A HISTORICAL EXPLORATION OF THE INTERNAL FACTORS IN
THE FALL OF THE APARTHEID SYSTEM:
THE CASE OF LEBOWA BANTUSTAN.
1970-1994

BY

AMOS PHEEHA MOKGAWA

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SUPERVISOR: Dr A V Dhliwayo 

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DECLARATION

I , A. P. Mokgawa and the undersigned hereby declare that this dissertation is my own work and that it has never been submitted in part or in at this full or any other University or academic institution for the proposed degree. I therefore, accept full responsibility for the statements and the conclusions drawn therein.

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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my family first: (Wife, Daughter and Son) Regina, Phillys and Freddy. They have always been supportive in my relentless endeavour to produce this text which has, in many instances, removed and separated me from them.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I have not made this historical text, I have written it. I have depended on primary and secondary sources; documents, books, audio recorded statements, archival and oral tradition. Without these, the writing of this dissertation would not been possible. The bibliography at the end of the text crowns it all.

I have also been privileged enough to meet and talk to those involved in one way or another in the Bantustan politics in general and of Lebowa in particular. Nelson Ramodike, the last of the Lebowa Bantustan Chief Ministers (1987-1994), I.E.K Moloko the School Inspector who became Member of the Lebowa Legislative Assembly from 1972, Dr Aron Motswaledi who became the icon of Democratic Movement and facilitated the formation of the progressive Teachers Union, The Northern Transvaal Teachers Union (NOTTU). Prominent Leaders of NOTTU and ultimately SADTU, the likes of Machike Thobejane, Ramaloko, Koti Nyama, Elias Mahoai, Sello Lediga, Benjamin Mphiko and many others provided tested and authentic information on the nature and form of the struggle against apartheid and Bantustans in the Northern Transvaal. Thobela FM also allowed me to gain access to its archival materials (recorded speeches); and the radio station librarian, Mr Ngoasheng heartily welcomed me into the library.

The writing of this historical text and the research program took place under the guidance and supervision of Dr A V DHLIWAYO of the School of Social Sciences at the University of Limpopo. I acknowledge his contribution to my success in this research work.

A P. MOKGAWA
PREFACE

The history of Apartheid, and its culmination in Separate Development and the division of blacks into ethnic homelands has not been fully explored by historians. One can hardly find a well-researched and written text on the history of any of the ten ethnic homelands (Bantustans) created by the National Party of South Africa in the early 1970s. In this regard, the writing of this text is therefore an attempt to bring to the historical surface the internal factors in the demise of Bantustans; with Lebowa as a case study. The internal political factors in the fall of the Lebowa Bantustan is the main concern of this exploratory study.

This study is a text of six chapters. Chapter One deals with the historiographical issues, covering the background and the statement of the problem. It also outlines the methodology applied in the writing of this text and the historiographical location of the author, Afrocentricity. Theoretical frameworks of other historians in the writing of the South African historical themes are also outlined in this Chapter.

Chapters Two and Three deal with the establishment of and opposition to Lebowa Bantustan and the economic basis in that Homeland politics in the White South Africa that led to the establishment of Bantustans as places to settle Africans that the Whites classified as superfluous appendages; the aged, the disabled, widows and women with dependent children.

The chapters outline forced removals of Africans who hitherto bought farms in the areas designated white, by the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts, into the already overpopulated Bantustans and imposing on them, carefully selected Magoshi to govern them through a Homeland Legislative Assembly with limited powers. The logic of the trend was to render Africans aliens in their mother country and guest workers in the so-called ‘white’ South Africa. In these chapters observation is
made of reaction by Lebowa; rejection of independence and confrontational
debates in the Legislative assembly against the State especially around the land
issue (Land consolidation, Land expropriation) and inter homeland border
disputes between Lebowa, Gazankulu and Kwa-Ndebele.

Chapter Four deals with the political and economic reactions of the affected
Africans in Lebowa and elsewhere in the country; marking 1976 as the beginning
of violent confrontation against apartheid. The chapter also covers youth
participation in the liberation struggle and the organisational role of the United
Democratic Front to mobilise the masses to confront apartheid and its
institutions. It also covers paradigm shift in the mind of South Africa and the
ultimate lifting of the ban on African political movements and the release of
political prisoners in 1990. This symbolised the fall of Apartheid and its
institutions like Lebowa Bantustan.

Chapter five deals with the Mass Democratic Movements, mobilisation of the
masses and the role of unionism in the Northern Transvaal; especially teacher
unions and the pressure they exerted on Lebowa to adjust her compass to the
new direction. Lebowa Bantustan’s relation to and participation in the
Convention for Democratic South Africa (Codesa) and her final extinction
through a new democratic ballot in April 1994 is also covered in this chapter.
‘Lebowans’ were restoring their rightful identity as Africans; thus jettisoning
Cornelius Mulder statement in 1978 that ‘there will not be one Black man with
South African citizenship.’ Lebowa became an integral part of New South Africa
and together with Gazankulu, Venda and part of Kwa-Ndebele formed a new
Northern Province in 1994.
CHAPTER ONE

HISTORIOGRAPHICAL ISSUES

1. 1 INTRODUCTION

Lebowa Homeland was a “self-governing” black ethnic territory created by the racist Afrikaner Broederbond-controlled National Party (NP) and imposed on the Northern Sotho speaking people in the then Northern Transvaal. It firstly started as a Territorial Authority in 1962 and remained as such until 1972 when it was proclaimed a self governing Homeland. It consisted of a hierarchical blocks of Tribal Authorities headed by Chiefs which in modern terms are called Traditional Leaders. The fear of black majority rule in a possible multiracial united South Africa made the NP in the 1948 election propaganda to warn the whites of black peril ‘swart gevaar’. Blacks were therefore to be divided into ethnical groups and relocated into geographical enclaves in order to reduce them to a series of separate minorities. The primary objective, inter alia, was to entrench and perpetuate white supremacist rule by weakening and dividing the colonised African population into ethnic units. The ultimate aim was to shepherd these units into independent states, depriving blacks of citizenship in a white South Africa. On February 8, 1978 Dr Cornelius Mulder, the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development said:

‘If our policy (separate development) is taken to its conclusion, there will not be a black man with South African citizenship. There will be no longer moral obligation on our Parliament to accommodate these people politically’

1. Interview with I.K.E. Moloko, Lonsdale, 17-08-2006.
3. A.L Moleah, South Africa: Colonialism, Apartheid and Dispossession, p.433.
The policy of separate development and its’ culmination in the homeland system was therefore not a just course for a black man. It was a cosmetic policy for a cosmetic promulgation of laws that would render an African, black in particular, alien in the cosmic space of his birth. He would as a result have no South African citizenship and therefore no right to live in it. Ten ethnic units were created; with overlapping and convoluted boundaries which turned the map of South Africa into a kind of jig-saw-puzzle.\(^5\)

Bantustans such as Transkei, Bophutatswana Venda and Ciskei accepted independence. Lebowa, the subject for this study, remained to its end what, in apartheid language, was called a “self-governing” territory. Never was it Lebowa policy to opt for independence at any given time. The price to pay for the denouncement of independence chilled both Dr CN Phatudi and his successor N M Ramodike to their marrows. The Story of Moutse land dispute, for instance must be traced back to Lebowa rejection of independence and Pretoria taking punitive measures to force Lebowa into a hollow independent Bantustan. In one of the legislative assembly sessions Phatudi said it in no uncertain terms that the policy of Lebowa, inter alia, has always been to use her legislative house to fight apartheid.\(^6\)

By the time Lebowa was created in the 1970s opposition to apartheid had reached fever pitch. It is thus reasonable to argue that the Bantustans were still-born. It should be remembered that the African National Congress (ANC) was formed in 1912 to fight against white supremacist rule in South Africa and occupied a central position in African liberation movement. So the arrest of its(ANC) activists should be viewed in the light

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of an attempt by whites to safe-guard their racial supremacy over blacks. The famous Soweto Uprising of 1976 which mobilised workers and students to crush apartheid constituted a significant landmark. The 1980s and the first two years of the 1990s were marked by the mass mobilisation of the oppressed Africans in a Herculean struggle against a system which the international community had branded a crime against humanity.\(^7\) With hindsight it would appear that the racist engineered Bantustan system was already collapsing while it was still on the drawing boards of the Broederbond. When Mandela was released from prison at 4:26 p.m. on 11 February 1990 the apartheid –the Broederbond racist adventure was literally dead.\(^8\) Today, what used to be Lebowa Homeland is an integral part of a liberal democratic South Africa. However, the actual internal political, economic and socio-cultural dynamics which contributed to the collapse of Lebowa have not been thoroughly researched by South African historians. This is why this study is exploratory. The intention of this research is to begin to lay some groundwork for thorough historical investigations in future.

### 1.2 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

The apartheid system, of which Lebowa Bantustan was a major component, created multiple divisions and oppressions among the people of South Africa. Racial hatred and rage is still the order of the day in many corners of the country. In Limpopo for instance people still see themselves as Vendas, Shangaans. Pedis, Ndebeles, Tswanas and white first and South African nationals after. If all these ethnic attitudes and emotions were to be recounted and described, countless books would be produced.

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The establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910 should be viewed as the establishment of white South Africa that placed blacks at the socio-cultural, economic and political peripheries, and the 1913 Native Land Act is counted among a plethora of Acts that were passed to realise white supremacy. The 1913 Native Land Act was not a farmer’s bill to protect the white farmers from African encroachment; it was a labour bill to force Africans into white farms, mines and industrial establishments as cheap labourers. According to that Act all Africans across ethnic divides were to share 7.6 percent of the land in South Africa. This was increased to 12.9 percent through the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act while the remaining 88.1 percent was for whites. The Act was rejected from the onset by the majority of the African people but it however, kick-started the evolution of the Homeland system that surfaced in the early 1970s. Moorcraft called Homelands sophisticated concentration camps wherein blacks were subjected to all manner of political, economic and socio-cultural indignities.

The Bantustans were based on a number of Acts passed by the NP from the 1950s; all of which linked to the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts. The 1951 Bantu Authority Act and the 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-government Act respectively, led to the establishment, in 1962, of the Lebowa Territorial Authority. In 1971, the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act was passed to give Lebowa a “self-governing” status. Urban Africans were also to be identified with one homeland or another through the promulgation of the 1970 Bantu Homeland Citizenship Act. While that was happening, Black

African liberation movements; the ANC, the Communist Party of South Africa which was later renamed the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Pan African Congress (PAC) were suppressed or banned. Their activists were banished, sent to exile or sentenced to life imprisonment. The whole notion of the Bantustan system was an imposition which could only succeed by suppressing its antagonists. It was therefore vehemently rejected and counteracted until its ultimate collapse in 1994.  

Apartheid and the Bantustan system were not simply a question of segregation laws, political institutions and structures, land laws and acts. Apartheid penetrated deep into the minds and psyche of all the people of South Africa. Some people in Lebowa were beginning to call themselves Lebowans thus jettisoning the pan-African nationalism which the liberation movement was spear-heading. Ethnic identity rather than national identity was becoming entrenched. Even if one had been born in Johannesburg and built a house in one of the townships there, “home” continued to be regarded as the rural area or Bantustan where one’s ancestors were born. Rumblings of ethnic favouritism were heard on the job market. Even in higher institutions of learning, key positions have not escaped the cloud of ethnicity.

There are also rumblings of ethnicity in our major political parties. The mass media is awash with claims by supporters of one or other dismissed or disgraced civil servant or politician that ethnicity was the main cause.

13. Interview with: S. Lediga, Polokwane, 2006-9-30
14. Ibid.
It would appear that the liberal ideology which structures our system or communist ideology which identifies people in terms of their class position in a historically evolved mode of production have not sunk any roots in our society ten years after the inauguration of what some South Africans claim was the most liberal democratic system in the world. The question of the role of “traditional” leaders who were central pillars in the apartheid system continued to plague the new democratic dispensation.

The succession problem in Sekhukhuneland threatens political stability there. The Ralushai Commission appointed by former premier Ramathlodi seems to have failed to resolve the problem. The issue has now been taken over by the national government with the appointment of yet another commission, the Nlhapo commission, instituted by President Thabo Mbeki. It’s reported that it is still pending. 17

The legacy of apartheid seems to continue to haunt, not only the Limpopo Province which has incorporated the former Lebowa Bantustan, but the whole country. The demise of Lebowa and what this entity represented is an issue not only of local concern but also of national concern. While international and external factors certainly played a role in the final collapse of this entity the local or internal dynamics were potent. These have to be researched thoroughly to determine and clearly grasp their nature, form and content; and also their strengths and limitations with regard to the vision of a liberated South Africa and Thabo Mbeki’s vision of African Renaissance.


1.3 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

As a political entity and its institutions and structures, Lebowa no longer exists. The elections of 1994, the interim constitution of 1993 and the current liberal democratic constitution inaugurated in 1996 have ensured this. What is not thoroughly and critically historically known is the political, economic, and socio-cultural factors, internal to Lebowa, which contributed to the process of its’ demise. To elaborate on this; the actual nature of the content and form of these forces or factors, particularly their strengths and shortcomings are not thoroughly known. This is the problem that constitutes the core of this study. It is, in short, the problem which might explain some of the major concerns mentioned in the previous section.

1.4 AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

1.4.1 Aim

The aim of the study is to provide an historical understanding of the internal political factors which contributed to the demise of the apartheid-created Lebowa Bantustan.

1.4.2 Objectives

- To identify and describe the internal political factors which led to the demise of Lebowa; Political mobilisation by political parties, role of the youth, defection of Traditional Leaders to liberation struggle etc.

- To identify and describe the internal economic factors which shaped the politics of Lebowa and her collapse.
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This study is being conducted at a time when South Africans are confronting the inhuman legacy of apartheid rule of the past. Transformation and the deepening of democracy demands that South Africans acquire a critical understanding of what has to be transformed. Our past. Those who do not critically learn from their past are likely to repeat its mistakes. This is what captures the significance of this study. The understanding of the past which will result from this study will be used to further the aim of transformation.

1.6 ASSUMPTION

Very serious and antagonistic political and economic contradictions within Lebowa contributed to its' collapse.

1.7 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The research questions derive from the discussion of the background of the problem and the statement of the problem itself. The following is the main question of this study:

1.7.1 Major Research Question

What were the political factors internal to the Lebowa Bantustan which led to its demise?

1.7.2 Subsidiary Questions

- What were the internal political factors which led to the demise of Lebowa Bantustan?
What were the internal economic forces which precipitated the demise of Lebowa Bantustan?

1.8 LITERATURE REVIEW

This study is exploratory because hardly any serious historical study exists which focuses on factors internal to Lebowa which led to its demise. Traditional historians, particularly of the Rankean School which emerged in nineteenth century, do not feel comfortable examining very contemporary events. Ranke believed that the duty of a historian was to show how it actually was. To realise this duty, he argued, it was necessary to be detached from the events being described. This was what was called empirical objectivism. If the events being described were too close and near in time, as in the case of this study, then bias would be unavoidable. The historian’s duty to tell the truth would be compromised. Most historians have come to prefer studying events which happened a long time ago, preferably more than fifty to sixty years ago. The ideas of Ranke are still respected in South African historiography. However, the Rankean view has of late been challenged. Jekins completely reject such views and argues that truth is, in any case, not attainable. Historians cannot, according to him, do away with bias because they always operate within the context of paradigms, cultures and assumptions which influence the way they look at the past. It is therefore legitimate to deal with contemporary events as long as historians clearly articulate the location, position and framework which influence their interpretations of data.

While there is no serious historical study available specifically on the internal factors which account for the demise of Lebowa, there are studies which deal with the fall of Bantustans in general, particularly as this relates to the intensification of the liberation movement and the change of policy
of the National Party when she realised that apartheid as conceived by her ideologues in the 1950’s was not sustainable anymore. A few of these works would be reviewed first.

Davenport, a well known liberal historian, deals with the problems of the lack of sustainability of what he calls the Homelands. Liberal historians, like their political science counterparts, have been generally hostile to the apartheid system as conceived by the Broederbond, since this system did not allow the flourishing of fundamental liberal principles such as the freedom of the individual, conscience, speech and others. In his study, Davenport clearly brought out the intensity of black opposition to the establishment of Homelands spearheaded in the 1980’s by the United Democratic Front (UDF) in all Homelands.

His view is that the Homeland policy, whose main objective was the granting of independence to ten ethnic units, faced opposition because most politically aware Blacks saw the policy as a form of denationalisation. He also mentions the role of trade union federations such as the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) and later the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) which was formed in 1985. The active role of the Black Consciousness Movement and the Azanian People’s Organisation(AZAPO) in mobilising the oppressed masses in the struggle against apartheid is also mentioned. AZAPO was portrayed as a radical movement because at its conference in Hammanskraal , north of Pretoria in June 1983, it advocated that the black working class should set up a democratic anti-racist worker’s republic where the interests of the workers shall be paramount through worker control of the means of production, distribution and exchange.18

The African National Congress (ANC) was portrayed as ideologically moderate and its participation in what he called South African public affairs after its banning in 1960, as “obscure”. His view is that the ANC, operating from exile, was largely ineffective. Its operations such as the bombing of the Air Force headquarters in Pretoria in 1983 were “acts of terror”. He, however, observes that because of the success of the South African military interception of its operatives, the ANC came to depend less on “acts of terror” but increasingly on the promotion of mass action spearheaded by the UDF and COSATU. He seemed inclined towards the view that it was the pressure of the internal mass movement rather than the ANC, operating from exile, which was most effective in putting apartheid on the defensive.

Students’ school boycotts, particularly after the Soweto uprising of 1976, protestant churches, who, in the 1980’s onwards started to disobey laws on the racial segregation of their congregations; bus boycotts and other forms of popular resistance are also mentioned as factors which led to the collapse of Apartheid and the Homeland system.

Perhaps, of more critical relevance for this study which Davenport mentions were the divisions and cracks within the “traditional” leadership who constituted the main pillar of the Homeland system. He pointed out that some traditional leaders like those in Transkei, Venda, Ciskei and Bophuthatswana accepted “independence” on South Africa’s terms. They accepted these blindly without either preserving South African citizenship for their subjects or gaining international recognition as sovereign states, or achieving territorial frontiers which satisfied them. Others such as those in Lebowa, Gaznkulu and Kwazulu rejected it.

