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THE XENOPHOBIC ATTACKS IN SOUTH AFRICA: REFLECTIONS AND POSSIBLE STRATEGIES TO WARD THEM OFF

D.D. Tewari

University of Zululand, South Africa

Abstract

Xenophobic attacks are now recurring phenomenon in South Africa. Recent attacks in the country were widespread and were at higher intensity than before. The rising trend in terms of spread and intensity of these attacks forewarns a change required for handling them. Serious analysis is warranted for designing a strategy to ward them off. This study provides reflection on the issues and explains how and why these attacks happen. Various theories of xenophobia and causes are examined and possible strategies to ward them off are discussed.

Keywords: Alien, Migration, South Africa, Violence, Xenophobia, Afrophobia

1. Introduction

Despite South Africa's remarkable transition from apartheid authoritarian rule to democracy in 1994, the unfair and violent attacks against migrants have intensified in the land. The change in the political power has brought in a range of new discriminatory practices against the "non-nationals" or foreigners (Vaiji, 2003); this is commonly known as Xenophobia. Xenophobia is one of the most contentious issues facing South Africa today and is usually understood to imply a "dislike for foreigners" characterized by a negative attitude, a dislike, a fear, or a hatred which when exhibited, usually result into bodily damage or some form of violence (Tshitevelle, 1999: 4; Harris, 2002). According to Kollapan (1999), it is very hard to separate xenophobia from violence and physical abuse; it is not only an attitude but an activity which results in bodily harm. Xenophobic attacks in South Africa are particularly carried out against black African foreigners. It is rather called Afrophobia because not all foreigners face this with equal might. In explaining xenophobia, geographical location plays an important role; the "particularities of place" in the understanding and the reactions of citizens must be noted (Oelefse, 2002). Various causes are attributed to xenophobia which includes high levels of violent crime, illegitimate corrupt and violent leadership structures, systematic exclusion of non-nationals in social participation, and culture of impunity with respect to public violence (Landau, 2008; Misago et al., 2009). In

brief, the concept of xenophobia encompasses all sorts of prejudiced attitudes towards non-nationals irrespective of their origin or nationality.

The South African Migration Project (SAMP) records that xenophobia in South Africa had been in latent phase. However, in recent times, the latent forms have escalated in active xenophobia, especially in 2008 and 2015. The recent experience of xenophobic activities in 2015 resulted into some counter-reactions from neighbouring African states. For instance, the newly elected government in Nigeria (All Peoples Congress (APC)) together with civil society headed a memorandum to the SA embassy in Lagos to stop violence within 48 hours or else SA businesses in Nigeria would be shut down (Mail & Guardian, 20 April, 2015). In Mozambique, cars with SA registration plates were stoned and trucks exporting goods got grounded. Similar calls were made in other neighbouring countries (Eye witness News, 17 April 2015). Many of such incidences confirm that xenophobic violence has both widespread and global consequences which cannot be ignored altogether. Can we now say that xenophobia is just a dislike for foreigners? What are the causes of such dislike in South Africa? Are there no consequences for such dislike? How can this menace be warded off? In light of these concerns, there is a need to understand the phenomenon of xenophobia, its root causes, its nature, and ways to ward it off. The discussion is arranged in six sections. Section 2 provides some stylized facts about xenophobia in South Africa. Theories of xenophobia are discussed in section 3. Possible factors that give rise to xenophobia are detailed in section 4. Some possible steps/strategies to ward off xenophobia are discussed in section 5. Finally, conclusions are discussed in section 6.

2. Stylized facts

Some stylized facts regarding South African xenophobia are warranted. These stylized facts or empirical truths would be useful towards deriving a policy to ward off xenophobia. We review them here in brief.

2.1 *Recurring and Incremental*

There have been recurrences of xenophobic attacks in South Africa since 1994. A timeline of xenophobic attacks in South Africa is presented in Appendix A. Based on the historical record, a rough guide is that every two year period is followed by some form of xenophobic event in South Africa. The other observable fact is that over the years, it has become incremental. For instance, only a small xenophobic incident took place in Alexandra with no harm to human life. But, in 2008, a minor xenophobic violence in Alexandra finally spread to the entire country, affecting major cities (Appendix A). The countrywide violence occurred again in April, 2015 (Appendix A). The xenophobia in the days of the apartheid time

was not so visible for various reasons. The white minority government discouraged black immigration, although thousands of Africans from neighbouring countries came into the country as contract workers to offer cheap, unskilled labour in mining and farming industries. The local population at that time was less antagonistic towards migrants due to the limited number of illegal migrants and the focus was on fighting apartheid, which was viewed as a major obstacle to employment and improved living conditions. The dynamics changed abruptly after the independence in 1994. The size of immigrants increased substantially, especially from North Africa and other neighbouring countries (Croucher, 1998).

The democratic South Africa became attractive to migrants due to its comparatively high living standards and political freedom. The end of the apartheid rule led to three main changes in patterns of migration to South Africa (Crush et al, 2005): (i) An increase in cross-border movement between South Africa and its neighbours led to expanded irregular migration. (ii) South Africa became a desirable destination for economic migrants from West, East and Central Africa (Morris and Bouillon, 2001). (iii) South Africa became a country of asylum for refugees from Angola, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan. It is worthy of note that most migrations to South Africa are intra-regional in nature and the numbers have been increasing since 2000 (Crush et al, 2005).

2.2 *Between Poor and Poor*

The xenophobic violence in South Africa is between domestic poor versus foreign poor. The advent of democracy has created high expectations about economic and social delivery from government circles. To a greater extent, the expectations are not met as the unemployment rate of about 25 percent still persists. While poverty and lack of development could be blamed on the government during the apartheid era, the same cannot be said, especially when governance is in the hands of black South Africans. Xenophobia is a new phenomenon in post-democratic South Africa and it is intensely related to building and construction of new rational identities (Peberdy 1999 and 2001; Sammaddar, 1999). Post-apartheid xenophobia has two noteworthy characteristics. Firstly, violence is largely by black South Africans against black non-national Africans, although all South Africans of all races are xenophobic (McDonald and Jacob 2005). Foreigners are often treated differently depending on their race and nationality. For instance, white illegal immigrants from Europe who overstayed their entry permits are not treated or stereotyped in the way that African migrants are (Peberdy, 2001) and the state does not abuse and exploit them in the way that it does to African migrants (Handmaker and Parsely, 2001). South Africans see migrants from Lesotho, Botswana and Switzerland as more desirable than Zimbabwe and Mozambicans and much more than Africans from further afield (SAMP, 2008: 30-31).

African migrants are identified through their spoken language, clothing and skin colour which is darker (Morris, 1998). Secondly, post-apartheid xenophobia stands in contrast to the relationship between African migrants and black South Africans during apartheid when fellow Africans were integrated into black communities, intermarriages were relatively common and they were seen as comrades in the struggle against apartheid.

Several factors, including foreign policy, competition over scarce resources, official and media responses and the perpetuation of stereotypes, provided fertile ground for intolerance and mistrust towards African migrants. The distrust between the two groups has gone up for several reasons which include the new foreign policy, competition for local resources, poor delivery of services to communities by the regime, and the media's instigating role and other constituents. The great deal of frustration emanating from the slow pace of transformation has led to foreigners or non-national as the real cause and they were "scapegoated" for this frustration. However, socioeconomic conditions alone are not reasons to be the sole cause of brutal attacks on non-nationals. Low levels of trust between groups have long characterized South African society, and were especially prominent during the institutionalized racism of apartheid. "Low levels of trust between South Africans and African migrants are reciprocal" (Crush, 2000). South Africans see foreigners as a threat to their socioeconomic prospects. Congolese and Nigerian migrants report that, due to the prejudice and antagonism they are faced with from South Africans, they have developed a stronger social cohesion among themselves (Richmond, 1988; Morris, 1999). This mutual distrust is a major factor that perpetuates the cycle of hostility and exclusion. For instance, the May 2008 violence was indicative of local's dissatisfaction with the state's apportionment of resources and Steinberg (2008) indicates that the violence in Alexandra had ethnic underpinnings with the Zulus trying to expel ethnic competitors which included fellow South Africans.

2.3 *Rooted in Violence*

After a decade or more of isolated attacks on individual migrants, South Africa experienced a country wide xenophobic attack in May 2008 (SAMP, 2008; Misago et al., 2009). Over 70 people were killed; about 100,000 were displaced, hundreds were assaulted and injured with widespread damage to property owned by foreign nationals. The mob violence lasted for two weeks, but sporadic attacks have continued ever since. On January 2009, foreign citizens were attacked in Durban leading to the death of a Tanzanian and a Zimbabwean. In reaction to the xenophobic violence of May 2008, the then president Thabo Mbeki argued that the attacks were criminal and not motivated by xenophobia. He claimed that South Africans were not xenophobic and that anyone who said so was xenophobic. Xenophobic denialism represents a troubling complexity or at best an inability to exert the

kind of political will and leadership that has characterized the battle against racism in post-apartheid South Africa. The African Union's New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) peer review mechanism in 2007 "singled out South Africa for its poor treatment of migrants and refugees"; the report indicated that foreigners, mostly of African descent are being subjected to brutality and detention (African Union, 2007). In response, South Africa strongly refuted the assertion that illegal migrants are subject to brutal and inhuman treatment, saying that reports of human rights organizations told a different story (CoRMSA, 2008).

3. Theories of xenophobia

A number of authors in the xenophobia literature (Harris, 2002; Morris, 1998; Tshitereke, 1999) have proposed various explanations at different stages. Xenophobia is best understood within specific economic, cultural and political context. Hypotheses, such as scapegoating, isolation, biocultural and social capital have been developed regarding xenophobia. Though these hypotheses do not interrogate xenophobia itself, they do offer theoretical underpinnings. To better understand xenophobia, it is necessary to examine the social relations and identities that are reproduced in the term itself. A brief review of each hypothesis is given below.

3.1 *The Scapegoating Hypothesis*

Despite the varying attitudes towards foreign nationals, the anti-foreigner sentiments are widespread throughout the South African society. There are many explanations for anti-foreigner attitudes rooted in individual psychology, economic conditions as well as South Africans' historical and political settings. Foreigners are usually used as a political scapegoat to distract the people's attention from the government's faults and failures (Landau, Ramjathan-Keogh and Singh, 2005). Scapegoating emanates from a relative deprivation and feeling of individuals (native) that foreigners are threats to their jobs, education, healthcare etc (Harris, 2002; Tshitereke, 1999). In other words, a gap between one's aspirations and reality leads to social discontent; and the insufficiency of resources can then be blamed on the foreigners as they also compete for the same resources (Harris, 2002). These social discontents instigate people around to scapegoat foreigners as the whole cause of the problem which often result into violence. Based on historical events, Morris stated that a majority group in a precarious economic state can be more prone to feel threatened by minorities especially if they are foreigners (Harris, 2002). Psychological interpretation of scapegoating must be managed with socioeconomic reality in order to understand xenophobia (Tshitereke, 1999). In other words, this relates to the jobs, houses, education, even women; foreigners are thus scapegoated for stealing jobs, houses, and women. Two

specific social motives for scapegoating foreigners are suggested. One, the government is barred to protect the civil and political rights of citizens to guarantee an array of social and economic services. Citizens thus needed to be given preference in providing jobs and other services. Two, it is generally “claimed that migrants cause local unemployment and drive earnings down by accepting low wages” (Adepoju, 2003: 11). South Africans view the foreigners as direct competitors for state resources (Steinberg, 2008). Foreigners are thus associated with violent crimes and unemployment (Evevatt, 2011: 16). Approximately 48 percent of South Africans feel that foreigners are a criminal threat (Crush and William, 2003). Legget (2003) reported that 63 percent of inner city Johannesburg residents mentioned foreigners as the group causing most of the crime in the area.

Empirical data, however suggest that foreigners are a disproportionately small threat. Published statistics revealed that foreigners constitute about 2 percent of those arrested (Haris, 2001: 34). Most foreigners there arrested are charged for illegal stay, not violent crime. The presence of foreigners, certainly place additional burden on public services, Scapegoating hypothesis thus explains the positive behaviour of people, but it is not founded on true cause-and effect relationship why scapegoat foreigners and why not any other societal group. Scapegoating is totally founded on ignorance and lack of social pedagogy.

3.2 *Isolation Hypothesis*

The isolation hypothesis is premised on the isolation provided by apartheid to South Africans. Because of apartheid, South Africans were not exposed to outsiders and unknown to them. The democratic transition opened the door to the rest of the world and South Africa got integrated into the world community. And, this very open interface has resulted into the hostility. “When a group has no history of incorporating strangers, it may find it difficult to be welcoming” (Morris, 1998: 1125). According to Zoe Nkongolo of NGO Africa Unite, “Lack of contact and engagement between communities encourage stereotyping and misconception of migrants and their impact on host communities” (Nord and Assubuji, n.d).

In brief, the social engagement with the apartheid system contributed to this mind set of South Africans. This is because under this system every individual was assigned an ethnic or social label and groups of masses were parted from one another leaving no room for interaction. South Africans see it difficult to identify themselves with other Africans (Handmaker and Parseley, 2001; Williams, 2008). There also exists the compassion fatigue due to the cruel wars on the African continent which further fuels intolerance and limit empathy with asylum seekers (Hardmaker and Parsely, 2001; Morris, 1999). The unceasing flees of migrants from the rest of Africa after 1994 has made foreigners more visible leading to the perception that South Africa is being overrun by poor illiterate Africans. According to

the 1997 and 2006 SAMP surveys, South Africans generally have little contact or experiences of interacting with foreigners, other than on a casual basis. Xenophobia is here understood as a defence against the anxiety produced by the unknown. However, it does not explain why the unknown produces anxiety and why this results in aggression.

3.3 *Bio-cultural Hypothesis*

Xenophobia is not applied equally across all foreigners. Some are much more targeted than others. Less than 20 percent of South African has favourable impressions of migrants from other African countries. For example, Nigerians and Congolese with unfavourable rating of 92 percent and 90 percent respectively are at a greater risk than those from Lesotho and Swaziland. African foreigners are particularly more vulnerable to violence and hostility than others, such as from Europe (Human Rights Commission, 1999).

The hypothesis is premised on biological and cultural features (hairstyles, accents, vaccination marks, dress and physical appearance) of foreigners that distinguishes them sharply from the native people. These features play a role in prompting xenophobic attacks. For example, at least 10 percent of the subjects who were arrested and detained under the Aliens Control Act, were apprehended on the basis of appearance, and nothing more (Harris, 2002).

3.4 *Social Capital Hypothesis*

The hypothesis identified xenophobia with South Africa's transition from part of racism to a future of nationalism. The hypothesis seeks to explain whether the broad social institutions in South Africa create trust between migrant communities and their host communities (Steenkamp, 2009: 444). This is well summed up by the term "social capital" coined by Putnam (1993).

The trust and social activism form the two ingredients of social capital (Steenkamp, 2009). Trust or social capital is further divided into bonding social capital (networks within the group) and bridging social capital (networks between groups). A very high bonding capital may promote exclusion and antagonism. Abundance of bridging capital on the other hand, will improve information sharing and create solidarity between grouping (Adler and Kwon, 2002). Bridging social capital is hence necessary for social mobility and advancement (Steenkamp, 2009). There is also another kind of social capital called "linking capital" which refers to the networks between individuals and groups in different social strata (Woolcock, 2001). High levels of bridging capital facilitates coordination and makes organization to

respond to new stimulus instantly in a positive manner so as to make a rational decision for the country.

As per social capital theory, the xenophobic attacks are symptoms of distracting or lack of social capital that is distract between “South Africans and foreigners, between foreigners and the state, and between South Africans and the State” (Steenkamp, 2009). Low levels of trust prevail between South Africans and African migrants as discussed elsewhere in this study. This leads to antagonism. African migrants also distract the state’s intention (Steenkamp, 2009). South African also distracts the state in terms of her service delivery promises (Steenkamp, 2009). Steenkamp (2009) rightly summarizes that the 2008 xenophobic attacks exposed the low levels of trust in the post-apartheid South Africa.

4. Ingredients of xenophobia

What causes xenophobia is difficult to ascertain. However a number of factors may be contributing to the occurrence of xenophobia in the country. We would highlight some important determinants such as illegal immigration, attitudes to foreigners, culture, media’s role, laws and skills shortages among others.

4.1 *Illegal Immigration*

After the democratic transition in 1994, the borders of South Africa were opened more liberally for Africans to build better relations with the rest of the African continent. Immigration from African countries has increased since then. For various reasons, migrants from the rest of the African continent move to South Africa and these may include instant conflicts, abject poverty and violence, persecution and war.

As per data from the United Nations (2008), the number and proportion of foreign migrants in South Africa are on the rise and was expected to reach 1.9 million in 2010 – this constituted about 3.7 percent of the total population (see Table 1). At the same time, migrant stock from Europe has declined (McDonald and Crush, 2002; Crush et al., 2005). For example, approximately 71.5 percent of the total migrant population in South Africa in 2001 was from the rest of Africa (Statistics South Africa, 2001).

Table1: Number and Proportion of Foreign Migrants in South Africa, 1990-2010

Year	Number (in millions)	Percentage of Population
1990	1.23	3.3
1995	1.10	2.7
2000	1.02	2.3
2005	1.25	2.6
2010	1.86	3.7

Source: United Nations (2008)

As per recent estimates, some 79 percent migrants now come from the rest of Africa; about 17 percent are white from Europe and other countries, and, only 3 percent come from India and Asia (Wilson, 2015). In a bid to stop illegal immigration, the South African government passed the Alien Control Act of 1991; this was amended in 1995 again. The basic objective of the Act was to prevent low-waged labour from neighbouring countries from entering and working in South Africa. Based on Alien Control Act, in March 2003, the South Africa Department of Home Affairs promulgated a new immigration Act, which places additional constraints on the requirements of foreigners. Section 32 (2) of 2002 Immigration Act states that “any illegal foreigner shall be deported”. However, arresting and detaining illegal immigrants is an enormous task and also a very costly procedure on the state’s resources. Due to porous borders and perhaps corruption, the illegal immigration continues to rise and deportation continues to increase. For example, some 44225 persons were deported in 1988; in increased to 96515 persons in 1993 (Mahara, 2004).

The estimates of illegal migrants are not exactly known. For example, an estimate ranging from 3 to 8 million people is suggested (Adepoju, 2001: 50 cited in Everatt, 2011). The Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC, 1996) estimated the number to be between 2.5 to 4 million (Waller, 2006). The Home Affairs has done a lacklustre job of deporting people and as per one estimate they deported 1 million people since 1990 as per Crush, Pebardy, and Williams (2006). Of these 1 million, roughly 800 thousand were deported to Mozambique and Zimbabwe. It is believed that there are from 4 to 5 million illegal migrants in the country at present. Rationally speaking, 25 percent South Africans favour a total ban on immigration and migration (Crush, 2000). The Wits University Survey indicated that some 64.8 percent of respondents thought that it would be a positive approach if most of the African refugees who are immigrants left the country. Though South Africa has the sovereign right to deport undocumented immigrants, deportation is having a little impact in discouraging immigration.

4.2 Attitude towards Migrants

In mid-1997 and late 1998, the South African Migration Project (SAMP) conducted attitude survey of people towards immigration policy. From the study, some startling facts appear that South Africa has strong anti-immigrant views. Some 25 percent preferred the complete ban on immigration and nearly 50 percent opined the strict limit on the numbers of foreigners into the country (Danso and McDonald, 2001). African immigrants are perceived as a real threat in terms of competing with jobs, contributing to crime and bringing diseases such as HIV/AIDS. In the survey, some 32 percent considered them as a threat to their jobs, 48 percent believed they were criminals; and 29 percent thought they brought diseases such as HIV/AIDS (Danso and McDonald, 2001). The SAMP survey in 1999 confirmed the hardening of these attitudes; for instance, between 1995 and 1999, the support for highly restrictionist policy increased from 65 to 78 percent (Crush, 2000: 109). And, almost one third of respondents stated that they would take direct action to prevent if migrants move to their area. About 65 percent of black South Africans opted for a direct action to prevent immigrants from doing business in their area (Crush, 2009). South Africans differentiate between migrants based on their country of origin. They have favourable impressions of migrants from Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland and share close cultural relations. Highly negative attitudes are shown towards Zimbabweans, Angolans, Somalis, Congolese and Nigerians. The human rights of foreigners are not valued in South Africa (Dodson, 2002: 1). Xenophobic attitudes percolate into police as well (Madson, 2004; Newham et al., 2006).

4.3 Culture of Violence

South African society in general in the normal state is governed by violence (Sampson et al., 1992; Kamber and Lewis, 1997). In other words, social relations and interactions are governed through violence. Hence violence is seen as a legitimate instrument or solution to the problems. The politics of 1980s laid the foundation of the violent society during apartheid. The political violence abounded in 1980s and it got carried through 1990s (Kamber, 1997). While the democratic transition brought the end of political violence, the culture was kept alive through violent crime (Kamber, 1997: 3). Since violence was a part of the South African culture, xenophobic events, hence were not being taken in an entirely different phenomenon.

4.4 Biased Media

South Africa media have not played an unbiased and reformatory role. A survey by SAMP in 2000 and 2004 on English print media found that reporting was largely anti-immigrant and analytical (Danso and McDonald, 2001). The trivial and highly sensationalized

reportage does not do any good to inform public about real issues of immigration. A completely neutral reporting, if not negative, may also not help building the cohesion between immigrants and the native population. The press needs to learn the purpose of reformation as well. It is argued that the South African press has clearly contributed to the problem related to migration issues (Danso and McDonald, 2001). The concerns about immigrants are not only spread in the populace, the national party leaders have also given much xenophobic promoting statements. For instance, the former Minister of Home Affairs, Mangosuthu Buthelezi in his maiden address to parliament said, "If South Africans are to compete for scarce resources with aliens in South Africa, then we can bid goodbye to the Reconstruction and Development Program" (Human Rights Watch, 1998: 20). The recent 2015 xenophobic attacks in Durban only are believed to have erupted following a pronouncement by Zulu King Zwelithini in public that "all foreigners should leave South Africa".

4.5 *Alien Control Act no 96 of 1991*

Although South Africa has ratified and signed several international conventions relating to rights of foreigners in the country, operationalization of the same remains elusive for various reasons. According to South African Human Rights Commission (1997), undocumented migrants have rights against arbitrary arrest or detention, the right to humanity, right to equality before courts and tribunals. There are many experiences of non-nationals in South Africa, which show that these rights are often violated. In order to stop illegal immigration, the South African government passed the Alien Control Act 96 of 1991 which was used to prevent low wage labour from working and entering South Africa. A New Immigration Act was promulgated in 2003 which put additional constraint on foreigners. As a consequence, voluntary migrants are unable to legalize their stay in the country after the expiration of tourist, work permit.

4.6 *Skills Shortage*

South Africa has long used migrant workers in the mines, factories, agricultural plantations, with a major drive for increasing economic growth, required skilled labour and entrepreneurs. South Africa does not produce enough of skilled people and entrepreneurs due to various constraints on the education sector. As a result, there will continue to be a demand for skilled labour in the country. The skill gap also exists due to historical reasons. There was a systematic denial and managerial experience for Black South Africans during apartheid. Skilled immigrants thus contribute to the economy, and there is evidence that immigration contributes to the country (Smith, 1995; Hunter and Skinner, 2003).

5. Strategies to Ward off Xenophobia

Xenophobia has economic implications for the country. Continuation of such events will certainly impact the economy negatively. A multi-pronged approach is essential in tackling the situation. A set of actions is recommended here and discussed as below.

5.1 *Legislative and Policy Framework*

Managing immigration prudently so as to ward off xenophobic events should be the policy of government. A public hearing on xenophobia was convened in 2004 jointly by the South African Human Rights Commission and the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee; a series of measures to prevent xenophobia were agreed upon. However, very little followed in the implementation of measures. This failure indicates a need for the comprehensive and coordinated approach to handling the xenophobic issues. This requires an applied research and constant monitoring and intelligence gathering on xenophobic actions. Furthermore, there is a need to undertake a political education campaign at local level and political leadership and will to address the causes of xenophobia are warranted. Immigration and refugee policy should be formulated on more rational lines. The avenue for legal migration should be opened up. Constant dialogue with neighbouring countries be maintained in order to control migration flows.

5.2 *Economic Growth*

Economic growth of South Africa has slowed down since 2010. Low growth rate (below 3.5 percent) coupled with the relatively high inflation rate (more than 5 to 7 percent) finally leads to rising unemployment and inequality. This means fierce competition for resources at the ground level and this would enhance the possibility of xenophobic incitements. Enhancing economic growth should be the lasting solution and also the first priority of the government.

5.3 *Education Drive*

Education policy regarding migration issues and immigrants is essential; educational programs on anti-xenophobia are needed to counter false information and the perception and negative stereotypes which built distrust between locals and immigrant communities. Role of migrants in generating economic growth should be highlighted. This is specifically important in the case of skilled labour. The meaningful interface between migrants and local community should be created through discussions and dialogue. Ground evidence suggests

that such meaningful interaction would reduce xenophobic attitudes among the people. Rebuilding of trusts or social cooperation at various levels between South African, between locals and foreigners, between states and civilians should be the major motive of this campaign. Furthermore, the media, government officials, opinion leaders who make unsubstantiated statements about the impact of migration need to be challenged.

Conclusion

From the analysis, it is revealed that xenophobia has grown rapidly in the last 20 years or so. It has now spread almost everywhere in the country. The repercussions on the economy and on the people are expected to be largely negative if it not controlled now. A multipronged approach is essential in curbing this menace. The study suggests the following measures: 1. A prudent management of immigration as per needs of the country is needed. 2. Sustainable economic growth is essential to meet the rising needs of the society. 3. Proper education drive and campaign be launched so that people are educated about non-nationals. 4. Media should play a reformatory role, rather than simply providing the sensationalizing news.

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THE PHENOMENON OF MIGRATION AND IMMIGRATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE GOOD, THE BAD AND THE UGLY

P.H. Munzhedzi

University of Limpopo, South Africa

ABSTRACT

Throughout the world's history, people have been migrating and immigrating across countries and continents in search of food, shelter, safety, hospitable weather, better business and employment opportunities. To this date, people continue to move for the same reasons, with safety as well as business and employment opportunities being the dominant ones. Immigration and migration have increased expressively all over the globe including in Africa. It is for this reason that around 214 million people are in other countries other than those of their birth. Immigration into the democratic South Africa has intensely increased, particularly as economic and political conditions in neighbouring African countries have deteriorated. Equally, South Africans have migrated to other developed countries particularly in search of better economic opportunities. Other scholars and practitioners alike have argued for a rigorous and extensive policing of borders as a solution to the movements of immigrants from other African states into the South. This paper seeks to explore the concept of immigration and migration around the world looking at the good and the bad, and the reasons for both immigration and migration. The paper disagrees with the notion that immigration and migration should be curtailed, but supports the adequate management of immigration particularly skilled immigrants who may contribute positively to the economy of their host country. A policy review which is biased towards the recruitment of skilled immigrants either through formal qualifications or entrepreneurship is recommended.

Keywords: Migration, Immigration, South Africa

1. Introduction

Immigration and migration have always been formidable engines of economic and demographic growth (Khan, 2007: 9; Peri, 2013), and they are often prominent features in the economic, social, and political landscape of many countries (Kerr & Kerr, 2011: 1). This is applicable in both developed and the developing countries. The economic effect of migration vary extensively, in that countries of origin may experience losses in the short term but may stand to gain over a long term in that migrants may wish to go back to their countries of origin when they retire at the countries they have migrated to or when they reach an adult age. However, the host countries may continue to benefit from immigrants in their own countries. Countries of origin's short-term economic benefit of emigration may also

be found in remittances. Remittances refer to the funds that migrants earn abroad and send back to their home countries, mainly in order to support families left behind (Somerville & Sumption, 2009:27). According to the United Nations (2002), over 1.3 million people accounting to 3% of the world population do not permanently stay at their countries of origin. The United Nations further reported that in 2007, approximately 27 million of the foreign nationals (which amounted to 7% of the world's population) stayed in the European Union (EU) countries. Kerr and Kerr (2011: 1) concurs with this report and further posit that most of the said foreign nationals resided in large EU countries like Germany, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Equally, Rogerson (1999: 2) and Posel (2003: 5) maintain that there has been a growing movement of foreign immigrants and refugees into South Africa since 1990s, particularly as economic and political conditions in neighbouring African countries deteriorate. Mukonza (2011: 1384) also concurs that South Africa has since the democratic era received an increased number of immigrants due to its socio-economic and political stability and the unstable conditions in their countries of origin.

