

**THE EVALUATION OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC ACCOUNTS' OVERSIGHT ROLE AND
PURPOSE IN PROMOTING ACCOUNTABILITY: A CASE OF THE LIMPOPO PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE**

by

PHEYAA ALFRED MAKGWATHANA

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SUPERVISOR: DR ML SHIPALANA

CO-SUPERVISOR: DR KR CHAUKE

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DECLARATION

I declare that "THE EVALUATION OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC ACCOUNTS' OVERSIGHT ROLE AND PURPOSE IN PROMOTING ACCOUNTABILITY: THE CASE OF LIMPOPO PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE" is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references, and that this work has not been submitted before for any other degree at any other institution.



PHEYAA ALFRED MAKGWATHANA

01 February 2023

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“Ke Mohlaloga. Bahlaloga wee, Rele lebogile”

ABSTRACT

This study explored the underlying problem of financial mismanagement in the public sector with pertinence to public accountability in South Africa. The problem of accountability has manifested in growing wasteful, irregular, and fruitless expenditure in the post-apartheid era, which is confronted by other multitude of social-economic challenges. Post-1994, South Africa embarked on an effort of policy development and legislative reforms to cater to public service regulation. These include legislative frameworks such as the 1999 Public Finance Management Act and the 2003 Municipal Finance Management Act.

To date, South Africa is still struggling with measures to counter corruption and the abuse of state resources. Given that South Africa has instituted and inaugurated several critical institutional mechanisms for legislative oversight, the study sought to explore the rationale for rampant problems pertaining to non-compliance, unaccountability, and lack of answerability within South Africa's public sector. This calls for research since these problems have serious implications for the future of the country and its ability to address inequalities relating to the history of exclusion of most people, especially Africans. Due to a rise in irregular and wasteful expenditure, this study highlighted the roles and functions of SCOPA as a key parliamentary tool for advancing accountability. The research objectives for the study were grounded on the growing problem of financial misconduct and abuse of public funds in the public sector due to lack of accountability, despite the existence of SCOPA as a parliamentary oversight mechanism.

From the reviewed literature, the Limpopo Provincial Legislature faces several challenges such as a lack of accountability, specifically on executives' accountability on their actions. Also, several departments attest to having several irregularities, fruitless and wasteful expenditures that affect service delivery, otherwise, the need for SCOPA to intervene. However, the SCOPA resolutions are not effectively implemented by the Limpopo Provincial Department and its municipalities. It is on this basis that the current study sought to evaluate SCOPA's oversight role and purpose in promoting accountability in the Limpopo Provincial Legislature.

The study adopted theory triangulation as the theoretical approach for the study, this is evident through the utilisation of four theories, which includes, Principle-agent theory (Mithick;1970); Functionalism theory (Parsons, 1930s); Constitutionalism theory (Locke;1680s) and Institutionalism theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1970s). These theories were adopted as the theoretical points of departure for the study due to their richness in examining issues of oversight and accountability. To explore the study, a triangulation research approach (qualitative & quantitative) was adopted. The data was collected from SCOPA members and members of the Limpopo Provincial Legislature. The collected data was analysed quantitatively and qualitatively for detailed findings.

The study reveals that SCOPA is not operating effectively to oversee and monitor public expenditure. The oversights done by Limpopo Provincial Legislature did not address issues pertaining to public finance management, which speaks volume in terms of accountability. From the findings of the study, it is evident that Limpopo Provincial Legislature is still facing several challenges, which ultimately affect service delivery. Towards addressing the problem of oversight and accountability, most of the study's respondents recommend that the system, process, procedures, and policies be reviewed, and SCOPA is required to establish new strategies that will help to fast-track the investigation within public institutions. Also, the provincial department is required to provide reviewed information within the agreed period. This study submits that provincial legislature should establishes other independent institutions to work in collaboration with SCOPA.

Key concepts: *Accountability, oversight, standing committee of public accounts, democracy, and good governance.*

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LIST OF ACROMONY

Acronym	Explication
AG	Auditor General
AGSA	Auditor General South Africa
MP	Member of Parliament
MPL	Member of Provincial Legislature
PFMA	Public Finance Management Act
SCOPA	Standing Committee on Public Accounts
SONA	State of the Nation Address
SISCDS	State Institutions Support Constitutional Democracy

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

1.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

This section of the study articulates and contextualises the research problem under investigation, which is focused on the efficacy of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) to promote accountability within public institutions. This is critical due to continuous challenges such as financial mismanagement and lack of consequences (Nwogwugwu & Ishola, 2019). This introductory chapter presents the purpose, objectives, problem statement, and delimitation of study as well as the theoretical points of departure guiding the study.

The current study focuses on critical issues in politics, public administration, and studies such as the effectiveness of parliamentary committee. Further, it outlines the roles and functions exercised by SCOPA in ensuring greater accountability in the public sector. In the context of this study, the assumption of SCOPA is to play a significant role on behalf of legislature to ensure sound financial management and to provide strategies as well as recommendation to the legislature, which gives effective confidence in management of finances within central government. Even though the oversight is supposed to be done by the South African parliament, there are continuous challenges such as non-compliance that leads to financial management impropriety of fraud, corruption and wasteful, as well as irregular expenditure that remains unchanged (Madue, 2017).

The strength of this study is not only limited to establishing reasons to hold the government accountable, but also to explore how legislative committee, public sector addresses the perspective of the questions that are raised, as well as the challenges faces by both these role players. Therefore, the efficacy of SCOPA is under critical analysis in the context of this study. This study provides an overview and understanding of disjuncture between the viability of the oversight mechanism and the financial responsibility. This emanates from the fact that challenges of effective oversight of SCOPA have the negative impact on the service delivery in South Africa (Pillay, 2016). The study put more emphasis on the oversight role played by SCOPA to eliminate misuse of public resources.

Fabadebo and Ruffic (2018) state that the legislature's incapacity to effectively control the administration promotes the oversight of the executive branch of government. In support, Douglas (2016) argues that corruption in South Africa is led by institutional weakness. In this regard, the separation of power is one of the significant stone of the rule of law because it reduces the abuse of state power, which is responsible for making the law, and the (judiciary) that is responsible for interpreting and applying the law as well as the executives who are responsible for enforcing the law (Labuschagne, 2014). Considering this, Mojapelo (2013) advises that legislature be considered as one of the most critical institutions.

The 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa ensures that the public institution remains accountable regarding the utilisation of resources for service delivery imperatives. It is important to note that this constitutional reform was done for the transitional apartheid to bring changes in the government and to eliminate imbalance among citizens as well as to confirm the vital state mediating social and economic relations in highly fragmented society (Pillay, 2016). Thus, the concept oversight included the important aspects such as public administration, financial ethical and element of legal strategies (Notshulwana, 2018). Additionally, the parliament appoints oversight committees to deal with misuse of public funds and maladministration and monitor the correct procedures and process of public resources within government machinery (Fagbadebo, 2019).

The Limpopo Provincial Legislature was instituted as one of the nine provincial legislatures of South Africa in 1994. This provincial institution is mandated by section 114 (2) (a) of the Constitution (1996), to facilitate and enable accountability by the provincial executive by means of an oversight function. The Constitution (1996), through section 114 (2), vests provincial legislatures with the power to oversight by setting out that legislatures should develop, possess, and implement tools and mechanisms to ensure that the executive is accountable. Such tools, in the case of the Limpopo Provincial Legislature, include its strategic plans, which enable the institution to understand clearly which aims to achieve and such planning (Limpopo Legislature Annual Report, 2020).

The South African government successfully developed the Constitutional State Institutions Support Constitutional Democracy (SISCDS), which according to Section 181 (1) of the South African Constitution indicated is responsible for promoting the

constitutional democracy (Constitutional of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). Further, in 2009, the ministry of Performance Monitoring and Evaluations was developed to deal with the improvement of performance in public institutions and to guide the transformation process as well as to ensure effective performance of the state. Despite efforts that the government has undertaken, there are still major challenges on service delivery improvement. Some of the contributory factors results from lack of oversight and monitory systems in the public institutions, hence the appropriateness of this study, which seeks to provide a detailed analysis of the roles and purpose of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts in promoting accountability within South African public institutions.

National Assembly (2018) outlines that, SCOPA plays a significant oversight role in promoting accountability and to ensuring good governance in South African public institutions. For SCOPA to fulfil its mandates, the committee focuses on findings that are raised in the audit outcomes, issues related to financial mismanagement disclosed in financial statements and compliance to the requirements of the Public Finance Management Act.

The Auditor General's reports (2021/22) provide several rules and regulations that served as guideline on financial management, which the government is not fully complying with. Also, the Auditor General's report (2021/22) reveals that there are several complains based on the public sector financial management and service delivery that are not implemented effectively. The report further states that the issue of poor financial management system results in challenges such as irregular, wasteful, and fruitless expenditure. In addition, Kunz, and Hamel (2022) state that the information was available to enable the Auditor General to work appropriately on all audited reports which were very critical for audit opinions and has become a challenge within the public institution. Drawing from this, the current study investigates the role of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) in promoting accountability, with a distinct focus on Limpopo Provincial Legislature.

The Auditor-General is a state institution accountable to the National Assembly. In terms of Section 188 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, the Auditor-General must audit and report on the accounts, financial statements and financial

management of all national and provincial departments, all municipalities and any other institution or accounting entity required by national and provincial legislation. In this regard, the Auditor-General must submit audit reports to the relevant legislature Limpopo Legislature Audit Report, 2021. The poor state of financial and performance management in all spheres of government, as evidenced by the audit outcomes, resulted in material financial losses at some municipalities and substantial harm to their ability to deliver on their mandate. The amendments to the Public Audit Act, which came into effect on 1 April 2019, provides mandate to report on these matters as material irregularities and to act accordingly and action accordingly and appropriately as measures to remedy the wasteful, irregular, and corruptive situation (Fagbadebo, 2019).

According to AGSA Report of 2022, issued notifications on these material irregularities to the municipal managers of 21 municipalities. As the material irregularity process is continuous in nature and not bound by the audit cycle, the SCOPA may continue to assess the findings from audits that could potentially be material irregularities. If confirmed and once the accounting officer have been notified, they ought to report on these matters in our 2020-21 reports. Based on the responses to the notifications and the actions being taken to resolve the material irregularities reported in the previous year, they can conclude that we are starting to see signs of a behavioural change by most of the municipal managers towards responding in a decisive and timely manner to our findings. To resolve material irregularities, the support of public sector institution is crucial, but this area has not yet observed any significant uptake or commitments.

According to Dowdle (2017), one of the main purposes of the oversight function of the legislatures is to hold the executive accountable for implementing the laws and policies that the legislature enacts and for implementing the plans, programmes and spending the budgets that the legislature approves. In addition to holding the executive to account, Rosenthal (1998) argues that the legislature and the executive have a joint responsibility to ensure that government priorities and associated programmes are focused upon, and ultimately implemented effectively.

According to the Limpopo Provincial Legislature (2014), the legislature strategic plans set out the legislature's overall mission, goals, objectives, activities, and resources towards achieving its overall mandate. In addition to these, Chapter 3 of the Financial Management of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures (Act 10 of 2009) sets out that the functions of the legislature, including the planning and execution of its activities should be accomplished through its strategic plans, thus making these plans the critical link in the oversight process. It is, therefore, important that the strategic plans enable the legislature to execute its oversight function in a manner that is aligned with the constitutional oversight mandate and with the relevant provincial service delivery priorities. If this is not the case, the resultant oversight may be devoid of constitutional guidance (legitimacy) on one hand, and provincial focus (relevance), on the other hand.

In the South African context, legislative oversight is defined as a constitutionally mandated function of legislative organs of the state to scrutinise and oversee executive action and any Organ of the State (Pelizzo, Stapenhurst and Olson, 2016). In addition, Fundiswa and Gregory (2020) defines oversight as a key feature of executive and legislative relations, in which the executive branch owes to the legislative branch certain obligations and information. On the other hand, Lenos (2010:3) explains oversight as a supervision of the actions of administration. Such supervision includes, but is not limited to hearings, summoning of ministers, resolutions of enquiry, special inventory committees, and confirmation processes. The oversight is part of the institutional design established to guarantee a certain degree of control against excessive executive power, which is a fundamental component of a democratic government.

It is the duty of any parliament to hold government and all its departments accountable for their actions. Global Parliamentary Report (2017) opines that legislative oversight intends to stimulate people's freedoms and well-being, and to improve accountability and transparency in government. Oversight is a function provided by the Constitution to parliament, to monitor and oversee government action. Legislative oversight is about ensuring that proper resources are supplied to execute government programmes. It is about recognising inadvertent or harmful effects of government policy and actions, and it seeks to observe the meeting of national and international commitments. Global Parliamentary Report (2017) further

articulates that successful oversight reinforces progress and deepening of democracy through strengthening legislation and policy, which lead to economic and human development. In addition, Wang (2018) reiterates that oversight is not just a supervision of what the executive branch of government has done but it is also supervision of the executive's legislative proposals. The impact of effective oversight is felt throughout society, as resources are distributed more fairly and services such as education and healthcare are delivered more effectively. This section discussed the background to the study, the next section discusses the problem statement under scrutiny.

1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT

Considering the continuous problem of financial fraud and misconducts within public institution, the study considers the key roles and function of SCOPA as most important in ensuring accountability in the parliament. Gusev (2020) reports that governing systems within the South African government coupled with the attitudinal disposition of the lawmakers remain a challenging or obstacle that weakens legislative capacity to hold the executives accountable. The Limpopo Provincial Legislature faces several challenges such as lack of accountability, specifically on holding the executive's accountability on their actions. Many departments in Limpopo Province present the report for irregular, fruitless, and wasteful expenditure which affect service delivery in a long-term basis, therefore, SCOPA is required to intervene in such cases. The SCOPA resolution is not effectively implemented by the Limpopo provincial department and municipalities and there is no action that taken against the accounting officer, management and official who are not accountable for state finance. It is important for SCOPA to oversee and monitor the process of financial management within the provincial government. The member of executive council brought the political interference on government administration.

The oversight of SCOPA is rooted within the context border of maladministration, unemployment, poverty, corruption, inequality and marginalisation of the majority of South Africa. The legislative oversight bodies are seen to be ineffective on their roles and responsibilities since most of the government departments and state-owned enterprises are still characterised with challenges such as irregular, wasteful, and fruitless expenditures. The public often criticises SCOPA because the standard of

service delivery is low and misappropriation of essential resources within the public institutions (Ndoma-Egba, 2018). In this regard, the need for a study which analyses essential roles and responsibilities of SCOPA in the context of Limpopo legislation is necessary. The failure to act against cases of fraud and corruption bring into question the effectiveness and efficiency of the oversight role of the parliament, which compromises good governance and democratic accountability in the service and democratic in the public services and affects socio-economic development.

The most adverse consequences are delays in the provision of services to poor communities, failures in the realisation of good governance and the potential of state stabilities as well as security, owing to disgruntlement of the poor and marginalised (Dowdle, 2017). Further, Mnage (2012) writes that the government's failure to relies on the new developmental mandate of working collaboratively with communities to meet their socio-economic and material needs while improving their lives could cause serious challenges. Hence, this study intends to also promote the concept of good governance as a concept that constitutes parts that are appropriate for advancing service delivery and democracy (Fagbadebo, 2019). In the context of this study, the problem and central argument are that to say South African parliament and legislatures in all the provinces has SCOPA as mechanism aimed at ensuring that the is a promotion of accountability and responsibility on the use of public funds. The problem was found to be the continuous financial misuse mismanagement as growing problem within the south African public sector.

According to Van Vurren (2013), South Africa is struggling with the problem to counter corruption and the abuse of power. In addition, there is an adequate analysis of consequence deficit. In alignment with the growing financial fraud and misconduct, the current study evaluates the role and functions of SCOPA as the key tool to advance accountability in the parliament. Given that institutional mechanisms are in place, the study explores the rationale for the rampant problems of noncompliance, unaccountability, and lack of answerability within the South African public sector, as there is serious impending implication in the future of the country. SCOPA's oversight is thus situated within the broader context of corruption.

Regardless of the oversight role played by the Limpopo Legislature, the province was placed under Section 100 (1) (b), due to maladministration of finances in 2011. It would have been expected that the legislature in exercising effective oversight

would have noticed early warning signs leading to maladministration of funds, raised the necessary alarms and possibly reduced the impact or prevented the situation from reaching such proportions (Fagbadebo, 2019). The intervention of national government in the management of the five Limpopo government's departments is indicative of the failure of the legislature to exercise appropriate oversight that could have prevented this downward spiral and pre-empted such an intervention (Legislature Annual Report, 2019).

According to Dowdle (2017), the maladministration in government's departments is a result of poor planning, leading to poor implementation. With respect to the Limpopo Provincial Legislature, the strategic plans show no direct evidence of any alignment with the constitutional oversight mandate and with the provincial priorities. This presents a problem because if there is no such alignment, meaning that the oversight conducted by the Limpopo Provincial Legislature may be illegitimate and irrelevant. Therefore, this study investigates the role of SCOPA 's oversight function conducted by the Limpopo Provincial Legislature, with the constitutional oversight mandate and with the provincial service delivery priorities for Limpopo.

The conflation of legislative and executive authority within the provincial legislature has been viewed as problematic according to De Visser (2010:91). This is because there is a lack of clear separation of powers between the executive and the legislature. The lack of clarity poses practical challenges and compromises the accountability required from the provincial administration. The 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa is unclear on the issue since both legislative and executive powers are vested with power in the provincial government, without provision of the distinctive role of the mayor (executive) and that of the speaker (legislative).

In South Africa, committees in parliament have been established to oversee the executive, relevant structures of the government, government activities and public finances. Nevertheless, these oversight committees have selectively held senior executives or ministers accountable for their ineffectiveness, maladministration, and misuse of government expenditure. This could be attributed to the fact that oversight in South Africa does not seem to be properly understood and implemented as it

should be. Moreover, the influence of the majoritarian authority of the ruling party in committees seems to be colluding with the executive (Fagbadebo, 2019).

There is a widespread maladministration and misuse of government expenditure in government's departments, particularly at a provincial level. However, public officials and ministers concerned are rarely called upon to account for this. In certain instances, the Public Service Commission, Public Protector, the Auditor-General, Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) and other state institutions supporting democracy make recommendations to the parliament on what actions to take against wrong-doers, but only few cases have been acted upon (Dowdle, 2017). Failure to act against cases of omission questions effectiveness and efficiency in the oversight role of parliament, which in turn compromises good governance and democratic accountability in the public service. The adverse consequence is the delay in the provision of good quality services to poor communities and the realisation of good governance. This section presented the problem statement of the study, the next section presents the study's aim and objectives.

1.3 AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

1.3.1 Aim of the study

The aim of this study is to evaluate SCOPA's oversight role and purpose in promoting accountability in the Limpopo Provincial Legislature.

1.3.2 Research objectives

- To determine the effectiveness of the performance of the oversight and accountability function of the South African parliament.
- To assess the impact of SCOPA and the strategic benefit of being chaired by marginal opposition rather than official opposition.
- To establish reasons for the public sector' failure to act against officials involved in irregular expenditures and fraud.
- To explore mechanism to improve the current situation in support of accountability in the public sector.
- To develop an integrated reporting framework that will assess the efficacy of oversight committees.

1.4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- What is the effectiveness performance of the oversight and accountability functions of the South African parliament?
- What is the impact of SCOPA and strategic benefit chaired by marginal opposition rather than official opposition?
- Why is the public sector failing to act against officials involved in misappropriation of funds?
- What are mechanisms to improve the current situation in support of accountability in the public institution?
- Which integrated reporting framework may be used to improve the efficacy of oversight committees?

1.5. DEFINITION OF KEY CONCEPTS

The following terms are used widely in this study to give meaning to oversight role and function.

- **Legislative oversight**

Gordon (2021) defines the concept of oversight as a constitutional power that is exercised by the legislative to control the powers or authority of arms of government. Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2014) state that oversight is considered as a way and strategy that is exercised by legislatures in the implementation of rules, and regulations, the observance of the constitution and the application of budget. Ndoma-Egaba (2016) indicates that legislative oversight is used to monitor, review, and supervise government activities as well as policy implementation. To this study, the function of legislative oversight is demonstrated as to oversee, uncover and end the misuse of resources and unauthorised conducts on the part of the government.

- **Accountability**

Pymen (2013) defines accountability as the process whereby the public servants are accountable for every decision and action taken within the organisation. Kam, Bertelli and Held (2020) further describe accountability as a state wherein public officials are elected and have an obligation to explain their decision and actions. It is worth noting

that accountability is important to both organisation and society. It also means that the management should face consequence for their performance or actions. The National Government Oversight Model (2012) reveals that accountability ensures the answerability of government in respect of how public funds are utilised. It also discovers uneconomical spending within government organisation. For the sake of this study, accountability would be used as concept of answerability and the obligation of the government, its agencies, and public officials to provide information about their decisions and actions to justify them to the public and those institutions of accountability tasked with providing oversight.

- **SCOPA**

SCOPA is an abbreviation for 'Standing Committee on Public Accounts'. According to Nkoloni (2012), the mandate of SCOPA is to examine the financial statements of all public organs of the province and other provincial organ of the state in ensuring that all revenues are correctly reflected, and all expenditure has been paid in accordance with applicable legislation. Gauteng Legislature (2016) outlines that the role of SCOPA is to exercise oversight over provincial and local government to ensure accountability in utilisation of resources and prudent financial management and make recommendation to legislature. The SCOPA committee is elected within the provincial government to deal with issues of accountability and the departments present their operational report for every financial year to the said committee. For this study, SCOPA would play the role since has the authority to investigate public expenditure, misused of public resources and inform the parliament about the outcomes.

- **Public institution**

According to Braimyrzaeva (2012), public institution is defined as an institution that is responsible for government unit under the administrative control of the government. It is an entity that is supported by governmental agency at the state and local level. Additionally, public institution refers to institution that is responsible for rendering service delivery to the community. Stapenhurst (2020) states that the budget of public institution is allocated by the parliament to operate effectively. The society views public institutions as places where they report and obtain goods and services, and where public servant are required to engagement. The public participation is considered as one of the systems required to be taken in accordance with the public

institution. This study would focus of the public institution because it is responsible for SCOPA to oversee and monitoring public sector.

1.6. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This study is intending to evaluate the roles and purpose of Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) as an oversight body on public institutions regarding service delivery imperatives. The significance of the study is quite necessary to explore the roles and responsibilities of the oversight bodies in a way of analysing their effectiveness on holding public institutions accountable for their mandates. Central to this, the study focuses on the impact of decisions that are taken by the oversight bodies towards preservation of service delivery and utilisation of the public resources in accordance with the requirements of government policies and treasury instructions.

SCOPA plays a major oversight role in promoting accountability and ensuring good governance in South Africa's public sector. The strength of this study lies in that it does not look at the issues from one side focusing on legislative committee and public sector. It is particularly for this reason that SCOPA efficiency is under critical analysis at the core of this study, as the assumption that SCOPA is vital in overseeing its role on behalf of the legislature to ensure good financial management as well as to make recommendation on their legislative ethic. In turn, this impacts the confidence in the overall financial management in government. Although oversight is supposed to be central work of the South African parliament, non-compliance is one of the main challenges.

The fundamental departure of the argument advanced in this thesis underscore the phenomena of wasteful, irregular, and fruitless expenditure. This is done by critically examining lack of accountability by elected representatives who are supposed to enforce the requirements of the relevant legislations such as public finance Management. The overall goal is to understand the role played by the Limpopo Legislature in its oversight and the challenges encountered in relation to the institutional capacity as well as the incentives that influence behaviour and the political will of members to perform effective oversight. Both the internal and external factors that influence oversight are explored.

Furthermore, the study is significant for academic purposes and will also add value to the practice of the discipline of public administration. The study will serve as a source of information for public administration practitioners, academics, students, and researchers. Again, the study will be helpful to public institutions such as departments, municipalities, the private sector, and agencies in making improvements on their oversight roles.

- **Theoretical contribution**

According to Swisher (2014), theories are logically consistent explanation of the relationships or connections between defined components, which are also known as constructs. These may also include comparing more than one theory and explaining the phenomenon on the same conditions and expanding the domain of the theory. In this study, the researcher does not develop any new theory, but the study intends to close the identified gaps in the body of knowledge. In this study, various theories that are relevant to the roles and responsibilities of SCOPA have been identified and these include principal agent, constitutionalism, and institutionalism theories.

It is observed that studies related to evaluation of roles and responsibilities of SCOPA in South Africa are limited. The fundamental purpose of scientific research at doctoral level is necessary to make contribution to the existing body of knowledge. There are three main components of body of knowledge that form the basis of this study. These components include existing empirical evidence in the literature about the topic of interest, understanding and explaining the phenomenon of interest and adding to the body of knowledge.

- **Empirical contribution**

Cognisant of the fact that there are numerous challenges confronting legislative oversight in South Africa, this study focuses mainly on the oversight role and purpose of SCOPAS as critical component in promoting accountability. This is due to its role to exercise oversight over executive to monitor, detect abuse and maladministration and misuse of public funds within the government machinery on behalf of the country's national parliament (legislature). This role is not performed in isolation, but is complimented by that the Auditor-General, whose mandate is to conduct audits of public sector bodies and submit reports to legislature, as per the requirement of Public Audit Act 2004 and the constitution of the Republic of South

Africa, 1996. Though this study reflects on maladministration pertaining to the Auditor-General Report (2021), this study does not cover issues such as detailed analysis of the patterns of mismanagement and general impact of mismanagement.

The fact that South African legislatures is confronted with numerous challenges, this study focuses on the roles and the purpose of SCOPA as a critical component in ensuring accountability. These can be done through exercising the oversight on executive to monitor and reduce the abuse and maladministration, to reduce public unnecessary spending within the government machinery of the national parliament of the country as well as dealing with irregular, unauthorised, wasteful and fruitless expenditures (Fundiswa & Gregory, 2020). As outlined in Public Audit Act of 2004 and the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, the above role is conducted by the Auditor-General whose mandate is to conduct the audit and submit the report to the legislature or parliament. The audit opinion is prepared by the Auditor-General which is based on how the audits performed. Be that as it may, the parliament requires to conduct strongly and effective oversight role and function within national, provincial, local government departments, state owned enterprise and institution that is tasked with ensuring that both use public funds prudently (Madumo & Koma, 2019).

- **Policy contribution**

Research on legislative functioning has been concentrated at a national level in South Africa and there has been a lack of research at the sub-national levels. There has been even less work done on the oversight function of legislatures as opposed to the law-making responsibility. With the growing emphasis on legislative oversight in South Africa, this study is aimed at contributing to the body of knowledge on legislative oversight in South Africa and possibly helping to strengthen oversight and accountability in South Africa and across Africa (Davis and Moore, 2016). It further assists the legislative sector to come-up with strategies that can be used to enhance oversight. Due to the scarcity of legislative oversight literature in the public domain, the current study will be shared with the entire legislative sector and research community through publication in a peer reviewed journal.

This section discusses the significance of this study with alignment to the theoretical and empirical literature, the next section presents chapter division.

1.7 CHAPTERS LAYOUT

The structure of the thesis is presented in six chapters which are discussed briefly below:

- **Chapter one: Introduction and background of the study**

This chapter contains research background, research problem, aim, objective and significant of the study. This chapter describes the conceptual basis for the research that investigate and include research questions, and hypotheses. It also covers the importance of conducting the current study. It introduces the study and the research problem investigated.

- **Chapter two: Theoretical literature**

Chapter two offers the literature review of the study. It also addresses the gap of the study through gathering information from different views of scholars. This chapter also presents the theoretical framework for the study.

- **Chapter three: Empirical literature**

This chapter review findings of other scholars with pertinence to the context of the current study. It conveys to the reader what knowledge and ideal have been established on the topic and built argument in support of the researcher problem under investigation.

- **Chapter four: Research methodology**

This chapter focuses on the research approaches, research design, sample size, data collecting methods and analysis as well as the ethical consideration of the study. This chapter describes the research methodology and explains the rationale for selecting the participant's methods as opposed to the alternative methodology. This also chapter describes in detailed what are the best research design to collect data. Further, it identifies the specific instrument and data source to be used to calculate all the different data required in the study. Concepts pertaining to general population, targeted population, and sample size of the study, are discussed.

- **Chapter five: Results, discussion, and interpretation of the findings**

This chapter demonstrates the findings from respondents and participants of the study. The findings are presented in terms of figures, graphs, and tables. The purpose of this chapter is to summarise the collected data, how it is analysed and presented as well as interpreted. It provides the summarised sample characteristics and demographics of the participants in the study.

- **Chapter Six: Conclusion and recommendation**

This final chapter focuses on the conclusion and suggested recommendation in the study. It is considered as a summary of the entire study. It reminds the reader about the importance of the study and briefly explains how the study intended to combine the body knowledge on the topic. This chapter discusses both primary and secondary findings and provides recommendations. Suggestions for further study are presented in this chapter.

1.8 CONCLUSION

This chapter outlines the role and the challenges faced by SCOPA in Limpopo province. The aim, objective and significance of the study are demonstrated. The purpose of this study is to investigate the role and the function exercised by SCOPA to enforce accountability in public institutions. The problem such as irregular, wasteful, and fruitless expenditure are presented which require the intervention of SCOPA to enforce the accountability in the public institutions. In South Africa, committees in parliament have been established to oversee the executives, relevant structures of government, government activities and public finances. This chapter sets the ground for the study; the next chapter discusses the theoretical points of departure for the study.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The theoretical literature reviewed in this study focuses on the SCOPA oversight in South African public institutions i.e., oversight impact, challenges, and opportunities within the public institution. It is imperative to acknowledge that parliamentary democracy, the bedrock of good governance and accountability has witnessed pronominal growth on the continent of Africa since early 1980s (Adagbabiri, 2015). Also, Ben-zeev (2012) indicates that powerful legislature, fair and free election played significant role in representative democracies within the country. The literature reviewed in this study enables the researcher to understand the current research in related field prior to conducting an empirical investigation. Literature review also allows the researcher to gather information from other scholars and determine the gaps on the current studies. According to Ricks and Doner (2021), the purpose of the literature review is to obtain and learn what has been done by others. In this regard, the literature review is done through contextualising the study's aim into contemporary scholarly debates, theoretical framework, and empirical understanding.

There are various theories that can be used to determine the oversight effectiveness. The current researcher deems it fit to have a theoretical point of departure. According to Khotami (2017), the concept "theory" is considered as an explanation organised body of concepts principle intended to give clarity on a particular phenomenon and to demonstrate how something operates (Eneaya, 2016). Therefore, it is appropriate to state that theories are producers of explanation and understanding of phenomenon as well as to organised ideas.

Gauld (2016) points out that theories can establish the scientific knowledge by (a) providing an explanation which is simple on observing relations concerning the phenomena relations (b) being consistence with knowledge that have been already

found and the observer relations, and (C) providing advice for revision and verification as well as (d) to strengthening further research areas which requires investigation. This study adopts “theory triangulation” which according to (Fundiswa & Gregory, 2020) is the use of more than one theory to solve a single research problem. In this study, the researcher adopts four (4) theories, which are, the Principle-Agent theory, the Functionalism theory, the Constitutionalism, and the Institutionalism theory, as detailed below.

2.2 PRINCIPLE-AGENT THEORY

Principle-agent theory, which emerged in the 1970s from several economists and theorists and introduced by Stephen Ross and Berry Mitthick. The Principle-agent theory focuses on the citizens (as principal) and the executive and legislature as (acting principal) on behalf of citizens (Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2014). The leaser of oversight function and role to hold the executive accountable is caused by the high cost of citizen to oversee the action of the executives (Bernhold & Wiesweg, 2018).

The Principle-agent theory on one hand acts as principal on behalf of citizens and executive and of the bureaucracy on the other hand. The Principle- agent theory also called the Agency theory comes from the information economics (Fundiswa & Gregory, 2020). Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2014:18) reveal that the Principal-Agent theory shows the “institutional mechanisms whereby principals are expected to monitor and enforce compliance on their agents”. The agency problem is the root of evaluation and monitoring programmes. This is because information regarding programmes is made available to ensure transparency, and accountability between citizens, the executive and legislatures. The legislature ensures accountability through public participation and community involvement (Smith, 2019).

Gailmard (2012) reveals that public accountability requires a specification of who is accountable to whom, which is the core ingredient of this theory. The executive and the legislature are equally both principal and agent which requires transparency. Furthermore, the executive accounts to citizens through the electoral process and to the legislature, which represents citizens, through a performance oversight function over the executive (Pelizzo & Stapenhurst, 2019). Further, Gailmard (2012) critiques Principal-agent theory because citizens usually do not have clarity about how their

wishes will be met by government. Secondly, the cost of oversight is very high, and thirdly, there is asymmetric information, meaning lack of adequate information for the citizens, regarding how the business of government is carried out.

The Principle-agent theory has proven to be an effective approach when there are problems associated with informational asymmetry (Madumo & Koma, 2019). Also, Eggertsson (1990) cited in Macias (2012: 55) states that “asymmetry is a perception that an agent has more information about the details of the allocated tasks”. The existing perception is that the bureaucracy has more knowledge than the executive, the legislature, and citizens. However, the executive possesses more information than the citizens and the legislature, which in turn has more information than the citizens. To deal with the above limitations, a development of tools for oversight, and application by legislatures is meant to increase effectiveness of these tools (Pelizzo & Stapenhurst, 2017). Legislatures have a responsibility to provide extensive feedback and share the necessary information to communities as agents. Committees represent communities in council and are tasked with an oversight function because of their electoral commitment, communities should hold them responsible to fulfil their mandate (Smith, 2019).

2.3 FUNCTIONALISM THEORY

According to Gauld (2016), the functionalism approach was developed between the 1930s and 1960s in the United States of America. Parsons studied Weber and Durkheim and translated some of these into English (Davis & Moore, 2016). Functionalism theory focuses on the sociology that views the society as a system. This theory provides the important drop with popularity within the display of the sociology, partly because of the criticisms that exist against it. Its main function is to motivate and support the organisational work. According to Mintrom (2019), different scholars of politics and administration use Functionalism as a theory that contribute to the activity (legislature) or the different pattern of behaviour in the society. The structural function associated to administration and the political structures are considered as one of the most important tools for this study. Functionalism theory pays attention to the public institution and it is important for the function and the role of parliament in ensuring accountability to be understandable and clearly interpreted.

Functionalism is a theoretical perspective that focuses on the functions performed in society by social structures such as institutions, hierarchies, and norms form the basis of the current study (Gómez-Diago, 2019).

There is a mutual relationship between the Principal-agent theory and Functionalism theory because the Principal-agent theory acts on behalf of the citizen and executive while the later dominant in how sociology views the society as a system. Both these theories focus on explaining how societies maintain stability and internal cohesion necessary to ensure their continued existence over time. In the Functionalist theory, societies are thought to function like organisms, with various social institutions working together like organs to maintain and reproduce them (DiMaggio, 2018).

The various parts of society are assumed to work together naturally and automatically to maintain overall social equilibrium. This is because social institutions are functionally integrated to form a stable system, a change in one institution precipitate a change in other institutions. It is sometimes called Structural-Functionalism because it often focuses on the way social structures such as social institutions meet social needs (Malan & Mathebula, 2020).

Fundiswa and Gregory (2020) point out that the Functionalism theory emphasises that social stratification that exists in all human societies, such as family and religion, therefore, it should be functional and beneficial. These authors believe that social stratification is a “device by which the most important roles are filled by the most qualified person”. Fundiswa and Gregory (2020) also argue that “societies are complex systems of interrelated and interdependent parts, and that each part of a society significantly influences the other”. In addition, Tumin (2017) criticises the above idea by pointing out that certain functions in any society are more important than the other. The logical question would be:

How does one know which functions are more important and who makes that decision?

Functionalism is anchored in positivism according to which there is a single objective reality to any research phenomenon or situation regardless of the researcher’s perspective or belief (Smith, 2019). According to Madumo and Koma (2019), the theory was initially dominant in how sociology viewed the society as a system or set

of interconnected parts which together form a whole. However, the theory witnessed a significant drop in popularity within the discipline of sociology partly because of criticisms against it. The main argument for Davis and Moore (2016), is that each society places individuals in social positions and motivates them to work. These authors added that some positions are more functional than others and require more talent and training than others (Davis & Moore, 2016). However, it was adopted in political and administrative studies. According to Nwosu and Ofoegbu (1986), functions as used by scholars in politics and administration refer to the contributions of an activity (legislature) or patterns of behaviour to the maintenance of a given society. For Yamamoto (2017), functionalism when related to politics and administration can be described as a means of explaining basic functions of both political and administrative structures, and it is a tool for investigation. This study which particularly pay a greater attention to government as an institution envisages that Functionalism theory would be useful in understanding functions of parliament in accountability.

2.4 CONSTITUTIONALISM THEORY

According to Adagbabiri (2015), the Constitutionalism theory focuses on leaders' power and the powers of government bodies, which is limited and applied with the establishment of procedures. The political doctrine and legal doctrine, means that the government in first insistence, offers great services to the whole community and the individual right should be persevered. The 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa is considered as a concept of political theory, and it demonstrates that the government does not drive its power for itself but result in laws which governs the power within the country. The Constitution also appears to be one of the government mechanisms which provide the power of government to be limited. According to Adagbabiri (2015), Constitutionalism theory plays an important role of empowering the judiciary to declare any action that conflicts with the constitutional provisions as null and void ultra vires.

The Constitutionalism theory and Functionalism theory are linked based on the power of government bodies. Whilst the functionalist perspective attempts to explain social institutions as collective means to meet individual and social needs, the constitutionalism promotes how the society is governed. The 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa allows and give individuals opportunities to challenge any

decision and action taken by the government, which is deemed as unconstitutional by the court of the law. This means that the Constitution is considered a regulatory and principle of role of law which governs the operation of government activities within the country. It is also seen as a system of fundamental law conversions and customs, and no country can operate lawfully without it (Khotami, 2017). As result, government uses the Constitution to govern the process, procedures, and functions and to ensure governance within branches of government to operate lawfully. The framework of the Constitution offered the mandates which is an independent organ of state to promote the separation of powers within government machinery such as legislature and judiciary. The limitation to perform certain functions of the Constitution implies that the procedures that governs should not be unconstitutional. In the context of this study, the relevance of this theory is that it provides the standard of norms that focus on the mechanism of oversight. As Adagbababiri (2015) points out that there is a limitation of Constitution in the exercise for their function.

According to Adagbababiri (2015), this principle of constitutionalism empowers the judiciary to declare any action that conflicts with the constitutional provision as null and void and ultra vires. It also grants individuals the chance to challenge any action of the government viewed as unconstitutional in the court of law. Yamamoto (2017) is of the view that Constitution may be defined as the whole body of fundamental laws, customs, conventions, principles, rules, and regulations according to which a particular government of a country or an organisation operates. As a result, governments use Constitution to spell out the functions and relationship among the branches of government. Wang (2018) indicates that constitutional framework provides among other things three independent organs of the state to ensure separation of powers within the government machinery; these are legislative, executive and judiciary. Limitation in the exercise of functions of the Constitution implies that the activities of those who govern should not be unconditional. The relevance of this theory for the study lies in that it provides constitutional norms behind oversight mechanism. As Adagbababiri (2015) points out, there is a constitutional limitation in the exercise of their functions.

2.5 INSTITUTIONALISM THEORY

Moeti (2014) states that the Institutionalism theory was introduced in the late 1970's, by John Meyer and Brian Rowan and further developed to generate the understanding of the organisation. It also helps the organisation to adopt changes and to operate effectively. Institutional theory is an approach that understands organisations and management practices as the product of social rather than economic pressures. Institutional theory is a prominent perspective in contemporary organisational research. It encompasses a large, diverse body of theoretical and empirical work connected by a common emphasis on cultural understandings and shared expectations. This theory is often used to explain the adoption and spread of formal organisational structures, including written policies, standard practices, and new forms of organization (Madumo & Koma, 2019).

The institutionalism and constitutionalism theories are linked because they provide ways of understanding how an organisation navigates the rules and norms of the system to navigate the legitimate and survive. In addition, Constitutionalism theory details how the power is derived within the organisation and provides the mandate of the institution. New institutions focus on cognitive and cultural explanation of social and organisational phenomena through consideration of the properties of super-individual units of analysis that cannot be eliminated to aggregations or direct consequences of individual's attribute or motive (Davis & Moore, 2016). For the organisation to survive, it should develop the rules and system that operate in the environment (Adagbabiri, 2015). In the book of institution *Theory in the Political Science: The New Institutionalism*, Petres (2019) assesses the importance of notification of theory within the institution and its political science paradigm. Although, in the literature there is an argument concerning the meeting of neo-institutionalism, it is considered as an organisational theory which rejects the rational actor models of classification economics and consists of eight on the theme of institutional analysis (Crocker, 2019).