19. Ibid., p.413.
That in itself led to the weakening of the whole system of separate development. There were also divisions within the royal families of some Homelands. The most notorious division occurred in Transkei where Kaizer Matanzima was pitted against paramount chief of the Thembu Sabata Dalindyebo. Sabata fled to Zambia where he contacted the ANC. In addition to these chiefly rulers' divisions, the scourge of ethnicity is mentioned. In Bophuthatswana, for instance, the majority Tswana were pitted against the minority Sotho and Ndebele. All these cracks further weakened the system.

Davenport also mentions the lack of economic viability and poverty of the residents of the homelands. Money to run the governments came from Pretoria. Homeland residents were poor. This led to their restlessness and general lack of support for the system. There was general instability in the country and commotion within the ruling party. All these factors led the homeland policy to collapse in disarray by the late 1980’s.

Pretoria was beginning to see the limitations of its policy at this time and started to exercise flexibility on matters such as “independence” and the question of citizenship. There was an urgent need of reforms in the country. This led to divisions within the National Party itself, particularly on matters of constitutional reform. The writing was on the wall for Pretoria. The weakening of the National Party made it amenable to negotiations with ANC in 1985. P.W. Botha also initiated secret talks with Nelson Mandela on 6 July 1989.

22. Ibid., pp. 421, 429-438.
P.W. Botha resigned as leader on 14 August 1989. F.W. de Klerk took over setting the stage for the release of Mandela and the unbanning of Black political parties in 1990. That set the stage for negotiations.

Thompson, also a liberal historian, covers the same issues identified by Davenport as leading to the collapse of the apartheid system. An issue which Thompson discusses, which is crucial for understanding the demise of the homelands, is the beginning of negotiations in December 1991 when 228 delegates from nineteen political organisations, including parties from all ten homelands met at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) at the World Trade Centre near Johannesburg's airport. Thompson observes that the main burden of the negotiations was carried by the ANC and the National Party (NP). Roelf Meyer (NP) and Cyril Ramaphosa (ANC) were central to the articulation of the key issues negotiated. Several principles which rang the death knell of the homelands were agreed upon at the beginning of the negotiations. These were; a new constitution that would provide for universal adult suffrage, a bill of rights that included civil and political rights, an independent judiciary with power to declare legislation unconstitutional; and the elimination of the homeland governments and the re-incorporation of their territories into a new set of regions. It is the last principle which destroyed the homelands. However, Thompson notes that the NP tried to ensure the maintenance of white power by advocating for the creation of federal states with “vast and irremovable powers”. On the part of the homelands, two showed some resistance to the ANC’s advocacy of a unitary state. Those were Kwazulu, whose leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi

25. Ibid., p.248.
26. Ibid.
refused to join the CODESA and Lucas Mangope who insisted that his Bophuthatswana should retain its “independence”. However, the resistance of the people led to the collapse of the Mangope regime. Buthelezi was later persuaded to join a new government of national unity. The 1993 Interim Constitution and the 1994 elections had put an end to the apartheid system and homelands. Judge Johan Kriegler, chairman of the Independent Electoral Commission, declared that the 1994 elections were “substantially free and fair” and the major parties decided not to challenge the results.27 Omer-Cooper elaborates on the phases or stages of apartheid that culminated in the Bantustans. The first phase called classical or baaskap (white supremacy) lasted from 1948 to 1961. During this period the NP adopted a legal frame that made it possible to pass legislation that made white supremacy a reality. Separate development was the second phase of apartheid in which, according to Broederbond, peaceful co-existence with Africans would prevail. It was an attempt by the NP to adapt to the winds of change as advised by Harold Macmillan in 1960. It is out of this Separate Development framework that the Bantustans evolved. Omer-Cooper brings in what he called multiracial co-option as the final phase towards the ultimate collapse of apartheid and its institutions. Most important in Omer-Cooper is the rise of African nationalism and resistance to apartheid in all its forms and modifications. The banning of the ANC, PAC, and SACP is also covered. Omer-Cooper also focuses on the Soweto uprising in 1976 and the impact it had on the South African socio-cultural and political changes including the collapse of Bantustans.28

The issues identified above by the three historians; divisions within the ruling National Party, cracks in the ruling traditional authorities of the homelands, the rise of African Nationalism, popular opposition by the

27. Ibid., p.354.
Mass Democratic Movement coordinated by the UDF and the trade unions, student boycotts, the 1976 Soweto uprising and poverty, as accounting for the collapse of apartheid internally, appear in other general studies, though with differing emphases. Van Kessel and Oomen, for instance, view the formation of the Congress of Traditional Leaders (CONTRALESAs) as very critical in the collapse of the Bantustans. This group of traditional leaders was formed in Johannesburg in 1987 with the express purpose of eradicating the Bantustan system. They visited Lusaka to offer their support to the ANC. Van Kessel and Oomen argue that this was critical in the collapse of Bantustans because a group which was supposed to act as the main pillar in the survival of the system had defected to the liberation movement. 29

This defection considerably weakened the system. It must be remembered that the Nationalist ideologues, in creating Bantustans, had depended largely on the loyalty of the traditional leadership. The total rejection of Bantustans by some traditional leaders was bound to weaken the confidence of the Broederbond in the success of its project. It would also weaken and reduce the legitimacy of the project in the eyes of the rural populace; a situation which would embolden this populace in the struggle against apartheid. Graaf puts more emphasis on the lack of economic viability of Bantustans. He observes that none of them had a reserve bank and controlled money supply. Bantustans depended upon Pretoria. Worden puts more emphasis on incessant violence precipitated by resistance of Bantustan residents who were opposed to the iron rule of the traditional leaders. From the 1980’s onwards this leadership could only keep itself in power through their local armies which were aided by the South African Defence Force. Johnson and Magubane also tackle the important issue of black opposition to Bantustans.

They, for instance, cite the example of Lebowa citizens in Soweto. It must be remembered that the Bantu Homeland Citizenship Act of 1970 had decreed that all urban Africans were to become citizens of one Bantustan or another. To Sowetans, black homelands meant balkanisation of South Africa and deprivation of Africans of their South African citizenship. Therefore the blacks refused to leave Soweto for the homelands as was expected by the NP government. They were doing just the opposite; leaving the homelands and heading for Soweto. That symbolised the African rejection of homelands. The homelands were nothing but encampments; people were arrested and forced to stay there. 30 Johnson and Magubane clearly capture the developments in Soweto schools that culminated into the June16, 1976 uprising. The killing of the thirteen-year old Hector Peterson and many other black children from 16 to 17 June 1976 created resentments in all corners of South Africa including the established homelands. The year 1976, therefore, marked a turning point in the struggle against apartheid and its institutions.31 Moocraft has focused on Pretoria’s militarism which emerged as a strategy to combat African resistance to Apartheid policy. During the late 1980s white farming areas in the northern Transvaal suffered more grievously from depopulation. Those depopulated areas were targeted for infiltration by guerrillas. The South African Defence force was deployed to reinforce the commando system. The bits and pieces of various homelands which had their own autonomous security forces also created problems of coordination, showing a weakness in defence. Homelands, which were originally seen as the solution to the apartheid dilemma were thus part of the problem. Poverty, unemployment, acute soil erosion, land dispossession, corruption turned the independent and non-independent

31. Ibid., pp. 61-62.
Bantustans into hotbeds of discontent and further breeding grounds for radical discontents. Moocraft’s study provides the groundwork on which this study can take-off. Bantustans, provides a devastating condemnation of these entities thus showing clearly why they could not survive. He observed that most Africans suffered from poverty, but that the poverty of those in the rural Moleah, although he does not deal specifically with the actual fall of areas and, particularly, in the Bantustans was grinding. While 30 per cent of African households in the urban areas were below the poverty level, the figure rose to 83 per cent in 1987. He further observed that the inhuman misery that Africans suffered in the Bantustans was a function of more than low income or lack of income but was compounded by lack of access to essentials such as fuel, transport, food, water supplies and health.

He further observes that Bantustans, right up to their collapse in 1994, were sources of cheap black labour for white controlled factories, mines and farms. They were also dumping grounds for those discarded or unwanted in the white areas. He also paints a dire picture of landlessness and overcrowding in the Bantustans. This overcrowding was worsened by forced removals from white areas. He cites chilling figures of overcrowding created by forced removals. The population of KwaNdebele climbed from 50,000 in 1975 to an estimated 250,000 in 1981; QwaQwa, from 24,000 in 1975 to between 200,000 and 300,000 in 1980. All these made agricultural activity not viable. In Lebowa which is the focus of this study, Bothashoek in 1980 accommodated 3,600 families on 160 morgen; which was calculated in 1951 reported to be able to support only 200 families on a sub-economic basis. Bantustans were therefore entities designed to achieve the worst

33. A.T. Moleah, p.454
34. Ibid.
dehumanisation of the Africans.  

While this literature does not provide us with detailed critical analysis of the internal factors in the collapse of each Bantustan, the data provided constitute an important foundation on which this study can take off. With the exception of the study by Moleah, most of the studies tend to be Eurocentric. The use of the term “homelands” for “Bantustans” by Davenport and Thompson implicitly implied some form of acceptance of the system created by the Broederbond. By using this term one implies that the only homes for Africans were these entities. Johannesburg and Durban could therefore not be regarded as homes even by Africans who were born there. Furthermore Thompson uses the terms “terrorist acts” to refer to the ANC military attack of targets such as the Pretoria Air Force Base. This implies that the ANC practised terrorism to achieve their objectives. The use of such terms is to view African historical activity from the perspective of the European rulers of South Africa. A new perspective is required if the history of the African is not to continue to be distorted.

1.9 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The dominant theoretical frameworks which have structured the production of South African history are familiar to most practising South African professional historians. Smith have analysed and critiqued the main schools of South African historiography. He identified several trends, but it would however appear that three schools have become dominant. These are the Afrikaner, English liberal and African nationalist schools. Before these are critiqued, it might be pertinent to briefly describe the less influential trends. The Settler School focused mainly on the interests of the white settlers. The school hardly tackled the interests

and activities of the Africans. The school was critical of the activities and policies of the British imperialist rulers. The imperial school celebrated the role of the British Empire in spreading Euro-Christian civilisation to African barbarians. Settlers were occasionally portrayed as obstructionists and impediments to the harmonious spread of European civilisation by provoking wars with natives and with each other, as in the case of the clash and conflict between the Dutch and English settlers. These two schools have lost influence in South African historiography. In fact they have largely been assimilated into the Afrikaner and liberal schools.  

The other minor school in South Africa is the marxist approach. This approach derives its ideas and notions from Karl Marx and F Engels who are the originators of dialectical materialism. In the context of South African history, as Smith observes, he focuses on the development of capitalism and the resultant class formation and class struggles which he argues, constituted the motor of history. All racial groups in South Africa played their role in history as either capitalists or workers. Processes of class formation among Africans are dealt with. This is one of the advantages of this approach which the other schools do not have. Other approaches tend not to mention Africans. Where Africans are mentioned they tend to describe them as either lacking in initiative or as a people whose culture and ideology were dysfunctional to the development of civilisation or capitalism. The Marxist approach could not sink any roots in South Africa. The Broederbond viewed communism as enemy number one. Marxist historians could only write and teach outside South Africa.  

37. Ibid.
1.9.1 The Afrikaner School

The Afrikaner school was developed mainly by Afrikaner historians whose main ideology was Christian nationalism. They focused mainly on Afrikaner activity and events such as the Great Trek, the Boer Wars and the creation of Afrikaner republics such as the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. These events, particularly the creation of Boer controlled states, were viewed as God-ordained. They viewed themselves as Christian guardians of primitive Africans.

The British and the Protestant missions were denounced and hated as protectors of African cattle thieves. The history of South Africa is portrayed as the history of Afrikaners. This approach cannot in any way be regarded as African history, since to them Africans contributed nothing worthwhile in the development of South Africa. This framework will therefore not be used in this study which focuses mainly on activities of the African people of the former Lebowa Bantustan.

1.9.2 The Liberal School

This school is slightly different. History is viewed as the interaction of the Bantu, Boer and Briton. The Briton is however put at the centre of history. The Briton is regarded as the humanising leader in the uncivilised and backward South Africa. The African is still viewed as barbaric but has the capacity to develop to the level of the Englishman in some vague future. Capitalist development and the spread of British culture are viewed as progressive. The violence which accompanies this process was a necessary evil since African culture had to be destroyed. The idea of development based on African culture was anathema to liberal historians. Liberal history was Eurocentric and therefore inappropriate for this study.
1.9.3 African Nationalist History

African nationalist history, a product of what Temu and Swai have termed the post-1945 historiographical revolution, developed in the wake of the rise of African nationalism, the African anti-colonial struggle and the coming to power of the Western educated elite in Africa. African nationalist history has been criticised for borrowing European concepts and theories of change. African nationalism has generally accepted European models of what it means to be human. Educated in European Universities and colonial schools in Africa, African Nationalists have tended to assimilate European notions of what it means to be civilised; to act in a civilised manner. Rational action is defined in Weberian terms; terms distilled mainly out of the study of the European capitalist actor. This approach distorts the activity, particularly of the indigenous pre-capitalist actor who looked at the world differently as will be shown below. The only merit of this approach is that the African is now viewed as an actor who resisted, rebelled and took over state power from the European colonial ruler.

1.9.4 The Afro-centric Approach

This is the approach and theory which structures this study. In Africa it is scholars such as Diop and Obenga who have done much to articulate Afrocentricity. They believe in the efficacy of African culture and values in the modernisation of Africa. Diop and Obenga have demonstrated that civilisation and philosophy have their origins in Black African Pharaonic Egypt and not in Europe. In fact according to them Greek philosophers such as Socrates, Plato and Aristotle studied in Egypt. However the scholar who has done the most in articulating Afro-centricity and applying it to the production of history is Asante, an African-American scholar.
Afro-centricity is defined as a mode of thought and action in which the centrality of African interests, values, and perspectives predominate. It is the placing of African people in the centre of any analysis of African phenomenon... It seeks to enshrine the idea that blackness itself is a trope of ethics. Thus to be black is to be against all forms of oppression, racism, classism, homophobia, partriarchy, child abuse, paedophilia and white race domination. 38

Afro-centricity involved the relocating and repositioning the African and African culture at the center of history. It draws its concepts from, and bases itself on, the culture of the African and the totality of African experience on the continent and the diaspora . Obenga adds to this by insisting that the writing of African history must be based on views and theory which avoid binary oppositions such as primitive/civilised, traditional/modern, emotion/reason which have characterised the European analysis of human experience.

It must be noted that binarism is largely responsible for devaluing and denigrating the African. Instead, Afro-centricity holds that human reality is made up of complementary pairs. Obenga refers to this as the complementary of duality. Afro-centricity, still a developing approach and theory in African history has the potential to revolutionise the discipline. Afro-centricity will structure the investigation of internal factors in the demise of the Lebowa Bantustan.

1.10. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study is qualitative. It seeks to make sense of and interpret the values, views, ideologies of people in the past, as well as the meaning they themselves attributed to their actions and activities. The study was largely an interpretation of human experience in the past. This was done by mainly interpreting information contained in oral and written sources. The research entails sampling, data collection, and data analysis.

1.10.1 Sample

Sampling was purposive. Only those people who have knowledge of events, especially those who participated in the system, mostly adults (men and women), participated in the study. The procedure of snowballing was deployed to build a group of knowledgeable men and women. One who knows lead to another knower. There are, still alive and active, many people who participated in, for or against the Bantustans. Documents such as Lebowa Legislative Verbatim Reports (Hansards) bear list of some of their names. Gender sensitivity demands that an equal number of men and women participate in the study. A group of thirty adult respondents was adequate for this study. A few respondents who have already been identified are listed under Oral Sources. Those have provided the starting point for the snow-balling process.

1.10.2 Data Collection

The study was people, time and space bound. Traces of events of a particular time, in a particular place by particular people mattered. The people were interviewed to collect oral data and to validate or invalidate that from other sources. Before the interviews were done an interview schedule composed of the main issues to be investigated
was constructed.

Written documents which are preserved in archives in Polokwane, Lebowakgomo and Pretoria, as well as those in private hands were interrogated by using another schedule of issues prepared beforehand. Written and published books that provided information on the topic were perused to provide secondary data. With the consent of the interviewees, audio recording technology was used. The local radio stations; Thobela FM in particular, provided me audio recorded speeches of people who were directly involved in the Lebowa historical events.

Volumes of the Lebowa Parliament Legislative Assembly Verbatim Reports or Hansards which contain heated debates on situations in which the homeland found itself, especially during the 1980s were also collected as data bases for this research work.

1.10.3 Data Analysis

Analysis of data began at the point of collection. Interviews were open-ended and dialogical and was directed towards determining the accuracy and authenticity of the data made available. The researcher believes that co-analysis of data yields the best results in historical research. The data was also criticised in order to determine the ideology embedded in the narratives. If this was not done, there was a danger that the findings would simply reproduce the ideological distortions of evident in people subjected to colonial rule and cultural imperialism. Also important in analysis was the technique of triangulation in which the data from one source was checked against that from another source. All these analytical processes were framed by the Afrocentric theoretical perspective mentioned earlier on.
1.11 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The shadows and obscurities which still shroud the past constitute an irresistible challenge to human curiosity. A visit to the past carries with it its own dangers and limitations. Limitations range from the risk of contradictions and confusions through lack of co-ordination, squabbles between schools of thoughts, written documents not telling it all and oral tradition; a very frail thread by which to visit the past through the dark twist of the labyrinth of time. Some of the custodians of the past are hoary-headed old men and women with cracked voices and memories often dim. Whenever one dies a fibre of Adriades’s threat is broken. Any study of the past will have limitations because the past is not present. It is gone. Only traces remain. Some events do not leave any traces. Furthermore memory cannot retain every event of the past. Some events will be lost forever. The study was also conducted within a clearly defined framework, the Afro-centric approach, which although striving for objectivity may appear biased from the anti Afro-centric perspective. The findings of the study bears the imprints of Afro-centric framework.

1.12 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

When dealing with human subjects in a research project or any Investigation, there are and there should be ethical considerations involved which this study has complied with. The following were the basic principles underlying the protection of human subjects:
➢ The principle of respect for persons.