Also important to note is that South African citizens have for one reason or the other migrated to other countries particularly to the EU countries, United States and Australia. In light of the negative reaction often associated with immigration, this paper seeks to explore as to whether these immigrants positively contribute to the well-being of their host countries, given their education, experience and high involvement in small businesses. Several studies have noted that the relatively higher level of education and skills of migrants is on the same level as those of host populations (Timberg, 2005: 4). Entrepreneurship is important to business because of the value it adds, the innovations it creates, the wealth it produces and the additional employment it creates (Kalitanyi & Visser, 2010: 380). Before the paper thoroughly discusses the good, the bad and the ugly of immigration and migration, all relevant concepts are conceptualised.

2. Conceptualisation

There are several concepts that are interrelated to immigration and migration but they have a different meaning. Mukonza (2011: 1386) emphatically states the significance of understanding the difference and the interlink between immigration, migration and emigration. Immigration refers to the movement of people (or a person) to permanently or temporarily stay in another country (Kalitanyi & Visser, 2010: 381). Basically, immigration is an inward movement from a country of origin to another country, while International Organisation for Migration (2003: 6) define migration as an outward movement from ones place of origin to elsewhere in the world. This movement could either be permanent or temporary. There are different types of migrants including but not limited to economic

migrants and long-term migrants as well as voluntary and forced migrants. Economic migrants refer to people whose movements to other countries were influenced by economic opportunities which do not exist in their country of origin (Centre for Development and Enterprise, 2010: 13). Long-term migrants in line with the definition by the UN (United Nations) is whereby a person who has moved to a country other than his or her usual residence for a period of at least a year is a long-term migrant, while a person who moves in for at least three months, but less than a year, is referred to as a short-term migrant (Kalitanyi & Visser, 2010: 381). People may voluntarily decide to move to another country while forced migration emanate as a results of other political, social and economic factors that are unfavourable. Often, it is difficult to really tell the real reason why immigrants have immigrated particularly because unfavourable conditions at the countries of origin are stated even when they are not applicable.

3. State of immigration in the world

A significant number of early migrants moved from Europe to the United States, Canada, and Australia (Somerville & Sumption, 2009) for the same reason discussed earlier. While migration into the said countries remains very substantial, the countries of origin have been affected drastically. Unlike before, most migrants to the US, no longer come from Europe but from Latin America, Asia and Africa. Kerr and Kerr (2011: 2) also assert that the migration patterns have also changed in Europe with most of the composition shifts affecting Northern European countries with the largest immigrant population shares. The United States is often a receiver of young, motivated, and educated people who are habitually on the move in search of better business and employment opportunities. According to Peri (2013), the United States is by far the largest magnet for international migrants with 41 million immigrants from around the globe particularly Latin America, Asia and Africa. On the other hand, Germany as one of the leading economies in Europe has received large inflows from countries like Turkey, while Moroccan immigrants were the most prevalent in Netherlands. As much as South Africans emigrate to England, Canada and Australia, so a similar number of English and Australians emigrate elsewhere or temporarily migrate.

South Africa has also been attracting huge number of immigrants since the advent of democracy (Khan, 2007: 3; Mukonza, 2011: 1384) and those immigrants are often involved in small business activities mostly in retail or service rather than in production. Posel (2003: 16) and Khan (2007: 3) also concur with the notion that immigration into the new South Africa has dramatically increased, particularly as economic and political conditions in neighbouring African countries have deteriorated.

Centre for Development and Enterprise (2010: 13) also emphatically state that South Africa as a country continue to receive quite a substantial number of immigrants from other countries in Africa and Asia, but equally an even more number of skilled citizens leave the country to be immigrants elsewhere. The Centre further states that South Africa as a country has not managed to attract adequate number of skilled professionals from the competitive global labour market, but they have received illegal and unskilled migrants instead. The activities of the said immigrants include but not limited to selling curios, retailing ethnic clothes and foods, motor-car repairs/panel beating and operating hairdressing salons. Other activities include operation of restaurants, nightclubs, cafes, music shops, several import-export businesses and traditional healing practices (Kalitanyi & Visser, 2010: 380).

The US's National Bureau of Economic Research points out in its study that 41% of Caribbean's, who have a tertiary education, live in an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries (Fakir, 2009). The US has also recently received large flows of highly-educated immigrants from all over the globe including Caribbean, Latin America, Asian and African countries. It is worth noting that the participation of other types of immigrants including refugees and asylum seekers in the economic activities of the host country is often limited due to them not having necessary documentations (Khan, 2007: 10). This is particularly evident in countries accepting more refugees and asylum seekers. The statistic shows that most highly- educated immigrants in the world originate from European countries or the OECD; and that only a third came from developing countries. However, despite these high-skilled inflows, the majority of recent immigrants to Europe had a lower level of education than natives (Kerr & Kerr, 2011: 3). On the positive, immigrant workers are inclusive of both newcomers and those already working in the United States are more willing than natives to move to all corners of the country in order to find jobs (Peri, 2013). On the contrary, Kerr and Kerr (2011: 3) are of the opinion that immigrants tend to concentrate in certain regions of host countries, often the major cities like Johannesburg, Cape Town, New York, Washington and London. For large nations like the US, geographical distances of cities to home countries also play a significant role. Kerr and Kerr (2011: 3) further notes that immigrant networks also play a contributory role when location decisions are done, although skilled and unskilled immigrants (those lacking formal qualification) of the same nationality may sort differently across cities in the host country. It is for this reason that two migrants from one developing country in Africa may decide to settle in two different cities either in South Africa or in the US.

4. Reasons of migration

Immigration policy can produce mixed results particularly because immigration is a delicate issue (Fakir, 2009). However, if managed adequately migration and immigration can produce considerable benefits for the host country's development. People move across countries for many reasons. There should be concern about foreign unskilled labour being exploited and used to displace local labour as it is often the case in host countries including in South Africa, but immigrants with requisite skills and entrepreneurial ability may add value to an already sluggish economy. Some of the common reasons for migration are discussed below.

4.1 *Economic reason*

Economic theory most prominently highlights the international labour mobility that descends from wage differences across countries (Borjas, 1989). Furthermore, many students from developing economies migrate to developed countries to study in the schools and universities of advanced countries with a hope of getting a 'better' education. According to Kerr and Kerr (2011: 3), migrants frequently cite higher income levels, better personal safety, short distance to home countries, and established immigrant networks as the main reasons for choosing their new host countries. To this end the income differentiation as one of the economic factors is so substantial and evident in comparisons of income or GDP levels between host and countries of origin. It therefore means that it is less likely for a migrant to move from a developed economy where there was a higher income to a developing economy where income is two times lower. In addition to higher income, potential business opportunities also play a contributory role. Entrepreneurship has the potential to broaden the economic base, contribute substantially towards economic growth and strengthen the process of wealth creation (Petrin, 1994: 7). It is safe to note that the participation of immigrants in the economy of the host country is also beneficial for the country itself.

Chiswick (1978) and Carliner (1980) indicated that the first studies on immigrants' income found that the US immigrants earned less than natives when entering the country but converged to the native wage level in 15 years. However, after 30 years of their stay, immigrants were found to earn more than natives of similar age and education. These findings propelled many to conclude that immigration had a positive net impact on the US economy. Similar to the US, European immigrants typically earn less than natives at entry and but over time these earning gaps do vary greatly across countries and time, and in certain instances other immigrants earn way more than natives (Bell, 1997; Grant, 1999). Clark and Drinkwater (2008) posit that these earning gaps are largely associated with lower

education levels among immigrants and nationals alike. Most studies concur that the earning gaps diminishes with time spent in the host country, and further postulate that earning gaps are closed as and when immigrants improve their language skills or obtain more education (Chiswick, 1991; Borjas, 1994). To address the language factor, many Scandinavian countries offer language courses to new immigrants so as to integrate them into the existing system, but Kerr and Kerr (2011: 7) are of the opinion that no evidence exists on the effectiveness of such training in terms of the success of job search or improved earnings.

Entrepreneurship world-wide contributes substantially to the social and economic development of a country, while also addressing issues such as unemployment and poverty. Entrepreneurship plays a significant role in reforming and revitalising economies because it establishes new businesses and helps existing ones to grow (Kalitanyi & Visser, 2010: 379). However, the Centre of Development and Enterprise (2010: 19) argues that the level of entrepreneurship in South Africa is consistently lower judging by international average. Immigrants do give entrepreneurship a boost though particularly Small Medium and Micro Enterprise (SMME's) in that most of them were established by business people in their country of origin, entrepreneurial experience was greater than that of locals, and that they occupied professional positions in their own countries before they migrated.

4.2 Employment reasons

Besides migrating from one's country of origin for economic and business opportunities, migrants also move to other countries of the world for employment opportunities. In his study about immigration and employment growth in the US, Enchautegui (2005: 10) posits that the overall immigrant population contributes more to increases in employment than does the overall native population. If managed efficiently and flexibly, immigration could bring about strong opportunities for economic growth, but immigration laws are often remain outdated, cumbersome, and rather restrictive. Peri (2013) emphatically state that these laws have substantially limited immigration for work-related reasons, both among the highly educated (scientists and engineers) and the less educated (construction, agricultural, and personal service workers). However, the South African situation has improved in recent years with regard to policy position particularly because a need for skilled immigrants exists in the country (Centre for Development and Enterprise, 2010: 14). This is necessary, particularly regarding the 2008 scare skills list released by the South African government which revealed that the country has got a skills deficit of more than half a million, including more than fifty thousand teachers. It could have been for this reason that the country has recruited a huge number of skilled professionals including

medical doctors, engineer, land surveyors, quantity surveyor and project managers from Cuba.

Human Science Research Council (2012: 39) posits that at times the employment of immigrants is a source of conflict between local South Africans and immigrants. However, this often happens in the informal sector where illegal or undocumented immigrants are employed, namely, farming, fishing and building. Employers consider illegal immigrants to be “cheaper” than locals. In the US and in many European countries, foreigners have grown their presence in the home services sector. Homeservices include cleaning, food preparation and gardening, as well as personal services such as child and elderly care (Peri, 2013). The increased presence of immigrants in this sector has made home services more affordable, which in turn has allowed more local women particularly the skilled ones to join the labour force or to increase their work hours. Kalitanyi and Visser (2010: 376) asserts that there’s one notion, or unsubstantiated belief held by many South Africans, that immigrants from north of the country’s borders are taking South Africans’ jobs. Timberg (2005: 3) however disagrees, maintaining, to the contrary, that they are actually creating employment for themselves and sometimes for unemployed South Africans through small businesses opportunities that they create.

4.3 Skills development

At times, migrants move from to other countries around the globe to develop certain skills that they lack through formal qualifications or apprenticeship. Immigration can stimulate local skills development and the transfer of experience (Fakir, 2009). Cross-immigration between emerging and developed economies may strengthen the role of emerging economies in an increasingly globalised world. Migration and immigration may also foster other benefits such as cultural understanding and the development of foreign relations. For example, highly skilled immigrants are a huge asset of the US economy which attracts scientists and engineers from all over the world. Furthermore, Peri (2013) alludes to the fact that one-quarter of the US-based Nobel laureates of the last 50 years were foreigners, and that highly educated immigrants account for about one-third of US. In 2006, immigrants founded 25% of the new high-tech companies with more than one million US dollars in sales, generating income and employment for the whole country. Innovation and technological growth are the engines of economic growth in technologically advanced countries like the US, where attracting and training new scientists and engineers is paramount to continued economic success. The very skills that migrants would have acquired in their host countries are beneficial to the countries of origin in the long-term in that they are likely to return home and utilise the acquired skills.

The Centre for Development and Enterprise (2010: 10) however notes that the skills production is grossly inadequate in that South African universities produce far less engineers and managers, training of artisans and technicians is inefficient, and that skilled professionals leave the country at an enormous rate. So besides increasing the skills production system in the country, intensive recruitment targeting immigrants ought to be developed so that they can transfer the vast enormous skills they have to the South Africans who would have been assigned as their understudy. That makes for a good skills development in the country. The Centre argues that the experience gained through the transfer of skills is equally important as production of newly qualified graduates.

5. Skills shortage versus skilled immigrants in South Africa

Centre for Development and Enterprise (2010: 9) affirms that the President of the Republic of South Africa has conceded that the country has got a bigger goal of wanting to achieve an annual growth rate of seven percent which may prove to be difficult to achieve. The Centre has alluded to the fact that the highest South Africa has ever gone in terms of growth is five percent (between 2004 & 2007). The principal reason being advocated by the Centre is that there's a dire skills shortage in South Africa. For example, South Africa in 2008 lacked 51 000 teachers and Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) college lecturers (Human Science Research Council, 2012; Stats SA, 2014). It must be noted that this is not only happening in the teaching and academic profession but in other sectors of the economy as well. The shortage of skills is also associated with a proportional number of skilled workforces leaving the country to developed economies in the world. This is evidenced by more than 520 000 South Africans who have migrated to other countries between 1989 and 2003, and this number accelerate by about 10% every year (Centre for Development and Enterprise, 2010: 10). Besides the entrepreneurial nature of immigrants in South Africa, they have no access to finance and credit in the country (Kalitanyi & Visser, 2010: 382). However, as Fisher (2005: 4), notes that entrepreneurs need to be creative and further concludes that the real entrepreneurs can start something out of nothing.

Appropriate policy framework ought to be developed to address the endemic shortage of skills in South Africa of which one of those could be to address the structural factors impeding the economy by attracting more skilled workers from other countries (Centre for Development and Enterprise, 2010: 9). There's also a concurrence by all stakeholders that some of the skills required by the economy cannot be produced in the country particularly in the short-term. The bold move proposed by the centre is to attract skilled personnel from abroad.

6. Benefits of immigration and migration

The US is an ultimate example of capitalisation of skilled immigrants in that more than a third of that country's engineers and other IT professionals working in that country are immigrants. Further to that is the fact that professional immigrants are said to be responsible for the US's 30% biotechnology invention, and they founded more than one-fourth of America's companies including but not limited to Google, Yahoo and Intel (Bell, 1997; Grant, 1999). Centre for Development and Enterprise (2010: 11) also notes that about 55% of the United States' doctoral graduates are from other countries. Due to these benefits of having skilled immigrants in the country, other developed countries including Germany, United Kingdom, France, Netherlands and Canada have stepped-up to compete with the United States in attracting skilled immigrants particularly targeting scarce skills of the economy. These countries have developed policy framework biased towards recruitment of skilled immigrants particularly from developing economies. This is not only limited to the United States and the European Union countries but to the Middle-East countries and elsewhere in the world. There's generally a concurrence that skilled immigrants contribute positively to economic growth of the country. Moreland (2006: 6) argues that self-employment constitutes the most important aspect of entrepreneurship. Serrie (1998: 212); Kalitanyi and Visser (2010: 380) also postulate that entrepreneurship is a strong tool for immigrants' economic and social integration and is a means by which immigrants without education or technical skills can escape poverty.

At the same time, developing countries particularly in Africa and Asia often suffer from "brain drain" which is the loss of trained and educated individuals from their countries of origin to other countries usually in the US, Europe and Australia (Somerville & Sumption, 2009). For example, there are currently more African scientists and engineers working in the US while migration has actually reduced the number of practicing doctors in Zambia from 1600 a few years ago to a mere 400 today (Shiner, 2008). The estimation is that Africa's brain drain has cost it nearly US\$9 billion in lost human capital and growth potential since 1997. The United Nations (2006) developed a State of the World Population report which postulated that Africa only retains 1.3% of the world's health care practitioners including medical doctors, pharmacists and nurses. It therefore means that, despite having over a quarter of the world's tuberculosis cases and 64% of the total numbers of people infected with HIV, Africa only has on average, a mere one nurse per 1000 patients (Shiner, 2008). With inevitable migration and immigration in the world, such a lack of skills in Africa may partly be addressed through immigrants from other parts of the world. Of paramount importance according to Centre for Development and Enterprise (2010: 3) is the fact that the country's economic growth may grow significantly because of immigration particularly

skilled ones like engineers, teachers, pharmacists, medical doctors and academics. For this reason, South Africa as a country falling in this category of developing countries in dire need of the said skills, could encourage immigration through its immigration policies so as to address the economic growth challenges facing the country. It must however be noted that South Africa as a country has lost a huge number of its skilled citizens to other countries of the world as well.

7. Immigration and migration challenges

One of the challenges associated with immigration is that not all of them are registered and documented which makes them ineligible to practice in their area of speciality. The South African situation is one in which there are a lot of qualified immigrants like teachers who are not practising. The other challenge according to the Centre for Development and Enterprise (2010: 12) is that the middle class tend to view skilled immigrants quite differently from the rest of the population in that they in most cases compete for the same space in the economy of which many of whom are fearful of the economic consequence. Friedrich and Visser (2005:11) argue that South Africa is very rich in minerals and other resources, which South African learners should be taught to exploit instead of leaving them to foreigners, many of whom have today become very successful business people in South Africa. However, it must be noted that with immigration comes illegal immigrants who is defined in terms of section 1 (1) of the Immigration Act, 2002 (Act 13 of 2002) as a foreigner who is in contravention of the Act (Republic of South Africa, 2002). South Africa has experienced huge “influx” of illegal immigrants who at times are referred to as undocumented or irregular migrants (Human Science Research Council, 2012: 29). There have been calls from within the borders of South Africa to “tighten, patrol and control” the borders from its neighbouring states so as to effectively deal with the illegal or undocumented immigrants. Those calling for tighter measures allude to the fact that the South African government is “too relaxed” and as such there is a need for the immigration policies to be revised so that it can effectively address the identified challenges. This paper disagrees with the notion of tightening and stricter control of the borders in that there’s more good than bad in immigration particularly in skilled immigrants who possess scarce skills including but not limited to engineering, natural and health sciences.

Unlike skilled immigrants who are qualified, illegal immigrants are often alleged of involving themselves in illegal or criminal activities (Human Science Research Council, 2012: 30) particularly because they are undocumented meaning that it is difficult for government to trace them if they have engaged themselves in criminal or fraudulent activities. The Council also alludes to the fact that ineffective Community Policing Forum (CPF) poses a big

challenge in dealing with immigration particularly illegal immigrants in that the forum is not likely to identify potential criminals. It could be safely noted that a fully functioning CPF may play a pivotal role in that it may know all foreigners within its area of jurisdiction and be able to identify them if ever they were involved in criminal and corrupt activities. Another challenge is the possible conflicts between locals and immigrants (Human Science Research Council, 2012: 30). More often than not, immigrants all over the world including in South Africa often settle for lower wages even when employed which makes them “employees of choice” by local employers particularly in the informal market (farming, building and mining) which does not need specialised skills. At times this is done in contravention of regulatory frameworks. These conflicts are at times as a result of access to low cost housing which are not to be owned by immigrants but in some cases they own them, which causes conflict. As noted by both Serrie (1998: 11) and Helton (2003: 5), the numbers of immigrants to any nation, and their countries of origin are powerfully affected by the receiving countries’ immigration policies and laws, as well as the degree to which those laws are enforced. However, Kalitanyi and Visser (2010: 377) note that immigration policies vary from one country to another. New Zealand’s regulations require proof of family income to prevent immigrants from placing a burden on the social welfare services, while the United States does not require proof.

Weaker employment and business opportunities may also lead to immigrants being dependent on social security and similar programs than natives (Kerr & Kerr, 2011: 15-16). Borjas (1994) postulate that migrants are more attracted to countries with high social benefits. Another challenge that is specific to South Africa is the destabilisation of economies in its neighbouring countries which leads to migration from those countries to South Africa. The inevitability is that some of the people who migrate from these countries do not have formally recognised skills and they end-up contravening immigration policies through overstaying visas, crossing borders and using services of human smugglers (Centre for Development and Enterprise, 2010: 18). However this challenge could be addressed by harmonising African economies through strengthening integrated imports and exports so as to generate more employment from within the continent.

8. Conclusion

McKinley (2006: 1) correctly maintains that the relevant question to ask should therefore no longer be whether or not migration and immigration should be accepted, but how to deal with it and manage it effectively so that the benefits it has to offer could be fully exploited and its negative effects reduced or minimised. Crush (2001: 1) and Mapisa-Nqakula (2006: 2) concurs and also maintain that the focus should be on the

multidimensional aspects of international migration in order to identify appropriate ways and means of maximising development and benefits and minimising negative impacts. Timberg (2005:9) dispel the notion that refugees are taking jobs that would otherwise go to South Africans, and correctly notes that they often start little businesses and also employ other locals in the process. However, these immigrant entrepreneurs are confronted with a number of challenges including xenophobic hostility directed at them and their businesses (Khan, 2007: 8). Despite the difficult local conditions in which South African immigrants operate, Rogerson (1999: 14) posit that most of immigrant entrepreneurs continue to explore the existing business opportunities.

Besides the need for the entrepreneurial immigrants for the growth of the South African economy through investment and creation of employment, the Centre for Development and Enterprise (2010: 16) asserts that a greater need for aggressive recruitment strategy not only limited to the region of Africa but international as well. Equally, a need exists to engage those who have vested interest including public sector unions, public sector employees and various organisations which continues to see the recruitment of skilled immigrants as a treat to their stability. This should be done particularly where there's a competition of existing space between nationals and immigrants. Khan (2007: 2) is of the opinion that South Africa has not sufficiently addressed the immigration and migration challenges due to its ineffective policy framework. An argument about the many South Africans who are unemployed is often used to oppose the recruitment of skilled immigrants from elsewhere in the world. This argument does not hold water in that government only target scarce skills which are difficult to find in the country including medical doctors, engineers, land surveyors, quantity surveyor and construction project managers. However, beside the said challenges, the long-term goal of government should be to increase the skills pool of nationals so as to limit the recruitment of skilled immigrants in the country. It is noted that the South African government has initiated two new universities, namely, University of Mpumalanga and Sol Plaatje University. The number of students taken to Cuba for training as medical doctor has increased substantially since 2009. For sure these two initiatives amongst others by the South African government are geared towards addressing the skills shortage in the country.

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AFRICAN GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS IN THE GLOBALISATION ERA: AFRICAN CRITERIA OF GOVERNANCE BASED ON THE HOME-GROWN SOLUTIONS

P. Magwele

University of Limpopo, South Africa

Abstract

Africa's pristine conditions of governance including its epistemic and ontological orientations were adversely impacted by colonialism. Since the brisk episode of colonial rule imposed unwanted, unfamiliar and unnecessary means of governance on a long pre-colonial traditional system of governance Africans had developed. As such colonial enterprise almost led to the obliteration of the continent's rich cultural, social, political systems and its architecture of governance. This dismantlement of Africa's established structures were replaced with colonial rule. Furthermore, colonial era entrenched in Africa a plethora of unbalance systems based on oppression, unaccountability, violence and militarism. The first wave of liberations through the political dinosaurs in the 1960s gave enough hope of witnessing the restoration of Africa's original sovereignty. However, the independence failed to effect the desirable end. Moreover, the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1989 which marked the end of cold war, left African states in a weak position. This occurred after they (African states) have been abandoned by their cold war's godfathers and patrons (the USSR and the United States and its Western allies) used most of African states as merely their ideological allies. As a result the western governments started to dictate Africa's way of governance and economic development. Hence, the present day African states by and large are still a reflection of the legacy of western and European imperialism. This complicated colonial inheritance in the continent retards its ability to accomplish a sustainable development and sound governance. This persist in spite the fact that the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) secretariat adopted the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which seeks *anti alia* to foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development which are the constitutive pointers of good governance. The paper's argument is that Africa needs a paradigm of governance based on the home-grown solutions. It explores measures which could be effective to help the continent to implement a genuine independence. Likewise, that may protect its sovereignty from the adverse influence of the neoliberalism.

Key words: Governance, Paradigm, Independence, Development, NEPAD

1. Introduction

This paper seeks to indicate that African systems of governance in the globalisation era need a paradigm based on the home-grown solutions. The paradigm could aid African leaders and policy makers today to know how best to deal with the demands of sustainable development and good governance against the goals of globalisation (Ikeme, 2000). The concept of good governance surfaced in 1989 in the World Bank's report on Sub-Saharan Africa, which characterised the crisis in the region as a "crisis of governance" (World Bank 1989). However the 30 years of good governance agenda advocated in the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the Washington Consensus appears to be a phantom concept in many African states today (Chabal, 2009). He goes on to say that countries such as Liberia, Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia, which feature in the Fragile states index (formerly the failed states index) , are a point in case. Moreover, African Governance Newsletter (2011) notes that there is a great deal that has unfolded and that continues to unfold as a result of the wider commitment to governance and democracy, but much of this remains muddled in formal reports and in the confines of diplomatic dialogue. Though there are contending perspectives on the historical and contemporary referents, dimensions and interconnections of the crises of postcoloniality in Africa (Omeje, 2015). There is a considerable amount of evidence that Africa's ailing governance today is informed by the colonial era's legacy. As Busia (1962) avers that the modern African state is structurally flawed because it was not designed to serve African interests but to facilitate and consolidate colonial administration. Conversely, since the third world debt crisis in 1982, which led to many developing countries to depend on the Global North for financial aid, has aggravated the already weak African governance. Western donors now emphasised "good governance," through free-market capitalism which led to the collapse of many African economies and its sovereignty (Wikipedia, 2015). The 'conditionality' that came with the aid through the imposition of structural adjustment programme (SAPs) on African states, has since left African's sovereignty to be an elusive concept. This occurred under the auspices of neoliberal economic policies which is the bedrock of the globalisation process. Accordingly, post-colonial Africa's multidimensional crises -political, economic, social and cultural - of epic proportions (Martin, 2012) are basically double-pronged. Firstly today's African states need to eradicate the legacy bequeathed from colonial experience. Secondly they need to find a strategy on how to maintain the capacity of their governance in the increasingly globalised world. Hence the paper will firstly focus on the paradigm which is African in orientation. Equally it will point out the need for the redefinition of the concept governance; also globalisation v. *Fundi wa Afrika*

will be juxtaposed and discussed. Likewise, development through dominant paradigm and development through compatible cultural democracy will be explored.

2. Conceptual Framework

2.1 Paradigm

Paradigm is defined as an intellectual perception or view, accepted by an individual or a society as a clear example, model, or pattern of how things work in the world (Kuhn, 1977). The term was used first by the US science fiction historian Thomas Kuhn (1922-96) in his 1962 book *'The Structure of Scientific Revolution'* to refer to theoretical frameworks within which all scientific thinking and practices operate. The potency of paradigm is more complex to overcome in that it serves as control system within conscious level (Breton & Largent, 1996). A great number of the staunch pan-Africanist theoreticians and intellectuals whose ultimate goal was to restore Africa that will be self-governed, pointed out that Africa needs a political paradigm based on African thought, culture and traditions (Fanon, 1986; Garvey, 1967 ; Biko, 1987 & Nkrumah, 1970). Exemplifying this, Fanon (1986) eloquently calls for a new and original African political ideology to serve as a blueprint for its governance. In his book: *Black Skin, White Masks*, he observed that Africans need a psychological healing from colonial experience which created their current worldview. By implication Fanon argues for an introduction of a new governing paradigm that is African in orientation which will eradicate the one which was established by the colonial occupation. As today African Union (AU) is accused of being a copy of European Union (EU), as such unable to resolve a plethora of African challenges through measures that are home-grown (Martin, 2012). Equally, at the core of Biko's philosophy of Black consciousness- in the late 1960's to early 1970s- was (and still is) a quest to attain a distinct political thought or paradigm that is African in nature, which is similar to the one that Fanon (1986) advocates for. As this is well encapsulated in the South African Student Organisation (SASO) Manifesto adopted in July 1971 which declares that Black Consciousness was "an attitude of mind, a way of life" in which a black man saw himself "as self-defined and not as defined by others". Indeed this strongly suggests that if Africa is to achieve self-governance based on home-grown solutions it needs to purge itself of the colonial paradigm of governance - which demonised everything concerning Africa. Most importantly this colonial paradigm has to be supplanted by the new one that is embedded in the pre-colonial African ontology, epistemology and axiology.