In this study, the Institutionalism theory is adopted to understand how to ensure and promote accountability within public institutions. The Institutional theory consists of three approaches, which are, historical, sociology and political institutionalism. The historical institutionalism is the system of political research which pays attention to the significance of the institution and rejection of the explanation of the functionalist such as emerge of the institution. According to Gauld (2016), sociology led

institutionalist to scrutinised the influence of the cultural of world society and ideational causes. These led theories to give the influence on the super state level, policies, and the societal level of the organisation. Political institutionalism focuses on the process of state or macro political level that provide the argument of state formation process, political system, and the system of political parties, specifically to influence the political process (Mintrom, 2019).

Unlike the sociology logical institutionalist, the political institutionalist pays attention not only on the policy convergence of the countries but also focus on how long-standing institutions mediate the influence of domestic organised political factors and global process (Ricks & Doner, 2021). It should be noted that all three various approaches mentioned above considers the Institutionalism theory and are defined broadly. Political and institutionalist consider the institution as process procedures, policy norms and establishment of organisational structure. Based on the adoption of exploratory, the theoretical departure is the Institutional theory in this study (Scott ,2008). This theory supports the study to discuss the role of the institution in terms of constitutional democracy support through promoting the effective oversight role and function of scopa. Institutional theory indicates that institutions are formal structures that develop the norms and values that serve as guidelines as well as to determine the policy and outcomes (Cosmeus, 2016). This theory is adopted to ensure accountability in public sector because the institutional power provides the ideas of enhancing the roles and the function of SCOPA to the country as a whole and world institutions.

Drawing from the above, it is important for this study to achieve its aim and objectives through the core questions and focusing on the new institutionalism. In this regard, the institutionalism deals with the roles and the purpose of SCOPA whilst the historical institutionalism focuses on the contextual issues of the historical exclusion and marginalised unemployment and the abuse of public funds.

Makhado (2016) asserts that institutions are social structures that have attained a high degree of resilience. In agreement, Scott (2008) argues that Institutional theory is a widely accepted theoretical posture that emphasises rational myth. According to Khotami (2017), Institutional theory emphasises the formal and legal aspect of government structure. Two dominant trends exist in the debate around this theory, which guide the literature to understand how norms, rules become established as a

guideline for social behaviour namely, new institutionalism and old institutionalism. Whilst New Institutionalism is a social theory that focuses on developing a sociological view of institutions, the way they interact and the effects of institutions on society, Old Institutionalism is an approach to the study of politics that focuses on the formal institutions of government and sees institution as both structural and procedural which should maintain its legitimacy (Adagbabiri, 2015).

2.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter discussed theories which forms the theoretical points of departure in this study which aims to determine the effectiveness oversight within the public institutions. The study adopted theory triangulation, which involves the use of four theories, namely, Principal-agent theory, Functionalism theory, Constitutionalism theory and Institutionalism theory. The relationship among these theories is demonstrated and how they have related each other in the context of issue under investigation. These theories put more focus on the legislative and different pattern of behaviour in the society as well as the public institutions. The importance of functions of the parliament in ensuring the management accountability and providing better understanding and clear interpretation, is also evident in these theories. These theories demonstrate how power is derived in government bodies and further provide a clear understanding on how the institutions operate. The next chapter discusses the empirical literature on the roles and responsibilities of SCOPA in the public institutions.

CHAPTER THREE

EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW

3.1 INTRODUCTION

An empirical literature review is commonly called a systematic literature review, and it examines past empirical studies to answer a particular research question (Landsberg & Graham, 2017). A substantive and thorough empirical literature review is the basis for any good research project and a well-crafted literature review section provides the theoretical foundation that is required to support any argument of contribution (Boote & Beile, 2005). In this study, the empirical literature review is in alignment with the objectives of the study, with a distinct focus on the discussion of oversight, its importance, normative point of view and the conditions to strengthen effective roles and oversight of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA).

3.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL SERVICES IN AN ORGANISATION

Accountability refers to an obligation of answering the performance duties and the central on it is to prevent adverse consequences (Mulgan, 2011). Further, Khotami (2017) considers accountability as measure to eliminating and redress the abuse of political power. In agreement, Olsen (2015) states that accountability is conceptualised as organisational instrument of promoting political order that develop the facts, formulation responsibilities and adopting the normative standards for assessing of conduct, gives reasons and developing capabilities for sanction in appropriate behaviour. The term accountability has a plethora of dimensions, it involves two distinct stages which mark answerability and enforcement. According to

Wang (2018) enforcement is when public or the institution responsible for accountability sanctions the offending party or remedy the contravening behaviour. Accountability is important as it inspires officials to act in the public interest. In any democracy, it is the role of oversight committees to strive to make different government departments to be accountable to them and the citizens, to make sure public resources are not put to waste. Accountability is a pivotal pillar in making democracy work and it is the seal of contemporary democratic governance. Democracy is in jeopardy if accountability is not one of its anchors. Lack of accountability gives those in power and those in charge of public purse and institutions to abuse state resources for their benefit (Pelizzo, et al, 2018). As a result, corruption becomes the bedrock of the state if leaders are not held accountable in public for their acts or omissions, for their choices, their spending, or strategies. Accountability is therefore the hallmark of good governance.

According to Malan and Mathebula (2020), accountability and oversight are issues that are key to effective and efficient political administration. Accountability means being accountable for actions or policies, whilst oversight refers to the role of legislatures in monitoring and reviewing actions of government's organs. However, the quality of oversight and accountability is only as good as the mechanisms and procedures that exist to guide them. With this in mind,

How can these concepts be assessed in a democratic parliamentary set-up? What can be done to strengthen them to ensure a better system of governance? What is their role with respect to other organs of state?

Accountability is constantly identified with great administration which suggests that public participation should direct public issues, oversee public assets and assurance that human rights are free from maltreatment and defilement while complying with the standard of law (Crocker, 2019). Accountability is imperative to show justly how government behaviour observing and control while avoiding centralisation of intensity and improving the learning limit and viability of public (DiMaggio, 2018). Accountability alludes to a commitment to uncover, clarify and legitimise activities (Van der Nest et al., 2008).

Wang (2018) clarifies that public accountability is to openly take responsibility for one's actions, accept consequences, learn, and improve from them. Public accountability as a constitutional mandate is one of the mechanisms that promote good governance globally. Similarly, Mamokhere (2020) indicates that public accountability is a key cornerstone of good governance. Therefore, it can further be clarified that public accountability is an obligation and willingness to accept responsibility. From another perspective, Nzimakwe (2014) writes that "public accountability and transparency involve the commitment to uncover exercises and after-effects of such exercises, clarify and legitimise them out in the public". Therefore, public accountability is the legitimacy and institutionalised practices of record giving (Crocker, 2019).

Section 195 of the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa stipulates that one of the fundamental values is that public administration must be answerable. According to Kraai (2018), accountability can be considered as social rapport where the departments and state-owned entities are compelled to explain and validate their actions to the accountability sector such as legislature. For Madue (2017), accountability is horizontal, and it is made by well-defined separation of powers between the executive linked with the requirement to accelerate good governance.

Ndoma-Egba (2018) states that lack of accountability has been ascribed as central to most governance challenges. The weak and insufficient organisational systems and on various structure in public sector is due to lack of accountability among leaders, and they have negative impacts on the human resource management, risk management procurements and financial management in the institution. In certain South Africa organisation there are various cases that indicated that there is a division of decision-making key and it is difficult to determine who is accountable for the implementation and results. Pillay (2016) reveals that the argument of the solution may be introducing the collective leadership. In this regard, the organisation is collectively accountable.

Accountability is the right to obtain justifications and explanations from public officials or private service providers responsible for the use of public resources (source). This places an obligation on officials to account for the use of public resources. It also places an obligation on oversight bodies to demand adequate explanations and

justifications from government officials, and where these are not provided or are unsatisfactory, instigate and recommend a corrective action (Luyt, 2018). Oversight bodies are perfectly placed because of their constitutional authority, to demand social accountability. They are responsible for ensuring that people's socio-economic rights are met within available resources by holding those tasked with service delivery to account. However, accountability also requires that oversight leads to adequate corrective action when necessary, and this requires political will to act against corrupt and/or underperforming officials (Luyt, 2018).

3.3 EFFECTIVENESS OF PERFORMANCE OF THE OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

This section of Chapter three reviews literature pertaining to effectiveness of performance of oversight and accountability to scrutinise existing practices, measured standardised, and to offer alternatives that could be utilised in the future. The effectiveness of performance of oversight and accountability is one of the most factors that determine the service delivery and how the public funds are used.

3.3.1 The important of oversight

The term oversight is used to define many activities executed by legislatures in relation to the executive. According to the South African Legislative sector (2012:2), "oversight can be defined as the active interface between a legislature with the executive and administrative structures that improve the delivery of predetermined objectives of government priorities". McEwan (2015) argues that legislatures efficiently position themselves as overseers of the executive and act as protectors of morality on behalf of the residents. Also, Tetey (2019) outlines that the 2019 South African accountability model describes oversight as a constitutionally assigned function of the legislative structures to analyse and evaluate the work of the executive organ of state. Furthermore, oversight entails overseeing the work of the executive in the quest to enhance service delivery to achieve improved living conditions for all residents. Where service disruptions transpire or grievances arise,

instruments should be available to hold the executive to respond in terms of their decisions or lack of action.

Oversight is the proactive control mechanisms initiated by the legislature with the executive and administrative organs of state to promote compliance with the statutory and legislative frameworks (South African Legislative Sector, 2018:4). In support, De Vilpers (2018) states that accountability be the obligation to expose, explain and justify the behaviour and actions of public functionaries in the three spheres of government.

The Legislature's institutional capacity and the internal supporting environment provide the facilitating mechanism and support that enables the Legislature to perform and engage in oversight over the executive. The institutional capacity is looked at in terms of the mechanism for oversight and accountability (Tsheola, 2017). These and external institutions that may assist and add value to the performance of oversight are explored. Apart from the oversight and accountable functions of the public institution, there are also committees and personnel who must fulfil the functions of accountability and oversight over public officials to ensure that organisation are able to meet their constitutional obligations such as the executive committees, mayoral committees, council portfolio committees, municipal public accounts committees and audit committees (Kim, 2018).

The term oversight is used to define a vast number of functions executed by the legislature in relation to the executive. According to the National Government Oversight Model of the South African Legislative Sector Report (2017), oversight can be described as the active interface between the legislature and the executive structures that improve the delivery of predetermined objectives of government priorities. Malan and Mathebula (2020), argue that legislatures effectively position themselves as overseers of the executive and act as protectors of morality on behalf of the residents.

In the South African context, oversight can be defined as a constitutionally delegated task of the legislative structures of the state to analyse and guide the executive exertion of other organs of state. Most importantly, oversight entails overseeing the work of the executives in the quest to enhance service delivery to achieve improved living conditions for all residents. Instances in which service disruptions transpire or grievances arise, instruments are available to hold the executive to respond in terms

of their decisions or lack of action (Landsberg & Graham, 2017). The provincial government provides basic requirements for the creation of committees; therefore, section 79 committees should support the provincial government to execute oversight. Thus, the relevance of the separation of powers, which provides checks and balances regarding the execution of executive duties makes the executive accountable to the citizenry. The National Government Oversight Model (2018:89) states that oversight comprises of several elements namely: political, administrative, financial, ethical, legal, and strategic elements. The purpose of overseeing includes:

- *Uncover and end misuse of resources and unauthorised conduct on the part of the government. Fundamentally, the function of oversight is concerned with the protection of the privileges of citizens.*
- *Ensure the answerability of government in respect of how public funds is utilized. It discovers uneconomical spending within government organisations. Thus, it can enhance the efficacy and effectiveness of government performance.*
- *Apply and implement policies adopted by government, including the analysed attainment of objectives determined by legislation.*
- *Enhance openness, accountability, and honesty of government operations to strengthen public trust in the government.*

The parliamentary oversight's function is one of the cornerstones of democracy. It holds the executive accountable for its actions and ensures that it implements policies in accordance with the laws and budget passed by Parliament. The robust monitoring of the executive by Parliament is an indicator of good governance, as it is through oversight that parliament can ensure a balance of power and assert its role as the defender and the legitimate custodian of the people's interests. The Constitution envisages a specific oversight role for the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, respectively (McEwan, 2015).

It places an obligation on the National Assembly to provide for mechanisms to ensure that all executive organs of the state in the national sphere of government are accountable to it and to maintain oversight of the exercise of national executive authority, including the implementation of legislation (De Vilpers, 2018). The

Constitution requires the National Council of Provinces to exercise oversight over national aspects of provincial and local government. The oversight and accountability model makes provision for various oversight mechanisms, including exercising oversight through committees, oversight visits, the passing of budget votes, questions for executive reply, members' statements, notices of motion, debates on matters of public importance and constituency work (National Government Oversight Model of the South African Legislative Sector Report, 2017).

One of the significant features provided for in the oversight and accountability model is the establishment of a Joint Parliamentary Oversight and Governance Assurance Committee to pursue all assurances and undertakings. This means that, in the context of this study, oversight is the supervision of government activities and public finances by the Legislature. It is a controversial concept that causes much debate among scholars, government, and civil society. According to Yamamoto (2017), it is difficult to ascribe a single meaning to the term oversight as it applies to Portfolio Committees and Select Committees, it also includes developing strategies for government departments, daily monitoring, and evaluation. Tsheola (2017) states that oversight denotes some form of legislative supervision or watchfulness of delegated authority to executive branch entities and officials. In the context of this study, this implies a failure to notice something that is overlooked or inadvertently omitted. Somgqeza (2014) point out that oversight covers a wide range of activities, including briefings, hearings, consideration of submissions, inspection of governmental documents ranging from strategic plans to annual reports and budgets, the approval or rejection of pending legislation, and the engagement of the public in all these activities. Slappin (2013) refers to oversight as a review process which suggests that oversight includes inquiries about policies that have been in effect, investigation of past administrative actions, and the calling of executive officers to account for their financial transactions.

The core of oversight function is to hold executive arm of government accountable and to remedy situations where the executive has not performed according to its stated policies. This function includes monitoring the achievement of goals set by legislation and the government's own programmes. In the light of the above, oversight seeks to improve transparency in government which is itself a condition of effective policy implementation (Reddy & Clarke, 2020). The institutions of oversight

which are guided by their mandates have the potential to investigate complaints from government departments and present findings either to parliament or to publish them on their websites to be available to the public as well. The positive aspect however is that they all share a common interest, which is to serve the people of the Republic of South Africa and remain responsible and accountable in this service. These institutions are established to assist and to bring the relevant information concerning government departments and their officials to the public (Fish,2006). Democratic accountability requires executive control and parliamentary oversight, as well as inputs by civil society (Notshulwana, 2019).

3.3.2 Oversight and accountability

One of the fundamental values enshrined in Section 195 of the 1996 Constitution is that public administration must be answerable. According to Kim (2018), accountability is a social rapport where ministers, departments and state-owned entities are compelled to explain and validate their actions to the accountability sector, which in this case is the legislature. This generally refers to giving account of actions and spending. In the South African context, this definition responds to the Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (Act 1 of 1999) concept of administrative accountability of the public officials. At the level of provincial and local government, municipalities and departments are required to prepare and adopt annual reports to advance answerability to the local community for determinations made during the year by the municipality (Ferry & Eckersley, 2015).

The role of the legislature as a representative body in ensuring both vertical and horizontal accountability can enhance the quality of democracy. Ensuring oversight over the executive is part of the horizontal accountability role that it performs. However, the institutional capacity of the legislature is vital for the legislature to effectively perform this role (Wang, 2018).

Ferry and Eckersley (2015) argue that the accountability relationship is a horizontal one made possible by the well separation of powers between the executive and the legislative authority which forms the foundation of an independent system of government. Consequently, the promotion of accountability by the executive is linked with the requirement to accelerate good governance. According to the World Bank Conference Report (2021), good governance refers to a policy process that focuses

on the functions of the political, administrative, and economic criterion of lawfulness and efficacy in the procedures of the public sector. In this regard, the legislature utilises oversight committees to promote good governance. This implies that the spheres of government should fulfil their responsibilities and oversight committees should assist to create greater accountability on the part of the executive (Global Parliamentary Report, 2017)

3.3.3 Key functions of parliament oversight

According to Tellier (2014), the parliamentary oversight function is one of the cornerstones of democracy. Oversight is a means for holding the executive accountable for its actions and for ensuring that it implements policies in accordance with the laws and budget passed by the parliament. Wasserman and De Beer (2018) state that the robust monitoring of the executive by the parliament is an indicator of good governance. Besides the parliament's legislative function, it is through oversight that the parliament can ensure a balance of power and assert its role as the defender of citizen's interests.

In both long-established and new democracies, the parliament is given the power to oversee the government through several tools and mechanisms. In this regard, the tools and mechanisms are outlined in the constitution and other regulatory texts such as the parliament's internal procedures (Smith, 2017). The specifics of how a parliament can utilise its oversight prerogative depends upon the existence of a legal framework, which consolidates the position of the parliament as an oversight institution and guarantees its powers and independence within the political system. Thus, while reforming the structure of the political system to increase a parliament's constitutionally given oversight capacities may not always be feasible, in some instances, parliaments can improve their oversight capacities by reforming their own rules (Mlambo, Zubane & Mlambo, 2019). For example, a good practice for committee systems is to assign a single committee to each government ministry. The parliamentary budget permitting, such reforms are usually within the powers of the parliament to implement. According to Olum (2018:105), parliamentarians conduct oversight to:

- **Ensure transparency and openness of executive activities:** Parliaments shed light on the operations of government by providing a public arena in

which policies and actions of government are debated, scrutinised, and subjected to public opinion.

- **Hold the executive branch accountable:** Parliamentary oversight scrutinises whether the government's policies have been implemented and whether they are having the desired impact.
- **Provide financial accountability:** Parliaments approve and scrutinise government spending by highlighting waste within publicly funded services. The aim is to improve the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of government expenditure; and,
- **Uphold the rule of law:** Parliament seeks protect the rights of citizens by monitoring policies and examining potential abuses of power, arbitrary behavior, and illegal or unconstitutional conduct by government (Olum, 2018).
- **Provide financial accountability:** Parliaments approve and scrutinize government spending by highlighting waste within publicly funded services

The 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa ensures that the public institution remain accountable with regards to accountable regarding the utilisation of resources for service delivery imperatives. It is important to note that this constitutional reform was done for the transitional apartheid to bring changes in the government and to eliminate imbalance among citizens as well as to confirm the vital state mediating social and economic relations in highly fragmented society (Pillay, 2016). Thus, the concept oversight included the important aspects such as public administration, financial ethical and element of legal strategies (Notshulwana, 2018). Additionally, the oversight committees are appointed by the parliament to deal with misuse of public funds, maladministration and to parliament appoints oversight committees to deal with misuse of public funds and maladministration and monitor the correct procedures and process of public resources within government machinery (Fagbadebo, 2019).

3.3.4 Legislative oversight powers in South Africa

The 1996 Constitutions of the Republic of South Africa provides for a series of measures to ensure that legislatures effectively scrutinised the actions and decisions of the government. The two countries have different governing systems. In South Africa, there is an incorporation of the system of separation of powers among the

three branches of the government: the legislature, the executive and the judiciary (Saner & Wilson, 2018). Each branch of the government has constitutionally structured responsibilities to promote the ideals of constitutional democracy. The Constitution empowered legislative institutions to harness the powers of control over executive responsibilities to ensure delivery of public goods and services. The South African Constitution also make provisions for accountability enhancing measures which include being voted out of office by the electorate, removal of president] by parliament through a motion of no confidence, or impeachment (Afrobarometer, 2021). The Constitutional court of South Africa describes these measures as crucial accountability-enhancing instruments that forever remind the president and cabinet of the worst repercussions that could be visited upon them for a perceived and actual mismanagement of the people's best interests (Community Law Centre, 2018).

Section 41 (1) (c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa compels the government to 'provide effective, transparent, accountable and coherent government for the Republic as a whole'. This is in pursuant of one of the cardinal purposes of the law is to improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). The Oversight Model of the South African Legislative Sector (2019) sets the pace for the expected functionality of the government, namely, effective service delivery to the public and empower the legislature and guide the implementation of public policies in accordance with the stipulation of the Constitution. Section 55 of the South African Constitution empowered the National Assembly (NA) to ensure executive accountability and maintain oversight of the implementation of public policies.

3.3.5 Types of accountability

Section 33(2) of the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa stipulates that official requires to provide the reasons. For this study, accountability is an obligation that ensure that all public officials' decisions and actions are monitor and subjected to oversight guarantee, which in turn assists the government to meet its mandates and objective thereby contribute to governance. Therefore, it is significant to discuss the various types of accountability as way of oversight improvement as well as for public sector to be protected against the abuse of power, financial mismanagement, and waste, irregular and fruitless expenditure. The following types of accountability are considered for this study.

3.3.5.1 Vertical accountability

Vertical accountability refers to a method of non-state agent which ensures the state to be held accountable through the relationship between the political representative and the citizens (Landsberg & Graham, 2017). Vertical accountability is accountability for the management of funds to higher authorities, such as accountability of work units to local governments, accountability of local governments to the central government, and accountability of the central government to the Parliament (Khotami, 2017). The measure of accountability ensure that the public has the electoral too to determine the mandates of choosing their representative if the interval control and evaluation tool fail to determine who is accountable on the office holders. Buhrmann, Marquand and Mechkova (2017) state that vertical accountability is the state's population on holding its government accountable through elections and political parties. It focuses on the relationship between citizens and their elected representatives. This establishes accountability mechanism based on incentives for leaders who want to gain and keep power (Skaaning, 2015:5).

3.3.5.2 Diagonal accountability

Diagonal accountability occurs when there is an engagement between citizens and institution (Gordon ,2021). The break of monopoly of state on the mandate of official and executive to conduct oversight is due to limited of the civil society watchdog functions. Luhurman et al (2017) reveal that diagonal accountability represents the extent in which state institution can hold accountable to the executive branch of the government. The purpose of this accountability is to capture the degree which the process of the institution with legal power to determine and balance the executive branch when exercise the function in practice (Ali et al., 2018).

3.3.5.3 Political accountability

According to Gusev (2020), political accountability refers to government civil servants and politician's accountability to the public and legislatives bodies such as parliament. Kolisang (2019) reveals that political accountability applies to internal structure of government including elected public representatives who assume decision making functions sources. Political accountability may furthermore take some administrative dimensions.

This type of accountability relates to the accountability of the elected office bearers. It also focuses on accountability to policies emanating from political role players in a democratic society in South African institutions (Kotia,2011). Even though this accountability raises many issues that political leadership should be accountable at various government levels to municipal councils, parliaments, provincial legislative and other legislative bodies (Kearns, 2016). This is to ensure that political leaders constantly verify that public institutions are carrying out the policies assigned to them which are government related and implemented in a manner that ensures effective delivery of services for value of money (Global Parliamentary Report, 2017). Political accountability applies to internal structures of government including elected public representatives who assume decision-making functions source. It also refers to non-elected public officials with roles and responsibilities as far as management and administration are concerned, including initiation of submissions for executives and councils to decide upon (Napier, 2007:380).

Wang (2018) argues that political accountability is the process where the electorate can measure the performance of the government, and to return or remove it from power. Political accountability also takes on some administrative dimensions, for example, when Municipal Public Account Committee (MPAC) questions the mayor on aspects of performance of portfolio. Koenane and Mangena (2017) argue that political accountability tends to be affected by neopatrimonialism acquaintance, nepotism, and political party patronage which undermines the principle of responsiveness to the public. These limitations, notwithstanding political accountability, remain the highest form of accountability.

3.3.5.4 Ethical accountability

According to Makwetu (2017), ethical accountability is a type of accountability that focuses on the improvement performance of individual and organisations through developing the mechanism, professional exercise and promoting the effective environment for individual and organisation to embrace a culture of sustainable development.

3.3.5.5 Administrative accountability

Administrative accountability considered as rule and norms for internal which hold the civil servants accountable within the government administration and mechanisms

that promote accountability (Gusev, 2020). These different kinds of accountability promote the effective accountability within the public sector and the importance of various dimensions. Answerability and enforceability are considered as most oversight tool such as oversight committee and the government appointment approval (Landsberg & Graham, 2017). In this regard, answerability is to strengthen accountability in this study. The parliament has established the oversight tools to address issues of accountability such as oversight committee. The challenges such as corruption and political interference in government administration eliminates the importance and potential gain from oversight function (Makwetu, 2017).

Koenane and Mangena (2017) explain that in terms of managerial and administrative accountability, officials both need to account to their superiors and political leaders as far as administrative performance is concerned. Managerial and administrative personnel are allocated with certain authorities and delegations to execute administrative functions in a governing authority (Kim, 2018). Furthermore, financial, and budgetary accountability involves accounting for the spending and allocation of rates and taxes and managing the control of public assets and liabilities. The focus of this type of accountability is on the activities of government officials as employees at any government institutions which might be a municipal or government department. In fact, this type of accountability prescribes the behaviour of employees and their circumstances of their choices. All the officials, therefore, should operate within a legislative framework since they are evaluated and held accountable.

Mamokhere (2018) states that administrative accountability should be understood by each government or municipal employee. This means that accounting officers, municipal managers or directors of institutions should ensure that this responsibility is properly understood (Achen & Bartels, 2017). This is known as traditional accountability. The actions of the employees should be based on standards of legality and regularity when they are held accountable for their actions. In addition, officials or employees act within the laws and regulations which govern public sector institutions. The task of management, therefore, becomes another kind of administrative and managerial accountability.

This concerns funds and property and other resources as well as human resources, with a view to efficiency in public usage. They are responsible for their actions and for more than just compliance with regulations and promoting the judicious use of

public resources. It is the responsibility of all municipalities and public sector officials to ensure that all signed tasks or assigned programmes are effectively achieved as set out as goals. The managers of directors of those programmes account for what has been achieved as required by law. Koenane and Mangena (2017) is of the view that the other type of administrative accountability is referred to as process accountability. It investigates methods and procedures of all institutions; section operations and the way inputs are converted into outputs as planned and arranged. It uses for performance terms of the process that was agreed upon by the programme administrator and funds provider of services or goods

The consideration of enforceability tools is depending on the form of government. The process of motion of no confidence, impeachment, and motions of censure and selection of cabinet for ministers are considered as tool that are applied in enforceability (World Bank Institute, 2013). The abuse of government branches and public agencies is monitored with the state institution such as anti-corruption agencies and legislatures which focus more on checking horizontal accountability. The types of accountability applied with responsibility and internal process of answerability to responsibility and the direction of enforceability in the government. This responsibility applies through legislatures assisted with the oversight tools such as constitutional designated and institution agents.

Transparency refers to a process which is open for all verification and to deal with any practice agreement and transition (Kotia, 2011). It also argues that every action and decisions that are taken should be open and the sufficient information should be available to the public and other agencies to determine whether the relevant process and procedures are followed (Achen & Bartels, 2017). Responsive refers to ability to offer the responds to all mandates that queries by the representative of the citizens concerning the financial administration of the country is tasked. Good governance is considered as way or system of reconstruction and sustainable development within the country (Kotia, 2011). These can be achieved through the overall performance of management and their capacity to produce the intended results.

3.3.5.6 Legal accountability

Legal frameworks that bind officials and public representatives is one of the factors. All institutions must adhere to these legislations, including complying with reporting frameworks (Crocker, 2019). From the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South

Africa to the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA), including internal control policies, every public financial activity must follow procedure and must be within the law. Koenane and Mangena (2017) argue that legal accountability involves the relationship of external oversight. Chapter 9 institutions which are established by the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa support constitutional democracy, such as the Public Protector, Auditor General and SCOPA as principals among the external oversight functions. These institutions ensure that individuals and groups performance comply with established standards and performance mandates.

3.3.5.7 Financial accountability

Financial accountability can make or break the public institution. It can determine whether public funds are handled in an effective, economic, and efficient manner. Notshulwana and Lebakeng (2019) align this with an obligation on the part of persons handling resources and holding public office and any other position of trust to report on the intended and the actual use of resources.

3.4 THE IMPACT AND STRATEGIC BENEFITS OF OVERSIGHT BODIES

The oversight contributes to the public integrity system's effectiveness, notably by means of adequate responses of public organisations to oversight bodies' recommendations; effective handling of complaints and allegations, through both oversight bodies' own procedures and those of public organisations and the impartial enforcement of laws and regulations throughout the public sector. There are impact and strategic benefits that brings through oversight.

3.4.1 The national assembly

The national assembly does however have the right to call organs of state at provincial and local level to account but does not do so operationally unless there are issues of public importance, national interest, and shared competencies. Accountability by organs of state at provincial and local level must be conducted through observance of the Intergovernmental Framework Relations Act and the principles of co-operative government (Oversight Model of the South African Legislative Sector, 2021). Therefore, government and public entities at all levels

need to be held accountable for efficient and effective planning and budgeting, implementation of programmes, and oversight and corrective action (Luyt, 2018).

3.4.2 The Nature of Electoral Systems

The electoral body in a democracy is given the responsibility to choose a particular electoral system that will be objective and provides equal opportunities for citizens to influence government conduct and highlights that there are reasons behind the choice of an electoral system in a democracy (Popescu, 2013:214). It alludes to what this discussion, focusing on the nature of the electoral systems, attempts to establish. Masenya (2017) states that electoral formulas of legislative elections are either categorised as majoritarian, proportional, and mixed based of which the latter represents a combination of both worlds (Majoritarian and Proportional Representation systems). The premise of the differentiation of these electoral systems is the number of political parties or actors taking part in elections that establish government (Freier & Odendahl, 2015:311). This highlights that the former restricts political parties from competing fairly in elections, and the latter encourages multiple party competition. It may be argued that electoral changes in a country are swayed by party systems and in turn changes in party systems influence the rules of party contestation (Bielasiak & Hulse, 2013:4). In addition, Wills-Otero (2009:35) argues that with a party system consisting of few large political parties (mostly two-party), the majoritarian tends to produce one winner in a district.

PR systems encourage multiple parties to participate since they have an advantage through the vote percentage to gain seats in a district (Louw, 2016). These are utilised in most democracies and espoused in South Africa. In the South African context, Faure (1996:90) argues that the period between 1990-1994 working towards democracy was instrumental in reaching a consensus on the popularity of a PR system as a preferred choice for an electoral system. This consensus was reached among the major political parties through extensive negotiations. Therefore, there is a need to discuss what makes PR systems a popular choice in most modern democracies.

3.4.3 Elected Member of Legislature

Parliamentary system of governance legislative oversight and executive accountability in South Africa occur within a representative democracy with a parliamentary system of governance and an electoral system that promotes proportional representation using party lists (Koenane & Mangena, 2017). Members of parliament and provincial Legislatures are elected for a five-year term to represent the will of the people, ensure government by the people and are accountable to the electorate (Crocker, 2019). As indicated by Parliamentary Monitoring Group (2018), in a parliamentary system, the executive is formed from Members of the legislature; the president is accountable to the legislature and can be dismissed by the Legislature. Within a sub national South African context, the legislature elects a premier who then constitutes the executive amongst other members of the legislature. The executive thus derives their democratic legitimacy from the legislature, they are accountable to the legislature and remain as members of the legislature. In Limpopo, the executive composes of the premier and nine (9) MECs who are allocated functional responsibilities by the premier. The parliamentary system of governance does not specify where power resides and has the potential to create conflict between these political institutions (Crocker, 2019).

3.4.4 The Role of South African Parliament

According to Miller (2017), parliament is one of the key governance institutions providing checks and balances on the executive. As a representative body, the Legislative Assembly is a central institution in any democracy. According to Chapter 4 of South Africa's Constitution, parliament is defined as an elected representative body having supreme legislative powers within a state. Munzhedzi (2016) defines parliament as a generic term depicting a representative body of individuals to whom the people have entrusted the responsibility of representing them by laying down the legal framework within which society shall be governed and seeing to it that these legal conditions are implemented in a responsible manner by the executive.

In a democratic South Africa, the role of the legislature is to advance the principle of separation of powers which is provided for in the country's Chapter 4 of the Constitution. The separation of powers system originates from Constitutional Principle 5 of the Interim Constitution of 1996 which provides that 'there shall be separation of powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary with

appropriate checks and balances to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness (Olsen, 2018).

The principle of separation of powers governs the relationship between the three arms of the state. Separation of powers is the extent to which the powers of government are separated functionally between the three branches. Under a strict understanding of the principle of separation of powers, each arm of the state should not interfere with the other arms of the State. The principle is aimed at ensuring that the use of state power is not abused and constitutes a system of checks and balances on state power (Koenane & Mangena, 2017). It requires that parliament through its oversight committees should make law, the judiciary must professionally interpret the law, the executive must dispassionately enforce the law; and all institutions must respect the law and abide by it (Reddy & Clarke, 2020).

The South African Constitution has vested in parliament the role of protecting the supreme law. Institutions and agencies of the state and government including the office of the president and cabinet, executive and non-executive commissions such as police, defense, intelligence, electoral commissions, etc. are all required to abide by the Constitution (Olsen, 2018). If properly exercised, vesting the power to protect the Constitution in parliament provides a useful mechanism to check the excesses of power held by these institutions and agencies (Maserumule, 2018). Parliament through its different oversight committees is therefore mandated to protect the democratic space through facilitating public involvement in its legislative and other processes which seek to foster accountability of the use of public resources in South Africa. The Constitution is clear that it is a responsibility to ask interested parties about draft legislation being considered by parliament and committee sittings to be held in public (Louw, 2016). This is all done to deepen democracy and foster accountability of public resources. It should be noted that in the South Africa, setting the concepts of oversight and accountability are deeply engraved in the country's Constitution and the legislature through its oversight committees are constitutionally mandated to scrutinise and oversee executive action and any organ of state.

Parliament can also establish a general oversight committee, which coordinates the oversight work of other permanent committees (Luyt, 2018). An oversight committee can recommend that other permanent committees investigate specific problems that

it has identified (Madue,2012). Other permanent committees can also bring matters before the general oversight committee. Many parliaments have a set of permanent committees that are related to the policy areas of government departments (Public Service Commission, 2018). These committees may be organised in such a way as to exactly mirror the government departments, although one such committee may oversee more than one department, or one department may be overseen by two or more parliamentary committees. According to Mamokhere (2020), it is common for permanent committees both to deliberate bills of and to be responsible for oversight of the corresponding government department. The naming of committees varies enormously from one parliament to another, and this can be a source of confusion.

A committee with the same title may be a departmental committee in one parliament and a non-departmental committee in another (Ferry & Eckersley, 2015). The basic function of parliamentary committees is to prepare for deliberation in the full chamber. Committees prepare reports and sometimes a representative or representatives of the committee participate in the plenary debates on these reports. Committee work is important in making possible informed discussion in the legislative chamber. The existence of many specialised committees adds value to parliamentary work since they can work simultaneously to tackle the same problem from different angles. A government's infrastructure plan, for example, can be examined from the viewpoints of public finance, economic growth, gender, and impact on local populations. In addition, committees can work as intermediary bodies between interest groups and the relevant authorities and can be entry points for citizens to the work of parliament (Louw, 2016). The composition of a committee reflects that of the parent chamber. Parliamentary political groups are typically represented in committees in proportion to their numerical strength in the chamber. Special consideration can be given to smaller groups to ensure their representation in committees, either as full members or as observers. However, the simple presence of members of the opposition in committees is not enough to guarantee effective parliamentary oversight (Miller, 2017).

3.4.5 SCOPA as a tool to promote accountability

The Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) is established to conduct oversight and hold the executive accountable for their action when spending public

funds (Makhado, 2016). It seeks to ensure accountability for resources and financial management per the requirements of the Public Finance Management Act, 1999, as amended (Daniels, 2019). The intention for the SCOPA, when executing its function, is to ensure that there is an effective, efficient, and economical use of public funds (Makhado, 2016). It promotes transparency and accountability in the use of public resources, ensure that public funds are spent to benefit the public and ensure that quality service is delivered to the public (Makhado, 2016). Considering all the role and responsibilities that SCOPA play. (Notshulwana, 2019) indicates that South Africa is still struggling with measures to counter corruption and the abuse of power. South Africa has instituted and inaugurated many critical institutional mechanisms for legislative oversight. However, Matebese-Notshulwana (2019) further opines that rampant problems of non-compliance, unaccountability, and lack of answerability within South Africa's public sector still persist. Yamamoto (2017) concludes that this conduct of unaccountability or lack of answerability and abuse of office power has serious consequences for the future of the country and the realisation of good governance practice. Thus, the role and function of SCOPA as a key parliamentary tool should seek to advance public accountability.

The Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) which focuses on public expenditure by the executive scrutinises the report of the Auditor-General regarding the financial management of various public institutions. SCOPA then summons whoever it deems necessary to appear before it and answer questions regarding the expenditure of public monies (Kim, 2018). Further, Yamamoto (2017) notes that most of the parliamentary work is done by committees of which SCOPA is one.

SCOPA is different from other portfolio committees in that these committees cover a broad range of issues including considering bills, dealing with departmental budget votes, and overseeing the work of the department they are responsible for, while SCOPA focuses on public expenditure by the executive. SCOPA may also summon administrative heads of departments as they play a pivotal role in these expenditures to account on the way the public money was spent. The challenge may occur between the political executives and ordinary members of parliament, the same cannot be said about the accounting officers and different portfolio committees (Luhmann, Marquard & Mechkova, 2017). The rationale behind this is that accounting officers do not enjoy the same powerful political status as ministers. As

such, they do not receive the same 'shielding' by the ruling party as ministers who appear before the SCOPA and different portfolio committees (Ferry & Eckersley, 2015).

According to section 24 of the 1996 Constitution of RSA, SCOPA is mainly mandated to ensure that public institutions are accounting for their administration actions. The SCOPA is considered as committee that ensures accountability within all South African public institutions. This can be done through conduction of more oversights to all department. Despite these transformations, the interest of oversight function and roles as well as the significant of legislative oversight as affirmed by Notshulwana (2018). However, this past decade, course the political scientist was giving more attention to the legislative oversight which have been described as significant challenge is the activity of the legislature (Ndoma-Egba, 2018). It should be noted that accountability is one of the factors that drive the efficacy within the public institutions. The issue of accountability should be taken seriously because it determines service delivery and the development in the continent. Previous studies argue and demonstrates that the legislative oversight instrument is associated with political and socio-economic (Ali, Saleem, Bashir, Riaz & Sami, 2018). Further, Stapenhurst, Jacobs and Pelizzo (2014) stipulate that the anti-corruption strategies generally ignore the legislature and the issue of ensuring accountability among the executive.

Political leaders cause legislature to be unable to restrain the executive power because most of them are elected from the dominating political party and have overwhelming support. Government (2018) argues that it is the responsibility of parliaments to conduct and establish the oversight functions to hold government accountable on behalf of the people. Somgqeza (2014) states that in the description of parliament of the South Africa indicated that to hold government accountable is a critical role on how the foreign policy is perused but perceived directly active as participants of international relations (Masters, 2015). In addition, Pymen (2013) believes that through checking the excess of executive power and ensuring that the government is operating lawfully this becomes the most important role of holding the executive accountable.

The presence of oversight tools is important, but the effective oversight becomes a challenge in public institutions (Notshulwana and Lebakeng, 2018). The additional

condition determines the effective oversight not only the availability of tools. These can be the oversight power that is offered by the legislature or the parliament, whether the sufficient information is available and the function of legislature and individual members (Godi, 2017). Further, Cosmeus (2016) argues that capacity building in the parliament is not only the procedure of performance improvement, the accountability and credibility of parliamentary institutes play an important role in strengthening the effectiveness of legislature. The Parliamentary Audits Committee and Public Account Committee (PAC) function as critical factors that determine the success of public institution (Makwetu, 2017).

In addition, the parliament is an institution that holds government accountable to the public. Parliament holds government accountable on behalf of citizens through the establishment of oversight functions (Izah, 2013). There are several tools that carries out the oversight function, but until the less analysis is to be undertaken on the use of those (National Assembly, 2018). For many studies, one of the procedures of the parliament could be to fulfil its oversight function and roles through the elected committee that formed part of the enhancing the legislature roles and function as well as to prevent democratic regimes through ensuring the order in administration and proper governmental (Gusev, 2020).

This study put more focus on the area of public accountability and demonstrate all core factors of accountability. In South African government, one of the critical factors is the inability to exercise accountability in cause of abuse of public funds, resources, and malfeasance. According to Fagbadebo (2019), every constitution of democratic country demonstrates the important of promoting the interest of the public. These require the country to take seriously the issue of promoting the interest of citizen and is crucial for every country. These crucial offered the important of promoting the interest of the public through the natural rights and freedom of self-government to the government in the exchange of the social benefits (Pelizzo & Stapenhurst, 2014). Regarding the key function of legislature is to scrutinise government official misconducting through demanding information about policies, decision and taking specific action in case of irregularities (Luhmann, Marquard & Mechkova, 2017).