Permission was sought for access to human respondents. Individuals were autonomous and had a right to self-determination and this right was observed.

➢ The principle of beneficence.

This involves efforts to secure the well-being of persons. One should do good, and above all, do no harm to the subjects. This also constituted an ethical consideration and the study has complied with.

➢ The principle of justice.

This study took into account and observed the subject's right to fair selection and treatment and the subject's right to privacy, anonymity confidentiality and informed consent as well as the subject’s right to withdraw from the research process.
CHAPTER TWO

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AND OPPOSITION TO LEBOWA BANTUSTAN, 1972.

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The 1955 Freedom Charter, which was adopted by the ANC in 1956, stated that
‘the people of South Africa, declare for all our country and the world to know that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white and that no government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of the people.’ 39

The Charter represented the aspiration of the majority of the Africans and their need for a unitary and non-racial South Africa. Contrary to that aspiration, the whites have since 1910 adopted a racial policy rooted in their belief that they were God-sent and dominant to blacks. Blacks were therefore not to have equal footing in the affairs of South Africa nor to be integrated in White South Africa as Mr Knowledge Gusana stated in 1973 that white politics
‘drums into the black mans head that he is a lesser human being than others, in a halfway evolutionary state of becoming form animal to man, not developed enough to be an equal of the white man, but not so underdeveloped as to be grouped with sheep and cows…he is a “come and go” cipher, sufficiently intelligent to be used but not cultured enough to be accepted.’ 40

But blacks were in majority. Their future posed two clear alternatives; as their attainment of freedom was inevitable, they had to achieve it either in part of South Africa or within the same political structures as the whites in a unified Anglo-Boer- African country.\textsuperscript{41} The latter raised a spectre of Black domination. The whites adopted and accepted \textit{Gebiedskeiding} (territorial separation or partitioning) of the black people as the only policy worth living and working for; the price to pay for it not withstanding. \textsuperscript{42}

Between 1913 and 1970 many Acts were passed to consolidate white supremacy in South Africa. By the early 1970s, Africans were as a result forcefully and ruthlessly driven out of the white South Africa, into the Bantustans where it was perceived they would exercise a kind of ‘self government’. Lebowa Bantustan was an ‘abhorrent’ end product of the apartheid policy of ‘separate development’ in which thousands of blacks were relocated to ‘homelands’. The Pass Law was an effective weapon to make whites realise their aspirations. All efforts were made to destroy it. This included mass protests, acts of arson, picketing, school boycotts that were triggered off by the 1976 Soweto uprising and protracted beyond 1980.\textsuperscript{43}

Many people were killed as a result of the state ruthless suppression of all antiapartheid protests as this chapter will outline. The system could, however, not withstand the test of time and the year 1990 marked a turning point when on February, 2 F W De Klerk took everyone by surprise by announcing the unbanning of political organisations and the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela and others.

\textsuperscript{41} J. Harker, The Legacy of Apartheid, p. 33.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{43} Lebowa Police report to LLA: Riots, Strikes and Uproar,1981.
The announcement made by De Klerk for the release of Mandela and other political prisoners marked a turning point in the history of liberation struggle in South Africa. It signalled the demise of apartheid and its institutions. There was a Black President at the South African political horizons.  

2.2 Ethnic Division; Bases of Separate Development.

‘If the policy of Separate Development is taken to its full conclusion, there will be not one black man with South African citizenship. Every black man in South Africa will eventually be accommodated in some independent new state.’

During the era of apartheid, South Africa had dedicated itself to live up to the statement above. South African whites had therefore fought for white domination. South Africa have cherished the ideal of dividing and ruling blacks and that could only be achieved by evicting blacks out of ‘white’ South Africa, into ethnical enclaves, thus reducing them to a series of separate ethnic minorities.

As long as blacks were divided along ethnical lines the whites were assured of survival in the socio-cultural and political aspects of the country. That was the ideal which the whites hoped to live for and to achieve. If need be, it was an ideal which H F Verwoerd, B J Vorster and P W Botha were prepared to defend with all means at their disposal, even if it meant killing the defenceless protesters. Killing was the whites order of law and the means to maintain what they called Law and Order.

44. J. Harker, p.194.
46. K. Shillington, pp. 6-7.
In South Africa blacks are in majority although they were spread all over the country in ethnic groups. The fear of the black majority in a united South Africa and black influx in white towns made Pretoria to warn of black peril 'swart gevaar' as early as 1929.  

The National Party echoed the 'black peril' again in the 1948 general elections manifesto and propaganda. It won the elections and then developed a divide and rule strategy according to which blacks were to be divided into a series of separate ethnical minorities with separate political parties and territorial placement. They were settled in a series of separate ethnic territories. They would then be given a kind of 'self government' under the white patronage and be developed into full-fledged separate independent Bantustans. Their independence would mean loosing South African citizenship; going there for as long as they offer their labour. As soon as they became no longer fit for work, aged and therefore unproductive and superfluous, they were expected to return to their homeland.

The Bantustan system was designed to fulfil three central purposes: to provide a moral justification for white domination in the rest of South Africa, to deflect black political aspirations from the centre to the periphery by focusing black attention on subordinate legislatures in the homelands instead of South Africa’s white dominated parliament in Cape Town and to reduce the black population in white-designated area; thus to reduce the immediate threat to the white minority. Lebowa Bantustan was mainly created and imposed to the ‘Lebowans’ as a factor to accomplish white domination in the country, with little or nothing good for the

47. Ibid.
49. J. Harker, p.67.
people for whom it was tailored and allocated. Noteworthy, however, is the fact that Lebowa and other sister Bantustans as ‘self-governing’ entities and apartheid institutions, did not have legitimate democratic origin. 50

Lebowa never gained any recognition by the International community and was, together with other nine Bantustans, unpopular and mostly despised by blacks and vehemently opposed by the major black nationalist organisations; the ANC, its PAC off-shoot and the Steve Biko’s Black Consciousness Movement.51

Even tribal leaders who cooperated in the implementation of Bantustan policy did that on demand for a greater allocation of land and resources; the demand that Pretoria was not prepared to meet. Pretoria have instead resorted to the promulgation of repressive Laws and instituting Law enforcement agencies to push for an inhuman direction that left millions of people in bitterness. Apartheid was also a very costly policy to implement, which also have stolen the freedom of its ideologues because no body could declare himself free if there was an enemy out there. One may further argue that the word ‘terrorism’ must have gained its entry into the South African vocabulary during the high tides of Apartheid ‘stimulus and responses’; much as the word toitoi. 52

2.3 BANTUSTANS AS THE INSTITUTION OF CHIEFS.

From 1950 South Africa promulgated a plethora of Acts; starting with the

46. Ibid.
51. Absolute astronomy, p,1.
1951 Bantu Authority Act and the ultimate 1971 Bantu Homelands Constitution Act that made Lebowa a ‘full-fledged’ ‘self governing’ territory. The Legislative Assembly consisting of 60 Magosi and 40 commoners was formed with M. M. Matlala as the first Chief Minister. Lebowa was therefore an institution of Magosi who were selected by Pretoria and roped in to implement the policy of separate development. It was an institution without democratic origin, devoid of the standing democratic principle; the government of the people by the people.

It is therefore not surprising that Kgosi Mokgome Maserumula Matlala, the Chief Councillor of Lebowa from 1969 to 1972 and Chief Minister for a year ending in 1973 named his party the Lebowa ‘National Party.’ Equally not surprising is Phatudi’s ethnic naming of his party the ‘Lebowa’ People’s Party.

Bantustan power rested with a hierarchy of Magosi from tribal to territorial levels, who were made utterly dependent on the patronage of the Department of Native Affairs. Magosi became more accountable to the Department than to their subjects, thus eroding their legitimacy.

Some Magosi were African enough, not prepared to succumb to the Nationalist Party policy. They were also not blind to the ‘divide and rule’, strategy as contained in the apartheid policy. They were also not deaf to the reverberating beats of resistance to apartheid policy.

55. Interview with N.M. Ramodike, Flora Park, 02/2007.
56. A. Flew, A Dictionary of Philosophy, p.87.
In Sekhukhuneland for instance, the acting Paramount Chief Morwa-Moche Sekhukhune and a majority of his people vehemently opposed the Bantu Authority system; a prelude to the Bantustan.\(^{59}\) He was deposed, banished to Cala in Transkei and replaced by Kgobalala a collaborative retired police man.\(^{60}\) In most cases subordinate headmen were offered recognition as chiefs. What followed then was a proliferation of chiefs. In the Sekhukhuneland a number of chiefs rocketed from nine to more than fifty in the 1970s.\(^{61}\) Paramountcy had been upset, with many chiefs having doubtful origins. As at the writing of this historical text, there is still the battle of Bogosi and Paramountcy in Sekhukhuneland and elsewhere in the former Northern Transvaal to an extend that the former Premier of Limpopo, Advocate Ngwako Ramatlhodi appointed Raloshai commission to look into Bogosi; which have since not made a headway. There is currently the Nthlapo commission, appointed by Thabo Mbeki, the former State President, to look into the conflict around Bogosi, especially in Sekhukhune land.\(^ {62}\)

Magosi became civil servants, to be hired, fired and paid by Pretoria. They came to be seen as the coercive agents of the Bantustan who contradicted their indigenous governance by operating in the racist and Eurocentric political theory.\(^ {63}\) This led to a perpetual conflict between the leadership in Lebowa and Pretoria and again, the conflict between the western educated elites in leadership and Magosi. That is the reason

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60. Davenport, p. 347. See also G. Mbeki, pp. 114-115.
62. W. Magoba, pp.36-37
63. Interview with S. Lediga, Polokwane, 04/2006.
why when Maserumula Matlala was outvoted by Phatudi, remarked that he would not be led by ‘lesoboro’, uncircumcised African man. The tripartite conflict between Magosi, Legislative elites and Pretoria was a recipe to weaken the apartheid policy, rendering the whole policy vulnerable to attack by the anti-homelands and anti-Pretoria activists. By embracing the Afrikaner political theory and applying it at their Tribal Authorities the Magosi had alienated their subjects. As a result conflicts between them and their subjects ensued while the political activists despised them, labelling them sell-out and collaborators.

The 1980s witnessed Magosi as the enemies of the Liberation struggle. The institution was by virtue of its participation in the apartheid policy an obstacle of liberation movements. It lost its traditional meaning and therefore its existence and legitimacy became questionable. On that note Govan Mbeki had this to write:

"If Africans have had Chiefs, it is because all human societies have had them at one stage or another. But when a people have developed to a stage which discards chieftainship, when their social development contradicts the need for such an institution, then to force it on them is not liberation but enslavement."

Chiefs became even more unpopular after 1986 following the abolition of the pass laws. Before then, the migrants had to annually present themselves at the chief’s office in their home village for the processing of call-in-cards. Chiefs controlled the migratory labour movement of their

64. Interview with I.K.E. Moloko, Lonsdale. 07/2006
66. G. Mbeki, The Peasant Revolt. p,47
67. J.D. Omer-Cooper, p.240.
subjects, controlling their registration fees, punishing disobedient villagers by withholding labour permits and pass books. 68 In 1986, I.K.E Moloko asked the Lebowa Legislative Assembly:

‘Why now is that the majority of our Magosi are afraid of their subjects, run away from their subjects and had to be protected? What wrong have they done to their subjects? I promise to tell the truth’ He continued.’ How does it come about that a Kgosi should impose a fine of R50 on his accused even before the case is tried?.. What will that subject think of the Kgosi? When a young man returns from the South with a call-in card, instate of getting any help, he is being accused of having not paid a variety of levies from certain date. He is even caused to pay the fine of his father. As soon as this young man gets back to work and find that his service has been terminated, he tells his colleagues about this. Now what is being built there is antagonism against Kgosi and that is the truth.’ 69

That was no longer the case after 1986. To make up for their lost revenue, chiefs reacted by imposing new local taxes and tribal levies. Local grievances ensued as the chiefs were becoming more authoritarian. More and more the people felt alienated by their chiefs and opted for an alternative solution to apartheid and Pretoria on the one hand and Bantustans and the collaborative Magosi on the other hand. 70

2.4. REJECTION OF INDEPENDENCE

Although participating in the Bantustan was a cause for concern in the

69. IKE Moloko, LL Assembly Verbatim. Report,. May 1986, p. 120.
70. Ibid,.
struggle for liberation, Lebowa never accepted independence. IKE Moloko argued that had Maserumula Matlala remained in office beyond 1973, Lebowa would have become ‘independent’ like Transkei and Bophuthatswana. That was what his party, the Lebowa National Party (LNP), an official opposition party to Phatudi’s Lebowa People’s Party (LPP), stood for. In addressing the people in Seshego Township early in 1972, M.M. Matlala stated the LNP’s intention and had this to say:

‘Re budule. E se go ye kaye rena ba Lebowa re tla be re fiwa maemo a go swana le a Traanskei. Translated as ‘We are ripe and ready to govern ourselves, not before long we in Lebowa will be given self-governing status like that of Transkei’

According to the Lebowa National Party, Lebowa would be given self-governing status which would be developed into independence. That would be fulfilling the logical conclusion of the policy of Separate Development; the deprivation of the African people in Lebowa of the South African citizenship. For that reason the LNP was viewed by the people in Lebowa as an extension of the Broederbond, in aspiring that Lebowa should be granted independence within the borders that rendered the black majority there landless.

With that type of political manipulation by Pretoria, Phatudi was in no way prepared to comply. In his response to the interview on what his position

73. Interview with B. Boshielo, Polokwane, 2007
was, concerning independence Phatudi said:

“We are totally opposed to the concept of breaking away from South Africa. We are in every way South Africans-as much as any white man and we will not reject our birthright. No matter what pressures might be applied to us, and no matter what incentives offered us, there is no way we will break away from the land of our birth. The issue is simply not negotiable.” 74

He stood firm in fighting to get the land back than entering into the so called independence without land. Land, land and more land was the prime necessity. In 1973 he had this to say to Pretoria in his quest for the consolidation of Lebowa:

‘In all Histories the conqueror, to restore peace returns land to the conquered.’ 75

He further said that it does not matter where, the conqueror after conquering the original inhabitants of the territory will later return the territory to the owner. That is why Britain returned the land to the population of South Africa and the people of Lebowa. 76 In 1987, on their way back from France he told and warned Nelson Ramodike that if he(Phatudi) was to quit politics, the people of Lebowa should not be thrown into the pit

74. LL Assembly Verbatim Report, (CNM Phatudi) see also H T Cooper, p.40.
75. LL Assembly Verbatim Report,(CNM Phatudi)1979.p.78
76. Ibid.,
of independence. To that advice and appeal, Ramodike remained committed from the time he became the Chief Minister in 1987.  

After having said that, can one simply confine Phatudi to epithets such as ‘puppet’ or ‘stooge’? May it not be meaningful to suggest that he, together with some legislators, were waging a verbal, minimal, territorial war of liberation against Pretoria? The statement reflects a kind of political network with other freedom fighters elsewhere. One only wonder what Phatudi actually meant when he said that South Africa got her first independence for both blacks and whites in 1910 when it is historically known that blacks were marginalised.

In the labour market in the white farms, mines towns and cities, the people of Matatiele and Mountfletcher, or to be more general, the people from the independent Bantustans of Transkei, Botswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC) were already regulated from the South African Labour Bureau as foreigners, carrying travelling documents to enter the white South Africa. They were always arrested of trespassing and deported back to their independent Homelands. Although similar treatment was given to those travellers from the self-governing Bantustans, they were better off than the TBVC in that they were not foreigners. The treatment of the TBVC travellers by Pretoria offered a lesson to Lebowa not to opt for independence. It is mainly around the rejection of independence that Phatudi and subsequently Ramodike were able to rally a support from the

78. LLA Verbatim Report (CNM Phatudi) see also H T Cooper, p.41.
80. Interview with S. Lediga, Bendor, Polokwane 04/2006.
people in Lebowa. 81 On invitation by Dr Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Phatudi attended a meeting in Umtata on the issue of federalism. The aim was to establish the so-called Federation of Autonomous States of Southern Africa. 82 Phatudi was later honoured to be the convener of subsequent meetings. By the early 1980s a Statement of Intent by the concerned Bantustans had already been issued to Pretoria, putting South Africa in a political dilemma. 83

Federalism as an alternative choice of the Lebowa People’s Party presented yet another vague way out of the Bantustan system. The choice basically meant the acknowledgement and acceptance of the status quo with the landless blacks sharing power with whites at the Central government. The predicament was saved by the 1994 first ever, democratic elections that ushered in the period of the Government of National Unity as against a federal state in Phatudi’s sense of government. 84

The stand pointed by Phatudi and his party not in any way to accept independence and attending the inter-homeland meeting convened by Buthelezi, marked the dawn of new direction to a constitutional reform for a full and true union of South Africa. The Lebowa Legislators were drifting away from political somnambulism, getting closer to understanding the aims of ‘Separate Development’ and Pretoria’s divide and rule tactics so as to deprive blacks of the South African citizenship and perpetuate white supremacy in the vast depopulated land following

81. Ibid
83. LL Assembly Verbatim Report, 1984, April. p.11.
84. Interview with B. Boshielo, Polokwane, 02/2007
the forced removal into what Moorecraft called sophisticated
congestion camps.  

In 1988, in his policy speech, Ramodike emphasized the denouncement
of independence by quoting the words of Connie Mulder on 8 February
1978 (there will be no black man with the South African citizenship)
and told J C Heunis that the concept of ‘independence’ chills him to
marrow. According to Ramodike, Independence would for Lebowa be
like ‘a zoo in which the defence forces play coup games with us.’

The denouncement of independence was an ingredient enough to
combine with others in the precipitation of the fall of apartheid and Lebowa
Bantustan. The punishment Lebowa had to face was systemic Land
excise; especially where she shared the borders with Venda and
Gazankulu. On the other hand, in Mapulaneng and Naphuno tracts of
land were excised from Lebowa to Gazankulu while Moutse was to be
seized from Lebowa to the newly established Bantustan of KwaNdebele.

That was a rigmarole, a demonstration that the self-governing status of
Lebowa Bantustan was an illusion. Pretoria could at any given time act
drastically against any Bantustan that indicated opposition to her
vision of a white South Africa with blacks as visitors or work seekers from
the impoverished ‘sophisticated concentration camp’. There were also
infiltrations by Pretoria agents to divide the people in Lebowa by telling
local dialects that Pretoria could grant them self-government over and
above that of Lebowa.

