Financial Imperatives and Constraints towards Funding the SADC Standby Force

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Abstract
Achievable and viable peace and security efforts in Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) have been limited by an over dependence on foreign and international peacekeeping. The aim of this article is to unpack financial imperatives and constraints towards funding the SADC standby force (SADCSF). Through this the article hopes to provide lessons towards a suitable and sustainable funding mechanism aimed at addressing the financial challenges confronting African standby forces in peace operations. In particular, this article focuses on the SADCSF since its establishment in 2007. This article uses information from existing statistical and research data to first, identify existing funding models in international (regional and continental) peace operation and stand-by forces across the globe. Second, using four critical analytical frames (financial viability, the nature of regionalism, fiscal sustainability and economic landscape), the article highlights various implications of a lack of funding mechanism for regional peace and security in Africa. Third, the article shows that the following are critical to find a sustainable funding mechanism for the SADCSF: the financially demanding variable geometric nature of regional integration in Africa; the proliferation of security agencies; the complex nature of terrorism and interventions; the cost of skill acquisition and training of the multidisciplinary personnel; payment of wounded soldiers and contingents and member state tight budget. Based on international experiences and local realities expounded, this article suggests lessons towards building a suitable and sustainable funding mechanism for African peace and security in general, and regional standby forces in particular.

Keywords
Africa’s regional governance, financial viability, financial sustainability, funding peace operation, peace operation, regionalism, SADCSF, United Nations

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Introduction

The twenty-first century has been rife with growing complexities in respect of terrorism, insurgency, militarism and/or warfarism. In Africa, the complexities of security issues is heightened by dysfunctional state and incongruence regional institutions, population explosion, effects of globalisation and other governance challenges. In addition to this, is the emergence of Islamists extremist militant groups (as Boko Haram in Nigeria, Al Shabaab in Somalia, Libyan Islamic Fighting Group in Libya, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis in Egypt and Ansar Dine in Mali) among others. At no other time, globally or in Africa have the need for a collective security projects become more crucial. Regional peace operations (RPO) can be understood from regional arrangements (RA) in international studies. Boutros-Ghali (1992, p. 63) in Section 61 of his 1992 agenda for peace speech in the United Nations (UN) summed up RA as, treaty-based organisations for mutual security and defence; those for general regional development or for cooperation on a particular economic topic or function; and groups created to deal with a specific political, economic or social issue of current concern. These RA types appropriate peace and security measures to conflict situations differently. According to Bures (2006, p. 85), conventional multipurpose treaty-based RAs like the European Union and the African Union (AU) by tradition approach conflict form an arbitration and mediation angle leaving traditional military peacekeeping role to the UN. Then there are the traditional military alliances like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which were aimed at external rather than intra-regional aggression and finally, organisations like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), focused on security through political cooperation and collective action.

However, international peacekeeping is a very expensive project. Funding collective security initiatives or in this case regional security projects especially in poorly resourced regions is a complex and challenging task. The challenges evolved from the complex nature of conflicts in Africa such as the intricate web of local and international interests. The other is the post-cold war shift in traditional peacekeeping—peacebuilding and peace ‘enforcement’ approaches (Sloan, 1995; Shaw, 1995). The move towards early detection and greater ‘militarisation’ of peacekeeping means that not only does peacekeeping begin early in the conflict continuum but also has to be sustained through a multilayered process addressing human suffering, peace-making (negotiations), de-escalation of conflict and when probable post-conflict peacebuilding. All these added layers (de-escalation of conflict, peacebuilding, peace-making and address human suffering in conflict areas) are imperative for peace operation but complicates the whole essence of peace operation in conflict areas. As evidenced, in peacekeeping missions across the world from Bosnia to Somalia, Western Sahara and so on, peacekeeping can last many years and will require generous financial resources for sustenance (UN, 2015a).