3.4.6 The SCOPA Resolutions

According to the SCOPA report of the Year 2021, the resolutions were sent to the provincial departments, 34 per cent were not implemented, 35 per cent were partially implemented, 28 per cent were fully implemented, and 3 per cent were not responded to. This means that most of the resolutions were not implemented. Reasons for departments not implementing resolutions are identified as failure of the departments to take appropriate action against officials who did not comply with rules and regulations, lack of appropriate evidence to support their responses, lack of recovery of money earned irregularly, fruitless and wasteful expenditures, tendency to institute lengthy investigations, shifting of responsibilities to implement resolutions to other departments and a lack of a sense of urgency when dealing with resolutions within specific timeframes (Limpopo SCOPA Resolution Report, 2020). The tight programme of the Legislature further makes it difficult for SCOPA to conduct its activities. This is compounded by replacing members that served in SCOPA as well as inadequate training and capacity building for committee members and staff. Ferry and Eckersley (2015) indicate that towards the end of the fourth term, SCOPA had a system where departments were called to explain to the committee when they did not implement resolutions. In addition to resolutions, the performance of SCOPA in terms of tabling of reports in the Legislature should be considered.

3.5 CHALLENGES OF OVERSIGHT

In Africa, the legislature never developed and addressed all the issues in mature democracies. This is due to historical and the inability of African legislatures to function effectively in the manner which addresses the challenges faced by the continent. According to Achen and Bartels (2017), it is necessary to note a worldwide of the legislature decline, determine the social and political forces that have shaped this development. It is very critical to acknowledge the legislature problems and the relationship between Africa and other centers of notably executive and political power. In this regard, the ineffective of African parliament and the executive dismissal. The African legislatures are weakening, and they undermine the service delivery of the continent (Nijzink, 2015). The executive holds qualifications which are not in line with their position, these hamper the development of African institutions. Otherwise, the relevancy of this study which focuses on the challenges of holding government accountable to the people.

The lack of consequences for poor performance due to inadequate responses to high levels of unauthorised irregular, fruitless, and wasteful expenditure within Limpopo Province is a serious concern. From the above, one could argue that the accounting officers have not fulfilled their oversight function effectively, as they have not acted on poor performance and transgression such as financial misconduct and unauthorised irregular, fruitless, and wasteful expenditure. Gusev (2020) argues that effective parliamentary oversight is essential to the quality of a democracy. The executive, in carrying out its tasks through implementing legislation or policy, acquires considerable power, such as the ability to influence or determine the conduct of a person. In a constitutional democracy, the condition for exercising that power is that the administration or executive should be checked by being held accountable to an organ of government that is distinct from it (Fagbadebo, 2019).

This notion is inherent in the concept of the separation of powers, which simultaneously provides for checks and balances on the exercise of executive power, making the executive more accountable to an elected legislature. Again, the current researcher finds it challenging for parliamentary committees who must practice oversight, while majority they belong to the ruling party. It often becomes challenging for them to hold senior management accountable. For example, the current issues such as *Phala Phala* report find it difficult to hold the president accountable. Without being unreasonable, some of these ministers, thus are challenge to the practice of oversight in Parliament (Koenane & Mangena, 2017). For committee oversight to be relatively effective, it would be advisable to consider the rotation of the chairing of committees so that it does not become a preserve of the majority party as it is currently the practice (Masters, 2015). Moreover, reaching of decisions in these committees through voting should be reviewed and consensus in decision-making should be embraced to accommodate opposing views of the Critical Analysis of the Oversight Role of Portfolio Committee in Parliament (Fundiswa & Gregory, 2020).

This would significantly reduce the number of court cases which have become a trend when opposition parties pursue the litigation route when they are disgruntled that their views are not given the necessary consideration. According to Mair (2019), effective and proper oversight of the executive thus requires members of parliament (MPs) and members of the executive to fully understand the constitutional justifications and rationale behind accountability in government, and the purpose

they serve. Accountability and oversight can be at their most effective if they are recognised by those in power as the central organising principles of the South African Constitution (Mamokhere, 2018).

The oversight role is often seen as that of opposition parties alone, designed to police and expose maladministration and corruption. Such a view is limited and deficient. Oversight and accountability, however, help to ensure that the executive implements laws in a way that is required by the Legislature and dictates the South African Constitution (Basheka & Sebola, 2015). The legislature is in this way able to keep control over the laws that it passes and to promote the constitutional values of accountability and good governance. Thus, oversight should be one of the central tenets of the South African democracy because through it, the legislature can ensure that the executive is carrying out its mandate, it monitors the implementation of its legislative policy, and draws on these experiences for future law-making (Matebese-Notshulwana, 2019).

Through oversight, South Africa can ensure effective government. When seen in this light, the oversight functions of the legislature complement rather than hampers the effective delivery of services with which the executive is entrusted (Dikotla & Mahlatji, 2020). Oversight committees are faced with several challenges that may impede the full realisation of effective oversight. These challenges affect the deepening of democracy and affect accountability of public resources. The challenges vary from lack of technical knowledge, time for oversight, research, and content capacity etc (Madue, 2012.) Oversight committees lack the technical knowledge needed in providing policy and legal know how on various policy and legal analysis (Mamokhere, 2018). Lack of this assistance has led to committees being in a difficult position, which does not make them effective in influencing policy. Due to this lack of knowledge, members cannot engage with the policy content (Makhado, 2016).

Government's work or the way government works has a lot of increased complexities which may prove to be a challenge to committee members and act as an impediment (Mattei, 2017). In addition, another challenge is that these committees lack financial assistance will be provided to facilitate the conduct of public hearings and provincial visits (Masters, 2015). These activities are very important as they afford oversight committees the chance to solicit citizen input into the formulation and implementation

of public policy (Mamokhere, 2018). While it is a financial challenge for oversight committees to conduct these activities, it is important that they conduct them as they are important in establishing regular mechanisms for parliament to receive technical and citizen input on key policy and legislative issues before the house, thus deepening democracy (McEwan, 2013). Furthermore, effective oversight by portfolio committee is faced by a challenge of lack of research and content capacity (Nijzink, 2015). This lack of research and content capacity affects the deepening of democracy and accountability of public resources in a plethora of ways. In Limpopo provincial legislature oversight committees' staff lacks proper training which is vital for its staff (Matebese-Notshulwana, 2019).

The training is important as it covers mainly areas such as legislative analysis and drafting, including analysis, and drafting of legislation with a gender lens. Policy and budget analysis, including gender responsive budget analysis and tracking as well as report writing (Daniels, 2019). According to Dikotla and Mahlatji (2020), oversight committees to avert these challenges need to be assisted with access to in-depth technical and policy expertise in a wide range of legal, political, economic, and social issues to enhance their capacity to influence the enactment of good law and policy. Further, the oversight committees are not well resourced on how to effectively use monitoring and tracking tools which, including the use of social accountability tools which are vital for deepening democracy and enhancing accountability (Makhado, 2016).

It is also imperative to note that some oversight committees' chairpersons are a challenge to effective committee oversight because they are not well trained on leadership and as a result, they fail dismally to effectively steer their committees' resolutions in the plenary of parliament (Fundiswa & Gregory 2020). In addition, Mair (2019) reveals that the quality of a leadership of the committee is important in enhancing oversight committees' effectiveness. It should be considered that some of these Committees' chairpersons are chosen on party lines and not on competence, hence training them is important to make them objectively debate and drive committee issues such as national budgets, other fiscal and monetary instruments. Appointing oversight committee which thoroughly interrogates issues such as the national budget and key government economic policies is vital as it provides

informed, objective, and well-balanced proposals for consideration by the executive (Mamokhere, 2018).

The importance of drawing-up accurate and realistic strategic plans cannot be overestimated. In the absence of coherent plans, public institutions cannot properly quantify the needs of those requiring their services or properly estimate costs, nor can they be accurately tracked, controlled, or reported on expenditure (Basheka & Sebola, 2015). Consequently, they cannot properly monitor the delivery of services. Poor planning and budgeting clearly influence implementation but even coherent plans may be poorly implemented (Luyt, 2008). It is vital, therefore, that public account for the implementation, including the financial management of their plans (Matebese-Notshulwana, 2019).

The administrators who are public servants in nature have surely contributed to causing problems of poor governance as they incubate bad politics (Basheka & Sebola, 2015). Elected representatives are made to account for their actions through elections where those that did not meet the citizen's social contract are removed (Basheka & Sebola, 2015). The administrators are appointed by politicians and who are put into office by the administrator. Further, Basheka and Sebola (2015) further argue that the formulation of policies is clear, and the implementation is expected in between these each would like to twist policy benefits against the primary intended purpose thereby compromising good governance (Sebola, 2014). Further, Sebola asserts that law-makers and the implementers would dodge the truth and resort to political lies to protect mischief in government without considering their integrity (Sebola, 2014). Proponents of good governance is on the one hand is characterised by corruption, unaccountability and being unresponsiveness to citizen's needs (Sebola, Tsheola & Molopa, 2014; Sebola, 2014). In South Africa, the tendency is to employ public servants without delving deeply enough into their ability to perform (Koenane & Mangena, 2017).

The formal institutional and support environment that provides the framework and facilitating factors for oversight to occur have been explored above. This section of the study focuses on the informal institutional incentives and challenges that influence and affect the practice of oversight, notwithstanding individual drive, and

benefits to do oversight. The informal institutional incentives are reviewed from a political, societal, and individual perspective (Fagbadebo, 2019).

3.5.1 Lack of Collaboration with Stakeholders

According to Notshulwana and Lebakeng (2019), the challenges posed by wasteful, irregular, and fruitless expenditure becomes obvious and require urgent intervention. The results of inability in South African is a growing challenge that undermine the service delivery and emerge from this study research problem. Consequently, the public sector weakens in the function and role of the SCOPA 's oversight to ensuring accountability is the results of the continuously problem of maladministration, poor financial management and mismanagement (Dube, 2017). It is, therefore, important for this study to investigate SCOPA in public sector. In South Africa, researchers through various legislative studies that have been conducted illustrate that there is a knowledge gap associated with the role and the performance in promoting accountability of SCOPA.

This research also contends that poor consultation has been a result of limited or lack of collaboration between communities and public institutions at the implementation level. The poor are not offered the opportunity to participate on the services forums due to lack of capacity and disorganisation. The state does not offer enough space for participatory process where they can be able to express their opinion (Masiya, Davids & Mazenda, 2019:29).

3.5.2 Lack of compliance to internal and self-regulated governance

According to Community Law Centre (2018), political intervention in the operational running of the public institution is apparent; however, government appears not to have fulfilled its oversight role of ensuring the sound governance of the public institution according to best practices. On the other hand, the public institutions appear to comply with external governance demands, but compliance to internal and self-regulated governance appears to be lacking (Daniel & Pablo, 2020). The institutions entrusted with oversight functions also encounter hindrance in conducting oversight work. For instance, the PACs in various jurisdictions in South Africa are

faced with various challenges that hinder effective oversight over the public institution (Daniel & Pablo, 2020).

3.5.3 Lack of implementation of resolutions

According to Daniel and Pable (2020), lack of implementation of resolutions by the public sector presents a challenge for effective oversight, transparency, and accountability. Most of resolutions taken by PACS are not implemented and in most cases no action is being taken to address issues raised by the PACs (Daniel & Pablo, 2020). In such cases, the power of the PAC flows from its ability to raise issues, to make officials answer for their actions and to place concerns in the public domain rather than to directly impose and enforce sanctions. Lack of implementation of resolutions is also exacerbated by overlapping of oversight mandates as conducted by the PACs.

3.5.4 Varying audit reports

The level of scrutiny that the PACs can deliver depends on the quality of audit reports. In South Africa, some of the public institutions are still audited by private firms, while others are audited by the Auditor-General (Nijzink, 2015). The challenge is that the reporting structure between the Auditor-General and private audit firms differs making it difficult to conduct effective oversight and holding the executive accountable (Daniel & Pablo, 2020). In addition, private audit firms did not in all instances highlight all issues affecting the performance of the organisation which thus compromise on effective oversight and accountability.

3.5.5 Lack of effective monitoring and transparency

The roles and responsibilities of the public institution in South Africa are increasing making it more difficult for both the shareholders and PACs to effectively oversee the performance of the public institutions. There is currently lack of continuous monitoring of the public institution and in most instances, the submission of public institution annual reports to the parliament is deliberately or unintentionally delayed (Daniel & Pablo, 2020). As a result of these delays, it negatively impacts on effective scrutiny of the report and results in these reports being accepted for the sake of compliance. In addition, other public institutions lack transparency since some of the

public representative sit in the board of directors of these institutions. Once public representative are board members of public institutions, they became subjective and other information turned to be restricted from public access (Dikotla & Mahlatji, 2020).

3.5.6 Capacity constrains

The effectiveness and efficiency of the PACs in overseeing the performance of the public institutions is determined by the technical support they receive from the committee support staff. Most of the PACs at provincial levels are served by two support staff which is not enough, considering the high volume of work that need to be processed (Daniel & Pablo 2020). The situation is worse at local level because most of the MPACs do not have support staff. There is also lack of skills that can cover all aspects required to conduct effective oversight. In addition, there is lack of continuity of members of PACs, as members are redeployed mainly due to political reasons and most of the Members serving at PACs are not retained after elections (Fundiswa & Gregory, 2020).

3.5.7 Budgetary constrains

Most PACs operate within a limited budget, which implies that even if there is training for members and support staff, not all members or support staff have an opportunity to attend such training. Lack of adequate budget implies that few members and support staff are nominated to attend the training. Budget constrains further determine the number of oversight visits and public hearings which can be conducted and thus hinders on the effectiveness of the PACs in overseeing the performance of public institution (Daniel & Pablo, 2020).

3.5.8 Factors that influence the parliamentarians in enforcing financial accountability

While legislatures are strategically positioned to enhance financial accountability, there are several factors that militate and impact them in effectively conducting this important role. These factors include capacity, sabotage and political polarisation (Luyt, 2008). The following section details how each of these factors influence the ways in which they stand-in or hamper the legislative effectiveness for financial accountability.

3.5.8.1 Capacity

According to Saalfeld (2010), conducting financial accountability is a very technical exercise that requires relevant skills and competencies. These technical skills and competencies are not required for one to be appointed a legislature in South Africa rather people are appointed on party list basis. Most of the MPs in the South African parliament are cadre deploys and they do not have the requisite skills and competencies to effectively conduct financial accountability. While reports are tabled in their different oversight committee, legislatures do lack technical capacity to use in their quest to do justice on matters of financial accountability (Limpopo Provincial Government, 2015). In addition, South African Parliament (2022), reveals that the staff at parliament should not be assisting and offering technical advices on issues of accountability because they have a low level of understanding on the issues and are incompetent. Furthermore, in some instances, legislatures serve on more than one committee and even in those committees they are expected to read and scrutinise each report. This becomes a serious challenge as the legislatures may not find adequate time to thoroughly conduct financial accountability for all these committees given the time frame, they will be working on. Legislatures indicate that the underperformance of certain staff members affects the performance of their work of enhancing accountability (Limpopo Provincial Government, 2014).

3.5.8.2 Sabotage

In addition to the issue of capacity, there is also an issue of sheer sabotage which is also another challenge that is acting as an impediment for legislatures to enhance financial accountability. Legislatures who attended the training programme members cited sabotage as one of the hindrances for effective accountability (Saalfeld, 2010). Also, Mair (2019) mentions that some political parties and communities do not allow them to do oversight work and this has a ripple effect on their accountability mandate. In these cases, some powerful politicians and officials who are under investigation are accused of using their influence in encouraging their communities to disrupt or not to assist any parliamentarian and parliamentary committee that may want to conduct oversight work in any department or community (Prempeh, 2008). Limpopo Provincial Government (2014) states that they often mobilise their

communities using propaganda and telling them that they are under political attack from their perceived enemies. The influence is also extended to some parliamentary staff members who then deliberately underperform and not cooperate with legislatures and thereby suffocate their work administratively. With administrative sabotage, it is very difficult for a legislator to conduct financial accountability as he/she will be systematically incapacitated (Limpopo SCOPA, 2017). Sabotage is also necessitated by legislature's too much reliance on the support staff to get information from the departments. This gives room for sabotage and limits their room for financial accountability as information from the departments is slanted in a particular way (Platner, 2013).

3.5.8.3 Political polarisation

According to Mbatha (2022), while the legislature gives legislatures the right to conduct financial accountability through various legal provisions that are enriched in the Constitution, political polarisation is affecting effective financial accountability. South African politics is slowly becoming polarised, hostile relationship is fast emerging between different political parties in South Africa while having different beliefs and ideology should be united by the need to protect public coffers from being misused. Khaile (2020:72) notes that good governance principles such as openness, transparency and accountability were replaced by distrust which impact on access to information and cooperation between parties. Khaile (2020) best describes the current situation in South Africa and projects as a gloomy picture on what financial accountability is facing as challenges and not being so effective. While the law mandates legislatures to conduct financial accountability, the method of decision-making in the legislature and legislative committees is done along party lines.

South African Parliament (2019) states that MPs and their portfolio committees are now part of a highly politically divided legislatures. Due to political polarisation, legislatures and legislative committees are further entrenched by the whipping system and have lost sight of their constitutional responsibility, which ultimately results in financial accountability suffering. Consequently, the issue of authority and power dynamics takes place and has a negative impact on accountability. Therefore, financial accountability is not being informed rationality, but it is rather informed by party political mandate. Financial accountability is compromised as it has become

partisan in practice making it highly compromised (Limpopo Provincial Government, 2014).

3.6 MECHANISM FOR EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT IN THE PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS

Legislative oversight plays an important role concerning how the public funds are used and ensuring that public funds are used based on the approval of parliamentary plans to benefit the public (McEwan, 2013). Further, Dube (2017) states that the mechanism of oversight in public sector is to ensure accountability of government in respect of how spent the revenue that collected from South Africa Revenue Services (SARS) through preventing the misuse of public funds by state officials and to prevent maladministration. Further, the public institution required to be monitored in terms of compliance of policy that enacted by government and all action and decisions taken on behalf of the people. Significantly, the legislative oversight required to ensure that programmes of government are effectively implemented and administered efficiently in a manner consistent with legislative intent.

According to Madue (2012:432), legislative oversight is important in ensuring that laws and policy are implemented, the approved budget are well spent, and executive held accountable. This may be achieved through constant oversight of executive's actions and implementation of its programmes. The South African parliament have set out the roles and the function of legislative oversight to review, monitor and evaluate the appropriate conduct of major entities within the society as well as to consider the appropriate development of laws and policy to engage and guide them. Furthermore, Agora (2017) considers the function of legislative oversight as critical aspect of democracy through holding executive accountable for their actions and its activities.

The legislative framework provides for the implementation of various mechanisms and structures within the municipality to facilitate oversight. Fundiswa and Gregory (2020) argues that mechanisms in this context refer to processes implemented by the council to carry out oversight and are structured for institutional arrangement to ensure that oversight is implemented accordingly. Public accountability considered as an increasing extent becoming one of the main requirements of good governance in all spheres of government (Dube (2017)).

Ijeoma and Sambumbu (2013) maintain that effective accountability and oversight result in improved good corporate governance, effective management of public finances and effective service delivery. Diale, Maserumule and Mello (2017) state that accountability refers to statutory obligation to provide for independent and impartial observers holding the right of reporting their findings at the highest levels of state, any available information about financial administration which they may request. Oversight entails the proactive control mechanisms initiated by the legislature for the executive and administrative organs of state to encourage compliance with the statutory and legislative frameworks, to ensure effective delivery on agreed objectives for the achievement of government priorities (South African Legislative Sector, 2018:4). In terms of statutory and legislative frameworks, the mechanisms and personnel pointed out in this section must exercise accountability and oversight over public officials for municipalities to be able to meet their constitutional obligation to provide democratic and accountable government to local communities within their jurisdiction (Dube, 2017).

Parliaments have an array of tools at their disposal for conducting oversight. The most common tools include mechanisms related to budgetary oversight, impeachment, and the possibility for the parliament to establish committees, commissions of inquiry or an ombudsman's office. Several of these tools are described below (Daniels, 2019):

- **Hearings**, either in plenary or committee meetings, are a primary tool of parliaments for obtaining information related to specific policies or issues. Nearly all parliaments conduct hearings. However, parliaments have varying capacities to compel individuals to give testimony (Daniels, 2019).
- **The vote of no confidence**, or motion of censure, is a motion presented by parliamentarians that results in either the withdrawal or the confirmation of the Parliament's confidence in the government or one of its ministers (Daniels, 2019). When a parliament withdraws its confidence in the government, the cabinet usually resigns and seeks a parliamentary dissolution. In some countries, withdrawals of confidence lead to a process in which the head of state either calls for the resignation of the government or the dissolution of the parliament (Dowdle, 2017).

- **Interpellation** refers to a formal procedure used by parliamentarians to require the justification of a certain policy by an individual member of government or, in some countries, the government in full. It can give way to broad debates on the policy at hand or lead to a vote approving or disapproving the issue discussed.
- **Parliamentary questions** are the most used oversight tool. Questions are intended to clarify, discuss government policies, and may lead to interpellation, where the rules permit, if the answer is not satisfactory. To properly monitor the executive, it is essential for members of parliament to be properly informed of the policies of the executive and its ministries (Fundiswa & Gregory, 2020). Government responses to parliamentary questions may lead to the publication of valuable information. Questions can often be asked in oral or written form although oral question and answer sessions may provide a dramatic atmosphere and opportunity for response and follow-up by either side. Consequently, the organization of these sessions is essential to effective parliamentary oversight (Dowdle, 2017).
- **Committees of inquiry** are usually parliamentary committees and commissions formed to carry out in-depth investigations on specific issues of public importance. The commissions usually benefit from a greater degree of access to information than normal committees (Mamokhere, 2018). The powers may include summoning witnesses to testify under oath, confronting one witness with another, requesting documents, ordering searches, organising field visits, and more. The commissions may possess the same powers as a magistrate making a judicial inquiry. Committees of inquiry are a commonly used oversight instrument in parliaments around the world and may be used to investigate important cases of corruption or abuse of power (Basheka & Sebola, 2015).
- **Budget oversight** is a means used by parliaments to ensure financial accountability. After the state budget has been passed, the parliament has an important role to play in monitoring how the budget funds are spent. This work is usually done by one key committee for example, Public Accounts Committee, Budget & Finance Committee but can also be done by other functional committees. Such scrutinizing is often done in cooperation with a

state auditing institution and an anti-corruption commission (Basheka & Sebola, 2015).

- **Supreme audit institutions**, such as the auditor general facilitate post budget oversight by playing a watchdog role and reporting its findings either publically or directly to parliament. Supreme audit institutions monitor how the government uses the public purse and informs the parliament of its. In Commonwealth countries, the auditor general reports to the Public Accounts Committee, which scrutinizes the findings of the audit and makes recommendations accordingly (Mair, 2019).
- **Ombudsman** is appointed by parliament to conduct investigations of public authorities on the basis of complaints or requests by the parliament. An ombudsman typically scrutinizes whether the workings of the administration or the offending actions are in accordance with the principles of good governance. As such, they play an important role in examining government transparency and openness. An ombudsman tries to find practical solutions to the problems they are tasked with and assume a role of conciliation between the public and the authorities (Mair, 2019).
- **Special standing committees** are provided for in the internal rules of some parliaments to systematically oversee the government with regards to highly sensitive issues such as national security, defense, and military procurement policies.
- **Review and confirmation of executive appointees** is a power that allows some parliaments to scrutinize executive appointees to high public office, the judiciary, and state-ran companies.

According to Dikotla and Mahlatji (2020), the mass media has become a powerful weapon to hold public officials accountable for office conduct. Therefore, mass media may be considered as one of the mechanisms of public accountability. The role of media influences the power on good governance. In agreement, Mlambo, et al. (2019) cited in Mamokhere (2020) indicate that in this new political dispensation, mass media are becoming a broadly used tool to hold the governing bodies accountable worldwide including in South Africa. Moreover, the mass media can function as both system for democracy and an instrument of democratic rule that makes the monitoring and evaluating of good governance by ensuring transparency,

accountability, and other basic principles. Through its function, the media expose the abuse of power and ultimately hold public officials accountable for their actions.

Similarly, Ashraf (2014) opines that the mass media is utilised to hold the government and government officials accountable. The mass media exposes what the public officials and governments are doing, so that the public or people can judge. Through this function, the new media helps to ensure good governance in a democratic system. However, even though the mass media function to facilitate public accountability, there are still challenges associated with their role. According to Mamokhere (2020), the media functions as an instrument for strengthening good governance and fostering public accountability, there are many challenges to deal with to ensure that mass media function smoothly without fear and favour. Their conduct is threats to the growing democracy and affects the realisation of good governance in South Africa.

The authoritative capacity for oversight and the executive responsibilities as it relates to institutional capacity should be addressed. The authoritative capacity contained in relevant legal and procedural documents are sketched out and perspectives on the institutional mechanism rules and processes for oversight are indicated (Tumin, 2017). The responsibilities of the executive in the oversight process should be outlined in line with the constitutional requirement that the Legislature establishes rules and orders, these must provide for the establishment, composition, powers, functions, procedures and duration of its committees and minority party representation in committees (Republic of South Africa, 1996). Furthermore, the Constitution provides that the legislature or any of its 58 committees may summon a person to appear before it to give evidence and produce documents, require any person or provincial institution to report to it and receive petitions, representations and submissions from any interested persons and institutions (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2018). In this regard, the Limpopo Legislature had adopted standing rules and orders of the Limpopo Legislature (2014:42), which provide for the establishment of committees in respect of EXCO portfolios to deal with oversight bills and other matters concerning the affairs of government within its portfolio. Moreover, the committee must monitor, investigate, and make recommendations relating to the legislative programme, budget, rationalisation, restructuring, functioning organisation, structure, personnel, policy formulation, any other matter it

may consider relevant of the provincial departments and must consult and liaise with those departments (Limpopo EXCO Principle, 2021).

The rules further stipulate that the portfolio committee require an MEC to appear before it to answer questions relating to the portfolio concerned (Limpopo Legislature, 2019:106). It further stipulates that the executive is required to table strategic and annual plans in the Legislature as per the provisions of the Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (Act 1 of 1999). Additionally, the rules require EXCO to table the annual reports and any other report that may be demanded by the committee concerning matters under their control as well as submit departmental quarterly reports on a date to be determined by the speaker (Limpopo Legislature, 2016). Committees, in terms of the rules, were to be composed of between five and ten members and established for the duration of the legislature unless the house determined otherwise. The chairperson of the committee had the responsibility to propose the agenda and could act on behalf of the committee on certain matters when the committee could not meet. Reports of the committee should be presented to the house at least every quarter. Resolutions of the house that affect the EXCO had to be communicated to the premier and the relevant MEC by the secretary and thereafter followed up by the relevant portfolio committee during its regular oversight functions (Limpopo Legislature, 2018).

The 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa sets out that legislatures should provide mechanisms and resources for maintaining oversight and ensuring executive accountability. Thus, the legislature is entrusted with the functional responsibility of oversight and therefore expected to develop mechanisms for the executive to account to it and maintain oversight on the executive (Malapane, 2019). Also, Desposato (2004) states that oversight over the executive is dependent on the formal institutional framework and capacity of the legislature. It is therefore essential that the Limpopo provincial legislature maintains strong administrative and operational enabling mechanisms and processes to give effect to and facilitate the oversight function of the institution. Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2018) point out that availability adequate resources (financial, human, technical and information) to conduct independent research and investigation are critical for the legislature to successfully undertake its oversight function. It is in this regard that Johnson (2005) attributes successful oversight by the legislature to the extent of operational and administrative enablers in the institution.

3.6.1 Strengthening the oversight function of parliament

Diale et al (2017) state that is important for a parliament's institutional and legal frameworks to encourage MPs to make effective use of their powers of oversight. Aside from the provision of oversight tools, these framework should provide for the independence of the parliamentary institution and the immunity of the MPs. These protections allow MPs to challenge the executive without fear of retaliation against their person. The parliament's legal framework should also include rights, such as access to information that give them the capacity to demand documentation and conduct inquiries that reach the heart of the government. Daniel and Pablo (2020) suggest that even in this functional area, the nature of the linkages between parliamentarians and citizens can have a strong impact on MPs' incentives to conduct effective oversight. For example, an electoral design in which political party leaders determine which operatives will obtain the top positions on the party's electoral lists may encourage a passive backbench. It is also important to highlight that systems in which the party rank and file select their party's candidates through a vote may permit the eventual MP more freedom to question her party and government leaders.

3.6.2 Good governance and service delivery

Governance is a multi-disciplinary concept that has to do with the way a country is governed, the way politics operates and how power is exercised. According to Mubangizi and Tshishonga (2013:302), governance also relates to how power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development. This definition of governance is however, limited because it does not capture the broad sense of governance in terms of interrelations with other stakeholders, for example, civil society. Mamokhere (2018) explains governance perfectly by starting that governance includes the connections, and interconnections between central, provincial, local authorities and the public. Loffler (2003:167) further explains that non-governmental stakeholders such as businesses, media and general civil society could exercise influence on the rules of the game, and how it is played out in the public domain.

The notion of good governance requires the government to be capable, accountable, and responsive, placing legislatures at the core of the governance debate. There has been growing consensus for inclusivity through participation in representative legislatures is central to ensuring that democracy and 12 democratic governance is promoted, realised and sustained (Diale, Maserumule & Mello, 2017). Good governance and state accountability requires a system of checks and balances on state institutions through the doctrine of separation of powers in structural and functional authority between the executive legislative and the judiciary.

According to Mathiba (2020), good governance is government and bureaucracy without nepotism, corruption, or maladministration. It is a process that ensures respect for human rights and the rule of law, strengthening democracy, and promoting transparency and capacity within public administration. Following the same argument Cloete (2000:17) states that good governance assumes that public service delivery is the implementation of public policies designed to provide concrete services to citizens. Good governance requires good citizens who are informed about their needs, resources, and development objectives.

According to Masenya (2017), in almost every country, governance and oversight functions by parliament are predicated by the provision of the Constitution (Mbetse, 2016). The Constitution sets the parameters of legitimacy and the checks and balances for the utilisation of the national resources to benefit every citizen. Ashraf (2014) indicates that parliament is the key institution for the application of the mechanics of governance at national and local levels. In South Africa, like other African countries, the Constitution has set up the criteria to enable every citizen to play a part in the distribution of the national resources to benefit every citizen. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, chapter 2 describes the set of rules that give every citizen the rights and access to, and protection of, all basic human needs.

Governance refers to the method of directing, leading, and controlling an institution or a country (Tamayao, 2014:4). Also, Tettey (2019) describes governance as a collaborative and symbolic association between the state and other stakeholders such as civil society, business and non-governmental organisations. Governance

includes the methods utilised in decision-making, the supremacy of institutions and the way public representatives are held answerable (Matheson, 2004:37).

According to Diale et al (2017), there is a strong indication that the principles acquired international acknowledgement. The principles include legitimacy, direction, performance, accountability, and fairness. The principles often overlap and complex to exercise as it assesses the application of authority. Furthermore, these principles can also inculcate values in public institutions. Louw (2017) identifies the results of good governance as sound execution of work, proficient management, good answerability, and tangible outcomes related to service delivery where good governance occurs. Mamokhere (2020) states that the essential element of our constitutional objectives in South Africa is to achieve a definite break from the misuse of state authority and resources. To realise these constitutional objectives, the South African government endorsed accountability, the rule of law and the supremacy of the 1996 Constitution as values of our constitutional democracy (Mathiba, 2020). The objective of the government is to ensure that democracy subsists within a specific government system so that the rule of law can be applied as well as provide services to the communities.

The purpose of the implementation of the new governance model is to promote optimal governance structures to strengthen oversight and scrutiny of the executive's work. This study will contribute towards the debate on the powers and functions of legislators in provincial government in relation to its ability to effect good governance and fill the current knowledge gap on oversight as well as scrutiny at the provincial sphere of government in South Africa. Therefore, the study evaluates the utilisation of legislative methods to foster greater oversight and separation of powers within provincial government (Masenya, 2017).

The concept of governance within the field of public administration has been prominent in international and academic debates. Tettey (2019) states that the initial governance debate commenced during the shift in the public administration domain from conventional thinking. This development relates to inadequacies in the delivery of services in the public sector. Consequently, governance debates began at the end of the bureaucratic period as the socio-economic situation in western countries were tarnished with inefficient service delivery to communities (Kjaer, 2004:2).

The World Bank (2018:12) defines governance as the way political, economic, and administrative authority is exercised to manage a country's affairs at all levels. It includes mechanisms, processes, and institutions through which civil society expresses its interest, exercise their rights and resolves their disagreements. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2006:3) states that governance is the exercise of political, economic, and administrative authority needed to manage a nation's affairs.

Scholars such as Mathiba (2020), defines governance as an authoritative policymaking process on a series of problems and the execution of these policies. Also, Lloyd (2007:2) describes governance within public sector as a government that is committed to do the right thing, in a truthful manner for the citizens in an approach that is timely and where government is accountable for their actions. In concurrence, Masenya (2017) sets the basis for understanding the association between governance and administration and refers to the following five assumptions:

- Governance is concerned with institutions and internal and external stakeholders.
 - Governance identifies the perversion of peripheries and the obligations to attend to socio-economic issues
 - Governance recognizes the power reliance involved in the relationships amongst institutions
 - Governance is concerned with autonomous self-governing systems of the stakeholders
 - Governance appreciates the capability to be self-sufficient and not to depend on the power of government.

According to the World Bank (2018), good governance refers to a policy approach that highlights the roles of the political, organisational and economic standards of lawfulness and efficacy in the daily operations of the public sector. Good governance personifies a bureaucracy inculcated with professional ethos functioning to promote the public good, the rule of law, transparent practices and a strong civil society participating in public affairs.

Louw (2017) defines good governance as the efficient allocation and use of resource to deliver excellent services to society. Governance is seen as good when resources are used efficiently, effectively, and economically. According to Munzhedzi (2016), good governance is defined as a governance system, which necessitates open and transparent processes in decision-making and policy formulation in the interest of civil 55 society. Furthermore, Taylor (2014) states that good governance is a value driven approach that necessitates the development of policies that promotes quality service delivery outcome and can be differentiated from bad governance.

The separation of powers governance model was implemented to empower the local council to operate in an effective and efficient manner and to promote compliance with regulations, legislation, policies, and processes which are aimed at improving accountability and oversight (Stapenhurst & Pelizzo, 2016). The conceptualisation of good governance from international organisations and scholars as illustrated above essentially portrays the perfect conditions for good governance within government systems. Good governance in respect of this study has interrelated features and principles, which guides the procedures and mechanisms within the public sector (Tetty, 2019).

Madumo and Koma (2019) describe governance as traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good. This includes the process by which governments are selected and replaced, the capacity of the government to formulate and implement sound policies effectively, the respect of citizens for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them. According to Hirst and Thompson (1996), governance is the act or manner of governing, exercising control and authority over the actions of the subject and system of regulations. Mamokhere (2020) amplifies governance as working and listening to citizens to manage the public's resources and respond to the needs and expectations of citizens as individuals, interest groups, and society. Governance includes active cooperation and engagement in policy processes among all stakeholders, including citizens.

Mamokhere (2020) indicates that good governance is the effective administration of public businesses over the generation of a regime that sets rules, accepted as legitimate for encouraging and improving societal values required by individuals and groups. According to Mamokhere (2018), good governance is clarified as a process

of decision making at both political and administrative level of government to implement the policies that will improve the quality of life for all members of the community and to improve service delivery. Good governance is about ensuring transparency, fairness, and equity, effective accountability, responsiveness, and public participation (Stapenhurst & Pelizzo, 2016).

The concept and practice of governance are deeply complex, especially in their contexts of power relations, interactions of actors, access to decision-making, planning, and control over public institutions (Tsheola, 2017). The governance aspects of public sector institutions are not sufficiently understood to be able to address their effectiveness issues (Motubatse et al., 2018). Sometimes those who have just been given the responsibility of government through elections and appointments tend to be authoritarian in the leadership styles that they present and thus creating a good governance poser for the public service (Matshabaphala, 2014). Other politicians and officials think that they know what the communities and those who report to them need (Matshabaphala, 2014).

3.6.3 Public governance and monitoring

According to Daniels (2019), the principles of public governance are clearly spelled out as, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty, and leadership. In the South African context, that culminates from the process and structures that will ensure that public governance live up to the constitutional provision. Such is inculcated in Chapter 3 (Co-operative Government) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. Mathebula (1999) reports that human elements always have a bearing on the extent to which statutory public governance structures go about carrying their mandate. Moreover, Malan and Mathebula (2020) reveal that it is expected that any public official holding a public office shall identify his professional duties in line with the constitutional principles enshrined as such together with the provisions of section 195 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. Ahmad (2008:18) argues that the political and social realities of there are far more complex than assumed by the international development diagnosis and prescriptions.

According to Masenya (2017), there are critical emerging issues in the public administration discourse that makes the implementation of any plan by the public

officials or other relevant authorities impossible and complicated to execute. Public institutions monitoring exists in modern democracy, their effectiveness in such role is often questionable when looking at the real public administration environment as against the ideal one based on principles of fairness and justice. Hirst and Thompson (2021) state that it is widely accepted that in most African countries, regulations are passed, and standards adopted but little compliance from the public service which is detrimental to service delivery achievements. The Department of Public Service and Administration (online) indicates that in South Africa, the Department of Public Service and Administration established a Compliance Monitoring System that inculcates the culture of accountability and responsibility by the public service. While coming up with compliance monitoring systems is a good innovation by government, the challenge is how effective are these monitoring systems for compliance.

3.6.4 Strong committee system

Limpopo Provincial Government (2019) states that committees are the engines of the legislature. This is where the actual processing of the oversight function takes place. It is, therefore, important that the Limpopo provincial legislatures continuously focus on strengthening its committee system. Mafunisa (2020) indicates that a strong committee system is essential in the oversight function of the legislature, while Raga and Taylor (2016), argue that a strong committee system espouses real accountability as it promotes direct interaction and allows elected legislators to scrutinize detailed aspects of executive performance. In addition, Limpopo Provincial Government (2020) points out that strong well-functioning committees give effect to the separation of powers as they ensure checks and balances over the executive sphere of government. Further explain that well-functioning committees are better able to subject the executive to more intense scrutiny.

The system of processes and formats is required whereby the legislature and the executive have a clear and unambiguous understanding of what the executive has planned, what it will report on and what the Legislature will oversee and thus pronounce on through its House Resolutions (Barkan, 2008). This system of processes and formats ensure that all levels of membership and staff find it easy and

uncomplicated to use all the available tools of oversight and reporting. This approach helps oversight to become objective and credible and assists in reducing the antagonism between the legislature and the executive. This process further has the potential to harness all the tools of oversight available to the legislature and centralize the strategic planning documents as important tools of oversight. Fish (2006) points out that standardised reporting processes would thus enable the quality of reported information and oversight conducted. The quality would enable clarity and transparency which would ultimately add to an increase in public confidence. Through this system, the alignment between the legislature strategic plans and the Constitutional mandate on oversight as well as between the strategic plans and the service delivery priorities for Limpopo will be enforced, strengthened, and maintained to the ultimate benefit to the service delivery recipients the people of Limpopo.

3.6.5 The notion of monitoring and evaluation

Good governance is characterised by the results that are seen to be satisfactory to the citizenry. However, Sebola and Tsheola (2020) argue that it is necessary to acknowledge that the relationship between public administration and governance is complex in the context of the long standing and unresolved interactions of society. Hirst and Thompson (2021) argue that monitoring and evaluation have become a significant part of the new management and accountability tools for fast tracking service delivery and ensuring hands-on performance by political leaders, government departments, ministries, and extra-ministerial public service office bearers. This will help government to have an idea and take a decision on whether policy choices made are delivering to the citizen or not. However, in South Africa, the achievement of policy outcomes about monitoring and decisions derived from that has been a problem. Luyt (2018) views that there are various factors that impede the success of monitoring and evaluation in government departments.

According to Stapenhurst and Pelizzo (2016), in this context, systems tend to interpret circumstances in terms of concepts from the point they are standing and such presents challenges for monitoring and evaluation. Currently in South Africa, the outcome-based approach to deliver services has been adopted. Yet there is not

yet a common understanding on what constitute an outcome. The interpretations of such have therefore created confusion into the minds of civil servants and those involved in service delivery processes. While such confusions are limited to public officials, there are also external confusions emanating from the complex political environment within which public administration operates (Hirst & Thompson, 2021).

Rabrenovic (2019) argues that despite the existence of pieces of legislation, code of conducts and administrative frameworks to promote good governance, the South African government struggles to cope with acceptable delivery mandates to its citizen. This is in line with modern thinking in the field of public administration that there must be a thin line drawn between politics and public administration as a government activity. However, the efficiency and autonomy given to institutions that are monitoring is often limited and vulnerable to state abuse.

3.6.6 Internal support

According to Makhado (2016), internal support concerns the resources that the legislature provides to enable engagement in effective oversight activities. These include financial, human, and other resources. The annual performance reports of the Legislature during the fourth term of 2021 provided an indication of the state of the institution and the support capacity that the institution provided for committees to do oversight. In this regard, a summary of relevant information from the annual reports of the Legislature is presented.

