Ibid).

In this context, the definition of African “rogue states” includes countries such as Somalia, (northern) Uganda, Sudan and Libya.26 Government institutions in all these countries are flawed. As outlined above, this situation renders their territories as hideouts for terrorists. Previously, consecutive US administrations have alleged that both Sudan and Libya were sponsors of terrorism. However, recent official statements by officials from Washington show that this perception is waning on the side of Tripoli. This view was confirmed by Bond (2006) with regard to Libya when he asserted that there were signs from the US policy-making establishment of bringing Tripoli to the fold of weapons certification and control. Tied to the foregoing statement is the fact that in 2003 the social identity of Libya as a “failed state” was

taken out of the American lexicon in return for Tripoli’s relinquishment of weapons of mass destruction (Squassoni & Feickert, 2004: 1-6). Moreover, the effects of the Arab Spring on Libya since the year 2011 have also sealed its de-classification from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Hence, the new Administration in Tripoli can best be labelled as the puppet regime of the US; and above all, the Washington has been instrumental in facilitating regime change in Libya (Poopedi, 2014).

It should also be stressed that failing states pose a danger not only to the US, but also to international peace and security. For example the Al-qaeda linked Al-Shabaab is known for launching transnational terrorist attacks against a series of countries in East Africa and the Horn of Africa (Botha, 2014). While Al-Shabaab is indigene to Somalia, its activities have been extended to countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. A case in point is the West gate mall (Nairobi) attack in September 2013. This attack has left 67 people dead and the other 175 with severe injuries (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2013).

African countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda have been targeted due to their active participation in the activities of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM); a force with a backing of the US. The foregoing analysis should be understood within the context that the leaderships of Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda are also close to the US leadership collective. That being the case, the agenda for AMISOM stands to thwart Al-Shabaab’s efforts to gain control of Somalia and in turn, use it (Somalia) as a launching pad to spread its ideology for establishing the Islamic Emirate in East Africa (Odhiambo et al; 2013; Igwe, 2015).

The ambitions and activities of Al-Shabaab constitute an imminent threat to regional peace and the strategic interests of the US. Hence, the scale of terrorism in East Africa has the potential to undermine and delegitimise the national leadership of those countries that stands with the US in the struggle against terror. According to Igwe (2015) fear and anxiety provoked by the wave of terrorism in Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Somalia thrills the diffusion of their governments’ support from the populations. This scenario could weaken the US’s upper hand in its conflict with the complex web of terrorist groups including Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda. This analysis is
anchored on the baseless American belief that there is a logical connection between Islam and terrorism (Yahya, 2002).

Nonetheless, the label of “failed states” especially in relation to African states that cannot make ends meet smacks of racism and pessimism. This study challenges this pessimistic view, and rejects the continued application of the label “failed states” to weak African states like Zimbabwe and Somalia. The impression that this label creates is that there are no prospects for such countries to become well-established states in the near future. In other words, there should be a definitive turn in the perspective in which these countries are viewed internationally, and the most reasonable label in this regard would rather be “failing states” (Gueli & Liebenberg, 2007: 302-303). This denotes that while weak African states are unable to create an environment conducive to human security, they are actually making an effort to improve the situation.

6.4. An empirical examination of the prospects of security cooperation between the US and Africa

In spite of all the negative arguments and counterproductive events in relation to the US Africa Policy, many of the respondents to this study agree that Africa has been marginalised by the US foreign and defence policy-making establishments over time, from the Cold War era to date. As a result of the thin line between information and propaganda, this suggests that the foreign policy of the US on Africa was often shaped by beliefs based on twisted information about a certain incident. Most of the American and Eurocentric scholarship associated the African continent with wars, famine, hunger, poverty, diseases, corruption and backwardness (Schraeder, 2000: 12; Ankomah, 2015: 8-9). In all fairness, some of these associations are relatively appropriate to certain African states but a broad generalisation about Africa is problematic, and the combination of all these factors amount to the old African label as a “dark continent”.

This research submits that ignorance lies at the root of this continued marginalisation or misinformation in terms of historical writing, and unfortunately this trend can also be observed in public and policy discourses in America and Europe in particular
(Muchie, 2015: 24-25). The key issue is that events never stop, but ever-changing circumstances prevail, and therefore new information becomes more significant for updating public policy or national security strategy in this case (Shively, 1995: 94-96). This goes on to explain that the “dark continent” cannot be comparable to the Africa of today, regardless of its political and socio-economic ills.

Based on the above and a review of the extensive literature on history, it is clear that there have been concerted and consistent efforts by European and American writers and neo-liberal scholars to perpetuate the negative image of the African continent (Ibid). This trend is apparent through the widespread reporting and recording of the negatives about the African continent, with little attention to its positive stories. This marginalisation does not go unnoticed. This appraisal is an attempt to correct this situation in the context of the evolving security discourse, while acknowledging Africa’s threats to the national security of other countries, the US in particular.

From an optimistic point of view, Africa presents a pool of opportunities that are strategically important for the national security of the US in the post-Cold War era. Contemporary studies placed more emphasis on the importance of the Africa’s oil to the energy and economic security of the US. To most political analysts, oil occupies a central position in the US-led war on terror and its economic security. The military vehicles and other automotive machines in the battle zones where the US soldiers and those of its allies are involved need oil to operate. The transportation of foodstuffs for the soldiers from production centres to the war zones also requires fuel to move. This situation has been complicated by the perceived relationship between oil and food prices that dates back to the global economic disaster of the 1980s. This view has been strongly contested by the Deputy Director General (DDG) of South Africa’s Department of Minerals and Energy (DME), Gumede (2008), who charged that “this is controversy as there is no relationship between oil and food prices, although it has become fashionable to do so”.

Notwithstanding all of the above, the ideal security value of Africa to the US is clearly spelt out by Ramalepe (2015) as follows:
The US economy depends much on the resources of the African continent. For the US economy to be sustained the US needs these resources. This is the sole reason that we see the US trying to pretend like it is in Africa for the benefit of Africans, investing a lot of their military resources through deployment of soldiers and financial aid that they shower some African countries with. The US also seeks to maintain its superiority in world politics and this requires resources and strategies. I also believe that the US is monitoring Africa's development and she is also using Africa to check and balance relative power of other players in the International Society.

This research proposes the addition of other elements to reinforce the view that Africa is a security anchor of the US. Africa prides itself on some countries that have adopted neo-liberal economic and political reforms (Josephs, 2010). Although still relatively weak, democracies like Ghana and Tanzania coupled with their continental status are important for peace and stability in Africa. Prior to the September 11 attacks, Ghana and Nigeria; and Tanzania and Kenya represented the regional enforcers of the national security strategy of the US in West Africa, East Africa and the Horn respectively. Recognising the threat of conflict in Africa to its security, the US channelled huge sums of foreign aid through the aforementioned regional powers to enable them to embark on peacekeeping missions in their respective regions and in Africa as a whole (Kornegay, et al., 2001: 106-108). It has been widely acknowledged that the severity of violent conflicts in Africa has been a burden for the White House, especially because American taxpayers are indirectly liable for the bigger portion of the US peacekeeping assistance to Africa. Besides threatening the economic security of the US, according to Rannenyeni (2009) the apportionment of more military aid into Africa in the congressional budget has the potential to brew dissatisfaction and protests among the American public and the government cannot afford always to leave this as an afterthought.

Although the US deployed its own troops to the continent after the September 11 attacks and intends to establish a permanent military base in Africa as soon as the opportunity arises, recent developments give a picture of the regard and continued wish of the US to secure Ghana and Tanzania (in addition to South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya) and other powers in other regions as geo-strategic bulwarks in the fight against terrorism. However, it would appear that this policy was mainly influenced by the experience from the US occupation of Iraq, which showed the risks of venturing
on a mission to stamp out terrorist groups or bring about forcible regime change without the support of the neighbours of the country targeted Pauly, Jr. & Lansford, 2005).

The fact that the US has shared values on freedom and liberty with the above-mentioned African countries (and others not mentioned here) puts it at an advantage if a meaningful military action to hunt down terrorists is to be undertaken (William, 2005). Even though they may not identify themselves with the US on its war on terrorism, logic dictates that they are potential allies and what is important is to make them understand that the war on terrorism is part of the overall global strategy of the US to make the world safe for freedom and democracy (Ngugi, 2008). Contrary to this, the situation on the ground suggests that it is very difficult for the US to combat terrorism without the limiting civil liberties of individuals in Africa and elsewhere, which relates to issues of torture and interrogation in the search for terrorists.

Lazreg (2007) reinforces the foregoing when she argues that:

… torture demands that intelligence officers have free reign, unencumbered by considerations of civil rights and due process. More importantly, its defense requires civil authorities to define political issues on military terms, and thus lose sight of the political and social consequences of their decisions.

It is partly because of some of this that most of the African states are not supportive of the proposed move by the US to establish permanent military bases on African soil. On the other hand, the aftermath of the US-led war on terrorism in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan shows that the American population is more at risk than the state itself. This implies that the invasion of suspected terrorist states by the US mainly endangers the wellbeing of the majority of its citizens in different parts of the world, rather than just a mere survival of its polity.

The ultimate strength of the theory of international political economy and securitisation is the ability to create sound links of political and economic issues in international relations (Maddock, 1992: 53-61). Based on this premise, the American leadership is mainly interested in the impact of Africa on the economic dimension of the national security of the US or what some scholars of Strategic Studies term
“economic security”. The key issue is that Africa has a high population density that represents a less-competitive market for the US. It is argued that the complexities of globalisation and the position of America in the whole process puts it at an added advantage to tap into the African market, where young Africans can easily develop loyalty to corporate brands such as Nike, Levi’s, Chuck Taylor and Coca-Cola, among others (McGowan, et al., 2006: 1-2). Equally important, the existing international trade regime gives the US the leverage of an unfair advantage over its African trade partners. A cheap labour market, affordable agricultural products, and a cost-effective mineral-energy industry in Africa is a boon to the American economy.

For Ramalepe (2015):

US foreign policy towards Africa is all about access to resources of which in Ghana is oil and gas. The US also enjoy being influential in national policies of African countries, this is done through assisting African countries like Ghana to meet the requirements of accessing financial assistance from either the IMF or World Bank. Unfortunately, the loans from the IMF and World Bank come with high interest rates and some conditions attached to them. It is these conditions that allow the US to influence the direction of national policies of the receiving countries. The US also prefers stationing its troops in African countries. She does this in the name of providing military training or assistance to local forces. This strategy helps the US in keeping an eye to the African countries. Ghana allows the US to monitor the whole of West Africa through their continuous presence in the country. There are a lot of minerals including gold, diamond and uranium just to name but a few in Tanzania and as such Tanzania is one of the strategic partners of the US in East Africa. The approach that the US is using in Tanzania is no different to the one they are using in Ghana and every part of Africa especially where they have interest.