The aim of this article is to provide lessons towards a suitable and sustainable funding mechanism aimed at addressing the financial challenges confronting African standby forces in peace operations from a SADC standby force (SADCSF) perspective. The article is divided in three sections.
Background

The shift in international peacekeeping came with the idea of RPO muted by the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992 (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). However, the success of the NATO in Bosnia in the 1990s, spurred greater interest in regional peacekeeping as perhaps an alternative to the UNs more global effort (Dorn, 1998). Key advantages of RPO as argued by proponents are the proximity to conflict (ideal for early warning initiatives), reaction time and local understanding of conflict (a possible advantage in seeking diplomatic solutions to conflict). However, the 1990s movement towards RPO also generated counter arguments in light of unsuccessful examples of RPO around the world: Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia and Organisation of American States (OAS) in Central American peace operation (Dorn, 1998). Lessons from these experiences show possible challenges which include the play of interests within regions especially more with more powerful states, the capacity for long-term sustainability of such decentralised formations and the power perceptions which ultimately raises the question of legitimacy of these regional security projects (Bures, 2006; Dorn, 1998).

SADC Standby Force: Origins and Status

The Constitutive Act of the AU allows it to intervene in a member state in acts of grave circumstances such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity as seen in the Article 14(h) and (i) of the Act. To legitimate the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU was proposed at the Lusaka Summit in 2001 and consequently ratified in 2004 under a protocol to the Constitutive Act adopted by the AU Assembly in July 2002. The protocol establishes the APSA as an umbrella term that defines the key mechanisms of the AU in promoting peace, security and stability in the continent (Article 2 of the protocol relating to establishment of the AU PSC). The protocol defines the PSC as a collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and effective response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa (AU, 2003). The protocol establishing the PSC stipulates other responsibilities such as prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, post-conflict peace building and developing common defence policies (AU, 2003). To manage these responsibilities, the APSA comprises the decision-making structure (the PSC); a mechanism for early warning on potential security threats (the Continental Early Warning System); a multidisciplinary response capacity (the African Standby Force), a preventive diplomacy collective (the Panel of the Wise) and a mechanism for sustainable funding provision (the AU Peace Fund) (Brett, 2013; Ndaguba & Okonkwo, 2017, p. 5).

In order for the AU to deliver on its promises of timely intervention in protecting citizenry in respect of grave circumstances; to provide prompt and robust response; as well as manage and resolve disputes in Africa, the African Standby Force was introduced as part of the APSA (Ndaguba, 2016, p. 44). The ASF is envisioned to
serve as a continental rapid-response team for Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) in the continent. It is composed of multidisciplinary civilian, military and police components on standby in their countries of origin ready for quick deployment at appropriate notice (Alghali & Mbaye, 2008). It constitutes standby brigades in each of the five regions in the continent: the East African Standby Force (EASF), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Standby Force (ECOWASSF), the North African Regional Capability, the Economic Community of Central African States (FOMAC) Standby Force (FOMACSF) and the SADCSF.

Funding Peace Operation in Africa: The Big Picture

In terms of capacity, world over, PKO is very expensive to maintain (Jentzsch, 2014; UN, 2009; von Einsiedel, Malone, & Ugarte, 2015). This is because peace operation by its nature tends to be protracted and wide in scope, from humanitarian assistance to force demobilisation. Majority of UN global peacekeeping missions are centred in Africa. For instance, in 2005, 51,163 authorised UN peacekeepers were deployed to Africa in seven UN missions totalling 76 per cent of global authorised total of UN peacekeepers (Cilliers & Malan, 2005). In 2015 the PKO figures show that Africa still commands the largest deployment of UN uniformed peace operations in the world (UN, 2015a). Given the scope of UN peacekeeping in Africa, the cost of peacekeeping in Africa far outweighs that of other regions. For example, in 2015, there were 21,357 uniform and civilian personnel in Darfur and 23,438 in the Democratic Republic of Congo with approved 2015/2016 budgets of US$1,102,164,700 and US$1,332,178,600 respectively (UN, 2015a). This shows that for many reasons (security of staff and equipment, ease of movement and communication) peacekeeping in Africa is not only a perennial global concern, but also an expensive one.