The fourth term annual performance reports of the Limpopo Legislature (Limpopo Legislature, 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019), gives an indication of the performance and the challenges experienced by the Limpopo Legislature. These reports contain the Auditor General's (AG) and Audit Committee's reports on the Limpopo Legislature. Throughout the fourth term of the Limpopo Legislature, the institution received an unqualified audit opinion with findings from the AG. Included in the findings are matters related to performance against the institution's predetermined objectives in the 2018/19 and 2020/21 financial year on issues related to the framework for predetermined objectives and reliability of information, respectively. The Audit Committee's findings concurred with the AG on performance information. The programmes of the Legislature that largely support committee work included

research report output and committee services. Overall, the targets were largely met for the fourth term, however, within specific financial years there were delays in achieving targets due to reduction in number of researchers, addressing backlogs from the previous term, elections, and the recess period (Limpopo SCOPA Resolution Report, 2020).

In 2018/90, the board of the Legislature resolved that each committee should have a researcher and two committee coordinators. However, the institution only managed to fill 4 out of 7 targeted posts in 2017/18 financial years. Posts were not filled because of budget constraints. To address the issue of budget allocated to the Legislature, the Limpopo Legislature passed the Financial Management of the Limpopo Provincial Legislature Bill 2009 on the 24th of November 2009 (Limpopo Legislature, 24 Nov 2009). The Bill promoted good governance and utilisation of resources allocated to the Legislature and put into context the notion of separation of powers. The premier of Limpopo challenged the Bill on the grounds of the competence of the province to pass this bill and the constitutionality of the Bill. The Limpopo bill was found unconstitutional by the constitutional court as provinces do not have the authority to pass legislation with respect to their own financial management. This was because Financial Management of Parliament Act had not expressly assigned this power to Legislatures (Luyt, 2018).

3.6.7 External support

According to Dikotla and Mahlatji (2020), members of the Legislature responsible for oversight can receive support from external institutions. These include the political party support to its members to perform their political and legislative duties. In addition, the legislature receives reports from independent oversight institutions such as the Auditor General (AG) and Public Service Commission (PSC) that could be used by committees to augment oversight over the executive.

3.6.8 The separation of powers

According to Matshabaphala (2017), the objective of the separation of powers of the three spheres of government, executive, legislature and judiciary is to circumvent the

exploitation of authority. According to Landsberg and Graham (2017:62), the principles of the separation of powers is that permissible political authority may not be assigned to individuals or a single institution in a state. The separation of powers underscores that one of the three spheres of government is responsible to enact laws. Consequently, the institution is neither responsible for the implementation of laws and take judicial decisions (Mojapelo, 2013:37). In concurrence, Wang (2018) reveals that Section 41(1) of the 1996 Constitution, guides the three spheres of government to honour its authentic position in another sphere and not to assume any authority or role apart from those conferred on them. According to McEwan (2015), co-operative government implies that all partisan formations and other partakers must honour, value and support the presence of the three spheres of government.

The purpose of the separation of roles between the executive and the legislature is to strengthen the oversight function of public representatives in Limpopo Provincial Legislature. Moreover, it seeks to achieve the objects of local government as stipulated in section 152 of the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa that is to foster a democratic and accountable government (Tettey, 2019). The Constitution creates three spheres of government at national, provincial, and local level as distinctive, interdependent and interrelated. It enjoins all spheres of government to observe and adhere to the principles of cooperative government. Parliament plays a significant role in facilitating cooperative governance through its work with the other arms and spheres of government. This includes the appointment and dismissal of office bearers of the institutions supporting democracy, various commissions, boards, and councils (South African Legislative Sector, 2018).

The objective of the separation of powers of the three arms of the government into executive, legislature and judiciary are to circumvent the exploitation of authority. According to Landsberg and Graham (2017:62), the principle of the separation of powers is that permissible political authority may not be assigned to individuals or a single institution in a state. Admittedly, the nature of a state and its powers are essentially co-dependent and interrelated, therefore, absolute division is impractical.

The separation of powers was derived from the statutory principle 5 of the Interim Constitution of South Africa, 1993 that acknowledged that there should be division of powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary with applicable checks and balances to guarantee answerability, transparency, and honesty (Ashraf, 2014).

Consequently, the 1996 Constitution was obliged to provide validity to this notion. Therefore, the 1996 Constitution assented to the separation of powers by dedicating three distinct chapters: Chapter 4 of the 1996 Constitution bestows explicit power and functions to the legislature; Chapter 5 stipulates that the president collectively with other members of the cabinet applies executive authority by executing and enforcing laws; and Chapter 8 outlines that the judicial authority is vested in the courts and administration of justice (De Vilpers, 2018).

Consequently, the judicial institution shall not be liable for the execution of laws and the judicial determinations concerning the laws (Mojapelo, 2013:37). South African Legislative Sector (2018) outline that Section 41(1) of the 1996 Constitution guides the three arms of government to honour the authentic position of government in another arm and not assume any authority or role apart from those conferred on them by the 1996 Constitution. According to De Villiers (2018), shared government requires that all political formations and other contributors must endorse value and support the presence of the three arms of government. Furthermore, Matshabaphala (2017) believes that the concept of the separation of powers ultimately advances into a model encompassing the following basic principles:

- The principle of the trials political, which consists of a recognised division to be made between three autonomous structures of government authority.
- The value of separation of personnel according to which the same staff should not be allowed to serve more than one organ of the state simultaneously.
- The principle of the separation of power of functions between the three organs of state authority to prevent interference or performance of tasks entrusted by law in another government structure.
- The principle of checks and balances that involves each organ to be assigned with distinct rules intended to serve as checks on the application of functions.

Therefore, the principle of the separation of functions entails that each institutions of the state authority be allocated mandates with its individual appropriate purposes. Explicitly, the legislature ought to enact laws; the executive ought to confine its

actions to 9 managing the activities of the state and the judiciary ought to limit itself to the role of judgement (Tettey, 2019).

At the local sphere of government, the 1996 Constitution does not explicitly make provision for legislative oversight because the executive and legislative authorities are 10 vested in the municipal council unlike in national and provincial government where the separation is clearer. These constitutional provisions create an obstacle for oversight because the municipal council cannot oversee its own affairs. It is more desirable that the executive functions executed by another structure over which the municipal council will apply oversight. Landsberg and Graham (2017:62) maintain that the conflict between the office of the speaker and that of the executive mayor necessitates the amendment of section 151 of the 1996 Constitution to give effect to the separation of powers in local government.

According to Kim (2018), during the past three decades, legislatures have enhanced their capacity to play a more active role in the policymaking process. They have asserted their independence from the governor, assumed a greater responsibility in formulating policy, and more actively oversee the operations of the executive branch. Legislative oversight takes many forms. Most often, legislative standing committees are responsible for continuous review of the work of the state agencies in their subject areas. Ashraf (2014) stipulates that legislatures also have created special committees or staff agencies designed specifically to evaluate agency operation and performance. In addition, legislatures may review the rules and regulations developed by executive agencies to implement law. Legislative oversight is a fundamental check and balance. As states have assumed greater responsibilities for government programmes and services, the importance of legislative oversight has increased. More active legislative involvement, however, may increase frictions with the executive branch.

3.6.9 Standardised oversight, accountability, and reporting processes

It is significant to develop a mechanism to standardise oversight, accountability and reporting between the legislature and the executive. Since the legislature oversees the work of the executive, it is essential that the executive reporting is standardised and fits to legislature oversight processes. Barkan (2008) explains that standardised reporting is an intricate type of reporting process which produces consistent, reliable,

actionable information from disparate sources. The emphasis on reliability is noteworthy because it would serve no purpose whatsoever if the executive reports on. The system of processes and formats is required whereby the legislature and the executive have a clear and unambiguous understanding of what the executive has planned, what it will report on and what the Legislature will oversee and thus pronounce on through its house resolutions (Limpopo Provincial Government, 2015). This process further has the potential to harness all the tools of oversight available to the legislature and centralise the strategic planning documents as important tools of oversight. Limpopo Provincial Government (2018) points out that standardised reporting processes would thus enable the quality of reported information and oversight conducted. This in turn would enable clarity and transparency which would ultimately add to an increase in public confidence. Through this system, the alignment between the legislature strategic plans and the constitutional mandate on oversight and between the strategic plans as well as the service delivery priorities for Limpopo are enforced, strengthened, and maintained to the ultimate benefit to the service delivery recipients to the citizen of Limpopo (Mattei, 2017).

Shaikh (2017) states that this committee has the responsibility to oversee the effective, efficient, and economical and transparent management of government departments. The most significant is to evaluate the Auditor-General's reports. However, the committee is believed to be effective in ensuring accountability by public departments, accountability by departments were done on visual media in which accounting officers are interrogated, but little is heard of sanctions implemented against those identified. Limpopo Provincial Treasury (2012) indicates that accounting officers who failed to act on perpetrators because of corruptive activities in government department include almost the entire departments and their units. In all fairness that become a reasonable functional limitation faced by both the institutions of governance and Accounting Officers of Public departments. Recently, in South Africa, activities of SCOPA are no longer vocal like they used to be in the previous years (Renée, 2012).

3.6.10 Public participation

Participatory democracy is based on the premise that public participation processes strengthen institutions of representative democracy by actively involving the public in the decision-making processes of government (Mattei, 2017). The 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa ensures that the public institution remains accountable regarding the utilisation of resources for service delivery imperatives (Olsen, 2018). It is important to note that this constitutional reform was done for the transitional apartheid to bring changes in the government and to eliminate imbalance among citizens as well as to confirm the vital state mediating social and economic relations in highly fragmented society (Pillay, 2016). Thus, the concept oversight included the important aspects such as public administration, financial ethical and element of legal strategies (Notshulwana, 2018). Additionally, the parliament appoints oversight committees to deal with misuse of public funds and maladministration and monitor the correct procedures and process of public resources within government machinery (Fagbadebo, 2019).

The Constitution requires the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, respectively, to facilitate public involvement in the legislative and other processes of the houses and its committees by conducting its business in an open manner. Whilst parliament may take reasonable measures to regulate access, it may only exclude the public from a sitting of a House or Committee if it is reasonable and justifiable to do so in an open and democratic society (Notshulwana, 2019).

To streamline public participation processes and make it more effective, the legislative sector has developed a public participation framework to guide the public participation activities of the parliament and provincial legislatures. The framework provides certain minimum norms and standards to ensure alignment in public participation processes and activities. Based on this framework, parliament has developed a Public Participation Model, which provides the institution with minimum requirements for public involvement and participation (Mattei, 2017). Public participation seeks to ensure that the government is accountable and responsive to societal needs and linking the public with the decision maker boosts public confidence and officials are responsible for their actions. Public participation is important in enhancing the role of legislative committees. The public may participate in the legislative process through several ways which are attending constituency meetings on key public policy issues, having civil society representatives and experts

enter constructive dialogue on identified thematic subjects with legislative committees, petitions. Public participation in these legislative processes is key in enhancing accountability to citizens (Landsberg & Graham, 2017).

While the oversight committees are doing their role as stated in the constitution, it is important that the public actively participates in committee activities to strengthen accountability. The participation of public citizens in legislative processes has several implications. Public participation increases the capacity of state to respond to public needs. When grass-root agency is activated, it is very difficult for government and state institutions to sit on their laurels and not address issues of concern to the public (Reddy & Clarke, 2020). This fosters accountability as it makes it difficult for the executive not to do diligent and effective work in the use of public resources. Furthermore, public participation also enhances effective oversight and redress.

The wide-ranging review and revision that is done in different public participation activities enhances the quality of scrutiny and accountability. Another implication of public participation is that it adds skills, involvement, and thoughts on use of public resources (Mathiba, 2020). Furthermore, engaging with a broader range of stakeholders during transitions increases the legitimacy of the new government and increases sustainability and accountability reforms. It also gives and makes the public feel that they do have a sense of ownership and say on the way their resources are being used and distributed by the government. According to Maserumule (2018), bottom-up processes through involving public participation increases empowerment, improvement and use of public resources by the state and its entities.

Another implication of public participation is that it promotes safeguarding of public funds and assets. It encourages every person who is responsible for the expenditure of public funds or resources to safeguard the funds and ensure that they are spent only on legally authorized purposes and in legally authorised amounts. Public participation makes sure that there is custody or control of public property, funds, and resources and ensures that it is not lost, destroyed, damaged, misapplied, and misused. Public participation regulates and promotes transparency, accountability of public resources. The public participation can help the SCOPA to investigate and oversight the public expenditure (Fagbadebo, 2019).

3.6.11 Supervising the budget: Between perfection and reality

According to Global Parliamentary Report (2017), the key task of parliament is to oversee the state budget implementation. Parliamentary oversight is a crucial pillar for creating credibility in budgeting and in holding governments accountable for the results. The mandates of Public Accounts Committees (PACs) and committees with similar responsibilities are mainly to investigate budget decisions, to follow up questions such as what amount of money should go to the departmental sector. The National Government Oversight Model (2018) reveals that budget transparency is enhanced, and allocation of financial resources is made effectively. In cooperation with the external audit institutions, parliamentarians responsible for budget processes can promote credibility regarding public spending. Unfortunately, the realities of budget control and oversight by parliaments are often far from perfect. In general, parliamentary committees in South African public sector countries suffer from a lack of commitment, technical capacities, and financial means, which hinder coherent legislative oversight over the budget cycle.

3.6.12 Ensuring Oversight and Accountability

From a South African perspective, Olsen (2018) indicates that oversight and accountability are constitutionally assigned roles of the legislatures to analyse and direct executive activities. Oversight entails the informal and formal, vigilant planned and coordinated scrutiny executed by legislatures. Parliament oversees the application of regulations, the control of the budget and the stringent adherence to laws. Essentially, it involves overseeing the efficient organisation of government units and state-owned enterprises to ensure improved service delivery (Reddy & Clarke, 2020).

Accountability and oversight instruments adopted by the South African parliament are classified into several categories. The Oversight Model of the South African Legislative Sector (2019) states the following categories, the role played by the portfolio committee in overseeing the executive to ensure accountability on the part of the different organs of the state. The application of processes as well as the

utilisation of activities and reports from institutions of the state to support constitutional democracy and to promote oversight roles of the national assembly. Thus, the applicable instrument for legislatures to conduct departmental oversight is achieved by means of portfolio committees.

In executing oversight, a portfolio committee requests a meeting with the national department or conduct a site inspection for information gathering to establish the facts of the matter in the inquiry. At the final sitting of the first democratically elected parliament, former President Nelson Mandela stated that it is in the legislatures that mechanisms are formed to improve the life of society (Davis & Moore, 2016). It is here that scrutiny and oversight of government work must be applied. Within legislatures, the public in all its formations has an opportunity to guide policy and its application. One of the most significant characteristics of the oversight mandate is the consideration of Parliament's annual report and the Auditor-General's reports by portfolio committees (Smith, 2017). To have a comprehensive understanding of Parliaments Annual Report, it is important to assess national departments work to understand the outcomes reported. If the portfolio committee requires additional information, Chapter nine institutions can be consulted as specified in the 1996 Constitution. Portfolio committees can also request information from community structures at provincial or local government level to ensure comprehensive information on the reported task (Rabrenovic, 2019).

Assessment of an arm of government's work requires the portfolio committee to ratify the inclusion thereof of the various units. Portfolio committees use the methods in respect of oversight and scrutiny resulting in the following (Rabrenovic, 2019):

- Portfolio committees have limited financial-related skills.

Portfolio committees have a reactive rather than proactive approach to departmental reports.

- The preparation of budgets, currency fluctuations as well as the significance of annual plans perplex portfolio committees.
- Portfolio committees were unsuccessful in reconciling departmental disbursements with policy priorities.

- Portfolio committees do not generally assess performance in crucial programme areas.
- Portfolio committees seldom monitor proposals or performance in fundamental areas of an applied policy to enhance performance.

3.6.13 Limpopo Provincial Legislature

The Limpopo Provincial Legislature Annual Report 2020/2021 stipulates that oversight and scrutiny of the executive is one of the most essential objectives of legislatures and serves as a foundation of democracy. It permits the legislatures to oversee the activities of the government as well as check the quality of governance. The members of the legislature hold the executive accountable through several instruments, which includes house resolutions, committee consideration of quarterly, mid-year and annual reports, focused intervention studies, ministerial accountability, and oral and written motions. Evidently, the Limpopo provincial legislature is constantly strengthening and implementing tools of oversight, which include the implementation of Programme Evaluation and Budget Analysis (Limpopo SCOPA Resolution Report, 2020).

Oversight at the Limpopo Provincial Legislature is primarily given effect through the work of the house and its committees (Malapane, 2016). The Limpopo Provincial Legislature in its Annual Report for 2019/20 sets out that there are three types of committees that exist at the provincial legislature, portfolio committees, standing committees and ad hoc committees. Portfolio committees are attached to provincial government departments for oversight purposes. Their role is to oversee the work of the executive and how it achieves its priorities and programmes. Standing committees, according to Limpopo Legislature (2019) have been established to handle other, non-portfolio matters relating to the provincial executive, including bills and matters referred to them by the speaker of the Limpopo Provincial Legislature and resolution of the House. Ad hoc committees are special committees established for a specific purpose and for a limited time only. Legislature committees are established as instruments of the Houses in terms of the Constitution (1996) to facilitate oversight and monitor the government. Thus, according to the South African

parliament (2017), committees are the engine rooms of a legislature's oversight work.

All the work and activities conducted by the Limpopo Provincial Legislature, emanate from its strategic plans. The Limpopo legislature plans and executes all its activities and functions in line with strategic plans as mandated by the FMPPLA (2009) at sections 13, 14 and 15 of Chapter 3 Planning and Budgeting (Limpopo Provincial Annual Report ,2021). According to the Limpopo Provincial Legislature Strategic Plan (2014 – 2019), institutional goals, objectives and targets are used to develop programme and committee annual performance and operational plans. Thus, the strategic plans of the Limpopo Provincial Legislature are the collective of those planning documents through which the mandate of the legislature is given effect to and from which all activities of the legislature emanate.

3.6.14 The policy compliance and accountability approach

According to Mfene (2018), sound financial management of a municipality requires compliance and accountability. It is important for the provincial government to do a regular reporting on its activities, especially on finances and ensure it adheres to all requirements as dictated to by the law. There must be a linkage between implementation, compliance, and accountability. If a department can get all these three aspects correct, it will be that National and Provincial financial provisions will be made available on time, service delivery targets will be reached and due to regular reporting, there will be transparency which will increase community's trust in its local government (Limpopo SCOPA, 2017).

3.6.15 The monitoring and evaluation in the public institution

3.6.15.1 Report on parliamentary oversight and accountability

According to Mattei (2017), accountability and oversight are issues that are key to effective and efficient political administration. Accountability means being accountable for actions or policies, whilst oversight refers to the role of legislatures in monitoring and reviewing actions of organs of government. However, Rabrenovic (2019) indicates that the quality of oversight and accountability is only as good as the mechanisms and procedures that exist to guide them. This is done with respect to the roles of the two houses of parliament (the National Assembly (NA) and the

National Council of Provinces (NCOP)). The report is based on an analysis of the country's Constitution and the nature of the parliamentary reporting system.

Said et al. (2015) mention the components to oversight and accountability. The accountability and oversight role of the South African Parliament is guaranteed by the Constitution, the role of the parliamentary houses (the NA and NCOP) requires clarification with respect to their oversight functions. This also applies to Parliament's role in ensuring accountability for other organs of state. Accountability and oversight focus on the following ways (Said et al, 2015):

- Whilst the Constitution does not explicitly require the NCOP to perform an oversight function, various provisions do indeed give it an oversight role.
- Parliament oversees a wide range of organs of state and it may not always be feasible and desirable for it to hold all these bodies to account.
- State institutions support Parliament in its oversight function by performing a key watchdog role and their independence should also be protected.
- The study also shown that the enabling mechanisms and procedures to guide accountability and oversight are inadequate.
- The joint parliamentary committees are not ordinarily desirable as their oversight functions differ and may thus lead to duplication.
- The present parliamentary system and procedure for reporting is awkward, effectively compromising efficiency and effectiveness.

The role of accountability and oversight is crucial to good governance and must be reinforced by suitable parliamentary systems and procedures. Through constitutional and legal understanding of the accountability and oversight role of parliamentary entities is a necessity (Olsen, 2018). This also extends to the systems and procedures that exist in parliamentary processes. Based on these assessments, appropriate corrective policy actions can be taken (Schillemans & Bjurstrom, 2019). These include:

- Passing of legislation to guarantee the independence and accountability of constitutional institutions.
- The feasibility and desirability audit on the types and nature of constitutional institutions that Parliament holds to account.
- The incremental extension (especially useful in resource-constrained parliaments) of the list of constitutionally recognized bodies overseen and accounted for.
- An amendment of existing rules for the regulation of reporting to parliamentary committees.
- Establishing new structures (for example, a Standing Committee) to analyse the reports of the organs of state and to make recommendations to Parliament.
- Extending the financial accountability of parliamentary bodies to other areas such as the implementation of policy (Schillemans & Bjurstrom, 2019).

3.6.15.2 Role of Public Account Committees in overseeing public institutions

The Public Account Committees (PACs) or better known as the SCOPA are established and institutionalised to assume their financial scrutiny authority over the national, provincial departments and SOEs. At local government, the above responsibility is executed by the Municipal Public Accounts Committees (MPACs). Generally, in South Africa, the mandate of PACs' at all levels of government can be expressed narrowly by concentrating on financial probity and regularity and can be expressed more widely in relation to performance or value for financial audits (Daniel & Pablo, 2020). As a result, the PACs fulfil the responsibility of overseeing the financial performance of the public institution using the financial audit report which in most cases is prepared by the Auditor-General. Therefore, the PACs play an important and specialised role of being the “watchdog” and protector of public monies (Council, 2016).

Notwithstanding the fact that section 55 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa enables the National Assembly to maintain oversight over all organs of state,

and section 92 enables parliament to hold the cabinet accountable operationally, organs of state at national level and Ministers and their departments are generally held to account by parliament. At national level, there is direct accountability to parliament by national departments, national public entities, and national bodies such as Commission (South African Legislative Sector, 2018).

3.6.15.3 Annual reports of the departments

There are critical reports that MPs are required to extensively scrutinise if financial accountability is to be enhanced. According to Council (2016), annual reports are the key reporting instruments for departments to report against the performance targets and budgets outlined in their strategic plans, read together with the (for the national sphere) and budget statement (for the provincial sphere). The annual reports contain information on service delivery, financial statements, and audit report. The documents focus on the department's performance in the just ended financial year and reports on how the budget for the current financial year is to be implemented (South African parliament, 2017). To enhance financial accountability, MPs and their committees have the role of interrogating these reports. It is envisaged that MPs should oversee these annual reports in a similar fashion to how they oversee the budget.

The Limpopo compels all municipalities, municipal entities, and department to formulate an annual report to account for activities of the municipality for a financial year. The annual report provides an account of departmental actions against the budget and it also enhances answerability to the residents for decisions taken during the financial year. Annual reports enable accountability of the executive authority and the administration to the municipal council (Limpopo SCOPA Resolution Report, 2020). This is evident when the mayor tables the annual report in the municipal council for consideration. Consequently, the municipal council and departmental accounting officer exercises oversight and holds the executive authority to account by analyzed the implementation of service delivery and budget implementation plan.

Thus, the provincial government council is provided an opportunity to utilise its oversight function over the executive authority (Kim, 2018). The provincial government annual reporting system makes the oversight process feasible due to compulsory requirement to submit documents. Prerequisite for the annual report

includes the Auditor-General report on the financial statements, and annual performance report including assessment by the accounting officer of any departmental debt (The National Government Oversight Model, 2018). These specifics in the annual report empowers the municipal council to analyse the functioning of the municipality and its executive authority. Therefore, the municipal council can formulate recommendations in respect of corrective measures in the application of oversight practices.

Parliamentary Monitoring Group (2018) states that given MPs involvement in legislative, budget and in-year monitoring processes, they are ideally placed to play a greater and more organized role in promoting financial accountability. Through portfolio committees which MPs are members of, they are favored to have competent expertise in precise functional areas. MPs are well-placed to conduct oversight of government's performance and supplement the current financial focus of the public accounts' committees. The public accounts committee being made up of MPs has a key role to play in enhancing financial accountability as it is constitutionally mandated to be the protector of the public purse (National Treasury, 2020). In addition, there are other reports that are referred to Portfolio Committees for instance reports of Chapter 9 institutions and reports on work initiated by portfolio committees etc. These are also important oversight tools that can be used by MPs in enhancing financial accountability. MPs can do so through their involvement with National Assembly and NCOP committees and have these reports thoroughly scrutinized for any mismanagement of public funds and resources (De Vilpers, 2018).

De Vilpers (2018) suggests that MPs in the public accounts account committee should consider the annual reports and focus on following:

- Issues raised in the General Report of the Auditor-General on Audit Outcomes.
- Issues of financial probity such as fraud as highlighted in the audit report or disclosed in the management report or in notes to the financial statements, or that come to the committee's attention in any other way.

- Compliance with the PFMA and associated Treasury Regulations, the Audit Committee, and the accounting officer in his or her management report in the annual report, taking into account matters that the Auditor-General may have reported on in this regard.
- The interrogation and evaluation of instances of over-expenditure (relative to appropriations), and other instances of unauthorized expenditures and the authorisation or non-authorisation of these expenditures for purposes of drawing up the Finance Bill or initiating processes to recover the funds.
- The interrogation of instances relating to irregular and fruitless and wasteful expenditure, statements of government, and the National Treasury's adherence to its deficit targets.
- The functioning of risk management systems, including fraud prevention, financial management systems, personnel management systems, Supply chain management and procurement, particularly large tenders, large capital projects and Public Private Partnership deals.
- The disposal of significant state assets, and any major financial or related losses suffered by government
- Corporate governance of departments, public entities, and constitutional institutions
- The consolidated financial statements of government, and the National Treasury's adherence to its deficit targets.

3.6.15.4 The Auditor-General South Africa

General Report of the Auditor-General on Audit Outcomes (2021) states that independent audit institutions in most nations are referred to as the Auditor-General, which is the principal assurance association in the structures of government and an 82-essential basis of knowledge. The fundamental objective of the highest audit establishment is to scrutinise the administration of public money by the authority of the day, as well as the reliability of information in respect of financial accountability of

funds that government provides to the legislature (Section 181 of 1996 Constitution). Chapter 9 of the 1996 Constitution established the Auditor-General of South Africa as one of the state institutions to maintain constitutional democracy. The Auditor-General is a constitutional body and an essential system to advance answerability in all spheres of government. The Public Audit Act, 2004 (Act 25 of 2004) provides guidelines for audits reports annually on all government departments, municipalities and public organisations. Furthermore, reports on discretionary, performance and other exceptional audits are also generated. The Auditor-General tables reports to the legislature with direct interest in the audit, namely: parliament, provincial legislatures, or municipal councils (Landsberg & Graham, 2017).

The Auditor-General is Chapter 9 of constitution which was established by the 1996 *Constitution* as an oversight body responsible for overseeing the management of public finances on behalf of the parliament. The functions of the Auditor-General are to ascertain, investigate and audit all the accounts and financial statements of All departments of the national, provincial, and local spheres of the government and any statutory body or institution which is financed wholly or partly by public funds, including public corporations and parastatals (National Government Oversight Model of the South African Legislative Sector Report, 2021).

Besides conducting performance audits, once public expenditure of departments has been audited, the Auditor-General prepares and publishes a report for that public institution (Ferry & Eckersley, 2015). The report is then submitted to parliament for discussion. However, it should be noted that the authority of the Auditor-General ends with the submission of a report and recommendations to parliament. The Auditor-General is basically the extension of parliamentary committees including SCOPA in that they use the very report of the Auditor-General to summon whoever they wish to summon, particularly the accounting officers and political heads of departments. Each public sector institution receives its own audit outcome which is then consolidated into the main report either of all municipalities and all national government departments (Minogue & Peters, 2018).

Crocker (2019) notes that through the responsibility for performance auditing, the Auditor-General of South Africa judges' policies, and transactions in terms of the value for money principle. Accounting officers refer to the highest-ranking

administrative officials who head a state department or municipality or any other public sector institution inclusive of parastatals and public co-operations. They are also known as the chief executive officers (Mafunis, 2017:14). Although these administrative officials often work under the direct supervision of government ministers, they are directly accountable to parliament in respect of their performance and particularly financial matters. All legislatures have public accounts and finance committees (SCOPA) which summon accounting officers to give an account of financial transactions involving their specific institution (Said, Alam & Aziz, 2015).

The Auditor-General of South Africa in terms of section 188 of the Constitution (1996), audits the accounts, financial statements and financial management of provincial state departments and administrations. Furthermore, the audit reports must be submitted to the Legislature that has a direct interest in the audit. The Limpopo General Audit outcomes reports of the AGSA were tabled in the Legislature annually and the AGSA also made presentations to the Legislature the reports. In addition, the proceedings of the Limpopo Legislature indicated other reports of the AGSA tabled on 17 June 2017 on government employees doing business with departments and Performance Audit of the Use of Consultants at selected departments of the Limpopo Provincial Government, respectively (Limpopo Legislature, 2018).

The reports were referred to the portfolio committee on treasury and SCOPA. The committee report on government employees doing business with departments was adopted in the legislature. Amongst the recommendations of the committee there was one recommending that disciplinary action be taken against those relevant officials and moneys be recovered from employees doing remunerative work outside the public service without relevant approval. The SCOPA should also have sessions with the AG where the AG briefed them to prepare for engagement with departments regarding some of the maladministration that took place in terms of expenditures of various departments (Limpopo Legislature, 2019).

3.6.15.5 National treasury guidelines on oversight committees

The National Government Oversight Model (2020) indicates that the national and provincial treasury should fulfill their oversight responsibilities over local

government's financial management. The national treasury may monitor and assess compliance by public institution with the provincial treasuries to fulfil their oversight responsibilities, monitor compliance. National treasury issued Circular 32 to provide guidelines in financial governance as well as maintain oversight within the broader governance framework. It focuses on the oversight procedure that all spheres of government must follow when analysing the annual report and how to manage the oversight report to promote continuous improvement and enhance answerability.

This circular explains that oversight happens at various levels in a provincial government and supports the governance framework applicable to local government (Stapenhurst, 2020). According to this circular, the separation of roles is recommended to support a councilor's oversight function. Thus, the supposition is that the separation of powers is essential to achieve the objectives of local government stipulated in the 1996 Constitution which relate to its democratic and accountable systems. Good governance, effective oversight and accountability is based on the principles of the separation of powers. The provincial government oversees the functioning of the administration through member of executive council and oversight committee meetings. The separation of powers evades conflict of interest and a referee/player situation and is comparable to the role played by parliament and the national assembly portfolio committees (Stapenhurst, 2020).

3.6.15.6 The composition of oversight committees

The portfolio committees were established to assist the executive on conducting oversight and their role encompasses executives and oversight functions (Mafunis, 2017). The oversight committees have an oversight role and monitor the implementation of decisions taken by the municipal council (Olsen ,2018). Oversight committees have the power to request departments and members of the committee and accounting officer to account on the performance of their functions (Cosmeus,2016). This arrangement supports the separation of legislative and executive powers within the provincial council (Taljaard, Venter & Jolobe, 2016). The provincial government appoints the chairpersons for oversight. The other members of the oversight committees are all members of provincial legislatures and appointed according to their percentage of political representation (Stapenhurst & Pelizzo, 2016).

The function to determine the number of provincial legislature's members to serve on each oversight committee and the representation of the various political parties are delegated to the chief whip of the municipal council in consultation with other political party whips. According to Ubisi (2018), one of the essential aspects of oversight or its efficiency is a powerful party-based structure. The association between the governing party and the executive arm of the member of executive council has an impact on the oversight process (Izah,2013). This is evident in a system of government if the outcome affects the performance of the political party as the executive and the legislator is interconnected (Mafunise, 2017:14).

The explanation is that the rise and fall of the two arms of government is alike (Slappin, 2013). Member of provincial legislatures are constantly unwilling to insist that the members of the executive arm of the provincial government from their own political party must account, because this can be perceived as compromising the position of the political party (Frolick, 2016). The use of the party-political system in South Africa to fill seats implies that, members of the ruling party are frequently able to execute oversight over high-ranking members of their own party, that is, the same members who could influence the configuration of the party list during the following elections (Nsingo, 2014). The current coalition government in prompted the ruling party to effect changes in the composition of oversight committees (Shabangu & Madzivhandila, 2017).

Parliament can also establish a general oversight committee, which coordinates the oversight work of other permanent committees. An oversight committee can recommend that other permanent committees investigate specific problems that it has identified. Other permanent committees can also bring matters before the general oversight committee (Stapenhurst & Pelizzo, 2016). Many parliaments have a set of permanent committees that are related to the policy areas of government departments. These committees may be organised in such a way as to exactly mirror the government departments, although one such committee may oversee more than one department, or one department may be overseen by two or more parliamentary committees.

It is common for permanent committees both to deliberate bills of and to be responsible for oversight of the corresponding government department. The naming of committees varies enormously from one parliament to another, and this can be a

source of confusion. A committee with the same title may be a departmental committee in one parliament and a non-departmental committee in another (Sorensen, 2017).

The basic functions of parliamentary committees are to prepare for deliberation in the full chamber. Committees prepare reports and sometimes a representative or representatives of the committee participate in the plenary debates on these reports. Committee work is important in making possible informed discussion in the chamber (Nsingo, 2014). The existence of many specialized committees adds value to parliamentary work (Mafunis, 2017:14). They can work simultaneously to tackle the same problem from different angles. A government's infrastructure plan, for example, can be examined from the viewpoints of public finance, economic growth, gender, and impact on local populations (Frolick, 2016). In addition, committees can work as intermediary bodies between interest groups and the relevant authorities and can be entry points for citizens to the work of parliament. The composition of a committee reflects that of the parent chamber (Hirst & Thompson, 2021).

Parliamentary political groups are typically represented in committees in proportion to their numerical strength in the chamber. Special consideration can be given to smaller groups to ensure their representation in committees, either as full members or as observers. However, the simple presence of members of the opposition in committees is not enough to guarantee effective parliamentary oversight (Mair, 2019).

3.6.15.7 Legal framework for oversight and accountability

The legal framework provides the legal parameters within which legislative oversight and executives' accountability take place. In this regard, the authority of the legislature, the accountability responsibilities of the executive and the authority of national government in executing provincial executives' obligations is reviewed (Desposato, 2016). Both legislative oversight and executive accountability are constitutionally mandated in South Africa. In addition to representing the will of the people and choosing the president and premiers respectively, the National Assembly and Provincial Legislatures are required to provide a forum for public consideration

of issues, passing legislation, scrutinising and overseeing executive action (Kearns, 2016).

Furthermore, the National Assembly and Provincial Legislatures are given the power to provide for mechanisms to ensure that all executive organs of state are accountable to it and to maintain oversight of both the exercise of Executive authority including the implementation of legislation and any provincial organ of state. Additionally, the Constitution (1996) provides for committees of the Legislature to be established in terms of the rules and orders of the Legislature (section 116) and must enable public involvement in the processes of the committees (Mafunisa, 2020). In terms of section 133 of the Constitution (1996), members of the EXCO are responsible for executive functions assigned to them and are accountable collectively and individually to the Legislature for the exercise of their powers and the performance of their functions. They must act in accordance with the Constitution and provide the Legislature with full and regular reports concerning matters under their control (Mbatha, 2022).

3.6.15.8 National intervention in provincial administration

According to National Treasury (2019), government within South Africa is constituted as national, provincial, and local spheres of government which are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated, where each sphere must exercise their powers and perform their functions in a manner that does not encroach on the geographical, functional and institutional integrity of government in another sphere. However, section 100 of the Constitution (1996) provides for national intervention in a provincial Administration, when a province cannot and does not fulfil an executive obligation. Parliamentary Monitoring Group (2021) suggests that the intervention may occur by issuing a directive to the provincial executive, assuming, responsibility for the relevant obligation in that province to the extent necessary to maintain essential national standards or meet established minimum standards necessary for rendering of a service.

The NCOP ensures provincial interests are considered in the national sphere of government. If the National Executive invokes Section 100, they must submit the written notice of the intervention to the NCOP. The NCOP must review the

intervention regularly and make appropriate recommendations to the national Executive and can end an intervention if it disapproves of the intervention (Venter & Landsberg, 2017).

Moreover, national legislation may regulate the process established by this section. Limpopo was placed under Section 100 (1) (b) of the Constitution (1996) in 2011. This intervention was prompted by the Province having an overdraft of 56 R1.7 billion and would have failed to pay its employees, honour payments of suppliers and provide for goods and services. There was unauthorised expenditure of R 2.7 billion, poor cash management, poor contract, and supply chain management (SCM), the use of Project Management Units (PMU) to avoid SCM processes and some departments like Health and Education had implemented the occupation specific dispensation (OSD) without an available budget (Limpopo Provincial Treasury, 2016). Moreover, Provincial Treasury's inability to provide support and exercise its duty of effective oversight over the provincial departments resulted in systematic failures posing significant risks for service delivery in the Province. This led to the national intervention in the departments of Provincial Treasury, Education, Health, Public Works and Roads and Transport (Limpopo Provincial Treasury, 2016).

3.6.16 The status quo of public accountability measures in the South African context

The endemic government administration issues experienced since the advent of democracy show the consistent malfunctioning status of South African government departments and municipalities. There are poor public funds usage and poor political leadership (Madumo & Koma, 2019). As of now, the nation has four commissions in administration matters to be specific: Commission of Inquiry into State capture; the commission of Inquiry into tax administration and governance in the South African Revenue Services; The commission of inquiry into Public Investment Cooperation and in lastly the Commission of Inquiry into the National Prosecuting Agency (De Villiers, 2018). Other than the absence of an ability to convey required services, the absence of strong financial related control frameworks and absence of political security, probably the greatest test confronting South African local government especially municipalities are debasement and maladministration (Munzhedzi, 2016).

Munzhedzi, (2016) agree that debasement and maladministration exist in every sphere of government but more specifically in the local government.

In addition, the appointment of a senior administrative workforce in public office, which is frequently impacted by the political alliance with a specific ruling party in government (Malan & Mathebula, 2020). Corruption is not sufficiently tended in this way, it will decimate the public services conveyance capacity as it makes an enormous scratch in the public purse (Munzhedzi, 2016). Political portrayal through decisions comprises the main conventional component of responsibility in neo-patrimonial frameworks since different roads of formal responsibility, for example, the standard of law, are seriously disintegrated (Masenya, 2017). Public Accountability measures are a greater amount of compromise more than serving equity subsequently Public service commission assumes a recommender role that is not authoritative.

3.6.16.1 Budget process

The budget process is an important tool used by parliaments and parliamentarians to exercise oversight and promote financial accountability. The Budget Committee and the Public Accounts Committee are the two main committees central to the role of Parliament oversight in the budget process. For Parliamentarians to effectively conduct their financial accountability, assists to analyse the budget through the Parliamentary Budget Office (Chiyamwaka, 2019). The parliament of South Africa has a parliamentary budget office which was established in 2013. According to Section 15(1) states that the parliamentary budget office is an independent, professional support unit to the Legislature and its committees on budget and financial matters. Its mandate is to provide a simplified expert analysis and impact assessment of the budget proposals and spending plans (Mamokhere, Musitha, & Netshidzivhani, 2021). To enhance financial accountability, they are expected to objectively debate national budgets, and other fiscal and monetary instruments. In so doing MPs are tasked to thoroughly interrogate the national budget and key government economic policies and well-balanced proposals for consideration by the Executive (South African Legislative Sector, 2018:4).

The budget process is an important oversight tool to enhance financial accountability as it gives parliamentarians the opportunity to assess government proposed budget

and how it is contributing to the realization of the nation's aspirations (Nzimakwe, 2017). Parliamentarians can promote financial accountability by keeping their eyes on the ball (budget process) and ensure that every step is in accordance with the law. The role of MPs in this process is to ensure that the Appropriation Bill is tabled in February every of every year, that budget votes are referred to the relevant Committees for consideration and report, that Committees receives briefing by the Departments, that Committees invite relevant stakeholders to give their input (public hearing) and that Committee report to the relevant House on findings and has made recommendations for budget to be amended (Sorensen, 2017).

3.6.16.2 State of the Nation Address (SONA)

According to the South African Government (2021), the State of the Nation Address is called by the president in terms of Section 42(5) of the Constitution and is a joint sitting of the two houses of parliament and one of the rare occasions that bring together the three arms of the state under one roof. It is a platform that affords the president a platform an opportunity to speak to the nation on the general state of the country. South African Legislative Sector, (2012). SONA is a point of reflection on a plethora of political, economic, and social matters. It gives the president an opportunity to articulate to the nation on the work of government and sets out, priorities of the executive for the year. In addition, it is during this address that the president is traditionally expected to make some important government pronouncements and reflect on what will be the focus points on service delivery for the year.