Moreover, Fanon in his essay: *'Toward the African Revolution'* he bemoaned the lack of political paradigm in Africa as he noted that "For my part, the deeper I enter into the

cultures and the political circles the surer I am that the great danger that threatens Africa is the absence of ideology” (Fanon, 1988). Further, in his book : *Consciencism*, Nkrumah (1970) identifies the three main segments of African society, animated by competing ideologies, as being the traditional, the Western and the Islamic. As a result, Nkrumah (1970) argues for a new ideology (paradigm) that reflects the unity of society, based on indigenous humanist African principles and catering to the needs of all. Also such an ideology he names *philosophical consciencism*. In addition, February 1967, *Mwalimu* (“The teacher in Ki-Swahili”) Nyerere proclaimed the “Arusha Declaration” which became the guide for Tanzania’s policy of self-reliance, was encapsulated in the concept of *Ujamaa* (meaning “community” or “familyhood” in Ki-Swahili), which typifies the pre-colonial style of governance in Africa (Martin, 2012). This is clearly captured in his preface to *ujamma: Essay on socialism*, therein, Nyerere laments the “lack of ideology” (paradigm) in his country that should determine its destiny; therefore, he adopted the concept of *ujamaa* as a specific type of African socialism. This was to be different and distinct from both capitalism and socialism. As he observed that capitalism seeks to build a happy society on the basis of the exploration of man by man. On the other hand he rejected the doctrine of socialism, which he argues that it seeks to build a happy society on a philosophy of inevitable conflict between man and man (Martin, 2012).

It is abundantly clear that the paradigm straddles exist between the two western time-honoured political ideologies which are entrenched in African systems of governance. *Ujamaa* as a form of governing paradigm provides a governing environment that is considerate of all and sundry involved in the process. Likewise, this paradigm is an antithesis of neo-patrimonial power structures imposed on the continent by Bretton Woods institutes, which prioritised geo-political advancement over the wellbeing of African peoples (Chabal, 2009). Such institutions such as International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank are what Ngugi wa Thiong’o (2005) observes as a replay from the classic text of the colonial process, Shakespeare’s *The Tempest*, wherein Caliban was continuously kept under the spell of Prospero. The same sentiments are shared by Thabo Mbeki in his biography *Fit to govern: the intelligence of Thabo Mbeki* (Robberts, 2006). Hence African leaders today need to evoke and embody the spirit of Biko that says “black man you are on your own” and that of Garvey: “*Africa for Africans*”. This could prove to be of great benefit for the fate of Africa’s remnant identity in the globalising world, in that globalisation is already obliterating the remaining indigenous cultures of many African societies (Ikeme, 2000). He goes on to say that indigenous knowledge and skill base -of governance- are under great threat of being eliminated in the globalising world.

2.2 Redefining governance

Governance in Africa needs to be redefined simply for two reasons: firstly is because before the European colonial rule, Africa had its own political institutions and mechanisms of governance which were massively disrupted by the colonisers (Crowder, 1968; Cohen, 1969). Collins and Burns (2007) aver that this colonial experience left a legacy of strong, centralised and authoritarian governments in Africa. Hence African states are necessitated by this fact to have a paradigm that will capture the meaning of governance that was lost during the colonial rule. On the one hand, the post-Cold War world of the 1990s saw a new paradigm emerge based on a number of issues such as the growing idea of globalisation as a significant theme and the subsequent weakening of nation-states and geostrategic breakdown (). Consequently, the modern way of governance exists in the context of globalisation and globalising regimes of power: politically, economically and culturally (Rosenau, 1995). He further indicates that this led to the birth of the world governance, which is the term used to designate all the regulations intended for organisation and centralisation of human societies on a global scale and the way in which global affairs are managed. It is against this backdrop that necessitates African states to redefine governance through a paradigm that is African in orientation. This could help them to resolve their problems through the measures that are homegrown. Also this will serve as protection from the adverse impacts of forces of the global governance.

This could be redefined through constructionist theory - particularly in this era of globalisation which has ability to define and weaken government's capacity (Caporaso & Maderia, 2012). This should be done in the light of these ideological propositions advanced by the pan-African ideologues. To a greater extent their paradigms and philosophies of governance - unwittingly or wittingly- were encapsulated in constructionist perspective. Gergen (2009) posits that in constructionism, concepts that are long honoured – such as “objectivity”, “reason” and “knowledge” are critically challenged. He further states that its basic idea is to ask people to rethink virtually everything they have been taught about themselves and the world. As it has been the tireless struggle of pan-African intellectuals and theoreticians in the past to deconstruct the western and colonial constructs about Africa. It is of paramount importance for incumbent African states' leaders and all stakeholders to reconstruct governance as a concept.

As it has already been indicated that the need to redefine governance is necessitated by the fact that colonial experiences have obliterated Africa's systems of governance and entrenched its own on the continent. Busia (1962) observes that the modern African state is

structurally flawed because it was not designed to serve African interests but to facilitate and consolidate colonial administration. He also contends that postcolonial state is essentially an unreformed colonial state. This unreformed state of governance is encapsulated by Mwakikagile in Martin (2011) as he points out that probably the most effective means the modern African state has used to perpetuate its existence and hold its people together has been arbitrary employment of coercive power that is legally wielded almost exclusively by the state to squash the dissent. He further argues that this approach to governance causes the most modern African states to remain corrupt and despotic. This is really a worrying observation that compels Africans to find a form of governance that will replace this state of affairs.

On the one hand, in this globalisation era, governance has been defined in various forms by different sectors. For instance, organisations such as the IMF and World Bank define governance as the way in which social resources are controlled in order to exercise political power and promote social and economic development (Wikipedia, 2015). This definition highlights the role played by governmental authorities in establishing a framework for economic activity and in deciding how the benefits of such activity are distributed. It is clear that this paradigm of governance places first the political power and capitals at the centre while people regarded as mere afterthought. Likewise, it embodies the spirit of imperialism and capitalist modernity wherein the locus of control is possessed by those who are well-resourced.

In contrast Martin (2012:12) argues that in indigenous African political systems, the rules and procedures of governance were established by custom and tradition rather than by written constitutions. He also notes that these systems were based on the *rule of law*- that is, respect for (and adherence) customary ways of resolving disputes and upholding the traditions of governing behaviour. More important, customary African laws were subject to full public debate and scrutiny. In fact, chiefs and kings could not promulgate laws without the consent of the councils (Martin, 2012:12). This clearly indicates that people were at the heart of governance, rather than power or capitals. As this is well articulated by Biko in his book: *I write what I like* when he states that “ One of the most fundamental aspects of our culture is the importance we attach to man. Ours has always been a Man-centred society. This attitude to see people not as themselves but as agents for some particular function either to one’s disadvantage or advantage is foreign to us.” (Biko, 1987). Osabu-Kle (2000) concurs that African political systems in pre-colonial times were essentially democratic, with all the trappings of government with the consent of the governed and balance between centralised power and decentralised power to prevent the misuse of authority by one person.

He also indicates that they were systems with checks and balances and the chief and his council ruled with the consent of the people as whole. If these systems be revived by today's African leaders, they can play a pivotal role in purging the remnants of colonial governance from African political systems. Likewise, this will help them to protect their people against ungoverned globalisation based on private forces (Caporaso & Maderia, 2012), which more often than not influences African leaders to disregard the people elected them to the government.

3. Globalisation v. *Fundi wa Afrika*

Stone-Sweet (2002:323) postulates that globalisation is a given, as this is seen in the rules regulating contractual relationships among firms, in the bilateral investment treaties (BITs) among scores of countries, in the institutions of the IMF, World Bank, G-8 and G-20. Caporaso and Maderia (2012) state that the globalisation of a variety of issues has been met with rising calls for governments to develop new tools to manage complex processes. They further claim that it is hard to imagine the alternative to global governance. Moreover, Haas and Hird (2008) are of the view that globalisation has become the political lodestone of contemporary international relations, as political positions and political identities are defined in light of their orientation to it. In the same vein Haass (2001) maintains that "globalisation is a reality, not a policy. But how we respond to it is a matter of choice and policy". The general feeling that is emerging from these observations is that any paradigm of governance is next to impossible if not aligned with the globalisation process.

However, Muini (2002) postulates a paradigm namely *Fundi wa Afrika* (meaning "builder or "tailor" of Africa in the Ki-Swahili language of east Africa). According to Muini this paradigm constitutes aspects such as: an exhaustive and radical critique of existing paradigms of the African state and taking a resolutely Africanist and Pan-Africanist perspective-namely, putting Africa and Africans first... and promoting economic and political unity of Africans (Muini, 2002). The paradigm seeks to provide two main guidance to the Africans. Firstly, it calls for the restoration and reconstruction of Africa' pristine conditions. Secondly, it serves as a guide for African to know how to guard its sovereignty in this era of globalisation (Martin, 2002). This is clearly captured in one of the 16 points that Muini (2000) calls practical aspects of the paradigm. In this point *Fundi wa Afrika* argues that:

African state must be reconstructed based on African culture, history, traditions, priorities and needs (however these are defined by Africans). It uses history to demonstrate that Africa political systems were radically and

permanently altered after slavery to serve minority and Western needs. To reverse this trend, Africans must first recapture their economies. Such a development implies the control by Africans over the resources within their borders for the *sole benefit* of the African people.

Indeed this paradigm serves as a lodestar for Africans, particularly its political leaders to know how to grapple with the seemingly unavoidable global forces. *Fundi wa Afrika* is also encapsulated in Nyerere's exhortation in Martin (2012) to Africans when averred that: "African... is isolated. Therefore to develop, it will have to depend upon its own resources basically, internal resources, nationally, and Africa will have to depend upon Africa. The leadership of the future will have to devise, try to carry out policies of maximum national self-reliance and maximum collective self-reliance. They have no other choice. *Hamma!* [There is none!]." In his book: *Africa must Unite*, Nkrumah share the same view that "unless Africa is politically united under an All-African Union Government, there can be no solution to our social and economic problems."

4. Development through dominant paradigm

Haas and Hird (2008) argue that despite the pressures that globalisation poses on governments to conform to the dominant development paradigm, it is important to realise that the laws and ethics of development that the international community has passed on as a part of our modern heritage are also part of the globalised world. They also indicate that these human rights instruments were adopted by United Nations in the past five decade and among them are: the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights...; and the Convention on the Rights of Children. In the same vein Caporaso and Maderia (2012) notes that international institutions such as the IMF and World Bank are the key drivers of dominant development paradigm. They further point out that these institutions - IMF in particular- work extensively with developing countries to help them achieve economic growth, maintain macro-economic stability, reduce poverty....and in return these countries are expected to adopt the IMF policy prescription known as Washington Consensus.

Furthermore, Chumbow in Mkandawire (2005) remarks that the concept of development proposed by the United Nations (UNDP, UNESCO, WHO, etc) is one that is 'redemptive' in character in that it underscores the social well-being of the citizenry of the entire nation in terms of minimum standard of living, which include health, shelter (housing), food security, life expectancy (reduction of infant mortality), education , work, etc. The question that should be asked today is whether Africa as a continent has really been

redeemed by the dominant development paradigm, which implicitly claims autonomy and universality in the world's development. Osabu-Kle (2000) contends that since its independence, most African states remain in permanent state of political, economic, social and cultural crisis, due in large measure to the fact that the Western type of liberal democracy actively promoted by western countries and agencies (notably the international financial institutions) has dismally failed to take root in Africa.

Likewise, dominant development paradigm operates within neoliberalism which has been the overarching development paradigm since the early 1980s. The period from 1979-1981 is known as "the birth of neoliberalism" when it developed as a global policy raft and political ideology (Harrison, 2010: 18). Anthropologists, as well as many other academics, have also criticized neoliberalism for numerous reasons. Neoliberal policies have been criticized as negatively impacting the already marginalized and susceptible members of society. The most vulnerable, such as women, children, the elderly and the disabled, are the primary victims as they are expected to survive with less social support (Bond, 2005). This suggests strongly that dominant development paradigm has not been helpful in redeeming Africa from underdevelopment. Similarly, it does not appear to be a means for African development in the future.

5. Development through Compatible Cultural Democracy

In the backdrop of this paralysis of underdevelopment African finds itself in, it behoves Africans to search for alternative measures that will offset the continent on a development trajectory. Osabu-Kle (2000) avers that "only a democracy compatible with the African cultural environment is capable of achieving the political conditions for successful development in Africa." He also points out that this compatible cultural democracy is the key to Africa's political, economic and social development. Fanon (1968) concurs that for popular democracy and development to succeed in Africa, Africans must stop blindly following the West: they must stop aping Western culture, traditions, ideas and institutions and above all they must be bold, innovative and develop their own ideas, concepts and institutions based on African values, culture and traditions. Indeed in order for Africa to attain sustainable developments, which will strengthen its sovereignty, it needs to stop depending on external help, such as Foreign Direct Investment (FDIs) for its economy to thrive. African leaders need to take cue from France which protects its movie industry and food from foreign completion, Also they must learn from Japan which argues that whaling is Japanese cultural activity, and it is willing to face the wrath of international environmental groups to protect its small whaling industry (Haas & Hird, 2008:432). Africa has to view its rich tapestry of culture and heritages as national cultural icons and harness them for its development. In doing so

Africa will be embracing compatible cultural democracy as a paradigm for its development and governance.

Moreover, compatible cultural democracy is not based on any foreign ideology be it socialism, Marxism, capitalism or liberalism but is grounded in *Africanism* (Osabu-Kle, 2000). It is as if pre-colonial Africa needs to reboot the system and start from the scratch. Martin (2012) maintains that within this paradigm “Africans should not be forced to choose between two Western ideologies: liberal democracy and socialism. Regrettably, some African leaders since its independence, such as Adi Amin (Uganda) opted even for third ideology namely, fascism, which inhibited good governance and development that could have been achieved. On the contrary in today’s globalising world, liberal democracy is seen as the only means of economic and social development. However, Osabu-Kle (2000) points out that what Africa needs today is a different paradigm (compatible cultural democracy) which entails the ideological, economic and political practice of Africans on African soil. Also he states that this must be in accordance with African culture and by Africans emancipated from colonial mentality and cleansed of foreign excrescence.

This is critically important in that majority of Africans’ psychic need to be restored to proper state. The scale of colonial damage was astronomical that even to date its impact is palpably clear. As an illustration, the bleaching of the skin and straightening of hair by most young African women, who want to graduate from the level of subhuman to human beings’. Also is a common phenomenon-particularly at taxi ranks- to hear a meal vendor after transaction was done with them expressing their gratitude by calling the buyer *lekgowa* (meaning “white man” in Sepedi). This evokes the spirit of colonial Masters who were deemed as the source of supply to their African slaves. This is what Ngugi wa Thiong’o calls an European planted memory that serves as bastion of its legacy on African soil and impedes it from developing. For this reason, a substitutionary paradigm (or memory) is compulsory in the form of compatible cultural democracy. Which was commendably hinted in the resolutions adopted at the 25th African Union Heads of states Summit held in Johannesburg South Africa (Semono, 2015). As amongst the resolutions was a united and functioning single military by the end of the year and the acceleration of the operationisation of the African Standby Force (ASF). Semono (2015) reports that this was proposed with the aim to achieve peace and security in the continent that will ensure sustainable development to take root. Indeed this can help Africans to drive their development from within and stop depending on Western donors and security. Also this will help the continent to service its staggering debt, as a result be fully independent. Consequently Africa will have strong bargaining power in this globalising process, as it (bargaining power) determines the success or failure of any government (Caporaso and Maderia, 2012).

6. Conclusion

This paper has argued that in this globalisation era, African systems of governance need a paradigm that is based on the home-grown solutions. Firstly, it defined the concept paradigm and indicated that it was first used by Kuhn (1962) in his book: *'The structure Of Scientific Revolution.'* The paper showed that Africa has had from the past theoreticians and intellectuals who advocated strongly a new paradigm for Africa, among them are: Fanon, Nkrumah, Biko and Nyerere. Furthermore it stated that governance in Africa needs to be redefined. It also argued that development through dominant paradigm cannot help Africa to develop. However it pointed out that Africa's development can be achieved through compatible cultural democracy. Moreover, it juxtaposed globalisation and *Fundi wa Afrika* (meaning the builder of African). In this instance the paper clearly showed that even if there is some sense from other quarters, that the world is currently at the mercy of global forces, the paper indicated that Africa can protect itself from negative aspect of globalisation process through the guidance of *Fundi wa Afrika*.

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THE ROLE OF IMMIGRANTS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION CHALLENGES: AN EXPLORATORY PERSPECTIVE

L.A. Makgahlela

University of Limpopo, South Africa

R.A. Lesabe

Atio Corporations, South Africa

ABSTRACT

In recent years, the topic of migrant labour has resurfaced in South Africa, mainly as a result of the widely reported 2008 and 2015 xenophobic attacks that pervaded the country. Evidently, an increasing number of immigrants have flocked to South Africa (legally and illegally) mainly for economic and social stability. South Africa, Johannesburg in particular, has for decades been seen as the business hub in the Southern African region, and the continent of Africa at large. These immigrants, from all over the world, have been met with and exposed to serious expressions of hostility and abuse associated, to a larger extent, to myths and stereotypes. As immigrants find it difficult to find employment, many of them are pushed into the world of entrepreneurship and start their own business to create job opportunities. A significant number of these immigrants have successfully applied their entrepreneurial skills in establishing small enterprises and employing locals, thereby exacerbating the tension with their South African counterparts. This study used a qualitative design. A data reduction analysis approach was used and 10 participants were selected using the purposeful sampling method to identify a more closely defined group for whom the research question was significant. Semi-structured in-depth interviews were used to collect data and the interviews were then transcribed for data reduction analysis. The findings suggest that migrants contribute immensely towards South Africa's GDP and job creation initiatives. The findings also suggest that there are integration problems within communities where migrants are concerned. Finally, socio-economic barriers linked to migrant business in South African has the potential to fuel xenophobia sporadically in future and gradually alienate foreign investment.

Keywords: Immigrants, economy, Social Integration

1. Introduction

The mass influx of immigrants over the past few years to South Africa has been a source of concern for politicians, researchers, government and the community. This phenomenon has given fuel to a fearful and hostile attitude to immigrants from local communities. As a result of long-standing patterns of labour migration, conflict and economic hardship in neighboring countries, and South Africa's peace and prosperity, the country has become a primary destination and transit point for migrants from throughout the region (Landau, Ramjathan-Keogh and Singh, 2005). Immigration is one of the globe's most fevered debates at the moment, with recent data suggesting that a record 107,500 migrants crossed the European Union's borders (Plucinska, 2015). South African on the other hand has experienced an influx of migrants since 1994 and the numbers have increased every year. The country's Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) once estimated that there are 4 to 8 million undocumented migrants in South Africa, but the figures were later revised (Stats SA, 2012). Statistics South Africa also estimates that undocumented persons in the country could be somewhere in the range of 500,000 to 1 million (Stats SA, 2012)

An independent team of analysts and researchers at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg estimated that the overall foreign population in South Africa ranges from 1.6 to 2 million, or 3 to 4 percent of the total population. Sadly, this subject of immigrants is rarely informed by evidence, but estimations. In this paper, the focus is on exploring a neglected aspect of the immigration debate, that is, the contribution of migrant entrepreneurs to the South African economy and challenges of social integration. The contribution of migrant entrepreneurs has not only been neglected by government, academia and the public discourse, but has also been under-reported in the media. While popular perceptions of immigration involve migrants arriving in the South Africa to take jobs and depress wages, corruption and criminal activities, illicit trading, etc. migrants actually tend to be highly entrepreneurial and business risk takers.

Literature reviewed from Africa and elsewhere in the worlds shows that immigrants have an important role to play in the economy of the host country. According to Friedberg and Hunt (1995: 24) until recently empirical work has been done on the impact of immigrants on the receiving economy and the results showed that immigrants play a critical role in economic growth and employment creation in the host country. Immigrants are also making a significant contribution by servicing the needs of poorer people who cannot access goods offered by big businesses, at places and times of day that are convenient. Despite South Africa's favorable legal and policy environment, there is evidence that immigrants find it

difficult if not impossible to get employment and create employment opportunities in South Africa. Most of the immigrants start their own small business as they find it difficult to get employment. In the process, these small businesses could be able to create employment opportunities for the local and grow the economy. They also used local suppliers and transport for their business to grow their small business.

Very often local citizens do not understand the role played by the immigrants in the economy of the country and their contribution to the economy. They tend to believe that immigrants are here to take their jobs or to compete with their businesses. Basically, as we plan our economic development and growth prospects, we can no longer afford to ignore such an important source of economic dynamism and job creation. The recent sporadic violence and hostility towards immigration – even within mainstream political debates and reckless messages by some traditional leaders – could prove damaging for future job creation in South Africa, especially in small business development or emerging sectors. The upshot of these messages can have a negative impact on the country's image and development and could also mean entrepreneurs are unable to fully utilize their entrepreneurial skills, experience, grow their business and thus contribute to the economy in an optimal fashion. Instead, we should appreciate that migrant entrepreneurs have overcome significant challenges to develop enterprises in the South Africa, and that their tenacity and creativity is all that business needs. In many respects, the odds have been stacked against them. Yet they still thrive and triumph still.

According to a study by New Zealand Immigrations (2010), immigrants plays a vital role in securing New Zealand's economic prosperity by supplying critical skills for the economy and bringing in visitors, tourists and international students. According to Carland, Hoy, Boulton, and Carland, (2005), several studies have also shown that self-employment has always been an important avenue for social mobility among immigrants. Immigrants find it difficult to find employment many of them are pushed into the world of entrepreneurship and start their own business to create job opportunities. Rogerson (1999) posits that foreign-owned small businesses are now a particularly significant element of the changing economy in many countries.

2. Research setting

The study was conducted in Diepsloot, a densely populated township in the north of Johannesburg, South Africa. Diepsloot can be categorised in to four different settlement arrangements, fully government-subsidized housing (extensions 4,5,6,9, and 10), partially

government subsidized houses (extension 3) brick houses built by landowners (extensions 2 and 7), as well as shacks (the biggest sections being extensions 1, 12 and 13).

2.1 Sampling

A purposive sampling technique (non-probability sampling) was used in this research, wherein subjects were selected on the basis of their expertise and knowledge in the topic under investigation (*township entrepreneurship and socio-economic challenges*). The sample was also chosen with a view that it should broadly reflect the population of small migrant business in Diepsloot Township and to a large extent, small migrant business in South Africa. Ten (10) small businesses were chosen, across various markets and disciplines, including a spaza shops (an informal convenience shop business in South Africa, usually run from home), hair salon, internet café, panel-beater carwash and butchery. A total number of 10 entrepreneurs (across all Diepsloot residential sections) were sampled, following a theoretical sampling process, based on grounded theory to ensure that theoretical saturation is reached. The sample comprises 4 Somalis, 2 Cameroonians, 2 Ethiopians, and 2 Bangladeshis. Although the main focus was on the contribution of migrants in the South African economy and their challenges, the researchers also spoke to local people during data collection phase, not as part of the sample but to gain more insight and understanding of the competition and common perceptions from the locals' perspective.

2.2 Data collection

The researcher used a hybrid of unstructured and semi-structured data collections method. When developing questions the researcher incorporated the funneling technique (Sekaran and Bougie, 2013), which allowed the researcher to form impressions of the situation from open-ended questions. This is a transition from broad to narrow themes. Interviews were conducted face-to-face; the interviewer did not enter the interview setting with a planned sequence of questions to be asked of the participants but with a '*prompt sheet*' focusing on broad problem areas and open-ended questions. The interviews therefore provided the researchers with insight rather than the statistical significance.

These methods and techniques of interviewing allowed the researcher and participants to engage in a conversation wherein initial broad questions were modified in light of the participants' responses and the researchers were able to probe interesting and important areas that emerged. This was done in line with Smith and Osborn, (2007) who found that semi-structured interviews are useful in that they: facilitate rapport/ empathy; allow greater flexibility of coverage; allow the interviewer to go into novel areas; and tend to produce richer data. On average interviews took about 30 minutes to complete. All

interviews were conducted in English as all participants were comfortable with the language. All interviews were conducted during off peak hours to avoid interruptions on both business processes and the interview itself, as most owners were also involved in the daily operations of their business.

2.3 Limitations

As in all research, limitations exist in this study. The purpose of this study was to explore and understand the contribution of migrants in the South African economy, as well as socio-economic challenges and social integration. However, the fact that some participants were not comfortable with going into details or giving examples of real-life challenges they are faced with (because of trust issues) means that the researcher was unable to thoroughly explore certain subjects. Also, the fact that most participants indicated that they regard this topic as sensitive and were concerned about their safety and consequences of taking part in the research (despite numerous assurance of confidentiality and anonymity) remains a serious limitation. It has to be noted also that about 10 migrant business owners sampled as part of the research pulled out before the interviews citing similar reason, this to a certain degree impacted negatively on the researcher's planning and timelines. More studies in this field are necessary to increase confidence in the findings.

2.4 Data analysis

The study followed the data reduction analysis approach outlined by Miles and Huberman (1994). Interview notes and transcripts of audio recordings were analyzed with a view of making an inference from the overwhelming data collected.

2. 5 Data Reduction

Two data reduction techniques (**coding** and **categorization**) were used in the analytical process to reduce, rearrange and integrate data to form a theory.

Table 1: Data coding

Coding units		
Theme	Theme code	Theme description
Regulations	001 R	No formal laws governing small business in townships. Red tape and inconsistency in the informal trading registration process
Business networks	002 BN	levels of business acumen and strategies
Societal perceptions	003 SP	perceived trade secrets and price manipulations
Criminalities	004 C	Sporadic criminal activities and violence targeting migrants business.

In the **coding phase**, the researchers choose 'themes as the coding units to be analyzed as opposed to words, sentences, or paragraphs. The reason for choosing themes was that themes are not only large units of content analysis but often more useful (Sekaran and Bougie, 2013)

Table 2: Categorization according to superordinate and subordinate themes identified and prioritized in the study.

(1) Regulations	(2) Business networks	(3) Societal perceptions	(4) Criminal acts
*Informal sector *Role of government *Red tape *Costly processes *Enforcement *Lack of leadership *Inefficient processes	*Procurement strategy *Cooperation *shared transport expenses *Longer trading hours	*Employment opportunities *Contrabands *Counterfeits *illicit trading *price manipulations *Cheap labour	*Xenophobia *Afro-phobia

The process of categorization involved organizing, arranging and classifying themes which were developed inductively following the grounded theory approach. Where preliminary theories existed, codes were modified to fit the data, adopting a top-down/ deductively technique. A summary of how themes extracted from the transcripts are condensed and displayed in this study using a matrix:

Table 3: Data matrix: role of migrants in the SA economy and socio-economic challenges

Participant group	Activities name	Comments and views	
Spaza shop business	*Procurement	<i>"I have 3 brothers in Johannesburg and we each spend R10 000 every week to buy in bulks and share the goods equally, we also use one truck to deliver at all the 3 shops, it's cheaper"</i>	
Hair salon business	*Working hours	<i>"Most of South Africans have standard working hours and are not prepared to work outside their working hours, we provide services whenever the customer wants it."</i>	

3. Findings and discussions

In accordance with the reporting tradition of qualitative research, each theme is introduced and supported with quotes from the data. From the 25 preliminary themes coded in the data reduction stage, 4 superordinate themes were identified. These themes are discussed below using subordinate themes to illustrate participants' views on the effect of migrant contribution in the South Africa economy and challenges faced by migrant business owners. The validation process of themes and theories developed (both deductively and inductively) in the analysis phase, involved revisiting the notes and transcripts from the interviews throughout the reporting phase.