It can be argued that the annual billion-dollar costs of peacekeeping in Africa is beyond the funding capacity of any African nation. The UN peacekeeping budget scale of assessment uses a scale methodology, which considers factors such as gross national income (GNI) and population of member states. This in other words is based on a country’s ability to pay. It is significant to note that even with the UN discount rates to poorer countries, none of the top fifty assessed member state contributors to the UN peacekeeping budget is African (UN, 2012). Compared to countries like Australia and China that contribute hundreds of millions, respectively, contributions of African member states are in the hundred thousand dollars range (UN, 2015b). From an African standpoint, the very high peace operation deployment needs vis-à-vis the very low peace operation budget assessment scale, puts into perspective, the difficulty in funding homegrown peace and security projects in Africa.

Experts indicate that the AU standby force will need at least one billion dollars to be operationalised (US$1billion). Perhaps the critical and universally accepted point to note is that African countries are unable to fund the venture (Nkala, 2015). As a result, according to the AU, the funding of the AU standby force will depend mostly on development partners for deployment up keep of brigades in terms
of logistics, equipment, feeding and so on while on deployment (Nkala, 2015). Significantly, funding deployments is only a part of peace operation financial obligations as are other operational areas, which make for successful and sustainable operations. These include management and running of other structures of RPO such as planning, training and maintenance of multidisciplinary personnel. The acknowledgment of these operational areas is vital to subsequent discussions in this article.

Certainly, finance remains one of the main challenges confronting pan-African initiatives in Africa (León, 2001). As African Sub-regional groupings (Regional Economic Communities or RECs) tend to be weaker than the AU (Brett, 2013, p. iii), funding the SADCSF could pose a bigger challenge than funding the African Standby Force, which also has remained largely non-operational (de Albuquerque & Wiklund, 2015). This is because RECs tend to be less resourced and advanced than the AU in operationalising APSA capabilities (León, 2001). However, the autonomy of RECs in Africa means that although the regional brigades have, like the ASF, funding limitations, it may be possible to find unique funding solutions based on regional uniqueness and strength.

This section provided background to RPO and the attendant financial considerations to keep in mind for effective functioning. However, to establish an effective funding mechanism for RPO in Africa, the conceptual and contextual conundrum of regional peacekeeping in Africa must be unpacked. In the next section, we will try to unpack this by providing an analytical basis in consideration of a funding mechanism for RPO in Africa.

**The Problem**

Given recent developments such as the leadership crises in Lesotho in 2014 and the drawn-out crisis in Democratic Republic of Congo, much like the African Standby Force, the SADCSF has failed to deploy. In the case of the Kingdom of Lesotho, it was rather South Africa that played the major role with its diplomacy in mediating the crisis, while the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) was used to protect the Prime Minister of Lesotho (AFP, 2014; Low-Vaudran, 2014). In the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo, the SADCSF did not also deploy leaving individual member states military to do so. The SANDF has been the principal peacekeeper in military deployment in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the region, with the help of the UN contingent and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (Allison, 2015; Mataboge & Pillay, 2014).

The biggest obstacle towards the operationability of the SADCSF since 2007 has been the lack of financial resources (Martins, 2009, p. 6). This has resulted in a SADCSF, which though having operational status, has lacked the fierce to engage in PKO due to shortage of finance (Cilliers, 2008; Solomon, 2015). Like the ASF, operationability and smooth functionality of the SADCSF is highly dependent on the ability of SADC to fund its activities. However, SADC runs a tight budget. The 2013/2014 budgets for the region were US$79,398 million for a
basket full of objectives including peace and security (SADC, 2015). There is no clear stated amount voted for security, which makes it difficult to clearly state the security vote for the region.

**Basis for Analysis**

The basis for this analysis has two main thrusts: first, the financial considerations for effective and sustainable funding mechanism. These are financial viability and sustainability of the arrangement. Second, constraints to sustained and effective funding of projects in Africa (see Figure 1).