Mbeki (2009) observed that the mineral-energy complex in South Africa is very weak.27 This research agrees with this observation, and affirms that this is a common problem of all African states. The reality is that the African mineral-energy industry relies heavily on wasting non-renewable assets, and on imported technology as well as capital, and is vulnerable to global market shocks. Washington has tapped into the backwardness of the developing world and in Africa most of the technological equipment imports used are made in the US. The political economy of African

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27 Moeletsi Mbeki is a political economist and deputy chairman of the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA).
countries also features the predominance of the American multinational corporations, alongside those of China and Japan. For instance, the American company, Wackenhut Corrections Corporation, was very instrumental in the construction and operationalisation of Kutama-Sinthumule maximum security prison in South Africa (Skosana, 2001). According to the World Trade Organization (WTO), as cited by the former ambassador of the US to South Africa, Cameron Hume (2002), ‘Africa accounted for only 1.4 percent of US exports in the year 2000 and for 2.3 percent of all US imports’. There might be a variation in terms of the quantity of imports and exports between Africa and the US, but the reality is that most of the African products are sold to the US at a lower price while those from America to Africa are sold at a price far higher than their production value. The strategic economic interest and importance of Africa to the US economic security was well articulated by Rice (2009: 66) when she said that about “100 000 US jobs are tied to our exports in Africa”.

Reinforcing Africa’s growing relevance to the US national security is the fact that the Cape controls shipping between the Atlantic and Indian oceans. Equally, or more importantly, ‘the Horn of Africa is a potential choke point for traffic between the Suez Canal and the Indian Ocean’, and America’s base access agreement with Kenya is key to its ability to project force, when necessary, in the Persian Gulf (Ibid). Clearly, however, the overall context of the US policy in East and North Africa is intrinsically linked to anti-American sentiments and trends in Arab Africa and pro-Israel Washington’s role in the Middle East. In sum, the security of Americans was intrinsically linked to the security and well-being of the Africans, and this is still the case (Abrahamsen, 2004: 677).

### 6.5. Locating Africa in the dual interpretation of terrorism

It has been widely reported that the September 11 attacks has revitalised US interest in Africa due to the imminent terrorist threat on the continent, and this event has become an academic magnet that has drawn the attention of the scholars of Strategic Studies to look at other non-military security issues. This study wholly

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28 Kutama-Sinthumule maximum security prison is the second largest private prison in the world and it is situated in Limpopo province, Makhado (previously known as Louis Trichardt).
rejects the thrust of the so-called ‘war against terror’ as articulated by George W. Bush and his sympathisers. This research argues that the recent global offensive by the US and its allies is a war on terror, instead of the war ‘against’ terror. It is appropriate to emphasise that terrorism did not start with the September 11 attacks, and this event was not a surprise to the US intelligence community, as is claimed by the Bush administration (Javis, 2002: 37-38). The only surprising thing was the skyrocketing death toll and its systematic and organised nature because the US was fully aware of the increasing dissatisfaction and discontent of the Arab world with regard to its policies in the Middle East. Equally, the US was fully conscious of the simmering tensions of the populations in human insecurity situations and how they see themselves through the mirror of the Pentagon and the World Trade Center.

It has been contended by many political analysts that the September 11 attacks provided the US with a durable foreign policy issue to advance its national interests in the Middle East, Africa and the world at large (Masindi, 2010). Although terrorism is a concern for America, the manner in which the Bush administration responded to September 11 attacks did not come close to addressing the root causes of this catastrophic event. It seems as if the foreign policy of George W. Bush was more influenced by the realists or the advisors who view the world through an orthodox analysis. The key issue is that terrorism became a dominant and useful tool to advance a particular political and economic agenda for the US. Arising from the antecedents of America’s centralisation of the victimhood of terrorist attacks and its unilateral approach to terrorism, it is clear that there are other concealed goals to the war on terror (Malone & Khong, 2003: 1-16). This eco-political agenda has been further hidden through the extreme exaggeration of America’s vulnerability to future terrorist attacks. Indeed, the Bush election campaign in 2000 was mainly sponsored by American oil and arms manufacturing companies. Taking the concerns and reservations of many ordinary Americans about Bush’s persistent war on terror, radical Marxist scholars guess that the ‘war on terror’ was a disguised strategy of the Bush kraal to create business opportunities for his election sponsors (Paul, 2010). This dualistic understanding of the war on terror implies Bush’s attempt to ‘kill two birds with one stone’, thereby targeting the oil-producing countries. In Iraq, for
instance, the ultimate beneficiaries of the invasion were American arms manufacturing companies and oil giants, among others (Williams, 2010).

Though he emerged victorious as president of the US, it was clear at the time that Bush was not that popular on the international stage or domestically as there were simmering tensions over some of the taxation and health care policies that he introduced. So as not to risk the life span his political career, Bush’s advisory council seized on the September 11 incident to score cheap political points to restore the confidence of the American people in him. This helped to direct the attention of the domestic American population away from unwelcome domestic issues towards the appreciation of the perceived efforts of the president to eliminate any future terrorist threats in the Middle East, Africa and beyond global reach. This should be partly understood within the context of the privatisation of the state by the ruling elite in the US, as is the case in other parts of the world including Africa (Danziger, 1997: 214-223. Regarding the sudden return of America to the old dominant school of thought in International Relations (realism), Bourke characterises this process as ‘a person becoming a policy at the White House’ (Moens, 2004).

Notwithstanding the need by the desperate president to appease his constituency, the macroscopic view of the world shows the desire of the US to retain its status as the only global hegemon. To this end, the US has explored all possible mechanisms to contain the rise of potential or competitive big powers like China and India (Mitchell, 2005: 180). It is on this premise that the Bush administration saw it as real and achievable to maintain its hegemony through the use of its military power. In Africa and elsewhere, for example, this policy would entail the use of its power to bring regime change in what is known as ‘rogue states’ and to impose US-friendly regimes and policing (or rather help) of those areas that are economically beneficial to the US economy. It has been reported in Foreign Policy in Focus that the total amount of US military sales, financing and training expenditure for eight African countries considered strategically important for the war on terror has increased from about $40 million over the five years from 1997 through to 2001 to over $130 million between 2002 and 2006 (Lemelle, 2008: 1).

29 American companies that secured lucrative oil, engineering and reconstruction contracts include Halliburton, KBR, Baker Hughes, Weatherford International and Foster Wheeler, among others.
However, according to Chabikwa et al. (2008), the key motive for the increased militarisation of US–Africa policy is the need by the White House to protect the natural resource endowments in Africa and ensure its continued access and monopoly to the energy-mineral complex on the continent. This is an issue that lies at the heart of the nerve centre of the government of the US. In other words, the peacekeeping efforts and contribution of the US in Africa have been driven mainly by its thirst for African raw materials. To be specific, Chabikwa et al. agree with Lemelle (2008: 1) that ‘military commands are not meant for humanitarian cause and they reinforce the above argument using the case of the desire of the US to station the AFRICOM along the Gulf of Guinea’ (Ibid). In other words, oil addiction and the preservation of its economic security interests on the continent as opposed to humanitarian and moral obligations are central to the national security strategy and the foreign policy of the US in Africa.

6.6. Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to provide an overview of the national security challenges facing the US within the context of its engagement in Africa. It also tried to demonstrate the reactions of the US to perceived African security threats to its national wellbeing. Based on the discussions above, it can be inferred that both realism and idealism remain relevant to the analysis of the nature and content of the US foreign policy in Africa and elsewhere. This does not imply that other theories are not important in the study of this nature. Although this study subscribes to the notion of addressing the root causes of human insecurity from a multidisciplinary vantage point, it challenges the bulk of literature on Strategic Studies that claims that the September 11 attacks marked a change of US policy in Africa. The reality, this study argues, is that the US has always accepted the African continent as both a threat and an opportunity for its national security. Therefore, it contends that the content of Clinton’s foreign policy was no different from those of his predecessor and his successor, George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush respectively. What did change, however, was the style of leadership.
While recognising the impact of African conflicts on the national security of the US, this research argues that Africa has something that the US wants and at times Washington uses either hard or soft power to destabilise the continent for its own benefit. This emphasises that conflict analysis is not unison and any attempt to subject it to a single framework renders policy implications and interventions irrelevant, especially when dealing with complex situations. It is concluded that Africa will remain a threat to the US if Washington does not inject more foreign aid to end non-military threats and curb societal ills such as poverty and HIV/AIDS. Previous strategies and aid programmes of the US to address these challenges have failed because they did not look at the root causes of the problem, but instead prioritised short-term interests, thereby advancing a particular political cause at the expense of humanitarian concerns. Lastly, September 11 did not change the academic discourse in favour of human security, but has just given rise to renewed interest on Strategic Studies, with emphasis on state security. Recent developments in the international system show that US reaction to the terrorist threat has reduced the liberal concept of human security to a lower degree, thereby stressing the centrality of the military in the conduct of international relations. Whereas the stated goals of the US ‘war on terror’ evolved around the restoration of human security, its end results are the fundamentals of state security.

In the next chapter the researcher makes use of Ghana to reflect and concretise arguments advanced in chapter 4, 5 and 6 surrounding the general trends in US foreign policy in Africa. It focuses on oil, democracy and to a limited extent, security as the magnets of Washington’s renewed engagement with Accra in the post-Cold war era.
7.1. Introduction

The wave of independence that veered across Africa in the 1950s and 1960s has impacted different nation states in the international system either positively or negatively. From the perspective of international relations, the decision of Britain to grant independence to Ghana in the year 1957 has provided a safe passage for the US to immediately establish diplomatic relations with Accra (US, 2015). While Ghana’s political independence was symbolised by the inauguration of Black leadership under the charismatic Kwame Nkrumah, Accra’s posture in the international economic system has proven that it was still trapped under the mattress of colonial economics (Meng, 2004:1-14). Such trappings made it impossible for Ghana to cherish independence to the fullest. Hence, the Black leadership largely depended on the economies of Britain, other Western powers and the international financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF. This is to say that while Ghana was officially independent, in practice its independence suffered from economic deficit (Meng, 2004: 8-10). Dependence on the donor community on the part of Nkrumah’s Administration had manifested itself through over-reliance on foreign aid (including loans and grants) to run the government of Ghana. Given the closer relationship between politics and economics, the absence of real economic independence on the part of Ghana gradually reversed the gains of political independence. In other words, the lack of sufficient economic power on the part of Nkrumah naturally opened a door of foreign influence in policy making. This is to say that more often than not, the donor community dictated terms on how their funds should be spent and ultimately, defined the content and direction of the domestic policy framework of the receiving country (Ghana). Hence, independence without economic power is meaningless. Taking this debate further, it is crystal clear that the donor community (including the US) has indirectly used their economic influence in Ghana to also influence political developments.
In spite of the challenges faced by Ghana post-independence, it is worth noting that the independence of Ghana has disadvantaged Britain. It is imperative to consider that Britain was disadvantaged because the loss of its colonies was tantamount to the loss of power and sphere of influence. The foregoing should be understood within the context that under colonial rule, the metropoles were able to plunder the mineral, petroleum and gas wealth of their colonies with impunity. Among other benefits, the colonies have also served as a source cheap human capital for the companies of their colonial powers. In contrast, it is argued that the independence of Ghana has afforded Accra with a rare opportunity to interact directly with other global players including the US (Gebe, 2008: 161-178). Over and above the briefly highlighted forms of relations between the colonies and their metropoles during the colonial era, the engagement between Ghana and Britain during this period and beyond reflected a slave-master relationship. This position should also be understood within the context that prior to independence, Ghana conducted its international relations through the tutelage of its colonial power, Britain. To add, in the independence era Ghana was not able to effectively alter the structure of its political economy in such a manner that would enable her to make independent and sustainable policy initiatives, interventions and positions without the influence of the donor community (including Britain and the US). Contextually, the fact that the diplomatic relations between Ghana and the US were established during the independence era does not suggest that relations between Washington and Accra were non-existent during the colonial era. Trade, personal and non-official relations between the Americans and Ghanaians date back before the establishment of the US between the year 1775 to 1783 (US, 2015). However, the engagement of Ghana with the US also manifested itself into a slave-master affair and it was in fact an extension of the US engagement with Britain. This is to say that under the colonial era, the US mainly dealt with Ghana through Britain.

