

**AN AFROCENTRIC CRITIQUE OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF REPUBLIC OF
CHINA TOWARDS AFRICA: CASE STUDY OF ZAMBIA, 2010-2018**

by

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Dissertation

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

in the

FACULTY OF HUMANITIES

(School of Social Sciences)

at the

UNIVERSITY OF LIMPOPO

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2020

Declaration

I, Rapanyane Makhura Benjamin, hereby declare that this dissertation: **An Afrocentric Critique of the Foreign Policy of Republic of China Towards Africa: Case Study of Zambia, 2010-2018** is the result of my original work and has never been submitted to the University of Limpopo or any other institution of higher learning. I also declare that all secondary materials used in this study have been duly acknowledged.

.....

Rapanyane MB (Mr.)

.....

Date

Acknowledgements

My sincerest gratitude and appreciation go to the support that I have received from God, the almighty and all-time father. The Bible says in the book of Proverbs 13: 4 that: **“A sluggard’s appetite is never filled, but the desires of the diligent are fully satisfied”** and also adds on the book of Colossians 3:23 that: **“Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, working for the Lord, not for human masters”**. With that being said, I would also like to extend my gratitude to the following contributors who have made meaningful contributions towards the completion of this research project.

- **A/Professor Shai, KB** - who was my research project supervisor for his all-time unshaken professional guidance. His perceptive guidance made every step of this research project easier, eye-opening possible for me to make a total completion. Equally important is his words of encouragement and patience coupled with hard work which have motivated me and made me a better critical thinker and writer.
- **Mr JPM Vunza** – who was my co-supervisor also made meaningful contributions towards the completion of this project. As such, it is a great honour to have been associated with a man of his critical merit, to have accepted me under his intellectual wing.
- **Family-** Exceptional thanks to the Rapanyane family. This includes amongst others, my brothers: Nakedi Johannes, Matome Frans and my little sister Maropeng Evelyn Rapanyane who have made all sacrifices including social and financial support. No words can describe the kind of support I received and continue to receive from my mother Semadi Doris Rapanyane who remains a continual inspiration figure. God bless you all.
- **My Friends-** Finally yet importantly, are my special gratitude’s to my friends: Florence Ramasela Sethole, Maphaka Dominic, Ngoepe Cedric Chuene, Lebogang Tiego Legodi and Thabiso Masenya for their social support, which was profound and immense and can never be forgotten.
- I also wish to record particular thanks to the Department of Centre for Academic Excellence (Reading and Writing Centre) for remaining my pillar of financial strength in all the stages of this research project.

Dedication

This research project is dedicated to my departed brother, Elias Kgalushi Rapanyane for his undaunted and stalwart academic support. *Gone too soon, your brothers are forever in commemorations.*

Abbreviations

ADBC	Agricultural Development Bank of China
AIIB	Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank
BGRIMM	Beijing General Research Institute of Mining and Metallurgy
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
BSR	Business for Social Responsibility
CCS	Chambishi Copper Smelter
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CNMC	China Nonferrous Metal Mining (Group) Company
CNMC	China Nonferrous Metal Mining (Group) Company
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
CSRwire	Corporate Social Responsibility Newswire
ELMFE	East Lusaka Multi-Facility Economic Zone
EAZ	Economic Association of Zambia
EU	European Union
FYP	Five-Year Plan
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
GEIDCO	Global Energy Internet Development Cooperation Organization”
GII	Global Innovation Index
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IMF	International Monetary Fund

IR	International Relations
KCM	Konkola Copper Mines
CLM	Luanshya Copper Mine
MoUs	memoranda of understandings
MSD	Mine Safety Department
MUZ	Mine workers Union of Zambia
MFEZ	Multi-Facility Economic Zones
MNCs	Multinational Corporations
NPC	National Party Congress
NUMAW	National Union of Mine and Allied Workers
NY	New York
NFCA	Non-Ferrous Company-Africa
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
OBOR	One Belt, One Road
PF	Patriotic Front
PLA	People's Liberations Army
PRC	People's Republic of China
PSRDP	Private Sector Reform Development Programme
SADC-FTA	SADC Free Trade Area
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SEZs	Special Economic Zones
SGCC	State Grid Corporation of China
SOE	State Owned Enterprise
TCA	Thematic Content Analysis

TREC	Turfloop Research and Ethics Committee
UNCHR	United Nations Commission on Human Rights Council
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UPND	United Party for National Development
USA	United States of America
UL	University of Limpopo
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization
ZCTU	Zambia Congress of Trade Unions
ZDA	Zambia Development Agency
ZDA	Zambia Development Authority
ZCCZ	Zambia–China Cooperation Zone
ZIC	Zambian Investment Centre
ZNBC	Zambian National Broadcasting Corporation

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Abstract

The foreign policy of the Republic of China (PRC) has been a considerable subject for debate in the past two decades. This is because China has turned its attention towards Africa, seen with the establishment of Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in the early 2000s. Another reason for this debate is found in the fact that after FOCAC's initiation, China has managed to become the largest trade partner of the African continent and the second biggest economy in the past two decades. Generally, China-Africa relations are largely a by-product of economic and political orientations. In the context of the above, this study uses a case study design to critique the foreign policy of China towards Africa. This case study design uses Zambia as a test case to critique the post-2010 Chinese foreign policy towards Africa. This is done by constructing and analysing China's Africa policy and subsequently, locating China's International relations with Zambia. To a great extent, this study imparts historical sensibility as it locates China's international relations with Zambia from as far as during the colonial period. The consideration of historicity in this study draws fundamentally from the fact that the past always provides a resonate basis for comprehending the present and the future.

In this study, the researcher advocate for the utility of Afrocentricity as a substitute theoretical framework important in apprehending China's foreign policy towards Africa. The adoption and utility of this paradigm in this study are informed highly by its ability in spotlighting and highlighting the Asian tiger (China)'s international relations with Zambia. It is believed in this study that a profound comprehension of China's Zambia policy can be realised when such interpretations and analysis are deeply found in the continental context of the African continent. Equally important are the objectives of this study which were realised, methodologically, through the use of document review.

In consideration of the case study of Zambia, It is important to highlight that China ground-roots its engagement with Zambia on several factors of which the leading are: investment, international legitimacy and market drive. To add, Zambia's stable political and economic environments continue to play a key role in the two countries' interrelations. This is so, even though some of the Chinese companies operating in Zambia are still unfamiliar with the practice of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).

Overall, the concept of CSR should be in the leading front when it comes to the operations of Chinese companies in Zambia's economic stakeholders.

Keywords: Africa, Afrocentricity, Foreign Policy, Drivers, Political Environment, Economic Environment, Corporate Social Responsibility, Zambia.

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CHAPTER ONE

Contextual Orientation of the Study

1.1. Background and Motivation of the Study

1.1.1. Background

The African continent occupies a strategic stance in the foreign policies of major powers such as the United States of America (USA), China, France, Britain, and Russia. This is because of the historical and present-day ties that the African States and these countries had and continue to have, either collectively or individually (Raphala, 2017). Therefore, this study attempts to critically explore the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China (PRC) towards Africa: the case of Zambia. This study firstly provides a historical background of the relations of China and Zambia to trace the interrelation between the two countries which is paramount crucial in foreign policy analysis. Similarly, it is the well-considered view of the current study that the nature and character of these relations are largely a by-product of China's foreign policy. This should be understood within the context that in an environment of deep unequal power relations, the powerful State tends to set the agenda while the weak State would naturally be at the receiving end. Equally, this study argues that China's engagement with Zambia should be equated, to some extent, with neo-colonialism. This is informed by several key drivers including Zambia's natural resources that are the centre of China's engagement with Zambia. Equally, supplemented by China's weaknesses in practising Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in Zambia's mineral sector. This is despite Zambia's satisfactory political and economic trends that are best suited for Chinese business operations in Zambia. The envisaged structure of the presentation of this section of the proposed study is preferred to maintain its logical flow since the study is an attempt at critiquing China's foreign policy towards Zambia.

Zambia's historical relations with China go back to the former's gaining of independence in 1964 (Lubinda & Jian, 2018: 207). In 1971, China encountered a huge foreign policy provocation as it wanted to be acknowledged to form part of the United Nations (UN). African states contributed a lot to the UN debate on Chinese admission into the UN including Zambia in the early 1970s (Leslie, 2016: 90). Since then, Zambia has been benefitting from Chinese projects including the Tanzania-

Zambia railway line, erected in the middle of 1970 and 1976 with an interest-free loan from China of about \$406 million (Leslie, 2016: 90; Mwase, 1983: 535). During Kenneth Kaunda's time in office as Zambia's president, China ensured a high presence in Zambia and both countries enjoyed peaceful relations, which were also maintained during the time of the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976 (Leslie, 2016: 91; Chan, 1992).

Frederick Chiluba succeeded Kaunda after defeating him in the country's general elections of 1991 (Shepherd, 2018). Concurrently, Chiluba sought rather develop ties with Taiwan than with China, but he reconsidered his stance after his electoral victory when he thought of how catastrophic it would be, taking into consideration the huge amount of loan Zambia was still to pay to China (Post-Newspaper, 2007). By 1997, the "Bank of China (Zambia) Ltd", a subordinate Bank of China, turned into the first Chinese monetary institution established in Africa among the Chinese firms and business entities in Zambia (BOC News, 2011). Due to this move, Chinese firms and business entities in Zambia now can utilize the currency to reduce the amount of paid commission when converting from "Zambia *Kwacha*¹ to USA dollar" (Leslie, 2016: 91). It is important to also note the nourishment of economic ties such as "Zambia–China Cooperation Zone (ZCCZ)" set up in 2007, which also became the earliest Chinese monetary and bargaining partnership situated in Africa (Alves, 2011). This was followed by the "East Lusaka Multi-Facility Economic Zone (ELMFE)" which was set up in 2009 (Zanis, 2009). Including several Chinese mining companies that have explored Zambia's mining sector since the announcement of the Chinese open-door policy in the early 1990s (Rapanyane 2020).

Equally important is the study periodization. The researcher deemed the year 2010 suitable as a starting point because of its August (2010), which marked the moment, supposedly when the Chinese economy surpassed that of Japan in size and became the second-largest in the world after the USA economy (Hosaka, 2010). The study ends in 2018, which serves as a historical period marking 17 years of the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) which pillars China's international political and

¹This is a national currency and legal tender of the Republic of Zambia, issued out by the central bank, the bank of Zambia. Its name originates from the concept of "dawn" in the Nyanja language and it subdivides into 100 100 ngwees.

economic cooperation with Africa and Summit and Seventh FOCAC ministerial conference which took place in Beijing in September (Ngwira, 2018).

1.1.2. Motivation

This study is heavily motivated by the report of *Africa Confidential* (global leading fortnightly compendium on African politics with exclusive inside information regarding several issues that have an impact on Africa) titled “bond, bills and ever bigger debts”. This report outlines how China is expected to take over some of Zambia’s strategic national assets such as ZESCO,² power utility and International airport (Leterza and Mususa, 2018). What triggered a serious study endeavour is the globally respected report’s revelations that highlighted how the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC) was already run and bankrolled by China (Waweru 2018; Rapanyane and Shai 2020). Equally, their report of Human Rights Watch (2011) has motivated the incorporation of the subject of CSR practise in Zambia’s mining sector due to the ill-treatments revealed by the global human rights watchdog practised by Chinese companies in Zambia. There was a need to seriously interrogate China’s engagement with Zambia both in the context of the findings revealed and extend the scholarly discourse to China’s neo-colonial tendencies and practises in Zambia’s mining sector. The current study drew several questions from these two reports which ground root the objectives of this study. Above all, the researcher deemed it important to conduct a study on China’s interrelation with Zambia to unpack the patterns and trends shaping China’s engagement with African countries.

1.2. Research problem

The existing body of knowledge on China’s foreign policy towards Zambia suffers from the perspectives of African scholars. It is largely anchored on state-centric theories such as Chinese perspectives, Marxism, realism and idealism and many more, which are rooted within the East-Asian and or Euro-American worldview informed by East

² This is a state-owned power company in Zambia, and it is the largest power company of the country producing about 80% of the consumed electricity in Zambia

and Western value systems of culture and experiences. This notion has produced either realist or liberal perspectives, views, and critics on the subject of this study. This situation has presented the lack of uniform understanding of China's foreign policy to a point where policy inconsistencies during the period under review can be observed. This implies that the prevailing discourses on the subject of this study fail to capture the essence of the practicalities and realities of China's international relations as expressed through the voices of the Africans. The combination of all of the above constitutes an epistemic injustice, which creates a false impression that African concepts, ideas, and theories have no place in shaping the development of International Politics scholarship and practise. One thing that this study seeks to do away with and start a scholarly debate that incorporates African way of knowing the analysis of China's Africa engagement.

1.3. Operational definition of Concepts

This study is tied up on the two concepts of Afrocentric Critique and Foreign Policy. As a result of their different roles in the study and their ensuing varying roles in the academy of International politics and their subsequent competing interpretations, this section of the study, in short, expound their interpretations in the setting of this study.

1.3.1. Foreign Policy

Gold and Pevehouse (2011: 78) define foreign policy as the master plan used by a government in its collaborations in the "international arena". Thus, in this study, foreign policy and engagement/ international relations are used interchangeably to denote a country's international collaborations in the socio-economic and political arena to preserve and protect its national captivates.

1.3.2. Afrocentric critique

An Afrocentric critique as explained by Asante (2003) is a critique that is advanced by African scholars and is based on the elements of the theory of Afrocentricity. The theory's principle analytic elements are "grounding, orientation and perspective" which makes up the analytic classifications of Afrocentricity (Modupe 2003: 62; Shai, 2016).

In disparity, the elements of mainstream political theories of realism, Marxism and idealism are dominated by Euro-American value systems (Chilisa, 2012). Despite this espoused difference, an Afrocentric critique also embraces the progressive views of these theories in International Relations (IR) (Rapanyane 2020).

1.4. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

1.4.1. Aim

This study aims to employ Afrocentricity as a contextual lens to critique China's foreign policy towards Africa looking at the case study of Zambia from 2010 to 2018.

1.4.2. Objectives

- To explore Chinese-Zambian relations within the broader analysis of China's foreign policy in Africa.
- To explain the key drivers of China's Foreign Policy towards Zambia.
- To evaluate the influence of political and economic considerations within the context of China's foreign policy towards Zambia.
- To examine Chinese mining Companies' CSR successes and failures in Zambia.
- To analyse the role of Chinese CSR in Zambia.

1.5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study assumed a qualitative research approach in the form of a document review. This assertion should be understood within the context that the current researcher was not interested in the quantification of data. Throughout all the study stages, the shape and content of this study were informed theoretically, critically, and descriptively.

1.5.1. Research design

For the study, the case study design was selected based on its ability to encompass analysis and synthesis in the case under study. The Zambian case was important in forming the current analytical framework of China's foreign policy towards Africa. Case studies are usually chosen to comprehend and explain the features within the context of the influence of a policy imitative (Goodrick, 2014). As such, this enabled the

researcher to provide an in-depth analysis of factors and patterns defining Beijing's Africa policy.

1.5.2. Data collection

The research methodology of the Afrocentric theory is better explained by both Reviere (2001) and Mkabela (2005). For this study, document review was used to assemble data using "documents appraisal of books, research reports, published articles, newspapers, political magazines, statements, policy documents and speeches" made by ministers of foreign affairs/international relations and presidents of countries under study. The idea behind this was to generate relevant secondary and primary data (Raphala, 2017: 26). The current researcher has deliberately avoided the use of interviews for data collection due to three main reasons. Firstly, China's engagement in Africa is relatively new and therefore, its foreign policy practitioners (diplomats) are hesitant to take part in critical studies of this nature. Even as and when they avail themselves, they generally do not deviate from the official positions of their government and such positions can be easily extracted from internet sources. Secondly, the Afrocentric location of this paper forced the current researcher to consider both oral and written data as equally important.

1.5.3. Sampling selection and size

Babbie (2010) defines sampling as the conditions of research that refers to all targets to which researchers pose questions and draw data from. In this study, books, articles, and academic documents were sampled. This also included official, academic, and popular literature. Approximately 160 studies were identified and analysed based on relevance (i.e. historical relations; key drivers; Corporate Social Responsibility in Zambia; Zambia's political and economic environment). The review of these documents was done until the researcher reached the saturation level.

1.5.4. Data analysis

This study employed Thematic Content Analysis (TCA) as better espoused by Anderson (2017). TCA is understood as the expressive demonstration of qualitative

data. In most instances, Microsoft word can fit well with TCAs. There are steps to follow in the application of TCA. First, an adequate TCA depicts the thematic content of other texts by pinpointing common themes in the provided texts for analysis. Second, in all TCA analysis, the researcher's epistemological position ought to be objective. Third, the researcher combines and distills from the provided texts, a list of familiar themes to give articulation to the collective voices across all texts. Fourth, each attempt is created to engage names of the themes from the actual texts to group these themes in a way that directly depicts the texts in their entirety. Fifth, while engaging in the interpretation of themes, this is mostly kept at a minimum level. Sixth, the researcher's thoughts and feelings on what the TCA themes are insignificant and therefore becomes irrelevant in this analysis. Lastly, the researcher reserves the interpretation of the meaning of these themes for a later discussion in the study report (Anderson, 2017). All the steps applied in the data analysis have worked successfully in the final analysis of the collected data. Equally, the researcher learnt that a qualitative research method in the form of document review as adopted, covers the entire process of process, from understanding the collection of data, theme allocation, philosophical understanding, theoretical interpretations to answering study questions and finalising the study.

1.5.5. Quality criteria

Credibility refers to the trustworthiness of findings in qualitative study. It is involved in ensuring that the results of the study are believable. This depends on the richness of the information gathered (Serfontein, 2006). The researcher ensured the credibility of data collected by applying data triangulation and triangulation through multiple analysts and member checks. On the other hand, dependability ensures the consistency of the study findings and also checks if they can be repeated elsewhere (Raphala, 2017). This implies that researchers using qualitative method explain in detail, the main methods of data collection, analysis and also the interpretation methods used so to ensure that the study is auditable to explain the situated conditions and for other following researchers to follow on the footsteps of the study (Raphala, 2017). This procedure was also ensured through data triangulation to enhance the dependability of the findings of this study.

Confirmability indicates the open-mindedness and non-alignment of the information to check the potential compatibility between two independent people about the relevance of the data, meaning, and accuracy (Polit & Beck, 2004). So the incorporation of scholars and trustworthy national and global leading media houses as contributors in the current study had the potential to neutralize the altitude of business that could have been encountered, as groomed through self-attentiveness and circumscribed or restricted comments of the diplomats which are meant to contribute immensely to a certain political subject.

1.6. Significance of The Study

This study contributes to the prevailing discourses on the subject of China's foreign policy in Africa, particularly as it relates to Zambia. It deepens the public debate on the subject of the study. Equally important, this study immensely contributes towards the existing body of knowledge on China's foreign policy in general. This is because an Afrocentric point of view and or views are missing in the current analysis of China's international relations with Zambia. This study offers an alternative perspective to the explanation and understanding of China's foreign policy towards Africa in general. Lastly but not least, this study serves as a stepping-stone for future studies on a more or less similar topic.

1.7. Ethical Considerations

1.7.1. Permission to conduct the study

The researcher sought first permission from the Turfloop Research and Ethics Committee (TREC) to operationalise this study in the form of ethical clearance. This was done to seek protection as the researcher is involved in research under the umbrella of the University of Limpopo (UL).

1.7.2. Avoidance of academic fraud

All the materials collected and cited in the report to be submitted as part of this study were solely used for academic purposes. An effort was also made to ensure that unless expressly stated, all the materials cited in the report to be submitted after this study was duly cited. Quotations used were also appropriately interpreted in such a way that the integrity of the original writers was protected.

1.8. CHAPTER BREAKDOWN

Chapter One: This chapter provides the background and motivation of this study, preliminary literature review, theoretical framework, the purpose of the study, research methodology encompassing: research design, sampling, data collection process, data analysis, quality criteria, the significance of the study and ethical consideration.

Chapter Two: This chapter provides a literature review and conceptual framework.

Chapter Three: This chapter explores the Chinese-Zambian relations within the broader analysis of China's foreign policy in Africa.

Chapter Four: This chapter provides the key drivers of China's foreign policy towards Zambia.

Chapter Five: This chapter provides the influence of political and economic considerations within the context of China's foreign policy towards Zambia.

Chapter Six: This chapter provides an examination of Chinese mining companies' Corporate Social Responsibility successes and failures in Zambia.

Chapter Seven: This chapter provides an analysis of the role of Chinese CSR in Zambia.

Chapter Eight: This chapter provides general conclusions.

CHAPTER 2

Literature Review and Conceptual Framework

2.1. Introduction

This section seeks to review existing literature on the subject of the relations between China and Africa, the case of Zambia. It does so by evaluating the information on foreign policy, encompassing both countries under study. Furthermore, the researcher explored the results and limitations encountered by other researchers on this subject. This preliminary literature review has helped the researcher to identify existing knowledge gaps on the subject and provide direction for the current study. The subject of China-African relations: A case of Zambia has received little attention from scholars of various disciplines, including developmental studies, Economics, History, Peace Studies, Political Science, and IR. For this study, scholarly works from the realm of IR and Political science were visited as part of the literature review. This includes the works by scholars such as Scott and Garrison (2012), Viottie and Kaupi (2010), Dlomo (2010), Edoho (2011), Mohan and Lampert (2013), Leslie (2016), Dynamic (2016), Li (2010), Lubinda and Jian (2018), Ehrbar (2013), Dunne (2004), McGowan and Nel (2006), Dunne and Schmidt (2008), Dunne (2008), Shai and Molapo (2015), Maserumule (2015, 2016), Shai (2016), Chilisa (2012), Asante (2003), Mkabela (2005), Legodi and Shai (2018) and Hoppers (2002).