86. LL Assembly Verbatim Report,(N.M. Ramodike) 1988/April. pp.8-9
87. Ibid.
88. Interview with N.M. Ramodike, Flora Park, 2007
2.5 THE LAND ISSUE AND BOUNDARY DISPUTES.

Lebowa Bantustan was a five pieces of disconnected land (as the map along side illustrates).\textsuperscript{89} It was created in accordance with the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts and drawn to exclude economically valuable land. It was jigsaw puzzle, a land share or dividend of the 13\% given to all blacks in the country. The boundaries were broken up into numerous enclaves with convoluted twists and turns. The territory was a disfigured overcrowded anomaly, designed by Pretoria without consultation with the people for whom it was meant.\textsuperscript{90}

Travelling between Bochum, in Kgoshi Leboho area to Pietersburg (Polokwane today) one would at irregular intervals of 30 kilometres find small black direction board written ‘Lebowa Grens’. It was therefore difficult to consolidate the Bantustan into one coherent whole while on the other hand Pretoria was threatening further land expropriation.\textsuperscript{91}

\textsuperscript{89}. A map from J.D. Omer-Cooper, History of Southern Africa, p.214.
\textsuperscript{90}. Interview with I.K.E Moloko, Lonsdale, 7/2006.
\textsuperscript{91}. Interview with I. K. E. Moloko, Lonsdale, 7/2006.
Most fertile soil, areas with potential mineral mines, economic forestry and citrus estates like the Zebdiela Estates, the pine tree forestry of Zaneen, towns like Pietersburg, Zaneen, Potgietersrus, Warmbath and many more others, were bordered out of the Bantustan. There was not in any case to be a town in Bantustans except the only ‘Capital Town; Lebowakgomo. It is for that reasons that in only one day term of his office as the Lebowa Chief Minister, Dr C.N.M. Phatudi informed the government of South Africa that:

 ‘If Lebowa was to become self-sufficient then substantial tracts of South Africa, including a number of white towns, would need to be added to Lebowa territory.’ 92

Contrary to such expectation, Pretoria was seizing land from the little Lebowa had. The logical end of the process of land excise and allocation was a massive forced removal of blacks from the white area, reassigning their citizenship to small area which was not proportional to their number and life stock. 93

In Naphuno and Mapulaneng there were a protracted land and border disputes between Lebowa and Gazankulu with Pretoria behaving paternalistic and covertly instigating in Gazankulu’s favour. That, the people of Lebowa were quick to see through eye of Ramodike as both places were in his electoral division. 94

The giving away of Douglas Smith Hospital which was within chieftainess Maake’s land to Gazankulu triggered off inter-ethnical

92. Cetric Phatudi, @ http://en.wikipedia:p.1
93. absoluteastronomy. p.1 (internet)
94. Interview with N. M. Ramodike. 7/2006.
vendetta. Seven Chief Maake’s farms were given to Gazankulu without consulting him or Lebowa. The South African Railway has made a railway line across Mapulaneng without telling the people that it was to serve as the boundary, taking half of that land to Gazankulu. Five of Chief Mokoena’s farms were as well allotted to Gazankulu. 95

Excising more land from Lebowa to Gazankulu was done as a good gesture to Samora Machel of Mozambique, who Pretoria believed would work with to combat the so called ‘terrorism attack’ from Mozambique. Pretoria even warned the Lebowa Legislators that if they attacked the Shangaans their houses would be demolished. 96 That was an attempt to buy favour from one ethnic group in outplaying another group, thus perpetuating the Nationalist Party policy of divide and rule and sustenance of white supremacy. 97

In Sekgosese seven of Chief Mamaila’s farms were given to Venda and Gazankulu respectively. Batlokwa tribes had settled there for 300 years. 98 The people there, were removed and ordered to occupy the lands of Chiefs Malebogo, Kibi and Moloto without consulting them. A conflict between the Chiefs of Sekgosese and those of Bochum and Moletsi ensued. 99

By 1987 Lebowa was not yet consolidated into a coherent territorial

95. LL Assembly Verbatim Report, 1979, pp. 48-49.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
totality. Tracts of land had by that time been already taken to Gazankulu and Venda with Pretoria’s assistance in the Gazankulu’s favour.  

100

Early in 1987 the minister of Development Aid and Education wrote a letter to Dr CNM Phatudi which read thus:

“Dear Chief Minister, the erection of a boundary between Lebowa and Gazankulu in Naphuno and Ritavi districts will Commence on Tuesday 12/5/1987.”

101

Recalling what one of the Central Government Ministers told the Lebowa Cabinet in Pretoria, Ramodike had this to say:

“the preference and priority in consolidation and addition of land will be given to those territories or states in South Africa which are ready to opt for independence.”

102

Lebowa responded to Veljoen’s letter by writing an eleven-points memorandum to Pretoria, demanding, inter-alia that:

“the so-called “cattle proof fence” now under construction…which is regarded as “a wall of shame” should be stopped forthwith and

101. Ibid.,
that the SAP and SADF should refrain from political issues such as national boundaries. Dragooning our subjects by a barrel of a gun to accept the envisaged boundary.”

The memorandum went on to demand that all of the Lebowa land already incorporated in Gazankulu should be transferred back to Lebowa.

There was an unscrupulous organised and systemic land excise by Pretoria all over Lebowa that one of the Legislators even remarked that in future Lebowa would be the smallest state in the country. As a result Lebowa Legislators and the people on the ground were angered and gradually losing trust in Pretoria and defecting to the liberation movements.

The other dimension of land excises came with Moutse. When Kwa-Ndebele became a self-governing Bantustan in 1987, Moutse, one of the districts in Lebowa was earmarked for incorporation into Kwa-Ndebele in order to consolidate Kwa-Ndebele into a feasible self-governing territory. Sentiments were already echoed by some Ndebele in Lebowa that they were an ethnic group that also deserved the homeland of their own. On 24 March 1978 Chief Shikwane Kekana of Zebediela issued a press statement that the Ndebele were tired of being the children of other ethnic groups by being distributed among the different homelands. He even incited his subjects to boycott the

103. Ibid. pp,302-304.
104. Ibid
105. Ibid.
107. www.sahistory.org.za, p, 4
Lebowa elections in that year.108

In order to assert their authority over the district of Moutse, the political leadership of Kwa-Ndebele had formed a vigilante group called Mbokodo, commanded by Simon Skhosana to invade the Moutse area, imposing upon its residents a reign of terror. A reaction was a series of campaigns of civil disobedience and daring unrest.109 Many people especially the Ndebele lost their lives. By 1st January more than fifty people were killed. Others were killed at the gate of kgoshi Mathebe’s head quarters on New Year’s day when they were trying to kidnap him.110

Obviously both Lebowa and Kwa-Ndebele were trapped in the cruel and irrational logic of Separate Development. Pretoria attempted by all means to play paternalism on Kwa-Ndebele’s behalf to the disadvantage of Lebowa. The people in Moutse however, declared openly to the dismay of Heunis that ethnicity failed and will still fail to bring apartheid to its logical conclusion.111

Phatudi governed Lebowa until his death in 1987 with Moutse Issue unresolved. He died reciting a maxim; Moutse ke Lebowa, Lebowa ke Moutse (Moutse is Lebowa and Lebowa is Moutse)112

Nelson Ramodike, who took after Phatudi could also not win the tug-of-

108. Ibid.
109. Ibid.
110. L L Assembly verbatim report, January, 1986, p. 2
war over Moutse. In 1987 Pretoria was forced to announce that the issue of Moutse had been shelved indefinitely. By 1990 these had been overtaken by the CODESA negotiations, and Moutse and Kwa-Ndebele issue became the footnote in South Africa’s bad chapter of Apartheid government.¹¹³

Key figures in the political play of divide and rule and main instigators of unrest were Grobler, Serfontein and Botha. Those three wanted to create more and more homelands. Botha had already advised Chief Chiloane that Mapulana did not belong to Lebowa therefore should form their own homeland. He also approached Chiefs Ledwaba and Kekana of the Mokerong Regional Authority and asked them why they contested for the Lebowa elections while he could still give them theirs.¹¹⁴ That was an attempt to create yet another MaNdebele Bantustan over and above the already existed Kwa-Ndebele.¹¹⁵

As it happened in dividing the Xhosa into two sub-ethnic Bantustans of Transkei and Ciskei why could it not be possible within Lebowa? Possibilities are that those three men would go beyond ethnic divides and encourage even tribes to establish their self-governing tribal mini-lands. The Tlokwa would accordingly belong to Kwa-Tlokwa, the Bakone to Bokone the aim being the disintegration of African Nationalism ¹¹⁶

However, Pretoria was, by so doing gradually creating a political quagmire that she was to work through in the subsequent years

¹¹⁴. LL Assembly Verbatim Report, March/April, 1979, p,66.
while on the other hand she was exposing the fallacy and fraudulent element in the policy of Separate Development. This is evident in the statement made by one Legislator during the third Lebowa Legislative Assembly on 15 March 1979; M.W. Chueu who said:

“*I am very much pleased that we realise that the Homeland policy is a fraud. I continue and say it is their policy which is fraudulent. We can go to a place where we can be accepted tell them whatever our problems are. I want all the blacks to unite and fight for their land. Seeing that this policy is a fraud, I suggest that we close this Parliament and go away.*” ¹¹⁷

The tension between Lebowa and Pretoria mounted up to make the apartheid policy weak and vulnerable. The Bantustan became an entry point for infiltration and underground operations by freedom fighters in pursuing the struggle for African liberation. Those who were made to be seen as terrorists were no longer perceived as such by the struggling masses in the country. ¹¹⁸

### 2.6 FORCED REMOVAL. 1972-1978.

Over and above the severe conditions the people of Lebowa were living in; poverty, congestion, overgrazed land, infertile soil, there continued to be an influx of thousands of Africans who were forcefully removed from the white South Africa following an operation called cleansing the ‘Black Sports’. ¹¹⁹ Black Sports were those areas which were bought either

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¹¹⁷. LL Assembly Verbatim Report, January/1979, p .51
individually or collectively by blacks but happened to be in the area reserved for whites. To arrive at a logical conclusion of Separate Development as Mulder said in 1978, the blacks were literally evicted from those Black Sports.\(^{120}\) Villages like Indermark, Morobjane, Mohodi Ga-Manthata, Mohodi Fatima, Sekakene and Madikana, all in Bochum in the Maleboho area, evolved out of a systemic force removal.\(^{121}\) New-Look, a place today known as Greenside, hardly a kilometre to the west of Polokwane was also cleansed and the people relocated to Seshego and Mankweng township respectively.\(^{122}\) The villages and townships mentioned above are just samples of the whole trend of force removal in Lebowa. Africans were once more, nomads. Forced removals in Lebowa and the pains that went with it were no less nor more than that of Sophia Town. The aim of the ideologues was the same, whether one was in Lebowa, in Johannesburg or elsewhere in South Africa. The burdens that went along with the removal were that an African had to demolish his home, relocate to a new place and build a new home there, all by himself.\(^{123}\)

Crowded again in a new place would force them to comply with the death ritual to identify a new cemetery, economic need for a new arable land and a political need to install a new Kgosi or induna. That had always resulted in new intertribal conflicts. In a village called Galelia in Mogalakwena there is still a daring vendetta around who should be the Induna. The village is divided into the Chokoe and the Nyamane factions. Both Chokoe and Nyamane are indunas who

\(^{120}\) Ibid.

\(^{121}\) Interview with P.K Manya. Senwabarwana. 03’2006.

\(^{122}\) Interview: Precilla, Mokaba, Turfloop, 02/2007.

\(^{123}\) Ibid.
found themselves relocated there from Kgosi Matlala and Langa respectfully 124

The other side of the epoch is that if one's wife or husband had died before the forced removal he/she would be buried in that old settlement.125 That in itself denied the surviving spouse the African cultural right to be buried next to one's wife or husband nor ancestral tradition to pay pilgrimage to the previous grave site as in most cases the people were denied access to areas which were dewily proclaimed white.126 That practice have negatively impacted on the African socio-cultural aspect of life. It was therefore bound to be resisted and so did the affected masses.

The other ugly face of force removal was the derogatory names given to new black settlements. Names like Kaffir-Boom, Kaffir-Kraal, Morsgat, Weenen (a place of weeping) Stinkwater, Steel-Poort and many more were littered to most new settlements for women and children sent out of the cities, for the old, the non-productive labour units and the superfluous appendages.127

To crown it all, Father Cosmas Desmond, a Franciscan priest spent a year travelling on dirt roads in Bantu reserves. Agreeing with Moorecraft that Bantustans were concentration camps, Desmond added that 'all forms of malnutrition, diseases, starvation and joblessness were

126. Ibid.
Characteristic of Bantustans'. Of more significance however is that the people were removed against their will and understood that to be the work of Pretoria’s separate development policy. That was very significant in the building of African Nationalism and solidarity against the system as the people were then able to read between the lines. The real situation in which the people found themselves provided a leverage for the anti-apartheid and anti-Bantustans activists to spread propaganda and to orchestrate public opposition to apartheid policy and its institutions. The United Democratic Front (UDF) played an important role in mobilising the people to resist the government policy.

128. Ibid.

129. Interview with S. Lediga. Polkwane

130. Ibid.
3 CHAPTER THREE

THE ECONOMIC BASES OF LEBOWA POLITICS.

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Lebowa Bantustan had its origins and foundations in the Broederbond capitalistic ideology whose primary objective was to secure Afrikaner economic dominance by reducing blacks to cheap labourers from the reserves. In the second place Lebowa was created as a reserve first and a homeland later, whose function was, to paraphrase Alain Lipietz, the production of an immense reserve army of children available for wage-labour as and when required. At the third place let it suffice to mention that Separate Development as perceived by its ideologues was not actually about developing the people in Lebowa, but rather a cynical legalisation of a policy through which Africans were to be exploited as cheap, migrant or guest labourers from the reserves. At the forth place let it also suffice to note that by the time negotiations for a new democratic dispensation took off the ground at the CODESA in the early 1990s Lebowa Bantustan and a large proportion of her population was far in the negatives of what Pretoria called Separate Development; economically backward with people living in abject poverty and dying in large numbers because of malnutrition related diseases. The economic factor and imbalances in Lebowa were also responsible for its ultimate collapse as this chapter will account for.

131. H. Marais, South Africa; Limits to Change, p. 17.
132. Ibid., 22.
133. A.T. Moleah, p. 433.
134. J. Harker, p.70.
3.2 ESTABLISHING THE BANTU RESERVES

The 1913 Land Act and the 1936 Native Trust Land Act provided the Nationalist Party with legal bases on which to implement the dispossession of the indigenous African majority by creating the Bantu Reserves that became Bantu ethnical Homelands in the early 1970s. Moleah correctly interpreted the Land Act as a labour bill to expel the Africans into the overcrowded and overgrazed Bantu reserves and force them back into white farms, mines, and industrial establishment as cheap labourers.\(^{135}\) Again, the whites did not envisage Africans in the Bantustans as their economic competitors. Separate Development was therefore a ‘carefully’ developed policy by the Nationalist Party to protect the whites economic interest and domination over other races in the country.\(^{136}\) The understanding, therefore, for the factors internal to the fall of Lebowa Bantustan should take along with, the economic aims of the ideologues of apartheid, Separate Development and Bantustans as alluded to in this paragraph.

The year 1978 was thought to be the year in which all Africans should be relocated to their homelands as permanent citizens there, and enter the whites man’s land as sojourners. The opposite was the case. Blacks were leaving homelands and heading for Soweto and other urban areas. Soweto did not care about homelands. To Sowetan blacks and many others who were sensitive to the notion of Separate Development, homeland meant balkanisation of South Africa and repatriation of thousands of people to areas where they did not belong.\(^{137}\) Blacks were

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136. Ibid., p 433.
137. J. Johnson and P. Magubane, Soweto Speaks, p. 46.
however, forcefully removed into the already overcrowded land, forced to reduce their livestock and expected to ‘thrive’ there economically.\textsuperscript{138} There were those many people who could not buy farms of their own nor be absorbed in the Pretoria created Trust farms. Those people became preys of the Boers who were in dire need of cheap farm labourer.\textsuperscript{139}

With vast land at their disposal, the Boers could established quasi settlements for those desperate people mentioned earlier. The conditions of staying in those quasi settlements was on agreeing to hand over ones life stock to the white farmer and to work for a rock-bottom wage.\textsuperscript{140} An elderly Phefo France, born in 1932 is a retired man staying at Ham 1, in 74 kilometres to the west of Mokopane. He came to Ham 1, formally known as Ga-Mmerebere, from Leibzight next to the Blouberg Mountain in the Malebogo area in 1951 to work in Jappie Schoeman’s farm. Testifying his long winter of subjugation and bitter experience at that farm (Ham 1) he had this sad story to tell:

‘I worked for Jappie Schoeman first and later his son Kobus. I worked for 25 cents per six weeks. With 25 cents (tick) and 5 cents (seke) I was able to buy a shirt called \textit{Mottalampa}. At the end of every year we were given each a shirt called \textit{Planyenye} as the end of the year bonus. That brownish shirt could loose its’ colour in a matter of a week and shrink to a smaller size that turn us into circus like comics. What worries me is that I was ordered to sell all my goats and 12 cattle which were always impounded as stray animals or trespassing into another boer’s farm. I always paid R60, an amount equal to my monthly salary by the late seventies, to

\textsuperscript{138} A.T. Moleah., P.433.
\textsuperscript{139} Ibid., p. 258.
\textsuperscript{140} J. Pampalis, Foundations of the New South Africa, p. 187.
release them from the pound. In 1987 I was told I am old, redundant and superfluous. I was given Pick and Shovel as my retirement gifts after many years of being exploited. As for this left arm amputated Matlou! (also a villager of Ham No 1) His arm was cut off by a tractor fan-belt and nothing was given to him for that grievous bodily harm. Moses Mokwena was given some kicks and punches because he had a watch on his wrist....time for WAte!  