Flowing from the above, this chapter seeks to analyse the relationship between the US and Ghana in the post-Cold War era. This analysis is done within the context of the US foreign policy (with a regional focus on West Africa) since it largely frames its relationship with those administrations that are either small or weak as compared to Washington. However, in order to make sense of the current issues informing the relations between the US and Ghana, historical events will be used as reference
points to justify the essence and context of Washington praxis with Accra. That being said, it is emphasised that research findings show that the affair between the US and Ghana is largely defined through the parameters of Washington. The simple explanation for this leaning is the unequal power relations between the two countries. While this chapter builds on the study’s responses to research question number 1 and 3, it extensively dwells on the following research questions: 2 [Why does the US view Ghana and Tanzania as indispensable political allies in West Africa and East Africa, respectively?]; 4 [How did the US change or continue its foreign policy towards West and East Africa since the year 1990?] and 5 [What are the peculiar features for the inter-state relations of the US with African states, Ghana and Tanzania in particular?]

7.2. **Obamania and its implications for US engagement in West Africa**

The notion of *Obamania* is used in this chapter to refer to the psychological condition that protrudes a blend of obsession and admiration of US President Barack Obama (MacMillan Dictionary, 2015). This condition has caught the imagination of people in the US, Africa and elsewhere in the world since the year 2008 when Obama was elected for the first time as the President of the US. Since Obama is an African-American, it is reiterated that there has been widespread speculation and expectation especially among the Africans and people of African ancestry in the US, Africa and elsewhere in the world that his presidency would usher in an era of extremely pro-Africa engagement of Washington in West Africa and Africa in general. However, Obama has scored very less in contrast to his predecessors (especially Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, Jr) in terms of prioritisation and commitment to West Africa (Mogotsi, 2013). The negative rating of Obama’s engagement in West Africa does not ignore the reality that Ghana and West Africa as a whole was the destination of his first state visit to Africa as the President of the US. It is worth noting that this has had a resultant significance in cementing the relations between Washington and Accra. Mogotsi (2013) uses the analogy of Henry Kissinger’s series of state visits to Beijing in the 1970s as a means to restore the US-China relations to underscore the need for Obama to make more than two trips to
West Africa, if the relations between his government and those of the West African states are to be strengthened.

Nevertheless, it is safe to state that under Obama’s Administration, there have not been any substantive changes insofar as his engagement with West Africa is concerned. In a lengthy analysis of the ‘US Africa Policy under Barack Obama’, Burns (2010:10) invokes Chris Alden’s conviction that the relationship between the US and Africa has been characterised ‘in the main by indifference and neglect, punctuated by flurries of interest and action’. On the other hand, White (2010:27) rightly claims that ‘Obama had not stated that his policy in Africa would be a complete rupture with that of his predecessor. As such, Obama’s foreign policy towards West Africa and Africa at large is reflexive of the influence of the legacy of his predecessors. In the same tone, Manyaka’s (2015) frank observation is that there seem to be no substantive changes in US foreign policy towards Africa, irrespective of who is the President.

Like Clinton and Bush, Obama’s administration has retained the strategy of using pivotal states to engage in various regions of Africa. In the case of West Africa however, there is a perception that Obama seems to be shifting from Nigeria to other West African countries as in pivot states. The foundation of this perception is the fact that Obama visited Ghana shortly after being inaugurated as the President of the US in the year 2009. In this regard, Ghana’s parliament had an exceptional chance to be addressed by the 1st African-American President in the entire history of the US. During his second visit to Africa, Obama’s first stop was in Senegal (West Africa) before proceeding to Tanzania (East Africa) and South Africa (Southern Africa). The 2009 visit to Ghana and the subsequent 2013 visit to Senegal in West Africa were largely and wrongly described by the media and others as snubbing of Nigeria (Louw-Vaudran, 2013). Hence, Nigeria is far bigger than both Ghana and Senegal in geographic, economic and all material respect. In this context, the World Bank as cited by Louw-Vaudran (2013) has it in good authority that ‘Senegal’s gross domestic product, for example is $14 billion against Nigeria’s $244 billion’. Equally important, the size of Ghana’s gross domestic product is approximately $38 billion (World Bank, 2015). This rating positions it far below Nigeria. Therefore, logic expects that a leader of a global superpower would honour and acknowledge the strategic
significance of its regional and continental counterpart to its foreign policy towards West Africa (and Africa by extension) through a courtesy state visit. This should be understood within the context that Nigeria is the powerhouse of West Africa and the largest economy in Africa. In defiance of the obvious, this chapter does not suggest that the size of the gross domestic product of a particular country is the only criterion that drives head of states and governments in deciding to visit a certain state (i.e. Ghana/Senegal) at the expense of the other (i.e. Nigeria). In this context, this chapter’s primary argument is to emphasise the essential influence of the external economic environment in the formulation and implementation of foreign policies (Reynolds, 1995: 103-129). In relation to this, Kornegay (2008:5) concluded that there ‘a perception that both the Democratic and Republican Parties continue to view Africa through a humanitarian lens rather than a more strategic prism’. The foregoing resonates with the scholarship in International Relations, which agrees that inasmuch as tangible elements of power influences foreign policy processes the influence of the intangible attributes of nation states cannot be wholly dismissed in this regard (Roskin, et al; 2010: 338-339).

Revisiting the debate about the resemblance in terms of the approaches of the successive American Administrations in the post-Cold War era; it is observed that Clinton has mainly expressed the US foreign policy through soft persuasion. In contrast, George W. Bush, Jr’s approach was underpinned by harsh rhetoric. On the other hand, approach of Obama’s presidency reveals the branding of US foreign policy through a mix of both harsh and soft words. Unlike his predecessors, the art of combining both hard and soft rhetoric in facilitating US’s international relations has enabled the Obama administration to fairly confront authoritarianism and other injustices in Africa and also to commend pace of democratisation in countries such as Ghana, Tanzania and Senegal.


It is the well-considered view of this chapter that the US foreign policy towards West Africa and Africa as a whole is complex and multi-faceted (IGD, 2013). It cannot be framed through a simple analysis of it being driven by the national interests of the
US. While the national interests of the US underpins its international relations with African states, it is safe to posit that the approach for espousing US foreign policy towards Africa is largely influenced by issues that are normally external to its domestic policy framework (i.e. internal political developments in the targeted country for a particular foreign policy (Clarke & White, 1989:163-183).

The visit to Ghana in 2009 and Senegal in 2013 does not present sufficient evidence of the reorientation of US foreign policy in West Africa from Nigeria to either Ghana or Senegal. For political, economic and strategic reasons Nigeria remains the most important partner of the US in West Africa. This position is supported and succinctly captured by Morris (2006:229) who wrote that ‘Nigeria dwarfs its neighbours by almost any conceivable measure of economic, geographic, or strategic significance. Since the Clinton administration, it has been called one of the four ‘anchors for regional engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa’. However, Nigeria is sensitive to being viewed as the sub-imperial client of the US in West Africa and Africa at large. Despite challenges relating to its security and to a certain extent, political and economic quagmire, Nigeria is the largest source of African oil imports to the US. In fact, Nigeria supplies 8% of the petroleum imports to the US (White, 2010:13). This role is emblematic of the significance of Nigeria to the economic and energy security of the US. It is arguable that while Nigeria tops the African countries list of oil exporters to the US, its contribution to the economic and energy security of the US is minimal if compared with the Middle East countries such as Saudi Arabia and countries from other regions including Canada, Mexico and Venuzuela (US Energy Information Administration, 2015). These are not far from the truth, but the realities in the international economic and political system are that even the contribution of the smallest producers and exporters of oil cannot be down played.

It is worth stating very briefly that Obama is yet to undertake an official visit to Nigeria, but his then Secretary of State (Hillary Clinton) was an official guest to Abuja in the year 2010 and again, 2012. Secretaries of State under the Bush Administration have also honoured Nigeria with an official visit (Olipohunda, 2012; White, 2010:14). However, it is emphasised that presidential visits symbolises the strong relations between the countries involved. It must also be pointed out that state visits by senior government officials including the Secretary of State are equally
important. The foregoing corroborates the fact that even though Obama has not visited Nigeria irrespective of its political, economic and strategic significance for the realisation of US foreign policy goals, there are observable indications of the close relationship between Washington and Abuja. Hence, Obama is not running the US alone. In dealing with international relations he normally functions with other multiple players such as Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defence, National Security Council (NSC), Presidential Advisor, Congress and etc (Stokes, 2014). This list attests the extent to which US foreign policy is a huge machinery. According to Stokes (2014) the US President normally pays attention to crisis situations in foreign affairs because most of his time is consumed by domestic issues ranging from taxation, health and etc (IGD, 2013:5-6). In other words, the US president has a very limited time to think about the world beyond the shores of the US; except in situations of war that threatens the strategic interests of his country (Cooper, 2014). It is for this reason that Obama has not given the amount of attention to Nigeria, West Africa and Africa as many analysts would expect. Mogotsi (2013:11) articulates this odd situation by writing that ‘Obama during his first presidential term, paid only a cursory and perfunctory attention to African issues, hardly beyond the narrow and narrow-minded dictates of the national security imperatives of the US hegemonic military-industrial-Wall street complex’.

Nonetheless, it is not less accurate to aver that the US diplomatic practice is professionalised in such a manner which is conducive for stability in foreign policy processes in either the presence or absence of a particular President. In the words of Cooper (2014), ‘the NSC is the gatekeeper for the President’. He further alludes that ‘the President is the ultimate decider on foreign policy issues, but mostly chooses not to’. The over-reliance of any US President on the NSC in deciding the pattern, content and direction of Washington’s policy towards a particular country should be understood within the context that countries are not judged equally.

The empirical study of this chapter has brought out that there is no sound basis to regard Obama’s visit to Ghana and Senegal as constituting the demotion of the centrality of Nigeria to US’s engagement in West Africa and Africa at large. For the American policy makers, Nigeria does not compete with either Ghana or Senegal for a space in the map of the foreign policy of the US in West Africa and Africa.
However, each of those countries has a particular role to play towards the enhancement of the national interests of the US. To this end, the value and essence of each of the African countries under review towards the US is not competitive, but complementary. For instance, Senegal feeds into the US agenda for the promotion of democracy around the world. Hence, Senegal is widely regarded as the oldest majority-ruled state in West Africa, a region that has been historically bedevilled by political and economic instabilities (Moss, 2012). In addition, fundamental freedoms relatively find expression in the daily lives of the Senegalese. This is what largely attracts the US about Senegal and apparently, both Washington and Dakar (Senegal’s capital and largest city) have shared wants. The shared wants between the US and Senegal ranges from the desire for ‘free people, free markets and etc’ (Mason and Flynn, 2013). In spite of these, the Institute of Security Studies as cited by Turse (2013) reports that Senegal is vulnerable to extremist tendencies and activities and this unusual situation has a potential to render it unstable. Senegal’s vulnerability to extremism can best be understood when located within the context of the anti-American sentiments among those who disapprove of its lengthy military cooperation with the US (Turse, 2013).