Despite having sharpened this study's conceptual framework, which focuses on the concept of foreign policy and Afrocentricity, it should be highlighted that the following literature review in this study is thoroughly followed by the categories of discussions addressed below. Meaning that the researcher did not conform to the sequential list outlined above in reviewing the current literature about this study. Therefore, the organisation of this chapter follows the five discussions (conceptual framework; identifying the existing knowledge gaps on China-Africa relations and China-Zambia relations; theoretical perspectives; the role of Afrocentricity; and the differences drawn from Mainstream theories and Afrocentricity) determined better by the periodization approach method applied against the alphabetical order sequence of the authors revisited.

2.2. Conceptual Exploration

2.2.1. Foreign Policy

Foreign policy is sometimes referred to as the “foreign relations policy” or “international relations policy”. In simple terms, foreign policy involves the practise of how a country conducts its international relations and coordination matters (Shai, 2016). Some analysts and politicians often have quarrels on the utility of the concept of “foreign”, ignoring the fact that foreign policy is mainly found at the National level and it depicts itself as having nothing to do with the country’s domestic policies. Even though various explanations are given for the understanding of this concept (Rapanyane 2018; Clarke & White 1989), it remains highly significant to note that foreign policy in this study is not offered with a universally acceptable definition, therefore, doing away with the questions of semantics in the current study.

Based on Scott and Garrison (2012: 138), “international policies affect relations between or among nations, such as trade, war, educational exchanges, and disaster relief efforts and so on.” Equally important to note is that foreign policies are not the results of the subject of one person (President) who has managed to preside over a certain administration that adopted or conceived them (Scott & Garisson, 2012). That is why is often difficult to discover descriptors in foreign policy like “Jinping’s Zambia policy” and the “foreign policy of Jintao” on politics and history. Such claims can be misleading and very much untrue as foreign policy is the result of the collection of people who come together in passing the policies (Shai, 2016). The combination of this collection can include the President, Parliament, Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), and alternative concerned departments such as (Defence, Economy) (Clarke & White 1989).

The collective mentioned above plays an important role in the foreign policymaking and execution of a country, either from those of the first world or the third world. The composite of the above-mentioned people is the primary and formal drivers of foreign policymaking who are mandated to execute a country’s foreign policy in the best possible manner for a country (Viotti & Kaupi, 2010). In the meanwhile, it remains not unexpected for political science and international politics students to disorientate diplomacy, foreign policy, and international relations. This is so as all these concepts

are intrinsically linked but different (Viotti & Kaupi, 2010). In this study, diplomacy is differentiated from all of them with the focus on the cunning and practise of negotiations conducted between two or more representatives of different countries in the international political and economic systems. Thus, it is associated with the facilitation of international relations as a phenomenon and practise as antagonistic to the discipline. To further this argument, Shai (2016: 18) and Dlomo (2010: 3) add that the practise of diplomacy involves “a political instrument with which to maximise the national interest of States and to pursue foreign policy goals and objectives”. Equally important to add is that the utility of the capital letters (IR) and that of the lower case (ir) is in connection with the concerns drawn from the need to make a disparity between the academic discipline and practise of international relations.

The field of international relations as better explained by Viotti and Kauppi (2010) is concerned with much more than relations between or among states. Other actors, such as international organisations, and terrorist groups, are all part of what is often referred to as “world or global politics”. Shai (2016: 19) further believes that the definition given by both Viotti and Kaupi (2010) is correct and puts the field of international relations as one that is pastured with context enquiry. Also, Shai (2016: 19) demonstrates that this serves as the continued usage of “politics” in the context of “world politics” and “international politics” which are complementary of the international relations which “is devoid of the honest appreciation of the multi-dimension and complex character of this field”.

2.3. A critical review of knowledge gaps

2.3.1. China-Africa relations

Edoho (2011) in the article “Globalization and Marginalization of Africa: Contextualization of China-Africa Relations” uses resource curse theory to examine the relations of Africa and China by contextualising the economic engagements of China in the African continent and cross-examining the implications of the emerging economic development relations in Africa. In essence, Edoho has investigated the contributions of globalisation to Africa’s marginalisation in the world economy. As such, Edoho’s main arguments in the article are that the inter-relations of China and Africa are the results of Africa’s marginalisation scheme in the globalisation context.

Practically, Edoho implied that China is in Africa to fill the space left out by the Western States since the end of the Cold War. In this article, Edoho has shown that, by Africans embracing China, this is led fundamentally by the issues of the post-colonial dependency engagements with the Western States and colonial experiences. Edoho has further shown three pictures of China in Africa. The first one was of China in-being the progressive development partner, with stiff strategic economic interests in the African continent. The second one, as a voracious competitor, meaning that China does not intend to assist Africa to realise the real development, and it will not either promote human rights and good governance in Africa in the process of its economic venture. Edoho's observation captures the practicalities of China's main attention to Africa as being drawn by outcompeting and overtaking the West by dominating African markets. The last picture is that of the new colonizer which means that China wants to recolonise Africa.

Edoho further intercepts that more than 800 Chinese companies are operating in Africa. Alternatively, Edoho advances the argument that even though globalisation has led to the Western disengagement in Africa, the resource base remains at the heart of China-Africa relations. Thus, advancing the voraciousness view. What is most important in this article is the fact that it has shown that Chinese investment in Africa also encompasses the areas of seaports, road networks, industrial infrastructure, railroads, power generation and telecommunications. Even though Edoho's article has helped shape the direction of the undertaking of this study from the continental level, it fell short of narrating the role of globalisation in the marginalisation of African countries like Zambia in the form of case points.

Mohan and Lampert (2013) in their article "Negotiating China: Reinserting African Agency into China-Africa relations" uses win-win game theory to examine the degree of the agency of Africa in its collaboration with China. Both argue that at different phases, African countries have shaped, negotiated, and even drove engagements with China in significant ways. This article has placed its limitation on the political analysis of China-Africa collaboration and depicted how China is taken as a commanding patron with little acknowledgement of the agency of Africa. Their article has further investigated the agency of Africa with a special focus on China's investments in Angola, Ghana, and Nigeria (with Zambia highlighted a bit in Introduction). In their section of African agency reassertion, both argued that there is

a strong interest-based class element to the social and political agency in China-Africa relations. Also, both argued that in the arena of threats and opportunities raised by the entry of China in Africa, civil society response is mostly effected to protect privileges of the class African elites who play a role in letting China into Africa. Whilst at the same time, the investments of China benefits part of their favourably select elite. Mohan and Lampert also illustrated how in Angola; State elites have let Chinese companies exploit the country's oil in environments where they replaced the oil companies of the Western States. In essence, both show that Chinese companies are looking for new markets in Nigeria and Ghana with local patrons' assistance in terms of their prosperity and survival to enact African agency. Drawing heavily, from the thematic link pinched from their analysis, it became understandable that African countries indeed play a significant role in their engagements with China. As such, countries like Angola, Nigeria and Ghana as depicting and/rather representing Africa in their study does not in anyhow means that their engagements are the same as those like in Zambia. Principally, Zambia has been identified as a special case as it is was understood as a possible victim of Chinese nefarious fangs in Africa. Thus, their limitations to Angola, Ghana and Nigeria have made their study to have limitations when it comes to the current study.

2.3.2. China-Zambia relations (2010-2018)

Leslie (2016) wrote an article titled "Zambia and China: Workers' Protest, Civil Society and the Role of Opposition Politics in Elevating State Engagement". In the paper, Leslie scrutinizes the contributions of opposition politics and civic protests in transforming the advanced interrelations of China and Zambia at the top government leadership and working-class levels utilizing a Protest theory. This paper broadly outlines several riot scenes in Zambia and shows that these riot scenes happened in the mines controlled by the Chinese businesspeople. It shows that most of the workers who were engaged in these riots for better working conditions and salaries were dismissed. Leslie's views in this paper are significant as they depict a pictorial status of Zambia regarding its mining industry within the context of its engagement with China's Multinational Corporations (MNCs). As significant as it is to the current study, Leslie's paper did not provide a follow up on the Chinese application of Corporate Responsibility in Zambia. The paper narrows the issue of CSR and does not fully

address it as well as to the extent that economic and political considerations influence China's foreign policy.

Dynamic (2015) wrote an article titled "What lies ahead for China-Zambia relations". In the article, Dynamic touches on the relations between China and Zambia. Dynamic uses a zero-sum theory to fully analyse the paper. Dynamic's article reveals that China's engagement with Zambia, similar to her engagement with other African countries, is driven by the principles of "sincerity, friendship and equality, mutual benefit, reciprocity, common prosperity, mutual support and close coordination between both countries". His article also highlights that by the year 2013, China's Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) stock in Zambia was at US\$2.2 billion compared to that of 2003 which stood at US\$144 million. Perhaps it should be highlighted as well that this article challenges the view brought forward by China that it practises economic win-win relationship with Zambia. His article also challenges the notion that China's engagement with Zambia is a brand-new strategic collaboration in the interest of the people of Zambia. From the article's critical analysis, it is conclusive that Dynamic was solely centralized on the imperfections of China's mining corporates in Zambia's mining industry which is importantly raising questions driving the current study. Dynamic's article was not side-lined but minor weaknesses are stemming from the article concerning the current one. This should be understood in the context that Dynamic sidelined the key drivers of China's foreign policy towards Zambia as well as the two countries' historical interrelations.

Li (2010) in Occasional Paper No 62 titled "The Myth and Reality of Chinese Investors: A Case Study of Chinese Investment in Zambia's Copper Industry", made a fairly satisfying contribution to the current study on the subject of Chinese relations with Zambia. Li's study is too divergent from the current study but thematically linked, although variables differ. This study highlights the clarification surrounding the folktales and realities of China's investment in the copper belt industry of Zambia. This study analyses the implications of China's investment and the activities of some of China's mining companies in Zambia especially those with endowments in the copper belt industry. In this study, Li does not pay attention to the key drivers of China's foreign

policy towards African countries. Perhaps it should be highlighted that this study has benefited enormously from Li's study as it reflects on Chinese companies and their CSR agenda in Zambia but leaves out Chinese mining companies' CSR's successes and failures from a broader comprehension.

Close to the gist of this study is Lubinda and Jian's (2018) paper titled "China-Zambia economic relations: current developments, challenges and prospects for regional integrations". This paper analyses the latter using Win-win game theory. This paper outlines the broader historicity of China's engagement with Zambia. This paper argues that China has always enjoyed friendly relations with Zambia as China chose Zambia to be its Chinese-African policy experimental country in the region. This paper also indicates that China's project of investments in Zambia is highly in the mining sector. The researcher's understanding of Lubinda and Jian's analysis must be understood in the context that their paper analyses Sino-Zambia relationship and how this relationship manifests itself in investments. Their analysis shows that although China and Zambia had strong geopolitical and strategic relations over the decades, the establishment of FOCAC in 2000 deepened this. Their study contributes immensely to the present study in the sense that they both give a short-summarised history of both countries and some aspects shaping both countries' geo-political and strategic relations. However, their paper does not address China's economic and political considerations or expectations in Zambia. It also falls short of addressing the natural resources in their entirety, which Chinese companies are exploiting or digging up in Zambia and also the role of Chinese CSR in Zambia. All of the above-identified knowledge gaps in the literature available are addressed in this study from an Afrocentric perspective.

2.4. Theoretical perspectives

Much of international relations literature is enlightened by the three dominant international relations theories namely: Marxism, Realism, and Idealism. Truly, these three theories have been very much helpful in the examination and behaviour of States, individuals, and other actors in the international system. Also, they have also been used in the analysis of foreign policy and they cannot be easily overlooked as their usefulness is also documented. Thus, it remains highly beyond the bounds of

possibility to counter check which one is more significant and highly valued than the other. Marxism which also deals with economic nationalism remains a dependable analytically in the school of social sciences, but it is averted that this school of thought has been overtaken by realism. The foregoing sentiments simply mean that the belief that “Karl Marx had followed realist principles way before critical realism gained the required recognition of a theory within the academic circles” may be true (Ehrbar, 2013).

However, Milan (1992) together with Rapanyane and Maphaka (2019) agree that Marxism cannot in anyhow be considered for study that is Afrocentric. The sentiment alleged above disparages the utility of Marxism as a conceptualised theory that is European dominated, and as such, cannot be used, as it does not consider the ground conditions of the Africans in Africa and elsewhere (Rapanyane & Maphaka, 2019). Thus, in disputing and dissolving the universalisation of these theories’ principles in the discussion of Afrocentric phenomenon, Dunn (2004: 149) has in a way that leaves no doubt postulated that “African experiences indicate a far more complicated picture of current international relations”. Put differently, any African study on the IR scholarship should benefit from the perspectives of African evidence (Dunn, 2004).

2.4.1. Realism

As a theory which is different from Afrocentricity, Realism champions the following propositions:

The international system is anarchic. Sovereign states are the principal actors in the international system; States are rational actors acting in their national interests; The overriding goal of each state is its security and survival and State survival is guaranteed best by power, principally military (McGowan & Nel, 2006: 26-30).

Historically, realism has been shaped with three categories of historical significance: classical realism as advanced by the likes of Hans Morgenthau (Renowned IR Scholar) and others. Structural realism as advanced by Waltz and Rousseau and Neo-Classical realism as championed by Zakaria (Dunne & Schmidt, 2008: 96). Throughout the development of this theory, the fundamental key principles have been survival and

self-help as well as statism which have trademarked all the features of this theory (Dunne & Schmidt, 2008)

2.4.2. Idealism

Dissimilar to realism, Idealism is also another dominant international relations theory that preaches the project values of liberty, order, tolerance, and justice in international relations (Dunn, 2008: 111). The proponents of idealism preach that:

Absolute gains can be made through cooperation and interdependence, thus peace can be achieved; The international system presents plenty of opportunities for cooperation and broader notions of power; State preferences, rather than state capabilities are the primary determinants of state behaviour; and; Interaction between states is not limited to political (high politics), but also economic (low politics) (McGowan & Nel, 2006: 30-33).

2.5. Role of the theory: Afrocentricity

The IR theories of idealism and realism have been over-abused in the field as compared to Afrocentricity, an emerging theory (Shai & Molapo, 2015). As such, the researcher in this study has adopted the utility of Afrocentricity as the alternative theory, but also managed to present realism and idealism as popular theories of IR (Rapanyane 2018). Therefore, in the aftermath of receiving more scrutiny in other areas of psychology, media studies, economics etc., the researcher has deemed its application in this study relevant to afford it a conducive place in foreign policy analysis especially in the area of China's Foreign Policy towards Africa (Rapanyane & Shai 2019). To realise this, the researcher has drawn significantly from the literary contributions of the existing body of knowledge to deconstruct the current political discourse on China's Africa Policy and to foster an alternative view on this subject.

The scientific relevance of the adoption and application of Afrocentricity in analysing this subject is a highly contested social phenomenon. Lest it not be forgotten that there is no theory that is perfect and applicable to all (Maserumule, 2016). As such, its application in this study furnishes scholars with a new picture of China's Africa Policy

as compared to the literature that is dominated by Euro-American theories (Asante, 2003; Maserumule, 2016). Of also greater significance are Chilisa's (2012: 24) views that "no society can develop by inventing everything on its own. When something is found effective and useful, that should be should be adapted and assimilated, whether it be an artefact or an attitude of mind". In the same context, the views of Modupe (2003) drawn heavily from the works of Asante in conceptualising and explaining the three elements of Afrocentricity were relevant as they interpret the analytic elements of this theory:

Grounding which is the process of learning that is centred on the Africans, their, history, culture, and continent. Orientation is having and pursuing an intellectual interest in the African and the formation of a psychological identity direction, based upon that interest, in the direction toward Africa. Perspective denotes self-awareness of viewing and affecting the world in a manner that prioritise the African interests and which is suggestive of the quality, kind and amount of the above mentioned two elements (2003: 62: 63).

Surfacing heavily from the above, it became a necessity to defend the utility of the adoption of the theory's elements in this study. As most of the academic literature on this subject has been analysed using Euro-American knowledge systems of knowing; which have been previously dispensed as applicable universally (Maserumule, 2015; Mkabela, 2005, Owusu-Ansah and Mji, 2013). This procedure has undermined the indigenous knowledge systems of Africans in the development of international relations as both academic and practise discipline (Maserumule, 2015). It is in this context that the current study has used the theory of Afrocentricity to undo the epistemic injustice that has been long practised by un-silencing the muted voices of Afrocentric academics (Legodi and Shai, 2018). For this reason, the consolidation of the world and theoretical views can yield out social materiality, which is respectful and cognisant of the transdisciplinarity, interdisciplinarity and diversity of the world and theoretical views (Hoppers, 2002; Shai, 2016).

2.6. Drawn disparities between Afrocentricity, Realism, and Idealism

To wrap the entire discussion, Afrocentricity in this study was applied to restructure the setting of reference to make certain that Africans, their ideals, history and culture dominate the synthesis, analysis and critique and also corrections observed in this field for decolonization purposes in South Africa's institutions of higher learning (Rapanyane, 2019). The acknowledgement of the expression invoked above simply means that, even though it is not yet an ideology, it is indeed applied as a theoretical framework in this study and also a guiding instrument to analyse China-Africa relations using the case of Zambia (Rapanyane & Shai, 2019). Equally important, this study did not deviate from the utility of the mainstream political theories (realism and idealism) in international relations as it only sought to show the difference that exists between these theories and Afrocentricity (Shai, 2016). Besides, Afrocentricity stood its ground in this study amongst the existing ideologies and dominant theories to produce the truth that may not be true to the alternative theories and/ ideologies (Asante, 2003: 56).

2.7. Conclusion

From the above analysis, it is conclusive that China's arrival in Africa is not a brand-new discussion. Thus, China's engagement with Africa goes back to the early 1950s. This collaboration with Africa which is mostly seen at the multilateral level continues to be a significant part of the Sino-Africa relations up to this day. After the period of the early 2000s, FOCAC has since taken over to drive these relations and remains the engine of Sino-Zambian relations which dates to the past 5 decades. Equally important, this chapter has outlined the historical developments of China's engagement with Zambia by outlining the significant historical phases which shaped these relations of which the contemporary is driven by FOCAC. This chapter has also placed attention on critiquing the studies which were conducted between the years 2010-2018 to draw the existing knowledge gaps. This was done to make a direction for the current study and show that the researcher has reviewed the current relevant literature about this study and drew heavily from these progressive views. The subject of theoretical contribution as a highlight in this chapter shows that the utility of Afrocentricity in this study is informed by the need to afford Afrocentricity a place in

the analysis of international relations, subject of China-Africa relations. in this chapter, the researcher has made an extensive critical review and/ or discussion of the theories of realism and idealism to draw the difference between them and Afrocentricity.

The next chapter gives an analysis of China-Zambia relations within a broader analysis of China's Foreign Policy towards Africa. In essence, this chapter explores China's engagement with Zambia within the context of its foreign policy in Africa.

CHAPTER THREE

Exploration of Chinese-Zambian Relations Within the Broader Analysis of China's Foreign Policy in Africa

3.1. Introduction

In this chapter, the researcher explores Chinese-Zambia relations within a broader analysis of China's foreign policy towards Africa. In context, the central attention was paid to a critical exploration of China's historical engagement with Zambia. Thus, a discussion of this historical engagement was limited into three phases. One other significant aspect of the discussion espoused in this chapter is an exploration of China's Africa policy in general. Also, the researcher analyses the pillars of China's Foreign Policy towards Africa as highlighted by China's Africa policy white papers of 1982, 1996 and 2006. Equally important is the discussion of the two policies of the open door and the latest which is the BRI initiative to show how China engages with Africa, particularly as it relates to Zambia.

3.2. China-Zambia Relations

The relations between China and Zambia goes back as far as before Zambia even gained its political emancipation from the United Kingdom (UK) in the early 1960s. Practically, China had interacted with Zambia before this period, apparently when it was still called the Northern Rhodesia (Rapanyane 2020). In most cases, the Asian tiger is seen as a country that was the prominent supporter of the political independence of Zambia during the African country's struggle for independence. There is no gainsaying that indeed China supported Zambia by material and financial means. Qiang (2007) has argued that the Asian tiger's international relation with Zambia is mostly subdivided into three prominent phases "1949-1979: 1979-1999 and 1999-contemporary times". Based on Qiang (2007), the first phase is mostly characterised by the issues which had to do with Zambia's fight for political independence from the UK. Concurrently, this was when China sought to cultivate its political relations with Zambia. Likewise, after the African country gained political independence in 1964, the Asian tiger started flooding Zambia with her aid assistance for infrastructural development. The fundamental drive behind this was to ensure that Zambia develops modern transportation networks so that it can develop economically.

Otherwise, also assist in the struggle for fighting colonialism in the Southern African Development Region (SADC) from imperialists.