Trust Council Laws ordered that Africans should sell their livestock at prices determined by the whites because the land the Africans were made to stay in could not accommodate both people and their livestock. Most of cattle farmers lost their cattle through impoundment. Livestock is impounded when found trespassing in another man’s land or found unguarded along fenced road. If no claim of such livestock is made within twenty-one days it is sold by an auction. This practice was left for abuse by the system and white farm owners to dwarf the already landless people economically.

As indicated earlier on that the Lebowa people, like people of other ethnical ‘self governing’ Bantustans where congested in the over grazed enclaves, their livestock were always straying across and therefore vulnerable for impoundment. Landlessness, reduced livestock and poor crop farming resulting from the infertile land allotted to Lebowa, were the three main ingredients of African impoverishment. So the bedrock of colonial dispossession was not only of land but also of livestock.  Early

in 1972, Segodi, an elderly African from a bought farm in Matjitjileng village in Lebowa took two of his beasts to a local Afrikaner winkelier to sell in order to feed and pay school fees for his children. The man with a price of R200 each beast went back home with R150 for both. 145 Was that not looting? African economic activities in Lebowa was predominantly subsistence and, as such, the people still had to go back to the white towns and farms for work to boost their meagre subsistent productions. 146 Therefore Verwoerd’s prediction that by the year 1978 all blacks including their intelligentsia will be wiped out of the white area was just an illusion or an empty wish. Blacks were forced to go back to white towns, mines and farms as cheap work seekers. That was however what Separate Development stood for. 147

3.3 THE ESTABLISMENT OF THE LEBOWA FACTORIES, 1978

When one travels through Seshego, a township for blacks in about 9 kilometres(ks) to the west of Pietersburg (Polokwane) one finds a chain of huge industrial buildings. Most of them are not fully utilised while some have since come to be white elephants. Buildings of such nature are also located in LebowaKgomo, a semi-urban township for blacks in some 56 ks to the south of Polkwane; a displaced urban as most people called it. Many more of such industrial building were littered at several places next to towns in Lebowa Bantustan. Many factories of small scales were also erected in various tribal lands of Magosi. 148 They are also seen to be dilapidating. Those industrial estate are the monumental economic legacies of apartheid, erected by the Corporate for Economic

147. Ibid.
Development (CED) from 1978.\textsuperscript{149}

Statistics shows that 14 were build in Seshego, employing about 1355 people. The famous Habakuk Shikoane I cane furniture operated in one of those industrial buildings in Lebowakgomo.\textsuperscript{150} The LDC took over the control of those industrial estates from 1980. Those factories, and many others were established primarily to attract blacks out of the white towns and cities; an influx control measure to reducing the number of blacks in the white towns and cities. They were also not owned by the blacks but whites who were readily able to access funds from those industry ideologues and the so called Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC) which was later renamed Lebowa Development Corporation (LDC). The LDC took ownership of most factory from 1979 when M.S. Maimane became the Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs.\textsuperscript{151} The aim to reduce the number of blacks to white towns could not make any headway (in terms of influx control) because unemployment was rife in Lebowa. About 75\% of the people were still unemployed.\textsuperscript{152} Only a fraction of Lebowa people could be absorbed by those factories. The factories also discriminated against those work seekers from deep rural areas in favour of those who stayed in township nearer to them.\textsuperscript{153} They only benefited the white who came in to exploit the blacks, paying them rock bottom wages, under the pretext of Separate Development. The Minister of Finance and Economic Development in Lebowa had even suggested to

\begin{quote}
149. LL Assembly Verbatim Report, January /April, 1979, pp. 125-126.
150. Ibid.
151. LL Assembly Verbatim Report, 01/1979, p. 237.
152. Ibid.
153. Ibid.
\end{quote}
the Legislative Assembly to intervene and rescue those factory workers from the grip of exploitation.\textsuperscript{154} The significant role played by those factories is that they brought nearer to the people in Lebowa trade unionism that was later to have impact and strength in the liberation struggle. \textsuperscript{155}

3.4 STATUTORY ENSLAVEMENT

Africans are statutory criminals and have to live with fear of arrest.\textsuperscript{156} Finding himself in a vortex of apartheid promulgated Laws; the pass laws, infringement of the Bantu tax laws and many other subjugating laws turned the whole of South Africa into a prison for Africans.\textsuperscript{157} Even though most of the arrests were political in nature, the economic undertone of imprisonment was the creation and provision of cheap labour pool for the farmers who were always hard pressed for cheap labour.\textsuperscript{158} To avoid the arrest and imprisonment one should remain in his Bantustan (a concentration camp) and follow the influx control procedures, controlled at the Magoshi tribal authority offices, to enter the white area as worker.\textsuperscript{( see page 52) From the major prisons especially Pietersburg and Potgitersrus trucks from the neighbouring farms would be seen loading the ‘bandits’ (derogatory name for prisoners) to severe and hard farm labour.\textsuperscript{159} Crop producing white farms benefited from that arrangement especially the potato fields at Pital. Motsamai was arrested.

\begin{flushright}
154. Ibid.
156. A.T. Moleah, p, 471.
157. Ibid.
\end{flushright}
for trespassing in Pietersbug while page C of ‘my pass book designated me to Mokerong. I was imprisoned for three months and sold out to potato crop farm in Pital. There I saw hell on earth, intensive slavery. All because of a brown pass book and section 10 of the 1955 Native (Urban Areas) Amendment Act. 160

Living in abject poverty, faced with all manners of repression, suffocating in the overcrowded Bantustan rendered an African accessible for recruitment in liberation movement; a recruitment which was further motivated by simple logic; standing up for one’s rights and self emancipation.

3.5 THE ZEBDIELA ESTATE

Zebediela Estate is one of the worlds most recognised and producer of the citrus fruits (oranges) situated in Kgosi Kekana’s jurisdiction and therefore justifiably belonging to Lebowa. 161 That estate and others in the Gilimburg vicinity meant much for Lebowa in terms of capital income. It was however never declared Lebowa property. It remained under Pretoria until the new dispensation in 1994. 162 The Lebowa government negotiated in vain for the attainment of the estate. The price for the Zebediela Estate to be given to Lebowa was even construed by the Lebowa Legislators as option for independence, which Lebowa was never prepared to do. 163

160. Interview with B. Matsoma, Mokopane, 03/2007. See also J. Pampalis. p.185.
162. Ibid.
163. Ibid.
3.6 MINING INDUSTRY.

The Lebowa Bantustan ‘had’ a high potential of minerals; Chrome, platinum, vanadium, asbestos and many more. Yet by 1979 no mines were located in Lebowa as the Minister of Finance and Economic Development reported.\textsuperscript{164} It would not be easy to locate any mine in Lebowa as it was still difficult to consolidate the loose five pieces of land into a coherent whole. Magoshi were given the title deeds of the uppermost layer of land.\textsuperscript{165} The logic of Apartheid was also not to see Black competing with whites in the economic field as white capitalists could not tolerate such competition. Villagers were even sceptical and fearful of geological rumours that there was potential mineral mining in their vicinity as that would result in their forceful eviction. In most cases Kgoshi entered into agreement with miners without the knowledge of his subject with mineral royalties channelled to Moshate.\textsuperscript{166} Villagers would suffer all forms of air pollution while mine explosions exhumed their graves as it happened at Mapela in the early 1990s.

3.7 THE LEBOWA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (LDC)

BIC or LDC was created in 1959 by an act of parliament in Pretoria, act No. 34 of 1959.\textsuperscript{167} It was usually called the economic arm of the Lebowa government. It was financed by Central government to provide financial assistance and guidance to small and big businesses in Lebowa for the Lebowa people. It was created to finance the people and not to establish businesses. While the budget speeches of all ministers in Lebowa

\begin{itemize}
\item[I.164] Interview with L.A.H. Mamabolo, Mokopane, 03/2007
\item[I.166] LL Assembly Verbatim Report, March/ 1979, p, 128.
\end{itemize}
were dominated by lack of funds, the LDC had every thing (cash) at its disposal but not for the good of the Bantustan for which it was declared an economic arm.\textsuperscript{168} By 1990 most business men who had linked their businesses with LDC were insolvent. Bus owners, hotel owners, cinema owners, bakery owners and many more black businesses disappeared from the commercial arena; especially bus companies.\textsuperscript{169} In 1974 a decision was taken by Pretoria that BIC should never own any trading site in the Homeland. Things changed after the departure of Collins Ramusi. The BIC enjoyed the right to own certain sites.\textsuperscript{170} In Mahwelereng BIC owned a site just in front of the black shopping complex and constructed a hotel and lured a prosperous bottle store owner to use it. Seeing that the hotel was doing very well, BIC decided to sell it to him.\textsuperscript{171} The black economic development logic would be that Mr Molala should himself owned the site and pay off the BIC building cost later. BIC had an obligation called “nasorg” meaning the guidance of a business man until he could stand on his own.\textsuperscript{172} Instate of that purpose, the BIC would make him insolvent and take over the business. L.D.C. had become more of a trading company and competitor than a development corporation.\textsuperscript{173} It had devoured almost all chances of potential black businesses, contesting for tenders, given tender to built 12 Post Offices in Lebowa.\textsuperscript{174} BP. has built a garage in Sehsego called Rametse Motors and offered a mechanical school for the children of Lebowa. L.D.C. took the contract

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{169} Ibid.,
\textsuperscript{170} Ibid., p.405.
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid. and also Interview with G. Molala, Mahwelereng, 04/2006.
\textsuperscript{172} Ibid., p.404.
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid., p406.
\textsuperscript{174} Interview with N. M. Ramodike, Florapark, 03/2007.
\end{footnotesize}
and at the end sold the garage to someone who repaid the L.D.C. instate of Lebowa which was a beneficiary.\textsuperscript{175} The L.D.C was by the early 1980s perceived to be a monster which trapped the up and coming black businesses into socio-economic miseries. \textsuperscript{176}

3.8 THE LEBOWA TRANSPORT ISSUES.

Transport constitutes the life blood of every economically developing states. Lebowa Homeland was 100% rural encapsulated in the vast white proclaimed area with a number of towns and hamlets like Pietersburg (renamed Polokwane), Potgietersrus (renamed Mokopane), Tzaneen, Groblersdal, Neilstroom and others. Those were the Central Business Distributions that the people of Lebowa had to go to from time to time for work and shopping purposes. That travelling could only be sustained with viable transport in the form of buses/taxis and trucks. The uniqueness to mention here was animal drawn wagons in Potgietersrus which is still prevailing today. There were however several black bus companies and some owned by individuals. The Bahwaduba buses of Lekganyane, the Shibambo bus services in Tshamahanse Mokopane, the Ntlhapile bus services in Matlala area, The Matlala bus services (owned by Kellerman), Hamba Boya bus services, the Batlokwa bus services, Monavee of Mr Rasebotsa, Bapedi bus service of Mr. Waterson (a coloured) and several others were operating in Lebowa. \textsuperscript{177} By 1990 many of them had faded into the oblivion of the cosmos or absorbed by Lebowa Transport. \textsuperscript{178} Lebowa Transport was a bus operation that came into being from the remnants of the insolvent bus owners.

\textsuperscript{175} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{176} Interview with Nthlapile Matlala. Mamehlabe, 06/2006.
\textsuperscript{177} LL Assembly Verbatim Report (N B Papo) 05/1981, p. 405.
\textsuperscript{178} Interview with B. Harrys, Westernburg, Polkwane, 03/2007
For instance, Waterson owned about 16 buses called the Bapedi Bus Service mentioned before. He had received a loan from BIC. After his death the BIC took over the buses and owned them permanently.\textsuperscript{179} By 1979 L.D.C and C.E.D were jointly operating a fleet of 205 buses as Lebowa Transport (Pty) Ltd.\textsuperscript{180} Many more other black bus companies faded away like the Bapedi bus service. Not only did Lebowa Homeland suffered land scarcity and the excise of the little land she had by Pretoria, the BIC was on the other hand looting black businesses from within.\textsuperscript{181}

\section{3.9 TAXATION AND OTHER FORMS OF LEVIES}

Taxation was another form of accruing the Lebowa Revenue. There were various forms of taxes to which the people of Lebowa were subjected. At the tribal authority level a man was to pay an array of levies and fines as determined by Kgosi and his councillors (Bakgomana). He was also expected, without failing, to pay Lebowa Tax of R2.00 which was payable at tribal authorities and magistrate offices in Lebowa on LOF 61.\textsuperscript{182} As a citizen of South Africa and by virtue of Lebowa's consistent rejection of independence, a man was also to pay General Tax of R2.50 annually payable to Pretoria on a receipt called BA 56. All of those taxes were paid annually whether one was employed or not.\textsuperscript{183} Both LOF 61 and BA 56 receipts were pasted in one's Pass book and were to be produced on demand by the police. Failing to produce was a criminal offence wherein culprits were liable to an arrest and

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{179} LLAssembly Verbatim Report (N. B. Papo), May 1981, p.405. \\
\textsuperscript{180} Ibid., pp. 127-128. \\
\textsuperscript{181} Interview with B. Harrys, Westrnberg, 03/2006. \\
\textsuperscript{182} LOF 61. (Perforated Duplicate Book at Magistrate Seshego.) \\
\textsuperscript{183} BA 56. (Perforated Triplicate at Magistrate Seshego.)
\end{flushright}
imprisonment. As a result men were always on the run and jumping fences on seeing a *Pongo* (Police van) entering a village.  

The other tax payable by all population groups in South Africa was the General Sales Tax (GST) which was not paid directly to Lebowa. That tax was as early as 1980 and throughout the decade a great cause for concern in the Lebowa Legislative assembly debates. Lebowa was not receiving its rightful share of the GST from central government.  

To illustrate the concern, in the year 1985 Lebowa received an amount of R5 million from Pretoria. The amount was based on the assumption that the people of Lebowa in white South Africa and in other homelands had the buying power of + R90 million while it was generally accepted to be + R600 million.  

The 1985 10% GST share for Lebowa should be about R60 Million. Contrary to that, Lebowa received only R5 millions. The annual budget distribution by Pretoria across the races was in 1985 as follows:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LEBOWA</td>
<td>R4.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLOURED</td>
<td>R565.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIANS</td>
<td>R1 350. million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHITES</td>
<td>R2 200 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures above sent resentments to blacks in Lebowa and that was a ____________________________

184. Interview with D. Chokoe (Lebowa Police Man in the 80s) 2/2006.
186. Ibid.,
187. Ibid., p. 54.
recipe for discontent that subsequently sent the people to streets, to toitoi and withheld their buying powers by boycotting white shops.\textsuperscript{188} The Chief Minister of Lebowa had even suggested that the people should not only depend on the outside support for their economic battle with Pretoria but rather switch over to the trump card of withholding their buying power in order to bring Pretoria to the negotiating table. with the people. \textsuperscript{189} On 18 and 19 April 1986 the suggested buying power strategy was in operation in Mahweleng / Potgitersrus. The people did not go to town and the whites were so miserable that they even pleaded with the local Lebowa Legislative assembly electorates to request their people to lift the buying power strategy. \textsuperscript{190}

From both political and economic factors in Lebowa one may deduce that the Bantustans were systemic institutions created by Pretoria to dispossess the people of their land under the pretext of Separate Development and self determination in the area which was not viable for that. Many laws which were antagonistic to the people were promulgated and forcefully enacted by the government under the so called ‘Law and Order’. Many people lost their lives at the trigger-happy fingers of Law enforcement agencies. From 1976 paradigm shifted as the people, youth in particular. took to street open riotous confrontation with the regime as the next chapter will outline.

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{188} Ibid.,
\textsuperscript{189} LL Assembly Rerbatim Report, April, 1986.p. 4.
\textsuperscript{190} Interview: R. Lebelo, Mahwelereng, 2006.
CHAPTER FOUR


4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter should be understood in the background of political strive by the oppressed African masses, which culminated in (1) outlawing and banning political movements opposed to the white government during the mid-1960s, the ANC and its off-shoot, the PAC, (2) imprisoning their leaders for life at Roben Island, (3) creating Bantustans quasi government headed by carefully selected collaborative chiefs. The ANC and PAC were seen as the non-effective entities in exile while the people in the country were left at the manipulative tactics of the Nationalist Party. The 1976 Soweto epoch, emanating from the Black Consciousness Movement marked the turning point in the demise of apartheid while the UDF (1983-1990) crowns it all by moving in, to organise and mobilise public opposition to the government. ‘Lawlessness’ ‘anarchy’ was turning South Africa into an oligarchy, exposed to world condemnation of its policy; creating pressure that PW Botha could not withstand. Equally so was his successor, F W de Klerk, who could not withstand the political heat and saved the situation by announcing in parliament on the 2 January 1990 the unbanning of African Political parties and the ultimate release of Nelson Mandela on the 11 of the same month.