Contextually, the decision of the Obama administration not to include Abuja in his presidential visits to West Africa and Africa has been largely interpreted in terms of Nigeria’s poor record of economic and corporate governance and its compromised political and security landscape (Turse, 2013). While it is true that Nigeria is faced with a terrorist conundrum, rampant corruption and its political environment is poisoned ‘with local militias waging attacks against foreign oil companies’, an analysis that punches this situation above its weight in regard to Washington’s geo-strategic calculations is deficient of truth (Dalan, 2009:3). Notwithstanding the normal diplomatic ties between Washington and Abuja, US is still closely and discreetly related to Nigeria at a bilateral level and openly through the auspices of ECOWAS and other regional, continental and international cooperation frameworks (Mason and Flynn, 2013).
7.4. Ghana’s macro domestic policy framework: A magnet of US praxis with West Africa

The US enjoys very close and warm bilateral and economic relations with Ghana. Both countries derive benefits from their partnership, though at an unequal footing. It is obvious that the unequal power relations between the Washington and Accra puts the US at a more advantageous position compared to Ghana in terms of the different types and levels of engagement. This is to say that the context and essence of the cooperation is largely framed according to the official prescripts of the US foreign policy, namely: promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law; enhancement of the security of the US and bolstering of US’s economic prosperity. These pillars have served as the guiding principles of the US foreign policy in Africa and elsewhere since the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and early 1990s to date.

While Ghana is not necessarily a pivotal state in terms of the US foreign policy towards West Africa and Africa, it is not far-fetched to state that Accra still has a complementary and spectacular role to play in this regard. Despite this, Mudimbe (2014) maintains that ‘the US goes to Ghana as a focal point for West-African regional issues’. Politically, Ghana is widely considered as a stable and vibrant democracy in West Africa. This position is informed by the fact that in 1992 Ghana has successfully transformed from a one-party state to a dual party state (Wikepedia, 2016). Since then to date, Ghana has been able to conduct five successive general elections which were largely described as credible, transparent and peaceful by both domestic and international observers. Between such cycles of elections, political power was transformed about two times to different political parties. Recognising that democratisation is not an end on its own but a means towards an end, this study’s conviction is that Ghana’s road towards democracy is remarkable and for this, it is inevitable for the US to partner with her. In other words, Ghana stands for principles that the US advocates. Like the US, Ghana has embraced a dual party electoral model since its return to political pluralism in the year 1992 (USAID, 2012:14-22). The commonality in terms of electoral model in both Ghana and the US has laid a fertile ground for reciprocal cooperation between the two countries. Still, liberal democracy as espoused by the US and to a larger extent, Ghana has proven to be
insufficiently accountable to the people. Hence, leaders tend to be more loyal to the political parties that deployed them into public office, rather than the electorate (Matlosa, 2015). Notwithstanding the efforts of American non-governmental sector in Ghana, the United States Informational Service (USIS), Democracy and Human Rights Funds (DHRF) and USAID have established themselves as the primary external actors for the building of democracy (Hearn, 1999:7).

Contextually, Mudimbe (2014) further maintains that the US sees Ghana as a beacon of democracy in Africa. Equally important, Ghana is viewed as an island of stability in an ocean of instability. A case in point is the insecurities unleashed by Boko Haram in Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon and the compromised security landscape has become a vantage point from which the US see West Africa as turbulent. As such, the US hopes to bank on Ghana to spread democracy in West Africa and other parts of Africa. For its part the US has had a lot of influence in the democratisation of Ghana, West Africa and Africa. As a self-proclaimed vanguard of democracy in the world, the US is usually involved in elections monitoring in Africa by either deploying its electoral observers and/or training domestic electoral observers. Owing to the supportive role of the US in the terrain of elections in Africa, the electoral commissions of Ghana (and South Africa) are ranked as Africa’s performing in the world (Finca, 2013). Despite the isolated incidents of electoral violence and other challenges not mentioned here, both Ghana (and South Africa) generally does well in logistical considerations relating to electoral processes. Indeed, it is hard to deny that election observation, conflict management, voter and civic education have become the tenets for the political culture of Ghana.

Taking the role of the US in the democratisation of Africa, Obama retorted that ‘Africa does not need strong men but strong institutions’ (Louw-Vaudran, 2013). This provocative message was coughed during Obama’s visit to Ghana in the year 2009 and again, during his second presidential Africa trip in the year 2013 (Obama, 2016). This message was in reference to leaders such as Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe) and other African leaders who have allegedly over-stayed their welcome in the highest office of their lands. Meanwhile, Michelle Gavin as cited by Cook (2009:2) has noted that Obama’s trip to Accra was an affirmation and confirmation of the state of [positive] governance and thriving democracy in Ghana. It is argued that although
Ghana’s strides towards democratisation are commendable, the conditions on the grounds indicate that the governance of Ghana represents a rule by the elite with limited benefits for the majority (Roskin, et al., 2010: 102-103). This should be understood within the context that the US in only committed to a limited form of democracy (Shai and Iroanya, 2014). That is a system that is only concerned about the political dimension of democracy and normally benefits the ruling political and business elites to the marginalisation of the masses. While the system unleashes limited benefits to the masses, it fosters maximum benefits through the collusion of the local political leadership and business elites with their international counterparts. If the current level of socio-economic development in Ghana is anything to go by; it can be safely contended that the mighty Kwame Nkrumah’s assertion that ‘Seek ye first the political kingdom, and all else shall be added unto you’ does not have a sound practical and theoretical basis for the launching of real socio-economic development and sustainable development (Pooe, 2014: 299). Hence, there cannot be durable peace in Africa and any country in the world unless there is economic justice. Taking the argument to another level, there cannot be any sustainable development in an environment which is not peaceful. As has been illustrated during the Arab Spring in the year 2011, there is a close link between peace, security, development and stability (Matheba, 2011; Poopedi, 2014).

This chapter shares the sentiment that democracy is good. But it finds Obama’s demonization and criminalisation of strong men in Africa as misplaced, to a certain extent. The indiscriminate berating of Africa’s strong men ignores the political and historical reality that traditionally, African communities were effectively and efficiently led by strong men. Besides that democracy was philosophically dismissed by ancient Greek scholars such as Plato because of its invocation for the rule by the mob or poor majority, it is the well-considered view of this research that Western democracy is irrelevant for Africa (Mokoena, 2014). The experiences of the democratic transition of several African states including Ghana, Tanzania, Namibia and South Africa, among others, has proven that Western democracy does not dovetail with the political, social and material conditions of the African continent. Besides other arguments advanced beforehand in this study, Western democracy negates ideals and practices that are inherent in the African communities such as Ubuntu (humanity), just to mention a few (Mokoena, 2011). It is within this context that even
African countries such as Ghana, which are usually paraded by the US as the best functioning models of democracy, are also bedevilled by challenges of weak governance institutions (Netshifhefhe, 2015).

Economically, the US finds comfort in having a sound affair with Ghana, one of the fastest growing economies in Africa. According to Cook (2009:9) in the year 2008 the economy of Ghana grew by 7.3 percent. This notable economic growth can be partly attributed to the discovery of crude oil reserves in Ghana during the year 2007. While there are certain advantages in the fact that Ghana’s oil was discovered offshore, it is also a challenge for the middle income economy given that the extraction of oil from the sea is expensive and also requires technical know-how and infrastructure that is scarce in Ghana and Africa. Pretty much, the US knows Ghana’s skills gap and underdeveloped industrial infrastructure. As such, Washington is courting Accra to prepare itself to fill the skills gap in Ghana’s extractive sector and eventually process its natural resources including the recently discovered oil. The US oil companies, Kosmos Energy and Anadarko are already making remarkable strides with the exploration and development of oil reserves in Ghana (Ayalazuno, 2013:1-8; McCaskie, 2008:316-322). This is not an emerging practice on the part of the US.

In fact when it comes to Africa, the US has supported development for decades and continues to do so. This argument find solace in that various private-public-partnerships and trade agreements such as AGOA have helped provide good relations of mutual interest (Magolobela, 2014). The foregoing does not imply any intention of this research to disregard the fact that AGOA has had very minimal impact in favour of Ghana. Instead, AGOA and other trade agreements that Accra is a beneficiary of, have jointly ushered in increasing economic growth. This economic growth has less meaning for the Ghanaians because it has not been translated into meaningful socio-economic development. Although Ajayi (2015: 18) instructively charges that ‘Ghana has halved poverty and hunger’, the reality is that the gap between the rich and poor among the Ghanaians is stubbornly widening. But Benyi (2015) cautions that such is not bad as it is the case in South Africa. To this end, the Obama’s Power Africa is commendable to a certain extent, but it is also an indirect acknowledgement that the people of this initiative’s targeted country beneficiaries
(including Ghana) have no reliable access to electricity at the turn of more than five decades of independence from colonial rule.

This study contends that the US targeted beneficiary for Power Africa is not the African people. It is argued that this electrification programme is meant to fortify the American business in Africa and equally, stimulate trade between the US and those countries that are destined to benefit. This can be understood within the context that programmes intended to support American economic interests in Africa have a potential to have both positive and negative spill-over effects towards the Africans. Thus African people would have access to electricity, but the fast-tracked industrialisation would also harness challenges of climate change and related environmental ills for the continent.

Accra is also still heavily dependent on foreign aid, a time bomb that constitute an imminent threat to the economic sovereignty of Ghana. Broadly speaking, IGD (2013) problematizes the notion of the West (US in particular) to put an emphasis on aid instead of renewed trade and investment in its dealing with the Ghana and other African states. For IGD (2003), at the heart of the problem is the sad reality that Africa ‘has never fully decolonised’.

Washington is also quick to even court more African states due to China’s forays into Africa. That Ghana is already ‘pursuing greater economic cooperation and trade ties with China is a thorny issue for the US foreign policy practitioners (Cook, 2009:12). Putting this discourse into a social constructivist perspective, Moss (2012) cautions that ‘US and Chinese interests only rarely conflict, and both countries stand to benefit from a more prosperous and stable Africa’. To diffuse the infiltration of China in West Africa, the US has housed its African Global Competitiveness Initiative (AGCT) in Ghana. Cook (2009:15) posits that the main purpose of AGCT is to ‘provide trade, investment, business information and technical assistance to African and US public and private sector business, trade and policy entities’. In locating the thesis of US interests being rattled by Beijing, Jordan (2013) strongly advised and opined that ‘Western concerns about possible Chinese, Indian or Russian exploitation of Africa’s resources and people would be treated less cynically if they had established a better record on the African continent.
7.5. Military cooperation

The US enjoys closer military cooperation with Ghana. For example, the US army conducts war games with the Ghanaian army in the latter’s territorial jurisdiction. While the US military exercises in Ghana can be viewed as the tentacles of US neocolonial tendencies, it is important to highlight that Ghana is one of the few African states that are receptive to the idea of an AFRICOM. The narrative of US neocolonial tendencies in Ghana does not disregard the fact that such actions are done with the consent of the host government. However, it should be noted that Ghana’s over-dependence on the US foreign aid has a potential to weaken Accra’s capacity and willingness to resist some of the foreign policy pressures unleashed by Washington.