This was also the period, particularly when the African country was still heavily dependent on the South-Sea for trade purposes, of which by the time was still under the total command of the South African apartheid regime (Mwanawina, 2008). For Zambia to break away from this sea dependency for transportation links, it sought rather develop ties with Tanzania to start making aid plans which will help both the countries in erecting their transportation inter-linkage or network. They started first with seeking financial aid from Western States (including USA, UK, and Canada etc.) and were not lucky (DFA, 2000). They then resorted to China in the East when Julius Nyerere (former Tanzanian President) visited China in the year 1965 to engage on financial aid talks to build a long rail-line which would stretch from Zambia to Tanzania. Though China did not start by agreeing at first side, this deal was finalised when Kenneth Kaunda (Former Zambian President) endorsed this aid assistance in his 1967 special visit to China (DFA, 2000).

Accordingly, the deal was finalised in 1967 after China agreed to begin with constructions plans after the three States, In Beijing, signed the “Agreement of the Government of the PRC, the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Government of the Republic of Zambia on the Construction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway” (DFA, 2000). This project was soon renounced the TAZARA ³ project and was started in the year 1970, to be only totally completed in the year 1976. By the look of recent Chinese developments in Africa, this project is considered as the largest of the projects of China in the African continent. This project is also coined the first phase, as it has been the one in which China sought, by all means, to assist the countries of Africa in their fight against colonialism, through infrastructural development and political support (Qiang, 2007).

The second phase as broadened was characterised by several important developments as both the African countries and China have moved attention away from political freedom to now economic and political modifications. One of the

³ is a bi-national railway linking the Southern Africa Regional transport network to Eastern Africa's seaport of Dar es Salaam, offering both freight and passenger transportation services between and within Tanzania and Zambia.

fundamental case points of the second phase was when Zambia experienced challenges when it comes to the economic stagnation of the early 1980s. This was as a result of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) incurred huge loans and also the coppers' hit hard low prices in the London Metal Exchange. Practically, this was also the supposed period when Zambia was going through a change in its political system to embrace multi-party democracy in the early 1990s. Not only Zambia but also China was undergoing economic and social ills which were as the result of the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" (1966-1976) led fundamentally by the reforms of capitalism brought by Deng Xiaoping (Former Chinese leader) which were highly prominent by then (Mwanawina, 2008: 1).

As important as it is to highlight the above mentioned, this was also a period when China embarked on its policy of "Going global/out"⁴ which caught African countries by a surprise when it became official in the early 1990s under the theme of the 'champions of free trade' (Mubita, 2013). The time in context contributed to some political and economic transformations as China now moved its attention from Africa's infrastructural and political concerns. To only now engage herself in activities that would pursue global economic opportunities. The most important deliberation to draw here is that, though this was the case, China's international relations with Zambia became signified less by little economic engagement in the early 1990s, although diplomatically impressive (Mubita, 2013). In this context, this period can be said to have brought a time supposedly when China and Zambia now moved to prioritise economic win-win. The last phase is the one from 1999 to the recent period which is highly poised to intensify the cultivation of the maintenance of economic development and economic win-win by Zambia and China.

In context, the current phase can be illustrated or analysed as the one in which both China and Zambia are extensively engaged in attempts to do away with huge unemployment rates record in the latter, by doing all means to increase international investment and also promote the peace in the SADC region. To discuss this phase without highlighting the role played by FOCAC would be a significant academic misdirection as it is the one engine of the current Chinese-Africa relations (Mubita,

⁴ was an effort initiated in 1990s by the Chinese government to promote Chinese investments abroad

2013). Accordingly, China now works, by all means, to better the economic performance of Zambia so that it can become a better Chinese partner in the international arena. This is because the African country's potential is found in its membership of the SADC and the "Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA)" (Mubita, 2013: 5). Bearing this in mind, it is also significant to allude that China has also invested in Zambia significantly with the records showing that China is growing economically into a significant worldwide economic hub, even though current acknowledgement should be given to western States for still being in charge of the world economy (Lubinda & Jian, 2018). Within the context of FOCAC, China has managed to influence African countries to consider the latter as the sole engine of the two's international relations and as such, it has also been a platform where both Africa and China had been able to discuss significant integrated principles of economic win-win, complementary trust, political equality, and cultural exchange partnership (Dynamic, 2015; Naidu, 2007). Even though these are principal pillars governing China and Africa relations, it is important to note that, even FOCAC is revised periodically to ensure that China increases her economic investments in Africa, particularly as it relates to countries such as Zambia with no deviation (Naidu, 2007).

An equal significant hand was extended in this study to broaden the discussion of integrated principles in the context of this chapter. As such, it became inevitable that although indeed China and Zambia relations are based on the above-highlighted pillars of which Mwanawina (2008: 2) maintains are in simple terms "political equality, mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchange" and continues to indicate that these pillars are well outlined in the Africa policy *white paper* of 2006⁵. Drawing from the latter and a quick review of Mwanawina's (2008) study, it became important to demonstrate that these pillars are also indicated in the "One China Policy" as discussed further by Lubinda and Jian (2018: 208). As already highlighted, the policy blueprint of the early 1990s proposed by China of Going global also had the motive of ensuring that Africa becomes an important policy reserve continent. Even though her 2006 Africa Policy paper seems to be having a lot of gaps in the discussion of the latter, the most important aspect to draw from the entire analysis is that this Going out policy blueprint became the overseer strategy of the Asian tiger's all

⁵ For more information on this white paper, see China Report (2007)

international relations in terms of economic development (Mwanawina, 2008: 23). Dynamic (2015) argues that some of the fundamental tenets of this Going out policy which was proposed back then still exists even in the post-2010 period.

Whilst the context of the current study moves us away from the events which happened from 2010, the researcher has deliberated the significance of the discussion of the BRI which is China-lodged, in the period post-2010 to strengthen the capacity of Chinese-Africa/Zambia international relations (Xhinua News Agency, 2019; Economist, 2019). Simuyemba Matthews (Chairperson of Economic Association of Zambia [EAZ]) for the Copper-Belt Province Division has stated that BRI in Zambia stands to enormously benefit the people of Zambia through infrastructural development especially in the area of roads and communications lines (Economist, 2019). By indicating this, He further outlined that the African country still needed speedy plans in developing its economy across the field of exportation of goods, including in the intra-African deals and beyond to develop an effective foundation for economic growth. Provided the latter, Simuyemba further stated that he believed that, although is a landlocked country (Zambia), the African country ought to nourish its economic ties with China to increase the extensive trade that was started by its former president Kaunda during the times of the building of the TAZARA railway project during the early 1970s (Economist, 2019). In the same context, this is the same project which continues to benefit immensely from China every year as it is fortified by Xi Jinping (Current Chinese President) (Breuer, 2017). Having discussed the above historical relations of China with Zambia, it was also deemed important on the same account to extend this discussion to the context of a broader analysis of China's foreign policy in Africa.

3.3. China's Foreign Policy in Africa

China's Africa policy in actual sense dates back to the previous five decades as indicated earlier in the study. During this time, China has managed to grow its economy immensely with extended policy changes on its encounter with Africa (Chief Economist Complex, 2010). In this study, the researcher has acknowledged that China's policy changed to range from diplomacy to information and economics leading to the Asian tiger to gaining strong ground in Africa. In context, one could argue that

to understand a complete narrative around China's Africa policy, it is important to centralise this analysis around China's economic motives in Africa (Rapanyane and Shai 2020). The foregoing in simple terms means that academics ought to signify the historical means of economic terms of reference, more particularly as she relates with the African continent. As already indicated, China's economic foot on the continent dates back before the 1950s (Chief Economic Complex, 2010: 15). In actual sense, whatever these relations were based upon back there, has been increased to now encompass trade, investment and financials including economic aid specifically for Africa's extensive infrastructural gains.

Equally important to note is that China's fangs in Africa often disturb her western counterparts in Africa and within the African States. This is so because it has become quite clear that China now is the leading African partner and investor as per the study conducted by IMF in 2008 which is followed by the EU and the USA (Wang & Bio Tchane, 2008). In another study conducted by the IMF in 2010, it was alternatively revealed that Africa's trade with western countries had decreased immensely (Chief Economist Complex, 2010). The practicality of the latter means that China-Africa's increment/ rocketed exports had led to this. Thus, the negative trade figures as provided by the IMF depicts an invariable drift which is problematic when it comes to Africa's imports from the Western States. The credit hence is given to Africa's increased trade partnership with China (The Economist, 2011). Drawing heavily from this, one could argue that the current economic developments in China are as a result of the Chinese international relations with the likes of Africa and Europe.

3.3.1. Pillars and/ Integrated Principles of China's Foreign Policy towards Africa

The above discussion has highlighted China's engagement with Zambia and Africa. As such, the deviation of the discussion towards China-Africa engagement has motivated the researcher to explore the pillars which guide China's international engagement with Africa as a continent (Dynamic, 2015). In context, this study has taken into consideration the Chinese Africa policy *white paper*⁶ of 2006 which interjects: mutual support, companionship and fairness, trustworthiness, trade-off, correlative welfare, continual habitual influence and interactive subsistence as the

⁶ This is an authoritative report or guide that informs readers concisely about a complex issue and presents the issuing body's philosophy on the matter. It is meant to help readers understand an issue, solve a problem, or make a decision.

guiders of the Chinese Africa policy. Just as highlighted earlier on in this chapter by Dynamic (2015), these are pillars which continue to drive China and Africa. Dynamic (2015) further alludes that in 2015 in line with the context of this study, China still placed a huge priority on the above mentioned. Though by then, added clear support for mutual integrity, strategic collaboration and interactive benefit as amongst the principal tenets of the foreign policy of China towards Africa.

To endorse the analysis espoused in this study, both the studies of Barton (2014:3) and Strauss (2009) show that most of the investments of China in Africa dated back to the 1978 “Open Door Policy”⁷. In their studies, they couple this with the emerging economic win-win collaboration of 1982, Africa *white paper* policy (1996)⁸ together with the Chinese *white paper* policy on Africa of 2006. All these earlier policy initiatives of China are attested to have pushed the agenda of ensuring that Africa and China “treat each other as equals, develop sincere friendship, strengthen solidarity and cooperation, and seek common development” (Barton, 2014: 3). To move away from the latest 2006 Chinese Africa *white paper* policy, this study now is found on the BRI objectives which now are pillaring China’s international relations with Africa in general terms (Phiri, 2018). As of recently, BRI has been interpreted as the biggest investment and infrastructural policy initiative in the history of the entire world. As it stands, BRI is the policy which has been formed to ensure that China interacts globally with the likes of Europe, Africa and Asia through infrastructural gap and expansion of the latter’s economic developments (Phiri, 2018).

In context, BRI was announced by Xi as a policy that would be the premise of Chinese-Africa relations and also one that would embrace principally, the development of Africa’s telecommunications, sea, railways, air travels together road and maritime travel to unfasten infrastructural buildout (Mwamba, 2018). Principally, there are certain countries which are the beneficiaries of this initiative, although Zambia is not mentioned but stands to benefit too. In the discussion of policies, BRI should not be seen as foreign initiative compared to the earlier 1996 and 2006 *white paper* policies on Africa by China (Lubinda & Jian, 2018). This is because of the huge amounts of economic aid in the forms of loans and extensive investments promised to Africa by

⁷ This refers to the new policy announced by Deng Xiaoping in December 1978 to open the door to foreign businesses that wanted to set up in china

⁸ For more information on this white paper, see Payne and Cassandra (1998)

China, which also tends to promise free trade bargains with Africa within the context of FOCAC. Simply put, free-market access which is poised to be the significant underlying factor having to do with resource engagement, interpreted with a narrative that the Asian tiger only seeks to access Africa's abundance of mineral resources (Lubinda & Jian, 2018).

3.3.2. From the Going Out Policy to the BRI initiative

From the Going out policy which was characterised by Chinese businesses flooding the global markets to now BRI (2013- present time). A policy initiative which is advocated principally by Xi who also coined this "One Belt, One Road" (OBOR) in the year 2013. In context, OBOR seems to be a policy that is also focused on the economic belt which extends from China across Europe, Africa and Central Asia in the form of the seafaring well-off long road. This long road initiative connects China to Southern Europe *via* the Suez Canal.⁹ Of which also incorporates East Africa and Southeast Asia (Tow, 2017). OBOR intends to connect Asia, Africa, and Europe with China through the use of ports, railways, pipelines and intends to form custom cooperations to promote well off-trade (Breuer, 2017). When interpreted broadly, OBOR also extends a hand in the interchange and collaboration in the areas of resources, sciences, tourism, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and environmental protections. All business deals which fall within the framework of OBOR are principally financed by the Export-Import Bank of China (China Exim Bank) or the governmental financial initiatives such as the Chinese "treat each other as equals, develop sincere friendship, strengthen solidarity and cooperation, and seek common development" (Barton, 2014: 3). By the same vein, about 80 States from South America, Europe, Africa, Asia and the Arab region members the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) and this team can raise approximately "100 billion USD" for this long road annually (Breuer, 2017: 7).

It was later in the year 2017 that BRI was officially embraced under the constitution of the 19th National Party Congress (NPC) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as part and parcel of the motivation to realise the "shared growth through discussion and collaboration" (Wo-lap, 2016). With this in mind, it became inevitable that Xi assumed

⁹ This is a sea-level waterway in Egypt, connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea through the Isthmus of Suez

his second term in the presidential office with a policy of his initiative that sought to cultivate China's global engagements, by promoting a strong economic strategy that had been also endorsed by China's leadership (Balding, 2017). As already explained, BRI is a policy that accommodates about 80 Global States with a prolonged investment loan of about \$8 trillion for developing the world's energy, transportation and telecommunication networks (Wo-lap, 2016; Hurley, Morris & Portelance, 2018:1).

BRI is also a policy that deals fundamentally with foreign policy, important security matters and economic motives for the Chinese government. In correspondence, the foreign/ policy banks of China such as the likes of "China Development Bank (CDB), China Exim Bank, and the Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC)" share a considerable hand in financing this deal (CPEC, 2017). The latter assertion cannot be overlooked as though China does not share its trans-border projects' figures as she remains explicit. But the figures of investment as highlighted from time to time show that there are periodic projections which are calculated at the national level for the sole purpose of checking BRI's success, although these statistics are not revealed or divulged intermediary (CPEC, 2017).

The foregoing has become a norm even though the Chinese policy commercial banks do depict figures of BRI investments, but such does not happen from time to time and their specific financial figures are not issued out (Hurlet et al., 2018: 8). In the final analysis, the contemporary period under study shows that Chinese-AU relations have signified infrastructural growth immensely. To support this statement, Li Keping (Chinese premier) in 2014 has stated that China intends to support the dream postulated by Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma (Former Chairperson of the AU Commission) of linking all African countries by the use of speedy railways in her speech to the AU in January 2014 (Kepiang, 2014). Not long after this assertion was the "memoranda of understanding (MoUs)" signed between China and Africa of building a "cross-continental infrastructure development" and a "whistle-stop train network" which remains a fundamental objective of the AU's 2063 agenda.

Then in 2017 during the Forum of BRI which took place in China, the 'State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC)' through the "Global Energy Internet Development Cooperation Organisation" (GEIDCO) supported a MoUs on energy collaboration with the AU continent (Breuer, 2017: 2). The endorsement of the latter has in all times

shown that OBOR now plays an important role in the analysis of the foreign policy of China towards Africa, although the pillars have never really changed but were transformed over time to incorporate new realities. Bearing this in mind, the researcher had acknowledged that in most of the times, particularly in the Chinese-Africa relations, the latter seldom experiences no-trade luck as raw materials trade terms often become unsympathetic to Africa when they turn volatile and unfair as Africa engages with the big power. Despite the trade unluckiness attributed to the volatility of the terms of trade led fundamentally by the unequal power relations, Africa still forms part and parcel of the BRI initiative which was developed to cultivate trade between Africa and China in context by the use of infrastructural loans for infrastructural development (Longwe, Chinang & Chipenzi, 2018).

3.4 Conclusion

In the discussion of China-Zambia relations, the three phases of 1949-1979, 1979-1999 and 1999- present times are important because they narrow the significant events, central to both countries' socio-political and economic relations. Thus, when scholars discuss China's foreign policy, it is important to discuss it at a continental level as China makes multilateral agreements with Africa. This is not to say that it does not engage with individual countries on different agreements, but its policies of the open door and the BRI are targeted at the continents (Africa, Europe, America, and Asia). In this chapter, the researcher has explored the fundamental pillars of China's Africa policy and also the two policies of the open door and the latest BRI initiative to illustrate how China has engaged with Africa and Zambia in the last 5 decades, since the arrival of the Asian tiger in Africa.

The ensuing chapter deliberates on the key drivers of China's foreign policy towards Zambia. The fundamental objective driving this following chapter is to unpack the realities and myths surrounding Chinese involvement in Zambia. This is done to make a broader understanding of the continental and national interests of China in Africa as it relates to Zambia.

CHAPTER FOUR

Key Drivers of China's Foreign Policy Towards Zambia

4.1 Introduction

Key drivers of China's Zambia engagement are explored in this chapter as they received little attention as of lately in the scholarly discourse. This emerging scholarly discourse on this nature does not pay too much attention to the incorporation of BRI in all these discussions which can be said to be the contemporary foreign policy engine of China-Africa relations. Agreeably, this chapter explores the drivers of China's Zambia engagement to extend the analysis in outlining what are some of the key features of China's Africa policy on a broader perspective. As an African country that is found in the Southern part of the continent, Zambia is presumed to be the next African country that is going to fall a victim of the Asian tiger's economic nefarious fangs on the continent (Rapanyane and Shai 2020). The researcher drew from the recent academic/ scholarly discourse prevailing in the continent which places much attention of whether this African country will indeed become China's first causality in Africa. Although practically possible, it is not the first even if it was going to be as such (Waweru, 2018).

Based on the report provided by Africa Confidential which lies at the heart of the undertaking of this study, Zambia is currently not capable of paying back a multibillion-dollar debt to China of which transmuted into talks between the two countries. Which are centralised on whether Zambia would do away with its debt by handing over the African country's national power utility which is in, totality a calculated national strategic asset (Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation [ZESC]) (Meccuno, 2018). Not only this asset but also the handing over of Zambia's Lusaka International airport. Practically, this means that China does not only intend to take these two only, as it also mines Zambia's cobalt, copper and nickel and transports the deposits back to China through her business networks (Rapanyane and Shai 2020; Chiwanza, 2018).

There is also the Chinese BRI policy initiative (discussed broadly in Chapter 3) that seeks to flood Africa with Chinese loans of multi-dollar trillions. To add, it also triples

the Chinese practise of economically financing infrastructure in independent State borrowers which also tends to cause an increment in the loan discomfort-ability from borrower countries (Hurley et al., 2018). The highlighted should be interpreted with the lenses that both Zambia and China have executed their loan arrangements with the purpose of either infrastructure or other things beyond the scope of this study. Thus, the real question here is, which conditions were attached to this arrangement that now China wants to take over Zambia's national assets. And it becomes clear when Zambia's national assets are being negotiated in exchange for debt cancellation, that whatever the conditions entailed, was an act of neo-colonial practise. To further understand some of the key drivers of China's engagement with Zambia and to some extent, Africa respectively, the researcher has explored the drivers below.

4.2. Key drivers of China's Zambia Engagement

4.2.1. Natural resources

Despite the efforts of the public relations in portraying the collaboration as multifaceted and comprehensive, the number one interest of China in Zambia is to secure minerals, oil and other raw materials to propellant its industrialisation ambitions (International Energy Agency, 2011). Such a huge interest in African countries like Zambia forms part of its going out or open-door policy formed in the late 1990s, which motivated both private companies and State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) to consider investing abroad. Especially in rich mineral resource countries. That is why by 2035, China is anticipated to be the biggest worldwide consumer of oil imports to safeguard its future supply (Hanauer and Lyle, 2014). With such changes, China is ponderously invested in the downstream and upstream oil sectors of African states such as Zambia, Angola, Sudan, and Nigeria. Zambia also bestows a big untainted market for the goods of China since the concerted African GDP is predicted to grow by 2035 to \$2.6 trillion (Roxburgh et al., 2010).

Emerging from the above, the investment of China in Africa has made significant contributions in the restricting of the economy of China from her "labour-intensive industries" particularly as it relates to the increasing labour costs. The continued trading of Zambia's mineral resources including the likes of copper, which is dominant, helps to increase the pace of China's economic development. As of 2018, China was

the largest consumer of copper globally of which totalled her 88% in the mining sector of Zambia (Lubinda & Jian, 2018). On the subject of which Chinese companies have operations in Zambia, the biggest of the Chinese mines in Zambia is the “Chambishi Copper Mine” of which is a State-Owned Subsidiary of China and falls under the “China Nonferrous Metal Mining (Group) Company (CNMC)” (Li, 2010: 6). Besides having the likes of Chambishi, CNMC is also in charge of the “Luanshya Copper Mine for \$50 million”. A key point to draw from the above analysis is that China has invested heavily in the mining industry of Zambia and her other mines include the likes of “Jinchuan Mining Group” which was known before to have been the “Nickel City of China” reckoning above 90% of the total production output of the “nickel and platinum group metals in China”. This has encouraged Jiabao Wen (Former Six Chinese Premier of the State Council of the PRC) to pronounce this Mine as the “pride of China” (Li, 2010: 7).