The State of the Nation Address is an important oversight tool for MPs as it assists the MPs in conducting and promoting financial accountability. SONA creates transparency with the public and accountability on the part of government and parliament as a separate arm of the government has duty to make use of it in enhancing government's financial accountability. After the president has made his SONA, parliamentarians can enhance financial accountability through inviting relevant government departments to explain how they will implement the priorities set out in the SONA by the president and table their budgets South African Legislative Sector, 2011). Parliamentary Committees are also obliged to use SONA to check whether the Executive delivered on priorities identified and if there was no

misuse of public funds and resources. SONA affords parliament to have a retrospective focus where parliamentarians and their committees evaluate gaps in progress made on implementing priorities identified the previous years. This enhances financial accountability as puts financial budgets and balance sheets of different government departments under spotlight ensure a thorough scrutiny is conducted (South African Government, 2021).

3.6.16.3 Political parties and power politics

According to Nzimakwe, (2017) political parties play an intermediary role in parliamentary systems, between the electorate and their representatives in the legislature and between the legislature and the executive. Hence, the disposition of the political party can have an impact on the political space given to the legislatures to effectively perform its function as well as incentives for parliamentarians to behave in a particular way. This can influence the manner and the extent to which the legislature and parliamentarians perform oversight over the executive. Political parties are traditional instruments of representative democracy, they are intermediates between citizens and the state as well as the party system and government and play an important role in the overall functioning of democratic governance systems (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2021)

Political parties' function to unite the individual legislators behind common policy goals and perform a role in organising the legislature s agenda and determining its procedures. Within parliamentary systems where the executive and legislature share the same party allegiance, this can have implications for legislatures to resist and modify policy set by the executive (Mair, 2019), but can ensure the predictability of the outcome of the vote. The legislature can be incapacitated by a highly fragmented party system, leaving the legislature incapable of making decisions. Furthermore, party cohesion with tight discipline will ensure voting along party lines even if preferences of individuals are not favourable (Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2014). Parliamentary seats are owned by the political parties that contest elections and the party nominate their candidates using party lists. Through party discipline, political parties can influence the incentives that drive parliamentarians to perform their responsibilities.

Mafunisa (2013) indicates that strict party discipline within the legislature is generally much stronger in parliamentary systems where closed list PR is used and this gives the party leadership leverage against parliamentarians who challenge the executive by punishing them with removal or demotions in future lists. Furthermore, members of parliament are usually subordinate in the leadership structure of the political organization to the executive (Mbatha, 2022), which may lead to incentives for members to toe the party line to secure a position on the party list or to secure their careers that are in the hands of the party. Mattei (2017) indicates that within South Africa, the ruling party has on several occasions invoked party loyalty and expelled members from the party to prevent Parliament from conducting effective oversight of executive action.

3.6.16.3 Institutional capacities of legislatures

According to Parliamentary Monitoring Group (2021), in constitutional democracies, legislatures derive their existence, formal powers and mandate from the Constitution. For legislatures to perform their constitutional responsibility, they require a certain level of institutional capacity including relative powers and autonomy from the executive. This is important in levelling the playing field with the executive and enhancing their ability to efficiently perform oversight over the executive. The country's constitution and the rules of procedure of parliaments define the legislature's formal powers. Legislatures can either be given broad formal powers which allow the institution to introduce legislation or more restricted powers such as amending or rejecting legislation (Taylor, 2014). Legislatures in presidential systems appear to have more power than parliamentary systems. Parliamentary systems however have oversight mechanisms not found in presidential systems such as public accounts committees and question periods (Ubisi, 2018). Besides power being distributed horizontally, the Constitution determines the distribution of power vertically between national, sub-national and local governments. The political rationale for such decentralization has been to improve democratic governance through enhancing local democracy, increasing government efficiency by taking services closer to citizens and promoting transparency and accountability in the management of public affairs (Washington, Staphenurst & Pelizzo, 2019).

Escobar-Lemmon (2006) points out that decentralisation in South American countries is driven by the need to rebuild the legitimacy of government and restore citizen's trust in government through ensuring greater accountability and citizen participation. In decentralised systems, the jurisdiction of the functions devolved to lower levels of government and overlap as concurrent responsibilities with higher levels of government. In these instances, a mechanism for cooperative policymaking and governance needs to be sustained and monitoring the performance of subnational governments by central government (Escobar Lemmon, 2006). In as much as governments embark on decentralisation of power intent to bring government closer to the people, in a sample of case studies from various countries. Sorensen (2017) discloses two divergent views on the consequence of decentralisation on accountability and service delivery.

The decentralisation process is believed to have made politicians more responsive to citizens demands with service provision improving. However, poor capacity in finance and administration at decentralised levels as well as poor accountability in monitoring and coordination increased opportunities for corruption. Providing authority to subnational governments that lack capacity are not responsive to their local populations will not achieve outcomes required by decentralization. In addition to the capacity of formal institutions. Mfene (2018) indicates that the capacity of citizens and civil society to engage in governance processes is essential for effective development of public policy. The core roles that legislatures in democracies perform which distinguishes them from the other political institutions are representation, oversight and law making.

Raga and Taylor (2016) identifies constituency services as a core role. Legislatures are the institutional mechanism where competing interests, representing society are expressed to advance various objectives in the policy making. Legislatures pass laws or policy and may either rubber stamp legislation handed down by the executive, develop legislation in partnership and independent of the executive. Constituency services are more prominent in constituency-based systems where citizens are represented on a shared place of residence. Ababio (2017) directs that these core roles exist in tension both functionally and in real time by competing for the time and resources that an individual member devotes to each role. Depending on which role time is spent on indicated s how much of their power the legislatures would yield.

Neglecting their shared duties can result in the legislature existing in name only. As legislatures evolve expanding their roles, they struggle with increased workload which further compounds the demands on time allocation to the various roles (Mafunisa, M.J., 2013). Further, Ababio (2017), points out that the Legislature need to find a way to restructure incentives so that members can devote time to the various responsibilities of the legislature as these balances out executive power.

Oversight is crucial in a democracy as it ensures that there is vertical accountability of representatives to the citizens as well as horizontal accountability of government agencies to the legislature. Legislative oversight is exercised on the executive branch to ensure that policies agreed upon and passed into law are implemented by the state (Nsingo, 2014) that state resources are used effectively and efficiently, spending decisions are in line with national priorities and essential to combat corruption and promote good governance.

The type of oversight inspection of the executive requires a measure of transparency in government operations (as well as a certain level of institutional capacity in the legislatures. De Vos, P. (2017) confirmed that in presidential regimes in Africa, weak parliaments usually have low levels of parliamentary resources and the institutional capacity to hold strong presidents to account and influence over policymaking, law making, and exerting oversight is limited. The capacity constraints that need to be addressed in legislatures must consider the historical and structural problems faced by the institutions. Kearns (2016) specifies that in emerging legislatures with colonial backgrounds, legislatures, unlike the executive branch, lack a history of institutional continuity and therefore have little experience with autonomy and no clear concept of their institutional prerogatives. In addition, the executive branch has been accustomed to operating without a credible counterbalance, implying that this executive dominance is likely to persist in the absence of explicit constitutional limits on presidential power. Furthermore, legislatures have been dependent on the executive for adequate resources which poses another challenge. Where legislatures have a free hand in determining their own budgets, they can increase salaries as well as cultivate an effective institution.

Most observers agree that a strong committee system is seen as key that determine whether legislature is both powerful and effective in performing the core legislative responsibilities including oversight (Barkan, 2009) and McGee (2002) points out that

an active committee system allows members to scrutinised below the surface of government administration, promoting direct interaction between elected legislators and the civil service, thereby making accountability real. Furthermore, active committees with strong oversight ensure candid separation of powers as they play a vital role in exercising inter-branch checks and balances (Strom, 1998). Committees that are permanent and run parallel to the executive structure are more likely to become a source of expertise outside the executive and more likely to subject the activities of the executive to more scrutiny and improve the policy making role of the legislature (Olson & Mezey, 1991; Murray & Nijzink, 2002).

Members of the legislature are important human resources in that they offer their skills and time to fulfil the collective responsibilities of the institution, with more members implying more resources to fulfil responsibilities of the legislature (Murray & Nijzink, 2002). Further, Murray and Nijzink point out that institutional resources as well as state resources available for developing institutional capacity are generally a low priority amongst African legislatures. Within the South African context, the committee system in parliament is under resourced and where it is functioning well, it is pressured to maintain party discipline. (Southall, 2000). Also, Barkan (2009) indicates that increasing committee and research staff and establishing a parliamentary budget office will enable legislatures to perform their core responsibilities. Johnson (2005:4), addressing the capacity of committee, managerial and technical staff and ensuring that legislatures maximise use of their constitutional powers.

Furthermore, utilising hearings and investigations by legislative committees, use of information and analysis from independent state institutions as well as more effective use of party caucuses could be used more effectively to strengthen oversight and ensure accountability. Desposato (2004) indicates that the nature of oversight within a political system is directed by the formal institutional framework that determines the type of authority, the informal institutional incentives to use that authority and the capacity of the legislature to engage in effective oversight activities, though he points out that legislators do not create capacity without incentives and that these are linked to the type of electoral system. Arter (2006) points out that most of the literature has focused on legislative operations, legislative capacity as opposed to legislative performance and its potential policy power rather than output.

Regarding oversight effectiveness, Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2014) indicate that there are two basic approaches in research. One approach indicates that there is a causal relationship between oversight effectiveness and oversight capacity, where capacity is measured as the number of tools by increasing oversight tools automatically translated into greater oversight effectiveness. They indicate that the most common oversight tools were identified as hearings in committees, hearings in the plenary assembly, inquiry committees, parliamentary questions, question time, interpellations, an ombudsman, auditors general and the public account committees. These tools were further regarded as internal and external, with questions, question time, interpellations, hearings, public account committees as internal tools, whereas ombudsmen and auditor's general are external tools (Pelizzo & Stapenhurst, 2004:13).

Other studies note that oversight tools are a necessary but insufficient condition for effective oversight as they posit that effective oversight depends on contextual factors such as the legislative oversight powers, powers to modify legislation, whether legislators are given proper information to perform oversight adequately, individual MPs and committee chairs roles, the saliency of issues and performance of the opposition (Stapenhurst, Jacobs & Pelizzo, 2014). Furthermore, Stapenhurst et al (2014), include the dimension referred to as facilitating conditions and supporting factors in addition internal oversight tools and external factors. External factors concern tools that are outside of the control of the legislatures but are used by the Legislatures to promote government accountability such as supreme audit institutions, anticorruption agencies and ombudsman's offices.

Facilitating conditions help strengthen legislative oversight capacity and concern contextual factors which shape executive legislative relations generally such as the level of democracy, social legitimacy, party cohesion and form of government as well as research capacity, access to information, amongst others (Stapenhurst, Jacobs & Pelizzo, 2014). In relation to empirical measures for oversight, the Stapenhurst Index for legislative oversight was developed to measure capacity. The internal factors refer to the presence or absence of some tools, their method of appointment and their institutional responsiveness to parliament. The external factors refer to the level of democracy and the level of legitimacy that a country enjoys using democracy as a measure that considers several characteristics of the political system.

Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2014b), implying that legislative oversight capacity accounts for more than three quarters of the variance in legislative oversight effectiveness. They indicated that the remaining unexplained portion that goes beyond capacity may be found in willingness to perform oversight. In addition, Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2016) posit a new theory of effective legislative oversight based on the strategic interaction between members of the ruling elite and society. They indicate that there are three intervening factors that mediate oversight, the oversight mandate, the resources available to a legislature and political will. Notwithstanding incentives linked to the democratic system of governance and electoral system. About resources needed for oversight control, Mbatha (2022) points out that several studies have suggested the availability of staff, information, adequate financial, human, and technical capabilities to conduct independent research and investigation.

In terms of political will, Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2018) suggest that agency must be brought back into the analytical framework of legislative oversight as they indicate that the tools for oversight are used effectively only if there is a demand for good governance which will influence the political will to adopt and use oversight tools effectively. Hence, they indicated that the ruling party would respond to effective (Jacobs & Pelizzo, 2014). In addition, if there is no political will to perform effective oversight, irrespective of the internal, external, and facilitating conditions, oversight will not be performed effectively.

Institutional strengthening and building the capacity of office holders in the legislature restores confidence and trust in the institutions. Addressing the capacity of both the parliamentarians as agents of oversight and the legislature as an institution will work towards ensuring the roles of the legislature are performed. While strengthening the parliamentary committee system and capacity is important to ensuring effective oversight over the executive, the political will of legislators to perform effective oversight is a key (Renée, 2012).

3.7 CONCLUSION

This chapter reviewed empirical literature focusing on accountability and oversight as significant factors in the South African Public institutions. It also has the implication

for social service in the organisation. The nature of elector systems plays the roles of elected political representative who are several for monitoring, overseeing, and ensuring that service delivers is rendered to the public. SCOPA considered as tool to promote accountability because of how the public funds are use and other public institution resources. From the reviewed literature, there are serval type of accountability used to enforce the public executive to be accountable for public funds and any other decisions and actions. The SCOPA provides the resolution required to be implement by public institutions. The public institution executives are considered as a critical element. There are several challenges of oversight that affect the progress of service in South Africa, and SCOPA is introduced to deals with those challenges.

There is mechanism for the effective oversight in the public institutions, therefore the SCOPA together with all spheres of government are required to adopt that mechanism and implement it for success operation. The roles of South African parliament in promoting and enforcing accountability is not doing enough. It also implements and evaluates the public institution. There are challenges that are faced by South African government such as unauthorised and irregular wasteful expenditure. There is poor performance within the departments of Limpopo Province. The mechanism to deal with the challenges that affect the oversight of Limpopo Province are presented as well as the tool that should be put in place such as hearing, budget oversight, ombudsman, and special standing committee. The good governance with the public institution promotes the service delivery. This chapter reviewed literature pertaining to the problem under exploration, the next chapter presents the research methodology.

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter reviewed literature related to the problem of the study, the current chapter presents the methodological foundations of the study, i.e., the research design and research methodology. In this section, concepts such as data collection, population, sampling, data analysis, are detailed. Research methodology is the path through which researchers need to conduct their research. It shows the path through which researchers formulate their problem and objectives as well as how they present their result from the data obtained during the study period (Creswell, 2019). For emphasis, in this chapter, the author outlines the research strategy, research design, research methodology, the study area, data sources such as primary data sources and secondary data, population consideration and sample size determination such as questionnaires sample size determination.

4.2 RESEARCH METHOD

Research methodology is the process and produces that solve the research problem (Stenbacka, 2021). It also demonstrates how the philosophical assumption underpin in the research study as well as how the research is carried out (Auriacombe & Mouton, 2017). In this regard, research methodology outlines different steps applied by the researcher in the study. According to Chege and Otieno (2020), research methodology is a plan and procedures that consist of steps of broad assumptions to detailed methods of data. It is based on the nature of research problem being addressed.

Barbour (2015) defines research methodology as a theory of how an inquiry should proceed. It involves analysis of the assumptions, principles, and procedures in a particular approach to inquiry. According to Creswell (2018), methodologies explicate and define the kinds of problems that are worth investigating; what constitutes a researchable problem; testable hypotheses; how to frame a problem in such a way that it can be investigated using designs and procedures; and how to select and develop appropriate means of collecting data.

Research methodology is a way to systematically solve the research problem, and essentially signifies how the research was carried out and which philosophical assumptions underpin the study (Wong, 2018). In addition, research methodology outlines various steps that are generally adopted by a researcher in studying the research problem with the logic behind them. Thus, it is necessary for the researcher to know not only the research methods and techniques but also the underpinning philosophical assumptions (Yin, 2019). The mixed methods research approach was utilised in this study.

4.2.1 Quantitative research methods

According to Chivanga and Monyai (2021), the quantitative approach includes the descriptive approach which is structured in nature and focus on the answers to questions such as what, who, when and how, as it considers the use of instrument measurement such as questionnaires. Crosssman (2020) states that the purpose of quantitative research is to generate knowledge and create understanding about the social world. It focuses on the gathering of numerical data and generalising its cross groups of participants and explain the phenomena.

Generally, quantitative methods are inflexible. With quantitative methods such as surveys and questionnaires, for example, researchers ask all participants identical questions in the same order (Creswell, 2019). The response categories from which participants may choose are “closed-ended” or fixed. The advantage of this inflexibility is that it allows for meaningful comparison of responses across participants and study sites. However, it requires a thorough understanding of the important questions to ask, the best way to ask them and the range of possible responses (Wagner, Kawulich & Garner, 2018).

Quantitative research on the other hand, is a research approach aimed at testing theories, determining facts, demonstrating relationships between variables, and predicting outcomes (Barbour, 2015), Quantitative research uses methods from the natural sciences that are designed to ensure objectivity, generalisability and reliability (Muhammad, 2016). The techniques used in quantitative research include random selection of research participants from the study population in an unbiased manner, standardised questionnaire, and statistical methods used to test pre-determined hypotheses regarding the relationship between specific variables (Siegle,

2019). The researcher in quantitative research, unlike in the qualitative research approach which is regarded as a great research instrument due to the active participation in the research process is considered as being external to the actual research and results are expected to be replicable (Bryman & Bell, 2015). For this study, qualitative methods were utilised.

4.2.1.1 Quantitative research design

According to Chivanga and Monyai (2021), quantitative approach includes the descriptive approach which is structured in nature and focus on the answers to questions such as what, who, when and how, as it considers the use of instrument measurement such as questionnaires. Crosssman (2020) states that the purpose of quantitative research is to generate knowledge and create understanding about the social world. It focuses on the gathering of numerical data and generalising its cross groups of participants and explain the phenomena.

4.2.1.2 Descriptive research design

Creswell (2017) states that descriptive research design can be defined as a situation, phenomena, to provide information and describe an attitude. The main purpose of descriptive research is to allow the researcher to obtain all necessary facts from the problem that exists in an organisation. Leavey (2017) articulates that descriptive research design provides a picture of a situation as it natural happens, and it may be used to justify current practices and make judgement as well as to develop theories.

Descriptive research design was utilised in this study. In descriptive research design, (McLeod, 2017) describes that the situation or case in depth in their research materials. This type of research design is purely on a theoretical basis where the individual collects data, analyses, prepares and then presents it in an understandable manner (McLeod, 2017). It is the most generalised form of research design. To explore one or more variables, a descriptive design might employ a wide range of research approaches. Unlike in experimental research, the researcher does not control or change any of the variables in a descriptive research design (D'Aleo, 2017). In other words, while qualitative research may also be utilised for descriptive

reasons, the descriptive method of research design is typically regarded as a sort of quantitative research (Nell, 2019). To guarantee that the results are legitimate and dependable, the study design should be properly constructed.

Descriptive research involves direct exploration, analysis and description of the phenomena, unexplained presuppositions, aiming at maximum intuitive presentation (Creswell, 2009). Descriptive studies are used to document the phenomenon of interest in the real situation. Descriptive research encompasses much government sponsored research including the population census, the collection of a wide range of social indicators and economic information such as household expenditure patterns, time use studies, and employment and crime statistics (Jilcha, 2019).

For this study, the descriptive research design was used. Bearing in mind that the methodological purpose of this study is to determine the casual link among variable that applied in the research problem. The descriptive research is adopted to gain better understanding of the existing problem as well as to acquire new insight from more precise problem. Descriptive research design refers to methods used in quantitative research. It is used to test specific hypotheses as well as to describe pertinent characteristics. Descriptive research has a clear and accurate research questions, it is, therefore, an effective design that can be used to get information that may be used to develop hypotheses and propose association.

4.2.1.2 The scope and area of the study

The study focuses on the essential analysis of the oversight role and purpose of the SCOPA in ensuring accountability within Limpopo Provincial Legislature. The data was collected within public institutions (departments, municipalities, legislature, and parliament). The focus was on the accountable of senior management on public resources. The target population of this study was members of the Limpopo Provincial Legislature. The members of SCOPA committee, departmental committee and local government committee were interviewed as source of the data.

Limpopo Province legislature is the legislative body of South African province of Limpopo. It is situated at Lebowakgomo government complex under Lepelle-Nkumpi Local Municipality. Limpopo province consists of eleven departments that are responsible for reporting to provincial legislature. The province covers an area of

123910 with a population of 5.4 million. It is considered as the fifth most populated province compare to other nine provinces as indicated by Statistics South Africa (2011).

4.2.1.3 Study population of the study

Brynard and Hanekom (2015) indicate that population refers to objects, subjects, phenomena, causes, events, and activities that the researcher wishes to research in order to establish new knowledge. Punch (2015) defines population as a full set of cases that consists of individuals, groups, human products, and events. The study population was categories of the members of SCOPA committee, members of executive council, and members of the legislature departmental committees and legislature senior management.

4.2.1.4 Target population

Target population is considered as the percentage of research respondents who are expected to have knowledge about the research (Chimaro, 2016). Population is defined by Polit and Beck (2018) as the aggregate or totality of those conforming to a set of specifications. Brynard and Hanekom (2015) indicate that population refers to objects, subjects, phenomena, causes, events, and activities that the researcher wishes to research in order to establish new knowledge. The researcher chose the Limpopo Legislature as an area of study. It consists of the overall target population of 49 members who are allocated to different standing and portfolios committees to undertake oversight responsibilities. The support staff includes researchers and committee coordinators and is made up of thirty professional employees.

The target population of this study was 12 members of SCOPA Committee, 11 members of Executive Council, 90 members of the legislature departmental committees and 38 legislature senior management, and it was purposively selected to participate in the study. The researcher interviewed and distributed the questionnaires to the member of Limpopo Provincial Legislature.

4.2.1.5 Accessible population

In this study, the researcher selected the members of SCOPA who consist of (SCOPA committee, members of Executive Council, members of the Legislature Departmental Committees, Legislature senior management and were selected purposively. The office of the speaker assisted the researcher to easily access the population of Limpopo provincial legislature, 150 SCOPA members were accessible.

4.2.1.6 Sampling technique and sample size of the study

Sampling refers to the process of selecting a portion of the population that conforms to a designated set of specifications to be studied. A sample is a subset of a population selected to participate in the study (Kandace and Landrieu, 2017). In agreement, Wisker (2001:138) writes that sampling refers to the selection of a particular section of the population upon which one carries out the research. Sampling is the process of data collection for generating theory whereby analysts jointly collect, code and analyse data and decide on the type of data to collect next and where to find it, to develop a theory as it emerges (Mouton, 2001:287). According to Mouton (2001:287), the following factors pertain to the size of the sample to be considered:

- Cost implications
- Homogeneity of the population
- Degree of reliability
- Practical considerations method of sampling

The researcher used a non-probability sampling whereby probability of any member of the population is unknown, and the researcher relies on personal judgement. This sampling involves reliance on available subjects and purposive (judgmental, quota and snowball sampling). The researcher selected a sample based on knowledge of a population, its elements, and the purpose of the study (Babbie and Mouton, 2004:183). It consists of the overall population of 250 members who are allocated to different standing and portfolios committees to undertake oversight responsibilities. The purposive techniques were used in this study.

4.2.1.6.1 Purposive sampling techniques for quantitative research methods

Purposive sampling considered as one of the most common sampling strategies, group's participants according to pre-selected criteria relevant to a particular research question). Sample sizes, which may or may not be fixed prior to data collection, depend on the resources and time available, as well as the study's objectives (Kandace and Landrieu, 2017). Purposive sample sizes are often determined based on theoretical saturation, which is the point in data collection when new data no longer bring additional insights to the research questions. Purposive sampling is most successful when data review and analysis are done in conjunction with data collection (Stenbacka, 2021). The researcher employed purposive sampling technique in this study, which is commonly used by most researchers in the qualitative research. Malaysia (2016) asserts that purposive sampling is known as judgemental or selective sampling and mainly used to access a certain group of people, as all participants of the study are carefully selected because such participant is fitting well into certain profile of the study (Risjord et al, 2021).

According to Showkat and Praveen (2017), purposive sampling requires selecting participants who are knowledgeable about the issue in question, because of their sheer involvement in and experience of the situation. On a similar note, Creswell (2018) states that purposive sampling refers to selection of sites or participants that best help the researcher understand the problem and the research question, they must be willing to reflect on and share this knowledge. The participants were selected based on their knowledge of the phenomenon, for the purpose of sharing their knowledge and experiences with the researcher (Risjord et al, 2021). In this study, purposive sampling was used to select the respondent.

4.2.1.7 Sampling size

According to Aspers (2019), a sample is defined as the population statistical which focus on obtaining information from participants drawn from the population regarding the matter under investigation. It is also defined as the process of selecting manageable respondents from the large population for the purpose of the study. In this study, a sample of 250 participants is drawn from members of Limpopo Provincial Legislature. The sample size was selected from different committee,

namely, SCOPA committee, executive council, legislature departmental committee and senior management from legislature administration employed in the Limpopo Provincial Legislature. Table 4.1 below illustrates the sample for the study.

Table 4.1: Purposive Sampling Size

MEMBERS Title	Target Population	Sample size
Members of SCOPA committee	12	12
Members of Executive Council	11	10
Members of Legislature Departmental committee	150	90
Legislature (senior management)	60	38
Total	250	150

Table 4.1 illustrates the sample size that the researcher included in the study. Participants included herein were selected through purposive sampling. The target population for this study was 250 participants from which a sample of 150 participants was drawn from members of SCOPA committee, members of executive council, members of legislative departmental committee and members of senior management from legislature administration.

4.2.1.8 Data collection during the quantitative study

Burns and Grove (2011) define data collection as methods of collecting and measuring and accurate insists for researcher and using standard validate technique. The researcher used quantitative methods to gather data from participants in this study.

4.2.1.9 Data collection methods

The questionnaires were assembled using Microsoft word. The researcher conducted the sessions with the participants where questionnaires were distributed.

The data collected in the study was organised and prepared after the interviews were transcribed.

4.2.1.10 Questionnaires construction

Saunders and Lewis (2018) mention that questionnaires tend to be used for descriptive or explanatory research studies. Questionnaires are designed by the researcher to source information from the respondents with specific guidelines and instructions on how they should be completed (Thorne, 2020). The researcher gives a complete clarity on what is expected of the respondents and the respondents will complete the questionnaire at own time. According to Shields and Alison (2015) the advantage of questionnaires is that the respondent has time to think about the answers to the questions in the questionnaire and many respondents can be reached. However, the authors caution of the disadvantage, which is that the researcher is not on hand to explain uncertainties, which may result in biased or distorted answers by the respondents (Siegle, 2019). The data collection instrument for this research study was questionnaire. The questionnaire is set up using the closed-ended questions. This study used questionnaire as a quantitative data collection method.

4.2.1.11 Structuring questionnaire distribution

The survey questionnaire, as shown in Appendix C, was applied to the sample of 150 respondents. The collection of questionnaires included time frames, collection points and storage of questionnaires. The research correlational survey was sent electronically, and hand delivered. The study survey was emailed to the sample of the target population. The questionnaires were structured into five section (A-E).

Section A: consisted of demographic characteristics which cover age, race, highest qualification, and racial status.

Section B: consisted of eight closed-ended questions to examine the effectiveness of the performance of the oversight and

accountability function of the South African parliament

Section C: comprised eight closed-ended questions about to assess the impact of SCOPA and the strategic benefit in being chaired by marginal opposition rather than the official opposition.

Section D: entailed eight closed-ended questions about to examine how the public sector is failing to act against officials involved in irregular expenditures and fraud.

Section E: had eight closed-ended questions about to explore mechanism to improve the current situation in support of accountability in the public sector.

4.2.1.12 Pilot study of questionnaire

Pilot Study is considered as an approach that focuses on the trial done in preparation for the main study, this is also known as feasibility study (Nell, 2019). It is used for pre-testing the instrument of the research (Welman & Kruger, 2021). A pilot study is often performed to test the feasibility of techniques, methods, questionnaires, and interviews and how they function together in a particular context. It also reveals ethical and practical issues that could hamper the main study (Olson, 2010). Therefore, pilot studies help researchers identify design flaws, refine data collection and analysis plans, gain experience, and train the research team, assess recruitment processes and learn important information about participant burden prior to undertaking the larger study. Noble and Smith (2015:1074) states, “a pilot study is a small-scale version of a planned study conducted with a small group of participants similar to those to be recruited later in the larger scale study”. The objective of the pilot study was to increase the probability of success in the main study by testing the feasibility of the procedures for recruitment and retention of participants, testing for content validity and face validity of the questions, and assessing the usability (including ease of access and navigation) of the technology employed for administering the questionnaire (Pawar, 2020). In this study, two participants were sourced from targeted population to take part in the pilot study. These participants did not form part of the actual study.

4.2.1.13 Research assistant

During the process of data collection, the researcher was assisted by the office of Limpopo provincial legislature the speaker to contact the participants and other questionnaire were returned to their office after completion.

4.2.1.14 Administration of questionnaires

The questionnaires were administered by the researcher and the types of data collected aided the researcher in drawing conclusions. Carefully selected questions formed part of a survey that output quantitative data. The survey correlated to this research study and was conducted using a questionnaire. The demographic data was kept to a minimum, and only relevant data that enabled the researcher to draw conclusions from, was included. During the process of data collection, the researcher provided explanation about the purposes, risks, and benefits of the study. The self-administered questionnaires were distributed after legislative sitting and the office of speaker provide the emails of another participant.

The quantitative data was analysed through Microsoft Excel to calculate the frequencies. This entailed using questionnaires as a more affordable, easier, and less time-consuming way of collecting primary data. The questionnaires were shared with the sample group, the purpose of the questionnaire was explained, and consent was gained from the individuals involved. All the completed surveys were stored electronically, and hand delivered during legislative sitting. The office of speaker of legislature assisted the researcher to collect the data and other member sent back the question to the office of speaker. The questionnaires were applied to a sample of 150 respondents, and the data from the questionnaires was entered in Microsoft Excel for analysis.

4.2.1.15 Data analysis for quantitative data

Data analysis is the process of obtaining data from appropriate outlets, evaluating the theory and to access the results (Saunders, 2016). In agreement, Scott, and Usher (2018) define data analysis as a process that is done to make sense of the accumulated information. Data analysis is the process of collecting, modeling, and analysing data to extract insights that support decision-making (Thomas, 2017). These authors further indicate that data analysis includes at least three steps, viz,

scanning and cleaning data, organising data and representing data through thematic order as emerging and interpreted from collected data. The data was analysed with the aim of identifying common themes, patterns, and experiences of the respondents. The common themes and patterns identified also assisted in ensuring credibility, quality and conformability of data collected, amongst others. (Stuckey, 2013).

Data analysis in this study occurred both within the quantitative (descriptive and inferential numeric analysis) and the qualitative (description and thematic text or image analysis) approaches (Smulowitz, 2017). In this study, the researcher used the computer software called Statistical Package Social Sciences (SPSS) in respect of quantitative data. The analysis of structured questions was used through descriptive statistics and inferential statistics such as frequencies and percentages, chi square (χ^2) and t-test. On the other hand, thematic analysis was utilised for qualitative data analysis.

4.2.1.15.1 Thematic analysis

According to Smithson (2019), thematic analysis is considered as a significant approach in qualitative. It is also a method used to identify patterns and themes within qualitative data. The focus is to determine the important themes in the collected data. According to Maguire and Delahunt (2017), thematic analysis is the process of identifying patterns or themes within qualitative data. The goal of thematic analysis is to identify themes in the data that are important and interesting for use to address the research. In this study, this is much more than simply identifying themes but to make sense of data as well as interpreting it (Welman & Kruger, 2021). It is, therefore, used to allow the researcher to precisely determine the relationships between concepts and compare them with collected data for possible linkage with various concepts and opinions of the respondents gathered during qualitative interviews which was useful during data interpretation (Trahar, 2013).

Scott and Usher (2018) argue that a common pitfall is to use the main interview questions as the themes to offer an accessible and theoretically flexible approach to analysed qualitative data. It is relevant and applicable to describe and examine SCOPA's relevance as well as its effectiveness. As such, choosing these concepts is

aimed at finding meaning of the study, to get the perception from the participants of their understanding about the roles of SCOPA and performance to help analyse the study's findings. These concepts also come out stronger during the interview questions to guide the respondents into a particular debate that the study seeks to achieve as well as to answer the main research question which is,

why is it that despite the existence of SCOPA as a parliamentary mechanism, there is growing problem of financial misconduct and abuse of public funds in South Africa's public sector?

According Rahi (2017) qualitative data collected from the interviews is often analysed using inductive thematic analysis. As an inductive analysis method, thematic analysis is about generating themes based on raw data (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill, 2012), which supports the research objective of developing a theory on the basis of the research findings. Just as the researcher favours the flexibility of a qualitative research methodology and the flexibility of conducting semi-structured interviews, thematic analysis offers flexibility in the data analysis process as it permits researchers to tailor it to match their own requirements (Yin, 2019). Thematic analysis is well suited for capturing the complexities of meaning within a data set.

The researcher uses thematic analysis to compare the perspectives, descriptions, and reflections of the research participants, and identified themes within the data (Saunders, Sim, Kingstone, Baker, Waterfield, Bartlam, Burroughs & Jinks, 2018). The theme can be a pattern of explicit ideas and observations found in the data or interpretations of implicit aspects of the phenomenon being studied. The themes serve as a basis for the researcher's analysis and interpretation of the data. In this study, the data analysis includes a comparison of theme frequencies, examination of the relationship between themes and identification of theme co-occurrence.

4.2.1.16 Validity and reliability of the questionnaire validity

As defined earlier validity is the extent to which an instrument measures what it purports to measure. Validity explains the truth about the research findings as explained by (Noble & Smith, 2015). Validity is the extent to which the scores from a measure represent the variable they are intended to. Researchers make this judgment by considering factors of reliability (Pandey & Pandey, 2015). On the other

hand, Vannette and Krosnic (2018) see validity as the degree to which in a quantitative study, a concept is accurately measured. For instance, it would not be regarded valid if a survey intended to investigate depression measures anxiety (Korb, 2012). Further, Biska (2015) states that when a measure has good test-retest reliability and internal consistency, researchers should be more confident that the scores represent what they are supposed to.

- **Internal validity**

Internal validity refers to the degree of confidence that the causal relationship being tested is trustworthy and not influenced by other factors or variables. Internal validity is the extent to which a research study establishes a trustworthy cause-and-effect relationship. This type of validity depends largely on the study's procedures and how rigorously it is performed. Internal validity is the extent to which the experiment is free from errors and any difference in measurement is due to independent variable and nothing else. Internal validity is important because once established, it makes it possible to eliminate alternative explanations for a finding. Internal validity ensures that any improvement in the subjects is due to the treatment administered and not something else. The researcher ensures that there is no systematic bias in how participants are assigned to the groups.

- **External validity**

External validity refers to how well the outcome of a research study can be expected to apply to other settings. This is important because, if external validity is established, it means that the findings can be generalizable to similar individuals or populations. External validity refers to the extent to which results from a study can be applied (generalized) to other situations, groups, or events. External validity is the extent to which the research results can be inferred to world at large.

4.3.1.15.2 Reliability

The concept of reliability refers to “the accuracy and precision of the measurement and absence of differences in the results if the research was repeated (Smithson, 2019). Test-retest reliability relates to the measure of reliability that has been obtained by conducting the same test more than one time over a period with the participation of the same sample group. Reliability refers to the extent to which the

same answers can be obtained using the same instruments more than one time. In simple terms, if the research is associated with high levels of reliability, then other researchers need to be able to generate the same results, using the same research methods under similar conditions (Noble & Smith, 2015). According to Wilson (2010) reliability issues are most of the time closely associated with subjectivity and once a researcher adopts a subjective approach towards the study, then the level of reliability of the work is going to be compromised. The researcher was employed the test-retest to the group of participants and used the same instrument to the same group to determine if the instrument yield the same results.

- **Test-retest reliability:** Assessing test-retest reliability requires using the measure on a group of people at one time, using it again on the *same* group of people at a later time, and then looking at test-retest correlation between the two sets of scores (Noble & Smith, 2015). This is typically done by graphing the data in a scatterplot and computing (Wong, 2018).
- **Internal consistency:** A second kind of reliability is internal consistency, which is the consistency of people's responses across the items on a multiple-item measure. In general, all the items on such measures are supposed to reflect the same underlying construct, so people's scores on those items should be correlated with each other (Noble & Smith, 2015). On the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, people who agree that they are a person of worth tend to agree that that they have several good qualities. If people's responses to the different items are not correlated with each other, then it would no longer make sense to claim that they are all measuring the same underlying construct. This is as true for behavioural and physiological measures as for self-report measures. This measure would be internally consistent to the extent that individual participants' bets were consistently high or low across trials (Neuman and Kreuger 2003:180).

Test-retest reliability and internal consistency reliability can only be assessed by collecting and analyzed data. One approach is to look at a split-half correlation. This involves splitting the items into two sets, such as the first and second halves of the items or the even- and odd-numbered items (Wong, 2018). Then a score is computed for each set of items, and the relationship between the two sets of scores

is examined. Many behavioural measures involve significant judgment on the part of an observer or an individual who will rate these measures independently. Inter-rater reliability is the extent to which different observers are consistent in their judgments (Shuttleworth, 2015).

4.2.2 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHODS

According to Patel and Patel (2019), qualitative research methods include gathering of primary data from a large sample with the aim of projecting the findings to wider population. Bhandari (2021) defines qualitative research approach as a process of collecting and analysed numerical data. It can be used to find patterns, averages, make predictions, test causal relationships and generalised results to wider population. Open-ended questions could evoke responses that are meaningful and culturally salient to the participants. The researcher should listen carefully to what participants say, engage with them according to their individual personalities and styles, and use probes to encourage them to elaborate on their answers (Barbour, 2015).

Although the objectives of quantitative and qualitative research are not mutually exclusive, their approaches to deciphering the world involve distinct research techniques thus separate skill sets (Wagner, Kawulich & Garner, 2018). Essentially, all qualitative data collectors have a clear understanding of the differences between qualitative and quantitative research to avoid confusing qualitative and quantitative techniques (Zikmund, Babin, Carr, Griffin, 2016). Whatever a researcher's experience in either approach, a general grab of the premises and objectives motivating each help develop and improve competence in the qualitative data collection techniques detailed in this guide

Qualitative methods are typically more flexible, they allow greater spontaneity and adaptation of the interaction between the researcher and the study participants. For example, qualitative methods ask mostly "open-ended" questions that are not necessarily worded in the same way with each participant (Muhammad, 2016). With open-ended questions, participants are free to respond in their own words and these responses tend to be more complex. In addition, with qualitative methods, the relationship between the researcher and the participant is often less formal than in quantitative research (McLeod, 2017).

Participants can respond more elaborately and in greater detail than is typically the case with quantitative methods. In turn, researchers can respond immediately to what participants say by tailoring subsequent questions to information the participant has provided (Nell, 2019). Concurrently, Saunders et al, (2016) indicate that the purpose of qualitative research is to provide the researcher with the perspective. This implies that in the qualitative paradigm, the researcher becomes an instrument of data collection and results may differ greatly depending on who conducts the research.

Leung (2015) states that the objective of qualitative research is to promote better self-understanding and increase insight into the human condition. Unlike quantitative research, qualitative research emphasises the improved understanding of human behaviour and experience (Yin, 2019). Qualitative methods include direct observation, document analysis and overview, participant observation, and open-ended unstructured interviewing. These methods are designed to help researchers to understand the meanings people assign to social phenomena and to elucidate the mental processes underlying behaviours. DeCuir-Gunby and Schutz (2017) characterise qualitative inquiry as a research approach that is generally conducted in natural settings, utilising the researcher as the instrument in both data gathering and analysis. The benefits of qualitative inquiry are embedded in its emphasis on thick description, i.e., obtaining real, rich, deep data which illuminates everyday patterns of action and meaning from the perspective of those being studied (Wagner Kawulich & Garner, 2018). This view emphasises the importance of the voice of the researcher and gaining first-hand information regarding the lived experiences of the researched on a particular subject. It tends to focus on social processes, where the established relationship between the researchers and participants.

4.2.2.1 Qualitative research design

Crossman (2020) states that quantitative is designed to reveal the meaning that informs action and outcomes that are typical measured. Qualitative researchers investigate meaning, interpretation, symbol, processes, and the relation of social life. One advantage of qualitative methods in exploratory research is that use of open-ended questions and probing gives participants the opportunity to respond in their

own words, rather than forcing them to choose from fixed responses, as quantitative methods do (Creswell, 2019).

The qualitative research design was utilised to collect data from members of provincial legislature. The researcher used structured interview to gather information from the participants. Creswell and Creswell (2018:11) states that research design is a process or a plan of how the research is conducted. Further, it is a strategy and plan for research investigation to obtain answers from questions on the problem under investigation. Ivankova (2015) defines research design as a plan for a study, providing the overall framework for collecting data. Additionally, Creswell (2014) defines research design as a plan for selecting subjects, research sites and data collection procedures to answer the research question. This means that the goal of a sound research design is to provide results that are judged to be credible. According Jilcha (2019), research design is a strategic framework for action that serves as a bridge between research questions and the execution, or implementation of the research strategy.

Research design is defined as the clearly defined structures within which the study is Implemented (Burns & Grove, 2001:223). A qualitative, exploratory, descriptive, and contextual design were followed using the phenomenological method. The richness and depth of the description gained from a qualitative approach, provides a unique appreciation of the reality of the experience (Munhall, 2001:106). The purpose of research design is to provide answers to research question validly, objectively, accurately, and economically as well as serve as a control platform, maximize systemic variance, control extraneous variance and minimize error. Many contemporary books about research focus clearly enough on the research process as a logical process which is liken to a good argument which in the technical sense is an attempt to assemble a set of claims or premises and arrange them in such a manner that make the conclusion falls directly from these premises (Hassan, 2018).