For the government of Ghana the idea of AFRICOM has good intentions and potential benefits for both the US and Africa, but its vision has been frustrated by anti-American sentiments veering across the globe. The foregoing expression should be understood within the context that at an individual level, the Ghanaian army is well-equipped with US manufactured weaponry. Hence, Ghana along with Nigeria has been very instrumental in showing leadership in the context of ECOWAS and AU’s efforts to find solutions to violent conflicts in countries such as Ivory Coast, Liberia and Sierra Leone. It is argued that even though Ghana has played a crucial role in establishing an environment of peace and security, the solutions to such conflicts would not last long. The short term value of Ghana’s contribution to conflict resolution in West Africa and other parts of Africa can be attributed to the fact that its approach has been militaristic (in the main), an approach that is preferable to the US’s spirit and letter of AFRICOM.

While military solutions provide short term solutions to challenges of violent conflicts in Africa and elsewhere, it is the contention of this study that there is a need for a paradigm shift; to entail aggressive measures to address the non-military aspects of violent conflicts. For the US, it (Washington) has bolstered the establishment of Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Ghana. This centre is essential
for inculcating professionalism within the military of Ghana and to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of Ghanaian soldiers prior to deployment in international peacekeeping missions and the Economic Community of West African States Standby Force (ECOWASBRIG) (Cook, 2009:15).

Emphatically, Washington's choice of Accra as the beneficiary for its military and police support should be understood within the context that the US view Ghana as an island of stability in an ocean of instability. The Americans see West Africa as a turbulent region, a case in point is the Boko Haram activities in Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon. That the Boko Haram has also pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Syria (ISS) is bitter pill for American foreign policy practitioners (Schneider, 2015: 8-21). On the other hand, Cook (2009:15) adds that 'military and police assistance centres on helping Ghana to counter its growing use as a key cocaine transhipment point in the region'. Given the stability of Ghana, the US can rely on Accra to fight the encroachment of Boko Haram in West Africa, where the national interests of the US are already under siege. This study submits that the securitisation of the US foreign policy towards Africa and the West Africa region in particular, demonstrates Washington's desperate desire to protect its oil based economic interests in the Gulf of Guinea. The former US Undersecretary of State for African Affairs, Walter Kansteiner as cited by Morris (2006:226) puts the unfolding argument into a proper perspective: ‘African oil is of national strategic interest to us, and it will increase and become more important as we go forward’.

7.6. Conclusion

The chapter has shown that Washington and Accra have developed closer bilateral relations since Ghana's return to majority rule in the year 1992. However, their formal relations date back to the year 1957 when Ghana became the first independent state in Africa. Their relations cut across the military, political and socio-economic spectrum. However, the relationship between them is asymmetrical due to the unequal power relations between Ghana and the US. The unequal power relations between the two countries have allowed the US to dictate terms on the nature and direction of its relations with Ghana. While the US derived a lot of economic and strategic benefits from engaging with Ghana, it has not been able to
bridge the wider gap between promise and action. Hence, its democracy support initiatives in Ghana has had a limited impact when compared to its goals in the area of access to natural resources and the enhancement of the security of its national interests, which are largely economic.

In the final analysis, the consolidation of democracy and the discovery of oil in Ghana have served as an impetus for Washington’s concerted engagement with Accra. Despite this, Nigeria remains the pivotal state for the US engagement in West Africa. Hence, Abuja is far bigger than Ghana in all material aspects and consequently, its strategic significance to the US. As such, Ghana simply serves as complementary and referent ally for West African issues. That being the case, it has been observed that the US foreign policy has many angles of influence, one being a political party in power. The foregoing observation does not in any way imply that the periodic change of the ruling party from the Republican Party to Democratic Party (vice versa) overtime has had any real effect to the US foreign policy towards West Africa and Africa at large. Furthermore, the findings of this research illustrated that irrespective of whoever is in power, there has always been close collaboration between Ghana and Tanzania in the major part of the post-Cold War era. Thus, successive Presidents irrespective of being Republican or Democrat will want access to the natural resources of Ghana, the Gulf of Guinea, West Africa and Africa at large. Lastly, the foreign policies espoused by varying US administrations in regard to Ghana and the West Africa are identical to a certain extent. They seek to contain the infiltration of Chinese within their spheres of influence and beyond.

In contrast to the preceding chapter, the succeeding chapter uses Tanzania as test case to reinforce the central arguments about the theoretical aspects of democracy and security as the key drivers of the US foreign policy in Africa. A broader context for understanding this chapter was laid through a detailed discussion of democracy (chapter 5) and security (chapter 6) as the ideological and guiding principles of the US foreign policy towards Africa.
Chapter 8
The US Foreign Policy Towards East Africa: Tanzania in Focus

8.1. Introduction

Africa and East Africa historically, has never been on the priority list of the US foreign policy makers (Waters, 2006:46; Mkandawire, 2010:6). Of recent though it has attracted lots of US interest due to the global war on terrorism (Igwe, 2015). The marginalisation of Africa in the US was not limited to the political circles. It was also evident in the production and dissemination of information through academic and popular publications. More often than not, Africa was pinned with negative labels such as a ‘dark continent’ and even a ‘hopeless continent’ (Soriot, 2014:36-37). This negative labelling of Africa was largely influenced by the cycle of violent conflicts, poverty, hunger, diseases and rampant corruption which had become a common feature of most African states (Jerven, 2015:84-86). The indifference of US to corruption and bad governance during the height of the cold war greatly contributed to these conditions, they supported governments across the continent without interrogating their poor governance record as long as they helped keep USSR at bay (Toure, 2015). In this context, Obama has warned that ‘[S]o long as parts of Africa continue to be ravaged by war and mayhem, opportunity and democracy cannot take root’ (United States, 2013). But parts of Africa, which are characterised by persistent conflicts and endless wars are not reflective of the whole of Africa as a continent. For instance, South Africa and Ghana are relatively stable whereas the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda and Rwanda are prone to conflicts. With such a background to Africa’s security landscape, one could safely conclude that each of its regions has a fair share of conflicts and peace dividends (Rannenyeni, 2009: 3). Regardless of Africa’s setbacks, it is worth emphasising that the “dark continent” is a construct of European powers.

While it is true that epidemics such as HIV/AIDS, political and economic instabilities have been a common denominator of the emerging patterns and trends of the African society, it must be pointed out that such a situation was at times exaggerated

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30 An earlier version of this chapter was published in Sebola, Tsheola & Mafunisa (2015: 210-222).
by the Western media, politicians and academics (Malherbe, 2013; Van Dijk, 2006)). The practice of exaggerating Africa’s setbacks has a long history within the American circles as a means of weakening African countries and economies by creating panic and eventually, justifying foreign intervention by the big powers such as the US, Britain and France (Ewi & Els, 2015).

According to Silaigwana (2016), the above stated fact could also be argued by looking at the Western countries and their allied global financial institutions, such as World Bank Group and IMF. These countries and institutions strongly advocate liberal economic policies with regard to African countries opening their markets for western exports, while African exports are subjected to stringent tariff and non-tariff barriers. This fact has created economic imbalance in favour of Western countries, while Africa wallows in poverty. This is even much clearer with the issue of global carbon gas emissions, which harm Africa gravely despite being the least emitter of carbon. Judging from the logical connection between Western countries and the Bretton Woods institutions in the exploitation of Africa, it is safe to concede that international organisations are nothing more than their leading states or constituent parts (Hurd, 2016).

In this context, Africa had to be projected as a continent that is in despair and in dire need of Euro-American assistance for the purpose of building sustainable political institutions and viable social and economic structures. Positive stories about Africa hardly attracted adequate attention of the American politicians, scholars and media practitioners. However, if recent reports about Africa in international media are anything to go by, it is safe to state that the perceptions of the Western populace about this continent are shifting towards the positive side (The Associated Press, 2015). It is now common to hear and/or read about narratives such as ‘Africa is on the move’ and ‘Africa is rising’ (Gerard, 2015:6; Ngcwaweni, 2013:56-61). The change of heart in terms of positive reporting towards Africa can be attributed to the emergence of scholars who analyse the continent’s economies with contextual, on-the-ground research (Jerven, 2015:84).

In the midst of the above analysis, Omiango (2015) advises that it is wise to interrogate the concept of “Africa rising”, within the context of economic growth and
development *visa vis* the economic status of majority African residents. For him, the recent introduction of the “Africa rising” narrative is a ploy by the capitalist multinational corporations’ eager to market Africa as a new economic frontier for its own gains. He takes the argument further by asserting that when clearly looking at the completed and ongoing huge scale development projects and incomes to poverty levels; it is evident that the majority of Africans are not actually gaining from this concept of “Africa rising”.

It is against this background that this chapter seeks to use East Africa as a test case to critique the US foreign policy from an African perspective (Asante, 2003; Mazama, 2003; Chilisa, 2012). While the primary focus of this paper is on East Africa, the researcher’s conviction is that a deeper understanding of the US foreign policy can be generated through an analytic tapestry which is located within a broader African continental context. In line with the periodisation method, the year 2008 is used as a starting point for this chapter because it has served as a watershed moment in the political history of the US when an African-American was elected for the first time as the president of that country. Given that Obama has presided over the Presidency of the US for the past seven years, this period is considered by the researcher to be sufficient for one to make a fair conclusion in addressing the research question number 1 and 3 in general; with a specific focus on the following: 2 [Why does the US view Ghana and Tanzania as indispensable political allies in West Africa and East Africa, respectively?], 4 [How did the US change or continue its foreign policy towards West and East Africa since the year 1990?] and 5 [What are the peculiar features for the inter-state relations of the US with African states, Ghana and Tanzania in particular?]

Inasmuch as the primary focus of this paper is on the post-2008 era, it is believed that a deeper understanding and sound conclusion on the two critical questions can be arrived at if the analysis of this paper is located within a historical context.
8.2. Glocalising the US-Africa policy in retrospect

Essentially, the derivative of *glocalism* appreciates the essence of the link between globalisation and localisation (Tien and Talley, 2012). This is a manifestation which is also evident in the formulation and implementation of US foreign policy. Thus, at the international stage the official foreign policy of the US can be summed up into three pillars, namely:

- Promotion of democracy and rule of law;
- Access to natural resources for fortifying economic prosperity; and
- Promotion of peace, security, stability and development (Shai, 2010).

The aforementioned pillars foregrounds the multiplicity of the overlapping principles of US foreign policy around the globe, but such have been given regional and national effect depending on the political, historic and material conditions of the receptive continent/ region and nation state. Equally important, these pillars have largely defined the content and direction of the US foreign policy since the end of the World War II to date. While varying administrations ranging from Bill Clinton to George W. Bush, just to mention a few, have come and gone; they have not introduced major changes to the substance and content of the US foreign policy. This claim has been echoed by Albright (2000:2) and she maintains that ‘[T]he fundamental purpose of America’s foreign policy has not changed in more than two centuries. It is to protect our citizens, our territory, our livelihood, and our friends’. The only changes that were evident during the change of leadership in the US was at the rhetorical level. This should be understood within the context of the complexity of the foreign policy processes in the US. The complex nature of foreign policy processes in the US requires stringent and rigorous professionalisation of the diplomatic practice (Paxen, 2014). The professionalisation of diplomatic practice in the US is critically significant for maintaining stability and continuity whenever the ruling party or president changes. In contrast, Pahad (2013: 32) notes that to date ‘the US has failed to understand its role in the new world order and there has been a lack of strategic coherence and consistency in US foreign policy’. Shai and Iroanya (2014: 910) suggest that such lack of strategic coherence and consistency display themselves through the US appetite for sponsoring ‘both its allies and their enemies across the board’. They further see this controversial tendency as laying a fertile
ground for the germination of seeds for political and economic instabilities instead of sustainable democratic environments. The whole idea behind the mention of the “promotion of democracy and the rule of law” as one of the guiding principles of the US foreign policy is merely used as a tool for international morality to justify American imperialism (Omiango, 2015).