4.2.2. International legitimacy

In the eyes of Beijing, African countries like Zambia depicts a fundamental strategic, diplomatic, and geopolitical party line on which China can realise its significant core propositions of non-interference, equality, and South-South solidarity between those nations which are still developing. The government of China still believes that the nurturing of the Sino-African state collaboration assists China in winning its “just international order” and international influence and advancing stability, worldwide equality, peace and prosperity (Hanauer & Lyle, 2014). Furthermore, the Asian tiger still sees itself as the largest developing state worldwide whilst African countries like Zambia are behind it in development. Michel Serge and Beuret Michel in their book titled *China safari* argue that the success of China in Africa has reinstated its stance as a worldwide incoming “Superpower” (Michel & Beuret, 2009: 4). This has also led China to increase and maintain its influence in the UN due to its engagement with African countries. As such, the votes of more than one-quarter of UN member states from Africa including Zambia play a significant role for China as these African states also sometimes occupy the non-permanency seats to endorse China’s initiatives (Hanauer & Lyle, 2014).

African countries like Zambia constitute a significant voting alliance for all the plans which are instituted or proposed by China which are sometimes against those proposed by the Western countries with which China is an opposition. Case points in would be that when the PRC has settled for diplomatic negotiations in replacing Taiwan in the UN. That was when African states including Zambia voted and constituted 26 votes of the total votes of 76 in endorsing for the PRC to taking over the seat of China in 1971 from Taiwan (Fransman, 2013). This fundamental move encouraged Mao Zedong¹⁰ by then to declare African countries as brothers who have carried China into the UN (Li, 2012). The votes of African states such as Zambia in the UN also works to protect Beijing from the condemnation of its human rights stance. Propositions, which have been passed by the Western countries in trying to condemn China because of its human rights abuses, have failed dismally due to the supports of African countries like Zambia (Eisenman, 2008).

Whilst Taiwan and China have managed to settle their differences into an agreement over their affairs in the African continent over diplomatic contestation, Beijing is still working actively, though in private to ensure that the diplomatic collaborations of Taipei and the remaining African countries like Swaziland, Principe and Burkina Faso-Sao do come to an end (Hanauer & Lyle, 2014). One fundamental case point in this would be that of Gambia's suffering of diplomatic collaboration with Taiwan in November 2013, which depicts Taiwan's continued lessening of diplomatic leverage on the African soil (Saine & Gold, 2013). It is true that Beijing does not recognize countries that are in collaboration with Taiwan and does not also assist such countries economically and it has in exchange ensured that those African countries which switched off from recognizing Taipei do benefit from its increasing economic engagement with Africa. A case point in this would be when Malawi started recognizing it during the early 2008 and the African country started receiving huge amounts of Chinese investments and aids, including the erection of brand new parliament building, schools, wells, national conference centre, scholarships and medical assistance (Smith, 2012). Brautigam (Renounced China-Africa relations scholar) argues that "Chinese aid agreements follow diplomatic ties", (2011: 208-210), to maintain her

¹⁰ Chinese communist revolutionary who became the founding father of the People's Republic of China (PRC), which he ruled as the Chairman of the Communist Party of China from its establishment in 1949 until his death in 1976.

international legitimate stance and African countries like Zambia are no exception in this.

4.2.3. Promote Security in Africa

China sees the stability, security and prosperity of the African countries as inseparably attached to the entire health of the Sino-Africa collaboration. African countries like Zambia which are vibrant economically and whose institutions of government and the security apparatus are capacitated to sustain the ongoing investment and trade of the two, not only come to benefit Africans but also Chinese business on the continent. That is why the fundamental key terms like “common prosperity, peace, security and human development” are always highlighted remarkably in the various white papers of China on Africa (Hanauer & Lyle, 2014). This stems from the realisation by Beijing that Africa’s instabilities and insecurities tend to impact on its economic interests. For example, the cases of the Somalia coast piracy are threatening the critical Chinese shipping lanes to its trade with African states and other parts of the globe. Equally important are also the civil wars and internal wars in countries like Zambia in the past which have also threatened the lives and safety of employees of Chinese business entities in the country and other African states (Hanauer & Lyle, 2014). In other parts of Africa, China had to withdraw its business entities due to these internal wars.

China is also a considerable supplier of the arms to the governments of Africa, making up to at least 25 % of conventional arms deals to Africa (Lynch, 2012). The Asian tiger has resumed trading weapons to the outcast regimes of Africa like those in Zimbabwe and Sudan, and even to those which are not outcast like Zambia, basing its argument on the notion that these are independent countries, which possess the rights to buy military equipment, despite the criticism, which stemmed from the international community (Lynch, 2012). Critics of this move, like Ian Taylor argue that China’s continued bidding on the sovereign states’ rights “simply camouflages its bottom line of profit and resource procurement, which arms sales to Africa possibly facilitate” (Taylor, 2009: 32). In part, due to these aroused critics and the matters of mitigating security-related issues to its economic captivates, the Asian tiger has now started playing a more positive task to champion stability in the regions of Africa. Despite this,

China remains the largest benefactor to the peacekeeping missions of the UN in Africa from those who are in the UNSC (Ayenagbo et al., 2012). China's participation, in this case, should be one that encourages and motivates its contribution towards the promotion of the regional security of the African continent. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has also deployed naval assets in support of international anti-piracy efforts off the coasts of Somalia (Ayenagbo, et al., 2012). Security issues in Africa have become an important tabled Chinese problem to be resolved as they present both challenges and opportunities for China's leaders and international investors in the future if they continue to be overlooked.


4.2.4. Investment drivers

The investment of China in Zambia can be found in both the market and specific policy drivers esp. those which secures access to strategic mineral resources. On the side of the policy initiative, it is important to highlight that the government of China's policy of "going out", explained well in China's 10th Five Year Plan (FYP) of 2001-05 that mineral resources had been the crucial driver of the Chinese SOE investments in Zambia (Connolly, Mentasti & Karodia, 2014). This fundamental policy blueprint was re-configured in the late 12th FYP of 2011-15 which champions the need to increase China's going out strategy in three key areas: expansion of outward investments; emphasis on the equal significance of FDI in China and Chinese outward investments; and transformation of China's intercontinental trade and outward investments models (Connolly, et al., 2014). The fundamental driver of this policy is found in the need to motivate Chinese firms to conduct their businesses abroad to equip their businesses with the skills of competitiveness in obtaining strategic assets, obtaining access to natural resources and forming brand new markets for China's exports in countries like Zambia (Levesque 2012).

Another significant aspect of this discussion is the fact that a lot of Chinese mining corporations have invested stiffly in Zambia's mining sector during the previous decade with figures in 2014 exceeding \$3 billion. This is a record of Ambassador Yang

Youming led Chinese embassy in Zambia. According to Youming, over 550 businesses of China operated in Zambia in 2014 (Lubinda & Jian, 2018). Therefore, in 2015, about 30 Companies of China were detailed to have procured a massive share of “US\$1 Billion” in the manufacturing sector to be announced as “One Belt and One Road Industrial Park”. This manufacturing park is driven by “International Physical Distribution Group and the Zhongrum Investment Development Group Corporation Limited (Zambia)” and it is foreseen to pillar on a stretched “700 hectares of land” (Lubinda & Jian, 2010: 209). Figure 1 is an exemplar of the number of Chinese companies in general which are operating in all the sectors of Zambia.

Figure 1: Chinese Mining Companies in Zambian sector



Source: (Abdelghaffar, Bryant, Campbell, Lewis, Namit, Paredes, Silva, Yu, 2016)

4.2.5. Creation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs)

By the use of the 12th FYP and the policy of “going out”, the government of the PRC has endorsed several Chinese businesses in initiating some experimental SEZs across African countries including in Zambia (Zambia-China Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone). Even though this is not well specified in the 12th Primary Years Programme (PYP), the government of China had also made plans of sponsoring economic collaboration with African states. This is so, as these SEZs are constructed by the SOEs of China and the private companies to assist the restructuring of China

to allow less labour-intensive and competitive industries of leather, textiles, building materials etc. to conduct their commerce abroad (Levesque, 2012).

By 2012, there were about six Chinese SEZs in Africa that were under construction ¹¹towards completion, two of them were 100% owned by the government of China. The motivator of this project is the government of China's Ministry of Commerce which remains an agency that pushes this agenda. The same ministry is also permitting the developers of Zones to also seek the financial assistance of up to 30% of the zone groundwork and erection costs through the China-Africa Development Fund and Trade and Economic Cooperation Zone Development (Levesque, 2012). Also, those firms of China which move to these zones in Africa would be compensated for up to 50% of movement costs and would also receive import and export tax rebates on China's construction materials (Levesque, 2012).

Whilst these Zones are primarily constructed by the firms of China, foreign businesses are also welcomed to conduct their business activities in these zones (Bwalya, 2018). The significant examples of these zones as broadly are industry niche each zone endorse in Zambia and these are Chambishi and the Lusaka subzones which places focus or central attention on the cobalt/copper processing and food, garments, tobacco, appliances and electronics (Levesque, 2012). The establishment of this was driven by millions of Chinese investors who are ready and cannot wait to invest in Zambia as their preferred investment destination in Africa. This is supported by the authorities of media in China who have demanded Zambia to furnish them with more data on their different investment slots (Bwalya, 2018). Others are well illustrated on the table below which shows a number of SEZs in different African countries including those that already been developed in Zambia.

¹¹ All of them located in Egypt (1) Zambia (1), Nigeria (2), Mauritius (1), Ethiopia (1)

Figure 2: Investment of Six China-Africa Economic Cooperation Zones (Circa February 2015)

	Zone constr. investment (\$ mil)	No. of tenant companies (signed)	No. of tenant companies (in operation)	Tenant company commitments to invest (\$ mil)	Tenant company actual investment (\$ mil)	Tenants: approx. no. of Chinese workers	Tenants: approx. no. of African workers
Egypt TEDA	93.42	58	38	610	357.6	n/a	nearly 2000
Zambia Chambishi	170	45	26	1300	322	1372	over 8000
Nigeria Lekki	82.5	30	8	700	76	n/a	300
Mauritius Jinfei	38.31	5	0	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Nigeria Ogun	23.7	40	19	150	58.28	200-300	4250
Ethiopia Eastern	88.9	25	10	192.4	159.2	390	4975

Source: (Brautigam and Tang 2014)

4.2.6. Promotion of Debt trap (ZESCO in Question)

Malaysia’s prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad refers to the situation of ZESCO in Zambia as the new scramble for Africa or perhaps a “new form of colonialism” (Hadebe, 2018). Mahathir further deliberates that even if Zambia is not alone in this mare’s nest, it is very much displeasing and terrifying to have to admit that the African country’s national asset is set to be withheld for debt purposes. In essence, this would not be the case as of now, but unfortunately, it is as Zambia has now come under China’s “curatorship” as Zambia did not reimburse its loans (Hadebe, 2018). In agreement, the Africa Confidential report has also alluded the Africa Digest’s expectation that some Zambia’s national assets could be hand given to China if Zambia continues to delay their debt reimbursement (Leterza & Mususa, 2018). This should be attributed to the increasing interest repayments which keep going up when the investor confidence is alternatively declining (Leterza & Mususa 2018).

To make matters worse, the 2018 Bloomberg figures have also shown that the African country’s bonds were continuously collapsing (Wallace & Hill, 2018). As such, Hadebe (2018) also agreed with the Asian times about the presumption that through the BRI initiative, about 70 Asian and African countries have already admitted to taking huge relief loans from China through BRI for them to develop their economies. On record,

the BRI initiative allows a country to secure a loan of from “\$1 trillion and \$8trln” (Hadebe, 2018). The demonstrated analysis ought to be interpreted with the lenses that Zambia is the one which tends to be on the receiving end of loss as these loans signifying debt trap force the African country to make reimbursement when not ready. The conditions attached are tremendously freight and by speaking the truth, Zambia is an average country that has become a victim by no luck.

Having illustrated this, it was also deemed important to interject, besides the “Bond, bills and ever bigger debts” report that was delivered on the 3rd of September 2018 by Africa confidential discussing how Zambia’s National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC) was already under the control of China, and now following ZESCO which was put on the negotiation table for handing over (Open Zambia, 2018; News Blaze Digital Team, 2018). In the west, both the IMF and the USA have described BRI as one of the contemporary Chinese plans that seek to encourage indebtedness and then capture countries’ national assets, of which are strategic, when these countries default in their payments/settling of these debts. A relevant case point would be ZESCO to be depicted as a victim (Lusakatimes, 2018a). Based on Lusakatimes (2018a), Zambians should wake up now and smell the coffee, as they might wake up in the future to realise that they even went deep into more Chinese debts.

Based on the US senate and the IMF, African countries such as Zambia have already gone deep to have to face the damage of incremental indebtedness to Chinese loaners of money. On records, Zambia is not on the top 23 trapped countries from the Chinese debt list, although it is already swimming in the highest likelihood of the indebtedness distress (Lusakatimes 2018a). Contextually, all of the Africa Confidential sources have indeed confirmed that much of the debts incurred by Zambia have not been paid or reimbursed and the country’s public treasury seemed not worried about this disdain (News Blaze Digital Team, 2018).

Besides the discussed Debt trap as amongst the leading figure, there are also financial geographic imperatives too. Which manifest in the way China has distributed OBOR especially in the military pedestal on the African continent like in Djibouti (Heanue, 2018). On records and figures, Zambia owes China an estimated \$13 billion and according to economic analysts, these are mostly made up of the Asian tiger’s loans incurred (Heanue, 2018). The dormant peril on this account is that the African country

had even gone additionally to take more money to make the debt reimbursement impossible to settle and now, instead of paying back the money, the Zambian government negotiates national assets with China for security reasons (Heanue, 2018).

Drawing heavily from the above analysis, it can be established that BRI as a Chinese initiative does serve to capacitate and strengthen China's international relations through loans to other countries. Having highlighted this, it also becomes confusing to have to come terms with the fact that all previous Chinese policies of including the open-door policy as well the policy of going out to have been straightforward though this one is not. But the practicality of the application of this narrative in this analysis means that China's foreign policy ought not to be separated from her drivers which are always win-win. Securing Zambia's national assets could work on China's favour as it continues to offer Zambia more and more loans in the name of infrastructural development will at the end make it more and more difficult for countries such as Zambia to be unable to meet their loan conditions. In context, it is arguable that such loans have very destructive effects on reimbursement deadlines. One Kenyan wrote in an editorial in Kenya's *Daily Nation* newspaper earlier in 2018 that "The Chinese will readily offer you infrastructure loans but you will only start feeling the pinch when the time for servicing the debt comes calling — and you realize that your economy is not raising enough dollars to repay it" (Fang, 2018). This means that the terms and conditions of the loans are negotiated from a position of disadvantage between two unequal powers in the international system.

4.2.7. Seeks Market potential

China has always had its eye on the African countries like Zambia for its market potential and capability (Rapanyane and Shai 2020: 17). The manufacturing industries of China appreciate the distinctive advantage of assembling electronics, textiles, and alternative products at a comparatively low price, which is suitable for the demand of the market of the least developed countries of Africa (Sun, 2014). As such, the importance of Africa as a market for China was drawn from the results of the international financial crisis of 2008 and its horrible after-effects on the Asian tiger's export industries (Qinmei, 2013). This event saw the request for the goods of China

declining from the declining western economies and by then, the export industries of China had to now retreat to look for market replacements to fill the gap. Qinmei (2013) argues that economic analysts were of the view that this event came after China replaced the USA as the largest trading partner of Africa. Besides, China now sought to ameliorate its industrial economy and take its stance in the international supply chain, and with Africa, as having untapped and vast labour resources, was distinguished as the best location for the labour-intensive industries and cheap Chinese products of China.

4.2.8. Change of work ethic

The government of China has been working with the ministry of labour in Zambia and the government of Zimbabwe since 2017 to initiate plans that will transform the working altitude of Zambians and Zimbabweans. In the case of Zambia, Joyce Simukoko (Zambia's Labour and Social Security Minister) demonstrated that the employees of Zambia in Chinese firms needed to enhance their work ethics in line with the sense of responsibility, good faith, teamwork, discipline and other needed requirements (Lusakatimes, 2017). Simukoko argued that this was a need as there was a practise of poor work ethic that was poised to temper with the execution of the seventh National Development Plan (NDP) and the attainment of the Zambian 2030 vision. Simukoko had since then encouraged Zambian employees to learn the efficiency of the Chinese people and imitate their attitude towards work. The first and foremost "China-Zimbabwe-Zambia Work Ethics Seminar" collectively took place at the embassy of China in Zambia with the special invitation to the Embassy of Zimbabwe in Zambia also the ministry of labour and social security of Zambia (Lusakatimes, 2017)

4.2.9. The desire to dump Chinese nationals in Zambia

The largest number of Chinese nationals in Zambia came during the times of the erections of the TAZAMA pipeline and TAZARA projects. With some leaving after those projects' completion. During the past 5 decades, others came to Zambia with alternative construction projects. Often, Zambians had complained about those Chinse who are unskilled and work as bricklayers, drivers and builders who were found

in these projects (Mwamba, 2018). Those who have attracted too much attention are those Chinese individuals or members of the existing families who migrated into Zambia and now run medium enterprises like farming, retail shops, brick-making and poultry and these have often become the face of the communities of China on social media disdain (Mwamba, 2018).

Even though this was the case, the politicians of Zambia have not been able to explain who these new Chinese settlers were, but in exchange, have been able to argue that these were not the kinds of investors they were anticipating (Kapembwa, 2018). The anti-Chinese affections are often instilled due to political reasons, and oftentimes, outstretch to treacherous Xenophobic incitement as experienced in the cases of 2006 and the most recent cases (Kapembwa, 2018). Other Zambian voices pursue the banning of the Chinese Small Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in poultry, retail shops, fruits and vegetables, brick making, and alternative small sub-sectors considered suitable or dedicated to Zambians (Mwamba, 2018).

One significant feature of being able to see that China is dumping its nationals in Zambia is that all of them are quite closed off from other local populations. A case point of this would be the headquarters of NFCA in the Chambishi and Kitwe localities often referred by Zambian nationals as the China houses. This is because Chinese employees work and live there, individually from those areas of the locals. The fundamental drivers of this are found the barriers created by the culture and languages. It is important to allude that language is a reminder of a critical issue to Chinese immigrants as only fewer of them can communicate using French or English, in total exception of the local languages in Zambia. The barrier created by the latter two deepens the difficulty of integration and communication lines with the locals for the Chinese nationals (Li, 2010). The depiction drawn from this shows that even if the Chinese nationals have come to terms with the economic terms outside China, still, most of them, especially those who are doing businesses in Africa are not yet ready to welcome the cultural disparity that exists between them and Africans who work and live with them.

This is so as culture remains a significant determining factor of people-relations. Thus, Chinese nationals have their oral history of placing loyalty in their families and very

much old-fashioned/ orthodox when it comes to the terms of sexual collaborations. That is why most of them travel abroad without the members of their families for years, to go home during spring festivals. Most of the Zambian locals do not comprehend how the Chinese can be able to sustain themselves for years without allowing themselves to explore sexual activities. Therefore, it remains unsurprising that most of the Zambians are not satisfied with the Chinese cultural conservatism (Li, 2010).

4.3. Conclusion

In the final analysis, the researcher submits that both Zambia and Chinese relations should be interpreted and defined by both Lusaka and Beijing, as their continued collaborations depict that China seems to be dictating the conditions and terms of the relations. This narrative should be understood simply to mean the existing unequal power relations between the two States. Drawing from the latter, it is important and very much relevant to understand that even though the Asian tiger has got her own solid and clear foreign policy towards Zambia, this foreign policy is only driven by the agenda of economic zero-sum. What is observable from the entire analysis is that in Chinese Zambian engagement, there are more similarities than differences in the context of China's international relations with African countries who are resource rich.

Even if several Africa countries including the likes of Zambia can argue that they stand to benefit heavily from their relations with China, the fact of the matter is that these are asymmetric benefits and they predominant in the economic circles. As it emerges from the above analysis, the researcher argues that China's international engagement with Zambia depicts the worst form of economic neo-colonialism. In the form of promoting debt trap in exchange for strategic national assets, digging Zambia's mineral resources for her economic feed and dumping Chinese nationals in Zambia both skilled and unskilled to compete with Zambians in the African country's job market. Having postulated this, the researcher has also further extended a hand in alluding that China's foreign policy towards Zambia is made up of promises of infrastructural development and economic objectives. In simple terms, OBOR and/ BRI as lying at the heart of China's contemporary foreign policy ought to be pushing the two latter promises. Though in the context of this chapter, the foreign policy of China should never be separated from its imperatives which are discussed broadly above.