3.1. Regulations of small informal trading

Many of the participants indicated that there are unclear and confusing registration requirements and processes characterized by corrupt activities. As one participant puts it *"I honestly do not understand how the government in this country works, the requirements for*

informal traders differs between municipalities. There are no standard processes. No permits are required for Spaza shops in other municipalities, but they are required in this region. They really make it difficult for us to operate and because of the red tape it is more difficult to comply with the law than to just ignore it and pay bribe if the police come to close your business.”

3. 2. Business networks

The study found that participants believe that they contribute immensely towards the country's GDP as well and job creation. Most participants indicated that they employ many locals in their business and also directly or indirectly pay taxes to the receiver of revenue through VAT, fuel levies, and trade licenses. One Somalis Spaza shop owner explains “*As a foreigner in this country I feel I'm contributing a lot to the economy of this country, I have 3 shops and all of them are in Diepsloot and every month I pay rent for the space I'm using for my business. The house owners are benefiting from the rent monies and able to take kids to school. When they don't have food to eat they come to the shops and I give them food on credit, hence I cannot understand why the violence was targeting foreigners because we help South Africans a lot. My friend from Somalia has two shops and employs 6 guys from the township, but the community still set alight his business few years ago*”

3. 3. Societal perceptions

The study found that most foreigners are aware of the perceptions about their business ethics and how locals feel about their involvement in the South African economy. One participant remarked “*The fact of the matter is that foreigners will always do better than South Africans in small business because we are here for business and we need it more than them. We have left our families at home and there is no time to sleep, we work hard and they don't. You must also remember that we naturally work together, and help each other to open their business so that they can assist other people, South Africans work individually. South Africans will always battle and come up with excuses about illicit business conducts but it's a cultural thing, and even when your try to teach them they just don't have the patience*”.

Interesting to note that a South African small business owner described the competition and challenges differently “*Personally I don't have a serious problem with foreigners, especially black foreigners because we have a lot of white European foreigners and Chinese involved in multi-million businesses in this country and no one is making noise but when fellow Africans begin to make small fortune we all up in arms. However I do have a small problem with our African brothers and sisters doing business in this country, they don't*

tell the truth about how they are making money – they always say we buy in bulks, but the question is where?. There is a lot of stuff coming into the country illegally and that is the problem because it affects our economy, and they are killing the market with ridiculous lower prices. It is just impossible to compete with them because they buy and sell counterfeits – they are crooks”

4. 4. Criminalities

This study found that most foreigners are targets of criminal activities in the townships and sometimes police are perpetrators themselves. Some participants indicated that police behavior encourage criminal activities by being part of the problem or by failing to take actions against culprits. As one Ethiopian puts it *“some police officers in this area are ruthless, they always come here demanding a lot of money and threatening to arrest us if we don’t comply. They will actually tell you that paper or no paper you are still a foreigner and if you don’t want problems you must just pay or else they will create issues around you”*.

Another participants added *“we are targeted by most criminals because they know they can always hide behind the lie that we are taking their jobs, we create jobs in this country. Criminals steal our goods and police do nothing about it because they are friends with criminals and because police don’t protect foreigners in this country, male and females alike – they always tell us we shouldn’t have been allowed to trade in this country in the first place, that is why we are always victims of xenophobic attacks.*

5. Discussion

This study provides insight into views and perceptions surrounding the role of migrants in the South African economy and social integration challenges they face. This chapter discusses what the findings means, their implications and how they relate to existing literature. It is worth noting that participants in this study were allowed to talk about various factors perceived to impact on their contribution to the economy as well as all those factors affecting relationships with other business people and the communities they operate in. Thus, the study was entirely exploratory in its nature. The finding that most participants find the informal trading registration processes unclear and confusing and characterized by corrupt activities means that migrant business owners are frustrated by the process and have no confidence in the system. This could lead to perpetual short-term investments as a risk mitigating strategy by most of these foreign investors. This may also explain temporary structures that most of these businesses are operating from, as most owners are reluctant to invest in infrastructure due to uncertainty in the market.

It is also clear from the data collected that although there are lots of claims that foreign nationals have complex and sophisticated trading methods which South Africans cannot adopt to easily, the claims are baseless and indicative of lack of leadership and research on this topic by government. Most of the participants cited factors such as lack of integration plans and proper leadership as the main reasons for slow progress in small business development in South Africa, especially amongst the locals. Some quoted the statement made by the Minister of Small Business Development in January 2015 as a clear indication of where the problem is and not the strategies used in their business.

“Foreigners need to understand that they are here as a courtesy and our priority is to the people of this country first and foremost. They cannot barricade themselves in and not share their practices with local business owners” Minister of Small Business

The finding that participants are concerned about the impact of illicit-trading perceptions on investor's confidence and social interactions amongst traders means that South Africa is missing out on an opportunity to leverage an opportunity to formalize the sector and increase its GDP in the process. This also means that government needs to rethink its strategy around small business development and how practices within various municipalities can be harmonized to eliminate negative societal perceptions. Interestingly, although the study found that most migrant participants felt that they are targets of xenophobic attacks and violence, some indicated that criminal activities in most cases are not necessarily as results xenophobia but pure criminalities fueled by xenophobia justifications. This is consistence with Charman and Piper (2012) finding that it is not necessarily the case that such violence is driven by anti-foreigner sentiment. Instead, as illustrated in the case of Delft, a poor, mixed-race area in the City of Cape Town, violence against Spaza shop owners may also be explained in terms of criminal activities and economic competition in the form of 'violent entrepreneurship'.

6. Conclusions and recommendations

6.1 Conclusions

As observed from the literature, it is obvious that immigrants can play an important role in the economic growth of the host country. However, despite this contribution, immigrants are still being attacked and exposed to serious expressions of hostility. The research question aimed at exploring the role of migrants in the SA economy and challenges they face, leads to a reasonable conclusion that in deed, as it was inductively inferred in the analysis stage, migrants contribute immensely towards the country's economy, GDP and job creation. It is also reflected in the results of the study that there are no clear integration plans of foreign-entrepreneurs into communities within which they are operating. The lack of clear

plans on the integrations of immigrants to the society has the potential to fuel xenophobia sporadically and gradually alienate foreign investment. To manage this, government needs to focus on two things; empower its leadership to communicate more, thus erode confusion and uncertainty in the business as the two are main sources of assumptions and negative perceptions. The main contribution that this study offers is the solid insight into the views and perceptions about the contribution of migrants into the South African economy, a broader exploratory perspective by migrants themselves and locals.

6. 2 Recommendations

It is recommended that the government invest more in research and development to further understand socio-economic dynamics in the industry, and ultimately demystifying what most still believe are complex and sophisticated business strategies by foreign traders. It is also recommended that similar studies in this field be commissioned, on different variables, under different conditions, in different regions and cities, to establish what other factors should be monitored and controlled to ensure success in this emerging industry. As with many qualitative studies, often findings are based on trends and patterns that emerged during the analysis stage, but are fundamentally developed out of anecdotal evidence or a subjective view, which calls for more research to mend the exiting gaps in literature.

Both public and private sectors can benefit from investing in further research on the impact of migrants in economic activities in South Africa and challenges affecting their integration into communities. An in-depth analysis of the relationship between the two variables may bring valuable insight in about the topic. Another area that requires further research is the subject of government role as the custodian on public policies, how bylaws and municipalities can be used to facilitated rapid formalization and transformation of the industry. These factors were not central to the study, therefore, were not discussed in details despite their direct relevance and influence in this study.

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“XENOPHOBIC” ATTACKS IN SOUTH AFRICA: A COMPETITION FOR THE LOCAL SOCIO-ECONOMIC SPACE?

R.K. Manyaka

University of Limpopo, South Africa

T.S. Madzivhandila

Small Enterprises Development Agencies

South Africa

Abstract

Migration of people from one place (country) to another is an activity that is as old as mankind. That is, throughout history, people have always moved from one country to another for different socio-economic and political reasons. It is not surprising therefore that the post-apartheid South Africa has become a preferred destination for most people from various parts of the African continent who are either fleeing their respective countries because of social, economic or political reasons. Consequently, there have been widespread attacks on foreign nationals which have been subjected to disparage by various commentators in the media and also in academia as xenophobia, which simply means the ‘dislike’ and or ‘hatred’ of foreign nationals. The paper is conceptual and argues that the characterisation of these attacks as ‘xenophobic’ is grossly inadequate and exposes the discourse to a variety of misconceptions malice. Firstly, the paper challenges the characterisation of these attacks as xenophobia precisely because the broadness of the concept whereas the attacks have been very specific to Africans. Secondly, it argues that the inadequate conceptualisation and contextualisation of these attacks could obscure long-lasting solutions to these problems precisely because the root causes of these problems would not be addressed. Lastly the paper seeks to provide a cogent argument that these attacks arises as a result of the competition for the socio-economic space between and among the locals and migrants. The paper will conclude by proposing measures that could assist the government to comprehensively deal with the problem.

Keywords: Migration, Xenophobia, Xenophobic attacks, Local Socio-Economic space

1. Introduction

Migration of people from one place (country) to another is global phenomenon (McKnight, 2008; Williams, 2008; Chigeza, 2012) and it is an activity that is as old as mankind. That is, throughout history, people have always moved from one country to another for different socio-economic and political reasons. As argued by Chigeza (2012: vii), “the movement of people particularly from African countries to other countries in search of a

better future will continue to increase". That is, the search for a better future by migrants is necessitated by the apparent declining socio-economic and political infrastructure which has often resulted in inadequate socio-economic opportunities which make life difficult to endure. Thus, people migrate in numbers from countries that have been ravaged by issues such as war, political intolerance, poor governance, etc. The post-apartheid South Africa has become a preferred destination for most people from various parts of the African continent who are either fleeing their respective countries because of social, economic or political reasons (McKnight, 2008; Adjai, 2010; Nyandoro, 2011). It is not surprising therefore that there has been a constant increase of African migrants to South Africa. These migrants consider the country to be having better socio-economic opportunities.

There have been widespread attacks on foreign nationals which have been subjected to disparage by various commentators in the media and also in academia as xenophobia. This is because on the 11th of May 2008, South Africa was shaken by an outbreak of a wave of violent attacks on foreign nationals (Williams, 2008). These attacks were characterised by an intensity and fierceness that was previously unknown in South Africa young and vibrant democracy. The paper is conceptual and exposes the discourse to a variety of misconceptions malice that have been used to characterisation of so-called xenophobic attacks on foreign nationals. Firstly, the paper challenges the logic of various terms that have been used mainly in the characterisation. Secondly, it argues that the inadequate conceptualisation and contextualisation of these attacks could obscure long-lasting solutions to xenophobia precisely because the root causes of these problems would not be properly addressed. Thirdly, the paper examines the various theories or hypotheses that have largely been used to explain the notion of xenophobia in the South African context. Lastly, the paper seeks to provide a cogent argument that these attacks arises as a result of the competition for the socio-economic space between and among the locals and migrants, who because of their nervous socio-economic conditions, find themselves at the bottom of 'classes' that characterise the South African society. The paper will conclude by proposing measures that could assist the government and its stakeholders to comprehensively deal with the challenge of xenophobia in a sustainable manner.

2. Conceptualisation and contextualisation of the notion of "xenophobia"

As with any other concept, the term xenophobia has increasingly become the subject of intense debate in post-apartheid South Africa. The literature on the phenomenon of xenophobia in the country shows that it is not a new phenomenon (Neocosmos, 2006; McKnight, 2008; Williams, 2008). In fact, Neocosmos (2006) argued that "by all accounts, the South African society has experienced massive problem of xenophobia" since the advent

of the democratic dispensation in 1994. The notion of xenophobia was first put on the agenda in 1998 when the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) and the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) convened a consultative conference which culminated in the adoption of the so-called Braamfontein Statement (Williams, 2008). The Braamfontein Statement among other things argued that no one should be deprived of their fundamental rights. It further pointed out to the fact that the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, endeavoured to construct a society where “human dignity, equality and advancement of human rights and freedoms are abiding values (Williams, 2008). It is important however to note that the discussions on xenophobia gained prominence in the year 2008 and more recently in 2015 following a series of violent attacks on foreign nationals that have engulfed the South African society. Following these attacks, xenophobia became a mantra that has attracted the attention of activists, commentators, policy makers and academics who have assigned different meaning and interpretation of the concept. This has generated a widespread confusion regarding the meaning of the concept. Davis (2010: 8) argues correctly that “a number of different terms and definitions have arisen to explain how xenophobic sentiments transform into xenophobic action”. Thus, it is important that the concept be properly and adequately conceptualised and contextualised for the purpose of enhancing the discussion on the discourse.

The etymological meaning of the concept of ‘xenophobia’ is derived from the two Greek words namely ‘xenos’ and ‘phobia’ (Davis, 2010; Hjerm & Nagayoshi, 2011). The former simply refers to a ‘foreigner’ while the latter means a ‘dislike or fear’ (Davis, 2010). The Oxford Advanced Learners’ Dictionary (2010: 1725) defines the notion of xenophobia as a “disapproving or strong feeling of dislike or fear of people from other countries”. The lexical definition of xenophobia has been developed in scientific literature in two ways. First, the stranger has come to be equated with foreigners or immigrants, and second, xenophobia has come to always include a derogatory understanding of immigrants (Hjerm & Nagayoshi, 2011). Most writers on the subject of ‘xenophobia’ have aligned their understanding of the term from within its simplistic dictionary meaning. The major flaw in using this basic dictionary meaning to characterise the violence taking place in the country against foreign nationals is that the concept tends to be used to refer only to ‘attitude’. Xenophobia is partly an attitude, but also includes an affective part: fear, which is intrinsic to xenophobia, is a result of being in a situation where individuals perceive that their individual or their group’s position is being threatened (Hjerm & Nagayoshi, 2011). Thus, it is not surprising that traditionally, the concept of ‘xenophobia’ has been used to describe attitudes, prejudices and other forms of behaviour that sought to exclude and vilify people solely on the basis that they are ‘foreign’ to the national identity (Davis, 2010). The framing of the concept of xenophobia

as mere 'attitude' has somewhat complicated attempts by scholars to thoroughly understand the phenomena. This is largely because the mere existence of a particular negative attitude or prejudice is not irksome enough to explain the primary reasons for these unwarranted attacks. For example, there are prejudices and unwelcoming attitudes that exist between and among various ethnic groups in South Africa but these have not necessarily resulted in violent attacks. This exposes the inadequacy associated with the concept if it is framed from the attitude point of view. That is, it offers very little insight as to why the foreign national, particularly those of African origins have been the subject of targeted attacks. The classical conception or description of the phenomena has not particularly been very helpful in trying to understand the shocking physical attacks on foreign nationals in post-apartheid South Africa in that it has largely focused simply on 'emotion' and not actions. However, Davis (2010) appreciates the point that the usage of the term has evolved quite considerably from its classical definition in that it is now contemporarily being used to describe the combination of both an action and just emotion.

It ought to be pointed out that whereas the term 'xenophobia' has been largely used to refer to the "fear and hatred of strangers or foreigners or of anything that is strange or foreign" (Harries, 2002; Williams, 2008); it is important to note that the so-called 'xenophobic attacks' in South Africa have been targeted largely, albeit not exclusively, at foreigners of African origin i.e. Blacks. It is largely within this context that some commentators, with a pan-African and black conscious ideological background, have denounced these attacks as 'afrophobia' (Landau, 2015) instead of widely used concept xenophobia. The term afrophobia is used to refer to a kind of hatred or suspicion of other Africans that is fostered through a generation of apartheid era education and social control (Landau, 2015). The framing of the discourse along this line is of critical importance specifically because it emphasises the fact that not all foreigner, particularly those who originate from Europe, have been at the receiving end of attacks by the South African citizens. However, it is worth noting on the one hand that the recent xenophobic attacks have revealed that not all victims of xenophobic violence are Africans and in fact many of those killed over the past years have been from China and South Asia (Landau, 2015). This point is not insignificant because it points out to the root causes of these attacks, if the correct questions are asked. That is, why are South African citizens only seem to be targeting foreign nationals mostly from third world countries in general and Africans in particular as opposed to their European counterparts who are predominantly white? Could these attacks be arising as a result of the intense competition for the socio-economic space that emanate from the nervous socio-economic conditions and status to which 'Africans' have been subjected to for centuries? It is important to explain that these questions are critical because according to Blessing (2015), the "violent

behaviour towards foreign nationals by locals can be directly linked to the ‘class’ they occupy in the society”. In this paper, the author adopts an ‘expansive’ view to refer to the notion of xenophobia a phenomenon that is more than just an ‘irrational fear’ of foreign nationals. In this paper the concept will be used broadly to refer to Thus, it follows that to effectively understand answers to the variety of issues associated with the phenomenon of xenophobia, it is important that the various theories that have been used to explain the phenomenon of xenophobia in contemporary South Africa be adequately interrogated.

3. The phenomenon of ‘xenophobia’ in South Africa

The literature on the discourse of xenophobia in South Africa points to the fact there is no consensus regarding its root causes. As a result, various theories have been developed with the prime purpose of explaining the incidences of xenophobia. It is for this reason that Davis (2010: 9) argues that any attempt to gain a better understanding of the discourse of xenophobia, it is firstly necessary to examine the common theories that have been developed in order explain the ‘xenophobic’ sentiments. Such theories include but not restricted to socio-biological, isolation and scapegoating.

The socio-biological theory explains that there are bio cultural features that can be used to explain the difference among and between foreign and South African nationals. Proponents of this theory argue that the difference between South African and foreign nationals can be virtually identifiable on the basis of their personal characteristics such as “hairstyles, accents, language, dress, and physical appearances” (Davis, 2010: 10). It is worth noting however that whereas these bio-cultural features provide the basic “identifiers” which assist in identifying who is a South African and who is a foreign national, it offers very little explanation for the motif for these attacks.

Isolation theory holds that the so-called xenophobic attacks should be understood within the framework of many years of isolation of the country from the international community (Harries, 2002; Davis, 2010; Williams, 2008). According to Harries (2002: 172), “the isolation hypothesis understands xenophobia as a consequence of apartheid South Africa’s seclusion from the international community”. In fact, Williams (2008: 2) argues that as a result of many years of isolation from the international community, “most South African citizens still see themselves as separated from the rest of the of the African continent”. Proponents of this theory explain that the collapse of the apartheid system of governance has effectively brought South Africans in close contact with ‘foreign’ nationals. The interface between the previously isolated South Africans and unknown foreign nationals creates a space for hostility to develop (Harries, 2002). This theory offers a highly erroneous explanation because it seems to assume, albeit incorrectly, that migration is a new

phenomenon in South Africa. This is a historically incorrect proposition in that the literature on migration points out to the fact that Africans from the neighbouring countries such as Lesotho, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Swaziland etc. have had to migrate into South Africa even during the apartheid as source of cheap labour thereby coming into contact with ordinary South Africans. In fact, some authors argued that South African citizens have co-existed peacefully with foreign nationals in the country for many years.

The other hypothesis that has been used to explain the phenomenon of xenophobia in South Africa is scapegoating. Scapegoating is rooted in the relative deprivation theory. This theory explains that following the advent of the democratic dispensation in South Africa in 1994; high expectations of better socio-economic opportunities were raised (Williams, 2008). These expectations were contained in a pro-poor policy framework called the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). This policy framework essentially promised 'a better life for all' South African citizens. However, it is worth noting that community expectations have largely not been met, at least not in terms of the rate at which they were expected (Williams, 2008)

According to Harries (2002: 170), the scapegoating theory "locates xenophobia within the context of social transition and change" that has started taking place in the new democratic South Africa in 1994. The scapegoating theory explains that the causes of 'xenophobic' attacks can be attributed to socio-economic ills that confront the post-apartheid South African society (Harries, 2002; Crush, 2009; Davies 2010). This is understandable because according to Davis (2010: 13), the literature on the discourse of xenophobia in South Africa is increasingly "showing a correlation between xenophobia and access to resources". Morries (1998) and Tshitekere (1999) in Harries (2002: 170) argued that this theory explain that the limited resources such as housing, education, health care, unemployment, coupled with high expectations during transition can be used to explain the 'hostility' of South Africans towards foreign nationals.

4. Xenophobia and competition for socio-economic space in South Africa

Strong differences of opinion have emerged about the root causes of xenophobia (Dodson, 2010). The literature on the discourse of xenophobia in South Africa reveals that the xenophobic sentiments and related actions often times arises out of the intense competition for socio-economic space between locals and African migrants (Steenkamp, 2009; Vrosmans, Schweitzer, Knoetze & Kagee, 2011). Some scholars argue that xenophobia has often been justified on the basis of the socio-economic crisis facing South Africa (Dodson, 2010; Neocosmos, 2010; Solomon, 2015). That is, the recent xenophobic

violence has had a lot to do with the worsening socio-economic conditions of the downtrodden masses of South African citizens as Solomon (2015) explains.

The central argument of this paper is that xenophobia arises out of the intensive competition for socio-economic space in the form of opportunities between the local citizens and foreign nationals. This is understandable because according to Booysen (2015), most poor South Africans are unable to compete with foreign nationals especially for such socio-economic opportunities. This can be attributed two main reasons. Firstly, it is because most of the poor sections of the South African population constitute a huge chunk of the unskilled labour in the country and as a result, they are unable to compete fairly with foreign nationals who, comparatively speaking, are most fairly educated, semi-skilled and even highly skilled. Secondly, most migrants have been used mostly as a reservoir of cheap labour work in South Africa. That is, the upper as well as the middle classes of our populations continue to exploit foreign nationals by making them work extra-hours with no over-time allowances. In most instances, the nervous conditions of the migrants make them to work for very little or slave wages and salaries, something that most ordinary South Africans are not willing to do. It is not surprising therefore that a number of seasonal workers from Zimbabwe has increased significantly in the farms (Palmary, 2002; Masigo & Polzer, 2009). According to Morris (1998), most foreign nationals regard themselves as “hard working, enterprising, caring, educated and cultured”. This point has been eloquently captured by Martin (2011: 11), who argues that “migrants are often attractive to local employers because they are willing to ‘work hard’ in jobs ‘shunned’ by local citizens. But what is problematic with Martin’s argument is that it depicts South African citizens, particularly those who are poor and unemployed as people who do not otherwise ‘work hard’ and who, often times than not, ‘shun’ jobs. This line of thinking is problematic in that it seeks to suggest somewhat that generally the poor South African citizens are ‘lazy’. This is an argument that has mostly been raised by local employers in justifying their choice of foreign nationals over local citizens on employment opportunities. According Masigo and Polzer (2009), there is a wide-spread belief among South African residents that foreign nationals work for lower wages at the farms. Thus, because of their willingness to work for little wages, migrants become better advantaged than an ordinary poor South African in terms of securing an employment opportunity either on a full-time or temporary basis. This situation makes most poor South Africans to think that ‘foreign nationals’ are ‘taking’ economic opportunities which were meant for them. These issues should be understood within the context of the structural socio-economic conditions that characterise the post-apartheid South Africa. Msomi (2015) view this as racially-based socio-economic order that virtually has whites at the top; Indians, coloureds and some section of the black population in the middle and the black poor at the

bottom of the strata. These points out to the fact that transformation of the apartheid system of governance is taking place at snail pace since the legacy of apartheid is still forcefully visible in post-apartheid South Africa society (Manyaka & Madzivhandila, 2013). This socio-economic order signifies the extent of the challenges that confronts the democratic society, especially when the “section of those at the bottom of the social strata perceive the influx of foreign nationals as the introduction of a new layer that would push further down the caste system” (Msomi, 2015: 1). That is, the working class is more likely to be xenophobic especially when immigrant working class is increasing. It is not surprising therefore that Hjern & Nagayoshi (2011) argue that the compositional economic threats matter strongly to the group that genuinely competes for scarce resources. High rates of poverty and unemployment among the majority of black South Africans further exacerbate the intensity of competition for jobs in both and informal sectors of the economy (Dodson, 2010). To this end, it can be argued that these are some of the issues that have increasingly incentivised and hardened negative attitudes and exacerbated violence against foreign nationals. In spite of this reality, it is worth noting however that these issues are, rarely if ever, subjected to scholastic and empirical inquiry with the view of determining their validity. It is not surprising that most research on the discourse of xenophobia approach the debate from the ontological stand point of the victim or the foreign national. That is, the most literature narrates the story from the viewpoint and experience of the ‘victims’ and often times leaving the other side of the story. The primary reason for debating this issue from the ‘lenses’ of the victims of xenophobia is because most scholars seek to position themselves as voices of reason or as people who generally abhor such attacks. The recurrent nature of the xenophobic attacks in the country points out to the fact that the strategy of merely condemning the attacks even by academics, as opposed to understanding why these attacks are occurring in the first place, is grossly inadequate. This ‘sympathetic and apologetic’ type of scholarship is not helpful in terms of getting to the root causes of xenophobia in South Africa. Lest these attacks will continue unabated.

5. Recommended measures for dealing with challenge of xenophobia in South Africa

The paper has demonstrated that xenophobia is entrenched and systemic in South African society, requiring similarly systemic responses if it is to be meaningfully addressed (Dodson, 2010). This should be understood within the context whereas the xenophobic attacks were initially condemned by most political leaders; there are few reasons to think that they will not happen again (Landau and Misago, 2009). Thus, the protection of foreigners’ rights, dignity, and welfare ranks near the bottom on the country’s list of political priorities, far below debates over the future president. It is within this context that the paper proposes the

following long lasting measures that need to be considered by authorities for comprehensively dealing with the challenge of xenophobic attacks in a sustainable manner.

5.1 Public education and awareness campaigns

One of the central strategies for managing the incidences of xenophobic violence against foreign nationals is to intensify public education and awareness campaigns on the rights of foreign nationals in South Africa. In terms of Section 29(2) (e) of the South African Immigration Bill, one of the functions of the Department of Home Affairs is to educate communities and civil society on the rights of refugees, foreigners, and illegal foreigners, as well as to conduct activities to prevent xenophobia. These awareness campaigns are essential in fostering a human rights culture within the South African society. A number of attitude related surveys have been conducted by researchers and research institutions with the view of determining perceptions of xenophobia. These surveys reveal that there are high levels of xenophobia in South Africa. For example, the Southern African Migration Project (1997) and (2006) indicates that foreign nationals in South Africa are increasingly considered as a ‘threat’ to the socio-economic well-being of ordinary South Africans. Yet, other studies such that conducted by Harries (2002: 179), shows that responses to xenophobia may also “manifest in hostilities and possibly violence from foreign nationals themselves”. Morries (1998) in Harries (2002) argued that foreign nationals mainly those from Nigeria and Congo, “generally exuded self-confidence and were often disparaging about local Africans”. This illustrates the point that foreign nationals are not necessarily always the ‘victims’ of xenophobic sentiments. All these shows that there is collective culture of intolerance between and among foreign nationals and local citizens. It is actually quite something just to accept difference, because difference is deeply challenging and as a result, it is important that public education and awareness programmes be popularised in all kinds of media, in schools in community meetings and every public space so that people could begin to have to find a way of accepting, embracing and where appropriate celebrating our differences as a potential source of strength

5.2 Facilitating the integration of foreign nationals within communities

As soon as the culture of human rights and tolerance has been sufficiently fostered and is deeply entrenched within communities that have been identified as ‘hot spots’ of xenophobia, it is important that efforts to facilitate their integration should begin. However, the facilitation of the integration of foreign nationals within communities is a process that should not be hurried. That is, authorities should not be quick to adopt re-integration of immigrants back into local communities without firstly dealing comprehensively, rigorously and sustainably with the issues that sparked the violence in the first place.