8.3. The Obama moment and its meaning for US engagement in East Africa

From the literature on the diplomatic history of the US it is evident that Washington’s engagement in Africa in the post-World War II era has been generally characterised by the (ab)use of regional powers (also known as pivotal states) (Mitchell, 1998). For both strategic and political reasons, the regional powers such as South Africa (in Southern Africa), Nigeria (West Africa), Egypt (North Africa) and Kenya (East Africa) were identified and (ab)used by successive US administrations as the launching pads of Washington’s engagement in their respective regions. The pivotal states of Africa are normally manipulated by the US in order for them to position and conduct themselves in a manner that prioritises the goals of Washington at the expense of the interests of their people. The political, economic and diplomatic leverage of Africa’s pivotal states implies that developments (be it violent conflicts or economic growth and development) have a great potential of spilling over to other nation states in their respective regions. This observation is supported by Ngcaweni (2013) who wrote that ‘[M]ost developing regions have leading countries that anchor growth and stability’.

Despite the rich history flowing from the foregoing, there have been impressions in certain circles that under Barack Obama, the US engagement in East Africa seems to be at significant stage of metamorphosis. This argument was articulated at two levels: firstly, the year 2013 decision by Washington to send Obama on a state visit to Tanzania, instead of Kenya (its traditional ally) was interpreted in certain circles as signalling the re-orientation of the US foreign policy in East Africa (Collinson, 2013; Honan 2015). For Melody (2015), the reason Obama skipped Kenya is not about shifting relations, but it was at individual and Democratic Party level, at a time when top Kenyan leadership, president and his deputy, were facing charges at the ICC. He was taking a rather moral upper ground. The fact that he visited Kenya later on when
only the deputy president was facing charges, shows that he was more driven by America’s strategic interests and not shifting alliances.

This study recognises the importance of high level state visits in the solidification of inter-African relations and international relations in general. The truth of the matter is that Obama had an opportunity to visit Kenya in 2006 during his tenure as the Illinois Senator, shortly before he was elected the President of the US. Therefore, personal ties and networks had already been initiated at that level. Notwithstanding this, Kenya has had great relations with the US before and during the Obama’s presidency. So, the target of Tanzania for the 2013 Africa itinerary was basically a strategic move by the US to enlarge its pool of partners in the war on terrorism within East Africa and the Horn and Africa as a whole. As it is the case with Kenya and US, Tanzania has also been a victim of a series of terrorism attacks (Perl, 1998:1-2). That the year 1998 was marked by the bombing of the American embassy in Dar esalam is a critical factor that has fortified mutual affinity and solidarity between the US and Tanzania.

It is worth noting that China’s largest trading partner in Africa is Tanzania (Reuters, 2015). Official records projects that Chinese companies in Tanzania totalled 500 by the end of the year 2013 and with time, this number has prospects of increasing enormously (Reuters, 2015). This economic development is a bitter pill to be swallowed by American foreign policy makers because recent scientific discoveries have pointed that Tanzania has a potential to become one of Africa’s oil producing countries (Ngcaweni, 2013:58). Hence, an economic affair has a potential for sparking bilateral relations in non-economic sectors, which may either be of political and diplomatic nature. For Bridgman (2013), ‘[A] new season of focused attention on economic ties is definitely apparent, even if largely due to the competition the US is seeing from China, India and others investing in the infrastructure and development of African economies outside of the World Bank and other traditional avenues where the US holds sway’. Additionally, Tanzania is a historic leader of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) and an active member of the East African Community (EAC), SADC and the AU (Magolobela, 2014). To this end, Tanzania’s membership to several regional organisations on the continent makes it a possible asset for championing the national interests of the US across Africa. As such, the recent
active involvement of Washington with Dodoma is a desperate attempt of the US to dilute the vast economic presence of China in Tanzania, East Africa and Africa as a whole. This is also meant to confuse the possibility of Beijing (Capital of China) to use its economic foothold in Tanzania to extend its spheres of influence in East Africa, Southern Africa and Africa at large.

8.4. A cross country analysis of Kenya and Tanzania: Emerging issues for the US Africa policy

While the indictment of the top leadership of Kenya by the ICC in the recent past has compromised the image and prestige of Nairobi (Capital of Kenya) in diplomatic circles, it is contended that Obama’s visit to Tanzania was never really meant to ‘snub’ the former as largely dubbed by the media (Collinson, 2013). In reality, Kenya and Tanzania are deemed by American foreign policy practitioners as complementary allies of the US and not competitive friends. Beside all of the above, it should be noted that Obama deliberately avoided making persistent visits to Kenya during his first term of office because he did not want to give conservative Republications (in the Congress) a reason to cast fresh aspersions about his American nationality and therefore, his suitability to serve as the President of the US (Kornacki, 2011).

It is against this backdrop that Obama has again visited Kenya in July 2015, dated as the few remaining months of his second and last tenure in terms of the constitution of the US. Considering that Obama is now finishing his second term, such a move carries no or less cost in terms of political risks. In spite of varying speculations about the reluctant visit of Obama to Kenya during his presidency, Ngcaweni (2013: 58) reminds us that ‘Kenya is widely regarded as the economic powerhouse of the East African region and has the potential to drive economic development well into the next decade’. The economic and political status of Kenya in East Africa is well-understood by the American foreign policy makers and there is no way in which the US can isolate Nairobi in favour of lofty foreign policy goals such as justice and democracy, just to name a few.
Moreover, there has also been a suggestion in certain quarters that the first address to the AU in July 2015 by the sitting head of state in the US is indicative of a departure from the tradition of sub-contracting the US foreign policy to regional imperial states such as South Africa and Kenya. Instead, Obama’s address to the AU has been viewed as a switch to continent-wide engagement, an approach whose seed was first germinated during the 2014 US-Africa summit in Washington, which has been hailed as the largest event that an American president has held with most African head of states and governments (Magolobela, 2014). It is the well-considered view of this research that the US foreign policy approach in East Africa and Africa at large is consistent. Thus, regional clients remain key for the launching of the US foreign policy in their respective regions.

The intermittent continent wide engagement through the 2014 US-Africa summit, and 2015 AU address simply reinforces the existing normal channels of engagement between the US and regional powers and by extension their respective regions. Based on the meetings between US and African leaders and observations of Obama’s most recent tour of the continent, it seems like the US has learned from China, not to patronise Africa, especially with regard to human rights issues, but to treat it as an equal partner—at least with regard to economic issues (Fabricius, 2014; Ichikowits, 2015: 14). Furthermore, this research embraces Bridgman’s (2013) observation that a meeting with the AU leaders ‘underscored the importance of the AU leadership in advancing development and democratic norms across the continent’. The foregoing dovetails with the promotion of democracy and the rule of law as one of the cornerstones of the US foreign policy towards Africa (Shai and Iroanya, 2014).

8.5. Tanzania’s domestic policy framework: a magnet of US engagement in East Africa

Tanzania has successfully moved away from the status of a socialist-orientated one party state to a capitalist-inclined market based economy in the 1990s (United States Agency for International Development, 2004: i). While the agenda for economic reform in Tanzania has heralded it as one of the fastest growing economies in sub-Saharan Africa, it is also true that the capitalist economic policy framework has made
it impossible for the much-spoken about economic growth to be translated into meaningful economic development. Hence, contemporary studies show that ‘Tanzania is ranked 164th out of 177 countries in the UN Human Development Index’ (Imperial College London, 2015). The irony between the pro-Dodoma accolades by the US and Tanzania’s level of economic development is evident of the hypocritic nature of Washington’s foreign policies in Africa and thus, their self-serving nature.

The change of politico-economic identity of Tanzania has naturally carved a safe space for Dodoma in the mapping of the US foreign policy in East Africa. Like Kenya and the majority of African states, Tanzania is perceived to have fairly embraced the values and practices ranging from economic liberalism and political pluralism which are valued highly in the US policy and political circles. There is also a perception that peace in Tanzania is an essential attribute that qualified her as the American reference for regional (East African) issues and as a model for development strategies (Magolobela, 2014). On the other hand, the position of the US foreign policy machinery is that Tanzania is a beacon and model of democracy, peace and security which must be replicated all over Africa. Tanzania’s move towards the politico-economic values and practices that are held in high regard by the US tacitly made Dodoma to become an appealing additional partner in the engagement of Washington in East Africa and beyond. Contextually, it must be noted that Tanzania is officially a multiparty state, but in reality and practice it remains a single dominant party state under the rule of Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). Its political landscape is not levelled and worse, rampant corruption can be observed in the midst of the fragmented and weak civil society (USAID, 2004:5). This political situation gives credence to this research’s conviction that there is a wide chasm between theory and practice insofar as the US foreign policy towards Tanzania is concerned.

In contrast to the American myth that Tanzania is a peaceful country, Shaba (2007:6) posited that ‘Tanzania is currently witnessing a surge of fundamentalism from all walks of life in the form of Islamic militants, evangelical revivalism and even witchcraft’. It is the well-considered view of this study that the envisaged peace, stability and security in Tanzania cannot be sustained in the midst of economic injustices. It is also worth reiterating the post point that the US engages with Tanzania (in East Africa) primarily for containing and eliminating terror groups such
as Boko Haram and Al-shabaab. This agenda is advanced “by giving aid and training to targeted countries, protecting American business and political interests”. Equally significant, it is argued that if the respect for public resources and constitutional values and principles do not find true and honest expression in the daily livelihoods of Tanzania’s national and international relations, the complex web of the political, economic and corporate governance would be compromised and gradually disintegrated. This is a scenario that Tanzania, Africa and the US cannot afford to witness and it is not in the best interest of the shared goals and objectives of each of these parties. Hence, if Tanzania fails to consolidate its democratic gains and maintain its perceived stability, such a situation would invalidate its position of being a US anchor for the promotion of democracy, peace and security in East Africa and other regions of the African continent. In matters of security however, Tanzania still has some in house issues to sort, such as the perennial squabbles between mainland Tanganyika and Zanzibar, calling for secession (Toure, 2015).

8.6. Conclusion

It is concluded that the US-East Africa affair still manifests into slave-master relationship post-independence. In short inter-African relations are largely dictated by foreign big powers including the US, UK and France. This unfortunate situation implies that inter-African relations are the extension of the foreign policy of Western big powers. Given the geographical diversity of Africa’s five regions, the US foreign policy towards each of them is bound to be unique. In the case of East Africa, it has been established that the priority of US foreign policy practitioners has sequentially been: (i) the promotion of peace and security; (ii) promotion of democracy and rule of law and (iii) access to energy resources for fortifying economic prosperity. The last positioning of the latter on the priority list of the US foreign policy makers should be understood within the context that East Africa is largely not rich in energy resources. However, research findings predict that though poor, countries such as Tanzania have a potential to produce oil. Most of the activities of the US government in East Africa have been on the promotion of peace and security; and democracy and the rule of law. This policy direction is informed by the fact that East Africa is bedevilled

31 The discussion on terrorism in East Africa especially as perpetrated by groups such as Al-Shabaab is analysed in detail on chapter 6 of this study.
by both military and non-military security threats and serious challenges to issues of political governance.