The following chapter explores the impact of Zambia's economic and political landscapes on China's foreign policy towards the former. The main logic behind this chapter is to furnish a general context for illustrating the influence of the two landscapes in China's engagement with Zambia. Or simply what continues to attract Chinese businesses in Zambia.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Influence of Political and Economic environments within the context of China's Foreign Policy Towards Zambia

5.1. Introduction

In this chapter, political and economic environments are equated with the political and economic trends and or factors. Meaning that environments go hand in hand with trends and or factors. This chapter discusses China's engagement with Zambia with a special focus on how Zambia's political and economic trends influenced and continue to influence China's Zambia engagement between the years 2010 to 2018. The researcher embraces the view that both China and Zambia are independent states with individual foreign policies outlining how they wish to interact with each other in the international arena. This chapter focuses on the role played by both Zambia's political and economic environments in China in the continued Chinese-Zambian relations. It is discussing Zambia's local economic and political trends that attract China's continued involvement in Zambia. Specifically, the discussion of these trends and or factors which play a significant role in motivating China to continue engaging with Zambia. Equally, the researcher has explored a broader Afrocentric analysis of the Chinese investments in the areas of energy, rail line, road infrastructure, agriculture, and farm blocks as well as in the mining. This chapter shows that Zambia's political and economic trends are very much fertile to make it a suitable investment and political ally of China in Sub-Saharan Africa.

5.2. Zambia's Political and Economic Environments

5.2.1. Political environment

In this section, the researcher has limited himself to the discussion of the domestic political trends that shaped the political environment of Zambia between the years (2010-2018) in the context of the study. One significant trend that continues to extensively shape Zambia's political environment was the country's elections of which played a central role in this chapter. To get straight to the point. The presidential elections of Zambia in 2011 coupled with the parliamentary elections were declared free though unfair. By a matter of surprise to opposition political parties and all the

observers of the elections, Michael Sata (former Zambian President) was elected as the president and constitutionally, he and his party took the governmental control (Electoral Commission Of Zambia, 2011). The process of inaugurating a new government took some time as the high-ranking officials, electoral commission and Zambia's military leader dragged them through the mud. In any given case, Sata as the president of the country assumed his immediate mandate of delivering his promises of the transformation of the entire labour force of the formal sector and also delivered common social spending throughout the country. It was not long after Sata lost interest in running for office again after encountering several turbulent leadership mal-practises, lack of democratic consultations between the civil society organisations and the government (Transformation Index BTI, 2018). Those who condemned his governing strategies were the ones who were extremely critical of his government on national and post newspapers. The below Figure illustrates how well the 2011 Zambia elections came about in terms of results which never brought about any political instabilities.

Figure 3: Zambia's 2011 Elections

20 September 2011 Presidential Elections Results			
Political Party	Presidential Candidate	Votes	% of Votes
Patriotic Front (PF)	Michael Sata	1,170,966	42.24%
Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD)	Rupiah Banda	987,866	35.63%
United Party for National Development (UPND)	Hakainde Hichilema	506,763	18.28%
Alliance for Democracy and Development	Charles Milupi	26,270	0.95%
National Restoration Party (NRP)	Elias Chipimo	10,672	0.38%
United National Independence Party (UNIP)	Tilyenji Kaunda	9,950	0.36%
Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD)	Edith Nawakwi	6,833	0.25%
National Movement for Progress (NMP)	Ng'andu Magande	6,344	0.23%
Heritage Party (HP)	Godfrey Miyanda	4,730	0.17%
Zambia for Empowerment and Development	Fredrick Mutesa	2,268	0.08%

Source: (Zambia, 2011; Electoral Commission of Zambia, 2011)

His (Sata) death in 2014 signified a need for the re-run of the presidential election. This was so even though before his death, there were times when his political party was involved in internal squabbles depicting a moment of political instability in the country in which his ill-health news was spread to cause internal factions in the

Patriotic Front (PF) which rose the succession struggle. After his death, the PF, the PF had already united behind Edgar Lungu, as his successor, poised to take the presidential power helms and bring unity to the already factional PF. Lungu's opponent at the time was Hichilema Hakainde who was in the opposition benches leading the United Party for National Development (UPND) (Transformation Index BTI, 2018).

The presidential elections of 2016 have ushered Lungu as the president although he met the extensive challenge in which Hichilema's UPND party rose to 46.67% support from 18.17% (Transformation Index BTI, 2018). This presidential re-run of 2016 elections was announced to have been fair and free by the electoral observer mission of SADC. As they announced, they specified that the elections were: "peaceful, transparent, credible, free and fair, thus reflecting the will of the people of Zambia" (Electoral Commission of Zambia 2016). Electoral mismanagement and conflicts were less in the party rivalries. Lungu's rise to power was with 27000+ votes to only be considered a wafer-thin margin, to set several debates around the outcome of the 2016 elections (Electoral Commission of Zambia, 2016).

Having shown that these elections were free and fair as announced by the regional observers, it was deemed important to indicate that this signified a political environment that is stable and very much fertile for international investment. By this, the researcher means that China has been extensively encouraged and motivated by an assurance that Zambia is one of the African countries that are not prone to electoral violence which then leads to post and continued violence that is at a time, driven by dissatisfied citizens on electoral results (i.e. 2018 Zimbabwean elections). The practicality of the latter engenders the view that this makes Zambia an attractive investment African country in Sub-Saharan Africa. Having alluded this, the researcher deemed it important to show the results of Zambia's 2016 elections which were deemed free, credible, and fair by the figure shown below.

FIGURE 4: Zambia’s 2016 Elections

Candidate	Party	Votes	Vote share
Edgar Lungu	Patriotic Front	1,860,877	50.35%
Hakainde Hichilema	United Party for National Development	1,760,347	47.63%
Edith Zewelani Nawakwi	Forum for Democracy and Development	24,149	0.65%
Andyford Banda	People’s Alliance for Change	15,791	0.43%
Wynter Kabimba	Rainbow Party	9,504	0.26%
Saviour Chishimba	United Progressive People	9,221	0.25%
Tilyenji “Kenneth” Kaunda	United National Independence Party	8,928	0.24%
Peter Sinkamba	Green Party	4,515	0.12%
Maxwell Mwamba	Democratic Assembly	2,378	0.06%
Total registered voters		6,698,372	
Total votes cast		3,781,505	
<i>Total votes rejected (out of total votes cast)</i>		<i>85,795</i>	
Turnout			56.45%

Source: (Electoral Commission of Zambia 2016)

Another point here is to show that Zambia as of today is counted amongst those Africa countries who have very productive democratic elections held every five years. The African country’s incoming elections will take place in the year 2021. The country is currently led by Lungu who also leads the PF government who won the elections in a closely monitored contestation that took place 2016 with UPND’s leader Hichilema (#AfricaCan, 2019). Based on the Global Innovation Index (GII), Zambia is a country that is politically, socially, and economically sound/ stable. As of today, Zambia stands

at 54 out of the 126 States on the global grading of countries with stability in terms of economics and politics in the year 2018 (Lusakatimes, 2018b). Not only is it stable, but also adhering to international law as a middle-income country and had been adjudged number 80 out of the 126 Global States on the GII. The report had been read and placed on the public space for everyone to see at the event which took place in Cornell University Campus (Roosevelt Island) in New York (NY) organized by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). The report also indicates that Zambia is amongst those countries in Africa in which there are no strict governmental restrictions on international investment, making the business environment more conducive without problems of liquidations and insolvency (Lusakatimes, 2018b).

5.2.2. Economic Environment


Under the classification of the economic environment, Zambia is said to be promoting freedom of currency convertibility, trade, free usage of profits and liberalization of foreign trade in principle and pricing. The capital markets of the country make the country's banking system to be oriented and differentiated as well as compared with global markets in principle (Transformation Index BTI, 2018). In context, the researcher has argued extensively that the signs depicted by Zambia of the liberal banking rules in the region and its banks, therefore, can best suit international investment better.

Thus, this assertion in simple terms means that in Zambia, there is banking supervision which is utilitarian by nature and with fewer capital conditionalities (Transformation Index BTI, 2018). Meaning that there is easy access to capital merchandises of both domestic and foreign capital. This is even if the country's property rights are not well explicated in the rural areas unlike in the urban areas where they are well interpreted. A relevant case point is found in the agricultural land of the Barotseland which is forever under the custodianship of the land's traditional leadership. The difficulty in defining the property rights in the rural areas is found in the difficult process that one has to undergo on engaging traditional leaders (Transformation Index BTI, 2018).

Despite the above indicated, Zambia remains economically very attractive as it subscribes to free trade and liberalization principles which are the forefront of

attracting global investment. The truth of the matter is that, even though Zambia cannot be placed on the same lane with regional economic superpowers like South Africa, it still stands a good chance of continuing to attract international investment, including investors from the West (USA, Canada, Brazil, UK etc..) and those from the East (China, Japan, South Korea etc.). The Figure below indicates a statistical proof of Zambia’s economic and business environment quality Scores from SSA (av.) and the World (av.)

Figure 5: Business Environment and Economic Quality scores in Zambia, SSA (av.) and the World (av.)



Source: (Legatum Prosperity Index, 2016)

Within the economic parameters, the real GDP had declined to 4.0% from 4.1% between 2017 and 2018. As stipulated, the agricultural output also declined by 35% due to the rainfall shortage which was experienced in the country in the year 2018. But on the other side, the copper and mining output had instead increased between 2008-2018 with 4.5% in ten years (African Economic Outlook, 2019). The construction of the infrastructure has also greatly assisted the economy of Zambia as a result of the huge public infrastructural investment, haul cement output together with commercial buildings had grown with 10% compared to the last previous decade (African Economic Outlook, 2019). To add, Zambia has between the years 2004-2014

recorded commending economic growth of at least 6.7% in GDP. Though between 2015-17, its economy had declined a bit with reasons having to do with the depreciation of the *Kwacha*, crumbling prices of copper and diminished power generation (Index Mundi, 2018). Using an Economic perspective, one could also, unfortunately, argue that Zambia's deprivation of the economic diversification and a considerable dependency on the copper as the main export escorts its vulnerability to the global variations in commodities markets (Zambia Economy, 2019; Moody's Analytics, 2019). But in the year 2017, the GDP of the African country recorded growth as the mineral prices grew. Despite these identified economic developments and weakness, Zambia has assumed the status of a developing nation although it is a victim of the high unemployment rate, high birth rate, market manipulations in agricultural and energy policies, HIV/AIDS as well as high levels of governmental debts (Zambia Economy, 2019). Hence, the reason why it raised "\$7 billion from international investors by issuing separate sovereign bonds in 2012, 2014, and 2015" (Moody's Analytics, 2019).

5.3. Political and Economic environments in sustaining a continued Chinese involvement in Zambia

As a developing African State, Zambia continues to engage in various measures to improve its business environment. That is why it has come up with the "Private Sector Reform Development Programme (PSRDP)" to crossbow on the already collapsing licensing methods of business to upgrade the supervisory procedures which are in line with the business activities (UNCTAD, 2011). In addition to this, Zambia has also come up with the 2007 "Zambia Development Authority (ZDA)" to vindicate and consolidate investment growth and promotion. Under the ZDA framework, which is pro-liberalism by nature, Zambia makes the after-care services to be accessible / provided. To add, Zambia also formed the "Multi-Facility Economic Zones (MFEZ)" to provide all global investors with like China, with a more "well-equipped and secure environment for operation". The reforms which take place in Zambia especially in the areas of visa and permits, automated registration, custom clearings and registration of land processing are accommodative. Equally important is that Zambia's labour laws are also closely monitored to attract more investment (UNCTAD, 2011).

Zambia also members of the SADC Free Trade Area (SADC-FTA) of which makes its market of 170 million to be accessible to other markets in the SADC market which is estimated to be “US\$360 billion”. Zambia is not only a member of the SADC-FTA but also members the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) which remains the largest regional association on the African continent comprising of about 400 million people from the total of the 19 member States (UNCTAD, 2011). Zambia is also interlinked with the regional infrastructural big projects such as the North-South Corridor¹² that links it to Dar el Saalam (former Capital of Tanzania). This corridor reaches to the Southern tip of the continent to inter land-link Zambia with South Africa’s conveyance hub and all its bordering States.

This corridor of road and rail travel can be nourished and improved for transportation in the region to be more effective. Besides all of this, Zambia has an abundance of mineral resources which are estimated to be 2 billion tons which are mainly found in the copper belt region of Zambia and these minerals have grown Zambia’s mining industry extensively. In context, Zambia has minerals which China demands or requires, like amethyst, aquamarine, gold, emeralds and diamonds. Besides, Zambia also possesses a lot of arable lands which is predicted to be about 750000Km² landmass making about 58% of the total land. It was in the year 2011 that Zambia began with its plans of handing out business land to both domestic and international investors (UNCTAD, 2011). Also, the African country advances/ promotes in the form of trade, horticultural and floricultural crops to the South African and European markets.

The above highlighted is a clear narrative indicating that the African country possesses enough chances of practising agro-processing and advancement of agro-investment as well as value chain using joint economic deals. Even in the area of tourism, Zambia owes its rich tourism to the abundance of natural resources which are pristine and also caters for an extensive and divergent scope of interests, including the adventure activities, varied, sceneries, wilderness and wildlife and national heritage sites. Besides the renowned Victoria Falls, Zambia has about 34 game reserves and also

¹² The project is defined as a multi-modal (road, rail and ports) trans-continental interconnector, ultimately connecting Cape Town in the south and Cairo in the north

about 19 national parks covering a landmass of about 22.4 million hectares (Kragelund, 2009).

In context, it is important to highlight that the FDI matters of the country are in the hands of the newly established ZDA Act of 2006 to become effective in 2007. This is one fundamental act that replaced the previous Zambian Investment Centre (ZIC) and undertook a neo-liberal path in terms of investment so that it can attract huge investments to create job opportunities. In this Act, the country rests assured that foreign nationals can abide by the local stricter rules in terms of residents permits (Kragelund, 2009). Although this Act does not really/ completely touch on the specific conditions of equity, local content, subcontractors, foreign investors employment issues and technology transfer and even on matters involving international investors' commitment to local participation on matters purely involving the CSR agenda, it is quite working well. The truth of the matter is that this Act allows foreign investors, e.g. Chinese investors to transfer money in any capital, freely back to their Chinese families at home. This includes all interests, fees, profits, dividends and royalties. This act has been channelled in a way that allows all international investors to send their allowances and incomes back to their countries (Kragelund, 2009).

Zambia also practises trade fair with China and this is closely monitored and financed by the Bank of China and the Henan Provincial leadership. The underlying trade fair champions both domestic and international investors to come and do their business in Zambia and explore investment opportunities in the African country. It was in the year 2017, during the trade fair session that Jianhua Xu (Vice President of Bank of China Henan Province Branch) illustrated that the business of China including the firms sought to do their investment procurement in the African States like Zambia as it seemed to have steady economic and political environment including mineral resources (Chimanse, 2017). At this session, the ZDA also made their presentations which included investment opportunities which could be explored in Zambia. In their presentations, the ZDA touched on the kind of a business climate international investors can expect to find in Zambia which has legal framework and incentive structure that make sure that the safety of all investors is guaranteed (Chimanse, 2017).

5.4. Zambia's Economic Area/ Sectors in Which China has extensive investment in

In this chapter, the researcher has argued that China's engagement with Zambia is extensively driven by the latter's both economic and political stabilities which are both depicted by a combination of prosperous democratic elections which come at hand every five years. In supporting the latter, a clear evident indication is interjected by GII which rates Zambia as both politically and economically stable to can conduct business affairs in. Also, it is highlighted that as Zambia adheres to all international laws, that makes it to possess very stable strong institutions of government which yield out a positive political environment. Despite the latter, the country's economic environment is also well placed with continuous signs of profits transportation, currency conversations and free trade which all marks clear elements of liberal trade which is in line with the global laws controlling the World Trade Organisation (WTO). This also makes it easier for China to invest with trust in Zambia which possesses conducive and suitable environments, amongst others in Africa. As a result of this, China has bestowed greatly in Zambia's areas of energy, transport infrastructure, road infrastructure, manufacturing and SEZs, agriculture and farm blocks.

5.4.1. Energy

The Zambian energy sector has seen a significant increase in FDI from China after the FOCAC initiation in the early 2000s. China has been making huge investments in Zambia's energy sector as depicted by the figure below. More especially in the coal and hydropower (Lubinda and Jian 2018). These projects have the potential to assist Zambia's national energy sector in curbing energy shortfalls. Even though ZESCO is at the forefront of these new energy generation capacities, China leads it in the areas of financial arrangements and construction of this generation infrastructure (Mwanza, 2018). The latter does not mean that China is practically in charge of ZESCO. Below is the Figure that shows Chinese investment involvement in the energy of Zambia. The below table shows all the projects, types, sizes, cost in \$US, year online, ownership, builder, and external finances.

Figure 6: Recent and Planned Large (>50 MW) Power Projects in Zambia

Project	Type	Size	Cost \$US Million	Year online	Ownership	Builder	External Financing
Kariba north bank Extension	Hydro	360 MW	\$460	2012	Zesco	Sino hydro (China)	China Exim Bank Development Bank of southern Africa (DBSA)
Maamba thermal Plant	Coal	300 MW	\$830	2015(?)	MCL PPA 100% to ZESCO; O&M by Nava Bharat (Singapore) 65%; ZCCM-IH 35%	SEPCO (China)	Bank of china Industrial and commercial bank of China
Itezhi-tezhi	Hydro	120 MW	\$275	2016 (?)	ZESCO, TATA (India)	Sino hydro (China)	African Development Bank; DBSA; Dutch Development Bank;propaco (France)
Scaling Solar	Solar	100 MW	Under tender	2016- 2017 (?)	Zambia Industrial development Corporation (IDC)	Under Tender	IFC/world Bank
Kafue Gorge Lower	Hydro	750 MW	\$1,940	2017	ZESCO	Sino hydro (China)	China Exim Bank

Source: (Lubinda & Jian, 2018: 210).

5.4.2. Rail line

In between the years 1968 and 1976, Zambia got assistance from China in the construction of the TAZARA railway. This 1860 KM railway project was completed with the technical and financial aid from China, which amounted to over US\$400m, secured in the ways of long-term, free interest loans. The same project was a way of furnishing Zambia with the way towards the sea, needed by Zambia to do away with its dependence on Angola, South Africa, and Zimbabwe ports and rails. Even though this is the case, the TAZARA project has not been sustained well as of recently (2015-present times), due to the drowning of the governments into debts and ultimately, TAZARA's operations were heavily curtailed (Lubinda & Jian, 2018). To avoid the aggregate disintegration of the entire rail authority on this project, China in 2012 reassured to step in and assist Zambia with an aid of about US\$5m to recondition 90

wagons. The conditions of the aid were highlighted in the loan agreement signed by Zhiyong Lin (Chief agent of the economic and commercial delegation of the people's PRC in Tanzania) and Mbikusita-Lewanika Akashambatwa (MD of TAZARA). After the signing of this, Mbikusita-Lewanika highlighted how the assistance of China under the 15 protocols gestured over the last decades had ensured the avoidance of the complete collapse of the rail authority of Zambia. Mbikusita-Lewanika said that:

We acknowledge that the support funds under the protocols are provided as interest-free loans to the Tanzanian and Zambian governments, we are also grateful to the government and the people of China for the continuing positive association with Tazara (Lubinda & Jian, 2018: 211)

Despite the erection of TAZARA for Zambia in 2009, China also agreed to assist Zambia with another rail line worth \$2.26 billion as part of the bigger Chinese investment foot on Africa's infrastructure. This rail line was struck to reconnect the two Zambian cities in the Eastern part of Zambia (Serenje and Chipata). The key signatory players in this were Zambia's Ministry of Transport, Work, Supply and Communications and China Civil Engineering Construction Corp (CRCC), which is a sub-actor of the Chinese state, owned Railway Construction, Corp. Ltd. This rail line stretches about 240 miles between these cities, enabling its passengers to travel about 75mph with a cargo weight of about 50mph (Lubinda & Jian, 2018). The same rail line is also poised to interlink Malawi and Zambia across Chipata Mchinji railway line¹³ (completed), which invigorates both Zambia's international and local trade prospects. The same project was signed to improve Zambia's regional transportation and trade competitiveness by affording Zambia with an opportunity to access the East Coast of Africa through the Nacala port of Mozambique, as both railways and road projects are important when it comes to interlinking countries. Alternative reasons given are that the travel and shipment-using railways are very much safer and cheaper. Thus, the construction of these railway line infrastructures was deemed to contribute to the reduction of transportation costs and delivery times which in exchange reduces the total trade costs (Lubinda & Jian, 2018).

¹³ Shortest route to the port of Nacala on the Indian Ocean, boosting trade not only in Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia but the entire southern African region.

5.4.3. Road infrastructure

In Zambia, roads or highway infrastructures are not really in virtuous conditions. As such, this has brought intense difficulty when it comes to land communication. In consideration of an economic perspective in this instance, it becomes observable that a substandard road infrastructure elevates transportations costs and the delays in terms of the delivery of goods (Road Development Agency, 2014). As a result, China has been heavily involved in the road infrastructure of Zambia. A considerable case point would be that of 2012 when the former president of Zambia, Sata began the “Link Zambia 8000 road project”, otherwise named the “Accelerated National Roads Construction Programme” (Road Development Agency, 2014: 3). From the 23 construction contracts of Link Zambia 8000, 16 of these work contracts were awarded to the companies of China of which “85% were bankrolled loans from China Exim Bank (Lusakatimes, 2010). This has shown the Chinese government that the Zambian government trusts them. This was not the first and last as the Zambian government had also awarded construction sector projects to China. A case point would be that of 2013 when the Road Development Agency (RDA) of Zambia awarded China with US\$108 million construction contract of Sino-Zambia Limited for the erection of “45.5 Kilometre dual carriageway from Kitwe to Chingola” (Lusakatimes, 2010).