5.3 Further research on the phenomenon of xenophobia

It is important to note that incidences of xenophobia “manifest differently in each place it occurs” (Davis, 2010: 21). As a result, extensive research needs to be conducted on the subject in order to assist the government to manage and or deal with the issue sustainably. The phenomenon of xenophobia has been recognised by the United Nations Organisation for Education, Science and Culture (UNESCO) as an ongoing issue global issue that has largely been influenced by the rapid globalisation process (van der Westhuizen & Kleintjes, 2015). This demonstrates that the phenomenon of xenophobia has not been an issue that is unique and only happening in South Africa. In spite of it been a global issue, it is important for each country to have a home-grown understanding of the trends of xenophobia. This requires commitment to regular research on the subject. With that said, it is important to note that the literature on xenophobia in South Africa shows that the debate has largely been approached from the ‘lenses’ of the victims. It is for this reason that there is need for a further research to be conducted. Such a research should focus squarely on capturing the understanding the phenomena from the perpetrators’ point of view because the lenses that researchers wear reflect their reality.

6. Conclusion

The purpose of this paper was to use the literature on the discourse of xenophobia in South Africa in order to advance the argument the xenophobic sentiments and related actions arise out of the intense competition for socio-economic space between locals and African migrants. It has been argued that any attempts aimed at better understanding of the phenomenon of xenophobia in South Africa should be based on the prevailing socio-economic conditions. The majority of black South Africans still have to endure life within the unpleasant socio-economic conditions. It is not surprising therefore that the literature on the discourse of xenophobia indicates that the high rates of poverty and unemployment among the majority of black South Africans further exacerbate the intensity of competition for jobs in both and informal sectors of the economy.

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ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS AS CAUSES OF XENOPHOBIA AND THE PERCEPTIONS OF EMPLOYMENT DEPRIVATION AMONGST SOUTH AFRICANS

J.B. Mkwana

I. Gouws

North West University, South Africa

Abstract

South Africa's transition from apartheid to a constitutional democracy has been internationally applauded. Since its democratic dispensation South Africa has become a beacon of hope to many African countries who are still suffering from entrenched colonial legacies, civil wars, and poverty and deep inequalities. With every victory comes adversity, South Africa's transition into democracy has not been without challenges. Just like all developing countries, the new South African government is faced with a mammoth task of translating the promises of freedom and equal opportunities to all citizens. It is this challenge of addressing the legacy left behind by apartheid that has heightened the attacks on foreigners in South Africa. A country with a constitution that is entrenched on liberal principles of; promotion of the rule of law, protection of human rights and equal citizenship has been marred with xenophobic attacks. This paper analyses the attacks on foreigners in South Africa post-apartheid, it explains the causes of the attacks. The paper contends that the perceptions that foreigners deprive South Africans of economic opportunities are the foundations for the attacks but there are other reasons behind the attacks that equally need to be analysed and contextualised. To achieve these objectives this paper engages theories dealing with both migration and xenophobia focusing on fundamental theories that help in understanding the attacks on foreigners in South Africa.

Keywords: Afrophobia, Xenophobia, Illegal Immigrants, Realism, Natural justice

1. Introduction

In 1994, South Africa became a democratic state, born out of free, fair and democratic elections. It was inaugurated as the 'Rainbow Nation' by Nelson Mandela, this new epoch ushered in a fundamental shift in the political, social and geographical landscapes of the past (Mosselson, 2010:642). In this democratic period segregation was replaced by unity, legalised racism replaced by equality and apartheid was replaced by democracy (Harris, 2002:169). The preamble of the New South African Constitution of 1996 better explain this transition when it echoes that;

'We, the people of South Africa,

Recognise the injustices of our past;

Honour those who suffered for justice and freedom in our land;

Respect those who have worked to build and develop our country; and

Believe that South Africa belongs

to all who live in it, united in our diversity’.

The importance of this statement is that it provided the necessary theoretical conception of citizenship in the ‘new’ South Africa (Hayem, 2013:82). The intention of the 1996 Constitution was to eradicate the apartheid notion of citizenship which was based on unequal rights and the marginalization of other people who were perceived to be different, inferior and others superior. South Africa build is constitution on the democratic notion of equality, which meant everybody in the country has equal access to basic human rights. Nation building in the post-apartheid emphasised a commitment to human rights and inclusiveness (Mosselson, 2010:642). The democratic transition of 1994 has brought with it new discriminatory practises and victims. One such discriminatory practise is xenophobia, which has become a regular feature in post-apartheid South Africa (Crush, 2014:1). Victims of these attacks are mainly non-South Africans, who come from other African countries, who are working in or looking for economic opportunities in South Africa. Some were documented and some were not, other South African citizens were also attacked during these attacks, when they try to protect their foreign neighbours or because some of the foreigners were their spouses, some were mistaken for foreigners (Hayem, 2013:80). In the face of such gruesome attacks on foreigners the ‘rainbow nation’ conception that South Africa belongs to all who live in it was challenged and seemingly rejected (Mapokgole, 2014:4).

This paper seeks to understand to violent causes of xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa. As a starting point the paper interrogated issues of belonging and exclusion in the new South Africa. It does this by defining what is meant by xenophobia and distinguishing it from criminality and Afrophobia. The paper further explains the legacy of apartheid and how it has heightened the attacks on foreigners in South Africa. The paper argues that the international theory of realism is fundamental to understanding why states tend to protect their borders, which seems to be the case with South Africa.

2. Xenophobia or Afrophobia? Defining the concepts

Xenophobia is understood as a deep dislike for non-nationals by individuals of a recipient state, this dislike is manifested in discriminatory attitudes and behaviours towards non-nationals and it culminates in violence against them (Mogekwu, 2004:242; David et al, 2005). Xenophobia comes in different forms such as; violence, murder, verbal abuse, discrimination and public hostility. The presence of xenophobic tendencies renders foreigners vulnerable to violence and exploitation. In its worst form xenophobia has been manifested in ethnic cleansing and killings (Adeleke et al, 2008:140). Xenophobia 'thrives where economic deprivation and hardships are acute'. The area of common confrontation and conflict between locals and foreigners has been in the informal sector (Maharaj, 2002:51). Xenophobia questions political identity, because in many parts of the world race plays a massive role in the xenophobic process of labelling outsiders as foreigners regardless of their legal status (Klotz, 2010:834).

Mapokgole (2014:5) argues that much academic discourse on xenophobia focused more on the current state of South Africa when explaining the violence. This focus on current affairs fails to incorporate the black South African's past in analysis of the violence. Naming the violence on foreigners 'xenophobia' without engaging in the black experience absolves some actors from accountability. It ignores and undermines the pivotal role that apartheid played in creating the racial conflict, which culminates itself into violence.

The violent attacks on foreigners bring together two concepts; xenophobia and afrophobia. Since xenophobia is defined above afrophobia is refers to 'the attacks by poor black South Africans on foreign black Africans' this violence attacks occurs in places where foreign Africans are not a majority but are minorities (Cronje et al, 2010:297). Afrophobia is 'a fear and dislike of blacks' this description encompasses not only hatred of blacks but also the psychological problems that exist within the black communities that emanate from colonial tortures or slavery torments and the oppression and psychological traumas endured under the apartheid regime (Mapokgole, 2014:37).

3. Theories of xenophobia

There are four theories of xenophobia identified by (Omoluabi, 2008) that will be analysed to better understand the concept. Namely:Psychoanalytic theory,Modeling theory,Genetic theory.

3.1 Psychoanalytic theory

This theory was formulated by Sigmund Freud who postulated that phobia is a form of ego defence mechanism which is used by an individual as protection from high levels of anxiety orchestrated by repressed impulses and conflicts (King, 2007 in Omoluabi, 2008:56). This theory was modified later on by Arieti in 1979 to make it more comprehensible in explaining the genesis of xenophobia. She theorized that children in their innocence trust the people they first live with to protect them against danger. The conflict that causes anxiety arises when children realise that the people were not reliable in protecting them. Xenophobia therefore emerges in their adulthood, when they children encounter strangers or foreigners to whom the anxiety was displaced because they have the appearance of the unreliable people (Omoluabi, 2008:56).

3.2 Modeling theory

This learning theory was formulated by Bandura and Rosenthal (1966) resulting from a series of laboratory studies. It explains that individuals tend to manifest physiological arousal through either verbal instructions or vicarious learning by simply watching a model in a pain-eliciting situation. The individual ultimately develops phobia for the situation. With regards to xenophobia, the radio and television are the prime sources of vicariously learning the painful experiences of models, especially when these media forms broadcast anti-stranger/foreigner messages. Some individuals who listen and watch this broadcasts become xenophobes (Omoluabi, 2008:56).

3.3 Genetic theory

Hetteman, Neale and Kendler in 2001 formulated this biological predisposing theory, on the basis of empirical studies. They discovered that the concordance rate for social and specific phobias was higher in monozygotic (identical) than dizygotic (Fraternal) twins. Similarly, the rate was also higher in in first-degree relatives of phobic patients than in patients who were not related. It is therefore expected that xenophobia will be more common among family members than in non-relatives. This theory is used to explain the social psychological fact of why many xenophobes are often found in the same location (Omoluabi, 2008:57).

3.4 Sociobiological theory

Waller (2002) postulated that there is a tendency among human beings to seek proximity with familiar faces and to avoid unfamiliar faces which are deemed as being probably dangerous, this inclination is a universal phenomenon that is rooted in biological evolution. The consequent of this natural selection has resulted in behavioural expressions of xenophobia and ethnocentrism. It is therefore believed that xenophobia is inevitable in human affairs because people who are genetically similar will always discriminate against those who are genetically different more so if those different are immigrants or minorities (Omoluabi, 2008:58).

3.5 Natural Justice Theory and the discourse of exceptionalism amongst South Africans

Since South Africa is perceived to be industrialised, democratic, advanced when compared to other states in the continent and a good example when it comes to reconciliation and political liberalism, Africa is perceived as the place of the other (Neocosmos, 2008:590). South Africa according to the discourse of exceptionalism is the envy of the world especially Africans states since it managed the reconciliation process successfully. South Africa is not really in Africa, its intellectual and cultural frame of reference comes from the USA and Europe. Africa is perceived as being a strange backward continent which is characterized by corruption, primitivism, failed states, poverty and authoritarianism. Africa therefore an embarrassment to the new black elite in South Africa, it is a reminder of those poor neighbours and relatives they wish to forget (Neocosmos, 2008:591, Matsinhe, 2011:301).

Natural justice is a theory that maintains that being born in a country gives one the right to its resources, this include right to welfare and a right to work. This theory evolved during the time when there was little transport or mobility and most people still lived in village economies, which were predominantly self-sufficient. It was on this basis that the claim to the local resources was made, because villagers processed these resources themselves and relied on them, though there was a tradition of generosity between communities especially in hard times (Goodwin, 2014:8). This notion of justice which is normally maintained by right-wing thinkers who are conservative, as being natural is an existing set of distributions which seeks to maintain a hierarchy of dominance and entitlement for some elitist form of socio-political organization. When these thinkers are challenged on the concept of natural justice they use the following arguments as their justification; tradition, the natural superiority of the favoured classes and God's will (Goodwin, 2014:427).

It must be argued that the natural justice theory is dominated by deep conservative political doctrine or ideology. Conservative ideas arose as a reaction to mounting pace of political, social and economic change which was brought on by the French Revolution. The earliest and most classical principles of conservatism were written by Edmund Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France* in 1790. Western states during the nineteenth century were transformed by the pressures that were brought by industrialization and growth for the support for liberalism, socialism and nationalism. While these ideologies called for reform and sometimes even supported revolution, conservatism stood to defend an increasingly embattled traditional social order (Heywood, 2012:66).

Goodwin (2014:162-3) traces the evolution of the conservative thought back to Plato's political theory oligarchy, which was a political system where rule was conferred to a few people in society often of wealthy or noble family. In what Plato called the republic which was ruled by philosopher kings, whose wisdom and goodness emanated from their understanding of ideas of justice, truth, beauty and the supreme idea. This was perceived as an ideal state and any negation from this model would result in the republic downgrading to imperfection and decay.

A similar conservative belief which critiques change in society is found in *Leviathan*, in which Thomas Hobbes encourages the support and obedience to the sovereign in all circumstances. He argued that the overthrow of established authority will lead to a dissolution of society and thus returning people to the savage of mayhem of what he calls the state of nature, 'A pre-social, pre-government situation where people live without laws or the institutions of civil society; this is forms the basis of social contract' (Goodwin, 2014:163).

Conservatism as a political ideology and natural justice are connected by their core themes which are the desire to conserve and uphold the status quo. It is possible for people or groups to be considered 'conservative', with regards to the fact that they oppose change, without them necessarily subscribing to a conservative political doctrine. Even though the desire to resist change is a dominant feature within conservatism, but what differentiates conservatives and supporters of rival political ideologies is the distinctive way in which this principle is upheld. Conservatives put more emphasis on history and experience and held distaste for rational thought since they had a view of human being as being imperfect, limited and security seeking creatures (Heywood, 2012:68). It can be argued then using this theory into the South African context, that there is sense of entitlement that exist amongst South Africans with regards to their resources, which is founded in deep conservative political culture which deems foreigners are those who seek to bring unwanted change and challenge the status quo.

4. Chronological accounts of xenophobic attack in South Africa since 1994

Matsinhe (2011:307) gave a chronological unfolding of xenophobic attacks on foreigners in South Africa since the dawn of democracy in 1994. It is important to note that the events mentioned below are just a few among a lot of violent attacks that foreigners have encountered in South Africa.

- December 1994. In Alexandra, Gauteng, armed youth gangs destroy foreign-owned homes and property and demand that foreigners be removed from the area.
- September 1998. In Johannesburg, Gauteng, two Senegalese and a Mozambican are thrown from a moving train by a group of individuals returning from a rally at which migrants and refugees were blamed for the levels of unemployment, crime and AIDS in South Africa.
- October 2000. In Zandspruit, Gauteng, fighting breaks out between South African and Zimbabwean residents.
- August 2005. In Bothaville, Free State, Zimbabwean and Somali refugees are beaten.
- December 2005. In Olievenhoutbosch, Gauteng, groups of South Africans chase foreigners living in the township of Choba's informal settlement from their shacks, shops and businesses.
- July 2006. In Knysna, Western Cape, Somali shop owners in a township outside Knysna are chased out of the area and at least 30 spaza shops are damaged.
- August 2006. In Cape Town, Western Cape, during a period of just over a month, between 20 and 30 Somalis are killed in townships surrounding Cape Town.
- February 2007. In Motherwell, Eastern Cape, violence triggered by then accidental shooting of a young South African man (by a Somali shop owner) results in the looting of over 100 Somali-owned shops in a 24-hour period.
- January 2008. In Duncan Village, Eastern Cape, two Somalis are found burned to death in their shop. Police later arrest seven people in connection with the incident after finding them in possession of property belonging to the deceased.
- January 2008. In Soshanguve, Gauteng, a foreign national is burned to death, three others killed, 10 seriously injured and 60 shops looted after residents apprehend the

suspects and attack foreign residents in retaliation for the alleged robbery of a local store by four non-nationals.

- May 2008. In Alexandra, Johannesburg, an armed mob breaks into foreigners' shacks, evicting them, looting and/or appropriating their homes, and raping women. The violence spreads across the country and continues for two weeks. Violence begins on 11 May. However, President Mbeki condemns the violence only 16 days later on 26 May.

5. The causes of xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa

Several explanations have been made trying to understand the causes of xenophobic attacks in South Africa. The first argument is the "scape goat thesis" which says the frustration by poor and unemployed citizens results in the loathing of foreign nationals and blaming them for social ills like; unemployment, crime and the spread of HIV/AIDS. The second argument is the "relative deprivation thesis" which contends that the slowness and inadequacy of redressing the inequalities left by apartheid leads deprived masses to manifest their anger against foreigners. The third argument is the "isolation thesis" contending the seclusion of South Africans, especially blacks from other African countries and the world during apartheid is the cause for hostility against foreigners. Because the ending of apartheid meant South Africa's borders were opened and its citizens overwhelmed with the sudden and intense exposure with foreigners. Forth and lastly is the 'bio- cultural hypothesis' arguing that foreigners because of the level of their visible difference can be easily identified and scapegoat them. Foreigners are identified by their clothing style, physical features and inability to speak indigenous languages (Matsinhe, 2011, Neocosmos, 2008, Harris, 2002).

6. Legal framework dealing with migration in South Africa

To fully understand the violent xenophobic attacks in South Africa post-apartheid it is important not to neglect the history of black immigration entrenched in racist apartheid legislation. In apartheid South Africa, one of the prominent immigration laws was the Aliens Control Act, 1991 (Act No. 96 of 1991), which was derived from the Immigrants Regulation Act, 1913 (Act No 22 of 1913), which limited black people from economic and geographic opportunities. The dawn of the new democratic dispensation in 1994 did not result in any major shift in the immigration policy. Change was only initiated in the period between 1998 and 2002, with the adoption of Refugee Act, 1998 (Act 130 of 1998) and the Immigration Act, 2002 (Act 13 of 2002) (Mukhonzha, 2011:1387).

Equally important is to locate South Africa's immigration laws in international perspective. South Africa's immigration laws are in alignment with international treaties, protocols and laws (Oliver, 2010 in Mukonza, 2011:1388). With regards to international law, the South African immigration laws are guided by the following instruments as outlined by (Mukhonza. 2011:1388);

- Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)
- Geneva conventions and related protocols (1949)
- Refugee convention (1951) and additional protocol (1976) relating to the status of refugees.
- International convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination (1965)
- International convention on civil and political rights (1966)
- International convention on economic, social and cultural rights (1966)
- Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women (1979)
- Convention on the rights of the child (1989)
- International convention on the protection of the rights of all migrant workers and members of their families (1990)

7. Illegal immigrants and realism as justification for border control

Illegal immigrants threaten the sovereign power vested in the state in many ways; first their very existence is a threat to state power, since by definition they are in a state or territory illegally. Their continuous illegal movement, dealings across and inside borders challenges state power and ability to control and manage the movement of the population. Confronted with such people/threat, sovereign states are required to combat, maintain and restore order (Mosselson, 2010:644).

There are three categories that can be used to differentiate between illegal or undocumented immigrants. The first category refers to those who enter the country without possessing relevant documentations that legalise their stay in the country. The second refers to those of who enter the country legally possessing relevant documentation but stay after their visas expire. The third category refers to refugee and asylum seekers who have proper documentation or their documents are still being processed (Maharaj, 2001:47).

However, Bicocchi and Levoy (2007:5) challenges the use of the term 'illegal immigrant', they prefer to use 'undocumented migrants' or alternatively 'irregular migrants' or opposed to using the term illegal immigrant. The use of the term 'illegal' is criticised based on three reasons, first because the term has connotation with criminality and not all undocumented migrants are criminals. Secondly, the defining of people as 'illegal' can be

seen as denying them their humanity. Thirdly, labelling 'illegal' asylum seekers who are in irregular situations may jeopardize their asylum claims.

The realist tradition, which is sometimes called political realism, is one of the oldest or classical theories in international politics. Its beginnings can be traced back to Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War (431 BCE), and to the classic work of Sun Tzu's called *The Art of War*, which was written in China in almost the same time. There are other significant figures who contributed a lot to the realist tradition which are Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. Realism gained incentive from the first and Second World War (Heywood, 2007:130). The basic foundations of realism which are explained by (Jackson & Sorensen, 2013:66) are as follows: Realism a theory of international relations is premised on:

- A pessimistic view of human nature.
- A conviction that international relations are necessarily in conflict.
- And those international conflicts are ultimately resolved by war.
- A high regard for the values of national security and state survival.
- A basic scepticism that there can be progress in international politics which is comparable to domestic life.

Realism is grounded on the notion of power of politics and the pursuit of national interest, according to the realists using Thomas Hobbes example of 'state of nature', international politics is conducted in a state of nature which is characterized by anarchy and not harmony. An anarchic international system is one that propels sovereign states to protect themselves and prioritize its own national interests, which are basically state survival and territorial defence (Heywood, 2007:130) The state's essential role is in preserving and protecting the good life of its citizens; the failure or absence of a state will result in human life being poor, nasty and short. The state therefore is seen as a protector of its territory, the population and the distinctive and valued way of life. Since all states are seen as primarily protectors of their own territory, this means other states and governments cannot be fully relied on or depended on (Jackson & Sorensen, 2013:66-67). The realists, emphasize that, international anarchy does not necessarily mean relentless conflict of unending war, conflicts are mainly maintained by cooperation's, interactions and agreements between states this pattern is called the balance of power . This balance of power is maintained in agreements, conventions, customs, rules and laws between states. However, this international system has inherent disadvantages in that if this balance of power breaks down, wars and conflicts are the end result (Jackson & Sorensen, 2013; Heywood, 2007). The realist theory when used in the South African context it helps in understanding in why immigration policies are

becoming stringent and rigid, South Africa is now prioritizing its interest above those of its neighbouring countries and other states.

8. Denialism, criminality and the state of discourse on Xenophobia

Xenophobic denialism talks about the ‘official response of the South African government to the violent attacks on migrants and refugees’. It is the refutation that such attacks were not motivated by xenophobia it further asks if xenophobia even exist at all (Crush, 2014:8). This theory argues that attacks on migrants and refugees are acts of criminality, not xenophobia. They are called ‘crimes of opportunity’ and can be argued on three reasons. The first perspective views the killings, looting, arson and destruction of foreigners’ property as criminal activities (Zondi, 2008:27). These criminal elements appear to use people’s vulnerabilities to commit crimes against the foreign nationals and use xenophobia as a cover up to criminal activities. Those individuals who are violent were not only violating the criminal laws of the countries by their actions, but were also discrediting the constitution and laws that attempt to make South Africa a home for all (Crush, 2014:8-9). The second perception is that attacks against foreigners were not spontaneous but were orchestrated with clear political motives, with the aim of discrediting African National Congress and its government. The third perception which is central to this paper is that xenophobia has been developing in South Africa over a period of years, and that it is amplified by a poorly managed immigration policy. Signs of xenophobia were given as early as the mid-1990s that xenophobia was escalating among poor blacks in South Africa (Matsinhe, 2011:308).

9. Neo-apartheid and post-apartheid; is the ‘rainbow nation’ a failed project?

South Africans have an identity crisis, who or what it means to be South African remains a ‘state of becoming’ and subject to contestations. South Africa can be described as a ‘contact zone’, that is a place in which different people coming from diverse ethnicities, who were previously geographically and historically separated came into contact and established new relations. These relations were arbitrated by conditions of coercion and inequalities (Pratt, 1992:6). South Africa’s social structures even after the ‘fall’ of apartheid continue to resemble that of a colony where strong racial/ethnic hierarchy persists. The first layer in the hierarchy consists of various black ethnic groups that experienced colonial conquest and apartheid domination (examples are; Zulu, Xhosa, Ndebele, San and khoi Khoi). The second layer are ‘colonial-racial subjects’ who came to South Africa as part of a long colonial and imperial history (examples are; English, Afrikaners, Indians and Chinese) (Gatsheni, 2011:14).

In South Africa, the colonial-racial subjects (white) succeeded in assuming power and dominated indigenous black people and other non-white subjects like Coloured and Indians. The black African people occupied the lower or bottom level in this racial/ethnic hierarchy. Black immigrants from within Africa, when they arrived in South Africa joined the black indigenous people in the bottom of the racial hierarchy. This situation fuelled xenophobic violence (Gatsheni, 2014:14). South Africa is currently at the 'neo-apartheid' period not 'post-apartheid'. The fundamental characteristic of neo-apartheid is the economic alienation of the demographic black majorities and the economic dominance and exploitation of the demographic white minority. Neo-apartheid manifests itself in the form of radicalization of criminality, in which black people are still regarded as the symbol of criminality. The politics of 'Post-apartheid' founded on the notion of the rainbow nation did not eradicate the status quo in which black people still feel marginalized and alienated (Gatsheni, 2014:15)

10. Conclusion

South Africa's transition to a democratic state was a 'miracle', the country was able to avert civil war, made compromises and saw the birth of a new country. It is this peaceful transition, even though there was violence involved that has giving hope to other conflict and violence invested African states that democracy in an ideal that is attainable. But this transition did not manage to avoid violence in totality; South Africa has been marred with xenophobic attacks. The current socio-economic conditions seem to heighten the attacks on foreigners. This paper argues that analysing xenophobic attacks solely based on the current conditions facing South Africa is disingenuous and not enough. There are deep legacies left by colonialism and apartheid that still haunt South African until today. Economic freedom that reached the marginalized group in society that are black can help fight xenophobia but for this to happen the government's insistence or 'denialism' delays this process. The economic injustices of the past must be addressed and issues of what or who is a South African need to be revisited and addressed. If these issues are not dealt with then xenophobic attacks with continuously feature in the everyday existence of South Africans. This violence manifest when black people fight against all forces that try to keep them on their knees begging for bread, water and affirmation. This violence is inevitable since the path to decolonization requires nothing less.

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SOUTH AFRICAN MEDIA AND THE COVERAGE OF XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE AGAINST FOREIGN NATIONALS: A STUDY OF TWO TABLOID NEWSPAPERS

T. Muswede

University of Limpopo, South Africa

Abstract

This article analyses editorial coverage of news about xenophobic attacks on foreign nationals in April 2015 by two South African tabloid newspapers, namely the Daily Sun and Sowetan. Tabloids have the highest circulation figures in the South African press and therefore remain a popular platform where prominent debates play out, with the potential to influence and stimulate transformational dialogue particularly among ordinary citizens. Notwithstanding their obligation to adhere to standards of professional journalism, their reportage of news on critical issues such as xenophobia ought to be as comprehensive and holistic as possible in order to cultivate positive attitudes towards African solidarity. However, most tabloids' reportage of such news is often sensational and devoid of context, with limitations of partiality and narrow-casting, as it camouflages more than it elucidates the root causes of violent behaviour. The study uses qualitative non-participant cross-sectional design and employs content analysis to analyse inferences implied by text messages based on news reports at the hype of xenophobia in April 2015. The analyses focus on story headlines, graphic expressions, prominence, language, objectivity, news angles, sources, depth of research and ethical imperatives inter alia. The study findings show that news reports focused mainly on the violent acts, government and civic groups' responses and the customary portrayal of xenophobia as a product of criminal activity. Furthermore, the reportage was episodic, focusing on the moment of attacks without explaining the logic behind use of violence by citizens to vent out their frustrations against those who allegedly "steal" their jobs and other economic opportunities. This event-based approach fails to spell out how xenophobia could be attributed simply to criminality, as official spokespersons often claimed. The study concludes that the tendency to pay attention to incidents rather than to fundamental aspects underlying xenophobic outbreaks is limiting. This reporting style often discredits the voice of "actors" by trivialising their circumstances due to reporters' inability to explore alternative angles to the narrative on xenophobia.

Keywords: Xenophobia, Tabloid newspapers, Discourse, Democracy, Alternative angles

1.Introduction

Although the media in their diverse forms are generally acknowledged for their extremely important role in providing information that is critical for the formulation of perceptions among target users (Mtwana & Bird, 2006), their treatment of xenophobia in South Africa has not escaped widespread public criticism. In the recent years, the press, particularly tabloid newspapers, have come under particular scrutiny for inflaming xenophobia with numerous research reports directly or indirectly accusing the press of contributing to anti-foreigner sentiments and perpetuating general stereotypes about immigrants and immigration (Hadland, 2010). Some scholars have gone further to argue that, xenophobic attitudes among South Africans are not a result of personal encounters with foreigners, but rather a product of (mis)information from secondary sources such as popular media and how they represent working class' material conditions. This is achievable through the formulation and publicity given to various anti-illegal views through, but not limited to, xenophobic reporters and commentators in the press (Danso & McDonald, 2001:2). Outside South Africa, a typical example of the negative influence of the media was evident in the atrocious events during the Rwanda genocide of 1994. This confirms that "xenophobic writing and editorialising (in the South African media) remains a concern" (Hadland, 2010:5) and therefore remains a subject of continuous investigation due to the undeniable powerful influence of the press on the public sphere.