According to Jilcha (2019), the research design built on clearly and concisely framed problems and questions and a clear sense of the research purposes. This research purposes might be identified as a set of aims and objectives that relate the research focus on the form of our research question and research problem. The clear and concise statement of research purposes is essential for doing good quality research. The research design contains a theoretical and conceptual framework that helps

simplify the questions, problems, and purposes of the study, discuss the known about the matters, and helps to understand how particular concepts and elements of theory might be useful in the inquiry (D'Aleo, 2017). Research design is also providing backbone structure to researcher for planning of answering the research question or testing from hypothesis. This type of research design includes descriptive design, exploratory design, experimental design, longitudinal design, cross-sectional design, casual design, action research design, cohort research design and case study design.

4.2.2.1.1 Exploratory research design for qualitative

To this study, the exploratory research design is used for the qualitative research approach. It is observed that exploratory research design deals with findings, formulation and determine what is happening and establish the new vision about the phenomenon. Surukan et al (2013:96) state that exploratory researcher deals with the situation that is unknown due to lack of data from past topics or previous research problem have been solved. The exploratory research design helps the researcher to understand the phenomena as well the process of obtaining insight in the study.

Exploratory research is defined by Burns and Groove (2001:374) as a research conducted to gain new insights, discover new ideas, and for increasing knowledge of the phenomenon. McLeod (2017) stipulates that exploratory research aims to explore specific aspects of the research area. Exploratory research does not aim to provide final and conclusive answers to research questions. The researcher may even change the direction of the study to a certain extent, however not fundamentally, according to new evidence gained during the research process. The researcher used exploratory research design in this study.

4.2.2.2 The target Population for Qualitative research

The target population for qualitative studies were officials of the Limpopo Provincial Legislature. Twenty participants were selected from the 250-sample size of Limpopo Provincial Legislature.

4.2.2.3 Accessible population for qualitative research

The researcher identified participants from Limpopo Provincial Legislature in this study. The participants who formed part of the study were officials of the Limpopo Provincial Legislature. The participants showed interest to participate in the study.

4.2.2.4 Sampling for techniques for Qualitative research

The study used a non-probability sampling technique in which the researcher relied on his/her own judgement when selecting participants from the population to take part in the study. In this study, the researcher used simple random sampling technique to draw members of Legislature whom in the opinion of the researcher, they possess knowledge regarding the roles and responsibilities of the SCOPA as an oversight body on government institutions for service delivery imperatives. Non-probability sampling is defined as a method of sampling in which samples are selected according to the subjective judgment of the researcher rather than through random sampling. Non-probability sampling is commonly used in qualitative or exploratory research and it is conducted by observation. This is because non-probability sampling is a less difficult technique, and the outcome depends largely on the expertise of the researcher (Kandace and Landrieu, 2017). This sampling technique is also used by researchers to save cost or time, especially when it is impossible to use random probability sampling.

4.2.2.4.1 Simple random sampling for qualitative research

Simple random sampling is a completely random method of selecting a sample in which each element and each combination of elements in the population has an equal probability of being selected as a part of the sample (Alvi, 2016:12). The 20 participants from Limpopo provincial legislature were selected randomly and drawn from 250 sample size.

4.2.2.5 Sample Size for qualitative research

Sampling is a process in statistical analysis where researchers take a predetermined number of observations from a larger population. The method of sampling depends on the type of analysis being performed. Twenty (20) participants were sampled and interviewed from the total population of 250 officials from Limpopo provincial legislature.

4.2.2.6 Inclusion and exclusion criteria

Inclusion criteria: The researchers considered voluntarily participants from Limpopo Provincial Legislative administration.

Exclusion criteria: Non volunteer and those participants who could not communicate maturely

4.2.2.7 Data collection approach and methods for interview

Bryman (2016) states that data collection instrument is a tool used to collect data on a selected sample of participants, with the purpose of answering the research question. Further, Kumar (2014) mentions that a research data collection instrument is an important part of the research project as the findings are based on the collected information. The researchers utilise semi-structure interview and other official were interviewed telephonically due to lack of time. The office of the speaker assists the research to facilitates the collection of data. Fourteen participants were interviewed through faced to face approach and they show interest of participating while 6 participants were interview telephonical in the study. The semi-structured questionnaires for qualitative approach and structured interview questionnaires for quantitative approach were used to collect data.

The study used semi-structured interviews as a preferred choice of data collection method. Semi-structured interviews are simply conversations in which the researcher through a set of questions finds out about what they want to know. Welman and Kruger (2021) argues that that these types of interviews are a versatile means of collecting data, hence they are likely and free to vary and change substantially between participants. The choice for this method is that it provides a more

appropriate format for discussing sensitive issues relating to accountability such as compliance.

4.2.2.8 Data collecting during qualitative study

The data was collected through semi-structured interviews from the Limpopo Provincial Legislature official. The semi-structured interviews give in-depth details of the phenomenon under analysis. Again, semi-structured interviews are seen in this study as the richer and most suitable option to collect data.

4.2.2.9 The structure of qualitative questionnaires

According to Aiston and Jung (2015), interviewing is the most appropriate research method for exploring complex and subtle phenomena such as opinions, feelings and experiences, complex issues that call for a detailed understanding of how things work, or privileged information based on someone's experience or position. The interview guide consists of opened ended questions. The interview guide of legislature officials was structured in to fifteen questions.

4.2.2.10 The Construction of interview Schedule

In qualitative interviews, the interview schedule is used to guide the researcher on how to pose questions and answer options to participants. It contains the list of questions and answer options that the researcher read to the participants. The researcher provides a schedule that is clear to the respondents.

4.2.2.11 Administrative of interviews and discussions

This study adopted semi-structured interview as a method of collecting data. According to Noble and Smith (2015), semi-structure interviews are considered as conversation in which researchers obtain the information through a set of different

questions. The semi-structured interview provides good and clear discussing format on the issues that investigated such as accountability. The main purpose of semi-structured interview is to ensure that every interview is presented with the same questions in the same orders (George, 2021). This is considered as the best kind of interviews that applies to qualitative study. It also provides more appropriate format in discussing sensitives considered to accountability such as compliance, transparency, and corruption (Thorne, 2020). The semi-structured interview is a qualitative data collection strategy in which the researcher asks informants a series of pre-determined but open-ended questions (Wishkoski, 2020).

Semi-structured interviews are flexible and conversation-like; some questions are prepared in advance to ensure that the conversation addresses the main topics of interest, (Shields & Alison, 2015), but the researcher can choose to discard some of the pre-prepared questions in favour of letting the interviewee elaborate on interesting topics that may come up during the interview (Shields & Alison ,2015). According to Siegle (2019), these types of interviews are personal and in-depth, and their aim is to identify a participant's emotions, feelings, and opinions regarding a particular research subject. Furthermore, the purpose in choosing this type of interviews is that participants get the same questions asked, but there is flexibility in how they are asked.

They are also well suited for exploring attitudes, values, beliefs, and motives in a particular subject. According to Yin (2019), the main advantage of interviews is that they involve personal and direct contact between interviewers and interviewees, and thus can potentially increase response rate. Considering the above, Galletta (2013) attests that semi-structured interview is a versatile and powerful qualitative research method with its remarkable potential. Galletta further confirms that it is sufficiently structured to address a specific dimension of a research question while also learning space for study participants to offer new.

Structured Interview on the other hand is defined as an interview process in which questions are pre-determined and asked consistently to all participants (Scott & Usher, 2018). The structured interviews commonly include a ranking scale associated with participants' answers (Trahar, 2013). Research suggests the most

important attributes and/or dimensions of a structured interview as job-relatedness interview and structured use of the data to evaluate the candidate (Wishkoski, 2020). The structure interview was employed in this study to provide the same amount of accurate information.

4.2.2.12 Data analysis

Data analysis in qualitative research is defined as the process of systematically searching and arranging the interview transcripts, observation notes, or other non-textual materials that the researcher accumulates to increase the understanding of the phenomenon. The process of analyzed qualitative data predominantly involves coding or categorizing the data. Once data collection has been completed, an in-depth analysis of the data is made by means of data filtering, mind-mapping (which can also be during the process of data collection with a view to eliminating irrelevant data) and the integration of the views of different authors (Brynard and Hanekom, 2006:60). The data was analysed through SPSS software.

4.2.2.13 Document analysis

According to Stuckey (2013), document analysis is referred as the analysis of documents that contain information regarding the subject under investigation. In this regard, analysis into the roles and purpose of SCOPA on government institution's accountability (Nell, 2019) support by describing document analysis as a technique that is used to categorise, investigate, interpret, and identify the limitations of the physical sources. These document source may include textual sources, journals, books, and other written material which are by virtue of references support the matter under investigation. In this study, the researcher used various written or textual sources to mitigate and identify where the study fit in the existing literature or body of knowledge (Pawar, 2020).

Document analysis is a type of data collection utilised to collect secondary data to supplement and corroborate primary data sources, which are semi-structured

personal interviews and participant observation (Thomas, 2017). This is in recognition of the fact that documents can be employed to collect both primary and secondary data. The data sources in document analysis include both published and unpublished documents. Unpublished data sources represent primary data, and published data sources represent secondary data (Smulowitz, 2017).

The researcher collected public documents such as official committee reports, committee agendas and programmes, and research documents, amongst others. This enabled him to analyse existing official documents, which included reports, question papers, programmes and minutes, amongst others for 2018 to 2022 financial year. The tool was utilised to collect secondary data on the form and types. This includes processes, role players, tools, and mechanisms of the oversight role of legislatures in promoting transparency and accountability as well as public involvement. From this perspective, qualitative documents, semi-structured personal interviews, and observation were important for data analysis purposes.

4.2.2.14 Enhancing quality and integrity of data

In qualitative study, validity and reliability can be ensured by credibility, transferability dependability and trustworthiness. The validity of this study is further underpinned by the level of attention paid to ethical issues in the research design and the researcher's conscious attempts to eliminate researcher bias throughout the entire research process, as discussed below:

Credibility: According to Heale et al (2015:66), credibility depends on the richness of the data and analysis and can be enhanced by triangulation, rather than relying on sample size aiming at representing a population. Credibility establishes whether the research findings represent plausible information drawn from the participants' original data and is a correct interpretation of the participants' original views (Hannafey & Vitulano, 2013). Credibility depends on the richness of the data and analysis and may be enhanced by triangulation rather than relying on sample size aiming at representing a population (Patino & Ferreira, 2018). The researcher may use triangulation to show that the research study's findings are credible.

Transferability: According to Patino and Ferreira (2018), transferability is how the researcher demonstrates that the study's findings are applicable to other contexts.

The researcher uses thick description to show that the study's findings may be applicable to other contexts, circumstances, and situations. The degree to which the results of qualitative and quantitative research may be transferred to other contexts or settings with other participants/respondents. The researcher facilitates the transferability judgment by a potential user through thick description. Transferability is achieved by thorough description of the research context and underlying assumptions (Patel and Patel, 2019). Drawing from this, the research results may be transferred from the original research situation to a similar situation

Dependability: According to Patel and Patel (2019), dependability is the extent that the study could be repeated by other researchers and that the findings would be similar if not the same. Dependability involves participants' evaluation of the findings, interpretation, and recommendations of the study such that all are supported by the data as received from participants of the study. Dependability includes the aspect of consistency. The researcher determines whether the analysis process is in line with the accepted standards for a particular design.

Trustworthiness: Trustworthiness is the process that researchers can persuade themselves and readers so that their research findings are worthy of attention (Patino and Ferreira, 2018). Trustworthiness criteria are pragmatic choices for researchers concerned about the acceptability and usefulness of their research for a variety of stakeholders. The researcher ensured that trustworthiness criteria be briefly defined and interview throughout a description of how they attempted to conduct a trustworthy thematic analysis (George, 2021).

4.3. Mixed-method research design

The mixed-methods approach was applied in this study because its purpose is to obtain the theories or pattern that assist and provide clarification of phenomenon of interest and the determinations of accuracy involved in verifying the information with informants and collecting information from different sources. This approach generates knowledge and observe phenomena or occurrences affecting individual. The mixed methods approach was used because the combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches provides a better understanding of the research. This is

affirmed by George (2021:22), who states that “mixed-methods approach helps the researcher to gain more complete picture than what the researcher would find with one method”. The mixing of both quantitative and qualitative data in a single study is based on the point that neither of the methods (qualitative nor quantitative) is adequate on their own to capture the tendencies and particular of the circumstance.


They view it as the class of research where the researcher combines or mixes qualitative and quantitative research techniques, methods, approaches, in a single study. Creswell (2019) argues that mixed methods research is more than simply collecting both qualitative and quantitative data but implies that data are integrated, related, or mixed at some stage of the research process. Creswell (ibid) further indicates that the underlying logic to mixing is that neither qualitative nor quantitative methods are sufficient in themselves to capture the trends and details of the situation. When used in combination, both qualitative and quantitative data yield a more complete analysis, and they complement each other. In pursuit of the same argument regarding the logic of mixed methods research, DeCuir-Gunby and Schuts (2017:67) indicate that “mixed methods research includes the use of *induction* which refers to the discovery of patterns, *deduction* which involves testing theories and hypotheses, and *abduction* which refers to uncovering and relying on the best set of explanations for understanding one ‘s results”.

Mixed method research design is an integration of qualitative and quantitative research and data in a research study. According to Merriam (2018), this is an empirical research in which a researcher combines elements of qualitative and quantitative research approaches for the broad purposes of breadth and depth of understanding and corroboration. Under mixed method research design, qualitative research brings in open-ended data without predetermined responses while quantitative research brings in closed-ended data (Creswell, 2014). It is also worth noting that “mixed method research design is based on pragmatic worldview” (Barbour, 2015:11).

This method was born out of the idea that both qualitative and quantitative designs have weaknesses, thus collecting both neutralises the weakness of the other. This approach “leads to a greater degree of understanding being formulated unlike if a single approach is adopted to a specific study” (Ivankova, 2015:43). They further stated that “a researcher collects and analyzes both qualitative and quantitative data

in either sequential or simultaneous and the exhaustive way the researcher integrates the two forms of data was depend upon the nature of the inquiry and the philosophical outlook of the researcher”. The qualitative which used interview and quantitative which used questionnaire were both utilised in this study.

Figure 4.1 Mixed Methods Research Design



Adopted from Yilmaz (2013)

The study adopted a mixed research methodology since both qualitative and quantitative research approach were used Creswell (2018) points out that mixed-methods research methodology is a procedure for collecting, analysing and mixing both qualitative and quantitative research methods in a single study to understand the research problem. Cameroon (2015:23) states that “mixed-method research approach involves collecting, analyzing and interpreting both qualitative and quantitative data in a single study, and the series that investigate the same underlying phenomenon”. Further, George (2021) agrees that mixed methods combine the

element of qualitative and quantitative research methods to answer the research questions. The comparison of the basic research designs is illustrated in the Figure 3.1 below.

Figure 4.2: Comparison of Basic Research Designs

A Comparison of Basic Research Designs			
	Exploratory	Descriptive	Causal
Objective	Discovery of ideas and insights.	Describe market characteristics or functions.	Determine cause and effect relationships.
Characteristics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Flexible. ▪ Versatile. ▪ Often the front end of total research design. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Marked by the prior formulation of specific hypotheses. ▪ Preplanned and structured design. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Manipulation of one or more independent variables. ▪ Control of other mediating variables.
Method	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Expert surveys. ▪ Pilot surveys. ▪ Case studies. ▪ Secondary data (qualitative). ▪ Qualitative Research. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Secondary data (quantitative). ▪ Surveys. ▪ Panels. ▪ Observational and other data. 	Experiments.

Adopted from McLeod (2017)

4.3.1 Triangulation research

According to Saldana (2016) triangulation in research is the process of using multiple research methods and perspectives to study a particular topic. Triangulation refers to the use of multiple methods or data sources in qualitative research to develop a comprehensive understanding of phenomena. It also has been viewed as a qualitative research strategy to test validity through the convergence of information from different sources.

Through triangulation, the researcher may refine their ideas and find new ways of understanding, interpreting a particular event and behaviour. Triangulation may validate the study findings and ensure accuracy. Researchers often add triangulation to their study to question and document their comprehensive evaluation and analysis (Risjord, Moloney & Dunbar, 2021). This approach strengthens the validity of their research because it checks for errors in interpretation or measurement through its multiple methods and perspectives. It also helps to prevent confirmation bias, which is an error that occurs when people unconsciously generate evidence for a position they already hold.

Thomas (2017) states that triangulation in research is important because it allows researchers to check and validate their research by comparing their ideas or studies with other people's ideas or research. "Triangulation in research is vital for discovery because it helps to strengthen the validity of the study, especially in quantitative studies" (Thomas, 2017:98). Researchers use triangulation for a more holistic perspective on a specific research question. Triangulation is also helpful for enhancing credibility and validity. The following segments explain data triangulation, method triangulation, theory triangulation and investigator triangulation.

Data triangulation is the process of checking data by comparing results obtained from different sources. Researchers may use it to "check the accuracy of their findings and to ensure that their results support their hypothesis" (Risjord, Moloney & Dunbar, 2021:11). Data triangulation is a "common technique in qualitative research and usually involves confirmation of the data by those who collected it and those who analysed it" (Kandace and Landrieu, 2017:56). Often, the data is also reviewed and verified by other scientists who specialise in a similar area or by experts in a different field. In the context of this study, the researcher used data triangulation to compare the results of qualitative and quantitative results.

Methods triangulation is the process of using multiple methods of data collection. This helps ensure objective analysis and prevents researcher bias in research results. It also helps to refine the study by identifying gaps or inconsistencies (Kandace and Landrieu, 2017). For example, to validate the results of their study, a researcher may use different methods of data collection. The researcher may use face-to-face interviews and phone surveys with different groups of people. To this study, the researcher used mixed methods to collect and analyse data.

Triangulating theory means applying several different theoretical frameworks in your research instead of approaching a research question from just one theoretical perspective.

Finally, there is **investigator triangulation**, where different researchers conduct separate analysis of the data, and their different interpretations are reconciled or compared. In participatory analysis, it also possible to have a kind of respondent triangulation, where a researcher is trying to compare their own interpretations of data with that of their respondents.

4.3.2 Variants of triangulation design

Researchers can also design a mixed-method qualitative and quantitative study where very different methods are triangulated. This may take the form of a quantitative survey, where partisans rank an experience and service, combined with a qualitative focus group, interview or even open-ended comments. It is helpful to use triangulation when the researcher wants to capture the complexity of real-world phenomena. By varying the data sources, theories, and methodologies, are important to gain insights into the research problem from multiple perspectives and levels. In this study, the researcher utilised both methods of qualitative and quantitative to strengthen the data collecting process. The researcher collected data through questionnaires and interview from the SCOPA members of the Limpopo Provincial Legislature.

4.4 ETHICAL CONSIDERATION

The World Health Organisation (2019:4) reports that it is important to consider the ethical principle while conducting the study, to protect the liberty and welfare interest of individual participants. The ethical principles are discussed below:

4.4.1 Ensure participants have given informed consent

Arifin (2018:30) states that participants/respondents should be adequately informed about the information of the research. The participants/respondents were given the

informed consent form by the researcher. According to Bhandari (2021:65), the informed consent refers to “a process in which all potential participants/respondents receive and understand the information as well as their decision to participate in the study”. This information includes benefits risk and information approval of the study. Informed consent is a “mechanism for ensuring that people understand what it means to participate in a particular research study so they can decide in a conscious, deliberate way whether they want to participate” (Resnik, 2015:46). Informed consent is one of the most important tools for ensuring respect for persons during research. This form generally goes through ethics committee approval procedures, includes legalistic language, and is signed by the participant, the researcher, and possibly a witness. Such informed consent forms are appropriate for biomedical and other research including qualitative when the risks faced by participants may be substantial. They may also be necessary for minimal risk research when the foundation for trust between researchers and participants is weak.

The researcher provided participants/respondents with all relevant information about the purpose of the study, risks, and the benefits of forming part of the study as well as the study timeframe. The researcher also ensured that all participants/respondents understand the procedures of the research study. Consent form that information should not be disseminated and leaked to other people were signed. The participants/respondents were approached and offered full explanation and clarity on the purpose of the study and data collection process.

4.4.2 Ensure confidentiality and anonymity

Ariff (2018:30) indicates that the confidentiality and anonymity of respondents is preserved by not disclosing their names and identity when collecting data during the reporting and analysis of findings from study. The data collected was kept in the safe place and protected against unauthorised access. Bhandari (2021) states that it is important for the researcher to guarantee anonymity by not collecting any personal identification information such as names and contacts. It should be noted that all participants had a right to privacy, therefore, it was deemed important to protect their personal data. The researcher did not identify the personal information of participants.

4.4.3 Ensure no harm comes to participants

According to Yin (2014:242), it is important to ensure that there is no harm to participants/respondents, such as physical and emotional harm. The researcher is required to be strategically in terms of protecting the respondents against harm and ensure that the respondents cannot suffered the unknown results as results of the research study. Due to Covid-19 pandemic, the researcher ensured that all protocols were followed.

4.4.4 Ensure that the permission is obtained

According to Yin (2014:242), it is significance to ensure that permission is requested from relevant organisations. The researcher obtained written permission from the Limpopo Provincial Legislature and an ethical clearance certificate was also issued from the University of Limpopo.

4.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter detailed the research design, sample size, data collecting methods and analysis as well as the ethical consideration followed in the study. This chapter describe the reach methodology and explain the rationale for such methods as opposed to the alternative methodology. This chapter describe in detailed the best research design to collect data and further identified the specific instrument and data source to be used when calculating all the different data required in the study. This chapter also discussed potential issues surrounding the research as well as how subjects and data were protected and how any potential issues were addressed. The next chapter covers the results, analyses of the data, and discusses of the empirical findings of the primary data

CHAPTER 5

DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF THE FINDINGS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents, analyse and interprets the gathered data collected. This chapter is based on the broad aim of the study, which responds to the relationship between the legislature and the executive; assessing the legislature's ability, capacity and determining the extent to which the public participates in oversight activities. The data analysed is in line with the objectives of the study and presented through identified common themes relevant to the study. The data was collected through various data collection instruments, namely, semi-structured in-depth personal interviews, sources from documents and questionnaire.

5.2 RESPONSE RATE

Vannette and Krosnic (2018:36) define response rate as a ratio of the number of participants in a study to the number of participants who are asked to participate. Babbie (2014) states that to calculate response rate one must divide the number of participants who took part in the study by the overall selected participants. Table 5.1 below reflects on the response rate of the participants of the current study.

Table 5.1 Response rate

Description of	Number of questionnaire s administered	Number of Questionnaire Completed	Percentage
Qualitative questionnaire for SCOPA members	150	150	100
Total number of usable questionnaires	150	150	100


Table 5.1 shows that the response rate for quantitative research was 100%, which is regarded as being good. The respondents were targeted during the sitting of mid-term budget, hence the 100% of the questionnaires that were distributed were encouraged. Most of the respondents were interested to be part of the study as the questionnaires are based on their daily basis activities.

5.3 SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

This section focuses on the demographic information of the respondents. This section firstly entailed the cover letter which ensured that respondents are aware and understand the nature of the research. Further, this section moves on to enhance information to the reader about the participants such as duration within the organisation, qualification, and designation.

5.3.1 Gender composition of respondents

Figure 5.1 Gender composition of respondents



The above figure 5.1 illustrates the gender composition of the respondents of the study which comprises male and female. From the gender composition of the respondents, majority of the respondents are female with 60%, while males make 40 % of the respondents. The data in terms of this study, demonstrates that gender equity is a good balance for the results of the study.

Table 5.2: Gender race of respondents

Gender	Gender composition statistics			
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Female	90	60	60	60
Male	60	40	40	100
Total	150	100	100	

The above Table 5.2 indicates frequencies and percentages of the gender of respondents who formed part of the study. The table portrays that higher majority of respondents in this study were female with (n=90) 60 %. It is evident that the Limpopo provincial Legislature complies with the Employment Equity Act.

5.3.2 Racial status of respondents

Figure 5.2 Racial status of respondents




Figure 5.2 indicates the racial status of respondents. The 3% (Whites); 96% (Africans) and 2% (coloureds). The significant of the data in terms of this study shows that the majority respondents were Africans. This reveals that most of the SCOPA members in the Limpopo Provincial Legislature are Africans.

Table 5.3: Racial status of respondents

Race	Racial status of respondents			
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
African	144	96	96	96
White	3	2	2	2
Colored	3	2	2	100
Total	150	100	100	

The above table 5.3 reflects the frequencies and the percentages of respondents. The African being (n=44) 96%, White at (n=3) 2%, and (n=3) 2% for colored. The high rate of respondents is African. This reveals that the population of Limpopo Province is dominated by Africans.

5.3.3 Age grouping of respondents

Figure 5.3: Age of respondents




Figure 5.3 illustrates the age of the respondents which ranges from 20 years to 50 years. This shows that the higher rate of respondents is between 41 to 50 years with 54.7%. Other respondents who participated in the study are between 26 to 30 years of age with 2% (31 to 40 years) and 10% (50 years). There are no respondents less than 26 years old.


Table 5.4: Age grouping of respondents

Age	Age grouping of respondents			
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
20 years and less	0	0	0	0
21 to 25 years	0	0	0	0
26 to 30 years	3	2	2	2
31 to 40 years	50	33.3	33.3	33.3
41 to 50 years	82	54.7	54.7	54.7
50 years plus	15	10	10	100
Total	150	100	100	

Table 5.4 reflects the frequencies and percentages of the age of the respondents. As indicated above, there are no respondents who are between 20 to 25 years because there are no SCOPA members on this age grouping from the sampled respondents. The findings show that more participants were between 41 to 50 years with (n=82) 54.7 %. The other respondents were 26 to 30 years, with (n=3) 2%, 31 to 40 years at (n=50) 33.3% and 50 years (n=15) 10%. This demonstrates that more respondents have relevant experience within the Limpopo Provincial Legislature.

5.3.4 Highest educational qualification of respondents

Figure 5.4: Highest educational qualification of respondents



The figure 5.3 illustrates the highest qualification of respondents, which range from matric to doctorate. The respondents with matric were 0%, National Diploma at 40%, Degree 50%. Honours Degree at 4.7 %, Masters at 4%, Doctorate at 1.3%.

This study reveals that more respondents hold degrees. The variety of qualifications in the sample allude to variety of responses in the study, and support reliability and authenticity of the study. It is evident that the Limpopo Provincial Legislature employs educated official, who can contribute immensely.

Table 5.5: Highest educational qualification of respondents


Education	Highest educational qualification of respondents			
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Matric	0	0	0	0
National Diploma	60	40	40	40
Degree	75	50	50	50
Honours Degree	7	4.7	4.7	4.7
Masters	6	4	4	4
Doctorate	2	1.3	1.3	100
Total	150	100	100	

Table 5.5 portrays the frequency and percentage of highest qualification of the respondents. Most of the respondents hold degrees at (n=75) 50%. This

demonstrate that the level of education is high at Limpopo Provincial Legislature. Other respondents have national diploma at (n=60) 40 %, honours degree at (n=7) 4.7%, masters at (n=6) 4% and the doctoral degrees at (n=2) 1.3 %. This shows that Limpopo Province Legislature complies with the recruitment policy. Other respondents indicated that they are currently busy with their postgraduate and advance diploma qualifications.

5.3.5 Departmental location of respondents

Figure 5.5: Departmental location of respondents



The above Figure 5.5 indicates that the large percentage of respondents is from SCOPA section at 40%. The findings show that more participants have knowledge about SCOPA processes and procedures. The 16.7% of respondents are from

portfolio committee, strategic management at 20%, financial management at 13.3%, legal services at 2% and 8% are from corporate services.


Table 5.6: Departmental location of respondents

Location of Respondents	Department Location of Respondents			
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
SCOPA	60	40	40	40
Strategic Management	30	20	20	20
Financial Management	20	13.3	13.3	13.3
Portfolio Committee	25	16.7	16.7	16.7
Legal services	3	2	2	2
Corporate services	12	8	8	100
Total	150	100	100	

The frequencies and percentages of departmental location of respondents are illustrated in the above table 5.6. The study reveals that more respondents came from SCOPA directorate. The above table 5.6 reflect the directorate of respondents where (n=60) 40% are from SCOPA directorate, strategic management at (n=30) 20%, financial management (n=20) 13.3%, portfolio committee at (n=25) 16.7%, legal services (n=20) 2%, and (n=12) 8% are from corporate services.

5.3.6 Duration in current position occupied by respondents

Figure 5.6: Duration in current position occupied by respondents



As indicated from the above figure 5.6, the duration of the current positions occupied by respondents ranges from 1 to 10 years. This indicates that 2% of the respondents had less than a year and 2% of respondents had 1 to 2 years, while 4% of respondents had 3 to 5 years. On the other hand, 72% of respondents had 6 to 10 year while 20% of the respondents had 10 years plus. The findings show that most respondents had more than 10 years' experience, therefore, it adds value to this study.

Table 5.7 Duration in current position occupied by respondents

Current Position of Respondents	Duration in current position occupied by respondents			
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Less than a year	3	2	2	2
1 to 2 years	3	2	2	2
3 to 5 years	6	4	4	4

6 to 10 years	108	72	72	72
10 years' plus	30	20	70	100
Total	150	100	100	

The above table 5.7 portrays the frequencies and percentages duration of current position of the respondents. Most respondents have 6 to 10 years on their current position. This assisted the researcher to obtain the data within the short period of time. It is evident that most of the respondents are knowledgeable about the process, systems, and procedures of SCOPA.

The respondents' showed the interest of participating in the study since the questionnaires were covered and base on their daily activities. It is reflected in the above table that (n=3) 2% of respondents had less than a year, (n=3) 2% of respondents had 1 to 2 years, (n=6) 4% of respondents had 3 to 5 years, (n=108) 72% of respondents had 6 to 10 year and (n=150) 20% had 10 years plus.


5.4 QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS

Section B: To examine the effectiveness of the performance of the oversight and accountability function of the South African parliament.

This section is designed to examine the effectiveness of the performance of the oversight and accountability function of the South African parliament.

5.4.1 The effective conduction of oversight in Limpopo Provincial Legislature.

Figure 5.7: Effective conduction of oversight in Limpopo Provincial Legislature



As indicated in figure 5.7, percentages are reflected in terms of the views of the respondents who strongly disagree at 2%, disagree at 8%, neutral at 4%, agree at 80% and strongly agree at 6%. The findings reveal that high percentage of the respondent agree that oversight is conducted effectively within the Limpopo Provincial Legislature.

Table 5.8: Effective conduction of oversight in Limpopo Provincial Legislature


The oversight is conducted effectively in Limpopo provincial legislature	The oversight conducted			
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	3	2	2	2
Disagree	12	8	8	8
Neutral	6	4	4	4
Agree	120	80	80	80
Strongly Agree	9	6	6	100
Total	150	100	100	

The above table 5.8 illustrates the frequencies and the percentages of the respondents. The above table portrays that most of the majority respondents agree with the statements as reflected that (n=120) 80% of respondents agree and (n=) 6 % are strongly agree. However (n=6) 4% are neutral, disagree at (n=12) 8% and (n=3) 2%. The findings in terms of the data reveals that members of SCOPA conduct the oversight accordingly.

National Assembly (2018) outlines that SCOPA plays a significant oversight role to promote accountability and to ensure good governance in South African public institutions. For SCOPA to fulfil its mandates, the committees focus on the findings that are raised in the audit outcomes, issues related to financial mismanagement disclosed in financial statements and compliance to the requirements of Public Finance Management Act

5.4.2 The parliament's establishment of effective process and procedures of oversight

Figure 5.8: The parliament’s establishment of the effective process and procedures of oversight



The above figure 5.8 shows that 8% of the respondents strongly disagree, 8% disagree at 8%, 4% remain neutral and 50% agree while 30% strongly agree. The significant of data in terms of this study shows that t (80%) majority of respondents believe that the process and procedures established by the parliament are effectively implemented within the Limpopo Provincial Legislature. However, other respondents state that the process and procedures of the oversights do not bring positive impact within Limpopo Province.

Table 5.9: The parliament establishment of the effective process and procedures of oversight

	Effective process and procedures of oversight			
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	12	8	8	8
Disagree	12	8	8	8
Neutral	6	4	4	4
Agree	75	50	50	50


Strongly Agree	45	30	30	100
Total	150	100	100	

Table 5.9 above reveals the frequency and the percentages of respondents who Agree at (n=75) 50% and strongly agree at (n= 45) 30%, however it shown that the more participants were responded positively. Respondents who disagree at (n=12) 8%, and those who strongly disagree are at (n=12) 8% while those who are neutral are at (n=6) 4%.

As indicated by Malan and Mathebula (2020), accountability and oversight are issues that are key to effective and efficient political administration. Therefore, the effective process and procedures established by the parliament serves as guidelines of SCOPA member when executing the oversight.

5.4.3. Parliament’s special mechanism for overseeing public sector institution

Figure 5.9: Parliament’s special mechanism for overseeing public sector institution



As indicated in the above figure 5.9, it is reflected that there are no respondents who strongly disagree, but there are those who disagree at 20%, neutral at 1.3%, agree at 60% and strongly agree at 24%. The above figure 5.9 reflects that the high rate of respondents agree that the parliament have special mechanism for overseeing public sector institutions.

Table 5.10 Parliament’s special mechanism for overseeing public sector institutions


	Special mechanism for overseeing public sector institution			
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	0
Disagree	30	20	20	20
Neutral	2	1.3	1.3	1.3
Agree	90	60	60	60
Strongly Agree	28	18.7	18.7	100
Total	150	100	100	

The above table 5.10, revealed that majority of respondents agree at (n=90) 60% and strongly agree at (n=28) 18.7%. Base on the above data it is evidence that the parliament have the mechanism for overseeing public sector institution. While other respondents are neutral at (n=2) 1.3% and disagree at (n=30) 20%.

Dube (2017) writes that mechanism of oversight in public sector ensure accountability of government in respect of how to spend the revenue collected from South Africa Revenue Services (SARS) through preventing the misuse of public funds by state officials and to prevent maladministration. Therefore, the establishment of special mechanism is important within public institutions.

5.4.4 Legislature’s role in ensuring horizontal accountability

Figure 5.10: Legislature’s role in ensuring horizontal accountability



The figure 5.10 above reflects the percentage of respondents that strongly disagree at 2. %, disagree at 2.7%, neutral at 4%, agree at 70% and strongly agree at 32%. The findings in terms of most respondents in the study reveal that they agree that legislature have an important role in ensuring horizontal accountability. Other respondents also mentioned that it is their responsibilities as SCOPA members to enforce the accountability in the public institution. The role of the legislature as a representative body in ensuring both vertical and horizontal accountability may enhance the quality of democracy. Ensuring oversight over the executive is part of the horizontal accountability role that it performs (Wang, 2018).

Table 5.11: The legislature’s role in ensuring horizontal accountability


	Legislature’s role horizontal accountability			
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative

				Percent
Strongly Disagree	3	2	2	2
Disagree	4	2.7	2.7	2.7
Neutral	6	4	4	4
Agree	105	70	70	70
Strongly Agree	32	21.3	21.3	100
Total	150	100	100	

The above table 5.11 illustrates frequencies of the respondents who form part of the study. It is reflected that most respondents agree at (n=105) 70% and strongly agree at (n=32) 21.3%. It is also reflected that 91% of the respondents responded positively that legislature have an important role in ensuring horizontal accountability. However, few respondents strongly disagree at (n=3) 2%, disagree at (n=4) 2.7%, neutral at (n=6) 4%. Thus, accountability also requires that oversight leads to adequate corrective action when necessary, and this requires political will to act against corrupt and underperforming officials (Luyt, 2018). However, the institutional capacity of the legislature is vital for the legislature to effectively perform this role.

5.4.5 The implementation of parliament systems for monitoring and overseeing government in Limpopo province.

Figure 5.11: The implementation of parliament systems for monitoring and overseeing government in Limpopo Province.



As indicated on the above figure 5.11, 80% of the respondents agree while 20% strongly agree. This reflects that all majority of respondents reveal that the implementation of parliament systems for monitoring and overseeing government action are restoring service delivery in Limpopo Province. This study reveals that the level of service delivery is improving in Limpopo Province.


Table 5.12: The implementation of parliament systems for monitoring and overseeing government action in Limpopo Province

	The implementation of parliament systems for monitoring and overseeing government action are restoring service delivery:			
	Frequenc y	Percen t	Valid Percent	Cumulativ e Percent
Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	0
Disagree	0	0	0	0
Neutral	0	0	0	0
Agree	120	80	80	80
Strongly Agree	30	20	20	100
Total	150	100	100	

The above table 5.12 portrays the frequencies and the percentages of the respondents. It is revealed that all majority of respondents agree at (n=120) 80% and (n=30) 20%. The results in terms of this study revealed that (n=150)100% of the respondents responded positively that implementation of parliament systems for monitoring and overseeing government action are restoring service delivery. One of the respondents also revealed that implementation is one of the critical issues in South African government, but it is their responsibilities to transform strategies into actions.

5.4.6 Parliament and legislative accountability on executives

Figure 5.12: Parliament and legislature accountability on executives



This figure demonstrates that 80% of the respondents agree and 18% strongly agree. The findings in terms of figure 5.10 of this study reveal that majority of the respondents (98%) believe that the parliament and legislature promote accountability through exercise of the executive power. There are no respondents who disagree, strongly disagree and only 2% of the participant were neutral, however it is evidence that it is the parliament that enforce the accountability in the public sector.

Table 513. Parliament and legislative assurance on accountability

	Parliament and legislative ensure accountability			
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	0
Disagree	0	0	0	0
Neutral	3	2	2	2
Agree	120	80	80	80
Strongly Agree	27	18	18	100
Total	150	100	100	

The above table 5.13 indicates the frequencies and percentages of respondents who formed part of this study. The high-rate percentages and frequencies of respondents is agreeing at (n=120) 80%, and (n=27) 18% of respondents strongly agree. This show that the parliament strongly promote accountability through checking the exercise of the executive power. As supported by views of Mamokhere, (2020), that

public accountability as a constitutional mandate is one of the mechanisms that promote good governance globally.

5.4.7 Parliament and legislature in ensuring that legislative oversight is conducted timely and lawfully

Figure 5.13: Parliament and legislature in ensuring that legislative oversight is conducted timely and lawfully




Figure 5:13 illustrates that no respondents who strongly disagree, disagree at 24%, neutral at 4%, agree at 58% and strongly agree at 41%. The study reveals that the high percentage of respondents agree that the legislative oversight is conducted every time and they are complying with the government laws. Furthermore, one of the SCOPA members indicated that they are having programmes that help them to conduct oversight within all Limpopo Province. In addition, the surprise oversight is also conducted.


Table 5.14 Parliament and legislature in ensuring that legislative oversight is conducted timely and lawfully.

	Parliament and legislature ensure that legislative oversight is conducted			
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	0
Disagree	36	24	24	24
Neutral	6	4	4	4
Agree	87	58	58	58
Strongly Agree	21	14	14	100
Total	150	100	100	

As indicated from the above table 5.14, there are frequencies and percentages that reflects the data of this study. The data reflects that the majority of the responded agree at (N=87) 58% and (n=21) 14%. Both frequencies and percentages reflected above (N=108) 72% revealed that most respondents indicated that parliament and legislature ensure that legislative oversight is conducted every time and ensure that the government operates lawfully. It is evidence that legislative oversight plays an important role concerning how the public funds are used and ensure that public funds are used based on the approval of parliamentary plans to benefit the public.

54.8 Constitutionalising government’s organs to ensure that executive remains accountable to the public

Figure 4.14: Constitutionalising government’s organs to ensure that executive remains accountable to the public



The above Figure 5.14 indicates that respondents strongly disagree at 4%, disagree at 2%, neutral at 2%, agree at 60% and strongly agree at 32%.

The results in terms of data show that 92% of the respondents responded positively towards this research statement. This means that the conduct of oversight on the organ of state is constitutionalised to ensure that executive remains accountable to the public. As indicated in Section 41 (1) (c) of the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South African, the government provides effective, transparent, accountable, and coherent government for the Republic as a whole.


Table 5. 15: Constitutionalising government’s organs to ensure that executive remains accountable to the public

	Constitutionalising government’s organs			
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	6	4	4	4
Disagree	3	2	2	2
Neutral	3	2	2	2
Agree	90	60	60	60
Strongly Agree	48	32	32	100
Total	150	100	100	

The above table 5.15 reflects the high percentage and frequency of respondents who agree at (n=90) 60% and strongly agree at (n=48) 32%. The findings reveal that most respondents are in agreement with the above statements. Furthermore, it also indicates that in Limpopo Provincial Legislature Annual Report 2020/2021 that oversight, and scrutiny of the executive is one of the most essential objectives of legislatures and serves as a foundation of democracy.