This road remains a pivotal road that is a significant link to the North-South Corridor and also a part of the regional trunk road network. This is one road that bears a significant number of link roads to the North-Western Zambia and the Copper belt as well as the international traffic to the rest of Zambia and beyond the country’s borders. In addition to the trust that Zambia bestowed to China, in 2015, Zambia also awarded the contract worth US\$209m to China Henan International Corporation for the erection and draw plans of the Mansa-Luwingu road¹⁴. In supporting the awarding of this contract, Bernard Chiwala (CEO of RDA) stated that the construction of this road was poised to furnish Zambians with the shortest travel from Kasama to Mansa and also ensures that there is a shorter interlinkage between the Luapula and the Copperbelt provinces (Lubinda & Jian, 2018). Also, Chiwala deliberated that after the finalisation

¹⁴ This is a 40-month road project worth more than US\$209.9 million, which also included the tarring of 30 kilo-metres of township roads in the Northern Province district

of these projects, the Zambian road infrastructure would have seen more development that would be very much faster and assist the supply and communication chain system. This was to also reduce transportation costs and make easy, access to Zambia's market to all regions of Zambia and Africa. This is so as the infrastructure remains a key factor in the environment of investments in countries such as Zambia and can make Zambia have more FDI inflows and more attractive as compared to other countries (Lusakatimes, 2010).

5.4.4. Agriculture and farm blocks

By the year 2015, records show that there were only two farms in Zambia which were owned by the Chinese state. But in the succeeding years, China had taken upon itself to assist Zambia to open some centres specifically for agriculture training. The Jilin Agriculture University is the one, through China, which assisted Zambia to open the Technological Demonstration Centre in Zambia-Lusaka in 2012. Since its opening, the centre has managed to train more than 200 students and farmers. The centre's main objective is to at least reach a target of about 300 students every year and in consideration of the number of already trained students and farmers every year, a target is reached and very much feasible. This centre trains students and farmers on programmes consisting of mushrooms, soya, vegetables, maize, and wheat together with classes on the operation of the machinery (Lubinda & Jian, 2018).

Even though it was established in 2012, it has a vision for Zambians of that of having extended programmes for the future in soil testing and computers for all University of Zambia (UNZA) students (Chileshe, 2010). The Zambian Ministry of Agriculture in 2012 illustrated that the centre's operations will bestow greatly to the country's national food security by uplifting the country's productivity in agriculture and by also edifying the farmer's welfare. Before its establishment in 2011, Rupiah Banda (Former President of Zambia) argued that the establishment of the centre was a positive move and it was poised to increase the country's economic growth and also agricultural production (Lubinda & Jian, 2018). In Banda's opinion, the establishment of the centre was to furnish Zambian small-scale farmers with more agricultural expertise needed to transform increased agricultural production and also a walk towards the reduction of poverty circles especially in the rural areas (Chileshe, 2010). This centre also

worked to lay bare small-scale farmers to brand new and very high productive crop diversification. Now Zambia can record extra bountiful harvests (Chileshe, 2010).

5.4.5. Mining

The burgeoning metal prices on the global commodity markets stimulated by an increase in demand for metals from the Asian countries such as China has led to Zambia to record extra copper production peaks, exceeding the largest which was last recorded in 1972 of the 700000 tons. As of now, Zambia continues to entice private FDI in the sector of mining which contributes immensely to the production increase of the copper and alternative metals. As such, the production of copper has increased in 2008 from 572, 793 to be on top of 800000 by the year 2012. This huge increment saw projections alluding that by the year 2016, it would have reached about 1500 000 tons if there were extra mining projects to have undertaken in the country's mining sector (Zambia Development Agency, 2014). Up to date, Zambia's mining sector continues to record a huge increase in mining production. Mubita (2013: 82) contends that Zambia's mining sector has managed to entice investment which exceeds USD 8 billion since the creation of FOCAC in the early 2000s and this has managed to furnish Zambia with about 740000 employment opportunities by the year 2012. In the mining sector, Mubita (2013) argues that the Asian tiger has managed to make important contributions in terms of FDI. To support this, the ZDA has also attested that the Asian tiger is in charge of about 5 mining companies and also continues to look for investments opportunities in the sector (Zambia Development Agency, 2014).

5.5. Conclusion

Flowing from the above discussion of how Zambia's political and economic environments influence China's Zambia policy, it is clear and informative that Zambia's political environment had been so fertile in the sense that there are no recurring electoral violations and human security¹⁵ challenges as it is seen by SADC electoral observation missions to have had free and fair elections in the past presidential

¹⁵ **Human security** embraces economic security, environmental security, food security, personal security, and national security.

elections. This chapter has explored also, Zambia's economic environment and the evidence that investigation that emerges from the above analysis shows that WIPO has admitted that property rights are protected in Zambia. Another significant aspect of this discussion is the country's economic liberalization which ensures that there are free trade and freedom of transporting profits back to China. What is most important is that the country is rich in copper, which had become a need for the Chinese economy. The context of rich mineral resources in Zambia, as well as the stable economic environment, has encouraged China to invest heavily in the African country's areas of energy, rail line, road infrastructure, agriculture, and farms block as well mining. These huge investment records show that China has placed its trust in Zambia as a test case for its investment plans in the continent. Thus, it is by no surprise that it also become conclusive that sustainable political and economic environments are what motivates China's flourishing engagement with Zambia.

The following chapter prospects the successes and failures of Chinese mining companies in the practise of CSR in Zambia's mining sector.

CHAPTER SIX

An examination of Chinese mining companies' Corporate Social Responsibility successes and failures in Zambia

6.1. Introduction

This chapter places attention on the analysis of successfulness and incompetence of the Chinese companies in the application of CSR agenda in Zambia's mining sector. The need to explore the CSR agenda arises out several studies which have reported how Chinese mining companies were mistreating Zambian workers as they have long working hours, poor safety and health conditions and their hatred of some of the relevant mining trade unions. For this study and chapter, the researcher has limited himself to the findings of the Human Rights Watch's 2011 report which revealed that China does not conform to the principles of CSR in Zambia's mining sector. Thus, this chapter outlines all the proceedings of Chinese mining companies in Zambia by looking at how they have conducted themselves in the practise of CSR especially in the areas of health and safety, remuneration, working hours as well as job safety and unionization between the years 2010-2018. To realise this, this chapter firsts outlines all Chinese companies which have operations in Zambia in the mining sector and escalates the discussion of HRW's 2011 report which shaped the analysis advanced in this chapter. Also, a further expansion of the analysis surrounding the bad publicity of Chinese mining companies in Zambia has been made to draw a thorough understanding of what could lead to this kind of publicity. In the process, this chapter has given a summary of the CSR agenda (aims and objectives) both in the global and continental context. This was done to ensure that there is an understanding of the CSR agenda in this chapter (before further deep exploration of the CSR: definitions and contours in the next chapter).

6.2. Chinese Mining Companies in Zambia Vs Human Rights Watch

Amongst those mining companies of China which have operations in Zambia include the likes of "Africa Mining Plc, Non-Ferrous Corporation Africa Mining Plc, China Beijing Soly Technology Co., Ltd, N F C Africa Mining Pic, Chambishi Metals Pi" (Africa

advice, 2019). Not only do the companies include the above highlighted but also the likes of smaller ones such as Jianchuan Mining Group/ Nickel city of China as well as Luanshya which are under the command of the CNMC (Li 2010). There are others as well which do not trade with the London Metal Exchange as they are smaller and instead, transport their minerals to China for further processing unlike the CNMC (Li, 2010). The HRW shows that China has shares amounting to 88% in the mining industry of Zambia. To be relevant to the context of this chapter, the researcher has discovered that in the year 2011, most of the Chinese mining companies were found wanted for violating Zambia's national law as it was reflected by a combination of poor health and safety conditions (Rapanyane 2020).

In furtherance, the Chinese dislike for the trade unions of Zambia also made this matter worse including long recorded labour hours in most of these Chinese mines per working day. It was still in 2011 when the Zambian workers of Chinese mines laid complaints that they were working under brutal conditions that tempered with the international and Zambian working standards/ laws (Smith, 2011). There is no gainsaying that matters of this kind are not foreign to Zambia as in the year 2010, both Wu Jian Hua and Xiao Li Shan (managers of a Chinese mine) were convicted of attempting to kill, by shooting straight at Zambian workers who were protesting in the Collum Coal Mine for better incomes in Sinazongwe, Southern town of Zambia in the Southern Province (Smith, 2011; Silwamba, 2010). Silwamba (2010) argued extensively that this incident was not supposed to be interpreted with surprised lenses as China is well known globally for its substandard human rights practises.

Having said the above, it became inevitable that since China arrived in Zambia, the Asian tiger's mining corporations have established about 14 China Nonferrous Metal Mining (Group) Company (CMNC) subsidiaries intending to explore the mining industry of the African country. In practical economic terms, China has also managed to create about 1400000 employment opportunities, making China the largest investor in the country's mining sector (CGTN, 2015). In terms of matters purely related to CSR, Chinese mining companies have managed to also establish the public hospital of the SINOZAM¹⁶ which was now and/ of recent closed for stocking medicines which are expired. This friendship hospital built by China in Zambia offers free medical aid to all

¹⁶ Is a hospital that caters for over 37000 Kitwe residents in Zambia

the workers of the Chinese mines, combined with the members of their families (CGTN, 2015). Chisanga Patrick (Dr. General of ZDA) has corroborated the importance of the Investment of China in the mining sector of Zambia as one of the things that seek to endorse the industrialisation plans of Zambia and also standing to contribute immensely to job opportunities for local Zambians (CGTN, 2015).

In his analysis of the subject matter, Okeowo's (2013)'s online article titled "China, Zambia, and a Clash in a Coal Mine" should not be side-lined as it shows the events that led to the bad publicity of the Collum Mine in Zambia. In context, what transpired in the Collum Mine was that, the Zambian workers became very angry and started a violent protest at the mine because of the little money it was paying them which, when converted can equal a single Kwacha in 2012. The consequences of this were that, there were two Chinese men who were killed, and some were even hospitalized. Having articulated the 2012 violent event, it is also important to add that this can be in line with the Human Rights Watch's 2011 report which was issued outlining extreme unions' dissatisfactions, little incomes and labour ill-treatments in the Chinese mining companies, more particularly as it relates to the CNMC subsidiaries (Dynamic, 2015). To reject the findings of this report, Jiechi Yang (Former Chinese foreign minister) dismissed it in the same year (2011) arguing that this report was flawed and western constructed. Yang added that all the workers of Chinese mines in Zambia were well taken care of as well as their rights which topped China's priorities at any collaboration level for both sides (Reuters, 2011).

The above analysis depicts a picture that illustrate that indeed China's international relations with Zambia has its own weaknesses, although some Zambians still do believe in the investment brought by China in Zambia's mining sector. The challenges underlined provide a clear scenario that shows well that in the mining sector of Zambia, China continues to experience problems as it at some point does not meet the requirements of the CSR's international standard. Thus, their practises at some point does not provide satisfaction to others whilst it is not a problem to others. A case in point would be the HRW's report issued in 2011 which was extensively dissatisfied with the Chinese corporate ethic strategies applied which should be nourished and preserved at all costs by these mining companies. The foregoing in simple terms meant that there is a need for scholars to get a picture of what the CSR agenda should entail especially when it is encouraged for all Chinese mining companies. This

assertion is deliberated with a clear admission that between the years 2010 to 2018, China did not really take CSR seriously in Zambia though at some point, it provided successes and challenges. The fact of the matter is that the denial of the Chinese leaders that China engages in ill-treatments to Chinese Zambia workers as illustrated in HRW's report provide a huge confusion to the subject of this nature. In context, the researcher has provided an extensive picture/ a broader analysis of the CSR agenda. Before analysing the successes and challenges encountered by Chinese mining companies in the practise of CSR. The researcher has also extended a hand in the discussion and summarization of what CSR should entail, particularly in the global context (thus a broader analysis of CSR in context is in the next Chapter).

6.3. The Concept CSR in the Global Context: An overview of the true agenda

In short and straight to the point, CSR can be defined as a procedure that is applicable to all international companies in their conduct for the purposes of managing and producing total positive results in the communities they have operations in (Baker 2004). This procedure covers social impact, ethical practises and sustainability, and if practised in the right way, could be all in the name of the business and how it realise profits and not really all about philanthropic engagements (Baker 2004). CSR has of the late transformed to be one of the fundamental elements embraced by international businesses which pursue profits and as such, its adoption and application always is a matter of comparison in different global countries. Even if they differ from one country to another, there is a clear constant view that CSR should be an understanding code of all different corporate citizens in different countries. In the context of this study, all mines in different global host countries are expected to engage CSR as a fundamental norm (to be highlighted broadly in the next chapter).

In Zambia for example, the practise of CSR is not only a matter of Chinese mining companies or international companies, but a normal practise of every business entity including those of the telecommunications, banks and hotels which are anticipated to embrace CSR in different ways (Womba, 2014). Whilst discussing this, it is also important to note that this concept can be applied in various ways. That is why it remains a tremendously debatable global topic as it has various interpretations which are always conditional to various global countries (i.e. Zambia in this case) and to

some extent political and economic affairs of a country. Cramer (2006) tells us that the CSR explanation is always conditional to the political conditions of a certain transparent country. Since its introduction ages ago, its interpretations have often been subjected to the collaborations of companies in their host country, especially in the areas they have operations in. The underlying fact behind this is that, even the affairs of companies may even to some extent be broadened to appear different in their business engagements in all these host countries. A relevant example in the context of this study is that as a developing country (Zambia), Zambia would expect all the companies to more concerned with philanthropic and social giving back than profit.

This is so even if Cramer (2006) has argued extensively that philanthropy is not important when it comes to Chinese mining companies. Cramer (2006) further demonstrated that the underlying reason behind this is because Chinese employees do not really give their employee permanent posts. That is because they are concerned with food supply and a place to sleep which remains even more relevant to both the team. The relevancy of the context of this argument has been placed in this chapter because the researcher has been inquisitive as to what extent could this be the myths and realities of Zambian employees. In adjoining the real disparity of the context of CSR in different countries. One could argue that is also a social programme integrating both economic and social policy just as supported by De Haan (2007).

Realistically, there is a need for a deep understanding of what the latter means to grasp what is happening in Zambia. De Haan (2007) did not shy away from reminding us that by amalgamating both economic and social policies so that a country can have economic growth and social development is one of the fundamental imperatives, particularly as it relates to education and health. In addition, it is also believed that the rule for combining the two can yield out economic growth which is more important than anything else. The most important result of the practise of this has been the 68% contribution of the mining industry in Zambia's gross export proceeds (Zambia EITI, 2016). The significance of the incorporation of this recent narrative is to countercheck the balance of philanthropy, social and economic together with political impacts on the CSR agenda worldwide before exploring the successes and challenges of CSR practise in Zambia between the years 2010-2018.

To be practical and truthful, in Africa, the CSR agenda is really shown when companies help all their host communities in development initiatives unlike in the Global North (USA, Canada, UK etc..). Haalboom (2012) has interjected the view that Africa's host communities expect these big companies to help them in erecting the likes of schools, furnishing the locals with job opportunities, aiding them with electricity infrastructure and also constructing roads together with ensuring that they make available microcredit lending schemes. But principally, they are really concerned with the issues of social and environmental footprints, fundamental human rights of the native people as well as the health and safety of the workers together with their humane incomes (Haalboom 2012). As we are still in the African continent, all of the above mentioned is to take place in all the surroundings of all these companies.

The inter-linkage between profit-making in this instance is to ensure that these companies do not really stick to making profit their concern. Of which will motivate the side-lining the host communities and as such, accountability and transparency to remain matters of concerns in helping all the companies of the likes of China and others from the Global North to do their operations smoothly (Kumar, 2016). The fundamental motive behind this discussion is to show that all business stakeholders from any country to the host country in the world can be well informed of the expectations that seeks to encourage good social, economic and good environmental implications of the business proceedings in Africa, (i.e. Zambia) (Kumar, 2016). Having the highlighted the above context of CSR in the world, it is informative for the reader to note that the next section goes straight into the role/ the expectations of the conduct of all Chinese mining companies in Zambia's mining industry. Thus, to remain relevant in this study, a well broadened discussion of the successes of all Chinese mining companies practise of CSR was deemed important.

6.4. The Successful CSR Practises of Chinese Mining Companies in Zambia

The relevancy of leaning on the HRW's 2011 report in which indicated that there were important human rights detractors in the operations of Chinese mining companies in Zambia was informed by the periodization approach. This forced the researcher to not side-line the important role played by this report in informing the public of the human rights violations and inhuman practise which continue to be the order of the day in the

mining companies of China. In underlying the significance of the report of the HRW, it remains informative to take note that, it only contributes to better understanding the context of the central theme of this chapter. Thus, it did not play a significant role in shaping the view of the researcher as an African in relation to what is transpiring in Zambia's mining industry. Thus, by virtue of concern, the views expressed in the report remain important as they are the result of extent groundwork which was conducted by the HRW to yield credible results. Though in this study, the researcher explores these problems with limited attention to some of the important issues which are raised in the return to check if, as of currently, these issues have been improved or not.

Realistically, this chapter sought to narrow the four fundamental issues of health and safety, working hours, wage and unionization and also job security to get a clear picture of how Chinese mining companies have approached and violated these four CSR related issues. In context, the successes which are first discussed have to do with highlighting the improvements, if any record that shows that Chinese mining companies have upgraded and improved the HRW's 2011 issues of concern in the Zambian case. Another sparking interest is given to a broader analysis of the challenges which continue to prevail in these mining companies. The remarks expressed in this chapter are the result of an Afrocentric perspective on the subject matter and that they should be seen or interpreted with the lens of the applied theory, just not to say the researcher is defending China, but analysing the counter-progress recorded since the year 2011. The first issue which was underlined in the 2011 HRW's report is the problem of health and safety.

6.4.1 Health and Safety problems

In description, this was exemplified the worst form of violation conducted in the mining companies of China. The report as it is has drawn this view from the personal interviews with 48 miners of the non-Chinese owned and 95 CNMC miners (HRW, 2011). Having this in mind, it remains important to inform readers that showcasing a progress in the violations expressed by Chinese mining companies is not a counter-progressive view but one that shows that Chinese mines have engaged the issue and tried by all means to deal with the problem underlined. Both Hairong and Sautman (2013) argue that the sentiments expressed in the HRW's report are those

representing the views of the global North and that all the views in the report contradicts the ground reality of the observers in the mining industry of Zambia.

Munyenyembe Oswell (Mineworkers Union of Zambia President) has supported the assertions expressed by both Hairong and Suatman by indicating that “his union cannot entirely blame the Chinese companies because other mining houses are equally culprits” (Daily Mail [Zambia], 2011). In addition to the views expressed by Munyenyembe, Delax Chilumbu (Chief Engineer of Zambia’s Mines) has furthered the argument by elaborating that “Chinese Mining Companies were doing very well around the issues of health and safety” of which confirmed the words of Kalezi Smart (Zambia Safety Department’s Chief inspector) who said that “Chinese mines were doing fine and no longer stood out” (Daily Mail [Zambia], 2011).

The sentiments expressed above should be accompanied by the views of Moota Lumamba (Dir. Of Mine Safety Department of Zambia) who has deliberated that all the Chinese mines which have operations in Zambia’s mining industry possesses advancement machinery equipment including the likes of trolley lines, dust abatement, winders which all do excellent work and do not have any implications on safety and health problems (Hairong & Suatman, 2013: 142). The narrative espoused simply means that by 2013, Chinese mines had already upgraded their machinery to counter the views of the HRW of that of 2011. The accused and labelled flawed in HRW’s report have displayed important concerns which have had a significant hand in the improvements recorded in Chinese mines by the year 2013. As such, even if it could have been hijacked by certain Global North imperatives to report narrowed facts of what is really happening in Zambia’s mining industry, it is still of importance to consider the views of Zambians in this case in order to have a ground projection of what is really happening in Zambia.

In spite of this, this study is of the view that much of the problems which relate to health and safety issues in Zambia have been tackled with and that although it is accused to be flawed, the HRW’s report has played a huge role in ensuring that these issues are done and dusted with. Both Webby Mushota (Dir. Of MUZ’s Occupational health and Safety) and Good Kaluba (National Union of Mine and Allied Workers’ President) have expressed their views that all Chinese mines especially those of the NFCA have recorded major improvements by 2013, particularly as it relates to health and safety

concerns i.e. Chambishi mine (Hairong & Sautman, 2013: 142). Despite the above mentioned two Zambians, Mwamba Roy (SG of Zambia Congress Trade Unions) has “acknowledged that the larger Chinese enterprises were abiding by local labour law” (Tang and Brautigam, 2011: 45). Meanwhile, there is a list of some of the Chinese mines who are said to have by 2013, completely abided by all the labour laws of Zambia and these were: “CLM, NFCA, and CNMC processing plant CCS, three of the four companies HRW says are abusers” (Hairong & Suatman, 2013: 141).