Numerous reports show that there has been extensive coverage and relatively equitable distribution of print media reportage on xenophobia before and after the major outbreak in 2008 (Danso & McDonald, 2001; Hadland, 2010). However, the coverage has been described as largely "unanalytical" and blatantly anti-immigrant, as seen in the different sections of newspaper reports such as editorials, columns, letters to the editor and event-based stories. This is despite the optimistic view that there "appear(ed) to be a change in the quality of reportage over time" Danso & McDonald (2001), a gesture that should supposedly have ensured a balanced, objective coverage of immigration issues in South Africa. Numerous articles were found to be problematic, reflecting the tendency by journalists and editors to merely catalogue statistics on migration-related events in media reports such as estimate numbers of illegal immigrants from the Department of Home Affairs. In May 2008, The Daily Sun in particular was reportedly challenged for being complicit in the tragic events and for even making "the xenophobic violence understandable and justifiable" (Hadland, 2010:3). Senior Government officials were also quoted as condemning the South African media for sensationalising the attacks and for failing to adequately investigate the causes of the violence. This was reinforced by the establishment of a commission by the Department

of Home Affairs following Xenophobia's Imbizo on 21-22 July 2008 where calls were made for editors and journalists to be personally liable for inflammatory content (ibid).

Although the criticism on the role of the press in reinforcing xenophobia has been extensive, tabloids have taken the centre stage. Notably, this criticism has not necessarily been centred much on the frequency of reporting or the quantity of news on xenophobia, but rather on how the topic has been presented or framed with reference to the quality of coverage. Morris (1998) cited by Nyamnjoh (2010) argued that "progressive legislation and positive reporting can alter perceptions (about migration issues) over time", however, scholars maintain that there has been little endeavour by the authorities or the media to construct narratives that would counter xenophobia targeted against black African immigrants, often called Makwerekwere (Nyamnjoh, 2010). This is further corroborated by other studies conducted on migration related articles from all English-language newspapers and wire services in South Africa which also showed "no indication that there has been any fundamental change in press coverage" of xenophobic discourse (Neocosmos, 2006). It is this trend, therefore, that has made the media to be viewed as being complicit in fomenting xenophobic violence.

More importantly, most of the research done on this subject often uses broad anecdotal and impressionistic surveys which provided generic outcomes based on multifaceted press reports such as a study that sampled all English-language newspapers by Danso & McDonald (2001). This approach has the shortcoming of creating a blanket view that presupposes that tabloids, spreadsheets and other forms of print such as magazines' coverage of xenophobia is dissimilar and therefore can be analysed holistically. The approach ignores the unique editorial specialties and context within which these different print publications operate. More importantly, this method fails to acknowledge that demographic readership patterns and trends for each category of these print forms are different. Hence, the study focuses mainly on the two tabloid newspapers due to their somewhat homogeneous target audience with a common lifestyle in the townships where pre-conditions for xenophobia are supposedly evident. It examines the nature of tabloid coverage of xenophobia with a particular focus on the quality of reportage and the impact it has on the readers' perceptions about immigrants and cross-border migration in South Africa.

2. Theoretical context of tabloid reporting

The role and significance of the tabloid press has been hotly debated within the media fraternity in South Africa and this has generated interesting dialogue from prominent media scholars, the state and civic society. However, dominant views in this debate tend to

“dismiss the journalistic integrity of the tabloids by doubting their contribution to the consolidation of democracy” (Hadland, 2010:13). In order to articulate the place of tabloids in society, the paper explores the nature and context within which they operate by providing a theoretical explanation on what they are, whom they serve and how they achieve their mandate. This is done under the following sub-headings:

2.1 What is newsworthy in South African Tabloids?

The term Tabloid refers to the format, the size of the paper, which is about half a standard broadsheet newspaper; that is generally easier to handle, to read on trains and buses or in small places (Merrill, 2005). Tabloids can further be described in terms of their textual features namely, range, form and style. This entails less space for hard news than soft news (sport, celebrities, entertainment); less focus on foreign but more local news; emphasis on visual representations such as colourful photographs, screaming headlines and graphics as opposed to traditional written text (Steenveld & Strelitz, 2010). The style thrives on use of personalised angles of coverage mainly on private lives of public figures. This style centres on its conversational tone which often reflects the colloquial language of target readers, a feature that makes tabloids more popular. Summarily, tabloids flourish on their formal qualities which include sensationalism, personalisation and a focus on private concerns (Sparks, 2000). Hence, the newsworthiness of tabloids content is derived from “the desire to speak to its wider realities” (Knox, 2014:2). For the purposes of positioning this paper, it is these features in tabloids that have generated a contestation between what some scholars call “trash vs popular journalism” (Steenveld et al., 2010), a binary opposition description. Now, in view of these theoretical propositions, the question is; characterised by their shock aesthetics, pronounced sensationalism and disregard of ethics (ibid), will tabloids ever be transformed to suit the “professional” demands of mediating the xenophobic discourse?

2.2 Agenda-setting influence of tabloid news

The agenda setting role of tabloid news is engendered in their influence on the salience of selected topics of the day. The influence is assessed on whether there is a significant number of people who really regard the topical subject in question as worthwhile to generate a dialogue among citizens. While many issues compete for public attention, only a few succeed in doing so, based on a news worthiness criteria. The selected news usually exert significant influence on readers’ perceptions of what the most important issues of the day are. Following this, the news media can set the agenda for public thought and public discussion. The agenda of the news media becomes, to a considerate degree, the agenda of the public. In other words, the news media set the public agenda to communicate a host of

cues about the relative salience of topics on their daily agendas (McCombs, 2013), through their editorial content which is usually predetermined by editors.

The agenda setting function of the media not only defines salient issues, but also captures the attention of the public and directs public discourse. McQuail (2010:513) argues that there is a correlation between how much emphasis the media place on a problem, and how significant the audience perceives that issue. This may be possible through creative approaches including deliberately omitting alternative ways of thinking (Katz, 2001:273). The news production process entails that, a limited number of issues can remain newsworthy at a particular time, and the choice of what is included (or excluded) sets the agenda and defines public interest (ibid). Through the day by day selection and display of the news, editors and news directors focus our attention and influence our perceptions on what the most important issues of the day are (McCombs, 2013:2). In addition, McCombs (2013:2) explains that newspapers communicate a host of cues about the relative salience of topics on their daily agendas. Therefore, the agenda setting process builds consensus about what issues are most important within the community (McCombs, 2004:128). This explanation helps to justify how newspapers set the agenda on coverage of migration issues in South Africa. Hence, newspapers play an important role as part of the broad mass media environment to facilitate dialogue among citizens and therefore remain a central element in interrogating the relationship between the media and social behaviour.

2.3 Impact of Dailies on public opinion

Public opinion usually revolves around specific issues of the moment that reflect the collective will of a society or a nation with opinions that may be both internally or externally constructed. Essentially, public views may be articulated broadly in terms of the collective consensus about political and civic matters reached by groups within larger communities and these vary from very small entities to vast international groups. A particularly relevant dichotomy for public opinion is a process of focus versus the process of outcomes. Perspectives on public opinion as a process stress the role of dialogue and deliberation as core elements in the description and evaluation of public opinion (McCombs, Hubert, Kiousis & Wanta, 2011:3). In this regard, newspapers are a major component of the mass communication environment capable of promoting robust dialogue among citizens.

Daily newspapers are considered as one of the principal sources of information about public affairs globally as they communicate a number of cues about the relative salience of socio-economic and political topics on their daily menu. Although readers have their views regarding many issues, only a few topics really matter to the news media. While many issues compete for public attention daily, only a few capture the attention of the gatekeepers

thereby enabling the news media to then exercise significant influence on readers' perceptions of the most important issues (McCombs, 2004:1). As such, newspaper content indirectly prescribes societal discourse and influences opinions regarding matters of importance including the manner in which people should behave and how they respond to socio-economic challenges such as crime, drug abuse, racism and xenophobia. Dailies capably provide information about events and social conditions to society in the world through explaining, interpreting and commenting on the meaning of those events and information. Rosen (2012:34) classifies the media as public opinion shapers as they bring issues to public attention, affect how the issues are framed, and give voice to selected opinion holders, whom society esteem highly.

2.4 Tabloids and transformational dialogue

Unlike the state censored press of the apartheid era, the post-apartheid South African society has had to adapt to a new, dramatic and unsanctioned form of press which has largely contributed to an irrevocable revolution in the local media industry. This 'newspaper revolution' has an impact on the structure, products and audiences of the media business (Hadland, 2010; Knox, 2014). Since their introduction in 2003, tabloids have ruffled and irked the entire media fraternity including the political establishment and civic society due to their unique populist approach towards issues. As the largest category of the print media in South Africa, they have prompted criticism and complaints from many quarters of civil society such as invasion of privacy and sensational reporting.

The rise of mass-circulating tabloids such as the Daily Sun and their popularity with the poor and working class, black majority, for most of whom broadsheets are irrelevant, elusive and oppressive, is indicative of a post-apartheid South Africa determined to renegotiate skewed professional assumptions and practices in the interest of an ethic of effective inclusion and common humanity in journalism (Wasserman, 2010). Due to the complexity of South Africa's contemporary political, socio-economic and legal environment, the media industry operates in a profoundly negative public sphere, with tabloids not being an exception. The transformational ability of tabloid journalism is associated with the manner in which they offer a platform for the South African public to comment on topical issues through letters to the editor, opinionated columns and community-based stories. Studies done on the role of the media in South Africa's xenophobic violence have presented valuable arguments on the constructive and reflective function of tabloids when compared to their mainstream counterparts (Jone, Vanderhaeghen & Viney, 2008). Instead of disregarding tabloids as 'trash', they argue that they should be regarded as an "immensely popular form of media which carries alternative world views" that broadsheets often fail to

address. Arguably, this accounts for their popularity and influence as demonstrated by the tangible evidence in terms of their circulation figures (Knox, 2014:2). Therefore, they are seen as a cultural articulation of the often contradictory and shifting processes of transition and serve as platforms of popular culture, mediated politics and citizenship in the country. Their perceived deviancy from the journalistic orthodoxy has served as a podium to demonstrate their functionality “in the light of the plurality of worldviews that constitute the fabric of South Africa” (ibid). Hence, through their simplistic form and content characterised by numerous pictures, boxes and bold ink, and visual appeals, they draw more on social skills signifying that tabloids do not speak to the people or for the people, but from the people (Steenveld, 2006). It is however, this lay ‘narrowcast’ approach to news coverage that arguably lends tabloids to the sensationalist paradigm, a pre-occupation of this study.

3. Methods of analyses

The study uses qualitative content analysis to examine the coverage of xenophobia in two tabloid newspapers. The content from news articles on xenophobia in the period between 1 April and 14 May 2015 was qualitatively analysed using the thematic approach. These dates were chosen because they fell within the period when the xenophobic upsurge was most evident and reported in the sampled papers. All news reports, in-depth news items, comments and columns making specific reference to xenophobia were included in the study. Both papers were purposively selected for their generic appeal to the lower-middle class black and coloured readership, who largely live in the townships. The Daily Sun is one of the leading tabloids that is widely circulated in the areas worst affected by the May 2008 Xenophobic attacks (Nyamnjoh, 2010). Although the Sowetan is regarded as a ‘tabloid of more sober habits than its counterparts’, it was the largest daily in the early 2000s (McComb, 2004). Moreover, these publications also belong to the largest and fastest growing populist newspaper category with very high circulation figures in South Africa (Wasserman, 2008) since they retail at affordable prices of below five Rands per copy. The Daily sun is the country’s largest daily newspaper (Hadland, 2010). Hence, both publications were selected because of their bulk readership and influence on the South African populace; a class dimension relevant to the study of xenophobia.

4. Discussion of results

Xenophobia reporting in the Sowetan and Daily Sun newspapers is discussed also acknowledging that the frequency of their reporting has not been contested due to the numerous articles written on the subject. Since it is the quality of coverage that remains the main concern for critics of tabloids’ reportage of xenophobia, this paper uses the main

dimensions of tabloids, namely news agenda, genres and sub-themes, presentation style, language and accuracy as reference indices to examine the manner of coverage.

4.1 Xenophobia and the news agenda

This aspect is addressed with reference to how the tabloids considered prominence of the topic as part of their news agenda. The frequency of news in and around xenophobia as a topical migration inclined subject demonstrates that the issue was high on the news agenda of both papers. The frequency of news coverage denotes a multifaceted coverage reflective of a broad spectrum of areas including social, economic, political, and cross-border treatment of the subject. Due to the quantity of stories that directly addressed xenophobia, items that indirectly referred to migration issues or treated xenophobia as a secondary theme were not included for analysis. However, the existence of such articles is a clear impression that both newspapers viewed the subject as a critical reality that needed intense reportage.

Table 1:

Name of Tabloid newspaper	<i>Daily Sun</i>	<i>Sowetan</i>
Number of news items	47	65
Number of copies	29	31
Average No of items per copy	1.6	2.1

The statistics presented above on Table 1 are an indication that coverage of xenophobia at the time of the upsurge was higher on the agenda of the Sowetan than in the Daily Sun newspaper.

4.2 Story types and sub-themes

4.2.1 Critical and in depth journalism

Genres are significant in the context of agenda setting because each variation has its inherent style and merits of reporting. Both newspapers paid attention to Xenophobia in a variety of genres, but mainly in news reports which comprised at least 80% (n=90) of the news items. This is common in tabloid journalism because this is where stories are introduced before they can progress into other forms of reporting such as editorials or in depth analysis. As the basis of all news writing, its limitation is that it focuses mainly on timeliness, novelty and human interest aspects with lesser demands for interrogation. This kind of coverage presented the challenge of failing to provide background information and

context to the articles on xenophobia thereby limiting readers to a surface meaning with the potential for misinterpretation of the said information. Usually, this approach trivialises the news being reported by making readers to think that the story is less important since it is not fully developed (Swanepoel, Fourie & Froneman, 2007). Few editorials or feature stories appeared in the Sowetan which also provided a vivid intention to place xenophobia high on the news agenda and taking responsibility in matters of nation building. Nonetheless, little usage of in depth coverage and other forms of reporting such as reviews, let alone in the Daily Sun, had limitations of not fully empowering readers to understand xenophobia.

4.2.2 Alternative news angles and contextualisation of xenophobia

The spread of xenophobic attacks and their effects on the targets was given much attention in both tabloids, albeit based on a perpetrator-victim angle which presented foreign nationals on the receiving end as people without equal human rights in the country. The Daily Sun in particular, presented victims of xenophobia as a homogenous group of “foreigners”, a pejorative term used without regard for their different immigration statuses in the country. This angle was not helpful in classifying who and how many of the foreigners were illegal or legal in order to highlight their levels of vulnerability in the country. There was little coverage of the attacks based on a reflective analysis in the context of both the South African Constitution 108 of 1996 and international law. The two publications gave precedence to prominent figures in the political domain such as the Zulu King’s imbizo and senior members of government including Ministers of Home Affairs (Mr Malusi Gigaba), Police (Mr Nathi Nhleko), State Security (Mr David Mahlobo) as well as the Premier of KwaZulu-Natal Province Mr Senzo Mchunu. This made the attacks to appear as if there was a leadership gap in the country’s top echelons. In the contrary, Human Rights groups have labelled South Africa as the most xenophobia country in the world nearly two decades ago (Mtwana & Bird, 2006).

Pertinent aspects of xenophobia reporting received limited attention in both newspapers. These areas include use of research-based information, impact of xenophobia on the country’s international outlook and recourse toward the victims of the scourge. Although the failure to focus on detailed coverage using these methods may be attributable to lack of capacity and resources, this cannot justify the two tabloids’ emphasis on the tired rhetoric about foreigners “stealing jobs” and committing crime. This kind of reportage does not measure up to tabloids’ role in championing the transformational dialogue in the new democracy.

However, both publications noted the legal imperatives of xenophobia from the victims’ perspective, an aspect evident in reports in the Daily Sun of the 21st of April 2015 where a

report said that “there is no charge called xenophobia”, suspects are charge for assault, ... theft etc. A Sowetan headline entitled “Xenophobes get away with murder” (opinion analysis dated 16 April) implies that there are no consequences for those who carry out attacks in South Africa. It is this lack of a direct charge for xenophobia that leaves the victims hopeless and likely not to get legal recourse for their suffering. Both papers are therefore appraised for this astute expose. Save for the above instance, xenophobia coverage in other instances was approached from a traditional news perspective that pays attention to the human interest elements of the incidents in line with the populist nature of tabloid newspapers without the capacity to influence change of behaviour.

4.2.3 Focus on positive and constructive news

Overall, the Sowetan had a significant portion of both positive and informed reporting on xenophobia than its counterpart (Daily Sun) whose coverage mostly featured a negative “doom and gloom” scenario that portrayed “foreigners” as undesirables due to their contribution to high rates of unemployment, poverty and competition for basic services. This was exacerbated by poor choice of vocabulary including use of mob metaphors such as “scores”, “floods” “hordes” and phrases such as Lindela Centre is “bursting at the seams” with foreign nationals and related sensational headlines which served as negative references including discriminatory terminology. Therefore, the Daily Sun largely contributed to reinforcing common stereotypes about foreign nationals as “illegals” or “foreigners”. Despite some grey areas relating to the above, evidence of constructive and progressive reporting was effectively demonstrated in the Sowetan edition of the 24th of April with the headline “MPs sent out to fight xenophobia” which dedicated a double pager (4 & 5) entitled “AFRICA CENTRAL TO CREATING OUR COUNTRY’S FREEDOM”. Here, renowned South African politicians such as Mr Matthews Phosa (ANC NEC member), Mr Letlapa Mphahlele (Former PAC President) and Ms Baleka Mbete (ANC Chairperson and Speaker of Parliament) and other liberation stalwarts chronicled how strategic countries in the African continent were in dislodging apartheid, also highlighting the kind of hospitality they got while in exile. This approach was useful in mainstreaming xenophobia into the invaluable democratic space and discourse on nation building and African solidarity.

4.3 Style of news presentation on xenophobia

4.3.1 Sensational and discriminatory reporting through news content

Like any other news themes, reporting xenophobia should be benchmarked against the South African Press Council Code which obligates all media houses to report news truthfully, accurately and fairly. It further states that news should be presented in context

without distortion, avoiding discriminatory or denigrating references to people's race, colour, ethnicity, etc. During the period of this investigation, news articles on xenophobia were often presented on the cover page or in the next 2-3 pages of the papers, a good sign that both newspapers regarded the subject as prominent in their news agenda. In the Daily Sun, most items on xenophobia were presented in bold ink, upper case headlines emphasising the news threshold. However, these were accompanied by unnecessary graphic material with little written text to help contextualise the articles, thereby confirming that the paper is sensationalist (Hadland, 2010).

The Sowetan carried a full page of graphic images of hundreds of victims strewn on the floors of the Germiston Community Hall in its 21st April 2015 edition after fleeing their respective homes. On page 8, sketchy captions on some of the images such as "Suffer the little ones", referring to children lying helplessly on the open floors and "Ain't heavy" referring to an image of a displayed man carrying a convincingly heavy baggage fleeing for his life, makes a mockery out of people's suffering. These and other grisly images including that of the Mozambican, Emanuel Sithole, whose tragic attack defined the heightened tensions of the 2015 xenophobic violence, are clear testimony of how tabloids' sensationalist and simplistic style of reporting fails to deal with the citizens' limited view of immigrants and migration issues, particularly from an ethical view. Although there weren't many news stories in both newspapers with discriminatory news flavour, the anti-foreign perspective was evident where calls for stringent controls of migrants were made accompanied by headlines such as "Foreigners want to leave" in the Daily Sun (8 April 2015). The tendency by both newspapers to often use a catch-all phrase that categorised all migrants as "foreigners" (literally translated as Makwerekwere) failed to make distinctions between formalised and illegal immigrants. This conflated use of discriminatory elements tends to complicate what is supposed to be a precise story. The presentation style could have avoided as public attitudes are often formed based on highly emotional media images that portray South Africa as "flooded or overrun" by undocumented migrants from Africa (MMP, 2003).

4.4 Choice of language or appropriate vocabulary

4.4.1 Use of insensitive, discriminatory language

Language is a critical component of tabloid journalism in determining how the press not only presents but also mainstreams particular issues in society. In both cases, there is undoubted evidence in headline "frames" from both newspapers that xenophobia was adequately problematised. This is plausible for getting people to talk about the topic. However, continued use of words that directly referred to foreign nationals as items "to be kicked out" "pounced on", and phrases such as "fury over foreigners", amakwerekwere",

“foreigners locked out” and use of mob metaphors such as “scores of foreigners” already highlighted in section 4.2.3, made the reports to fall into the trap of sensation. Both newspapers did not use less subjective terminology such as “undocumented” or “irregular” migrants to refer to “illegal” immigrants, a term that has loosely been associated with criminality among foreign nationals. The term “undocumented immigrant” was recommended by the Centre for Violence and Reconstruction (2002) to avoid portrayal of immigrants as “other” within a pejorative ideological connotation. Hence, it can be said that both tabloids largely failed to use non-discriminatory and appropriate vocabulary to describe African immigrants.

4.5 Accuracy of reportage

4.5.1 Objectivity in reports (fairness, balance, accuracy, credible sources)

In addition to broadening the platform of discourse about xenophobia, the monitoring of news sources helps in understanding the editorial angle of newspapers and the degree or depth of coverage of the topic through analysis of the calibre of source persons. In terms of the basic principles of news writing, both papers somewhat presented their stories as precisely and factually as possible albeit as event-based narratives of episodic occurrences. This is evident in their reports about the location of horrendous events e.g. Isiphingo in KwaZulu-Natal where the attacks started, providing the time and dates of attacks, name(s) and estimate number of victims and action taken by the police where applicable. Although most stories identified for analysis were news reports, most views presented about xenophobia were limited to heavy reliance on the Police (SAPS) and Government officials, a tendency that failed to reduce biasness or lopsided reportage. This was compounded by frequent reference to victims’ responses (90%), thereby capturing the emotions instead of the factual, impartial and balanced tone of the events. A more balanced coverage would have featured academics (specifically from KwaZulu-Natal), civic groups and experts such as lawyers representing victims of xenophobia. The Daily Sun in particular hardly used any expert sources and guest writers or interest groups’ input in an attempt to provide readers with a comprehensive picture of xenophobia discourse. Essentially worrying was the indiscriminate use of statistics with no reference to research data accompanied by use of speculative language, particularly claims that victims who were “bused” home would soon return back to South Africa (Sowetan, 4th of May 2015).

5. Conclusion

Given the immense power of tabloids as narrators of daily ‘realities’ with the capacity to sway public opinion, it is essential that their coverage of issues that have the potential to

perpetuate public violence be holistic; adhering to standards of professional journalism, particularly the South African Press Council Code. Due to their “class dimension” antics inclined towards the ordinary citizen, tabloids have the latency to champion a transformational agenda by providing informative and educative reporting on xenophobia. However, despite a growing awareness of the consequences of xenophobia among journalists and editors in the press, a remnant of blatantly xenophobic reports is still common especially within the tabloids category. They still continue to employ a rather sensationalist style in their coverage of xenophobic violence. While this approach somewhat succeeds in creating widespread consciousness and soliciting indirect international sympathy through reproduction of grisly images of the attacks including on social media platforms, it is unfathomable how a responsible press should continue to thrive on sensationalising human suffering and death in a constitutional democracy like South Africa.

To this end, it is worth noting that most news articles in the tabloids, particularly in the Daily Sun, failed to explore alternative news angles aimed at changing or influencing positive attitudes towards the treatment of foreign nationals during the xenophobic violence. In the contrary, a majority of them were mere memorial narratives that “celebrated” the pain, anguish and plight of desperate victims of violence with hardly any reconstructive input from relevant expert sources. The reportage was limited, shallow and fell short of mainstreaming the transformational discourse fashionable to tabloid journalism globally. Hence, there is a need for the press to pursue an objective and more nuanced narrative about xenophobia to enable news readers to participate in the formulation of a more constructive discourse. This may be possible through the design of ethically acceptable guidelines on the coverage of xenophobia following a consultative process with stakeholders in the country’s media fraternity.

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LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA: REFLECTIONS ON FOREIGN NATIONALS' INFORMAL BUSINESSES

S.K. Mokoena

University of the Free State, South Africa

Abstract

This paper examines the informal businesses as a driver for Local Economic Development (LED) in South Africa. Recently, South Africa (SA) experienced a number of xenophobic attacks which resulted to a killing of one Mozambican national who was involved in informal businesses. Both national and international media houses had their own speculations about the attacks and titled their article publications, just to name a few, “SA’s xenophobic attacks: are migrants really stealing jobs; SA faces backlash over xenophobic attacks on migrant workers”. As a matter of fact, these foreign nationals do contribute to LED in cities, small towns and rural areas of SA. Thus, LED can be summarized as a contemporary approach in the local government development process. Literature presents that globally, LED is aimed at enhancing economic growth. However in the African context, LED goes further than just enhancing economic growth, but prioritises poverty alleviation and greater inclusion of previously excluded groups. Furthermore, the literature do acknowledge the distinct challenges in implementing LED in the African continent. The research design used on this paper was in accordance with the qualitative approach. It uses a narrative-analytical approach with a focus on descriptive analysis of the impact on the effective implementation of LED. This approach is relevant in predicting a future framework for LED. The findings point to the fact that foreign nationals play a positive role in South Africa’s economy. South Africa needs to deal with the tensions and other underlying social challenges that the country is confronted with currently.

Keywords: Local Economic Development, Foreign Nationals, Informal Businesses

1. Introduction

Local Economic Development (LED) has a vital role to play in reshaping the economy of South Africa (SA). Local communities need to turn around their economic and development direction to one that is prosperous and beneficial to their communities and ultimately the country as a whole. LED is one of the tools necessary for reversing the

economic injustices imposed on some local communities by the previous apartheid state. LED is a concept that saw implementation in South Africa after the post-apartheid government took power in 1994. The apartheid state left a legacy of inequality and underdevelopment in some areas of South Africa through the use of a centrally focused economic planning and development system (Zulu and Mubangizi, 2014). There was neglect in planning and development in some localities, and this led to the country having a dual economy. The state had a policy where the black population was neglected. According to the then Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) (2005:14) central to the design of apartheid economics was an enforced spatial development process that resulted in a well-capitalized, relatively technologically advanced urban based first economy sector that relied on skilled labour and a second economy located in peri-urban and rural areas associated with low skill requirements, poor infrastructure and poor labour conditions. This systemic marginalization resulted in the intentional underdevelopment of the peri-urban and rural areas.

The South African government strives to ensure that the country as a whole becomes developed and intends to do away with inequality, poverty and any form of discrimination. According to the South African Local Government Association (2010:3) the post 1994 government emphasised grassroots initiatives and community participation. With local government being viewed as a sphere of government, this meant that it was allocated a range of roles and responsibilities with respect to economic and social development. The local government environment is more supportive of the concept of LED. Given the importance of LED, the first section of this paper explores what LED is. Thereafter, examines the pieces of legislation dedicated to LED. The paper further provides a discussion on the recent LED and xenophobic attacks in the country. The paper concludes by presenting some challenges experienced by municipalities on the topic of this paper.

2. Defining of LED

The World Bank (2014: online) defines the concept of LED as a process that offers local government, the private and not-for-profit sectors, and local communities the opportunity to work together to improve the local economy. It focuses on enhancing competitiveness, increasing sustainable growth and ensuring that growth is inclusive. LED encompasses a range of disciplines including physical planning, economics and marketing. It also incorporates many local government and private sector functions including environmental planning, business development, infrastructure provision, real estate development and finance. Blakely (1994) in Nel (2001:1005) defines LED as the process in which local governments or community-based organisations engage to stimulate or maintain

business activity and/or employment. The principal goal of LED is to stimulate local employment opportunities in sectors that improve the community, using existing human, natural and institutional resources. Koma (2012) on the other hand argues that LED is intended to empower the most vulnerable, marginalised and poor sections of local communities to be able to raise sufficient incomes to meet their basic needs and aspirations. LED cannot be separated from poverty alleviation projects and programmes initiated and implemented in the local government sphere.