**Financial Viability**

Financial viability is the ability of an agency to generate sufficient income to meet the operating cost, debts commitments, payments and where applicable to allow for growth while maintaining operations (National Regulatory System for Community Housing Directorate 2014, p. 3). It can also be seen as a complex phenomenon characterised the level of usage of fiscal and any other towards the achievement of the aims of the agency (Koleda & Oganisjana, 2015). As an economic condition, it creates prerequisites for a stable favourable income to expenditure ratio, steady reproduction process and efficient use of resources under the conditions of active influence of internal and external factors (Zhevak, 2006).

![Figure 1. Imperatives and Constraints in Funding Regional Security and Peace Operation Organisations](image-url)

**Source:** Authors’ configuration.
Ventureline collaborated with the above submission in stating that financial viability is the capability ‘of an entity to continue to achieve its operating objectives and fulfil its mission over the long term’ (Masoom, 2013, p. 224). Therefore, for the effective operations of regional projects, financial viability implies a level of financial independence in AU integration. This can only be achieved by developing funding models that may be termed homegrown.

This is reinforced by the submission of the former President of Tanzania that any strategies to halt the dependence of African nation on foreign aid must engage deeper and direct participation of the people in the development of the continent, which is also one of the reason why this study opines that for enduring peace to be achievable in Africa and possibly around the world citizen participation and engagement is paramount (Tandon, 2008). Though financial viability can be seen as the benchmark towards the Africanisation of the SADCSF, without financial sustainability the functionality will short-lived.

**Fiscal Sustainability**

Fiscal sustainability is the ability of a government agency to maintain its current spending, viability, tax and all other policies in the long run without threatening the solvency of some/all of its liabilities or expenditures (Balassone & Franco, 2000; Krejdl, 2006).

There are basically four pillars of financial sustainability: financial and strategic planning; income diversification; sound administration and finance; and own income generation (León, 2001). This all tend to give perspective to the ownership and forecast of an agency to ensure it remains sustainable in the long term. Which invariable propel an organisation to forecast or reiterate about its future and how the venture or operation will be sustained. Thereby establishing means through which it will generate the funds to ensure such operationalisation. It is also the financial operation plan of the agency in quantifying its indispensable priorities in fulfilling the mission for the establishment of the agency in addition to its ability to cover operation and fixed cost over a period of time.

For SADCSF, achieving financial sustainability is tantamount to its survival to cover its administrative cost and priorities without interminable dialogues with funder or what we will like to call partners who may disagree with percentages in intervening in peace missions in the region. However, no or fewer studies exist that examine or proffer models towards financial sustainability of security agencies in the continent.

According to León (2001) Fiscal sustainability (FS) tend to give a clear direction on the administration and prudent financial management of an agency in managing its resources and means through which funds are generated. By ensuring that procedures for administration and finances are governed by series of institutional policies that enhances accountability and transparency. Therefore, it will be wrong for the SADCSF to be dependent on donor funding.
The Logic of Regional Peace Operation

Boutros-Ghali (1992), defined peacekeeping in four stages, each representing a phase in a continuum of possible actions:

1. preventive diplomacy which was action taken to prevent disputes from arising and escalating into conflicts;
2. peacemaking which was action to bring hostile parties to agreement;
3. peacekeeping which was the deployment (with the consent of parties involved), of a UN presence in the field. It was a technique that expanded the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace; and
4. post-conflict peacebuilding was action to identify and support structures sustain peace in the long term.

Definitions of region, regionalism, regionalisation and regionness abound, each focusing on one or more predominant factors, whether geographical proximity, economic unification, political stability, cultural identity or security interdependence (Buzan & Wæver 2003; Cantori & Spiegel, 1970), all provoke the study of regional alternatives either as regionness or regionhood (Hettne and Söderbaum 2006; Van Langenhove 2003). This article sees regionalism as state-based macro-regions (three or more states), as opposed to micro-regions, or territorial areas smaller than states. Geographic proximity have been argued as the basis for regionalism as opposed to regionalisation, the former which is often seen through the prism of regionness principally for the purpose of trade, for example, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Trade Organization (WTO), which are all based on a common identity, ideology and sometimes culture (Fawcett & Gandois, 2010). Though both concepts are used loosely interchangeably, this article considers both concepts as separate, though linked. While the former refers to a process that encompasses an increase in region-based interaction and activity by state actors and non-state actors (non-state actors are usually the driving force: individual, corporate organisation and nongovernmental organisations), regionalism is simply a political project of state actors (Fawcett & Gandois, 2010).