This chapter has stated that the discourse on International Relations has always been approached from an American perspective. The emphatic reference to ‘US foreign policy towards Africa’ may suggest that the analysis of this study is falling on the same trap by following the same line of thought. However, the silent and envisaged narrative of the ‘foreign policy of Africa towards the US’ is beyond the scope of this study. While this study seriously appreciates the diversity of East Africa and Africa as a whole; it also affirms the homogeneity of African culture as expressed through ‘compassion, reciprocity, dignity, harmony and humanity’ (Nussbaum, 2003:21). That being said, the exclusive focus on Kenya and Tanzania as the test cases for studying the current US foreign policy towards East Africa was influenced by the perceived demotion of Nairobi in favour of Dodoma, as on-the-ground agency for Washington’s praxis in that region. In the final analysis, the US foreign policy towards East Africa as espoused by Obama cannot be seen as a representation of obvious continuity or complete change from his predecessors’ foreign policy. The purpose, content and approach of the US foreign policy in East Africa has been maintained; with an additional set of variables depending on regional and continental dynamics.

Among others, the following chapter sums up the arguments and analysis of this study and then puts forward recommendations.
Chapter 9
General Conclusion(s)

9.1. Summary of the findings

This study used Ghana and Tanzania as test cases to critique the US foreign policy towards Africa in the post-Cold War era from an Afrocentric perspective. Owing to the vastness of Africa as a continent, this study cannot claim to be representative but it has used both Ghana and Tanzania to show the patterns of the US engagement in Africa, in West Africa and East Africa in particular. Ghana and Tanzania were chosen as the cases for this research due to the active engagement of Washington with Accra and Dodoma in the recent past. The inclusion of both Ghana and Tanzania in the US’s Partnership for Growth and the recent visit by Obama to these countries constitute the multiple indications of closer engagement between Washington with Accra and Dodoma. The following subheadings are organised according to the research objectives and in overall, they represent the summation of the findings of this study:

9.1.1. The areas of divergence and convergence between the US foreign policy and the national interests of Ghana and Tanzania

At the core, this research explored the economic, political and security dimensions in US foreign policy towards Africa using the following: oil, democracy and national security. These are the three areas in which the US engagement in Africa was found to be active. However, the African oil reserves and the terrorist threat in the continent were found to be the major drivers of the US foreign policy. Thus tangible issues (i.e. security threats and natural resources) were found to be taking precedence over the intangibles such as democracy. In the context of the period under review (1990-2014), it is clear that the US foreign policy practitioners focused mainly on the increasing significance of matters of life and death and less on the relevance of moral judgements in their conduct of international relations (Mazrui, 2004).
9.1.2. The role of the US in the democratisation of Ghana and Tanzania

With reference to the test cases for this study, the agenda for democratic consolidation features prominently on both of them while oil is only applicable to Ghana in this regard. In the context of the above, it is worth emphasising that Ghana and Tanzania are to a larger extent, stable democracies and the US maintains closer ties with them for strategic, political and economic reasons. Hence, Ghana has joined the bloc of oil producing countries in the Gulf of Guinea since the discovery of ‘black gold’ in its shores during the year 2007. It is not unimportant to also state that Tanzania is not yet an exporter of petroleum resources, but Dodoma continuously encourages US companies and investors to explore and build infrastructure for oil. Even though Washington is fast driving towards self-reliance, it has been established that African oil is key for long term economic and energy security of the US; more especially because the US is looking for further investment opportunities in Africa’s extractive industry as a counter-strategy to roll back the notable inroads made by Beijing in this regard.

9.1.3. The security concerns of the US in Africa and the views of Africans in this regard

In contrast, Tanzania distinguishes itself both as a victim of terrorism (terrorist threats) and equally so a strategic partner of the US anti-terrorism efforts in East Africa. Yet, oil in Ghana is important for the US both as an economic resource and strategic energy source for wartime period.

9.1.4. The shift in the US Africa policy by identifying the dominant patterns of Washington’s involvement in Africa since the end of the Cold War

Periodically, this study covered the presidencies of George W. Bush Sr, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush Jr and to a reasonable extent, Barack Obama. First, it was found that George W. Bush Sr. was at the helm of the US for a limited period of two years in the post-Cold War era and was not able to develop a clear foreign policy towards Africa. This was because of the disappearance of the communist threat in Africa following the collapse of the Soviet empire in the late 1980s and the emergence of
major powers such as China, India and Brazil. He simply continued on the same space of his predecessor while pledging support for emerging democracies. A distinction should be drawn between rhetoric and action. Contextually, new challenges of the post-Cold War era and limited time robbed Bush of his privilege to develop an independent foreign policy towards Africa and instead put him at the sharp eye of analysts for having left no legacy for Africa. In this respect, Bush Sr.’s foreign policy in Africa envisaged the following: protection of few vital American interests and the promotion of open trade. This is symbolic of the change of foreign policy that is Cold War orientated to the other with a focus on new issues.

Overall, the change of regime in the US in the post-Cold War era did not bring about any radical changes on the substance of its foreign policy towards Africa. The strategies developed and executed by the US under the administration of either the Democratic Party or the Republican Party in the post-Cold War era are more or less the same. They all contracted their foreign policies in Africa to client states or what they call ‘pivotal states’ such as Kenya and Nigeria and this practice dates back to the Cold War period. Their foreign policies have also featured the essential elements of both realism and idealism. At the same time Americans, both democrats and republicans seldom differ on realist foreign policy priorities in Africa and elsewhere. In the post-Cold War era, both the changing administrations from the Republican Party to Democratic Party and vice versa, have a common purpose in accessing Africa’s natural resources and containing the Chinese influence on the continent. It is within this continuum that successive US administrations viewed Africa through the perception of a threat and fear. The foregoing analysis should be understood within the context that certain readings contend that the Cold War is not over, rather it was dormant and now there is a resurgence of Russia/ US divide and this affects what Africa receives from not only the US but also from Russia, China and India.

The 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi (Kenya) and Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) strengthened the position of the Clinton administration that Africa is a high security risk and this was further solidified following the September 11 attacks. Despite this, they also acknowledge that Africa is an opportunity and if engaged properly, it can be a guarantor of their national security. Both Clinton and Bush sought to use Africa to diversify US’s energy sources along those of the Middle East
and Latin America. The most significant fact to explain the contradicting narrative of US’s view of Africa as both a threat and opportunity is that the Americans are the most paranoid people on earth. The foregoing analysis should be understood within the context that the US military has killed many people from Afghanistan to Iraq. As a result, the American foreign policy practitioners know that their country has a lot of enemies and they go a long way to protect their nationals. It is crystal clear that the US spends a lot of money on defence than any state on earth. But the cauldron of the enemies of the US is fairly attributable to its controversial foreign policies around the globe.

9.1.5. The economic, political and security dimensions of the US policy in Ghana and Tanzania

Whereas African oil anchored the economic security of the US, this research found that its proceeds have not been used effectively to develop the population of oil exporting countries due to corruption, illegal trading and poor macro-economic management among key reasons. As a new entrant to the oil producing market, Ghana could draw hard lessons from other poor African states who are resource rich (i.e. Equatorial Guinea and Angola). Equally important, Ghana can take soft lessons from resource-rich countries such as Botswana and Norway, who took precautionary measures to ward-off the ‘Dutch disease’. Among other development paths to be followed, Ghana should diversify its economy and not limit itself to the petro industry as the mainstay of its economy. This move will ensure that its economy remains stable even when the prices of oil in the international market fluctuate.

Within this context, it is essential to highlight that the US has done very little to improve the deteriorating resource governance situation in Africa due to the limits imposed by its national interests. Some of the abnormalities in the affairs of the African oil exporting countries were blessed by the US in order to guarantee their availability as its suppliers of energy. Some of the illegal activities in oil trading in Africa have mushroomed as a result of the involvement of the American officials who often share the returns of the loot with the local ruling political elites. It is now clear that there are no visible points of convergence between the policy goals of African states and the US especially in the area of oil trade and any other sectors
whatsoever. This is an area that needs to be revisited by American politicians in order to arrest the globalisation of Africa’s problems. While there are no clear signs of convergence between the interests of the US and African states; the major argument of this study is that the US and African states have more shared than competing interests.

Whereas it is important to help Africa police its borders to prevent the circulation of terrorists, the US should also capacitate Africa on non-military sectors instead of taking advantage of this continent’s economic vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, the nature of the US military engagement in Africa is driven by the desire to safeguard its commercial interests centred on oil resources and the threat of terrorism is just an afterthought that is probable of inducing the Africans to be open to the Americans.

Furthermore, this study has established that the US foreign policy does not have specific principles as it is often claimed. This contradiction should be understood within the context of the gap between official rhetoric and action on the part of US when dealing with critical foreign policy issues concerning Africa. The values that are often mistaken to constitute the principles of America’s foreign policy towards Africa are universal. It is strongly argued that the framework of US engagement differs from one country to the other. Irrespective of what is written in a particular strategy the American actions in Africa illustrates that tactical interests trump values in times of increased threat to security and commercial interests. To this end, the US influence in the political and economic governance has often brought about mixed results. It has groomed and trained dictators (i.e. Hosni Mubarak of Egypt) and rebels (the late Jonas Savimbi of Angola) alike. On the other hand, it has backed processes and institutions that enabled majority rule to thrive in some states like Ghana and Tanzania in West Africa and East Africa, respectively.

Despite the consistent indifference of the US towards Africa, the empirical findings of this study highlight that the US engagement in Ghana and Tanzania is not a microcosm of the overall US policy towards the continent (Mazrui, 2004). Relations with Ghana and Tanzania are warm and with Zimbabwe are cold. When considered in the context of regional focus, there is no convincing evidence that Ghana and Tanzania are the hearts of US foreign policy in West Africa and East Africa,
respectively. Nigeria and Kenya are regional powers in West Africa and East Africa respectively, and they wield a lot of influence compared to Ghana and Tanzania.\textsuperscript{32}

As such, Nigeria and Kenya remain the pivotal states for the US engagement in their respective regions. For the US, Ghana and Tanzania are the complementary allies who have been found attractive by Washington due to their political and ideological affinity to the US.

The US foreign aid remains among the key ingredients of political development in Africa, particularly in Ghana and Tanzania. But its positive role is often negated when it is provided in order to sustain a particular political course that undermines positive political and socio-economic relations. While emphasis on values in the development and implementation of foreign policy is understandable, such cannot be applied across the board but where possible, it can be used as means to rally the support for further strategic goals of the strategy in question.

From this study, it is clear that the manifestation of AGOA through its inhumane system of capitalism is parasitic of the benefits proclaimed by the liberal democratic project. The difference between Clinton, Bush and Obama in terms of Africa policy is on approach or style, while the content of their policies remain the same. The pattern of the deeds is the same, but there is no coherence regarding their rhetoric. Clinton preferred rhetorical flexibility while his successor opted for harsh diplomacy. This is an area that heightened his profile at the international stage despite failures on the question of Somalia and Rwanda in Africa. Hence, Clinton leaped a ‘carrot’ in the form of AGOA to gain more accessibility to the African markets. This is part of Clinton’s policy that resembles the elements of the foreign policy of his predecessor in addition to a focus on human rights and nation building. Although AGOA was actualised under Clinton’s successor, Bush’s approach to the terrorist threat dampened the human face of his foreign policy in Africa.