It can be argued that LED is process-orientated requiring inter alia the formation of new institutions, the development of alternative industries, the improvement of the capacity of existing employers to improve quality, the identification of new markets, the transfer of knowledge, and the nurturing of new enterprises. Irrespective of what form it takes globally, LED has one primary goal, which is to increase the number and variety of job opportunities available to the local communities. However in order to facilitate these activities, municipalities and community groups must take on an initiative rather than a passive role (Gilothe and Meire, 1989 in Koma, 2012:128). A number of deductions can be made about the nature of LED based on the above definitions. LED is a local government initiative aimed at stimulating business activity in a locality, creating employment and alleviating poverty.

3. Legislative framework

LED in South Africa does not have a specific piece of legislation dedicated to it but it is however contained in, influenced by, and derives its legitimacy from a number of legislative documents and policies. The following outlines the pieces of legislation and policies that give legitimacy to LED.

3.1 *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996*

Section 152 (1) (c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 states that the objects of a municipality are to promote social and economic development and further states in section 152 (2) that a municipality must strive within its financial and administrative capacity to achieve the objects set out in subsection (1). Section 153(a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 further states that a municipality must structure and manage its administration and budgeting and planning processes to give priority to the basic needs of the community, and also to promote the social and economic development of the community.

In as much as the constitution states that municipalities should promote the social and economic development of communities, it does not explicitly point to LED as the vehicle through which this should be achieved, hence (Rogerson, 2010) purport that LED has been viewed by others as an unfunded mandate for municipalities. The then DPLG (2005:9) however states that there is a clear implication that LED is not an unfunded mandate given the juxtaposition of the constitution and its schedule that municipalities have a key role in creating a conducive environment for investment through provision of infrastructure and quality services rather than by developing programmes and attempting to create jobs.

3.2 White Paper on Local Government, 1998

The White Paper on Local Government, 1998 provides for developmental local government where local government is committed to working with citizens and groups within the community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic and material needs and improve their quality of life. The white paper outlines four interrelated developmental characteristics which are; maximising social development and economic growth; integrating and coordinating; democratizing and; leading and learning. The white paper states that municipalities need to have a clear vision for the local economy, and work in partnership with local business to maximise job creation and investment. It is further stated that local government is not directly responsible for creating jobs. Rather it is responsible for taking active steps to ensure that the overall economic and social conditions of the locality are conducive to the creation of employment opportunities. The white paper advocates for provision of basic household infrastructure as the central contribution made by local government to social and economic development. It further states that local government can play an important role in promoting job creation and boosting the local economy by investing in the basics and providing good quality cost-effective services and by making the local areas a pleasant place to live and work.

3.3 Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, 2000 (Act 32 of 2000)

The Local Government Municipal Systems Act, 2000 (Act 32 of 2000) makes it compulsory for every municipality to have an Integrated Development Plan (IDP). Section 25 (1) of the Local Government Municipal Systems Act, 2000 (Act 32 of 2000) states that each municipal council must, within a prescribed period after the start of its elected term, adopt a single, inclusive and strategic plan for the development of the municipality. According to the Local Government Municipal Systems Act, 2000 (Act 32 of 2000), a municipality's IDP must reflect among others; the council's development priorities and objectives for its elected term, including its LED aims and its internal transformation needs; the council's development strategies which must be aligned with any national or provincial sectoral plans and

requirements binding on the municipality in terms of legislation; a spatial development framework which must include the provision of basic guidelines for land use management system for the municipality.

This piece of legislation points out a number of factors vital to LED. LED strategies should be embedded in municipalities' integrated development plans and that some level of coordination between local, provincial and national plans should be achieved. There should be efforts to ensure that municipal IDPs and their LED strategies, Provincial Growth Development Strategy (PGDS) and National Social Development Plan (NSDP) are harmonised. To reinforce this assertion Koma (2012:131) argues that harmony and alignment among the NSDP, the PGDS and municipal IDPs ought to exist with a view to ensure an integrated approach to development planning among the three spheres of government. Koma (2012:131) with a specific focus on LED argues that LED policy planners have to acquaint themselves with the NSDP in order to understand and locate the potential economic growth points for local areas.

3.4 The National Framework for LED in South Africa (2006 – 2011)

Although not termed a national policy as such, this document is de facto a national policy framework with official sanction (Nel and Rogerson, 2007:3-4). Nel and Rogerson (2007:4) argue that after years of LED being a requirement (based on the constitutional mandate), through the National Framework for LED in South Africa (2006 – 2011), government finally put on the table a statement of its understanding and goals for LED, and local authorities now have a more defined document to guide them in their activities. The National Framework for Local Economic Development in South Africa (2006 – 2011) presented a turning point for LED in South Africa as will be highlighted in the paragraphs that follow. The Framework promotes a strategic approach to the development of local economies and a shift away from narrow municipal interests focused only on government inputs in ad-hoc project (then DPLG, 2005:3).

The framework consists of the following ten principles and an additional seven objectives for supporting the strategic agenda for Local Government and LED:

- Through a developmental approach, Government has a decisive and unapologetic role to play in shaping the economic destiny of our country.

- Creating an environment in which the overall economic and social conditions of the locality are conducive to the creation of employment opportunities is the responsibility of Local Government.
- Local Economic Development is an outcome of actions and interventions resulting from local good governance and the constant improvement and integration of national priorities and programs in local spaces
- Inward investment from the state or private sector will only be effective where the potential and competitive advantages of each area are known and exploited.
- Promoting robust and inclusive local economies requires the concerted, coordinated action of all spheres and sectors of government centered on the application and localization of the principles espoused in the National Spatial Development Perspective (NSDP).
- Locally owned appropriate solutions and strategies must emerge to support national frameworks in both rural and urban local spaces and should promote sustainable development and sustainable human settlements.
- South Africa competes in a global and increasingly integrated world economy whose threats must be minimized and whose opportunities must be exploited.
- Private companies, including social enterprises and cooperatives, form the heart of the economy and have a crucial role to play as partnerships with public and community role players that will ultimately stimulate robust and inclusive local economies.
- People are the single greatest resource and including all citizens in development and increasing their skills leads to increased opportunities for stimulating local economies.
- Local initiative, energy, creativity, assertive leadership and skills will ultimately unlock the latent potential in local economies and will shape local spaces.

The objectives are as follows:

- To shift towards a more strategic approach to the development of local economies and overcome challenges and failures in respect of instances where municipalities themselves try to manage litany of non-viable projects or start-ups.
- To support local economies in realising their optimal potentials and making local communities active participants in the economy of the country.
- To elevate the importance and centrality of effectively functioning local economies in growing the national economy.

- To wage the national fight against poverty more effectively through local level debates, strategies and actions.
- To improve community access to economic initiatives, support programmes and information.
- To improve the coordination of economic development planning and implementation across government and between government and non-governmental actors.
- To build greater awareness about the importance and role of localities and regions which globally are playing an increasingly significant role as points of investment facilitated by supportive national policies.

It is evident that the above policy framework supports the notion of local competitive advantage. Rogerson (2010:483) argues that the 2006 framework embodies an implied rejection of the community economic development approach in many respects it represents an unsatisfactory compromise that offers local government elements of both the competitive and the welfare approaches to LED. It is argued further that although the current approach makes it clear that LED is not about projects, the majority of the LED strategies contained in IDPs from small local municipalities are almost entirely project focused.


4. LED and xenophobia

Previous research by Ligthelm (2013) indicates that not all forms of entrepreneurship and business formation are beneficial to economic growth and development. Baumol (1990) in Ligthelm (2013) distinguishes the following entrepreneurial categories: productive, unproductive and even destructive (e.g. illegal activities). Productive entrepreneurship encompasses the exploitation of profitable opportunities with inherent growth prospects. Unproductive entrepreneurship is essentially business formation aimed at survival in a situation of unemployment and poverty and is particularly prevalent in the informal sector. This paper identifies LED informal sector as small unregistered businesses operating as street vendors and in-home businesses established on residential sites (often termed 'spaza shops' or 'tuck shops' in South Africa). In contrast, small formal businesses are defined as businesses operating from fixed building structures located on business stands demarcated as such by local government (municipal) town planning regulations. Most informal businesses are established for survival. It can be argued that such entrepreneurs do not have the talent, the skills or the appetite for risk needed to turn informal businesses into really successful businesses. However, on the other hand, it may be argued that informal businesses still have an important role to play in the lives of the poor, because these tiny businesses will remain, perhaps for the foreseeable future, the only way many of the poor can manage to survive. With the recent xenophobic attacks in South Africa, it was revealed

that small foreign-owned retailers are more competitive than local rivals. Tshabalala (2015) indicates that earlier this year, after the outbreak of xenophobic violence-melted out on most Somali, Ethiopian, Bangladeshi and Pakistani retailers – South African Minister of Small Business Development, Lindiwe Zulu, implored small foreign retailers to share their trade secrets to avoid any further harassment. The Minister's statement suggests that small foreign retailers have a secret treasure trove of business practices that they are not willing to share with their South African competitors. In contrary, the African Centre for Migration in Johannesburg published a report on economics of small traders in South Africa two years ago which found nothing unsavoury about the business practices of foreign small traders. Instead, savvy business principles are used, that is, most small foreign retailers set a low mark-up to make a high turnover, they locate their businesses on highly trafficked pedestrian areas, and they open early and close late and have a wider product range. Furthermore, the report found that customer-focused business practices sets them apart from their South African counterparts. Moreover, the report found that Somali retailers invest considerable effort into sourcing low prices for their products, using sourcing techniques like buying in bulk in order to get discounts from wholesalers. Almost all the Somali traders pool their resources each month to source goods. Each retailer procures specific goods for their store individually but the costs associated with restocking, like transport and labour are shared. Tshabalala (2015) further substantiated this argument by making reference to findings of another study by the South Africa Migration Programme, that small foreign retailers employ a sizeable number of South African people, women in particular. In addition, they contribute a huge chunk to South Africa's value-added-tax (VAT), through their large purchase of goods from major South African wholesalers.

Indeed, the foreign nationals do play a positive role in South Africa's economy as Steyn (2015) agrees with this argument and reference is made to the findings by the non-profit organisation, Livelihoods Foundation, in its Formalising Informal Micro-Enterprise (FIME) project, where it interviewed 950 spaza-shop business in eight townships between 2010 and 2013. The research affirmed that foreign-run shops dominated the market. It was found that 51.5% of spaza-shops in the survey were run by foreigners, and these were often linked to partnerships. Figure 1 below illustrates the percentage of spaza-shops operated by foreign nationals and South Africans in a survey of eight townships.

Figure 1: Spaza shops operated by foreigners and south Africans



Adapted from an article by Lisa Steyn

The figure reveals that Somali is the highest foreign nationality operating spaza-shops in South Africa with a percentage of 22.5 followed by Ethiopia with a percentage of 14.2 on the selected study area. Tshwane led xenophobic attacks levels with a percentage of 44 and followed by Ekurhuleni. The survey shows that Westonaria had lowest xenophobic attacks with a percentage of 20. The fact that research has yielded different findings on whether foreign spaza-shop owners hire locals, this paper argues that South Africans are the biggest economic beneficiaries of the sector, because the vast majority of foreign spaza-shop owners rented premises from the South Africans. In view of the above, it is important to briefly explain the two LED approaches, that is, pro-growth and pro-poor.

4.1 Pro-growth LED

The objective of the pro-growth LED approach is to make urban localities more competitive, focus on entrepreneurship and poverty reduction (Abrahams, 2003:191). The generally weaker infrastructure and capacity of rural localities means that some of the objectives of pro-growth LED would face great difficulty when applied in this context. In South Africa's leading cities, the mainstream LED practice has been dominated by market-

led approaches that have been increasingly geared towards achieving competitiveness and sustainable high economic growth rates (Nel and Rogerson, 2005 in Rogerson, 2011:159). According to Rogerson (2011) Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, Pretoria and Ekurhuleni pioneered LED activities which were targeted at building local competitiveness. These cities aimed at responding to situations of weak demand and of micro-economic constraints on local productive capacity. Rogerson (2011) further argues that in the quest to create more productive and competitive cities, notable LED pro-growth interventions have been innovated in the form of, among others, initiatives for enhancing institutional efficiency reducing the local cost of doing business in a particular locality or of improving local “logistical pathways” in order to strengthen the relationship between economic growth and infrastructure investment.

To reiterate and to add on to the discussion on pro-growth LED approaches, Rogerson (2003:53-54) argues that overall, the four leading foci of urban LED interventions are seen as concerning the promotion of the competitiveness of localities, particularly through the attraction of inward investment, the enhancement of growth through implementing property-led city improvements, supporting job creation from the inside in terms of business retention or assisting small enterprise development and, finally, supporting a range of community development initiatives, including community enterprises or cooperatives. What can be learned from the above is that the pro-growth approach is more suited for urban cities which already have established infrastructure and capacity to carry out initiatives aimed at being competitive and achieving sustainable high economic growth rates. The lack of adequate infrastructure and capacity at more rural localities therefore call for an alternative approach to LED. Pro-growth LED approaches can be associated with initiatives aimed at increasing economic and business activity in localities as indicated above. Place marketing and formation of partnerships can be viewed as pro-growth approaches to LED. Place marketing according to Binns and Nel (2002a:186) can be regarded as a locality based strategy to re-image and restructure local economies. Binns and Nel (2002a: 186) argues that service-based economic sectors have received significant impetus from altered consumer preferences, choices, wealth and location mobility. Binns and Nel (2002a) argue that tapping into economic shifts such as these can have significant potential for areas that are seeking to re-orientate their local economies. They state that one sector that has performed particularly well in this context is tourism, which has become one of the most critical forces shaping the world’s economy and has been recognized as having a key developmental impact.

Marias (2011) makes reference to a case where the KwaZulu Natal (KZN) Provincial Government and the European Commission embarked on a programme called Gijima, to promote LED in the wider province outside the main metropolitan area of Durban. The main focus of the programme was to bring about a more effective implementation of LED in order to achieve equitable economic growth in KZN. Marias (2011:ii55) argues that the programme had three main objectives; to promote pro-poor interests, build management capacity of LED and ensure local competitiveness through partnerships. Marias (2011) points to a number of challenges facing this programme which can be used as learning opportunities for future partnerships for LED and shows that these partnerships are likely to improve the viability of community based LED.

4.2 Pro-poor LED

The above approaches to LED have mainly focused on aspects that are geared towards making localities and institutions more competitive and more productive, mainly focused on the market side of LED. Pro-poor LED proves to be more people centred. Rogerson (2003:54) states that in the developing world, the extent, depth, and growth of poverty inevitably forces questions of poverty alleviation much higher onto the LED policy agenda. As a result, this means there is a need to adopt LED strategies that are more inclined toward the pro-poor approach. According to Abrahams (2003:191) pro-poor LED that is people centred and favours a bottom up approach to development is a favourite for South African rural areas. Abrahams (2003) further argues that the critics of orthodox approaches to LED are of the opinion that investment attraction and place marketing alone have not succeeded in creating sustainable employment in the local economy over the long run. Moreover he argues that the contention is that the returns on investment as envisaged in the pro-growth approach do not usually trickle down to the neediest, who rarely benefit from these investments. The proponents of the pro-poor approach argue that community based LED strategies are more sustainable and through having communities actively participating in the planning and implementation of new developments, the benefits will be greater.

Rogerson (2004:182) argues that the literature on LED has accorded limited attention to the role of the construction sector. Rogerson (2004:187) argues that the construction can be an efficient industry for generating employment and can thus be a useful tool for poverty alleviation. Islam and Majeres (2001:189) also concur with the above assertion and are of the contention that the infrastructure and construction sector are an important catalyst of employment intensive growth. The construction sector for the above reason can be viewed to be a vital part to the promotion of pro-poor LED since it addresses the problem of employment and poverty alleviation. The only problem with the construction sector is that it

is not able to provide sustainable long lasting employment since infrastructure and construction projects usually have a start and end date.

According to Binns and Nel (2002a:238) within South Africa, in addition to longstanding popular tourist destinations such as Kruger Park, Golden Route and Cape Town, a wide range of other localities are now seeking to drive development through tourism promotion, often as an explicit part of their LED programmes. Binns and Nel (2002) further argue that such interventions tend to have a community/pro-poor focus. In addition, Forstner (2004: 497) argues that in order to realize potential gains from tourism for local communities, it is contended that tourism development needs to be reoriented according to the interests of local stakeholders, in particular poor people. It is evident that tourism is a vital tool for LED and it even has a pro-poor element to it.

Rogerson (2010) presents at least five advantages inherent in tourism which make it an attractive sector with considerable potential for promoting pro-poor growth. First, it is a diverse industry offering wide scope for participation, including very importantly the participation of the informal sector. Second, the customer comes to the product, providing considerable opportunities for linkages with other sectors. Third, tourism is highly dependent upon natural capital such as wildlife and scenery and culture, which are assets, that some of the poor have. Four, tourism can be more labour intensive than manufacturing. Finally, compared with many other economic sectors, a higher proportion of the benefits from tourism, in terms of jobs or entrepreneurship opportunities, accrue to women.

There is a clear distinction in terms of the nature of pro-growth and pro-poor LED approaches. In as much as the distinction exists a factor that remains is that both these approaches are in place to ultimately achieve a similar goal which is economic development and economic equity across South Africa. A factor that is also evident is that different approaches are applicable in different areas, it is important for this reason to be aware of what approach to apply in what situation in order to reap the utmost benefits out of it. Abrahams (2003:191) argues that, despite the differences between rural and urban areas and between market-led and pro-poor approaches, there is indeed synergy between the different approaches to LED. The underlying principles of both market-led and pro-poor approaches include self-reliance, employment creation, participation, local co-operation and environmental sustainability, which are relevant in both urban and rural contexts. This synergy needs to be maximised and applied in a manner that will reap benefits in both rural and urban contexts.

5. Conclusion

In conclusion, the paper argues that LED is aimed at enhancing economic growth and through literature; it was evident that foreign national businesses do contribute positively towards the South African economy despite the socio-economic challenges that confront the country. Through analysing LED related legislation, the paper observed that the policy guidelines for implementing LED in South Africa give impetus to the synergy that has to be developed and operationalized for the achievement of LED.

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TOWARDS EFFECTIVE PROVISIONS FOR GOVERNING AND MANAGING ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION INTO SOUTH AFRICA

C. Letsiri

K. Wotela

University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa

Abstract

The paper reviews the provisions for governing and managing immigration into South Africa. We conclude that these provisions are ineffective, inefficient, as well as unsustainable and broaden the base for violating human rights. Findings from interviewing officials that manage migration show that addressing illegal immigration needs interventions beyond conventional arrangements currently in place. This is because the South African circumstance is largely unique and probably only comparable to the United States of America. While the effects of illegal immigration are within South Africa, the causes of the problem are largely outside its borders. We, therefore, recommend that to govern and manage illegal immigration, the South African Government needs a ‘four-legged’ stool [1] to commit to serious and effective enforcement so that the Government can [2] firmly but fairly deal with illegal immigrants who are already in South Africa and [3] manage family networks of illegal (and legal) immigrants residing in South Africa. Lastly and more importantly [4], to deter potential illegal immigrants from coming to South Africa through encouraging, rewarding, and protecting South African private entrepreneurs that provide employment and training to unemployed low-skilled individuals residing in countries that have the most illegal immigrants. The third stool implies controlling, if not cutting, migration networks within and outside South Africa. While the last stool implies using the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) format, to encourage, reward, and protect South African private entrepreneurs that create employment outside the border.

Keywords:Immigrants, governing, South Africa, foreign nationals

1. Introduction

One can divide foreign nationals entering South Africa into legal immigrants and illegal immigrants. The former have official permission to enter and stay in South Africa for a prescribed duration. The latter group comprise immigrants without legitimate or valid official

permission to be in South Africa. Further, Lebhart (2002), Crush and Williams (2005), as well as Campbell (2007) break down illegal immigrants into two groups—that is, those that enter South Africa legally but stay on after their permits have expired and hence remain in the country illegally as well as those that enter South Africa illegally and remain in the country illegally. This paper focuses on individuals that are staying in South Africa illegally regardless of how they entered the country. This definition excludes immigrants accorded asylum or refugee status by the Government. We hardly refer to the group that is in South Africa legally unless we are clarifying a point on our subject of focus. In the next section, we review existing provisions for managing illegal immigration and then discuss the interviews with officials managing immigration to authentic arguments arising from our review in the next section.

2. Provisions for managing immigration

More generally, the South African Constitution has mandated the Department of Home Affairs with the responsibility of managing and processing entry of foreign nationals into South Africa. Specifically, among other duties, the South African Immigration Act 443 of 2002 provides for the Department of Home Affairs to allow foreign nationals with valid documentation to enter and stay in South Africa for a stated duration. Second, this Act provides for measures to detect, deter, and punish illegal immigrants. Third, it also provides for immigrants without documents or those whose documents have expired to leave South Africa voluntarily. Lastly, if they do not leave South Africa voluntarily, Act 443 provides for the South African Department of Home Affairs or the Police Service officials to arrest and detain them at a facility called Lindela Repatriation Centre before deporting them to their respective countries. Since the Immigration Act 443 of 2002 provides for a budget to manage illegal immigration, we examined the provisional estimates to get a picture of the Government's policy intentions and then the actual expenditure to know its actual doings. Table 1 presents annual estimates for the Department of Home Affairs from 2009 to 2012 (Department of National Treasury, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012).

Table 1: Estimates of public expenditure: Department of Home Affairs, 2009 - 2015

Medium Term Expenditure Framework Estimates	2009/10	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15
<i>Estimates of National Expenditure 2009 (figures in 1000)</i>						
Administration	1 087 087	1 202 961	1 454 039	-	-	-
Services to Citizens	1 336 936	1 403 304	1 398 491	-	-	-
Immigration Services	1 327 415	1 557 745	1 260 673	-	-	-
Transfers to Agencies	1 299 149	1 416 813	893 776	-	-	-
Total expenditure estimates	5 050 587	5 580 823	5 006 979	-	-	-
<i>Estimates of National Expenditure 2010 (figures in 1000)</i>						
Administration	-	1 470 926	1 468 761	1 483 267	-	-
Services to Citizens	-	1 446 011	1 386 155	1 429 316	-	-
Immigration Services	-	1 219 694	1 238 469	1 275 848	-	-
Transfers to Agencies	-	1 528 953	910 135	956 415	-	-
Total expenditure estimates	-	5 665 584	5 003 520	5 144 846	-	-
<i>Estimates of National Expenditure 2011 (figures in 1000)</i>						
Administration	-	-	1 782 879	1 569 262	1 323 866	-
Services to Citizens	-	-	3 093 652	3 135 123	3 966 782	-
Immigration Services	-	-	587 603	545 281	573 609	-
Transfers to Agencies	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total expenditure estimates	-	-	5 464 134	5 249 666	5 864 257	-
<i>Estimates of National Expenditure 2012 (figures in 1000)</i>						
Administration	-	-	-	1 674 107	1 766 765	1 933 619
Services to Citizens	-	-	-	3 067 809	3 894 581	3 975 124
Immigration Services	-	-	-	554 057	596 481	627 875
Transfers to Agencies	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total expenditure estimates	-	-	-	5 295 973	6 257 827	6 536 618

Source: Department of National Treasury (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012)

Notes: **Administration:** Provide for the overall management of the department and centralised support services.

Services to Citizens: Carry out the department's core functions: grant rights and citizenship to eligible persons.

Immigration Services: Control immigration in line with South Africa's skills and investment needs. Manage refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa.

Transfers to Agencies: Provide financial support to the Film and Publication Board, the Government Printing Works and the Electoral Commission.

Despite an undertaking to manage illegal immigration, the provisional estimates tell a different story. At some point, estimates for the Immigration Services Programme amounted to 25 per cent of the Department's total budget. Even then, unlike other budget lines, the Department spent less than they provided for. For example, the 2009 estimates provided for 1.5 Billion but the 2010 Report shows that the Department only spent 1.2 Billion. Further, when Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was Minister, the Department of Home Affairs cut the allocation to the Immigration Services Programme by more than half. The Reports attribute this cut to the Department's saving initiative on travel and subsistence allowances (Department of National Treasury, 2011). Their earlier report however, attribute this significant cut in the 2011/12 budget to the conclusion of the Advanced Passenger Information and Profiling system that would later only need maintenance (Department of National Treasury, 2009).

Table 2: Estimates of public expenditure: Department of Home Affairs, Immigration Services; 2009-2015

Medium Term Expenditure Framework Estimates	2008/09	2009/10	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15
<i>National Expenditure 2009 (figures in 1000)</i>							
Immigration Affairs Management	99 391	62 076	85 943	84 963	-	-	-
Admission Services	183 986	335 382	481 275	80 214	-	-	-
Immigration Services	218 220	222 716	232 322	247 580	-	-	-
Provincial Immigration Services	418 549	458 714	508 295	581 722	-	-	-
Asylum Seekers	69 789	99 062	88 305	94 389	-	-	-
Foreign Missions	123 642	149 465	161 605	171 805	-	-	-
Total expenditure	1 113 577	1 327 415	1 557 745	1 260 673	-	-	-
<i>National Expenditure 2010 (figures in 1000)*</i>							
Immigration Affairs Management	-	62 800	84 600	84 300	85 600	-	-
Admission Services	-	233 100	144 200	33 000	34 100	-	-
Immigration Services	-	223 300	210 300	224 000	221 400	-	-
Provincial Immigration Services	-	471 300	513 500	588 100	613 700	-	-
Asylum Seekers	-	111 400	101 300	133 100	137 000	-	-
Foreign Missions	-	153 800	165 700	176 000	184 100	-	-
Total expenditure	-	1 255 700	1 219 600	1 238 500	1 275 900	-	-
<i>National Expenditure 2011 (figures in 1000)</i>							
Immigration Affairs Management	-	-	46 048	21 442	21 800	23 260	-
Admission Services	-	-	300 981	173 438	128 607	135 491	-
Immigration Services	-	-	310 462	323 767	325 559	341 787	-
Provincial Immigration Services	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Asylum Seekers	-	-	44 749	68 956	69 315	73 071	-
Foreign Missions	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total expenditure	-	-	702 240	587 603	545 281	573 609	-
<i>National Expenditure 2012 (figures in 1000)</i>							
Immigration Affairs Management	-	-	-	60 883	31 627	34 740	36 500
Admission Services	-	-	-	170 117	175 499	185 002	192 268
Immigration Services	-	-	-	288 687	288 338	312 600	331 189
Provincial Immigration Services	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Asylum Seekers	-	-	-	59 084	58 889	64 139	67 918
Foreign Missions	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total expenditure	-	-	-	578 771	554 353	596 481	627 875

Source: Department of National Treasury (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012)

Notes: **Immigration Affairs Management** provides overall management policy direction, sets standards, and manages back office processes.

Admission Services controls admission of travellers at ports of entry and processes permanent and temporary residence permits.

Immigration Services deals with immigration issues including detecting, detaining, and deporting illegal immigrants.

Provincial Immigration Services delivers immigration

Asylum Seekers considers and processes refugee asylum cases in line with the Refugees Act (1998) Sections 22 and 24.

Foreign Missions deliver and communicate South African immigration policies and procedures in foreign countries.

*2008-09 and 2009-10 figures are rounded off because this report provided its estimates in 1000000 and not 1000.