The UN will be analysed for the purpose of proposing recommendations that will induce a partnership model for the SADCSF, based on two perspectives: political allegiance and strategic importance. The case of Syria and the genocide in Rwanda are perfect examples based on these two parameters. While the conflict in Syria has passed its fourth year little has been done or achieved by the UN peacekeepers in ensuring peace in the region due to political contestation between France, Britain and the USA against Russia and China, who vetoed the regime in power of the Syrian government. Thereby inhibiting the UN from intervening in Syria. This issue on veto given to the permanent five is seen as one of the most undemocratic principle of the UN that limits PKO of the UN (Nahory, 2004). In the case of Palestine, the abuse of the undemocratic (autocratic) political nature of
the UN resulted in refusal to recognise and declare as a sovereign state. Despite 136 of 196 member states acknowledging Palestine as a state. It is argued that these political divergences in UN decision-making amongst other issues as will be discussed subsequently, makes it difficult for weaker member state regions, to gain unparalleled support for interventions where veto state powers are invested.

However the end of the cold war in 1991 ended the blanket use of Security Council veto powers by the USA and Russia. This improved the ability of the UN to act on security important issues otherwise stifled under vetoes. Thus, demands on the UN in terms of conflict resolution and the preservation of peace increased.\(^1\) This in turn led to the expansion of the traditional role of UN peacekeeping to include humanitarian assistance, mine clearing, preventive deployment, force demobilisation and collection of weapons, and electoral monitoring (Shaw, 1995). These developments resulted in the seminal report presented by former UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali on post-cold war peacekeeping titled *Agenda for peace*. The report brought into focus the role of RPO in the global context of peace and security. Since 1992, there has been a marked increase in RPO (Bures, 2006). From this perspective therefore, it is important to understand the UN/RA peace operation relationship.

The UN Charter encourages regional peace and security arrangements geared towards local resolution of conflict and disputes. However, only the UN has the sole mandate to authorise peace operation deployments (enforcement action) in terms of the UN Charter albeit recognising that in some urgent situations that authorisation may be sought after such operations have commenced. Under article 53 of the UN charter, RPO can only take place when the UN deems it fit for its own purposes or when specially allowed by the UN. This presents two broad possibilities for RPO arrangements.

1. **Non-enforcement action**: Non-enforcement action deals with the use of diplomacy and negotiation for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and even post conflict peacebuilding.
2. **Enforcement action**: Enforcement action constitutes, deployment of peacekeeping personnel (military and civilian).

The principles governing UN/RA cooperation after the cold war in this regard are: the establishment of mechanisms for consultation; respect for the primacy of the UN; the definition of clear division of labour to avoid duplication; and the adoption of a consistent approach to common problems (Bures, 2006). In *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace* in 1995 Boutros-Ghali further elucidated on this relationship between the UN and RPO. Areas for cooperation between RA and the UN are in the areas of consultation, diplomatic support, operational support, co-deployment, and joint operations (Nahory, 2004). The UN/RA peace operation are thus spread between the non-enforcement cooperation such as consultations and diplomatic, and operational support in election monitoring for instance and enforcement cooperation in co-deployment and joint operations.
However, the practicality of this relationship has been put into question over the years with the tendency for unilateral decisions in interventions by powerful states within the region, as were the cases of the USA with the OAS, Britain with the British Commonwealth in Zimbabwe, and Nigeria with ECOWAS. The success and failure factors of non-UN sanctioned missions, are important to note especially from the point of view of the African Standby Force as these have great implications for successful funding of operations. Some examples of cold war era RPO are discussed. Non-UN sanctioned RPO efforts like the OAS military intervention in Nicaragua in 1965, which was initiated by the US and in which the UN played a very minimal role (Fortna, 1993). This was a full regional force with the US not allowing for any UN peacekeepers. It is also important to note the USA also funded in its totality this mission spending almost US$308 million on operations and follow up aid (Fortna, 1993). The OAS experience also however showed the cooperative side of UN/RA during the elections in Nicaragua between 1989 and 1990 and in Haiti in 1990. This was a good example of UN/RA consultations and co-ordination to avoid duplications of activities without a joint operation relationship (Fortna, 1993). However, the International Commission of Support and Verification (CIAV) was an example of UN/RA joint operation in post conflict demobilisation and peace building. This involved task being divided between the UN and OAS across geographical lines.