6.4.2 Remuneration problems

According to the report of the HRW, there were concerns raised showing that Chinese mines were paying their workers little incomes which were “one-fourth compared to their contenders for identical duties” (HRW, 2011: 24). The sentiments expressed in the report shows that there was some other unnamed NGO which has deliberated that in 2010, Mufulira mines which had sub-contractors was paying their Zambian workers half incomes of all permanent employees for the same duties (Counter balance, 2010: 17). In practical terms, the revelations in Counter balance indicate that this was due to the CNMC subsidiaries employed and continue to employ high numbers of permanent employees of which in disparity, their competitors only employed and continue to employ low paid contract workers.

This as shown, has extensively narrowed to dismiss the problem of wage gaps in the records of comparisons (Counter balance, 2010). A matter of concern from this could be that the report of HRW could have side-lined the workforce composition in the construction of this dominant narrative for matters of wage disparity. Thus, to be precise, what has transpired in all these Chinese mines, according to Counter balance (2010) was also a day to day activity of the Chambishi mine which paid its workers fewer incomes in comparisons with its counterparts of the UK-India led or Owned Konkola Mines (KCM) to have been rated the best paying mine by the year 2011 in the country.

After this rating, all Chinese Mines begun with the processes of improving their industry-standard remunerations as indicated by Munyenyembe that they started making these promises in the year 2012, for the years which were coming after 2012.

The reality of the matter is that some other Chinese mines have indeed met their commitments like those subsidiaries of the NFCA which managed to raise their wages from 54% to 76% in 2012 (Hairong and Sautman, 2013: 142). It is important to note that there were certain reasons on why in the year's prior 2013, Chinese mines were paying their employees little incomes. These reasons range from the CNMC high proportion of investment to reasons beyond the scope of this study. Meanwhile in 2010, the NFCA once deliberated that it has invested in Zambia's mining sector but also put aside "US\$1.4 billion" for the country's infrastructural development imperatives (Times of Zambia, 2010). In addition to these reasons, NFCA had by then also invested "US\$800 million more to develop Southeast Ore Body" in Zambia (Times of Zambia, 2011).

There were other extensive projects which were put aside which demanded millions, if not billions such as the Rehabilitation of the Luanshya Copper Mine (LCM) which demanded at least US\$70 million from the CNMC after it was abandoned by the Swiss owners in the year 2008 citing problems with London Metal Exchange. To add, an extra US\$438 million was placed aside back then to enlarge the Baluba mine and also build the Mulyashi Mine, all done with the purpose of increasing job opportunities. Not only this but also an added US\$340 million which were CNMC invested for the erection project of the Chambishi Copper Smelter (CCS) (Zambia Review, 2011: 48, 51). One of the fundamental reasons which is given in relation to the low incomes paid to Zambian employees was attributed to the fact that the period prior 2013 had been accompanied by scourge of discontinuities and transformation in the Chinese mining companies, hence low salaries (Hairong & Sautman, 2013: 145). Thus, the relevancy of the incorporation of definite historicity, structure and profitability of the CNMC productions should be taken into consideration in the discussion of the above factors in the CNMC and Non-CNMC mines, particularly as it relates to wage disparities (Van Bracht, 2012).

6.4.3 Working Shifts

Based on the HRW's (2011: 3) report, both the Sino Metals and CCS hired employees who had worked for about 12 hour shifts which contradicted the law of Zambia and the standards which outlines well that Zambians should be on duty for at least 8 hours in

a day in all the mining operations including the Zambian copper mines. Wells (2011) indicates that the HRW report has also outlined well by elaborating: “several Chinese-run copper mining companies require miners to work brutally long hours—72-hour workweek for some, 365 days without an off day for others”. Times of Zambia (2012) reports that what sparks a dramatic evident picture of this issue are the strikes which took place in the Chinese mines in the place of Kansanshi in the year 2012 whereby the workers made specific demands to better curb the enforced 12-hour shift to be cut to 8-hour shift.

The views expressed in relation to the working shifts are countered by the sentiments of Hairong and Sautman (2013) who have observed that by 2013, there was a court battle over this matter and the Zambia Industrial Relations Court ordered that in all these Chinese mines who have working hour shifts, Zambia employees should with immediate effect start working for 8-hour shifts. The CNMC subsidiaries embraced this order with both hands and started effecting the demands of the court. Since the year 2012, all mining employees have been working for 8 hours in a day and often times have one day off in a week to rest.

6.4.4 The affairs of Job Security and Unionization

In the report, there is another important issue which attests that most of the workers Unions have been discharged and thrown out of both the Sino Metals and CCS (HRW, 2011). A clear demonstration is given indicating that the likes of MUZ have been sidelined with their operations in most of the Chinese mines. This violent human rights malpractise infringed on the human rights of the people of Zambia. The report has been communicated even if Ngosa and Van Alstine (2011: 23) have both agreed that indeed NUMAW and MUZ have been negotiating working deals with the Sino Metals since the year 2010. The fundamental narrative espoused by the two authors is evidenced, although when explored further shows that indeed there had been about 50% to 70% workers unionization in all the copper mines of Zambia.

A relevant case point in this would be both the 2011 and 2012 when the Mine of Kansanshi was completely unionized with all workers' union affiliation (Ngosa & Van Alstine, 2011: 23). On records, NUMAW was the most effective with more than 1000

membership than MUZ in the mine of Kansanshi. In the spirit of progress, the CLM in 2012 also recorded more effective NUMAW than MUZ (Haglund, 2010: 107). It is still Haglund (2010) who postulates there were contradictions in relation to the other 2010 court order that was issued out demanding that CCS recognise MUZ even though the CCS has never heard of such before. In context, it became clear that this was impossible, especially with the support of Haglund's study which has shown that the CCS was a subsidiary of the NFCA which supported MUZ together with CLM and Sino Metals (Haglund, 2010: 107).

The context of the argument espoused above has pushed the researcher to advance a conclusive remark that what has tarnished the unionization activism in Zambia's mining sector might have not been CNMC. But perhaps a depreciation when it comes to the union-membership because of financial liabilities which were also worsened by extensive retrenchments which were happening all over in the companies which were non-Chinese owned (Hairong & Sautman, 2013). To support this, in the 2011, there was a devastating effect on MUZ which had experienced a dribbled membership from 26000 to 12000 in all Non-Chinese owned companies before their retrenchments. The context of the discussion of both CCS and Sino Metals in the HRW (2011) is narrowed as it does not reflect an analysis which highlights the unavailability of MUZ at both companies which might have had an impact on both's unionism. The absence of the acknowledgement of the CNMC's operations during Zambia's economic stagnation is the one aspect of this discussion which also raises a question of whether CNMC with its provision of employment opportunities was ever taken into consideration. An example of this was when Zambia went through a financial draught in 2010 and the CNMC stood still with its 2400 employees' addition after it acquired Luanshya mine.

The most pertinent practise that could have never been avoided in the report is the previous Swiss owners only employed 1000 employees on a contractual basis (Times of Zambia 2004). After it was acquired by China in the year 2009, the Chinese CNMC abandoned all the contractual agreements and nourished the Zambian locals with permanent posts and even doubled their salaries (Fessehaie, 2011: 60). Chinese companies also continue to support other mining companies which seek to abandon their operations based on technical problems and low prices. This includes the likes of the Albidon Ltd, Chinese State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) supportive act of 2011

when it supported Munali Nickel Mine because of the latter. In the spirit of *ubuntu*¹⁷, China through Albidon Ltd with 51% owned by Jinchuan continued with its disbursement of salaries to its estimated 2000 workers off duty so that it can be credited for CSR (Zambian Watchdog, 2011). Beside the latter, some of the mines of China also begun their agenda of CSR in the year 2012 in the form of building “two high voltage electric power transmission lines” to have been expected to be finished to feed both mining and agricultural projects including the cotton (Reuters, 2012). The above-mentioned projects were interlinked to Zambia’s power supplies in the industry of mining including the likes of “Lumwana Power Project to supply the Lumwana Copper Mine” (Faurie, 2009).

Having recorded the above, it was deemed important also to place it on record that there are Chinese actors in the mining sector of Zambia especially in the sections of infrastructural development which have committed themselves to aiding the country with economic growth (Elliassen, 2012: 28). These actors have committed themselves to decreasing their operational costs so that they can pursue increased trade ties so they can assist in the development of the country’s economy especially in the areas of railways, bridges, roads, help in building power stations and providing loans. To add, promoting extensive trade domain by making sure that there is accessibility to telecommunication by all Zambians. Such Chinese actors continue to be acknowledged for the significant role in Zambia (Davies, 2010: 23).

Therefore, with China’s extensive engagement in Zambia’s mining processes, it is non-arguable to allude that this is what has led to Zambia in ensuring that the 68% total export earnings come from the mineral resource complex trade which accounts for up to 11% of the entire country’s total GDP (Dynamic, 2018). Thus, from the year 2012, records have been showing well that the employment rate provided by the mining industry in Zambia makes up to 21% of the total official Zambia’s private precinct. To add, since 2012, it has been estimated that the mining sector was going to even contribute more and more and even double its skill in dealing with the problems of Zambia more esp., job scarcity and backward linkages (Dynamic 2018; World Bank Group, 2015).

¹⁷ is a Nguni Bantu term meaning "humanity" It is often translated as "I am because we are," or "humanity towards others"

6.5 Contemporary CSR challenges that brings bad publicity to Chinese Mining companies in Zambia

The above backdrop has discussed the challenges expressed in the HRW's 2011 report and the extent to which some of the Chinese mines had been able to tackle these problems. It was deemed important to broaden some of the contemporary challenges which continue to prevail in the mines which are owned by China. As of the years 2013-2017, there were reports that some of the Chinese employees were crying about their Chinese bosses which also accounts for \$1 billion investment in the copper rich mineral industry of Zambia (The Namibian, 2013). It was in the year 2017 when the complaints were received by Zambia's mineral industry from the government of China in relation to the nationals of China who were captured by the Zambian authorities after having engaged in several unlawful mining practises (BBC News, 2017).

In the process of this incident, the mining license which was acquired by one of the arrested was revoked by the Zambian mining authorities citing the Chinese national's failures to pay them mineral royalties. To add Mukanga Yamfwa (Zambia's Minister of Mines) articulated that "The government has also taken over the running of the mines and will continue operating them until a suitable investor is found" (BBC News, 2017). It was also Mukanga who in 2013 said that the Collum Coal mine has a history of poor safety, health, and environmental capitulation which in most of the times was caused by the non-qualified workers (Adamu, 2013). In addition, Mukanga added that: "in some instances, the entire mine has been closed to allow the mine management (to) comply with mine safety department directives, but there has been no improvement" and also that: "The mine did not have emergency medical treatment facilities such as ambulances or a first-aid station underground" (Adamu, 2013).

On records, the mine was also accused of having not released the reports showing their mineral production which is needed for the mining companies which have operations in Zambia as per the law (Adamu, 2013). The al-most suffered same fate/worst horror was that of the experiences under the Black Mountain mine in 2018 when it encountered an incident whereby 11 people died after the mine collapsed as a result of the largest copper and cobalt slag dump site which collapsed too. The victims of

this incident were severely injured. The collapse of this mine is attributed to the operations of the “Jerabos”¹⁸ who have operations in mines of this kind without the necessary skill or equipment, and as a result falls under the category of untrained and unqualified workers who have been in charge of the utility of the dumpsite’s resources. This incident received too much attention because it happened in the mining owned by China (Mutale, 2018).

On the other side, scholars allege that this incident could have been caused by the unstable politicians of Zambia including the likes of Edgar Lungu (incumbent), as the Mine Safety Department (MSD) of Zambia had also demonstrated that Lungu had received threats earlier on of giving him an order to give the “Jerabos” the mine (Mutale, 2018). On the other side, there have been records showing that by the year 2015, both the conditions in the local mine unions and NFCA have improved significantly to now standardized relations, although there are still cases that some of the Chinese mines are still unsafe with unregulated environments of which some had no safety equipment. Dynamic (2018) proclaims that the post-2012 incidents which involves China were not worse than the incident of 2006 of BGRIMM¹⁹ which killed a lot of people and also the 2010-11 protests which were more involved in the NFCA subsidiaries. In context, it is quite clear that there have been major changes when it comes to the enforcement of both safety and labour regulations both in the NFCA and CCS subsidiaries (Dynamic, 2018).

The above analysis as broadly given should never depict a picture of a certain direct engineered attack on Chinese mines which have operations in Zambia, but rather an objective informed perspective which highlights the challenges that China is facing in the mining sector of Zambia (Dynamic, 2018). Practically, the former is led by a number of factors, one: Chinese companies come from a country that has not subjected its companies to the merits of CSR unlike their counterparts in the West. This narrative is extensively led by the fact that in China, all their companies are not exposed to the demands of CSR. Therefore, this means that when China adopted the policy of going global in the early 1990s, all Chinese companies had to come to terms

¹⁸ This can be defined as jail boy in Zambia’s lingua franca. It was coined because of the illegal mining activities on the Copper belt of Zambia by youths normally incarcerated.

¹⁹ This is a multinational conglomerate founded in 1878, based in Bangkok, Thailand and deals with healthcare, energy, building and industrial systems, real estate, e-commerce, and transport

with the fact that they would be operating in totally different and difficult environments which adhered to the global standards of good practise as they went even deeper into the global market (Dynamic, 2018).

On this basis, it is important to also indicate that, majority of these mines in Zambia would consume some time before they adopt and embrace the international and national rules of the host countries. Admittedly, this process would be a bit difficult, though achievable as the Asian tiger's mining companies are also in a process of pushing their dominating model in the character of the international stage of mining (Tan Mullins, 2014). Just as much as it is important in underlying the devotion of these mining companies to CSR, it is equally informative to indicate that they should embrace it and run with it to all areas of the global extractive industries for China to be a good international example (Zambia EITI, 2016). Stemming heavily from the above indicated, this would be likely to create a good picture of China, particularly as it relates to good business practise to benefit the Asian tiger in a long run. In essence, the entire context of this chapter served to highlight that China is facing several issues when it relates to the practise of CSR. Hence, it recorded some successful attempts in their practise of CSR, particularly as it relates to the 2011 HRW's report. Therefore, the following chapter serves as a guideline to China of showing the steps they are supposed to take in ensuring that they are in line with the practise of CSR to avoid negative investment publicity coming from the poor outcome of CSR practise in the context of Zambia.

6.6. Conclusion

In this chapter, it is observable that there are several Chinese mining companies which have operations in Zambia's mining sector. Thus, most of them are owned by their CNMC, NFC, State-owned and some are smaller companies and do not have direct access to the London metal exchange. Therefore, their mined resources are sent back home for processing. In the process, this chapter has also revisited, through a narrow window, the agenda of CSR which in this chapter is conditioned to transparency, philanthropy, and accountability as to all the actions of Chinese mining companies in Zambia. As such, the above discussion illustrates well that all the fundamental aspects of HRW's report on Zambia in 2011 have been at the centre of this chapter's

discussion. Hence, all of them (health and safety, remunerations, working shifts, unionization and job securities) have been handled well (although not completely satisfying) by the Chinese mining companies operating in Zambia as part and parcel of the drive to enhance CSR agenda in the mining sector.

This has been achieved by improving their surrounding environments. Although this has been the case, there are still several contradictions in the HRW's 2011 report which have not been reported well and raise several questions in all the areas identified above and all of them have been attended to, in this chapter for further clarity. Even though these successes are well recorded, there were still several issues surrounding the practise of CSR in Zambia such as those recorded in the Collum Coal mine and the Black mountain which were very much daunting to the people of Zambia. But others have improved significantly.

The following chapter inspects the role of CSR as it should be applied by all Chinese companies operating Zambia's stakeholders of the economy. The main idea is to generate enough knowledge of how Chinese companies are expected to behave.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Analysis of the role of Chinese CSR in Zambia

7.1. Introduction

Having highlighted the broad agenda of CSR in the previous chapter. It was deemed important to revisit the entire context and critically analyse the concept of CSR so that both readers and Chinese Mining companies can understand better how to practise or adopt such a practise. Meaning that this chapter examines the role that should be depicted by Chinese companies in their operations in Zambia's economic stakeholders. By doing this, a greater emphasis is placed on discussing the broader concept of CSR and giving a comprehensive overview of the CSR fundamental elements which should be followed in its execution. This chapter analyses the concept of CSR by looking at its fundamental components of economic and legal responsibilities and ethical together with philanthropic obligations to all the host countries. Thereafter, the context of Chinese companies in Zambia would be thoroughly explored to give an overview of how Chinese companies should have conducted themselves in the period under review.

7.2. CSR: definitions and contours

Since the previous chapter gives us the broad agenda of CSR both in the global context and in Africa (Zambia), without narrowing it down to deeply understand it, the researcher had found it relevant to revisit this concept in a broader perspective. Meaning this chapter is deeply analysing all the significant aspects, elements, and ingredients of a CSR practise to help scholars understand what a CSR is in a broader context. Therefore, regarding CSR, there are a lot of definitions which have been given, particularly as it relates to the concept itself in the past 2 centuries. Based on Dahlsrud (2006), there was a study (though not named specifically) which was able to discover that there were 37 definitions of the concept. Caroll and Shabana (2010) postulate that the 37 definitions did not include the attempted definitions which if applied could have given a wrong meaning to the subject of this concept. In this study, it is informative that the underlined and adopted definition including the central themes

of this concept have been borrowed from elsewhere, including from the study of Carroll (1991). Having this in mind, academics should note that it is not an academic suicide to use Google searches to incorporate the alternative definitions which are mostly explained by various organizations in their contexts like the Corporate Social Responsibility Newswire (CSRwire), Commission of the European Communities and also the Business for Social Responsibility.

In this study, it is highly important to take note of that fact that the practicalities of what the CSR can side-line and what it can include for further development. Within the context of the adoption and the utility of the content analysis as applied by Dahlrud (2006), it was deemed unavoidable to mention CSR using the category of the five definitions which included the likes of voluntariness, social, economic, stakeholder and environmental dimensions, of which were found on google, to make them scientifically irrelevant and inapplicable, though existing in other sectors of CSR application elsewhere.

As important as it is to mention it, the above combination should serve as a future Afrocentric comparison to the elements discussed in this study. The most important and relevant way of scholars in identifying what CSR should be made up of especially in Africa is to try and check the ground conditions first. From there, a relevant category can be placed for the pursuits of all international companies so that they can be relevant and appropriate. Within the context of the application of CSR in Africa and/ Zambia, Carroll (1979, 1991) has argued that the four elements of the classifications of CSR should be made by the companies actualisation of “legal, ethical and discretionary and/ philanthropic and economic liabilities” (Carroll & Shabana, 2010).

The reality of this assertion is that special attention ought to be given to “The social responsibility of business encompasses the economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary [later referred to as philanthropic] expectations that society has of organizations at a given point in time” (Carroll, 1979: 500, 1991: 283). The study conducted by both Carroll and Shabana (2010) has revealed to us that there had been more successful study which had shown that indeed the four elements espoused above have been in the utility space for almost 25 years up to today. Stemming from this observation, the researcher deemed the analysis of the two categories of elements to appropriate them

to the role which should be played by Chinese mining companies in Zambia (Carroll and Shabana, 2010).

7.2.1. Economic and legal Responsibilities

Based on economic functionality of any business, there is a need to produce “goods and services that society desires and to sell them at a profit” (Carroll, 1979: 500). Meanwhile, this process will make sure that all businesses do fulfil their principal economic imperative in the host societies. Of the most important point to draw from, there is a confusion which had to do with the extent a business should go to realise its profits. But in dealing with this, the researcher has understood that every business is driven by the principles of profit as highlighted to be something that can be endurable for as long as a business exists, and that is ‘profit maximization’ (Carroll, 1991).

There is no gainsaying that the element of maximization of profit remains relevant even in the contemporary times of the context of this study. As such, when these businesses do pursue profit, it becomes clear that they are motivated and highly informed by the classical economic liberalism of the advocate of Milton Friedman (1962) who is also cited by Carroll (1991: 41) to argue that:

There is one and only one social responsibility of business – to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition without deception or fraud.

The argument of Friedman (1962) has been incorporated and advanced by the scholars such as Drucker (1954/2006) who acknowledges the role played by classical economic perspective, though advances even more suggestion to make it seem better for the people. Drucker (2006) has opined that even if a business is driven solely by profit, it should at least incorporate and fulfil the three fundamental responsibilities of calculating the effectiveness of its engagements; bestowing greatly to the so-called ‘risk premium’ mandatory for all business/ companies to remain unharmed in all their engagements; ensuring that there is successive relief for all capital flows. By so doing, “a profitability objective, therefore, measures not the maximum profits the business can produce, but the minimum it must produce” (Drucker, 1954/2006: 76–77).

On the other side, the legal responsibility of all businesses is to communicate both the positive and negative agreements placed on the businesses by the laws and regulations of the host communities in which they have operations in. In admission to the limited knowledge of the context of what constitute the legal responsibilities of any business, Carroll (1991) highlights that scholars have argued that the host societies should be the one which imposes the laws and rules that govern these businesses. Also, the incorporation of the views on legal agreements of the business owners should always be considered as they are relating directly with the influence of their business towards these host communities. In essence, this means that the laws should be drawn up with 10% views from the business owners who influence these operations (Carroll 1991). The fundamental key point to draw from the above assertion is that the views of both parties are considered important in the legal responsibilities of any companies in the host countries. Carroll (1991:41) shows us a clear relevant example by highlighting that both laws and regulations are the “codified ethics” of any society. And as such, should depict “partial fulfilment of the social contract between business and society”. The scope of legal responsibilities of any company is broader and to some extent, champions extend commands. Debates are often brought up to countercheck if indeed regulations are relevant to the conduct of business to fulfil CSR. De-Schutter (2008) gives us a clear picture of a relevant case point by arguing that CSR in all companies should “rests on certain presuppositions about markets and the business environment, which cannot be simply assumed, but should be affirmatively created by a regulatory framework for CSR”.