There is little doubt Africa would be counted as one of Bush Jr.’s foreign policy legacies on humanitarian issues including poverty and HIV/ AIDS. While PEPFAR

\textsuperscript{32} In the case of East Africa, the question of regional ‘power’ is a dicey one. Hence, Kenya is a bigger economy, but it trails behind Tanzania in terms of military strength, role and place in international peacekeeping.
contributed immensely in the war against HIV/AIDS in Africa, the reality is that it was a well-calculated move by the Bush administration to help arrest this epidemic in Africa because its prevalence also threatens the security of the US as indicated earlier. To be sure, PEPFAR and its associates were feeding into the US strategy to combat the threat of terrorism and countries that benefited from it were expected to rally behind Washington. Linked to this, preventive war was the framework of Bush’s foreign policy and democracy promotion was only stated as part of the overall strategy to combat terrorism. Chicago Council on Global Affairs conducted a study that illustrates that in the past decade and half, realist priorities have consistently earned more than sixty percent (60%) in the US while liberal policy priorities obtained less than fifty percent (50%). The ultimate implications are that America’s relations in Africa are not based on principles or values but desperate political interests.

In contrast, Obama’s approach in Africa has resembled a blend of development, defence and diplomacy. It is instructive to state that there is a general feeling among Africans and people of African descent in the US and elsewhere that George Bush, Jr. so far did more for Africa than any other US President. His administration channelled more aid into Africa and fast-tracked the implementation of AGOA. By all indications, the record of Obama’s Presidency on Africa shows that in the US the race factor is less important in the conduct of international relations. Hence, his presidency has not introduced any extraordinary changes towards the US engagement in Africa. But his retention of MCC, PEPFAR, and renewal of AGOA is illustrative of the influence of the legacy of Clinton and Bush Jr on his administration’s foreign policy towards Africa. Regardless of all of the above, it is not insignificant to state that at the country level, the relationship between the US with both Ghana and Tanzania is mutual. But the former (Washington) derives more benefits than Accra and Dodoma due to its political, economic and diplomatic weight.

9.2. Significance of the study

Firstly, this study seeks to make its contribution to the field of International Politics by enhancing the existing literature on US-African affairs. Secondly, it is first full length comparative case study on US foreign policy towards Ghana and Tanzania that
implicitly and rigorously employs Afrocentricity as a new contextual lens that will capture the essence of African reality. Thirdly, it will stimulate and deepen the evolving academic discourse on US foreign policy in Africa in the political, security and socio-economic arena. Fourthly, the findings drawn from each test case are poised to change the readers’ thinking and understanding about the US foreign policy towards the African states, especially its impact on the national security, political stability and socio-economic development of Ghana and Tanzania. Lastly, this study have an element of decision making scientific enquiry that has the potential to inform counter-strategies of Ghana and Tanzania in relation to the foreign policy of the US towards them.

9.3. Implications for theory and practice

Gazing from the findings of this research, it is safe to state that this study makes a significant contribution in International Politics particularly on the role and place of ‘political legacies’ as they relate to the US foreign policy towards Africa. Also, the issue of political rhetoric is path-breaking. In the final analysis, the ‘differential’ foreign policy towards individual African states is also a significant observation which dispels the myth of a universal US foreign policy framework.

Secondary to the hierarchy of concerns for this study is that it has shown that there have been attempts to shift the very foundations of thinking away from Eurocentrism. As such, Afrocentricity was showcased as a silenced theory from Africa in order to demonstrate that it helps in the understanding of US’s international relations and world affairs in general.

9.4. Limitations of the study

Minor constraints were experienced during the conduction of this research. For instance, some of the active diplomats of the US, Ghana and Tanzania were not willing to participate in this study due to the level of secrecy involved in their trade (diplomacy). The inaccessibility of some official government documents of the US due to official embargo has also posed a challenge for this study. However, this cauldron of challenges has not had far-reaching impact on the admissibility or
reliability of the findings of this study. In spite this, the findings in this study may not be generalised, but can be used as a stepping-stone for future research on the subject. Beside this, it is important to note that in case studies generalisations are normally limited to testable theory; not empirical finding (Platt, 2007: 104, 114). Hall (2007: 95) takes this argument a step further by concluding that comparative case studies can serve as an enabler to determine the validity of a certain argument (and to generate general knowledge).

9.5. Recommendations

Emerging from the findings of this study, it is recommended that African states must admit what hinder their individual and collective progress and discard them. This basis is critical if peace, security, development and stability are to prevail in Ghana, Tanzania, US, Africa and the world at large. Academically, future studies on the subject of post-Cold War US foreign policy towards Africa could be embarked upon by using different case studies. However, this study calls for a shift from viewing Europe and North America as the universal referents for the geography of reason. Instead, it is concluded that there is a pressing need to also foreground future studies on Afrocentricity. This is critical for the purposes of unmuting the quietened voices of the Africans in the academic discourse and praxis on international relations. Particularly for the Africans; the essence of the application of Afrocentricity on this subject is well-captured in the African proverb which says that “borrowed water will not quench your thirst”.

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Annexures

Annexure 1: List of Interviewees:

Achu, N.C. Research Specialist (AISA), Pretoria, 28 April 2009.

Benyi, K. Research Scholar, University of Venda, Thohoyandou, 16 March 2009 & 14 October 2015.

Bevlyn, M. (not real name), Official of the US Diplomatic Mission to South Africa, Pretoria, 09 June 2010.33

Chavez, F.* Executive Member of the banned People’s United Democratic Movement (PUDEMO) in Swaziland, 13 April 2010.

Chingombe, K. Assistant Researcher, University of Venda, Thohoyandou, 18 April 2010.


Dhliwayo, A.V. Senior Lecturer: University of Limpopo, Turfloop, 28 February 2016.


Igwe, K.* Official from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Djibouti, 18 December 2015.


33 True identity of the respondent withheld for ethical reasons. Where the symbol (*) appear it denotes a pseudonym.
Le Roux, G.* Professor: University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 15 November 2014.

Mabale, G. Lecturer, University of Venda, Thohoyandou, 19 October 2008.

Mabizela, D. Lecturer, University of Limpopo, Turfloop Campus, 13 October 2015.


Makhanikhe, T.J. Student Researcher: University of Venda, 08 February 2016.

Makonese, R.* Doctoral Fellow: University of Pretoria, Pretoria, 10 July 2013.

Manyaka, R.K. Lecturer, University of Limpopo, Turfloop Campus, 14 October 2015.

Maphunye, M. Researcher, Ekurhuleni Municipality, 6 November 2008.

Masindi, T. Student Researcher, University of Venda, Thohoyandou, 28 April 2010.


Molapo, R.R. Senior Lecturer, University of Venda, Thohoyandou, 19 October 2008.

Mutheiwana, L. Researcher Intern (AISA), University of Venda, Thohoyandou, 27 November 2009

Ndhambi, S. Official of South Africa’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), Luanda, 18 February 2016.

Netshifhefehhe, M. 2015. Official of the University of Limpopo’s Political Science Students Association (PSSA), Midrand, 12 August 2015.


Ramalepe, M.A. Independent Research Consultant, Polokwane, 03 December 2015.

Raphala, M.G. Student Researcher: University of Limpopo, Turfloop, 07 February 2016.

Rannenyeni, M.S. Head of Department: Tourism, Hluvuka High School (Elim), 11 January 2010.


Toure, S. Doctoral Fellow at the University of Nairobi, Nairobi, 03 December 2015.

Zitha, N. Student Researcher, University of Venda, Thohoyandou, 27 April 2010.
Annexure 2: Research Interview Guide

An Afrocentric Critique of the United States of America’s foreign policy towards Africa: The case studies of Ghana and Tanzania, 1990-2014

My name is Kgothatso B. Shai, a post-graduate student in the Department of Cultural and Political Studies at the University of Limpopo, Turffloop campus in South Africa. I am currently conducting a research on the above-mentioned topic. In view of this, I would like to invite you to share your views with me about the topic under investigation. Your views will help me to write scholarly report to be submitted in fulfilment of a Doctoral degree in International Politics. Your personalities will be kept confidential during the report writing phase of this study; unless you elect otherwise. In the same vein, your views will not be passed to third parties not involved in the study.

Please note that participation in this study is voluntary and there are no financial benefits for either the researcher or the participant to be derived from this exercise, which is solely done for academic purpose. However, your participation in this research is important as it will help to deepen and shape the current academic and policy discourse on questions surrounding the US Africa policy. The final product of this study will increase awareness on US-African affairs among students, academics and other interested parties.

If you are willing to proceed with your participation in this study, please complete this interview guide elaborately and e-mail it back to me. Should there be a need for further information about this study, the supervisor: Prof R.R. Molapo can be contacted at Email: Richard.Molapo@univen.ac.za or Tel: 015 962 8247.

With deepest respect, I thank you and hope to hear from you soon.

Yours truly,

Kgothatso B. Shai

Cell: 078 573 6357  E-mail: SKgothatso@yahoo.com
1. Personal particulars

1.1 Full names (Optional):

1.2 Nationality:

1.3 Institutional affiliation (Optional):

1.4 Designation (Optional):

2. Interview details

2.1 Date:

2.2 Place:

3. Interview questions

3.1. What are the commonalities and discords, if any of the US foreign policy and the national interests of the oil producing African states in so far as economic growth and development are concerned?

3.2. To what extent did the US influence the process of democratisation in Ghana and Tanzania?

3.3. Is it a myth or reality that Africa is a major security threat to the US? State your views.

3.4. In what ways did the end of the Cold War affect Washington’s engagement in Africa?

3.5. What are the differences and similarities between the US foreign policy in Ghana and Tanzania?

3.6. Is Barack Obama presidency illustrative of (dis)continuities of the US foreign policy towards Africa?

3.7. What do you consider to be the real motivations and the major highlights of the efficiency and effectiveness of the US policy on Africa?

3.8. Do political parties (the Republican Party and Democratic Party) have any meaningful role to play in US foreign policy making and execution? Briefly explain.

3.9. Is it justifiable for the US to re-orientate its foreign policy from Nigeria to Ghana in West Africa and Kenya to Tanzania in East Africa?

3.10. What was the effect of the end of the Cold War on the foreign policy of the US on Ghana and Tanzania?
3.11. Using Ghana and Tanzania, do you think Washington’s engagement in these countries provides an exact microscopic representation of the overall US Africa policy?
Annexure 3: Ethical Clearance Certificate

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TURFLOOP RESEARCH ETHICS
COMMITTEE CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE

MEETING: 02 September 2015
PROJECT NUMBER: TREC/131/2015: PG

PROJECT:
Title: An Afrocentric critique of the United States of America's Foreign policy towards Africa: The case studies of Ghana and Tanzania, 1950-2012
Researcher: Mr KB Shai
Supervisor: Prof RR Molapo
Co-Supervisor: Prof T Sodi
Department: Cultural & Politics
School: Social Science
Degree: PhD in International Politics

Note:
1) Should any departure be contemplated from the research procedure as approved, the researcher(s) must re-submit the protocol to the committee.
2) The budget for the research will be considered separately from the protocol. PLEASE QUOTE THE PROTOCOL NUMBER IN ALL ENQUIRIES.

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