Indeed, RPO in Africa predates the adoption of the PSC Protocol establishing the African Standby Force in 2002. There have been several peace operation operations in Africa without UN mandate. Unlike the experience of the OAS, cold war era experiences of RPO without the UN in Africa has had mixed results. The British led Commonwealth intervention in Zimbabwe, and Nigeria’s role in the OAU intervention in Chad and ECOMOG in Liberia are examples. Fortna’s analysis as seen above shows that considerable success or failures of these missions were hinged on political and financial success factors. This helped move the political negotiation forward towards elections.

These examples of cold war RPO efforts present some lessons for RPO in the current milieu. First is that the UN is reluctant to fund or participant in peacekeeping efforts that it does not sanction. Second, from a RPO point of view, while there are advantages of RPO from the intimate knowledge of the situation by regional actors, this is a double-edged sword with potential to exacerbate conflict especially given long term regional political dispositions. More important and from the perspective of this article, funding operations and logistics of RPO is a risky venture especially in less resourced regions of the world. Where they have been financial successes as seen our discussions, there is external funding support (Britain in the Commonwealth Monitoring Group) and a willingness of more resourced states within the region to fund large aspects of the missions (US in OAS and Nigeria in ECOMOG). However, these also have their disadvantages as these funding countries tend to want to dictate mission strategies and outcomes. Even more important to note is that these missions are more likely to be short lived in contrast with UN missions that span the course of several years.
Types of peace operation in Africa from the UN regional peacekeeping perspectives are those UN mandated but African led missions and the UN led collaborative missions (hybrid) with African RA. However, the ASF leans more towards African led missions requiring more UN funding. The challenge is that any such UN funded mission must have a UN mandate. However, this tends to hamper timely interventions from regions close to the conflict and limits the opportunity for uniquely African solutions to African conflict. This implies that any African initiated or led missions without UN mandate will have to seek support from other external parties outside the UN.

The UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change further identified challenges in the UN/RA peace operation relationship post-Cold War era. Some of these challenges are ensuring that regional action is within the framework of the UN charter and the integration of operations, roles and responsibilities. These are problems that the UN has persistently grappled with. Nonetheless, the recommendations of the Panel present important points towards UN/RA relationship in the financing of peacekeeping in Africa.

1. Expansion and formalisation of agreements
2. Information exchange
3. Exchange and co-training of civilian and military personnel
4. Commitment to a 10-year sustained capacity building support to the AU and RECS such as SADC
5. Member State agreement for UN equipment support from UN owned sources to regional operations.

From the discussions so far, it can be argued that the logic of RPO is in the decentralisation of global peacekeeping initiative, which can help with early detection and resolution of conflict and efficient deployment. However, the question is whether the African Standby Force and its regional brigades, was designed as a reflection of this logic. This is because; despite calls for more involvement of RA in traditional peace operation areas of the UN (2000, 2004, para 271) there is a reluctance to defer to the AU on African peace and security issues. Perhaps the experiences of non-sanctioned UN peacekeeping in Africa as discussed earlier account for the reluctance. The PSC, on the other hand, argues that it has greater interests and understanding of African issues and that (especially UN mandated but African-led missions) should be eligible for UN financial support. There is evidence of a growth in AU confidence in matters of political mediation and early prevention across Africa as seen in the case of Mali (Brett, 2013, p. iii). However, operational expectations are still highly limited. As a result, the AU prefers a UN relationship that is underpinned by a shared strategic vision involving a flexible and innovative interpretation of Chapter eight of the UN Charter on regional cooperation (the hybrid mission in Darfur is seen as an example of this), and enhanced consultations between the PSC and the Security Council. This is not far-off from the cooperation sentiments as expressed by the UN.
The Nature of African Regional Governance