5.4.9 Effectively measuring oversight to counter corruption and the abuse of power

Figure 5.15: Effectively measuring oversight to encounter corruption



As indicated from Figure 5.15, respondents who strongly disagree are 20%, disagree at 12%, neutral at 4%, agree at 50% and strongly agree at 22%. The above figure 5.15 shows that 72% of the respondents indicate that the conduct of legislative oversight is effectively measured to counter corruption and the abuse of power.

Table 5.16 Effectively measuring oversight to encounter corruption

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	30	20	20	20
Disagree	12	8	8	8
Neutral	0	0	0	0
Agree	33	22	22	22
Strongly Agree	75	50	50	100
Total	150	100	100	

The above table 5.16 portrays the frequency and percentages of respondents. The high percentages of most respondents are strongly agreed at (n=75) 50% and agree at (33) 22%. The findings in terms of this study reveal that it is significant to conduct the legislative oversight to effectively measure to counter corruption and the abuse of power.


There were no respondents who respondent at neutral and only (n=30) 20% strongly disagree while (n=12) 8% disagree. However, the SCOPA members hold the executive accountable to promote good governance through fighting with corruption within the public institution. Considering all the role and responsibilities that SCOPA play, Notshulwana (2019) indicates that South Africa is still struggling with measures to counter corruption and the abuse of power.

5.5. Section C: To assess the impact of SCOPA and the strategic benefit in being chaired by marginal opposition rather that the official opposition.

This section is designed to assess the impact of SCOPA and the strategic benefit in being chaired by marginal opposition rather that the official opposition.

5.5.1 SCOPA's role in holding the executive accountable

Figure 4.16: SCOPA's role in holding the executive accountable



The above figure 4.16 reflects the percentage of respondents who strongly agree at 80% and strongly agree at 4.7%, however it is evidence that the SCOPA plays an importance role in holding the executive accountable. Over 84% of most respondents responded positively. Furthermore, 2% of respondent are strongly disagree, disagree at 14 % and neutral at 2%. It is also revealed that SCOPA may also summon administrative heads of departments as they play a pivotal role in these expenditures to account on the way the public money was spent.

Table 5.17 SCOPA’s role in holding the executive accountable

	SCOPA played an importance role in holding the executive accountable			
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	3	2	2	2
Disagree	21	14	14	14
Neutral	3	2	2	2
Agree	120	80	80	80
Strongly Agree	3	4.7	4.7	100
Total	150	100	100	

The above table 5.17 demonstrates the frequencies and percentages of respondents. It is reflected that most of most respondents agree at (n=120) 80% and strongly agree (n=3) 4.7%. The findings show that high percentage of the majority respondent indicated the importance role of the SCOPA, however, other

respondents are neutral at (n=3) 2%, disagree at (n=21) 14% and strongly disagree at (n=3) 2%.

According to Section 24 of the 1996 Constitution of RSA, SCOPA is mainly mandated to ensure that public institutions are accounting for their administration actions, therefore, SCOPA is considered as a committee that ensure accountability within all South African public institutions.

5.5.2 SCOPA as a tool in promoting accountability

Figure 5.17 SCOPA as a tool in promoting accountability




Figure 5.17 illustrates no respondents who strongly disagree, 2% who disagree, 2% who are neutral, 91.3% who agree and 4.7% who strongly agree. The data in terms of this study indicate that 96% of the majority respondents show that SCOPA is considered as a tool in promoting accountability. The provincial department are requested to submit their reports every financial year. The SCOPA members held several meetings with different department as a way of enforcing accountability.

Table 5.18 SCOPA as a tool in promoting accountability

	SCOPA is considered as tool in promoting accountability			
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	0
Disagree	3	2	2	2
Neutral	3	2	2	2
Agree	137	91.3	91.3	91.3
Strongly Agree	7	4.7	4.7	100
Total	150	100	100	

The above table 5.18 portrays that (n=137) 91.3% of the respondent are agree and strongly agree at (n=7) 4.7%. This is evidence that high percentage and frequency of the majority of respondent agree with the statement. There are no respondents who strongly disagree, disagree at (n=3) 2% and neutral at (n=3) 2%.

5.5.3 SCOPA's responsibility in overseeing public expenditure of Public funds

Figure 5.18 SCOPA's responsibility in overseeing public expenditure of Public funds




Figure 5.18 indicates that there are no respondents who strongly disagree, disagree, at neutral, and there are 94% who agree and 6% who strongly agree. The data shows that 100% of all respondents responded positively base on this statement. These means that it is the responsibility of SCOPA to oversee public expenditure. It is further supported by statement of (Kim, 2018) that the SCOPA which focuses on public expenditure by the executive scrutinises the report of the Auditor-General regarding the financial management of various public institutions.

Table 5.19 SCOPA’s responsibility in overseeing public expenditure of Public funds

	SCOPA’s responsibility in overseeing public expenditure of public funds			
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	0
Disagree	0	0	0	0
Neutral	0	0	0	0
Agree	141	94	94	94
Strongly Agree	9	6	6	100
Total	150	100	100	

As indicated from table 5.19, all respondents responded positively that SCOPA has responsibility for overseeing public expenditure of Public funds. It is reflected that (n=141) 94% of respondent strongly agree and (n=9) 6%. This show that SCOPA’s departments are required to provide the financial statements reports for every financial year. It should be considered that the department are not submitting their reports in time and other submitted the incomplete information

5.5.4 The SCOPA's role in monitoring and providing strategies in the public sector on how public funds are used.

Figure 5.19 The SCOPA's role in monitoring and providing strategies in the public sector on how public funds are used.




Figure 5.19 demonstrates that there are no respondents who strongly disagree, disagree, at neutral, and 60% that agree while 40% strongly agree. The data results in terms of the study reveals that 100 % of all respondents indicate that SCOPA is introduced to monitor and provide the strategies in the public sector on how public funds are used. The findings show that SCOPA members are knowledgeable about their responsibilities.

The Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) is established to conduct oversight and hold the executive accountable for their action when spending public funds (Makhado, 2016). It evident that SCOPA plays an important role in service delivery in Limpopo Province.

Table 5.20 SCOPA’s role in monitoring and providing the strategies in the public sector on how public funds are used.

	SCOPA is introduced to deals with overseeing the public sector			
	Frequenc y	Percen t	Valid Percent	Cumulativ e Percent
Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	0
Disagree	0	0	0	0
Neutral	0	0	0	0
Agree	90	60	60	60
Strongly Agree	60	40	40	100
Total	150	100	100	

As indicted in the above table 5.20, the frequencies and percentages of responded are illustrated. Table 5.20 reveals that the respondent who agree are (n=60) 90% and (n=60) 40 %. This shows that all respondents agree that SCOPA is introduced to deal with monitoring and providing strategies in the public sector on how public funds are used. It is important for public institutions to comply with Public Finance Management Act as most of the departments are overspent their budget every financial year, which results in negative impact in the service delivery.

5.5.5 Submission of information required by SCOPA

Figure 5.20: Submission of information required by SCOPA




Figure 5.20 reflects on the respondents who strongly disagree at 12%, disagree 70%, and agree at 18%, there are no respondents who strongly agree and who are neutral. The findings in terms of this segment shows that most respondents indicate that the provincial departments are not always submitting the information required by SCOPA committee within required time framework.

Table 5.21: Submission of information required by SCOPA

	SCOPA is introduced to deals with overseeing the public sector			
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	18	12	12	12
Disagree	105	70	70	70
Neutral	0	0	0	0
Agree	27	18	18	18
Strongly Agree	0	0	0	100
Total	150	100	100	

Table 5.21 displays frequencies and percentages of the participants. The high percent of the majority respondents are participants who disagree at (n=105) 70% and strongly disagree at (n=18) %. Most of the respondents reveal that reports are

not always submitted in time by provincial departments. Most of the respondents indicate that it important for departments to meet the due date of submission to manage the programmes very well.

5.5.6 Annual and quarterly reports of SCOPA as an instrument of holding executive accountable

Figure 5:21. Annual and quarterly reports of SCOPA as an instrument of holding executive accountable




Figure 5.21 shows that the respondents who agree are 60% and those who strongly agree are 40%. The significance of data in terms of this study shows that all respondents believe that SCOPA uses annual and quarterly reports as an instrument of holding executive accountability.

Table: 5.22 Annual and quarterly reports of SCOPA as an instrument of holding executive accountable

	Annual and quarterly reports of SCOPA as an instrument of holding executive accountable			
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	0
Disagree	0	0	0	0
Neutral	0	0	0	0
Agree	90	60	60	60
Strongly Agree	60	40	40	100
Total	150	100	100	

The above table 5.22 show that frequencies and the percentages of the respondents of this study. It is reflected above that there is respondent who agree at (n=90) 60% and (n=60) 40%, however, there were no respondents who disagree, strongly disagree and neutral. The findings reveal that all the participants responded positively that the annual and quarterly respondents are serve as instrument of hold executive accountable.

Limpopo SCOPA Resolution Report (2020) states that the members of the legislature hold the executive accountable through several instruments, which includes: house resolutions, committee consideration of quarterly, mid-year and annual reports. It permits the legislatures to oversee the activities of the government as well as check the quality of governance.

5.5.7 Effective strategies and recommendation to sustain financial management within public sector

Figure 5.22 Effective strategies and recommendation to sustain financial management within public sector

The SCOPA provide effective strategies and recommendation to sustain financial management within public sector




Figure 5.22 illustrates that there are no respondents who strongly disagree, disagree at 20 %, neutral at 2%, agree at 60% and strongly agree at 18%. The significance of data in terms of this study indicates that 78% of respondents indicated that the SCOPA provides effective strategies and recommendation to sustain financial management within public sector. However, the respondents reveal that it important to transform these strategies into action.

Table 23: SCOPA provide effective strategies and recommendation

	SCOPA provide effective strategies and recommendation			
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	0
Disagree	30	20	20	20
Neutral	3	2	2	2
Agree	90	60	60	60
Strongly Agree	27	18	18	100
Total	150	100	100	

The above table 5.23 reflects the percentages of the respondents who agree at (n=90) 60% and strongly agree at (n=27) 18%. The findings reveal that most of the respondents indicate that SCOPA provide effective strategies and recommendation to sustain financial management within public sector. The role and function of SCOPA as a key parliamentary tool should seek to advance public accountability (Kim, 2018). According to Gusev (2020) one of the procedures of the parliament is to fulfil its oversight function and roles through the elected committee that formed part of the enhancing the legislature roles and function as well as to prevent democratic regimes through ensuring the order in administration and proper governmental.

5.6. Section D: To establish the reasons for public sector's failure to act against officials involved in irregular expenditures and fraud

This section establishes the reason for public sector's failure to act against officials involved in irregular expenditures and fraud.

5.6.1 The officials in provincial public institution including that of the legislature administration follows the Public Finance Management Act and treasury regulation

Figure 5.23: Public Finance Management Act and treasury regulation




Figure 5.23 displays the percentage of respondents who strongly disagree at 14%, disagree at 72%, and agree at 10% as well as strongly agree at 4%. These findings reveal that 86% of the respondents show that officials in provincial public institutions including that of the legislature administration are not fully comply with the Public Finance Management Act and Treasury regulation. This shown by evident of many fraud cases reported within the Limpopo Province. Kunz and Hamel (2022) state that the issue of information available to enable the Auditor General to work appropriately is very critical for audit opinions and has become a challenge within public institutions.

Table 5.24: Public Finance Management Act and treasury regulation

	Public Finance Management Act and treasury regulation			
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	21	14	14	14
Disagree	108	72	72	72
Neutral	0	0	0	0
Agree	15	10	10	10
Strongly Agree	6	4	4	100
Total	150	100	100	

Table 5.24 demonstrates the frequencies and percentages of respondents. The

study reveals that most of the majority respondents disagree at (n=108) 72% and strongly disagree at (n=21) 14%. It is evident through this study that most of the officials do not fully comply with the Public Finance Management Act and treasury regulation, however, there are respondents who agree at (n=15) 10%, strongly agree at (n=6) 4% and no respondents who are neutral.

The Auditor General’s reports (2022/21) exhibits several rules and regulations that serve as guidelines of financial management in which government is not fully complying with the requirements of such rules and regulations. Other department are not providing the full information about their financial statement to Auditor-General.

5.6.2 The resolutions made by provincial SCOPA are implemented by the department officials

Figure 5.24: Departmental officials’ implementation of the SCOPA resolutions.




Figure 5.24 illustrates the percentage of respondents who strongly disagree at 50%, disagree at 10%, neutral at 13.3%, agree at 26.7% and respondents who strongly agree are at 4%. The data in terms of this studies show that 60% of the respondents indicate that the departmental officials are not fully implemented SCOPA resolutions. Other SCOPA members indicated that they are serval resolutions that proposed by SCOPA which is still pending.

Table 5. 25 Departmental officials' implementation of the SCOPA resolutions

	The resolutions made by provincial SCOPA are implemented by the department officials			
	Frequenc y	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	15	10	10	10
Disagree	75	50	50	50
Neutral	20	13.3	13.3	13.3
Agree	40	26.7	26.7	26.7
Strongly Agree	0	0	0	100
Total	150	100	100	

Most of the respondents disagree at (n=75) 50% and strongly disagree at (n=15)10%. This shows that most of the respondents responded negatively on the above statement. It is evident that the public officers are not implementing the resolution proposed by SCOPA. The other respondents agree at (n=40) 26.7, neutral at (n=20) 13% and no respondents who strongly agree. This is in alignment with Dowdle (2017:45), who states that “one of the main purposes of the oversight function of legislatures is to hold the executive accountable for implementing the laws and policies that the legislature enacts and for implementing the plans, programmes and spending the budgets that the legislature approves”.

5.6.3 Continuous problem of financial fraud and misconduct within public institution, SCOPA promote accountability

Figure 5.25: Continuous problem of financial fraud and misconduct within public institution, SCOPA promote accountability




Figure 5.25 demonstrates the percentage of respondents who disagree at 20%, agree at 78% and strongly agree at 2%. The findings in terms of this study shows that 80% of the majority respondents indicated that the SCOPA promoting accountability within the public institution act as a continuous challenge of fraud and misconduct in the Limpopo Province. The respondents indicate that there are still more cases that are under investigation where SCOPA enforce accountability. It is evidence that SCOPA is continual addressing the continuous problems of financial fraud and misconduct within public institutions.

Table 5.26 Continuous problem of financial fraud and misconduct within public institution

	continuous problem of financial fraud and misconduct within public institution			
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	0
Disagree	30	20	20	20
Neutral	0	0	0	0
Agree	117	78	78	78
Strongly Agree	3	2	2	100
Total	150	100	100	

The above table 5.26 show that the respondents who strongly agree at (n=3) 2% and agree at (n=117) 78%. The high percentages and frequencies illustrate that the participants agree that the SCOPA is promoting accountability. It also evidence that SCOPA is promoting accountability and operating effectively to eliminate corrupting and fraud within public institution. Still on the above table, there are respondents who disagree at (n=30) 20% and no respondents who strongly disagree and who are neutral. This study considers the key roles and function of SCOPA as most important in ensuring accountability in the parliament.

5.6.4 The public always cruises SCOPA on service delivery experience from public institution due to lack and promotion of financial administration and usage by public institution

Figure 5.26: The publics cruises on SCOPA for service delivery experience




Figure 5.26 reveals the high percentage of respondents who agree at 60% and strongly agree at 9%. The above figure also reveals that most of the respondents agree that the public always cruises SCOPA on service delivery experience from public institutions due to lack and promotion of financial administration and usage by public institution. In addition, there are respondents who disagree at 8%, neutral at 2% and there were no respondents who strongly agree.

One of the respondents indicated that Limpopo Provincial Legislature received more complaints and other issue where community reported the provincial department

about the service delivery. There are several petitions where SCOPA engage with the provincial department on service delivery improvement. It is also supported by Gusev (2020), that governing systems within the South African government coupled with the attitudinal disposition of the law makers remain the challenge obstacle that weakens legislative capacity to hold the executives accountable.

Table 5.27: The public cruises on SCOPA for service delivery experience

	The public always cruises SCOPA on service delivery experience			
	Frequenc y	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	0
Disagree	12	8	8	8
Neutral	3	2	2	2
Agree	90	60	60	60
Strongly Agree	45	30	30	100
Total	150	100	100	

The above table 5.26 indicated that most respondents agree at (n=90) 60%, strongly agree at (45) 30%, However, other respondents disagree at (n=12) 8%, and neutral at (n=3) 2% as well as no respondents who strongly disagree. This reveals that most of the respondents agree with the statement. According to Ndoma-Egba (2018), public often criticises SCOPA since the standard of service delivery is low and misappropriation of essential resources within the public institutions. It is evident that the SCOPA required to enforce accountability among accounting offer of the provincial department.

5.6.5 The oversight role and purpose of SCOPA is to promote accountability in Limpopo legislature and public institution on financial management

Figure 5.27: SCOPA's role to promote accountability




Figure 5.27 demonstrates that there are no respondents who strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree at 80% and strongly agree at 20%. The results in terms of this study show that 100% of the respondents based on this statement revealed that the oversight role and purpose of SCOPA is to promote accountability in Limpopo legislature and public institutions on financial management.

Table 5.28: SCOPA’s role to promote accountability


	The oversight role and purpose of SCOPA is to promote accountability			
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	0
Disagree	0	0	0	0
Neutral	0	0	0	0
Agree	120	80	80	80
Strongly Agree	30	20	20	100
Total	150	100	100	

Table 5.28 illustrates the high frequencies and percentages of respondents who agree at (n=120) 80 % and strongly agree at (n=30) 20%. This reveals that all the

respondents are positive that the oversight role and purpose of SCOPA is to promote accountability in Limpopo legislature and public institutions on financial management. There are order papers that also send to the department for request of the information.

5.6.6 The failure of incompetent, unqualified officials in financial management division and the generality of public institution constitutes the holistic collapse of public institution.

Figure 5.28: The failure of incompetent, unqualified officials in financial management division



The Figure 5.28 indicates the percentage of respondents who agree at 100% which shows that all the respondents reveal that the failure of incompetent, unqualified officials in financial management division and the generality of public institution constitute the holistic collapse of public institutions. There were no respondents who strongly agree, strongly disagree, disagree and neutral.

It is evident that other officials are placed on the position that is not in line with their skills, knowledge, experience, and qualifications. The provincial department place the senior management based on the employment level other than skills, knowledge, and qualification.

Table 4.5.29: The failure of incompetent, unqualified officials in financial management division

	The failure of incompetent, unqualified officials in financial management division			
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	0
Disagree	0	0	0	0
Neutral	0	0	0	0
Agree	150	100	100	100
Strongly Agree	0	0	0	100
Total	150	100	100	

The above table portrays the frequencies and the percentages of respondents which show all respondents agree at (n=150) 100. The study reveals that all respondents agree that the failure of incompetent, unqualified officials in financial management division and the generality of public institutions constitute to the holistic collapse of public institution.

The departments are not allocating more funds for conducting training which will advance their skills and knowledge. The provincial treasury required to allocate enough funds for training and workshops of officials hence they gain more knowledge and brings improvement in the service delivery (Saalfeld, 2010)

5.6.7 The executive constitutes to discuss the findings as indicated d by SCOPA against public institution

Figure 5.29: Discussion on SCOPA’s findings




Figure 5.29 illustrates the percentage of respondents who disagree at 14%, neutral at 4%, agree at 74% and strongly agree at 8%. The significance of data in terms of this study displays that (82%) of respondents responded positively. This means that the executive constitutes to discuss the findings as indicated by SCOPA against public institution. One of the respondents indicated that they conduct the meetings with departments, and they came up with their departmental informing to present to the SCOPA committee.

Table 5.30: Discussion on SCOPA’s findings

	Discussion on SCOPA’s findings			
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	0
Disagree	21	14	14	14
Neutral	6	4	4	4
Agree	111	74	74	74
Strongly Agree	12	8	8	100
Total	150	100	100	

The above table 5.30 indicates that most respondents agree at (n=111) 74% and strongly agree at (n=12) 8%. The findings reveals that most of respondents agree that executives constitute to discuss the findings as indicated d by SCOPA against public institutions. It is evident that member of executive council, HODs, chief

director is appearing at SCOPA hearing for their relevant department. As mentioned by Daniels (2019) either in plenary or committee meetings, are a primary tool of parliaments for obtaining information related to specific policies or issues. Nearly all parliaments conduct hearings.

5.6.8 The public officials who act on irregular, wasteful and fruitless expenditure, the department taken disciplinary steps against them.

Figure 5.30: Disciplinary steps against irregular, wasteful and fruitless expenditure caused by public officials




Figure 5.30 illustrates the respondents who strongly disagree at 10%, disagree at 56.7%, neutral at 12%, agree at 18% and strongly agree at 3.3%. Most of many respondents show that public officials who act on irregular, wasteful and fruitless expenditure, the departments are not taken disciplinary steps against them. This means that there are no outcomes of cases investigations in the public institutions. One of the respondents reveal that there are more pending cases in Limpopo provincial department and the HODs also do not provide a clear progress. The lack of consequences for poor performance due to inadequate responses to high levels of unauthorised, irregular, fruitless, and wasteful expenditure within Limpopo Province is a serious concern.

Table 5.31 Disciplinary steps against irregular, wasteful and fruitless expenditure caused by public officials

	Disciplinary steps against irregular, wasteful and fruitless expenditure caused by public officials			
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	15	10	10	10
Disagree	85	56.7	56.7	56.7
Neutral	18	12	12	12
Agree	27	18	18	18
Strongly Agree	5	3.3	3.3	100
Total	150	100	100	

Table 31 reveals that respondents who disagree at (n=85) 56.7 % and strongly agree at (n=15) 10%. This reveals that most respondent's respondent negatively towards this statement. However, other respondents agree at (n=27), strongly agree at (n=5) 3.3% and neutral at (n=18). It is evidence that most of the head of department are not implementing the recommendations made by AG and SCOPA. An oversight committee can recommend that other permanent committees investigate specific problems that it has identified.

According to Slappin (2013) accounting officer of public institution they don't want to take disciplinary steps against them because, they fear breaking their personal relationship and other were threaten with other political leaders. Accounting officer also implicated on irregular, wasteful and fruitless expenditure.

5.7 Section E: To explore mechanism to improve the current situation in support of accountability in the public sector.

This section is designed to explore mechanism to improve the current situation in support of accountability in the public sector.

5.7.1 The confirmed case of financial fraud and corruption by public institution official are reported to South Africa police Service and other law enforcement agencies

Figure 5.31: The confirmed case of financial fraud and corruption




Figure 5.31 illustrates that the respondents who strongly disagree at 4%, neutral at 2%, agree at 92% and strongly agree at 2%. The data in terms of this study reveals that (94%) of the respondents shown that there are confirmed case of financial fraud and corruption by public institution official, as reported to South Africa police service and other law enforcement agencies.

Most of the respondents reveal that the investigation of cases made by SAPS take time to provide outcomes and other cases disappears. In other cases, other powerful politicians and officials who will be under investigation are accused of using their influence in encouraging their communities to disrupt or not to assist any parliamentarian and parliamentary committee that may want to conduct oversight work in any department or community (Prempeh, 2008)

Table 5.32 The confirmed case of financial fraud and corruption

	The confirmed case of financial fraud and corruption			
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	0
Disagree	6	4	4	4
Neutral	3	2	2	2
Agree	138	92	92	92
Strongly Agree	3	2	2	100
Total	150	100	100	

As indicated in the above table 5.3.2, there are frequencies and percentages of respondents who form part of this study. It reflects the high percentage of respondents who agree at (n=138) 92% and strongly agree at (n=3) 2%. The majority of respondent agree that there are confirmed case of financial fraud and corruption by public institution officials who are reported to South Africa police service and other law enforcement agencies South African Parliament (2019) mentioned that special committee should be established to support the SAPS during investigation and the public institution should provide the correct and complete information.

Dowdle (2017) reveals that the failure to act against cases of fraud and corruption bring into question the effectiveness and efficiency of the oversight role of the parliament, which compromises good governance and democratic accountability in the service and democratic in the public services and affects socio economic development.

5.7.2 They are guilty convictions and sentence by court on public institution management officials and that at lower positions charged for financial mismanagement

Figure 5.32: Guilty convictions and sentence by court on public institution management




Figure 5.32 displays that respondents who strongly disagree at 8%, disagree at 28%, neutral at 20%, agree at 40% and strongly agree at 4%. The data reveals that (44%) of the majority respondents shown that there are guilty convictions and sentences by court on public institution management officials. This finding shows that other public officials are protected to be charged in mismanagement.


Table 5.33: The confirmed case of financial fraud and corruption

	They are guilty convictions and sentence by court on public institution management			
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	12	8	8	8
Disagree	42	28	28	28
Neutral	30	20	20	20
Agree	60	40	40	40
Strongly Agree	6	4	4	100
Total	150	100	100	

As indicated d in the above table 33, there are respondents who agree at (n=60) 40%, strongly agree at (n=6) 4%, which indicates that most respondents reveals that there are guilty convictions and sentence by court on public institution management officials and at lower positions charged for financial mismanagement. There are respondents who disagree at (n=42) 28%, neutral at (n=30) 20% and strongly disagree at (n=12) 8%.

5.7.3 Public officials training on miss-financial management

Figure 5.33: Public officials should train on miss-financial management



The above Figure 5.33 reflects the high percentages of respondents who strongly agree at 100%. The findings in terms of this study show (100%) of all respondents indicated that public officials should be trained on miss-financial management to improve the situational and the current financial support as well as accountability in public institutions.

This study reveals that training helps official to obtain new skills, knowledge, and experience. The training is important as it covers mainly areas such as legislative analysis and drafting, including analysis, and drafting of legislation that govern the organisation.

Table 5.34 Public officials training on miss-financial management

	Public officials are trained on miss-financial management			
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	0
Disagree	0	0	0	0
Neutral	0	0	0	0
Agree	0	0	0	0
Strongly Agree	150	100	100	100
Total	150	100	100	

The above table 5.34 reveals that respondents who strongly agree at (n=150) 100%. This show that participants responded positively regarding the above statements. There are no respondents who disagree, neural and strongly disagree. It is an evident that training plays an important role in public institutions and may strengthen the standards of service delivery.

Daniels (2019) states that training can assist the employee to acquire new skills ideas to perform the job within the organisation. In the public sector, training is based on a particular job responsibility or where the directorate that official belong to. Training and development opportunities are vital for encouraging employees to be loyal and productive.

5.7.4 To recruited well skilled, experience and qualified executive management to ensure a better financial governance in public institution

Figure 5.34: To recruited well skilled, experience and qualified executive management




Figure 5.34 illustrates that no respondents who strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree at 70% and strongly agree at 30%. The data in terms of this study shows that 100% of all respondents indicated that it is important to recruit well skilled, experience and qualified executive management to ensure a better financial governance in public institutions. The recruitment policy of the organization should be review as well as the organizational structure.

Table 5.35: To recruited well skilled, experience and qualified executive management

	To recruited well skilled, experience and qualified executive management			
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	0
Disagree	0	0	0	0
Neutral	0	0	0	0
Agree	105	70	105	105
Strongly Agree	45	30	45	100

Total	150	100	100	
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As indicated in table 5.35 there were respondents who agree at (n=105) 70% and (n=45) 30%. The findings as reflect in the above table indicate that all respondents agree that recruiting well skilled, experience and qualified executive management to ensure a better financial governance in public institutions. There are no respondents who disagree, strongly disagree and neutral.

Sorensen (2017) indicate that the systems of reification of skills, knowledge, experience, and qualification should be strengthen to employee the suitable candidate.

5.7.5 To have quarterly meeting with report that on procurement plan and strategic business objective aligned to the business objective and or annul plan of every public institution

Figure 5.35: To have quarterly meeting with report that on procurement plan and strategic business objective




Figure 5.35 portrays that there were no respondents who strongly disagree, disagree at 10%, neutral at 6%, agree at 80% and strongly agree at 4%. The findings term of this study show (84%) of the participants responded positively towards statement. This means that it is necessary to have quarterly meeting with report that on procurement plan and strategic business objective aligned to the business objective and or annul plan of every public institutions.

Limpopo SCOPA Resolution Report (2020) reveals that members of the legislature holds the executive accountable through several instruments, which includes house resolutions, committee consideration of quarterly, mid-year and annual reports, focused intervention studies, ministerial accountability, and oral and written motions.

Table 36. To have quarterly meeting with report that on procurement plan and strategic business objective

	To have quarterly meeting with report that on procurement plan and strategic business objective			
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	0
Disagree	15	10	10	10
Neutral	9	6	6	6
Agree	120	80	80	80
Strongly Agree	6	4	4	100
Total	150	100	100	

The above table 5.36 demonstrates the percentage of respondent who strongly agree at (n=120) 80 % and strongly agree at (n=6) 4%. The high percent of most participants responded positively towards; however, it should be considered that the department must always updated their quarterly report and procurement plan and as well as to establish the strategic decision. The quarterly report helps the organisation to determine the area that required intervention. It also helps the organisation to determine how much the used and left from their allocated budget as well as to plan for the next quarter (Somgqeza, 2014).

5.7.6 To ensure that department refrains from committing public funds on non-priorities objectives not aligned to annual performance plan of every public institutions

The below Figure 5.36 illustrate that no respondents who strongly disagree, disagree at 8%, neutral at 0%, agree at 71% and strongly agree at 21%. The significance of data in terms of this study shown that (92%) of respondents indicated that, it is significant to ensure that department refrains from committing public funds on non-

priorities objectives not aligned to annual performance plan of every public institution.

Figure 5.36: To ensure that department refrains from committing public funds on non-priorities objectives

To ensure tha department refrains from committing public funds on non- priorities objetives



As reflected above, Figure 5.36 displays that there are no respondents who strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree at 82% and strongly agree at 18%. However, this study shows that all respondents indicated that it is significant to ensure that department refrains from committing public funds on non-priorities objectives not aligned to annual performance plan of every public institutions. Evidently, the Limpopo provincial legislature is constantly strengthening and implementing tools of oversight, which include the implementation of Programme Evaluation and Budget Analysis (Limpopo SCOPA Resolution Report, 2020).

Table 5.37: To ensure that department refrains from committing public funds on non-priorities objectives

	To ensure that department refrains from committing public funds on non-priorities objectives			
	Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	0
Disagree	0	0	0	0
Neutral	0	0	0	0
Agree	123	82	82	82
Strongly Agree	27	18	18	100
Total	150	100	100	


As indicated on table 5.37, the respondents who agree at (n=123) 82% and strongly

agree at (n=27) 18%. This study reveals that the high rate of the respondents agree that it is necessary to ensure that department refrains from committing public funds on non-priorities objectives not aligned to annual performance plan of every public institution, however one of the respondents mentioned that it is responsibilities for SCOPA members to exercise that.

The compliance with the PFMA and Associated Treasury Regulations serve as one of the most important guides on public finance. As supported by (Stapenhurst, 2020) that the National Treasury should monitor and assess compliance by public institution with the provincial treasuries to fulfil their oversight responsibilities, monitor compliance.

5.7.7 To promote economic and quality on procurement of goods and services on rotation of qualified supplies and register through Cipro to trade in legible for tax contribution

Figure 5.37: To promote economic and quality on procurement of goods and services



As indicated in the above figure 5.37 there are respondents who disagree at 26%, neutral at 8%, agree at 50% and strongly agree at 16%. The findings reflect 66% of the majority respondents indicates that it is important to promote economic and quality on procurement of goods and services on rotation of qualified supplies and register through cipro to trade in legible for tax contribution.

There are many complaints that they receive from supplier about the process of

procurement and other claim that the tender is awarded to unqualified suppliers. National Treasury issued Circular 32 to provide guidelines in financial governance as well as maintain oversight within the broader governance framework.

Table 5.38: To promote economic and quality on procurement of goods and services

	To promote economic and quality on procurement of goods and services			
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	0
Disagree	39	26	26	26
Neutral	12	8	8	8
Agree	75	50	50	50
Strongly Agree	24	16	16	100
Total	150	100	100	

Table 5.38 portrays the frequency and the percentage of respondents who participated in this study. However, there are respondents who agree at (n=75) 50% and strongly agree at (n=24) at 16%, which reveals that majority of respondents agree with the statement. The other respondents disagree at (n=39) 26%, neutral at (n=12) 8% and no respondent strongly agree.

The SCOPA should also have sessions with the AG where the AG briefed them to prepare for engagement with departments regarding some of the maladministration and procurement systems that took place in terms of expenditures of various departments (Limpopo Legislature, 2019). However, this can support the enforcement of accountability within public institutions.

5.7.8 The public official should be enforced and monitored on the implementation of SCOPA resolution within public institution

Figure 5.38: The public official should be enforced and monitored on the implementation of SCOPA resolution within public institution




Figure 5.38 indicates that the respondents who agree at 97.3% and strongly agree at 2.3%. The results as reflected in the above figure; all participants responded positively. This indicates that the public official should be enforced and monitored on the implementation of SCOPA resolution within public institutions. The Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) which focuses on public expenditure by the executive scrutinises the report of the Auditor-General regarding the financial management of various public institutions.

Table 5.39 enforcing and monitoring the implementation of SCOPA resolution within public institution

	The public official should be enforced and monitored on the implementation of SCOPA resolution within public institution			
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	0
Disagree	0	0	0	0
Neutral	0	0	0	0
Agree	146	97.3	97.3	97.3
Strongly Agree	4	2.7	2.7	100
Total	150	100	100	

The above table 5.39 demonstrates that the frequency and percentage of respondents who agree at (n=146) 97.3% and strongly agree at (n=4) 2.7%. This reveals that all respondents agree that the public officials should be enforced and monitored on the implementation of SCOPA resolution within public institutions.

This statement is supported by Ferry and Eckersley (2015) who indicate that towards the end of the fourth term, SCOPA had a system where departments were called to explain to the committee when they did not implement resolutions. In addition to resolutions, the performance of SCOPA in terms of tabling of reports in the Legislature should be considered. This section of Chapter 5 presented the findings of quantitative analysis, the next section presents the findings of qualitative analysis.

5.5 QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS

The qualitative study findings are presented, interpreted, analysed and discussed in this section. The chapter commences with how the various qualitative questionnaires were administered. The qualitative findings were presented and described under sub-sections, summarised and concluded by the key findings from the qualitative study. Qualitative research is more particular than quantitative research and utilises diverse methods of collecting data.

5.5.1 Response rate

Babbie (2014) states that to calculate response rate a researcher should divide the number that took part in the study by the SCOPA members. The respondents show the percentage and frequencies of respondents who formed part of the study.

Table 5.40 Response rate

Description	Number of questionnaires administered	Number of Questionnaires Completed	Percent
Qualitative questionnaire for Legislature officials	20	20	100
Total number of usable questionnaires	20	20	100


Table 5.40 shows the response rate for qualitative research study as 100%, which is regarded as very good. Most of the participants are interested to be part of the study as the interview is based on their daily basis activities.

5.5.2 SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

This section focuses on the demographic information of the participants. This section firstly entails the cover letter which ensure the respondents aware and understand the nature of the research, further this section moves on to enhance information to the reader about the participants such as duration within the organisation, qualification, and designation.

5.5.2.1 Gender composition of participants

Figure 5.39 Gender composition of participants



The above figure 5.39 demonstrate the gender of the participants. The findings reveal that most of the respondents were female with 55% and 45 % were male. The data in terms of this study demonstrates that gender equity is a good balance for the results of the study.


Table 5.40: Gender of the participants

Gender	Gender Composition Statistics			
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Female	11	55	55	55
Male	9	45	45	45
Total	20	100	100	

The above Table 5.41 indicated frequencies and percentages of the gender of participants who form part of the study. The findings show that higher majority of participants in this study were female with (n=11) 55 %. Male were (n=9) 45%. It is evidence that the Limpopo Provincial Legislature complies with the Employment Equity Act.

5.5.2.2 Racial status of participants

Figure 5.40 Racial status of participants



The above figure 5.40 portrays the racial status of participants. Ten percent were White, African at 70%, Indian were 5% and coloured were 15%. The significance of the data in terms of this study shows that the majority respondents were African. These shown good sample.

Table 5.42: Racial status of participants

Race	Racial status of participants			
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
African	14	70	70	70
White	2	10	10	10
Indian	1	5	5	5
Colored	3	15	15	100
Total	20	100	100	

The above table 5.42 reflects the frequencies and the percentages of participants. The African were (n=14) 70%, White at (n=2) 10%, (n=3) 15% were colored and Indian at (n=1) 5%. The high rate of participants is African.

5.5.2.3 Age grouping of participants

Figure 5.41: Age of participants




Figure 5.41 reflects the age of participants which range from 20 year to 50 year. The findings reveal that most participants are between 31 to 40 years with 55%. The other participants who participate in the study are between 26 and 30 years, at 15%, 41 to 50 years at 10% and 50 years at 10%. There were no respondents below the age of 20 years.

Table 5.43: Age grouping of participants

Age	Age grouping of participants			
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
20 years and less	0	0	0	0
21 to 25 years	2	10	10	10
26 to 30 years	3	15	15	15
31 to 40 years	11	55	55	55
41 to 50 years	2	10	10	10
50 years plus	2	10	10	100
Total	20	100	100	

The above table 5.43 reflect the frequency and percentage of the age of the participants. As indicated above there were no participants who were less than 20 years. The findings show that the more participants were between 31 to 40 years with (n=11) 55%. Other participants were 26 to 30 years, with (n=3) 15%, 41 to 50 years at (n=2) 10% and 50 years (n=2) 10%. This demonstrates that more participants have experience within the Limpopo Provincial Legislature.

5.5.2.4 Highest educational qualification of participants

Figure 5.42: Highest educational qualification of participants




Figure 5.42 shows the highest qualification of participants which ranges from matric to doctorate. The participants with matric were 0%, National Diploma at 45%, Degree 25%. Honours Degree at 10 %, Masters at 15%, Doctorate at 5%. This study reveals that more participants hold National Diploma. The variety of qualification in the sample will allude to variety of responds in the study support reliability and authenticity of the research. It is evidence that the Limpopo Provincial Legislature employ the officials with qualifications.


Table 5.44: Highest educational qualification of respondents

Education	Highest educational qualification of participants			
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Matric	0	0	0	0
National Diploma	9	45	45	45
Degree	5	25	25	25
Honours Degree	2	10	10	10
Masters	3	15	15	15
Doctorate	1	5	5	100
Total	20	100	100	

The above table 5.44, portrays the frequencies and percentages of highest qualification of the participants. Most of the participants had National Diploma at (n=9) 45%. Other participants claim that are had Degree (n=5) 25 %, Honours degree at (n=2) 15%, Masters at (n=3) 15% and the Doctorate (n=1) 5%.

5.5.2.5 Departmental location of the participants

Figure 5.43: Departmental location of participants



The above Figure 5.43 reflect that the large percentage of participants is from strategic management section at 40%. The findings show that more participants are from strategic management and they are responsible for gathering information from different department, therefore, it is important for the reliability of this study. The 15% of participants are from Portfolio committee, SCOPA at 10%, Financial Management at 15%, Legal Services at 10% and 10% are from corporate services.

Table 5.45 Departmental location of participants


Location of Respondents	Department location of participants			
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
SCOPA	2	10	10	10
Strategic Management	8	40	40	40
Financial Management	3	15	15	15
Portfolio Committee	3	15	15	15
Legal services	2	10	10	10
Corporate services	2	10	10	100

Total	20	100	100	
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The frequency and percent of departmental location of participants were demonstrated in the above table 5.45. The study revealed that more participants came from strategic management directorate. The above table 5.6 reflect the directorate of participants where (n=2) 10% are from SCOPA directorate, strategic management at (n=40) 20%, financial management (n=3) 15%, portfolio committee at (n=3) 15%, legal services (n=2) 10%, and (n=2) 10% are from corporate services.

5.5.2.6 Duration in current position of participants

Figure 5.44: Duration in current position of participants



As indicated from the above figure 5.44, the duration of the current position which ranges from 1 to 10 years. This indicated s that 5% of participants had less than a year, 3% of respondents had 1 to 2 years, 20% of respondents had 3 to 5 years, 40% of respondents had 6 to 10 year and 20% had 10 years and more. The findings show that most participants had more than 10 years' experience, therefore, it will add value to this study.

Table 5.46 Duration in Current Position of participants

Current position of participants	Duration in current position of participants			
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Less than a year	1	5	5	5
1 to 2 years	3	15	15	15
3 to 5 years	4	20	20	20
6 to 10 years	8	40	20	20
10 years' plus	4	20	40	100
Total	20	100	100	

The above table 5.46 portrays the frequency and percentage duration of current position of the participants. Most of the participants had 6 to 10 years on their current position. This assisted the researcher to obtain the data within the short period of time.

Participants shown the interest of participating in the study since the questionnaires were covered and base on their daily activities. It is reflected in the above table that (n=1) 5% of participants had less than a year, (n=3) 15% of participants had 1 to 2 years, (n=4) 20% of participants had 3 to 5 years, (n=8) 40% of participants had 6 to 10 year and (n=4) 20% had 10 years plus.