4.2 YOUTH IN THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE SINCE 1976

The history of struggle against apartheid in South Africa may not be complete without tracing and including the role played by the youth. Active
participation of youth in Lebowa in the liberation struggle against apartheid and the Lebowa Bantustan itself may be traced back in 1976 with a paroxysm of riots in Soweto. It was the boast of white South Africans in the post-Sharpville debacle that, however much might be thought to be wrong with South African society, ‘Law and Order’ prevailed.\(^{191}\)

The unrest which erupted during the middle of 1976 disturbed that white complacent assumption.\(^{192}\) The Soweto riots went beyond Orland and Dube expanded outwardly to cover the whole country. From the 16 June 1976 there was an upward spiral of inland uprisings, unrests, anarchy and in many instances open bloody confrontations between the youth and the police in all corners of South Africa and this text’s main concern will be on how the riots reverberated to Lebowa and how critical they were in the fall of apartheid and Lebowa Bantustan. Key, however is the fact that the uprising set in motion a chain of revolutionary activities and liberation struggle all over the country which continued spasmodically until 1980.\(^{193}\)

Fuel to the fire was added by the arrest of the Black consciousness leader Steve Biko who suffered at the hands of Security Police in Port Elizabeth. Seriously assaulted by the police, he was taken from there by road unclothed for a long distance to Pretoria and died on 12 September 1977. Davenport portrays him as tragic a martyr to the cause of his people emancipation as any person in the history of South Africa.\(^{194}\)

The formation in 1969 July at the University of the North, of the South

\(^{191}\) R.T.H. Davenport, p. 389.  
\(^{192}\) Ibid.  
\(^{193}\) Ibid.  
\(^{194}\) R.T.H. Daverport; p. 393.
African Student Organisation (SASO) with Steve Bantu Biko as the president including the likes of Harry Nengwekhulu in the committee, marked a turning point in the history of struggle for liberation in South Africa.\textsuperscript{195}

SASO with its Black Consciousness ideology, struggled first to emancipate the Africans from the grips of inferiority complex, entrenched into their minds by the apartheid ideologues through all mechanisms of white cultural imperialism.\textsuperscript{196} In its first conference at the University of Natal in July 1970 SASO resolved that it would act in accordance with its belief that the emancipation of the black people in this country depended entirely on the role black people themselves were prepared to play. Self-reliance became the new message. ‘Blacks are tired of standing at the touchlines to see the game that they should actually be playing’ Biko said.\textsuperscript{197}

He continued to say that;

‘A black person is reduced to an obliging shell, he looks with awe at the white power structure, accept what he regards as the inevitable position.. In the privacy of his toilet his face twist in silent condemnation of the white society but brightens up in sheepish obedience as he comes out hurrying in response to his master’s impatient call…He has become a shadow of man completely defeated, drowning in his own misery, a slave and ox bearing the yoke of oppression with sheepish timidity’\textsuperscript{198}

\textsuperscript{196} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{197} Ibid., p 262.
\textsuperscript{198} Ibid., p. 286.
SASO produced a newsletter that proved in a short space of time to be the most powerful instrument in propagating the Black Consciousness ideology. By 1972 the newsletter had circulated to almost 4,000 students. SASO had actually closed the gap or filled the void left by the African Liberation movements; the ANC and PAC who were no longer functioning organisations within South Africa following their ban in 1960.  

SASO had from the word go pronounced its stand against separate development and its rejection of the Bantustans. Entities like Lebowa Bantustan were viewed as the “dummy institutions” by SASO. SASO committed itself to a campaign of discrediting and exposing what was seen as a fraudulent notion that blacks could use the institutions of “separate development” to their own advantage. It also campaigned against Bantu Education to an extent that it already made headways into High school politics. The 1976 Soweto riots may therefore be correctly ascribed to the influence of SASO.  

Earlier on, on 29 April 1972 Onkgopotse Tiro, also a SASO leader, addressed the graduation ceremony where he attacked Bantu Education and the government. He inter alia said:

“the day shall come when we shall be free, when every man and woman shall breath the air of freedom, and when that day shall come, no man no matter how many tanks he has shall reverse the course of freedom.”

199. Ibid., p. 270.
200. Ibid., pp. 288-289
201. Interview with H. Nengwekhulu, Polokwane, 05/2006.
His address led to his expulsion from the University, class boycott by the students who demanded his return and the subsequent closure of the University by the authority. Students reapply for readmission. Two years later Tiro died in Botswana from the explosion of a parcel bomb. Tiro speech, his death and the Black Consciousness campaign, politicised most of the University students, the Mankweng community and the likes of Peter Mokaba, without whom the story of the youth participation in the liberation struggle would not be complete.

The cross-migratory movements of parents to the Reef and their children to Turfloop and other townships and rural areas in Lebowa provided a network of communication among places. It was only within a blink of an eye that Turfloop and Mankweng echoed the Soweto conflagration of the 16 June 1976 and schools like Hwiti in the closest proximity of the University were quick to join.

The politics of infiltration surfaced. SASO went on to infiltrate the Bantustan Authorities, Magosi and most of those politicised peoples who were willing to co-operate with the student course. Pamphleteering, slogans and picketing became the order of the day.

With a protracted conflict between Lebowa and Pretoria over the Land Consolidation, land excise and a triggered Black anger following the 1976 epoch, seasoned with the death of Tiro in 1974 and of Steve Biko in detention on 12 September 1977 and the ultimate banning of SASO, the people in Lebowa, progressive Legislators in the Lebowa “Government” and the underground political activists were beginning to find each other

202. Ibid., pp. 296-298.
203. Interview with Precilla Mokaba (Peter’s Mother) Mankweng, 03/2007.
205. Ibid.
and forged links against apartheid policy.\textsuperscript{206} Banning the African liberation organisation, banishing and killing their leaders could however not reverse the clock. The harder and intransigent Pretoria was on the revolutionaries, the more radical and rebellious the latter became and that, coupled with the ongoing declaration of the state of emergency, became the order of the decade. By the late 1980s Lebowa was almost a military state. One would at all corners see a military vehicle with a dozen of black/white soldiers on board. Lebowa have become a mini-sanctuary for insurgents.\textsuperscript{207}

The eruption of Soweto in 1976 served as pace-setter for the already politicised community in many parts of Lebowa Bantustan. When it started, Peter Mokaba was the President of SRC at Hwiti High School and the school was among the first to join. With the home made petrol bombs in their hands students pressed panic buttons in the police and the riots lasted until the end of 1976. In the subsequent year Mokaba was served with two letters, one from Hwiti informing him that he had been banned from attending school at Hwiti. The second letter was from Lebowa Bantustan, banning him from attending any school in Lebowa.\textsuperscript{208}

From 1976 waves of liberation were escalating. Civil disobedience, unrest, police harassment and murder became the order of the time. Riots reverberated and ricocheted to engulf the nearby townships of Seshego, Lebowakgomo and Mahwelereng. Most of the Lebowa rural areas joined the struggle sooner and the whole Bantustan later.

\textsuperscript{206} G.M. Gerhart, pp. 298 and 312.
\textsuperscript{207} P. Moorcraft, p.428.
\textsuperscript{208} Mokaba-phtml, Life of Courage; Peter Mokaba in his own words, p. 5. 

@ \url{http://www.ANC.org.ZA/people/}
Between 17/6/1976 and 28/9/1976, sequence of events at the University, neighbouring schools, townships, and even homelands of Venda and Gazankulu started. The students passed derogatory remarks against Afrikaans-Nederland lecturer and subsequently attempted to burn the office of Prof. Sinclair, head of faculty of Afrikaans-Nederland. This was followed by a class boycott the next day. On the 18/6/1976 about 800 students marched to a gathering at the sport stadium. They further marched to the lecture halls and stoned Mr Badenhorts. At about 11H10 the student community hall was set on fire and totally burned down. It was later discovered that the main telephone line to Sovenga Post Office was cut off. Sovenga Post Office was also burned including two (LG) Catterpillars. Open conflict between the police and students ensued. 12 students were injured with Robert Keetse dying on road to hospital in Pretoria. Keetse was reported to have jumped out of third floor and fallen down. 359 students were arrested, 166 charged, the rest were released. On the same date the University was indefinitely closed and the police remained on campus while students were away.

The closure of the University only helped the expelled students to carry acts of arson randomly to the embarrassment of the state and the University authorities. The same night Mphefu High School in Venda was set ablaze while in Seshego, Ambag School, the office of the Principal was burned down. In Setotolwane the thatched roof Library was also

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209 Archival, Onluste Verslag, SAP Afdeling Noord Transvaal. pp. 2-8. (Kronologiese Volgorde van Gebeure.)

210 Ibid.

211 Ibid.

212 Ibid.

213 Ibid.
completely burned down. On 23 June 1976 the NG Kerk at Tshilisini was totally deleted by arson with an estimate damage of R50,000.\textsuperscript{214} 1976 Schools reopened and the Homeland of Lebowa was once more blazing with acts of arson. In Mahwelereng, Nonchimudi Primary School was gutted down with fire.\textsuperscript{215} On 4 August 1976 the secretary’s office at Hwiti High School was also set alight with the damage estimated at R300,00.

As the situation protracted into the 1980s the country became almost ungovernable and that fitted very well with the aspiration of the youth, especially the University students and the freedom fighters who openly stated that they wanted to make South Africa ungovernable.

The period 1977 to 1983 may in the history of African liberation struggle be called the period of “armed propaganda.” \textsuperscript{216} The ANC mobilised domestic political support while continuing with underground acts of sabotage and hitting targets symbolic to apartheid. \textsuperscript{217} The apogee of such acts was a successful hit of the showcase SASOL oil plant which was guarded by the highly-rated commando reservists in the country. SASOL was turned into ‘a sea of flame, the fire of freedom, the most beautiful fire which symbolised the largest act of sabotage in South Africa’ as exalted by the ANC magazine, Sechaba. \textsuperscript{218} Hand grenades, limpet mines, landmines, Skorpion 7.65 mm, Makarov 9mm and the deadly AK 47 constituted the inland weapons of the ANC.\textsuperscript{219}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{214} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{215} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{216} P. L. Moorecraft, African Nemesis, p.352.
\textsuperscript{217} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{218} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{219} Ibid., p.353.
\end{flushleft}
At UNIN the Azanian Student Organisation (AZASO), an ANC-aligned, now known as the South African Student Congress was formed. For security reasons the members of the committee were unknown. strategies around Lebowa were organised and planned by that committee. Godfree Selepe and Benjamin Mphiko (popularly known as the Chinese Philosopher) were amongst the members of that committee.\textsuperscript{220} Alongside SASCO there was also the Northern Transvaal Students Co-ordinating Committee (NTSCC) which was mobilising students in all corners of Lebowa to take to the streets all sorts of activities that would set an African free from the joke of apartheid. \textsuperscript{221} On 16 September 1985 the NTSCC issued volumes of pamphlets titled CALL FOR UNITY, MOBILISATION AND PROTEST. The pamphlets were distributed to all schools in Mankweng vicinity. The pamphlets called for solidarity with UNIN students whose campus was under police siege, Cosas banned, comrades beaten by the police, SRC offices turned into security police head-quarters.\textsuperscript{222} A University student Gerald Makhene was at that time lying ill in hospital because of the police raid and torture at Turfloop campus. As a results NTSCC called for the 16-20 September 1985 as a week of march protests during which all schools, colleges of education and the University should boycott classes. \textsuperscript{223}

The Bantustan leaders and Legislators, their homes and cars, institutions like Police Stations and even institutions of learning were primary targets of invasions and arsons. Hwiti High School was gutted down by fire to an estimated damage of R165 000.

\textsuperscript{220} G Selepe. Blowing my Horn. p.48.
\textsuperscript{221} Interview with: B Mphiko. Mankweng 7/2006
\textsuperscript{222} The said pamphlet of NTSCC is found in Hwiti High School Log Book, 2007.
\textsuperscript{223} Ibid.
In Mahwelereng for instance, the house of Mr S P Kwakwa, the Minister of Education in Lebowa Bantustan was burned down completely.\textsuperscript{224} He received an amount of R25 000 as compensation. Later on the Mokerong Magistrate Offices situated in Mahwelereng were gutted down by arson.\textsuperscript{225} Everywhere else in Lebowa some such incidents were happening. The Mankweng Police, which is close to the University had to be reinforced with armed Lebowa and South African Police and later on, depending on the escalating turmoil and unrest, added the South African Defence Force. The police and SADF were deployed everywhere in the Bantustan.\textsuperscript{226} In Sekhukhuneland alone there were several antiapartheid initiatives. The Sekhukhuneland Youth Congress and the Sekhukhuneland Parent Crisis Committee, added the Civic Associations were, by the mid 1980s, liberation forces to reckon with all their activities coordinated by the UDF.\textsuperscript{227}

On 12 June 1986 a state of emergency, lifted in March, was declared again.\textsuperscript{228} The students were subjected to an ordeal when the whole campus (UNIN) was besieged by hundreds of heavily armed soldiers.\textsuperscript{229} Even Luis Le Grange, the then Minister of Law and Order was personally there. Students remarked that it was the longest night they ever lived through. A sudden loud hauling announcement by one military commander was made at 12H00 midnight to the effect that all students

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{224} LL Assembly Verbatim Report, April, 1985, p.143.
\item \textsuperscript{225} LL Assembly Verbatim Report, June, 1988, p.694.
\item \textsuperscript{226} Interview with J. Malatji. Turfloop, 02/2006.
\item \textsuperscript{227} LL Assembly Verbatim Report, April/May, 1986, p. 31.
\item \textsuperscript{228} P. Moorcraft, p. 374.
\item \textsuperscript{229} Interview with Mr. Dolo, Seshego, 03/2007.
\end{itemize}
should, without fail, get into their hostel rooms and live their doors open.230 A massive search for political activists, banned literature, revolutionary documents, T-shirts bearing labels and inscriptions like SASCO, ANC, AZAPO, ensued. From a hostel to another one could hear a heartbreaking cry of students in the brutal hands of the South African Defence Force (SADF). That was the nature of the State of Emergency. The following morning documents, pamphlets, T-shirts bearing political statements and messages including the banned literature were found littered on the ground surface outside the student hostels as they were thrown out through the windows by students who were afraid of police torture (Self)231

These counter-revolutionary attacks on students in particular and the youth and freedom fighters in general was made legal from time to time and annually through the declaration of the State of Emergency by Pretoria. It empowered the police to arrest and imprison without trial and even to kill if necessary.232 From 12 June 1986 to 1989 the combined forces of the SADF, SAP and LP assumed control of the University security services.233

There are today many people whose disappearance have not and cannot be accounted for. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission has for sure not told it all. Confrontation with the armed state security agencies became the order of 1980s decade. Toitoi, school boycotts, bus boycotts and sloganeering fashioned the decade. In all occasions, a call for any form of boycott was to be obeyed and descanters were

230. Self observed and occupied peripheral hostel room and saw
231. Ibid.
232. Interview S Lediga, Polokwane, 07/2007
233. LLAssembly Verbatim Report (K P Phasha), May/June, 1988, p,553.
always labelled as collaborators who were supposed to be severely punished by the angry mob.\textsuperscript{234} Punishments ranged from burning one’s room at hostels or one’s home. It was a very sophisticated act of arson. One student’s home which was in some 350 Ks from the University of the North was burned the same day as he descanted the call for class boycott.\textsuperscript{235} That coordinated action was enough, a causal connection, to demonstrate how sophisticated the prevailed network of anti-apartheid activities was. In townships a practice called ‘neck lacing’ marked another dynamic in dealing with the state informers. One who was declared a police informer or state spy was tightened with a tyre soaked in petrol on his neck, set alight and stoned to death.\textsuperscript{236}

At all rallies and mass meetings protest and revolutionary songs were chanted. Of all the slogans chanted during political rallies, the Peter Mokaba’s \textit{Kill the Boer Kill the Farmer}, seasoned with the maxim \textit{one settle one bullet} was the most radical; contrary to MORENA BOLOKA or NKOSISIKELEL’I AFRIKA, a peace song composed by Enoch Sontonga in Nunsfield Hostel in Soweto in the late 1880s and now the National Anthem.\textsuperscript{237} The Peter Mokaba slogan sent fear and triggered off anger in the whites, especially Boers who were scattered all over large tracts of land. The song is said to be responsible for the establishment of the Commando System (an organised Boer Self Defence Unit). While that was happening the Boers in the said farms suffered at the hands of guerrillas; those Africans who were engaged in clandestine operations and attacks from the borders of the front-line states.\textsuperscript{238} There was all over Lebowa an open interracial rage and violence and killings.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{234} Interview with B. L. Mphiko, Turfloop, 7/2006.
\textsuperscript{235} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{236} Interview with J. Sebone, resident of Soweto and Lebowa, 08/2006.
\textsuperscript{237} T.R.H. Davernport and C. Sanders, p.568.
\textsuperscript{238} Interview with T. T. Cholo, Polokwane, 06/2006
\end{flushright}
Whites could enter a bus or a train and start shooting at black passengers. To quote Dr CNM Phatudi;

‘In this country violence is showing its ugly head not infrequently to the concern of all peace-loving and patriotic South African’.

Phatudi said that, registering his concern on three people who were shot dead and two seriously injured at Pietersburg Railway Station on the 17 April 1983. The culprits were two De Beer brothers. A letter was there and then written to the Minister of Cooperation and Development, protesting strongly for the incident. There was a bomb explosion in Pretoria where four ‘Lebowa people’ lost their lives.

The 1980s witnessed an ever increasing political death reports. The Minister of Law and Order in Lebowa issued an order that all the so-called comrades must be found and be kicked to death. Makompo Kutumela, a resident of Mahwelereng and member of Azapo became a victim of that order. He was a journalist for a tabloid linked to Die Bosvelder in Potgitersrus. He was arrested for his political activism in Mahwelereng township and the surrounding villages. He died in the hands of the Lebowa Police. To take matters to extreme the Law and Order Department issued an order that not more than 100 people must attend Makompo’s funeral. That triggered off rage in Mahwelereng and the order was vehemently challenged to an extend that the Law and Order

240. Ibid.
241. Ibid.
243. Ibid.
Department withdrew the order and thousands of people attended the funeral.\textsuperscript{244} The struggle for liberation was no longer reversible. Students were freely seen wearing the T-Shirts bearing the release Mandela inscriptions.\textsuperscript{245} That has sent a message to the ruling National Party. Change was inevitable. If one critically assessed the situation, one observes that there was a triangulated duel. The youth and revolutionaries against Lebowa Bantustan and Pretoria on the one hand, Pretoria against the latter and the former on the other hand and through her less sophisticated police force against freedom fighters; a marked contradiction. More critical is the clear paradigm shift in the mind of some Bantustan Leaders and elders to forge links and join ranks with youth to dismantle apartheid.\textsuperscript{246} For instance, Phatudi, as the Chief Minister of Lebowa, was more in favour of peace and love and co-operation than confrontation with Pretoria and the provocative neighbouring Bantustans of Kwa-Ndebele and Gazankulu. He was however forced to change his policy to align himself with fellow Legislators, who usually urged him to adopt radical stance against agent-provocateurs. The National and territorial waves of the youth radicalism from 1976 filled the political gaps in the minds of the majority of the people in Lebowa; even Magoshi and the government legislators.\textsuperscript{247}

4.3 DEFECTION OF MAGOSHI TO THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE, 1987 AND BEYOND

In September 1987 the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa

\textsuperscript{244} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{245} Interview with E. Mpaho, Mahwelereng, 08/2006.
\textsuperscript{247} Ibid.
(CONTRALESA) was launched with a membership of 38 chiefs mainly from Kwa-Ndebele and Moutse.\textsuperscript{248} It was an ANC-aligned organisation whose constitution spelt it out that it aimed at uniting all traditional leaders in the country, to fight for the eradication of the Bantustan system and re-orienting them to the course of African liberation struggle and he role they should play in order to win back the land of their forefather.\textsuperscript{249} Most of the Magoshi especially in Lebowa, became affiliates of CONTRALESA. With the ANC in exile, with Pretoria providing no solution to their quest for land and with unscrupulous land excise CONTRALESA appeared to be the Chiefs future mouth piece to the intransigent Pretoria.\textsuperscript{250} The formation of CONTRALESA was very critical in the collapse of Bantustans. Those chiefs even visited Lusaka to offer their support to the ANC while, reciprocally, the ANC offered them political education starting with the wars of resistance waged by their predecessors.\textsuperscript{251} The chiefs have come back home to join their African brothers in the liberation of their country. ‘chiefs coming back to the people.’ \textsuperscript{252} The small land they occupied and ‘governed’ could then play a critical role as a point for infiltration and underground African political activism. The infiltration confused the South African defence system. The Defence Force which had hitherto been confined to the South Africa’s Northern borders was from 1987 deployed to all corners of the Bantustan and villages because the main pillar in the survival of the apartheid system had henceforth defected to the liberation movement. “Terrorism”, as the apartheid state

\textsuperscript{248} J. Pampallis, p.296.
\textsuperscript{249} Race Relation Survey, 1988.
\textsuperscript{250} Interview with Kgosi S Thobejane, Polokwane, 2006.
\textsuperscript{251} Van Kessel, p.180.
\textsuperscript{252} T. Zuma, pp. 65-70.
was labelling the African liberation activism, was no longer fought at the borders. Everywhere in the country there was a ‘terrorist’.