In the context of this analysis, assertions castigated are debatable and to some extent opposed, thus even in the context of De-Schutter (2008). There is a relevant case point that is also important though raised earlier by Philips, Freeman and Wicks (2003) who have placed their opinion on their understanding of the context that all CSR engagements ought to have management stakeholder interactions so that there is continuity of the prevalence of voluntarism. Philips et al., (2003) dismissed the earlier narrative of which proclaimed that “business performance is highly influenced by the stakeholders in their relationship with management, which then changes the transformation of regulations and laws and promotes expansion” as guided extensively by the advocates of the stakeholder theory. The trio authors have advanced their view that the theory of stakeholder “does not require a change in the law to remain viable”

(Phillips et al., 2003: 491). The foregoing debates to the context of the legal framework of CSR continue till this day from all these camps by presentations of arguments to defend the relevance of the legal demands to be assigned to all companies. From a different perspective, there are also the advocates of regulation like Williamson, Lynch-wood and Ramsay (2006) and Valor (2008) who question the ability of the “free-market apparatus” in supporting the adoption and the applicability of the CSR engagements.

Williamson, Lynch-wood and Ramsay (2006) and Valor (2008) even extend their arguments by alluding that they have noted that the market failures and business environments do not reward the committed businesses towards complete CSR engagement. On the other side, it is the regulation rejectionists who posit that individual interests and those of the society are handsomely rewarded by the free market apparatus in who practise CSR *modus operandi*²⁰ which is individually favoured (Caroll & Shabana 2010). The fundamental point to draw from the above analysis is that there are certain CSR activities which are not taken seriously because they are valueless, and no one sees any importance in endorsing them. Thus, all the CSR credit activities ought to always consider the relevancy of the free market apparatus (Caroll & Shabana, 2010).

7.2.2. Ethical and Philanthropic responsibilities

As already indicated above that the second of the foursome-part interpretation of CSR is the ethical and philanthropic duties, these are also some of the demands which are handed down to the bosses of companies by the society as well as the companies ‘stakeholders’. The advantage of the inclusion of this part of the classification is found in the analysis of McGuire (1963: 144) who has placed it on record that the: “purpose of social responsibilities presumes that a business does not only have legal and economic obligations, but also irrefutable obligations to the host society which go beyond the former responsibilities”.

Drawing heavily from the above analysis, there is no gainsaying that the four-part definition given by Caroll has played a significant role in reshaping the researcher’s understanding of McGuire’s study. This is because Caroll was the one which had

²⁰ a particular way or method of doing something.

managed to actualise the extension of the discretionary and ethical/ philanthropic elements of CSR and broaden it. Well, this is found in the illustration that they can go beyond economic responsibilities (Caroll & Shabana, 2010). Therefore, in this study, the researcher is of the view that whatever is discussed here as an extension of Caroll's views can best be extended beyond the philanthropic duties. Equally important to add here are the economic and legal functions which are relevant and necessitate the need for the inclusion of philanthropic responsibilities that are craved. The fundamental narrative that has been drawn by the researcher was that the combinations of traditional and modern functions in the block always bring out the best of what one could be.

Looking at both the classical notions of legal and economic responsibilities, it was deemed to indicate that the classical companies have had a fair share of their well-represented social contract with their host communities. A sum up argument in this context is that the highlighted new functions in the form philanthropic responsibilities now depicts the modern reality of what the current social contract in the form of a CSR should look like. Caroll and Shabana (2010) have both argued that in the contemporary analysis, esp. those involving the extent of broadening the CSR, there is a clear emerging narrative that scholars should go beyond these two obligations. The practicality of the matter is that, as of today, Zambians should ask all Chinese mining companies in Zambia a question of to what extent are these companies going to ground root themselves in both ethical and philanthropic responsibilities and even beyond. Kotler and Lee (2005) reminds us the same narrative that CSR should be found in the dedication to improve the lives of the members of the host communities through the application of philanthropic donations and practises by using business resources

7.3. The Context of the adoption and practise of CSR in Zambia

In the case of Zambia which is amongst the African States with a lot of mineral resources, it is often articulated that the likes of Zambia are still victims of the so-called resource curse as clearly pinpointed by the study of Ayelazuno (2013). The foregoing assertion has drawn heavily from the view that Zambia is one of the countries which undergoes continual environmental and social provocations which co-exist with slow

economic growth and sometimes, stagnation even when the African country's minerals are of abundance (Kumar, 2016). An important point to draw here is that the raising of this matter is relevant because of the above-discussed elements of the various classifications of CAR as relevant to be applied both externally and internally at the national and local governments (State to Corporate level).

To the relevant context of Chinese MNCs in Zambia, the researcher admits that may it be that the principal agenda of these companies is profit maximation, though be it necessary for them to incorporate the social and environmental aspects of business undertakings in furnishing a way to encourage these MNCs' owners to ensure that in applying the profit chasing strategy, they ought to make it certain that they are responsible social investors (Kumar 2016: 143). An alert here is that all Chinese companies in the application of the CSR should aspire to have transparency and accountability. This is the result of an activity that involves both social and environmental good impact in Zambia. The latter should not be considered a recommendation but one aspect which can assist them in the mining endeavours.

In short, the researcher has taken note of the bad publicity which has surrounded some of the Chinese mining companies, including the likes of CCS, Collum Coal Mines and MSD which, practically despaired the practise CSR (Li 2010: 9). The study of Li outlined the challenges expressed through the Chinese view that indeed after the BGRIMM incident of 2005 which took 50 Zambian lives, Chinese businesspeople have started to adapt to the local Zambian context by employing some of the aspects of CSR so that they can be regarded as philanthropic. A lot of the post-2010 protests which taken place were led by low salaries and casualisations, which reconsidered and reconstructed the practise/ dominant narrative of paying Zambian locals with little salaries. It is admittable since these strikes have gradually reduced over time, that they remain very much relevant in shaping and reshaping Chinese companies in the international operations with Zambia. Having this in mind, it is important to also narrate that much of the academic literature is heavily dependent on the view that as a big economy compared to Zambia, China cannot be at the centre of pushing the agenda of philanthropic necessities as it is focused on straight on all means to draw mineral resources from Zambia its own economy's stability. Meaning that China can go to an extent of despairing the practise of CSR in some instances.

7.3.1. The Afrocentric Position concerning Chinese CSR Practise in Zambia

As an emerging Afrocentric decolonial scholar, the researcher argues extensively that the dominant views expressed through the North [ern] angled perspective or the Chinese perspective do not stand to depict the genuine voices of African people like the researcher of this study. In this study, the researcher argues extensively that this study was shaped fundamentally by the views expressed in by local Zambians on the adoption and the application of CSR in the ground level. Equally, reporting in this study has remained careful in illustrating that African voices speak louder than mainstream political voices. Meaning that the researcher has supplemented the already existing body of knowledge with the dominance of Afrocentric voices to make meaning of certain arguments and revelations in this study. The combination of the two has ensured that there is no bias of any kind in the final analysis and presentation of this study, as there is a complementarity practise. Informed by the above analysis, it is safe to say that China is extensively showing signs of neo-colonialism in Zambia.

Having made the researcher's theoretical background clear, it was deemed important to also acknowledge the scholarly views of both dominant mainstream theorists such as Hairong and Sautman (2013: 142) who have reported Chilumbu clearly when he indicated that by the year 2013, the Chinese mining companies were "raising the bar". Also, to add the views of Kalezi (Chief Inspector of Zambia's DSD) in the year 2013 who articulated that NFCA was also doing just "Ok" and was no longer an outcast in the practise of CSR. They meant that the likes of NFCA improved to an extent that Chinese mines were moving slowly to embrace CSR like the local mining companies. This is also happening even in the sectors of infrastructure and construction. Whereby, the mining companies of China are attested to have concerned themselves with dealing with reducing the recorded economic stagnations of the previous years. Records show that between 2000 and 2013, the annual copper production had increased significantly of recording an increment of about 350%. To interject the relevancy of the latter, Zambia has been expecting China to even invest more in the mining industry so that it can anticipate more economic growth that will supplement the local mines and promote economic diversification in the name of supplying the local people with job opportunities to counter lack of progress (World Bank Group

2015). Realistically, and supported by Munyenyeembe, Chinese companies in Zambia are not doing that bad. Thus, they need to be given a chance, perhaps a few decades because they only started to arrive in Zambia in the last 2 decades (Rapanyane 2020).

7.3.2 Recent Developments in the Practise of CSR

History tells us that in Zambia, China arrived in the year 1998, particularly after the Asian tiger adopted the policy of going out. Hence, it is noteworthy to acknowledge that until this day, China managed to build 14 CMNC subsidiaries that only focused on exploring Zambia's mining industry. Besides the historical contemplation, CGTN (2019) tells us that by the year 2019, Chinese companies had also, as part of the CSR agenda, created about 140 000 jobs for Zambians in which, with this kind of record, makes them the biggest investor in the mining sector of Zambia. Not only did they help Zambia to this extent, but also extended a hand in erecting the SINOZAM friendship hospital to offer its workers together with members of their families a considerable medical treatment to counter the negative view that China is not doing anything in Zambia.

In the final analysis, it remains important and relevant to allude that the developments around the CSR application by Chinese mines is a considerable subject matter of debate that is still on-going. The latter is supported by the fact that there are good and bad records. In disparity to the negative views concerning the CSR practise, Namibia Press Agency (2019) has of recently reported that China's Sino Metals Leach (Zambia) Limited confirmed that they would be handing out "66 000 US dollars in the erection of one-by-three classroom block", a project set to take off in the copper-belt province of Zambia. Not only did the mines of China promise Zambia to build the latter, but also extended a hand in building the "ablution block at Chishilano Primary School in Mwambashi community of Chambishi Township in the Copper Belt Province" (Namibia Press Agency, 2019). Earlier in 2019, Mulenga Rashid (Mayor of Kalulushi Town) found in the copper belt province has deliberated that the community of Mwambashi (Village in Kalulushi) was relocated for a short period by the Chinese mining companies who sought to develop the local community's infrastructure and to also ensure that the community access education and health from their financial purse in exchange for land operations (Namibia Press Agency, 2019).

During the middle of the year 2019, Mulenga highlighted again that: “We would like to thank Sino Metals for now fulfilling its pledges it made to the people of Mwambashi community after it recently relocated them when they acquired land for operations, this is a good social responsibility move” (News Ghana, 2019). After demonstrating the above, Mulenga also added that Zambia is a country that is still developing and needed these companies’ help in ensuring that the locals access clinics and classrooms as part and parcel of the CSR practise package. She further postulated that the Chinese mining companies operating in the area have promised the area that they would build a health care centre for them. In context, the sentiments expressed by Mulenga were endorsed by Peiwen Zhang, Sino Metal’s CEO (Chief Executive Officer) who reiterated that this package was to come with their plans in practising social responsibility program (Namibia Press Agency, 2019; News Ghana, 2019).

7.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, the researcher advanced an argument that all Chinese companies including those with operations in the mining sector should conduct themselves in the manner that conforms to the elements of CSR as highlighted in the chapter (ethical and philanthropic including Economic and legal Responsibilities). The fundamental principle of economic responsibility features profit maximization, whilst the legal responsibility in this context depicts regulations and laws in the society of operations. Also, the alternative principles of ethical and philanthropic responsibilities concern and ground roots themselves on donations of business resources to the societies of the host country. In the context of this chapter, the researcher has argued that Chinese companies operating in Zambia including those in the mining sector have been perpetrators of both bad and good reputes of CSR practise in Zambia and relevant case points have been given.

The following chapter summarises the study’s findings and explores the implications for the theory and practise, makes recommendations on the findings and also proposes a future research agenda.

CHAPTER EIGHT

General Conclusions

8.1. Introduction

From an Afrocentric perspective, this study sought to analyse the foreign policy of China towards Africa. It used the case study of Zambia to determine the patterns and trends of China's engagement with African states. The case of Zambia was chosen because of the negative folk tales which surround China's engagement with Zambia. The proceeding chapter places the central attention of the analysis of the findings of this study and makes recommendations.

8.2. Summary of Findings

8.2.1 Drivers of China's Zambia Policy

This study has discovered that China's engagement with Africa: The case of Zambia is driven by several key factors. These are mineral resource drive, investment, international legitimacy, security affairs, the creation of Chinese SEZs, the desire to loans African countries and the debt trap them. Others include the need to access Zambia's market potential and ensure that Zambian workers adopt to the work ethics of Chinese nationals in general. Also, China is also involved in a process of sending more and more of its nationals to the African country. When explored with an Afrocentric perspective, this shows well that China is involved in Zambia for matters of business. To some extent, this means that the Asian tiger's involvement in Zambia is largely a by-product of the need to secure natural resources such as oil and copper which are of abundance in Zambia.

China's ideals of winning the "just international order" can be achieved by amassing huge support from the African countries in an international organisation such as the UN. That is why one of the fundamental drivers of China's Zambia policy is to safeguard the African country's support for its international legitimacy. An alternative to this is that China also promotes stability, prosperity and security in Zambia with a need to curb Africa's insecurities and instabilities which are seen as having the power

to impact negatively on its economic interests in Africa as a continent and Zambia. China has also signified FDI in its engagement with Zambia especially in the areas of mining, construction, farming, real estate, metal products, wholesale, and retail together with technical services. Equally important is that China also encourages SOEs in Zambia as part and parcel of the “going out” policy that it developed in the early 1990s. This policy was established with the need to equip Chinese businesspeople with international competitiveness and it has been the driver of Chinese engagement with African countries such as Zambia from the early 1990s until now. By the same token, the Asian tiger, through the utility of BRI signified conditional loans which in turn contributed to the creation of debt trap for Zambia. The disbursement of these loans to African countries such as Zambia are conditioned to the hidden agenda of national assets capture in the case where these loans are not paid back. This is not the least or last as China also sees Africa and Zambia as having big markets for its processed products. Or perhaps, put differently, dumping sites. To add, China is also fundamentally driven by the desire to make a huge transformation in the work ethics of Zambia towards the learning and acceptance of the efficiency of Chinese nationals by Zambian employees. To support this, an initiative such as the China-Zimbabwe-Zambia Work Ethics Seminars should be put in place. In the spirit of achieving a Chinese space in Zambia, China is also involved in the process of promoting the dumping of Chinese nationals in Zambia who have to some extent, established their areas away from those of the local Zambians, some which are called China towns.

8.2.2 The influence of Zambia’s political and economic environments on China’s Zambia policy

In this study, it was also discovered that Zambia’s political and economic landscapes play a significant role in China’s engagement with Zambia. The sentiments expressed above supported immensely by the discoveries made in this study that the African country’s political environment is quite conducive and very much stable with prosperous democratic elections which are held every 5 years. Zambia has also been classified amongst those countries which are highly praised for conforming and respecting international laws and this makes it to be an easier political environment where one can conduct business affairs in peace. As it has been discovered that

Zambia also respects the fundamental conformity to the tackling of liquidations and insolvency which are very much important to the big powers such as China. In the economic environment, it was discovered that the African country's economic landscape depicts signs of freedom of trade, liberalisation policies, FDI principles as well as freedom of currency convertibility, price, and profits. These elements are supported by the key policies of liberal banking and the protection of property rights. These policies are heavily applauded by China that is why its heavily engaged in Zambia areas of road and rail infrastructure, energy, mining, agriculture, and farm blocks.

In the area of energy, China has got a hydro project of the Karimba North Bank Extension; Coal project of the Maamba thermal plant; hydro project of itezhi-tezhi; solar project of solar scaling and also the hydro project of Kafue Gorge lower. In the area of rail infrastructure, China continues to assist Zambia with loans to maintain the TAZARA project which was established in the early 1970s. In the area of road infrastructure, China is heavily involved in Zambia's ministry of transport in the sense that it has been helping Zambia with projects such as the "8000 road project" and the "Mansa-Lungwu Road" and others which are led by Chinese companies. China has also managed to gain Zambian governments trust as they are now awarded contracts such as the ones outlined in the "Accelerated National Roads Construction Programme". In the area of agriculture and farm blocks, China has erected the technological demonstration centre in Zambia-Lusaka to show its commitment to Zambia's economic development. China is also heavily invested in the mining sectors of Zambia as the discoveries show that Chinese mining companies in Zambia are more than five with significant more others which are not state-owned. The combination of the above analysis shows how well China has invested in Zambia following depicts Zambia's conducive political and economic environments which makes business activities flow well.

8.2.3 Successes and failures in terms of CSR practise by China's companies in Zambia

This study has discovered that some of the problems which have been highlighted in the HRW's 2011 report on the conduct of Chinese companies in Zambia's mining industries were in part flawed and did not represent what was transpiring in Zambia. Although this may be the case, some of the bad repute accused companies in the report have since taken initiatives in reversing the bad publicity they were exposed to after they failed to conform to Zambia's CSR agenda. The problems were in the areas of health and safety, remunerations, working shifts as well as job securitization and unionization. Most of the problems which were experienced as the HRW report alludes were in the companies owned by the Chinese nationals like the CNMC and NFCA and others. As such, Chinese mining companies had since taken an effort in curbing these challenges, although others still prevail. Like those presented by the Collum Coal mine, unlawful mining activities, "Jerabos" operations on slag dumpsites of the black mountain mines owned by the Chinese nationals. Other issues include the unavailability of safe mining equipment in some of these Chinese owned mines. But some of these problems are not new if we consider the cases of the BGRIMN incident and the 2010-11 protests strikes in the subsidiaries of NFCA.

8.2.4 Analysis of the role of Chinese CSR in Zambia

It was discovered that the concept of CSR leans on the elements of economic and legal responsibilities together with ethical and philanthropic responsibilities. As such, the former remains a combination of the practises of business profit maximisation and conformity to the codified ethics of the society. Not only this but also a huge submission to the regulations and rules governing the way an international company should conduct itself in the host country. Whilst the latter is very much brand new in the social contacts drawn between the host countries and international companies and are more concerned with donations which are made by these companies to the host countries such as Zambia. Another discovery in this instance was that most of the Chinese mining companies in the period under review have been accused of bad repute in the sense they never practised CSR. In this study, the discovery was that most of them were not fully aware and taught about the concept of CSR because of their country which does not subscribe to the norms and values of international standings on

fundamental practises such as CSR. As such, when they emigrated into Zambia, it was difficult in the first place, but conditions got better and better went time went by. That is why to this end, most of these companies are still working to improve and upgrade themselves to conform to the practise of economic and legal as well as ethical and philanthropic obligations.

8.3. Implications for theory and practise

The findings of this study produce a consequential benefaction in the arena of international politics, especially as it relates to the discussion of China's foreign policy towards Africa. Also, the importance of this study depicts China's international relations with Africa and how Beijing engages with individual African countries like Zambia at a more individual and practical level. Principally, the adoption and utility of Afrocentricity in this study as the alternative theoretical lens have assisted the researcher in apprehending and analysing China-Zambia relations. It has made a considerable shift and/ move away from the state-centric and traditional theories dependence in the analysis of international politics. In this study, the theory of Afrocentricity has been denoted as a theory that re-shapes the knowledge of real-life international engagements about China-Africa relations. Second but not least, this study has shown that international politics has been shaped by Euro-American experiences, or in fact, Eurocentrism by dominance. Thus, Afrocentricity was adopted to illustrate a brand-new understanding of China's international relations and world issues in general.

8.4. Recommendations

Based on the summary of the findings highlighted above, this study recommends that China should do away with its new evolving tendency of sending their nationals who are going to house themselves way from the nationals of their host countries. This is so as there is a need for local Zambians to interact with Chinese nationals especially when it comes to their working relations. China should also do away with trying to change Zambian work ethics as this might hamper the Zambian employees' normal working ground conditions. This sentiment is addressed as there is no need to impose

the Chinese attitude of working to Zambians especially in their own countries as this to some extent re-introduces the notion of neo-colonialism. China should also desist from negotiating their loan reimbursement in exchange for Zambia's national assets such as ZESCO, as there is no lawful right and/ justification for the Asian tiger to compel Zambia to give up their national assets which are of significant use for the people of Zambia to China. To add, China should rather extend the deadline times for the reimbursement of its loans.

Chinese companies which have operations in Zambia should abide by the fundamental principles of CSR in the form of economic, legal, and ethical, as well as philanthropic responsibilities. To add, China's mining corporates should also adopt the notion of B Corp Certification. They should also establish formulate safety workplace programs as well as the Comprehensive Sustainability reports to ensure that there is always a consistent adherence to CSR and at all costs in Zambia. On the other side, Zambia should also make it a priority that their political and economic landscapes that continue to motivate the continued Chinese investment do not go through unwanted changes in the sense that there will be no more democratic wave and conducive environment for economic activities. In essence, Zambia should continue to conform to the international laws governing World Trade Organization (WTO), making it easy for Chinese investors to trust Zambia as one of the suitable and conducive environments in Africa for investment.

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