The political economy of Africa’s regional landscape also play a critical role in inhibiting and limiting the functionality of the SADCSF in the region, such factors which have direct or indirectly influence on financial viability and sustainability of the finances of the SADCSF include, lack of political will and commitment of member states to fund peace operation missions, according to the DFID, political will is referred to the level of determination of an individual political actor to do and say things that will produce a desired outcome, the emphases is on the political actor to do and say things that produces results (DFID, 2007), which have effects on the capacity and administrative instrument to produce the desired result.

Another unique feature of regionalism factor in Africa that inhibits the financing of the SADCSF is the number of failing and failed states. According to the 2015 Fragility Index most of the SADC member states were identified as been unable to provide socioeconomic facilities for their communities (Messner et al., 2015). However recent studies (Caruso & Schneider, 2011; Suleiman & Karim, 2015) have shown that the growing number of insurgent ‘terror group’ have emerged as a result of bad governance, non-provision of essential service, increasing trends of poverty, social exclusion and increasing number of unemployment, which are also on an alarming rate in the SADC region. The influx of migrant from other Southern African countries to South Africa is an indication of this assertion; see the Oucho studies on the relationship between migration and poverty in Southern Africa (Oucho).

The challenges of securing Africa and ensuring development of its citizens can be traced to the division of the continent for the administrative convenience by the west, consequently resulting into a completely misconceived analogy (Gibb, 2009), which Campion and Thayer (1987, p. 78) referred to as ‘arbitrary grouping of activities’. Though the essence of regionalism encompasses efforts by group of nations to integrate to enhance their political, economic, cultural, and social collaboration to improve the living standard of the citizens through mutual interaction (Chingono & Nakana, 2009; Lee, 2002). Such efforts can take on different forms: regional cooperation, market integration, and development integration. Which the AU agrees that economic integration and cooperation is the only engine through which Africa’s development could be achieved (Ginkel, Court, & Van Langenhove, 2003).

Another cause of this in-cohesiveness is the lack of finances on a regional scale as a result of the proliferation of various security institutions, programs, and budgets, which has constantly led to reviews of erstwhile programs and financing mechanisms (Jentzsch, 2014). Consequently, this proliferation of security institutions (ASF, SADC-OPSC (Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation), ECOMOG, ACIRC (African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises) to mention a few) has resulted in the shortage of funds, owing to five major blocs: ‘the inadequacy of UN reforms to overcome financing constraints; global financial meltdown; the insufficiency and unpredictability of voluntary contributions; restrain of contributor due to mixed track records of some peace operations; and the limited capacity of African regional organisations’ (Jentzsch, 2014; Sabra, 2011).
Several studies have shown that some member states of SADCSF are also members of other regional economic community (REC) (Cilliers, 2008, p. 2). That creates a burden for the region to exert loyalty from member states especially in terms of financial commitments.

The nature of Africa’s regionalism and volume of intra-trade activities is not capable of accelerating growth and development within the continent in general and SADC in particular. As a result of weak: transnational trade, poorer and fragile states, weak/poor institutions and systems, no significant production of commodities in commercial scale, higher emphasis on foreign goods, no significant manufacturing and ownership of good and services at a commercial scale in most member states. These make it difficult if not impossible for member state to ensure financial viability and sustainability within, which is made worse by the fact that most African states in general including SADC rely heavily on natural resources, which is subject to global manipulation (global market economies).

It is clear from the foregoing that it will be impossible for the SADCSF to become functional and effective based on the above discourse. Therefore, there is need to access possible models from other regional security arrangement that have remained financially viable and sustainable. On of such is the NATO.