One morning in 1987 a young white soldier interrupted a group of twenty students who were burning down some documents at the so called Travalgar Square in the University of the North. As they showed no remorse nor fear for him, while chanting slogans, he called another senior soldier and finger-pointed at the students and said: “They are all terrorists.” One may therefore construe that the word “terrorist” held different meanings for different people in the country. As the students declared themselves “comrades” the young white man took them for “terrorists”. Even in the Legislative Assembly, which was predominantly Magoshi, one could from 1987 hear demand for the release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC, PAC etc. L. C. Mpya, the member of the Legislative Assembly from Mokerong electoral division have even suggested to the cabinet to intervene and negotiate with relevant authorities (Pretoria) to have Nelson Mandela unconditionally released.

4.4 THE UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT (UDF) AND THE MASS DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT (MDM).

The banning of the ANC and the PAC in 1960 and the imprisonment of their activists in the subsequent years had for a long time frustrated the course of African liberation struggle. There was hardly any sensible political movement threatening the Nationalist Party government. The

253. Interview with J. Mafafo, Mamehlabe. 05/2007.
254. Interview with B, Mphiko, Turfloop, 02/2006.
Black Consciousness was also suppressed and ultimately banned. A creative minority and political strategists like Rev Alan Boesak responded to the internal political holocaust and came with what became known as the UDF.\textsuperscript{256} It was formed in 1983 as a coalition of about 400 civics, churches, students, workers and other organisation whose primary objective was to fight the envisaged Tricameral Constitution. Its slogan, “UDF Unite, Apartheid divides” embraced the reality of the South African political situation. It was officially launched on August 20, 1983.\textsuperscript{257} From the very beginning the goal of the UDF was to coordinate existing organisations, basing its policy and political theory on the 1955 Freedom Charter.\textsuperscript{258} The UDF stood for a united South Africa without tribal based Bantustans. In 1986 it resolved that tribal structures should be replaced with democratic structures. The Magoshi had to give way for the people to run the villages.\textsuperscript{259} At its peak in 1987 the UDF had its roots in students/ youth organisations, trade unions, church groups, civic structures and/or any anti apartheid movement of the time which embraced.\textsuperscript{260}

The UDF had its base first in Sekhukhuneland that by 1986 that place was the most politically advanced by comparison with any other tribal area in Lebowa. The political advancement of Sekhukhuneland as well be dated back to the 1950s with the formation Sebata-Kgomo, a political vein of the ANC created by Flack Boshielo, Nkadimeng and Motswaledi. People Like Peter Nchabeleng (UDF leader), Laurence Phokanoka, Dr. Aron Motswaledi, Joe Phaahla, Machike Tobejane played a very critical role in mobilising the community.

\textsuperscript{256} Wikipedia.org.za, pp,1.  
\textsuperscript{257} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{258} Http://www. pp.1-2.  
\textsuperscript{259} Van Kessel, pp. 593-614.  
\textsuperscript{260} P. Moocraft. p. 355.
participate in the liberation struggle. The UDF was already established there with Peter Nchabeleng as the leader. He was so strategic and tactical a leader that he could organise political meetings in churches. He used to organise the community of Nchabeleng in the Lutheran Church and invited activists like Terror Lekota to come and address the people with Bibles in their hands, under the pretext of religious sermon. One night Terror Lekota drove in an old Nissan Langley to Ga-Nchabeleng and during the ‘sermon’ the church was besieged by soldiers and security forces. They entered the church and started searching the people and found nothing except Bibles and Hymn books. The soldiers even thought that Terror Lekota was a priest, given his body built.

Individual churchmen have had a dramatic effect on mobilising the people, particularly during the highly charged atmosphere of mass funerals. Funerals were becoming rallying venues for the activists to mobilise the people into the liberation struggle. With the militant youth in the fore front of politics, the Magoshi joining in the liberation struggle. the UDF playing an organising role and the whole country in turmoil and ungovernable, walls were written before the face of Pretoria. The winds of change speech of Harold McMillan, that Pretoria remained passive of, was blowing vividly throughout the country. African Nationalism was mellowing into victory.

261. Interview with S Lediga. 03/2007.

If one studies all the policy speeches of Dr CNM Phatudi from the day he was inaugurated the Chief Minister of Lebowa in 1973 to the last policy speech he delivered in 1987 one hears more of liberation statements than conformity to the white policy of apartheid. Suffice it to mention that although that remained his(Phatudi) standpoint one may not tell with certainty what was his actual national political platform over and above his ethnical Lebowa People’s Party. However, much as he suffered bitter relations with Pretoria over a number of issues on the one hand and being labelled a ‘puppet’, ‘sell-out’ and ‘stooge’ by the anti-apartheid and anti-homeland politicians on the other hand, he was equally more of a thorn to Pretoria than simply a collaborator. He died in 1987. 264 He was succeeded by Nelson Ramodike. Ramodike have by all means not deviated from his predecessor except that he changed the party name, the Lebowa People’s Party to the United People’s Front to adapt to the envisaged new order. In April 1988 in his policy speech he had this to say to Mr J.C. Heunis:

“The death of the late Governor, His Excellency Dr C.N.M. Phatudi only served to bring a change in leadership and not in direction. Lebowa remains unalterably committed to the search for peace, stability, justice and equality of all South Africans” 265

By the time Ramodike took over in 1987, Lebowa, as a ‘self governing’ Bantustan, was not yet consolidated into a coherent whole. Lebowa was even more smaller in geographical size than it was in the early 1970s.

A tug of war was still raging over Moutse. The whole country was in a catastrophe. The youth were becoming more militant and displaying a generational and political conflict with their parents that they branded tamed and timid.\textsuperscript{266} The most significant and a step further into apartheid’s verge of collapse was Ramodike and his people’s refusal to Pretoria’s call to participate in what was called National Council.\textsuperscript{267} Having failed to attract Lebowa and five other Bantustans into the horns of independence, exposed to international criticism on the policy of apartheid, with civil disobedience and turmoil as the order of the day, Pretoria thought of establishing the National Council. This was a body, unilaterally created by Pretoria, to serve as a forum in which to negotiate with the Bantustan Leaders about the new democratic order.\textsuperscript{268} Pretoria was even trying to take advantage of Phatudi’s death that when he was a Chief Minister he had agreed to participate in the envisaged National Council; a statement that Ramodike dismissed as a blatant lie.\textsuperscript{269}

Ramodike, justifiably juxtaposed and compared the envisaged National Council with the attempt in the early 1980s by Pretoria to establish a Tri-cameral Parliament that would include the Indians and Coloureds and exclude Blacks. This time the National Council excluded the ANC and other banned African political movements.\textsuperscript{270} Both the Tri-cameral Parliament (1983) and the National Council (1988) were in the words of Ramodike analogous to inherently good song that is robbed

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{266} Interview with B. Mphiko. Mankweng, 05/2006.
  \item \textsuperscript{267} Interview with Kgoshi B K Matlala, Gamatlala, 05/2005.
  \item \textsuperscript{268} LL Assembly Verbatim Report.
  \item \textsuperscript{269} LLA Verbatim Report, (Ramodike) 04/1988. p. 10.
  \item \textsuperscript{270} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
of its melody by the exclusion of a baritone. Unbanning all the political organisations in the country and releasing all political prisoners was what Ramodike demanded as a prerequisite to the success of the National Council and a condition for Lebowa to participate in. ²⁷¹

The intransigent Pretoria have thus for sure confronted the recalcitrance of Lebowa and the militant youth. What was to be a racial solution from Pretoria and the Broederbond point of view has now become dragon teeth.²⁷² Pretoria was in an inescapable vortex of his own making. Lebowa was not prepared at all to compromise a stand. PW Botha could no longer stand the heat. There is a say that if you cant stand the heat you must get out of the kitchen and that was the logical thing Botha did. He resigned. His successor and the last of the white Presidents, W.F. De Klerk was more of a reformist than the rest of predecessors. In Cape Town, on Friday, 2 February 1990 at 11h00 De Klerk delivered the Parliamentary opening speech that made a turning point in the history of South Africa. The climax of his address is captured in his firm words when he said:

‘I think Mr Nelson Mandela could play a role. The government has noted that he has declared himself to be willing to make a constructive contribution to the peaceful political process in South Africa. I therefore, Mr Speaker, wish to put it plainly that the government has taken a firm decision to release Nelson Mandela unconditionally’. **BOOING.** ‘I am serious about bringing this matter to finality without delay’.²⁷³

Nine days later, on the 11 February as per de Klerk speech,

²⁷¹ Ibid., pp, 10 &12.
Nelson Mandela walked out of Victor Vester prison a free man, after having served a 27 years jail sentence. 274 The release of Nelson Mandela symbolised the end of apartheid and its institutions and a dawn for a new dispensation. By Mandela’s release De Klerk seemed to have capitulated together with his Bantustans cohort of Chief Ministers and abdicated power to him (Mandela), a new pilot.

4.6 THE MEDIA

The media was another instrument used in propagating and promoting apartheid. Censorship, in myriad forms, invaded all aspects of South African life. By the 1970 there were well over 100 laws that controlled the flow of information to every nook and cranny. 275 Secret censorship committees dominated by the conservative Afrikaners sat in judgement on any paraphernalia that threatened the South African way of life. In 1976 television was introduced in South Africa, kept rigidly under state control. Similarly, radio broadcast was a strict state monopoly 276 When Lebowa was declared a Territorial Authority in 1962 the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) created her a broadcasting station, Radio Bantu, broadcasting from Pretoria with Justice Tshungu and Rasebotsa as the first black announcers. 277 Tshungu was a multi-lingual African who was at all times called to translate between the Central Government visiting white Afrikaner ministers and the Bapedi of Lebowa. 278 He was once called for a

274. Ibid.
276. Ibid.
277. Ibid., pp.148-150.
disciplinary hearing as the SABC authorities suspected him of inflammatory political rhetoric following his radio broadcast wherein he called Africans *bana ba tsie-kgalaka*;

279 the Northern Sotho metaphor for social classification of the people living in abject poverty.

In Radio Bantu cum Radio Lebowa cum Thobela FM there should always be an Afrikaner who was employed on the basis of Northern Sotho language understanding and fluency in order to monitor all form and nature of broadcasting contents; apparently recommended for appointment by the secret censorship committee mentioned earlier on. 280 The radio station did therefore, not provide the people with access to information or freedom of expression; hence the call for a reprimanding and warning of Justice Tshungu that he should avoid using words that were construed as inflammatory or political to be more specific. 281

There were always a cry that Radio Lebowa was not giving the Lebowa Legislative Assembly correct coverage. It was criticized and accused of listening to Pretoria at the expense of the people for which it was established. 282 Its code of ethics was also questionable. During the apogee of boundary disputes between Gazankulu and Leabowa in the mid 1980s, Radio Lebowa was always making announcements in favour of Gazankulu. 283

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279. Interview with Mankopane Ngoako of Thobela FM, 09/2006.
280. Ibid.
281. Ibid.
282. Documentary: UPF Submission to Codesa working groups.
That came again in 1987 when Radio Lebowa was listed with the local newspapers, Times and City Press of the 14-6-1987 of having reported that a proposal was made by certain members of the Legislative Assembly at Lebowakgomo to opt for independence. That was not the case as the Legislators interpreted the report as a general opinion of Radio Lebowa, not what they have actually agreed upon. It was even recommended that Sol Morathi, a reporter for City Press should withdraw that report as it was a recipe enough to defame the Chief Minister and instigate the people against him. It was also a potential media means to wrick havoc in the Lebowa and African political circles.

That was a very sophisticated strategy by Pretoria to confuse and frustrate African unity and perpetuate white supremacy. In the media circle every propaganda that promoted the ideology of Separate Development, Bantustans, apartheid and white supremacy was given a go ahead while any counter active media was censored. In 1977 the World paper was censored and its editor Percy Qobosha was banished following the report he wrote on the death of Steve Biko.

During the apogee of the African liberation struggle the media could not always report on the true state of affairs in Lebowa and the country as a whole. From the mid 1985 the UDF, backed by the ANC’s Radio Freedom, which was broadcasting from outside, was at work to tell and report on the actual state of affairs and events in the country although it had its audience from few to the exclusion of many who were inhibited to listen

284. Ibid (MJ Mahlangu)
to it or did not have a Radio as it was a rare commodity for blacks. 288

Suffice it however to state that TV, cameras and other technological advancements closed the gab between the oceans. Many political incidents were covered to expose the fallacy and fraudulency of apartheid while the domestic reporters and photographers like Magubane and many more others provided the true pictures and photos of the events in South Africa that put to shame the policy of apartheid.

288. A History of the UDF @ http://www.anc.org.za, p.2
CHAPTER FIVE


5.1 INTRODUCTION

The release of Nelson Mandela following the speech of De Klerk on 2 February 1990, set in motion a chain of events in the whole country which few anticipated. \(^{289}\) The Groote Schuur minutes, of the 4 May 1990 which entailed the agreement between the ANC and the government led to a safer return of the exiles. On the 6 August the Pretoria Minutes led to the release of political prisoners and the repeal of the Internal Security Act. The release and the return would help in ending violence as it was indeed reflected by Mandela’s announcement of ending the armed struggle.\(^{290}\) In two years time from the release of Mandela the De Klerk government had repealed many Apartheid Laws that it was possible to call for the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA). \(^{291}\)

5.2 THE CONVENTION OF A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA (CODESA).

That theatrical occasion happened on the 20/21 December 1991, at Kempton Park, attended also by delegates from Bantustan governments including Lebowa.\(^{292}\) As the CODESA talks were

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289. R. Davenport and C. Sanders, South Africa; A Modern History, p.559
290. Ibid.
291. J.D. Omer-Cooper, History of Southern Africa, p. 24
unfolding, there were white right wingers as well as some ‘blacks’ in the Bantustan who felt threatened by the new developments that would in a way deprive them of their apartheid era privileges. For instance in Pietersburg and the rural north Transvaal almost all whites voted ‘NO’ on De Klerk referendum of white voters, in March 1992, on whether they wished the process of negotiations to roll on. Some of the Legislators who have benefited from the system still wanted the status quo to remain. Some still maintained that political prisoners should remain in detention or that there should be further detention in future in Lebowa as it was first remarked back in 1989.

Of more significance was the role of the people on the ground and Lebowa adaptation to the winds of change. The MDM was taking its toll in Lebowa. Apartheid could no longer hold. It was a laughing stock to the international communities. It equated South Africa with the age of barbarism. South Africa was on a backward move from apartheid day one.

5.3 POST 1990 LEBOWA

Victory and FREEDOM was certain and visible in the horizon. Lebowa as the institution and appendage of apartheid had to fade away to pave the way for a new dispensation. Unlike the previous refusal to participate in the Botha’s envisaged National Council, this time Lebowa participated in CODESA that she considered the legitimate, all African organ of constructive engagement. Lebowa preferred a federal system as she contemplated even during the era of Phatudi.

294. J.D. Omer-Cooper, p. 248.
5.3.1 LEBOWA SUBMISSIONS TO CODESA WORKING GROUPS, FEBRUARY-MAY, 1992.

In a gesture of adaptation to changes in South Africa, the Lebowa People’s Party, which was ethnical in nature and origin was renamed the United People’s Front (codenamed UPF). Lebowa participated in CODESA with the UPF cap and a college of Magoshi. The UPF with N Ramodike as its chair person evolved out of a systemic infiltration by the MDM and the readiness of Ramodike to co-operate with the ANC. Since his release, Mandela had several meetings with the Bantustan leaders including Ramodike. The UPF emerged out of such meetings. Walter Sisulu played a role in changing the LPP to the UPF. The UPF seemed to have been a better name that fitted well with the constitution of the LPP written some 17 years ago through the guidance of a legal practitioner Collins Ramusi. The LPP cum UPF has always been vexatious to Pretoria, especially when it outlined that it shall be the aim of the party to ensure in the government of Lebowa and of future government of a new United South Africa with common citizenship and nationality. It even extended its membership across the country and races. It was ethnical in name and national in contents. Its founder and compiler, Collins Ramusu received death threats that he even found refuge and asylum in the United States.

297. Ibid.
299. Ibid.
300. Lebowa People’s Party Constitution, pp, 1 and 2.
UPF made various significant submissions to various working groups of both CODESA 1 and 2. The first submission was on the issue of the state controlled media, both electronic and print media. The core of that submission is documented as follows:

*It is patently clear to all and sundry that there has always been a very close relationship between the SABC and the government. If the government subscribe to the principle of freedom of speech… then it should be willing and prepared to have those bodies that have historically taken steps to restrict a free flow of information or went to censure or distort information, completely restructured.*

Restructuring the board of the corporation is what it entailed. In the Print Media the UPF, in consonance with the principle of Freedom of expression, urged for the freedom of media to pursue its editorial policy and the removal of restriction that were statutorily imposed on newspapers.