5.5.3 Data analysis based on themes

5.5.3.1 Theme one

5.5.3.1.1 Do you think the role and purpose of SCOPA is to promote accountability

In response to the question, most participants indicated that the role and purpose of SCOPA are to promote accountability. The results show that the South African

parliament established the SCOPA to enforce the accountability of executives. The intention of the SCOPA, when executing its function, is to ensure that there is an effective, efficient and economical use of public funds (Makhado, 2016). SCOPA promotes transparency and accountability in the use of public resources, ensures that public funds are spent to benefit the public and ensures that quality service is delivered to the public (Makhado, 2016). DiMaggio (2018) reveals that accountability is one of the critical issues within public institutions. DiMaggio (ibid) further states that accountability is imperative to show justly how government observe behaviour and control while avoiding centralisation of intensity and improving the learning limit and viability of the public.

5.5.3.1.2 Do you think the SCOPA resolution have positive impact in the public institution

In response to the question, most of the participants indicated that the SCOPA resolutions have a positive impact on the public institutions. This shows that executives are accountable for their actions and decisions taken. Other participants indicated that the resolutions of SCOPA are not bringing changes. One of the participants reveal that the HoD department within the province are not implementing the SCOPA recommendations

Other participants reflected that the SCOPA resolutions have positive impacts on public institutions. This shows that the member of SCOPA performs well within Limpopo Province

5.5.3.1.3 Why do you think the Limpopo Provincial Legislature requires other independent institutions to enforce accountability in terms of public finance?

Based on the above question, majority of participants indicated that the Limpopo Provincial Legislature requires other independent institutions to enforce accountability in terms of public finance. Other participants indicate that “SCOPA require other independent institutions which will work together in terms of facilitation the investigation within the short period of time”. Few participants in terms of this question reveal that there is no need for other independent institutions to enforce accountability in Limpopo Province because SCOPA is operating effectively. One of the participants indicated that “the key is to strengthen the monitoring system of SCOPA”.

However, one of the participants shows that SCOPA is performing well, independently. Other participants reveal that one of their reasons are that there are continuously challenges of misused of public funds and resources in presence of SCOPA therefore SCOPA required assistant”.

5.5.3.1.4 In your opinion, Limpopo provincial department are fully comply with legislative framework

In respond to the question, majority (number) of participants reveal that Limpopo provincial department are not fully compliant with legislative framework. The other participant state that Auditor-general reveal more findings where the correct procedures were not followed”. However, few number of the majority the participants state that the official in provincial department complies with legal frameworks.

This shows that there is a lack of compliance of legal frameworks within the public institutions. One of the participants reveal that compliance is one of the critical elements in South Africa. Matebese-Notshulwana, (2019) further opines that rampant problems of non-compliance, unaccountability and lack of answerability within South Africa's public sector still persist.

5.5.4. Theme two up to the last theme

5.5.4.1 Focus-group interviews schedule

In response to the question, majority of participants indicated that the process and procedures of SCOPA committees required to be reviewed to prevent irregular, wasteful and fruitless expenditure. Other participants indicate that the officials who do irregular, wasteful and fruitless expenditure are not taken disciplinary steps against them. Limpopo Provincial Legislature (2019) reveals that one of the critical element within Limpopo provincial department is to prevent irregular, wasteful and fruitless expenditure.

5.5.4.2 Do you think the legislative oversight have positive impact in service delivery standard?

All participants indicated that the legislative oversight have positive impact in service delivery standard. The results show that the legislative oversight is enforcing the service delivery. Oversight is the proactive control mechanisms initiated by the legislature with the executive and administrative organs of state to promote compliance with the statutory and legislative frameworks (South African Legislative Sector, 2018:4). One of the participants indicated that there is improvement of service delivery in Limpopo Province.

5.5.4.3 In your experience, do you think the Limpopo provincial government is taken into consideration the findings of both SCOPA and Auditor general?

In response to the question, 50% of majority (number) of participants indicated that Limpopo provincial government should take into consideration the findings of both SCOPA and Auditor-general. However, the other 50% of the participants reveal that Limpopo provincial government did not take into consideration the findings of both SCOPA and Auditor general. Further, some participants reveal that other departments provide the prove of implementation of Auditor general and SCOPA recommendations. It is also found that some executive managers are not implementing recommendations because of the personal relationship with other officials who perform wrong doings.

In response to the question, most participants indicated that there are other aspects that they can mention in relation to issues of finance in the Limpopo Province that are not covered. Most of the participants indicate that issues of procurement process in public sector should be taken into consideration. The issue of overspending exists every financial year in public management. Other participants reveal that there are aspect such as financial statistics analysis in that determine the current and past performance.

5.9 SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS

The results shows that the South African parliament established the SCOPA to enforce accountability of executives. The intention for the SCOPA, when executing

its function, is to ensure that there is an effective, efficient and economical use of public funds (Makhado, 2016). Fifty-five percent of respondents indicate that the SCOPA resolutions have the positive impact in the public institutions.

Other respondents show that executives are accountable for their actions and decisions taken. While other respondents reveal the resolutions of SCOPA is not bringing changes. Most participants indicate that the Limpopo Provincial Legislature requires other independent institution to enforced accountability in terms of public finance. Other respondents indicate that the SCOPA require other independent institution which will worked together in terms of facilitation the investigation within the short period of time”. However few respondents reveal that there is no need of other independent institution to enforce accountability in Limpopo province. One of the respondent indicated that the key is to strengthen the monitoring system of SCOPA.

The number of most of the respondents reveal that Limpopo provincial department are not fully compliant with legislative framework. The other respondents state that Auditor-general reveal more findings where the correct procedures were not followed”. However, few respondents state that the officials in provincial department comply with legal frameworks.

Most of the respondents reveal that the process and procedures of SCOPA committees required to be reviewed to prevent irregular, wasteful and fruitless expenditure. The results show that the legislative oversight is enforcing the service delivery. In this study, 50% of the participants reveal that Limpopo provincial government should take into consideration the findings of both SCOPA and Auditor general. However, the other 50% of the participants reveal that Limpopo provincial government did not take into consideration the findings of both SCOPA and Auditor general.

It is reflected that all participants indicate that there are other aspects that they can mention in relation to issues of finance in the Limpopo Province that are not covered. Most of the participants indicate that issues of procurement process in public sector should be taken into consideration. The issue of underspent exists every financial year in public management.

NO	Description of themes	
	Main theme	Sub-theme
1	Accountability and responsibility of public officials	Accountability and responsibility
2.	Provision of envisaged	Public finance management
3.	Innovative systems that develop the SCOPA as committee	Innovative management
4	Process and procedures of Oversight	Development of process and procedures of Oversight

This are themes of interview of this study. The respondent who forms part of the focus group and semi- structures interview were officials of Limpopo Provincial Legislature. The dives were utilised to ensure accuracy of the data collected. These themes focus on the operation of SCOPA within the Limpopo province.

5.7 CONCLUSION

The chapter analysed data and presented quantitative results figures and tables, while qualitative data was analysed and presented through thematic content analysis. The respondents responded based on the four objectives of this study. The results in terms of this study show that the oversight and accountability are continuously challenges that faced by public institutions. The SCOPA establishes serval resolutions, but the executive is not implementing them accordingly. The issues of public finance management become one of the critical issues in Limpopo Provincial Legislature. The SCOPA was introduced to deal with the challenges such as irregular, wasteful, and fruitless expenditure. The mechanism is demonstrated to address the challenges that face by Limpopo province department. Most of the respondents respond positively on the mechanism of strengthen accountability and oversight. This chapter presented, analysed and interpreted data, the next chapter presents conclusions and recommendations of the study.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION AND RECOMENDATIONS

6.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter focuses on the conclusion and recommendations of the study. This chapter is considered as a comprehensive summary of the entire study since it reminds the readers about the significance of the study and briefly explain how the study intended to contribute to the existing body of knowledge on the topic. This chapter also focuses on the literature review and primary findings. The findings are presented to support recommendations. Also, the proposed adjusted or improved framework arising from the findings of this study is outlined.

6.2 THE OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

This chapter is presented in line with the objectives of the study. As set out in Chapter 1, the objectives of this study are:

- To examine the effectiveness of the performance of the oversight and accountability function of the South African parliament.
- To assess the impact of SCOPA and the strategic benefit in being chaired by marginal opposition rather than the official opposition.
- To establish the reasons for public sector's failure to act against officials involved in irregular expenditures and fraud.
- To explore mechanism to improve the current situation in support of accountability in the public sector.
- To develop an integrated reporting framework that will assess the efficacy of oversight committees.

6.3 RE-CAP ON THE RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

The study used a mixed method approach which included qualitative and quantitative research approach. The combination of both quantitative and qualitative involved data collection, analysis, and interpretation of the findings. Data was gathered through questionnaires and interviews from SCOPA in the Limpopo Provincial Legislature. A total of 250 SCOPA members made the total population of

the study. Version 22 of the SSP was used to analyse the quantitative data while thematic content analysis was employed to analyse qualitative data. The findings of the study derived from the analysis are summarised in terms of the study objectives as follows.

6.4 KEY FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

6.4.1 To examine the effectiveness of the performance of the oversight and accountability function of the South African parliament.

The findings revealed that high percentage (80%) of the respondents agree that oversight is conducted effectively with the Limpopo Provincial Legislature. The study showed that (80%) majority of respondents believe that the processes and procedures established by the parliament are effectively implemented within the Limpopo Provincial Legislature. Table 5.9 reveals the frequency and the percentage of respondents who agree at (n=75) % and strongly agree at (n= 45) 30%, however, it is vital to reflect that more participants responded positively that the legislature have an important role in ensuring horizontal accountability. It also reflected that 91% of the respondents are positively that legislature have an important role in ensuring horizontal accountability. The results in terms of this research objective, affirm that the implementation of parliament systems for monitoring and overseeing government action restores service delivery.

The findings in terms figure 5.10 of this study also revealed that (98%) of the majority respondents agree that parliament and legislature promote accountability through exercise of the executive power. The study also revealed that the high percentage of respondents agree that the legislative oversight is conducted every time and they comply with the government laws. This means that the conduct of oversight on the organ of state is constitutionalised to ensure that executive remains accountable to the public. Furthermore, the finding also indicates that in Limpopo Provincial Legislature Annual Report 2020/2021, oversight and scrutiny of the executives is one of the most essential objectives of legislatures and serves as a foundation of democracy.

The figure 5.15 shows that 72% of respondents indicated that the conduct of legislative oversight is effectively measure to counter corruption and the abuse of power.

Also, most of the respondents indicate that the effectiveness of oversight within the Limpopo Provincial Legislature is conducted effectively and that the process and procedures established by the parliament is not effectively. The study revealed the parliament has special mechanism for overseeing public sector institutions. The findings also indicates that the parliament and legislature promote accountability through exercise of the executive power and the respondents indicated that the legislative oversight is not conducted every time and they are not compliant with the government laws. It also indicates that the conduct of legislative oversight is effectively measure to counter corruption and the abuse of power conduct of legislative oversight is effectively measure to counter corruption and the abuse of power.

6.4.2 To assess the impact of SCOPA and the strategic benefit in being chaired by marginal opposition rather than the official opposition.

The findings in terms of this objective show that 87% of the respondents believe that SCOPA plays an important role in holding the executive accountable. According to Section 24 of the 1996 Constitution of RSA, SCOPA is mainly mandated to ensure that public institutions are accounting for their administration actions, therefore, SCOPA is considered as committee that ensures accountability within all South African public institutions. The data shows that it is the responsibility for SCOPA to oversee public expenditure. The findings in terms of the study reveal that SCOPA was introduced to deal with monitoring and providing strategies in the public sector on how public funds are used.

The findings in terms of this study also show that provincial departments do not always submit information required by SCOPA committee within required time framework. The study also discovered that the annual and quarterly reports serve as instruments to hold executives accountable and for SCOPA to provide effective strategies as well as recommendation to sustain financial management within the

public sector.

Most respondents show that SCOPA plays an important role in holding the executive accountable and it is considered as a tool in promoting accountability. The respondents reveal that it is the responsibility of SCOPA to oversee public expenditure and all respondents revealed that SCOPA deals with overseeing the public sector in the form of how public funds are used. The study further reveals that SCOPA committees do not effectively address the issues of preventing irregular, wasteful and fruitless expenditure though the conduct of legislative oversight is effectively measure to counter corruption and the abuse of power. Furthermore, it is revealed that in South Africa, oversight and accountability are constitutionally mandate functions of the legislature to scrutinise and oversee executive action, thus SCOPA provides effective strategies and recommendations to sustain financial management within the public sector.

6.4.3 To establish reasons for the public sector's failure to act against officials involved in irregular expenditures and fraud.

From the findings, 86% of the respondents believes that officials in provincial public institution including that of the legislature administration are not fully compliant with the Public Finance Management Act and Treasury regulation. This is in alignment with Dowdle (2017), who states that one of the main purposes of oversight function of legislatures is to hold the executive accountable for implementing the laws and policies that the legislature enacts and for implementing the plans, programmes and spending the budgets that the legislature approves.

This reveals that all the participants responded positively that the oversight role and purpose of SCOPA is to promote accountability in Limpopo Legislature and public institutions on financial management. One of the respondents stated that there are questions that send to the provincial department before they appear on the hearings. There is order paper that also send to the department for request of the information.

The findings in terms of this objective shows that majority of the respondents agree

that SCOPA promotes accountability within public institutions as there are continuous challenges of fraud and misconduct in the Limpopo Province. Most of the respondents agree that the public always cruises SCOPA on service delivery experience from public institutions due to lack and promotion of financial administration as well as usage by public institutions. One of the respondents indicated that Limpopo provincial legislature received more complaints and other issues where community reported the provincial department about the service delivery. The findings in terms of this objective, show that 100% of the respondents believe that the oversight role and purpose of SCOPA is to promote accountability in Limpopo Legislature and public institution on financial management.

Figure 5.28 indicates the percentage of respondents who, agree at 100%, which means that all the respondents revealed that the failure of incompetent, unqualified officials in financial management division and the generality of public institutions constitute the holistic collapse of public institution. The significance of data in terms of this study displays that 82% of the respondents are positive that the executives constitute to discuss the findings as indicated d by SCOPA against public institutions. One of the respondents indicated that they conduct the meetings with department, and they come up with their departmental information to present to the SCOPA committee. The findings reveal that most respondents agree that executives constitute in advancing SCOPA against public institution. One of the respondents revealed that there are more pending cases in Limpopo provincial department and the HODs also do not provide clear progress. It is evidence that most of the heads of departments are not implementing recommendations that made by AG and SCOPA.

This study shows that officials in provincial public institutions including that of the legislature administration are not fully compliant with the Public Finance Management Act and treasury regulation. The findings in terms of this objective indicate that departmental officials are not fully implementing SCOPA resolutions. SCOPA is not doing enough and operating effectively to promote accountability within public institutions as there are continuous challenges of fraud and misconduct in the Limpopo Province. The study also reveals that public always cruises SCOPA

on service delivery experience from public institution due to lack and promotion of financial administration and usage by public institution.

The study further reveals that the oversight role and purpose of SCOPA is to promote accountability in Limpopo Legislature and public institutions on financial management. It also indicates that the failure of incompetent, unqualified officials in financial management division and the generality of public institutions constitute the holistic collapse of public institutions. It is also revealed that the respondents that the public officials who act on irregular, wasteful and fruitless expenditure, the departments are not taken disciplinary steps against them.

6.4.4 To explore mechanism to improve the current situation in support of accountability in the public sector.

The findings in terms of this research objective reveals that 94% of the respondents confirmed cases of financial fraud and corruption by public institution officials as reported to South Africa police service and other law enforcement agencies. The data reveals that there are guilty convictions and sentences by court on public institution management officials and that at lower positions charged for financial mismanagement.

The findings in terms of this objective also show that all respondents indicated that public officials should be trained on miss-financial management to improve the situational and the current financial support and accountability in the public institutions. Further, it found important to recruited well skilled, experience and qualified executive management to ensure a better financial governance in public institutions. One of the respondents indicated that the systems of verification of skills, knowledge, experience, and qualification should be strengthen to employee the suitable candidate. This means that it is necessary to have quarterly meetings which report that on procurement plan and strategic business objective aligned to the business objective and or annul plan of every public institution.

This study shows that it is significant to ensure that departments refrain from committing public funds on non-priorities objectives not aligned to annual

performance plan of every public institution. Also, it is important to promote economic and quality on procurement of goods and services on rotation of qualified supplies and register through Cipro to trade in legible for tax contribution. One of the respondents revealed that there are many complaints that they receive from supplier about the process of procurement and other claim that the tender is awarded to unqualified suppliers. This indicates that the public official should be enforced and monitored on the implementation of SCOPA resolution within public institutions.

The study also reveals that it is important to promote economic and quality on procurement of goods and services on rotation of qualified supplies and register through Cipro to trade in legible for tax contribution. Most respondents indicate that the public official should be enforced and monitored on the implementation of SCOPA resolution within public institution.

6.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE STUDY

To avoid the growing problem of the misuse of public funds within the public sector role in providing a complete picture of the performance of provincial departments trough oversight exercise encompassing its finance, its systems, its human resources, and its service delivery performance. According to Malapane (2016), in recent times, the information has been receiving attention in the public domain and discourses. The strategic objectives are to understand why irregular expenditure persists and to improve existing mechanism of parliamentary oversight, particularly that of SCOPA and enhances its capacity to fulfil its oversight function in line with parliament's strategic direction.

Considering the findings of the study, the following are recommendations considered to address existing challenges:

- Senior officials should be capacitated to be able to take responsibilities for financial management and procurement of goods and services within the public sector to promote good government.
- There should be enforcement of consequences management or disciplinary actions against officials who transgress or violate the regulations and prescripts as this was identified as one of the major challenges.

- There should be capacitation and strengthening of internal control of the national government department by appointing competent and properly qualified senior personnel who understand public finance and procurement regulations opposed to cadre deployment.
- SCOPA should form part of the recruitment process to oversee the selection and appointing of official in position of finance and supply chain management.
- To reverse the challenges and the prevalence of irregular expenditure as identify in this study and thus realise development and democracy, there should be renewed emphasis on strong procurement system and independent boards and legislative oversight to pay its mandate role
- SCOPA should be positioned as an overall committee mandate to ensure effective public spending and financial management. In this way, SCOPA should take its rightful place as a parliamentary oversight committee to ensure effective oversight.
- The country's treasure register has already been directed to audit all the companies. The audit should result in ensuring that the appropriate mix of executive and non-executive directors are appointed and that directors have the necessary skills to guide the department.
- Emphasis in government appointments should be based on ethical and effective leader leadership.
- To have quarterly meeting with report that on procurement plan and strategic business objective aligned to the business objective and or annul plan of every public institution
- To recruited well skilled, experience and qualified executive management to ensure a better financial governance in public institution.
- Public officials should be trained on miss-financial management to improve the situational and the current financial support and accountability in the public institution
- SCOPA should ensure that department refrains from committing public funds on non-priorities objectives not aligned to annual performance plan of every public institutions
- The public official should be enforced and monitored on the implementation of SCOPA resolution within public institution

- SCOPA should establish and develop new policies that will strengthen the process of investigating the case of misused and fraud in the public institution.

6.6 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDIES

It is recommended that the same study be done on a larger scale covering all the nine provinces in South Africa. The study may also include international integration systems.

6.7 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The following section discuss the limitation of the study. Limitation of study are potential weakness in the study and are out of the researcher control. According to Arrow (2015), limitations of a research study are influences that the researchers cannot control. The limitations of this research study were:

- Respondents who did not complete their questionnaires on time due to busy schedules.
- Some respondents were not willing to disclose or give full departmental information.

6.8 THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY

The contribution of the study is quite necessary to explore the roles and responsibilities of the oversight body by analysing its effectiveness on holding government institutions accountable for their mandates. This study focused on strengthening decisions that are taken by the oversight bodies towards preservation of service delivery and utilisation of the public resources in accordance with the requirements of government policies and treasury instructions.

This study contributes on restoring the service delivery in Limpopo Province. The recommendations will also be shared with the legislature and the other Limpopo Provincial Department. In addition, the study will help the officials to take into consideration the SCOPA resolutions and recommendations. It will further help senior management of all provinces to develop and establish strategies based on financial management. This study will contribute towards the review of SCOPA

process, procedures, and strategies as well as on how to enforce accountability within public sector.

6.9 IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY

This study has implication for all the officials from the provincial department. The recommendations should be taken into consideration by all nation department provincial department as well as public entities.

6.10 CONCLUSION

The primary and literature findings were presented as well as recommendations that may be used to address the challenges. The desire for more accountable public services that provide greater value for money and meet rising expectations in terms of service performance, seems universal. Hence, “the primary function of the legislature, as the representative of the collective will of the people, is to hold the executive accountable through effective oversight process” (Fashgba, 2019:123). Thus, it is evident that the major functions of the legislature in any democratic state is the practice of oversight of the executive arm of government.

This entails the formal and informal, watchful, strategic, and structured scrutiny exercised by the legislators, in respect of the implementation of laws, the application for the budget and the strict observance of statutes and the Constitution (Legislative Sector in South Africa, 2012). Essentially, the true test of democracy is measured by the extent to which parliament ensures government remains accountable to the people by maintaining its oversight role of government’s actions. Otherwise, the realisation of government to deliver good quality services to the poor communities remains a challenge and a potential threat to state stability and security.

The role and functions of legislative oversight was challenged, and the developmental state was put under test. Consequently, the South African legislative oversight failed to hold the executive to account and, in the process, several ministers were implicated in facilitating or enabling state capture. It is evident throughout the study that oversight role of SCOPA is one of the major progressive mechanisms for change to regulate the misuse of public funds in South Africa. What

remains a challenge though is that, despite its existence, weak implementation of its role and function provides major opportunities for corruption to thrive. Due to the nature of the study, despite the written consent letters, certain public sector officials were uncomfortable to participate in the study for the fear of being exposed or found to be speaking on issues relating to financial mismanagement involving their institutions.

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Appendix A: Letter of Permission to Conduct the Study

Enquiries : Makgwathana P.A
Date : 23 August 2022
Tel : 015 284 7568
Cell : 082 622 1791

The Chairperson of SCOPA
Limpopo Provincial Legislature
Private Bag X9309
Polokwane
0700

REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT PHD RESEARCH

I Makgwathana Pheya Alfred working at Department of Public Work, Roads, and Infrastructure. I am student of Doctor of Administration at University of Limpopo.

I hereby requesting the permission to conduct research study at Limpopo Provincial Legislature.


I will be conducting the research study with the following topic: **THE EVALUATION ON PUBLIC ACCOUNT OVERSIGHT ROLE: THE CASE OF LIMPOPO PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE**

Hope you will find this in order

Your respond will be highly appreciated.

Makgwathana P.A

Date:



Limpopo Legislature

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

Physical address:

Lebowakgomo
Government Complex

Postal address:

Private Bag X 9309
Polokwane
0700

Enq: Dr Makhado RA
Cell: 0156338049 / 0827442988

Pheyaa Alfred Makgwathana [REDACTED]

Doctor of Public Administration

UNIVERSITY OF LIMPOPO

Sovenga

0727

24 August 2022

RE: REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT ACADEMIC STUDY


The above matters refers,

1. The Office of the Speaker kindly acknowledges receipt of your letter requesting to conduct academic research with the Members and staff of the Limpopo Legislature.
2. You are kindly informed that your request has been approved. This approval also authorise you to conduct interviews with the Members and staff of the Limpopo Legislature as well as access to public documents which might be relevant to your study.
3. Your topic "*The Evaluation of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts' Oversight Role and Purpose in Promoting Accountability: The Case of the Limpopo Provincial Legislature*" is essential in

strengthening accountability by the Executive. It will also contribute towards good governance within the provincial administration.

4. We look forward to your research outcomes, which we hope will benefit the institution in improving its oversight function.

Kind regards



.....
HON. MOLAPO RR
SPEAKER: LIMPOPO LEGISLATURE

Appendix B: Informed Consent

INFORMED CONSENT

, _____, hereby confirm that I:

1. Have been informed by the researcher, Pheyaa Alfred Makgwathana, about the nature, conduct, benefits, and risks of this study.
2. Have also received, read, and understood the Letter of Information regarding the study.
3. Have also been informed that the results of the study, including personal details required by the study will be anonymously processed into a study report.
4. Agree that the data collected during this study can be processed in a computerized system by the researcher.
5. Am aware and understand that I may, at any stage, without prejudice, withdraw my consent and participation in the study. Where I have had questions regarding the study, these have been answered by the researcher to my satisfaction.
6. Understand that significant new findings developed during this research that may relate to my participation will be made available to me.

Additional consent, where applicable

I hereby provide consent to:

- Audio-record my interview: YES/NO/NOT APPLICABLE
- Video-record my interview: YES/NO/NOT APPLICABLE

I declare that my participation in this study is entirely voluntary.

Appendix C: INTERVIEW GUIDE

FOCUS GROUP INTERVIEWS SCHEDULE

The researcher's central question was:

What is effectively performance of the oversight and accountability functions of the Limpopo provincial legislature?

The following probing questions are necessary to solicit responses on issues of public finance within the Limpopo provincial department. Participants are requested to elaborate on their responses:

In your view what is the role and purpose of SCOPA is to promote accountability in Limpopo legislature.

What are the process and procedures of SCOPA committees to prevent irregular, wasteful, and fruitless expenditure?

. Do you think the SCOPA resolution have positive impact in the public institution?
Please elaborate

In your experience do you thinking the Limpopo provincial required other independent institution to enforced accountability in terms of public finance.

In your opinion Limpopo provincial department are fully comply with legislative framework. Please elaborate

General probing question

In your experience, are there other aspects you can mention in relation to issues of financial in the Limpopo province that are not covered above? Please elaborate.

Thank you for your cooperation!

Appendix D: Editing Certificate



COPY-EDITING ENDORSEMENT

To whom it may concern,

This certifies that the doctoral thesis (excluding appendices) whose title appears below, has been edited for proper English language grammar, punctuation, spelling, and overall style. It remains the researcher's decision to effect the recommended changes.

TITLE

The Evaluation of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts' Oversight Role and Purpose in Promoting Accountability: A Case of the Limpopo Provincial Legislature

RESEARCHER

Pheyaa Alfred Makgwathana

DATE EDITED

02 February 2023

Signed

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'L. Nendauni', is written over a horizontal line.

Mr. L. Nendauni
Copyeditor
Nendauni Editing Hub
Cape Town
South Africa

Reg 2020 / 099423 / 07

Nendauni-Editing-Hub

Appendix E: Survey questionnaire

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

Respondent's code:

Questionnaire Instructions:

- Answer the questions as they relate to you. Check the box with the answer that is most applicable to you and mark with a cross (X) or by writing your opinion in the space provided.
- The researcher will protect the respondent's privacy, confidentiality, and anonymity.

Section A: Demographic Characteristics

A1: Gender of Respondent

Male	<input type="checkbox"/>	Female	<input type="checkbox"/>
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A2: Racial Status of Respondent

White	<input type="checkbox"/>
African	<input type="checkbox"/>
Indian	<input type="checkbox"/>
Coloured	<input type="checkbox"/>

A3: Age Grouping of Respondent

20 years and below	<input type="checkbox"/>
20 to 29 years	<input type="checkbox"/>
30 to 39 years	<input type="checkbox"/>
40 to 49 years	<input type="checkbox"/>
50 to 59 years	<input type="checkbox"/>
60 years' plus	<input type="checkbox"/>

A4: Highest Educational Qualification of Respondent

Matric	<input type="checkbox"/>
National Diploma	<input type="checkbox"/>
Degree	<input type="checkbox"/>
Honours Degree	<input type="checkbox"/>
Master's Degree	<input type="checkbox"/>
Doctorate	<input type="checkbox"/>

5: Department Location of Respondent

SCOPA	
Strategic Management and Archives	
Financial Management	
Portfolio Committee	
Corporate services	
Legal Services	

A6: Duration in Current Position of Respondent

Less than a year	
1 to 2 year	
3 to 5 years	
6 to 10 years	
10 years' plus	

Section B: To examine the effectiveness of the performance of the oversight and accountability function of the South African parliament
 This section was designed to examine the effectiveness of the performance of the oversight and accountability function of the South African parliament.

	1 = Strongly Disagree	2 = Disagree	3 = Neutral	4 = Agree	5 = Strongly Agree
Item	Statements				
	1	2	3	4	5
B1	The oversight is conducted effectively in South African Parliament				
B2	The parliament establish the effective process and procedures of oversight				
B3	The parliament have special mechanism for overseeing public sector institution				
B4	The legislature has an important role in ensuring horizontal accountability				
B5	The parliament systems for monitoring and overseeing government action				
B6	Parliament and legislative ensure accountability by checking the exercise of the executive power				
B7	Parliament and legislature ensure that legislative oversight is conducted very time and ensure that the government operate lawfully				
B8	The conduct of oversight on the organ of state is constitutionalized to ensure that executive remains accountable to the public				
B9	In south Africa the oversight and accountability are constitutionally mandate function of the legislature to scrutinize and oversee executive action				
10	The conduct of legislative oversight is effectively measure to counter corruption and the abuse of power				

Section C: To assess the impact of SCOPA and the strategic benefit in being chaired by marginal opposition rather than the official opposition.

This section is designed to assess the impact of SCOPA and the strategic benefit in being chaired by marginal opposition rather than the official opposition.

1 = Strongly Disagree	2 = Disagree	3 = Neutral	4 = Agree	5 = Strongly Agree					
Item	Statements				1	2	3	4	5
C1	SCOPA played an important role in holding the executive accountable								
C2	SCOPA is considered as tool in promoting accountability								
C3	SCOPA has responsibility for overseeing public expenditure of public funds								
C4	The SCOPA is introduced to deals with overseeing the public sector in the form of how public funds are used.								
5	The SCOPA committees are operating effectivity to prevent irregular, wasteful, and fruitless expenditure								
C6	The conduct of legislative oversight is effectively measure to counter corruption and the abuse of power								
C7	In south Africa the oversight and accountability are constitutionally mandate function of the legislature to scrutinize and oversee executive action								
C8	The SCOPA provides effective strategies and recommendation to sustain financial management within public sector								

Section D: To examine why the public sector is failing to act against officials involved in irregular expenditures and fraud.

This section is to examine why the public sector is failing to act against officials involved in irregular expenditures and fraud

1 = Strongly Disagree	2 = Disagree	3 = Neutral	4 = Agree	5 = Strongly Agree					
Item	Statements				1	2	3	4	5
D1	The officials in provincial public institution including that of the legislature administration follows the public finance management act and treasury regulation								
D2	The resolutions made by provincial SCOPA are implemented by the department officials								
D3									

	Considering the continuous problem of financial fraud and misconduct within public institution, SCOPA promote accountability					
4	The public always cruises SCOPA on service delivery experience from public institution due to lack and promotion of financial administration and usage by public institution					
D5	The oversight role and purpose of SCOPA is to promote accountability in Limpopo legislature public institution on financial management					
D6	The failure of incompetent, unqualified officials in financial management division and the generality of public institution constitutes the holistic collapse of public institution					
D7	The executive constitutes to discuss the findings as indicated d by SCOPA against public institution					
D8	The public officials who act on irregular, wasteful and fruitless expenditure, the department taken disciplinary steps against them					

Sction E: To explore mechanism to improve the current situation in support of accountability in the public sector.

This section was designed to explore mechanism to improve the current situation in support of accountability in the public sector

1 = Strongly Disagree	2 = Disagree	3 = Neutral	4 = Agree	5 = Strongly Agree					
Item	Statements	1	2	3	4	5			
E1	The confirmed case of financial fraud and corruption by public institution official are reported to South Africa police service and other law enforcement agencies								
E2	They are guilty convictions and sentence by court on public institution management officials and that at lower positions charged for financial mismanagement								
E3	Public officials are trained on miss-financial management to improve the situational and the current financial support and accountability in the public institution								
E4	To recruited well skilled, experience and qualified executive management to ensure a better financial governance in public institution								
E5	To have quarterly meeting with report that on procurement plan and strategic business objective aligned to the business objective and or annul plan of every public institution								
E6	To ensure that department refrains from committing public funds on non-priorities objectives not aligned to annual performance plan of every public institutions								
7	To promote economic and quality on procurement of goods and services on rotation of qualified supplies and register through Cipro to trade in legible for tax contribution								

E8	The public official should be enforced and monitored on the implementation of SCOPA resolution within public institution					
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Section F: Recommendations by Respondents

Finally, do you have any recommendations to make that would add value to this research study?

.....

Thank you for participating in this research study, it is much appreciated.

Appendix B: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

DNYAKISHISO

Nomoro ya sefetudi:

Ditaelo tja di putjisho:

- raba di putjisho goya le ka mokgwa wo di amanang le wena ka gona. Beya le swao ka gare ga lepokisi le o bonago gore Karabo ya gona e dumelana le dikgopolo tja gago goba o nwale di kgopolo tja gago.
- Monyakišiši o tlo tshireletja se tsebane sa moarabi.

Karolo ya A: Dika tja Dipalo-palo

A1: Gender of Respondent

Monn a		Mosadi	
-----------	--	--------	--

**A2: Mohlobo wa
moarabi**

Motho Mosweu	
Motho moso	
Moindia	
Motho wa mmala	

A3: Mongwega ka peyakantsho yaba arabi

Mengwaga ye 20 goba kafase	
Mengwaga ye 20 goya 29	
Mengwaga ye 30 goya 39	
Mengwaga ye 40 goya 49	
Mengwaga ye 50 goya 59	
60 ya Mengwaga oba gofeta	

A4: Seemo sa thuto sa moarabi

Marematlou	
Lengwalo la dipoloma	
Kgerata	
Kgerata ya godimo	
Kgerata ya godimo ya mastera	
Lengwalo la bongaka	

A5: Tshupa kgoro ya baarabi ba

SCOPA	
Ditiro tsa dipeakanyo le dipolokelo	
Ditirelo tsa masheleng ohwa le sets	
Tsa Molao	

A6: Seemo sa bjale sa baarabi

Kafase gangwaga	
1 goya 2 ya mengwaga	
3 goya 5 ya mengwaga	
6 goya 10 ya mengwaga	
10 ya mengwaga	

Karolo ya B: Go bona kgonagalo ya tshumiso ya boka theko le go tsea maikarabelo mo tshepidsong ya palament ya Afrika Borwa

1 = Ganetša Ka Matla	2 = Ganetša	3.Boemogare	4 = Dumela	5 = Dumela ka Matla					
Item	Statements				1	2	3	4	5
B1	Thlokomelo etjwa ka katlego parlamenteng ya afrika borwa								
B2	Palamente go								
B3	The parliament have special mechanism for overseeing public sector institution								
4	The legislature has an important role in ensuring horizontal accountability								
B5	Ditsamaišo tja palamente tja go beya leihlo le go hlokomela mesepešo ya mmusho.								
B6	Palamente le molao di netefatja boikarabelo ka go hlahloba perekisho ya matla								
B7	Palamente le lekgotla la tjamolao di netefatja gore hlokomelo ya molao e etjwa ka nako ye telele le go netefatja gore mmušo o latela molao								
B8	Boitshwaro ba bolebedi ba lekala la mmušo bo thekgilwe ke molaotheo go netefatja gore phethagatjo e dula e ikarabella go setshaba								
B9	Afrika Borwa, bolebedi le boikarabelo ke mmereko wa molaotheo wa lekgotla la ketjamolao go lebelela le go okamela tiro ya molaodi.								
B10	Boitšoaro ba tlhokomediso ya molao ke tekanyo ya matla ya go lwantsha bobodu le perekiso ye mpe ya matla.								

Karolo ya C: Go lekola tutuetšo ya SCOPA le maemo a go sebeiwe bjwalo ka šetšwe kganetšo ya se molao

1 = Ganetša Ka Matla	2 = Ganetša	3.Boemo gare	4 = Dumela	5 = Dumela ka Matla					
Item	Statements				1	2	3	4	5
C1	SCOPA e tjere karolo ya bohlokwa ya go neteftja gore molaodi								

	o be le maikarabelo.					
C2	SCOPA ke mokgatlo wa go netefatja maikarabelo					
C3	SCOPA e na le boikarabelo ba go hlokomela tshelete ya setšhaba					
C4	SCOPA e thoma go berekana le go okamela lekala la setshaba ka mokgwa wa rone na dichelete tja setshaba di berekisha bjang.					
D5	Dikomiti tja SCOPA di bereka ka katlego go thibela ditshenyegelo tja go se laolege.					
C6	Boitshwaro ba tlhokomedišo ya molao ke tekanyo ya matla ya go lwantsha bobodu le perekisho ye mpe ya matla					
C7	Afrika Borwa, bolebedi le boikarabelo ke mmereko wa molaotheo wa lekgotla la tja molao go hlahloba le go okamela ditiro tja phetagatjo					
C8	SCOPA e fana ka maano le di kgothaletša tja maleba go thekga taolo ya ditshetele ka gare ga lekala la setshaba					

Karorolo ya D: Go lekola lebaka la go thibela mmuso go tjeya mogato kgathlanong le babereki ba mmuso ba baleng ka gare ga bometswa ba thelete.

1 = Ganetša Ka Matla	2 = Ganetša	3.Boemo gare	4 = Dumela	5 = Dumela ka Matla					
Item	Statements	1	2	3	4	5			
D1	Bahlankedi ba setshaba sa provense go akaretša le ba tsamaisho ya lekhlotla la tjamolao ba latela molao wa di sepidisho ya ditshetele tja sechaba le taolo ya matlotlo.								
D2	Ditlamo tja go dira ke SCOPA sa provense di phetagatjwa ke bahlankedi ba lefapha								
D3	Ka lebaka la bothata ba go se fele ba bomenetjwa ba dichelete le boitshwaro bo bobe ka gare ga di karolo tja setshaba, SCOPA e godisa boikarabelo								
D4	Setshaba se dula se etela SCOPA mabapi le boiphihlelo ba phano ya sepeso go tjwa mekgatlong ya sechaba ka lebaka la go se felele le kgothaletso ya tsamaiso ya dichelete le perekisho ya karolo tja sechaba								
5	Karolo ya bolebedi le maikemishetjo a SCOPA ke ho kgothaletša boikarabelo lekgotleng la tja semolao karolo tja setshaba sa Limpopo mabapi le tsamaiso ya ditshetele.								
D6	Go palelwa gwa balaodi ba sa berekeng, tja go hloka mgwalo a thuto ya tsamaiso ya dichelete le kakaretso ya karolo tja setshaba, ke go phuhlamiša bo bogolo ba lekgotla la sechaba.								
D7	Balaodi ba boledishana ka di nyakishiso tja SCOPA kgathlanong le mokgatlo wa setshaba								
D8	Lekala le ile la tjeya magato kgathlanong the ba bereki ba setshaba ba bailego bonwa molato ka bomenetša								

Karolo ya E: Go lebelela ditsela tja go tiyishetja maikarabelo ka gare ga mmuso.

1 = Ganetša Ka Matla	2 = Ganetša	3.Boemo gare	4 = Dumela	5 = Dumela ka Matla							
Item	Statements	1	2	3	4	5					
E1	Melato ya bometsa ba tshelete le bogilego ka mekgatlo y aba setshaba e ile ya tsebiswa go SAPS le mekgatlo e mengwe ya go tishetja molao										
E2	Go na le dikathlolo tja kgoro ya tsheko go ba bereki ba setshaba ba go bonwa molato ka bo menetsa ba tshelete										
E3	Babereki ba mmuso ba rutiwa go berekiswa gampe ga tshelete ele go tiyishetja boikarabelo ba tshelete go mekgatlo ya setshaba										
4	Go hira balaodi ba go rutega go tiyisetsha perekisho ye botse ya tshelete ka mekgatlo ya setshaba										
E5	Go ba le kopana ya kotare go fana ka pego bothlale ba mano a perekisho ya dikgwebo le pereko ya mekgalo ya setshaba.										
E6	Go netefatja gore lefapha la mmuso ga le berekishi tshelete mo a sa swanelang go bereka gona.										
E7	Go hlatloša tša boiphedišo le theko ya dinyakwa tja maemo go barekishi ba go swanegela ba go ngwadiša le CIPRO.										
E8	Bashomedi ba Mmuso ba swanetse gogapeletswa le go lebelela tswelletso ya dikutullo tsa SCOPA kagare ga Mmuso										

Karolo ya F: kgothaletšwa tja

Moarabi

Mafelelong, onale kakanyo efe goba efe yeo akadirang difarolognyo mo dinyakisisong tsa thuto ye?

.....

Onagana gore ke eng se seka diriwang go netefatja gore bashumi ba mmuso babe le maikarabelo goya le ka mokgwa wo tshelete ya setshaba e berekishwang ka gona?

.....

Onagana gore balaodi ba masheleng le dihlogo tsa dikarololwana tsa mafapha mmusong baswanetse go ithutela tsa goshomisa maseleng a mmuso, ge gole bjale ke _____ ka lebaka laeng _____ o _____ nagana _____ bjale?

.....

.....

.....

.....

Ke leboga go tseyeng karalo ya gago mo dinyakisisong tse, go itumetse kudu.