The central idea of NATO operation is that cost lie where they fall system of NATO (NATO Handbook, 2006), which this study doubts its feasibility in the SADC context as a result of, weak institutions, fragile and failing states grappled with increasing poverty, poor member states which relies heavily on external borrowings and foreign aid to fulfil the obligation of the states, heightened by the fact that most personnel: military, police and civilian are under-trained. This method both the SADCSF and the AU cannot afford.

This in turn questions assumption the suitability of the NATO model in funding the SADCSF. In that, if the SADCSF is meant to be financed like NATO, the question then is, is the region capable of mobilising and ensuring payment of deployed soldiers on the basis of ‘cost lie where they fall system?’ Having in mind that the difficulties inhibiting the functionality of the SADCSF remains:

- inability of member states to send contingents to RPTC,
- inability to finance the five major arms (SADCSEM, PLANNELM, RTPC, MLD and MPMCC) of the SADCSF,
- dependent nature of most member states on foreign borrowings and aid and
- over-dependence on South Africa in the region.

This therefore questions the possibility of a financially sustainable regional security in a region when most member states budgets are not financially sustainable. Krejdl, Balassone and Franco argued that fiscal sustainability is the ability of an agency to maintain its current spending, viability, tax and all other policies in the long run without threatening the solvency or defaulting on all/ some of its liabilities or promised expenditures (Balassone & Franco, 2000; Krejdl, 2006). The implication for SADC member states is worrisome like it is with every other region in the continent in terms of fiscal sustainability, where most member states run their economies on deficit, borrowings and aid, intensified by weak
institutions and systems that are unable to exert tax systematically, of its citizens. Also considering the nature of governance, poverty, high rates of fragility, over-dependence of some members on foreign borrowings as a major source of financing the state budgets, in addition to the effect of colonialism and apartheid, makes it more difficult for any country to be dictated to, based on the principle of state sovereignty. While NATO ensure that every member state contribute 6 per cent of its GDP to financing the organisation such is not feasible in the continent.

More so the issue of sovereignty limits the region from exerting compliance. Rather it relies on member states to cooperate. With most member state failing to provide basic amenities to meet the MDG target, how would such country contribute towards fighting insecurity when the root causes of insecurity have been identified in recent times to be socioeconomic problems to religious perception. This is one of the reasons why this study opines that a proper and suitable funding mechanism would ensure that burden is not placed on any single member state and the sovereignty of weaker member states are not threatened/compromised in any ramification.

These analyses above have resulted in the inability of the SADCSF to fund the establishment of mechanism that ensures sustainable peace in the region. Thereby making it difficult to resolve dispute and halt conflicts from escalating and spreading.

Conclusion and Recommendations

From the discourse, it is clear that for a security agency such as the SADCSF to attain full operationability, the four analytical tool adopted in this study are key towards a financially vibrant standby force capable of deploying PKOs timeously. This article suggests the following as means towards the operationalisation of the SADCSF:

The article suggests that a UN/RA logic that allows for UN support in kind or cash for peace and security must be clearly established. Alternative means of funding the SADCSF must involve citizen engagement and private partnership. Thereby accelerating a good financial system that allows inflow and outflow of funds for the SADCSF. Curtail the proliferation of multi-regional forces. Tax companies with more than US$15 million gross profit 3 per cent, and 1 per cent for over US$5 million. Establish Peace Fund based on accrual and investment. Rethinking the demarcation of continent.

In conclusion, it is not in doubt that the region has the resources to finance a suitable and sustainable multinational force as the SADCSF adequately. However, indecision by political actors, lack of common and/or shared vision fuelled by disunity has further divided the ideal and the fear of the consequence of South Africa’s dominance in the region.

The study resolves that government must create a legitimate and effective governance structure that secures public confidence through community financing, equal justice and the rule of law, economic well-being, and the provision of essential social services; while prioritising education and health. Therefore, the
study proposes citizens’ participation and community policing, as a mechanism for a viable and sustainable operation of the SADCSF.

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**Notes**

2. Some of these recommendations were also put forward by Kofi Annan and the UN committed to a 10 support to the AU during the meeting of the World Summit in 2005.

**References**