Lebowa (UPF) also proposed that chiefs and headmen should always be neutral irrespective of their political affiliation, with regard to the new constitution. The proposed constitution emphasized unity, democracy, non-racism and non-sexism.

The UPF further proposed to CODESA that all discriminatory and racially based Laws should be scrapped.

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302. Hand out; United People's Front Submission to CODESA.
303. Ibid.
304. Ibid.
Some of those laws are so cruel that they dehumanised people and made them loose their self-esteem and self-respect. The notorious migratory labour act has torn families asunder.  

Moving closer to the demise of Lebowa the UPF also called for the scrapping of the BANTU HOMELAND CONSTITUTION ACT (ACT 21 of 1972) which was the maim pillar on which homelands existed.  

Available evidence shows that all Bantustans were policed by the South African Military and Security apparatus. The Bantu Homelands Constitution Act, prohibited Homelands Legislatures from dealing with matter of defence, foreign affairs, banking and Radio services. It was therefore worthless to hold on to.  

The call for the scrapping of the Bantu Homeland Constitution Act by a homeland delegation to CODESA was critical in the demise of Bantustans; an overt testimony that the whole system was imposed to blacks in those enclaves which looked almost like the Caribbean archipelagos. The submission also suggested the dimension and extend to which Lebowa was penetrated and infiltration by the Mass Democratic Movements with the politics of liberation.

5.3.2 THE MASS DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT .

The UDF played a major role as a strategic transmission belt to cross-fertilise African political organisations in order to arrive at a political synergy to face the challenges in the years before the first ever South

305. Ibid.
306. Ibid.
307. Ibid.
African all inclusive democratic elections. The MDM should also be viewed as the brain child of the UDF. With the ANC unbanned, the UDF formally dropped tools in August 1991 and led the ANC to continue with the struggle for total emancipation of the people. Together with Cosatu, Civic structures, SACP and other organisations that bought into the struggle, the ANC led the struggle and the collective was named the Patriotic Front, which was the forerunner of the present Tripartite Alliance of the ANC, SACP and COSATU + South African National Civic Organization.

The remaining part of this text will outline the local activities of the Patriotic Front that led to the fall of Lebowa, the closure of the Legislative Assembly, the ultimate pull down and disappearance of its flag and its Armoria Patriae (Mphiri o tee ga o Ile) and her disappearance from the map of South Africa.

5.3.3 TEACHERS ON BOARD

For the great part of the 1980s teachers in Lebowa were affiliated to TUATA which nationally affiliated to ATASA of Leepile Taunyane. ATASA was labelled a collaborator to the state and the new generation of teachers that sprang off from 1976 could not find political home in it. Those who joined TUATA did that on the hope that they would transform it from within. The young and militant breed of teachers always had conflict with the oldies,

309. Ibid., p.3.
school inspectors that they always labelled conservative, intransigent and puppets and agents of the state. The label held a element of truth in that the elder cherished the notion of education first despite the shortcoming and divisive contents of the Bantu Education Act of 1953, while the progressive youth brigade of teacher preached and practiced the idea of liberation first.  

In 1991 the Northern Transvaal Teachers Union (NOTTU) was formed. It later made confluence with other progressive Teacher Unions country wide, spearheaded by COSATU, for the formation of the South African Democratic Teacher Union (SADTU) 

When a call was made at Harare for Teacher Unity in South Africa, it was impossible back at home for the militants and the collaborators to find one another in confluence to signing for unity. When the signing day for teacher unity came and the celebration took place at Orlando Stadium the President of TUATA who was also to sign did not come. As a result there remained a marked and sharp distinction between TUATA and what was to become SADTU. In the education system almost all managerial positions were occupied by the elders and mostly members of TUATA. School principals and inspectors were always against all meetings and mass actions called by progressive teacher union. Members were always subjected to all form of charges that pivoted around the so called insubordination. Any one who was charged with any act of insubordination could hardly be promoted to any level above teacher (CS1). All meetings and mass action were

312. Interview with M.T. Mabitsi, Steilloop, 05/2007.
313. Ibid.
314. Ibid.
declared illegal. Participating in them one ran the risk of a leave without pay. Many teachers were as a result dismissed or removed from the teacher’s payroll. Pledging solidarity with the affected teachers evolved into a maxim ‘an injury to one is an injury to all.’

The climax was reached when a 21 days teachers chalks down culminated into no work no pay principle out of which many teacher in Lebowa were severely affected, with their salaries cut. Many marches were then made to the Department of Education in Lebowakgomo parliamentary buildings in demand of deducted monies and unbiased promotions within the system. Teachers in the progressive line were convinced that their activities were for the correct and just course. Lebowakgomo stadium became a venue for many subsequent meetings and point of departure for all marches to ‘head’ office. In sympathy with the affected teacher NEHAU joined in and there was a stage in Lebowa wherein almost every thing came to a stand still including clerks at Head Office who offered to pledge solidarity with the disgruntled teachers. Pretoria could read the writing on the wall as she could no longer hold the central power as the Bantustans were falling apart. The next move by Pretoria was to deploy Fourie to Lebowa as a de facto Chief Minister with Ramodike holding a de lege portfolio as the Chief Minister. At the central position to politics in Lebowa, Fourie made some strides in salvaging the situation in Lebowa as the stage of ungovernableness was at its zenith. Among other things, he authorised the payback of Leaves Without

317. Ibid.
218. Interview with M.T. Mabitsi, Steillop, 05/2006
319. Ibid.
320. Ibid.
Pay for all who were involved in mass actions. Teacher, especially SADTU affiliates, were the most affected and their repayments were doubled.  

That was viewed as an attempt by the National Party to perpetuate a notion that sehlare sa mosotho ke lekgowa and to gain political mileage in black communities in Lebowa, as at many occasions the NP would slaughter a beast and invite blacks for a feast and campaign for the elections. That is why on the occasion of Ramathlodi’s ‘welcome home’ rally at Nakonkwetlou School, Dr. Aron Motswaledi had this to say:

‘we are aware of the ‘beast feasting ’rallies by other parties, especially the NP which for so many years made us suffer…dancing for the orchestra of our empty stomachs .Attend and eat those beasts but not to forget to vote for the ANC in the forthcoming elections.’

5.3.4 THE 1994 ELECTIONS

Parallel to conflagration in Lebowa there was an on going debates and negotiations at CODESA for a democratic change while in all Bantustans of Lebowa, Venda and Gazankulu (what was to become Northern Province) the People and their legislative assemblies have outgrown Bantustans politics in anticipation of a new national call for the first non racial and democratic elections. CODESA had put in place the Transitional Executive Committee (TEC) and the Independent Electoral Commission . ( code named the IEC). 12 February 1994 was the deadline for registration of all political Parties.

321. Interview with Ramaloko, backed by a copy of his salary advice (pay slip) repayment of LWP.
322. Interview with M.T. Mabitsi, Steilloop. 02/2007.
In Lebowa and Northern Transvaal Region, the ANC and the MDM, including the UPF have organised themselves into an election pact; a Patriotic Front. N Ramodike was by that time a leader of the UPF and at the same time a member of the ANC of Lebowakgomo branch. Ngoako Ramathlodi was the chairperson of the Northern Transvaal Region of the ANC and the premier elect.  

The problem that confronted the UPF was whether to have itself relinquished and go behind the ANC or not. In terms of the Patriotic Front Agreement all members of the front would contest under the banner of the ANC.

On 10 February 1994, two days before the registration closing date, the UPF held a meeting at Lebowakgomo Club house to debate about the UPF registration issue. There was a complain from the UPF that their candidates for the coming elections were at the bottom of the list produced by the Patriotic Front. The UPF resolved to register with the IEC as a party to contest the said elections. As M J Mahlangu did not carry out the task to register the party on the 11, the task was accomplished by Mokhudu Ledwaba on the 12th. That move was viewed by the ANC as a breach of the Patriotic Front agreement. According to Ngoako Ramahlodi, who was invited to the UPF meeting, accompanied by Koti Nyama and Casell Mathale, the UPF chairperson, N Ramodike requested that his name be removed from the ANC list. Despite several attempts by Ramahlodi to persuade

324. D. Nkwana, Affidavit to Supreme Court. Case No 7156/94 Between N, Ramodike and the Patriotic Front and an interview.

325. Ibid.

326 J. Dombo Affidavit to Supreme Court, Case No 7165/94.

327. N. Ramahlodi, Affidavid to Supreme Court, Case No 7165/94.
Ramodike to remain in the patriotic front he(Ramodike) went on to read the letter that he wrote to Nelson Mandela:

‘Dear Comrade President, I wish to inform you that the difficulties encountered by us in this province has led to the decision by the UPF to register as a political party with the IEC to contest the forthcoming elections in this region. 328

At the end of it, however, Ramodike’s name was deleted from the ANC list. There is a denial by the latter that he requested that his name be removed from the ANC list. The issue had even been contested in the Supreme Court of South Africa, Cape Provincial Division, Case No 7156/94. 329

The National Party cherished a hope that when the first all people democratic elections come, it would win the election with the support of many fragmented Bantustans political Parties it has help to establish before 1990. 330 Most of those parties have however vowed to vote the ANC at National Level and themselves at Provincial or local level as Mokhudu Ledwaba always motivated the reason for the UPF to contest for the Provincial or regional elections. 331 On the 27 April 1994, the day of the elections as set by the TEC and the IEC, one could see, on the provincial ballot papers the UPF in chorus with some 23 other parties which contested the elections. 332 With the ANC overall victory of 62%, apartheid and its institutions including Lebowa Bantustan

328. Case No 7156/94. Supreme Court, Cape Provincial Division.
330. Ibid.
Ceased to exist. The Lebowa, its sister Bantustans and the South African
flags would no longer be hoisted in any government buildings.\textsuperscript{333}
They have reached their pan-ultimate destination but not to be forgotten
as it is the aim of this historical text.

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{333}. Lebowa, (S. A. Homeland) \textsuperscript{\textcopyright} \url{http://www.crwflags.com}, p. 1.
\end{quote}
CHAPTER SIX

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

The history of the Homelands in general and of Lebowa in particular is actually the history of the South African white minorities, and the National Party to perpetuate the whites political, economic and socio-cultural supremacy on the one hand and the constant successful African mass actions to counteract that. It is a history of a protracted racial rivalry resulting from the Calvinistic beliefs of the Afrikaners that they were the God-ordained, selected from Europe to South Africa to civilise and rule over the barbarous indigenous tribes. It is a history of the expansion and multiplication of the ‘hedges of bitter Almond’ as Alister Sparks puts it, that perpetuated racial divisions along ethnic lines. It is a history of systemic African land dispossession through a plethora of Acts, passed by Pretoria since 1913. It is a history of conflicts and contrasts between the Freedom Chartered who maintained that South Africa belong to all who live in it, black and white and the Cornelius Mulders who maintained that there will be not a single Black with a South African citizenship.

It is a history that put to surface two halves of Pretoria’s face; the one half scolding and frowning as a sign of disapproval of Mandela and African Nationalism while the other half is smiling as affirmative gesture and approval of Bantustans and their Chief Ministers. By locking Mandela behind the bars, banning the African National Congress and banishing the likes of Oliver Thambo to exile; by killing the Steve Bikos, Hector Pietersons, Onkgopotse Tiro, Ngwako Ramalepes, Makompo Kutumelas and many more political activists, Pretoria have undone
the work of the earlier philanthropists and lied to the world that separate development was a solution to South Africa's racial problem. The hard core and logical conclusion of the policy was to render Africans foreigners in the land of their birth and reduce them to undefined existence.

The best place for an African was therefore a prison, Robben Island or Bantustan. The best friends of Pretoria were therefore Chiefs that ‘Central Government’ carefully selected, proliferated and roped to participated in apartheid machinery. That is why P W Botha wanted to release Mandela on condition that he agreed to be repatriated in Transkei and not South Africa, live the nation and join the tribe, a political demotion from a hero to a midget.

There was all along a displacement of concepts; ‘Law and Order visa Terrorism. Law and Order killed while ‘terrorism’ liberated because the new South Africa, if correctly observed is not the by-product of Law and Order but the result of Blacks commitment to fight apartheid, a just course which the apartheid Ideologues called ‘terrorism’.

The great question to ask which this study has attempted to answer and still calling for comments is: were the participants in the Bantustans politics, really “stooges”, “puppets” and all sorts of derogatory epithets ? Lebowa had from the onset located herself in an anti apartheid political stand point, strategically accepted the apartheid imposed “self government” and tactically rejected independence until the ‘new’ South Africa came. Martin Luther King Jr. in his Strength to love says:' no man is strong unless he bears within his character antithesis strongly marked.' The Lebowa Homeland through the vision of her Chief Ministers ( Phatudi and Ramodike) beard in her policy antithesis as said by Martin Luther King Jr. Much as Pretoria was playing
hypocrisy with Lebowa, the latter played back by accepting the burdens of Bantustan politics with the sole intention of fighting and dismantling apartheid from within. That policy is reflected in many policy speeches made by both Phatudi and Ramodike in the Lebowa Legislative assembly. In H T Cooper (1985) there is an ex ray of Phatudi’s political thoughts that to a greater extend exonerate him from the labels ‘puppet’ ‘sell out’ and many more derogatory others. It is mainly for that reason that Pretoria went all out to expropriate land from Lebowa as an attempt to replace Lebowa by something else because those that Pretoria thought would tow the her line did not. One Legislator was perhaps partly right to proclaim that Lebowa would in future be the smallest state in the country but lacked a vision that Lebowa would in future form the integral part of Limpopo Province and South Africa as the case now is.

It is however the forces of history seasoned with divine directives that things unfolded the way they did. South Africa is today the envy of the world. Although the Bantustans were build up at the cost of blacks, they absorbed possible conventional war in South Africa and they may correctly be regarded as other tracks on the time line of the current South Africa.
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Ramatlhodi Goako Abel, Chairperson of the ANC, Northern Transvaal Region in 1994.

Nkoana David, Member of the Executive Committee of the ANC, Northern Transvaal Region in 1994.

Mangena Modjadji Sarah, ANC Branch Secretary, Lenyenye and a lecturer at Naphuno College, 1994.

Dombo John, Advisor to UPF and Assistant Secretary of the UPF until March 1994.

Mahlangu Mniwa Johannes, Member of the UPF, 1994.

Mokwena Mathupi Lameck, Member of the UPF, 1994.

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Boshielo, B. Anti-apartheid political activist from Sekhukhune and former lecturer at Sekhukhune College of Education.

Cholo, T.T. A member of the Limpopo Provincial Legislature From Lenes(Ga-Matlala). A trained MK and an underground Political Activists during the apartheid era.

Duba M.J. A Minister in both Phatudi and Ramodike’s cabinet In Lebowa.


Letwaba, M.J. Member of the Lebowa Legislative Assembly(LLA) from Mashashane area.


Lediga, S. Apolitical Activist and a Lecturer in Sekhukhune College of Education during the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Lekalakala, M.M.:Member of the LLA in 1987/88.

Mabitsi M.T. A Teacher and Principal who played Active role in Sadtu; Steilooop Branch during the period under study.
Mafafo, J. A retired South African Security Police who according to him has helped many young South African blacks to cross the borders. Now staying at Mamehlabe.

Malatji, J. The University of the North employee and the Dean of Students during the 1980s.

Mamabolo L.A.H. Secretary for Agriculture of Lebowa Government during the mid-80s.

Maphoto, I. Member of Limpopo Provincial Legislature and former Mk cadre.

Mashalane A. K. A teacher and member of TUATA during the period under study.

Matlala B.K. (Kgosi) A legislator of Lebowa Government.

Matlala Nthlapile, Owner of the Nthlapile Bus Service that operated between Matlala and Potgietersrus in the early 1970.

Matlala, P.T. (Kgosi) A Legislator of Lebowa Government.

Matlou C, A Ham No 1 farm labourer whose right arm was cut off by the Tractor pulley.

Moloko I.K.E. A long standing speaker of the LLA and former school inspector in Lebowa.
Mokaba P. (Precilla), Peter Mokaba’s Mother; now staying in Mankweng, Turfloop.


Morudu, P. A resent resident of Newstand who for many Years stayed and worked as a farm Labourer at the Boer called Radipatlana in MARNET near Limpopo River to the west of Lebowa.

Motswaledi, A.P (Dr) Pre and post apartheid political activist in the Sekhukhune Area and Now(2006) the MEC for Education in Limpopo Province.

Mphaho, E. A resident of Mahwelereng who participated in the Struggle along with the Makompos and many others.

Mphiko, B.L. A committee member of Azaso in the University of The North from 1983

Mpya, L.L.; A member of the LLA in 1988 and a Cabinet Minister in the early 1990s.

Nkoana D. Commissioner of Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) 1994, ANC Executive Committee Member

Nyama, K. A lecturer of Sekhukhune College of Education from the early 1980s to the early 1990s and currently a Member of the Limpopo Provincial Legislature.
Phefo, F.: An elderly pensioner who stayed and worked at Ham No 1. and earned 25c per six weeks.

Pila. M. A teacher and resident of Galelia Village where there is a daring conflict of the Chokoe and Nyamane factions on who is the legitimate ntona of the village.

Ramaloko T, A teacher in the Bochum area (Schoengazight Secondary School), a co-founder and active member of the Northern Transvaal Teacher Union (NOTTU) that later became SADTU.


Ramphele, Mamphela, She was banished to Lenyenye in 1977 in the then Lebowa government, by the security police and lived there until 1983 when the banishing order was lifted.

Rapholo, M.J.: Popularly known as Sienzeni. A qualified Teacher who skipped the borders to train in Mk and came back to execute under ground operations.

Seboni, J.: A dual resident of Soweto and Mamehlabe in Lebowa who is an eye witness of the 1976 conflagration and how it expanded outwardly to cover the great part of Lebowa.

Segabutla / Saohatse M. A pre and post apartheid political activist who schooled in Solomon Mahlangu College and learned History under the tutelage of John Pampalis.
Sehodi, N. a Resident of a bought farm of Wisconsin (Matjitjileng) whose father used to sell beasts to a White


Thobejane, S. ; Kgosi of Mafefe and President of CONTRALESA of Limpopo.

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