Table 2 above reveals that cost cuts in the Immigration Services Programme came from recentralisation of the Immigration sub-Programme. Initially, the National Treasury (2009, 2010) had anticipated an increase in expenditure because the Department of Home Affairs had sought to extend provincial immigration services to districts and prepare for the 2010 International Federation of Association Football (FIFA) World Cup. However, the Department dropped the decentralisation idea (and the provincial budget line) in the 2011/2012 fiscal

year—a signal that they had re-centralised immigration services. National Treasury Reports as well as the Department of Home Affairs' (2011) Strategic Plan [2011/12 to 2013/14] and the Parliamentary Review of the Department in 2008 do not provide a justification for re-centralising immigration services. At that time, the Department was also intending to extend the special dispensation of documenting illegal Zimbabwean immigrants—rather than deporting them—to other nationals in the region (Department of National Treasury, 2011, 2012). The 2011 National Treasury Report also vaguely introduces the “ ... integrat[ed] immigration systems, in particular the national immigration information system case management, and the movement control system with key citizen affairs systems (home affairs national identification system and case management). ... developing and implementing a risk based immigration management approach to minimise risks and maximise benefits to the country ...” (Department of National Treasury, 2011: 13).

Table 3: Audited public expenditure: Department of Home Affairs, Immigration services; 2005-2012

Audited Expenditure	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08	2008/09	2009/10	2010/11	2011/12
<i>National Expenditure 2009 (figures in 1000)</i>							
Immigration Affairs Management	19 586	41 100	38 874	99 391	-	-	-
Admission Services	10 037	27 605	20 585	183 986	-	-	-
Immigration Services	165 863	168 649	196 753	218 220	-	-	-
Provincial Immigration Services	228 956	255 167	329 152	418 549	-	-	-
Asylum Seekers	27 867	46 999	47 372	69 789	-	-	-
Foreign Missions	12 255	32 202	132 152	123 642	-	-	-
Total expenditure	464 564	571 722	764 888	1 113 577	-	-	-
<i>National Expenditure 2010 (figures in 1000)*</i>							
Immigration Affairs Management	-	41 100	38 874	72 600	62 800	-	-
Admission Services	-	27 605	20 585	23 000	233 100	-	-
Immigration Services	-	168 649	196 753	216 800	223 300	-	-
Provincial Immigration Services	-	255 167	329 152	424 500	471 300	-	-
Asylum Seekers	-	46 999	89 300	134 200	111 400	-	-
Foreign Missions	-	32 202	132 152	81 200	153 800	-	-
Total expenditure	-	571 722	806 816	952 300	1 255 700	-	-
<i>National Expenditure 2011 (figures in 1000)</i>							
Immigration Affairs Management	-	-	38 874	72 550	59 870	46 048	-
Admission Services	-	-	51 231	83 884	183 325	300 981	-
Immigration Services	-	-	328 905	298 027	218 494	310 462	-
Provincial Immigration Services	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Asylum Seekers	-	-	79 111	84 555	52 410	44 749	-
Foreign Missions	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total expenditure	-	-	498 121	539 016	514 099	702 240	-
<i>National Expenditure 2012 (figures in 1000)</i>							
Immigration Affairs Management	-	-	-	72 550	59 870	54 678	60 883
Admission Services	-	-	-	83 884	183 325	292 720	170 117
Immigration Services	-	-	-	298 027	218 494	562 778	288 687
Provincial Immigration Services	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Asylum Seekers	-	-	-	84 555	52 410	50 106	59 084
Foreign Missions	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total expenditure	-	-	-	539 016	514 099	960 282	578 771

Source: Department of National Treasury (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012)

Notes: **Immigration Affairs Management** provides overall management policy direction, sets standards, and manages back office processes.

Admission Services controls admission of travellers at ports of entry and processes permanent and temporary residence permits.

Immigration Services deals with immigration issues including detecting, detaining, and deporting illegal immigrants.

Provincial Immigration Services delivers immigration services described above in the provinces among other support functions.

Asylum Seekers considers and processes refugee asylum cases in line with the Refugees Act (1998) Sections 22 and 24.

Foreign Missions deliver and communicate South African immigration policies and procedures in foreign countries.

*2008-09 and 2009-10 figures are rounded off because this report provided its estimates in 1000000 and not 1000.

Table 3 presents the audited spending on immigration services—this includes but not limited to detecting, capturing, detaining, and deporting illegal immigrants—from 2005 to 2012. Spending on national and provincial immigration services rose from 400 Million in the 2005-to-2006 fiscal year to 700 Million in the 2009-to-2010 fiscal year and then dropped to 300 Million in the 2011-to-2012 fiscal year. The Expenditure Reports attribute the increase to higher costs of detaining and deporting illegal immigrants, catering for the 2010 International Federation of Association Football (FIFA) World Cup tournament, as well as developing and implementing a passenger profiling system (Department of National Treasury, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012). Without details, the 2010 Report mentions a proposed “ ... new law enforcement strategy ... for implementing a uniform and standardised policy on dealing with

illegal immigrants” (Department of National Treasury, 2010: 58). This is equally vague in their 2011/12 – 2013/14 Strategic Plan in which the Department reports to have “... started work on a risk based approach to immigration in order to maximise benefits for the country and minimise risks” (Department of Home Affairs, 2011: 13). Later, the Department proposes developing “... a new policy document to deal with economic migrants” (Department of Home Affairs, 2011: 23). We also note that these Expenditure Reports—especially 2011 and 2012 Reports—focus more on improving ways of processing legal immigrants rather than managing illegal immigration. This might explain why the Department of Home Affairs has over 500 staff members dealing with admission services and yet the problematic illegal immigration function has about 150 personnel (Department of National Treasury, 2012).

The reports reveal an obvious struggle between what the Department should be doing to manage illegal immigration and the Government’s policy direction on this issue. The reports hardly highlight the urgent need to deal with illegal immigration but rather emphasise the need to process legal immigrants especially ways of simplifying importation of scarce and critical skills into South Africa. To confirm this assertion, we should investigate these issues with officials managing immigration into South Africa.

3. Research strategy, design, procedure, and methods

Given the nature of the enquiry, we opted for a qualitative research strategy using a cross-sectional design described in Bryman (2012). We used semi-structured qualitative interviews to gather information from these officials. A major limitation is the few interviews conducted due to resource, accessibility, and time constraints. However, we supplemented these interviews with detailed content analysis of documents and reports on the Department of Home Affairs. Besides, after reviewing other past studies that have used a similar approach but with more resources—for example, Solomon (2003)—we observe that they also generated similar findings.

We purposively targeted officials in three key institutions—the Department of Home Affairs, the South African Police Service, and the South African Human Rights Commission. As discussed in the preceding section, the Department of Home Affairs is a key player in managing illegal immigration. Further, the Constitution (1996: 112) has provided for the South African Police Service to “prevent, combat and investigate crime, to preserve public order, to protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property, and to uphold and enforce the law”. The same Constitution provides for a Human Rights Commission to promote human and cultural rights of all South Africans as well as foreign nationals that are resident in South Africa temporarily or permanently whether legally or illegally. As Polzer (2010) points out, Chapter 2 (the Bill of Rights) of the Constitution grants South African

citizens as well as documented and undocumented noncitizens the right to life, dignity, equality before the law, administrative justice, basic education, basic health care, and labour rights.

In total, we interviewed six respondents. Three were officials involved in managing illegal immigration into South Africa—that is, one senior and one middle management Department of Home Affairs officials as well as one high-ranking South African Police officer. The Department of Home Affairs senior official in his mid-forties had served the Department for 15 years while the other officer in his late thirties had served for eight years. Similarly, the colonel in his early fifties had served the South African Police Service for 22 years. To get a balanced view of how the enforcement institutions process illegal immigration cases, we interviewed an experienced fifty year old Commissioner with the South African Human Rights Commission. In addition to these four officials, we also interviewed two detained illegal immigrants awaiting deportation to get their views so that we compare and contrast them with those of the officials. The first was a 34 years old male who had been in detention for 8 months and a 32 years old female who had been in detention for three weeks. The latter had been detained twice before—for four and two months, respectively. She disclosed that on her two previous detentions, she had returned to South Africa within 48 hours after being deported.

During our visit to Lindela Repatriation Centre, we also got a general description of an average illegal immigrant in South Africa. Most illegal immigrants are physically fit young males of working age (20-40). As the South African Police Service official remarked, “illegal immigration is risky business and only physically fit males take on such a risk”. However, the detained female illegal immigrant observes that the proportion of “female illegal immigrants [is on the increase] because we also have to strive to survive”. Because of proximity, most illegal immigrants come from neighbouring countries other than Namibia and Botswana. However, neither the officials nor the detained immigrants could pinpoint the nationality of most illegal immigrants in South Africa. Further, the two detained illegal immigrants observe that, “once in South Africa, we [immigrants from a particular country] live in proximity with each other. We are also in touch with our families back home and support them with monies we earn here.” This is in line with earlier reports that these individuals migrate due to economic circumstances (Crush & Williams, 2005; Solomon, 2003; Tati, 2008). Lastly, they state that when their “earnings here [in South Africa] are inadequate to maintain our ‘home’ [their households outside South Africa], [they] invite [their] partners and children to [their] ‘new found home’ and find them jobs as well”—a pull we attribute to migrant networks as propounded by the migration networks framework.

The interviewing schedule (Appendix 2) comprised twelve open-ended questions but we only asked the six questions to the illegal immigrants. We informed the respondents that they were not obliged to take part in the interviews and those that do should not necessarily answer all questions. We encouraged them to respond freely by assuring them that we will never reveal their identities. Fortunately, all the respondents took part in the study although some did not answer all the questions. After transcribing the interviews, we independently analysed and interrogated the transcripts for face and content validity—as suggested by Struwig and Stead (2001). Thereafter, we compared notes to identify similarly findings. We arrived at three common themes: policy provisions for dealing with illegal immigration; management provisions for dealing with illegal immigration; and implementation issues. Generally, almost all the respondents provided similar answers on these issues. Surprisingly, officials as well as detained illegal immigrants agreed that corruption affects management of immigration into South Africa. The only divergent view between officials and detainees is on why deported illegal immigrants resurface in South Africa with the latter weighing more on corrupt officials.

4. Findings and analysis

4.1 Policy provisions for dealing with illegal immigration

All the three officials we interviewed doubt the effectiveness of current policy provisions for dealing with illegal immigration. For example, the senior Department of Home Affairs official observes that, “the Immigration Act [443 of 2002] is vocal on how illegal immigration into South Africa should be dealt with; however, implementing the policy is a major challenge in many respects”. They point out a lack of oversight and, therefore, allowing corrupt officials to carry out tasks as they please.

Obviously, the officials agree that the government should find a way of managing illegal immigration more effectively because the problem is frustrating South Africans. However, the Department of Home Affairs officials doubt if creating more laws and policies would address illegal immigration more effectively. Instead, the government should ensure that the current provisions are properly implemented and monitored.

Lastly, the Human Rights Commissioner observes that effective management of illegal immigration does not mean compromising the basic rights of illegal immigrants. The South African Government should house and protect illegal immigrants from attacks and harassment while they await deportation. Apart from dealing with illegal immigration effectively, the Government should also attend to complaints of illegal immigrants and ensure that the police and immigration officers do not harass them.

4.2 Management provisions for dealing with illegal immigration

As an indication that they truly know what they should be doing, all the four official respondents explained the mandates of their respective organisations. The South African Human Rights Commission oversees human rights violations and reports such violations to the appropriate authorities. The South African Police Service enforces the law by arresting individuals who break the law including but not limited to illegal immigrants. Among other duties, the Department of Home Affairs controls immigration into and emigration out of South Africa. According to the senior official, “the Department of Home Affairs issues, authenticates, and if need be withdraws documents that grant foreign nationals permission to enter and remain in South Africa”. The two Department of Home Affairs officials describe the procedure of dealing with suspects follows: “once detained, they allow suspects without identification to call someone who can bring their documents, if any. If the documents are authentic and valid, they release the individual. However, if the individual has indeed violated immigration laws, they detain him or her at Lindela Repatriation Centre before deporting him [or her]”. In agreement, the two Department of Home Affairs officials stress that, “it is their duty to allow only foreigners with valid permission to enter and remain in South Africa”.

The Department of Home Affairs and the South African Police respondents confirmed that the Government grants “financial and other resources to combat illegal immigration”. However, when asked for details, the officials with eight to fifteen years with the Department of Home Affairs had no idea how much the Government provides. The senior official’s response was, “my unit has a mandate to oversee and deal with illegal immigration into South Africa as well as outbreaks of xenophobic violence, where most legal and illegal immigrants fall victim, but I have no idea of the figures involved”. The junior of the two said, “housing, feeding, and then deporting or repatriating illegal immigrants requires considerable resources but I have no knowledge of the amount involved”. This revelation might imply that those tasked with implementing are hardly involved in planning and budgeting for tasks they implement.

The functions of the Department of Home Affairs and the South African Police Service seem clear and provided for financially but not every official upholds constitutional rules and duties. The senior of the two Department of Home Affairs respondents thinks that “... not every official knows their roles nor are they carrying them out according to procedure”. Why then do officials fail to “fulfil their basic duties” (Kabwe-Segatti & Landau, 2008: 38). The most prominent answer to this question is corruption. For example, while all official respondents agree that not all immigrants desire to settle illegally—the Human Rights Commissioner observes that—“the Department of Home Affairs officials frustrates some, if

not most, individuals who have attempted to earn legal immigrant status legitimately and this is why they turn to living in South Africa illegally”. Even though some illegal immigrants qualify for legal status, most of them are not aware. As a result, some officials at the Department of Home Affairs use this loophole to make it difficult for those applying for resident permits legitimately so that such officials get bribes (Vigneswaran, 2008). One of the officials we interviewed remarks that, it “... is sad that those [immigrants] who are able to influence some officials financially easily receive legal documentation”. It is this behaviour or failure to fulfil basic duties by some officials that undermines the credibility of South African institutions managing illegal immigration.

4.3 Implementation issues

At a macro level, all the respondents suggest that intra- and inter-institutional cooperation and collaboration needs strengthening to manage illegal immigration effectively. For example, one respondent’s remark—that “the South African Human Rights Commission is an oversight body that monitors human rights violations but how successful this is remains a mystery”—shows a lack of faith between departments and institutions. Whilst it is the responsibility of the Department of Home Affairs to deal with immigration issues, the Department can only be effective if other departments and institutions help.

Other than management, the Department of Home Affairs and the Police Service officials face implementation challenges that are mostly beyond their control, means, and current technology. First, despite concerted efforts to control movements into and out of the country, the official respondents feel that South African border points and ports are porous—that is, “they lack reasonable deterrents to prevent illegal immigrants from crossing the borders illegally”. This makes management and monitoring illegal immigration less effective or increases the cost of doing so astronomically. Second and related to the first, the Department of Home Affairs does not have an accurate estimate of illegal immigrants in South Africa to work with because the available ones are grossly speculative. The Department’s senior official feels that “it is impossible to deal with illegal immigration [effectively] if they have no idea how big the problem is”.

Third, because of multilingualism in Southern Africa, the enforcement officials have challenges distinguishing between South Africans and non-South Africans. One of the detained illegal immigrant recounts that “there are instances when immigration officials detain us with [indigenous] South Africans especially those from Limpopo”. Vigneswaran (2008: 157) observed that one “... can become a target of immigration policing, and end up in Lindela, simply for speaking with a different accent, living in the wrong neighbourhood, associating with immigrants or, more disturbingly, having the wrong skin colour”. This

extends to xenophobic attacks as well—the mobs have sometimes struck South Africans belonging to minority groups that speak distinctive languages (Klotz, 2012).

Fourth, it is difficult to distinguish between legal migrants and illegal migrants. According to one official, there is no law that individuals should have identification documents with them all the time. Besides, for security reasons, authorities advise individuals not to carry vital documents around so that they do not lose them in, say, a mugging. Regardless, officials usually assume that anyone without identification is in the country illegally. More so, the Human Rights Commissioner's worry is that "... most South Africans see every foreign national as an illegal immigrant". He has proposed that Government should sensitise South Africans that, 'not all immigrants are in the country without official permission'.

Further, there are instances when enforcement officials are not sure if documentation that individuals present to them is genuine—"this is why sometimes we [Immigration and Police officers] do not take identification documents at face value". To this, the South African Police Service officer insinuated that some Department of Home Affairs officials issue fraudulent documents that foreigners use to enter and stay in South Africa illegally. The Department of Home Affairs has also raised this concern officially stating that foreigners "... often acquire civic documentation and even citizenship through syndicates working with corrupt officials of Home Affairs" (Department of Home Affairs, 2011, p. 12). In agreement, the two immigration officials note that "apart from Home Affairs officials there are individuals—especially those involved in human trafficking syndicates—that produce and issue fake documents that foreigners use to enter [and stay in] South Africa illegally".

Lastly, most repatriated illegal immigrants return soon after deportation. One official remarks that, "it is not a win-win situation because most illegal immigrants are apprehended and deported more than once". Sarabia (2012) calls this trend the revolving door—that is, authorities deport apprehended immigrants to their respective countries but they cross back immediately, sometimes within a day of deportation. The respondents argue that proximity of countries where they come from plays in the immigrant's favour. Further, it is easy for them to re-enter South Africa because of its porous border and port points. However, the detained illegal immigrants point to corrupt officials with one of them stating that "they [illegal immigrants] sometimes bribe officials to release them during deportation ...". This is an indication that enforcement, costly as it maybe, is not a suitable approach to managing illegal immigration.

5. Findings and discussions

Ineffective governance and management of illegal immigrants can compromise the defence and security of a country or at least affect the general wellbeing and safety of its residents. During the early discussions of the immigration reforms, “Desmond Lockey, Parliamentary Portfolio Committee chair ... publicly agreed that ‘foreign nationals put enormous strain on ... social services at the expense of [South African] citizens’ and [therefore] legislative review must ensure that more effective measures are introduced to curtail this influx ...” (Klotz, 2012:199-200). Further, failure to intervene implies that planners plan for a considerable proportion of unknown beneficiaries. Therefore, to propose effective ways of managing illegal immigration into South Africa, this paper set out to establish actuality of illegal immigration. First, our review shows that there is room for improving existing provisions for governing and managing illegal immigration.

Second, officials we interviewed confirm our assertions on problems associated with governing and managing illegal immigration into South Africa. They suggest that achievements recorded in the Annual Reports paint a brighter picture than what might be on the ground. Lastly, levels and trends of demographic parameters (illegal immigration) are a manifestation of leadership and governance. Poor leadership and governance affects development resulting in high mortality, fertility, and emigration. Therefore, one can use demographic parameters to gauge the level of development as well as the effectiveness of leadership and governance. Intuitively, we argue that high levels of emigration into South Africa are signs of low levels of development as well as ineffective leadership and governance in the region. This implies that only effective leadership and governance might improve the development trajectories which will lead to lower levels of mortality, fertility, and emigration. Ultimately, the solution to illegal immigration into South Africa is effective leadership and governance that promotes development in the region.

More specifically, we should first point out the distinction between legal and illegal immigrants. The former are mostly white-collar individuals pulled to South Africa to advance their education and career. However, the latter are mostly individuals in non-white-collar occupations pushed out of their respective countries to find means of subsistence in South Africa’s construction, service, and commercial farming industries (Crush & Williams, 2005) as well as small informal enterprises. Inferring from Zolberg (2006: 239), immigration, both legal and illegal, is likely to continue because the “ ... gap in economic conditions ... [between South Africa and its neighbours] ... is unlikely to be narrowed in the foreseeable future, [therefore] rational human beings will continue ... [coming to South Africa] ... to seek to improve their condition ... even at a high cost”. The pressure to come and remain in

South Africa illegally is so great that they hardly mind the consequences. It is likely the South African Police Service official made the ‘starvation remark’ during interviews having witnessed the despair illegal immigrants present when they are arrested. From this comment, we can deduce that enforcement officials probably release some of these individuals out of sympathy without money or favours exchanging hands. In sum, the Government should recognise that the effects of illegal immigration are within the borders of South Africa but the root causes of the problem are outside its boundaries. This implies that increasing enforcement will remain less effective despite its cost and will also continue making South Africa look like it is violating human rights of foreign nationals. Sarabia (2012) has argued that enforcement actually produces more illegal immigrants and closes doors for them to legalise their status.

6. Conclusions and recommendations

To manage illegal immigration, South Africa needs a ‘four-legged’ stool—that is, one-leg more than the ‘three-legged stool’ that Janet Napolitano has proposed —[1] to commit to serious and effective enforcement so that the Government can [2] firmly but fairly deal with illegal immigrants who are already in South Africa and [3] manage family networks of illegal (and legal) immigrants residing in South Africa. Lastly and more importantly [4], to deter potential illegal immigrants from coming to South Africa through encouraging, rewarding, and protecting South African private entrepreneurs that provide employment and training to unemployed low-skilled individuals residing in countries that have the most illegal immigrants—we discuss the first and last ‘stools’ in the proceeding paragraphs.

Official respondents agree that current provisions for addressing illegal immigration are adequate and they doubt if creating more policies and laws would effectively address the problem. The respondents point out that the Department of Home Affairs’ problem is implementing, managing, and monitoring the current provisions for countering illegal immigration. Therefore, the Government should attend to corruption and inefficiency due to lack of monitoring as well as a lack of intra- and inter-institutional or departmental collaboration. However, we doubt if functions outlined in the 2011/12 to 2013/14 Strategic Plan can deal with corruption within the Department. We should not forget that, like most other African countries, South Africa has inherited a governance system that was strategically designed to serve the objectives of the colonial government and later on the apartheid regime. It is unlikely that such objectives will always tally with those of the incumbent Government. Such a status quo takes away the sense of ownership and culminates in less productivity and corruption. As a result, most civil servants do not want to work hard like their counterparts in the previous governments but would like to have what

they had or have. Unless the Government makes some tough decisions, it will take long before the country has governance and accountability structures that serve the majority South Africans. Correcting this attitude will need the Government to promote ownership and enlarge the decision space probably through effective decentralisation—this implies delegating with responsibility. Further, Government institutions need senior officials that are accountable to the public and their representatives. Therefore, chief executive officers should be induced with technical incentives rather than political incentives. Henry (1994) has argued that most senior officials fail to differentiate between political and administrative responsibilities. Therefore, Director Generals may choose to serve politicians that appoint them rather than the public who are the actual clients. Consequently, this alienates middle management and, therefore, paralysing public institutions.

With reoriented governance and accountability structures in place, it will be easy to attend to other issues raised in this article. First, the Department should implement its commitment to “... equipping ports of entry with Enhanced Monitoring Control System ...” (Department of Home Affairs, 2011: 17). However, over and above this technological barrier, it should also seal the porous border points and ports with physical and human barriers. This includes re-fencing the almost 4000 Kilometre land borderline and deploy the South African National Defence Forces to patrol the borderline—save for understandable cases such as those described in Steinberg (2005). These are probably some of the functions that the proposed Border Management Agency should take up. The Agency can also use the discussions and recommendations in Hennop, Jefferson, and McLean (2001) as its guidelines for their functions.

Second, since Output 7 of the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security (JCPS) Cluster aims to improve the integrity of identity and status of citizens and residents (Department of Government Communication and Information, 2012), the Cluster should then propose equipping immigration and police officials with information technology devices that they can use to identify individuals on the spot. This also means encouraging citizens and residents to carry legitimate and verifiable photocopies of their identification documents. Third, Output 6 of the JCPS Cluster—effective and integrated border management—provides for inter departmental collaboration (Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, 2010). Technically, this is the main objective underlying the formation of Inter-departmental Clusters and there is no doubt this is a step in the right direction. So far, reports of these Clusters show that they are making progress in their respective mandates but certainly there is still room for improvement. A caution is that Government should address governance and accountability for each Department before clustering them to improve on this collaboration—otherwise it will be clustering problems instead.

With regard to the fourth 'stool', whether the Government enacts a new policy or strengthens the current one, there are issues that compromise the current policy provisions that might also affect future policies as well. Largely, if the South African Government has to pass a new policy of averting illegal immigration, it has to boldly synchronise the solution to the problem—that is, what Solomon (2003) calls the 'interventionist approach'. However, addressing illegal immigration into South Africa needs innovative interventions beyond the current thinking because this supposedly South African problem has its root causes outside its border. This does not imply South Africa should develop countries in the region unless such a move benefits South Africans.

Invariably, to improve leadership and governance which might result in meaningful development in the region, the Government should take a hard stance on its neighbours even though these countries hosted the current ruling party during the struggle. True, the pressure of indebtedness has continued to date with prominent politicians of neighbouring countries still demanding acknowledgement if not compensation—for example, the Zambian Minister of Finance, Alexander Chikwanda, was offended that the main speakers at the 2012 Global African Diaspora Summit in South Africa did not acknowledge Zambia's contribution towards the freedom struggle in Southern Africa (Editor, 2012a). Kenneth Kaunda contributed to the struggle for personal satisfaction as a humanist (Mupeta, 2010) not in anticipation to be paid back. So the answer to the question that Klotz (1997: 38) raised three years after the African National Congress ascended to power, "does South Africa 'owe' anything to other countries in the region, which suffered from overt military aggression, destabilisation, economic coercion, and more subtle political costs for supporting the anti-apartheid movement" is 'no'. Therefore, without sounding insensitive, the neighbouring countries should not hold 50 million South Africans to ransom because, 'truth be told', a fraction of the African National Congress comrades lived in their countries during exile (Sutter, 2003). Equally, the African National Congress led Government should stop rewarding its neighbouring countries or treating them with 'kid-gloves' because they feel indebted. Like corrective policies, 'appreciative' policies will not help South Africans or its neighbours. Regardless, we are not calling for anti-immigrant electioneering revealed in Landau's (2008: 201) interview with a senior Johannesburg planner who suggested this might happen as soon as "... the pain of past racism and discrimination fades ...".

Instead, we are thinking of innovative interventions good for ALL Africans north and south of the Limpopo River (Solomon, 2003). As Ellis (2008b) points out, hosting the unprovided for illegal immigrants takes jobs away from South Africans and puts pressure on the country's social services. Illegal immigrants are in South Africa because their respective governments have misplaced governance and leadership priorities despite claiming to be

democratic. Articles in Melber's (2003) edited volume, that captures governance and leadership issues in the region, show that leaders of these countries are getting richer and their countries poorer. Similarly, de Haas (2011) has argued that emigration is most likely for countries that are not democratic, not decentralised, and do not uphold fundamental human rights. Unfortunately, it is South Africa that has to host citizens of its neighbours when their leaders misplace governance priorities. For example, " ... the catastrophic collapse of the Zimbabwean economy ... greatly increased numbers of refugees entering [South Africa] ... " (Ellis, 2008a: 51).

An example of such an intervention would be for the Government to develop some form of " ... a regional industrial strategy" described in Ellis (2008a: 51) by borrowing from say the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) initiative. Through the Department of Public Works, the South African Government uses this initiative to reward government institutions that provide employment and training to unemployed low-skilled South Africans (McCutcheon, 2001). In a similar fashion, we propose that the Government should encourage and reward South African private businesses employing and training unemployed low-skilled individuals residing in countries where illegal immigrants come from. Central to this intervention is that most South African business initiatives are crowding the increasingly saturated South African market and yet most of their products—for example, insurance—are largely absent in some countries in the region. Therefore, extending their businesses elsewhere will benefit the South African private sector. At the same time, this will generate employment for individuals who would have otherwise immigrated to South Africa at all costs. Similarly, as a way of reducing the migration network web, the South African Government should encourage corporates to station their skilled foreign nationals in their respective countries by opening and manage their interests there rather than here. Zolberg (2006) has argued that helpful trade and investment policies are among the best to induce a stay-at-home response.

Economically, these countries will benefit from private South African financial injections at least cost. Socially, this will induce a general well-being within the region and avert situations portrayed in the findings of this research—that is, "back home I spent days without seeing ... food and not knowing where next I can find means to survive". Politically, this implies the South African Government should take an interest in governance and leadership issues of these countries to protect by all means interests of South Africans outside its border.

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CONTEMPORARY LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES IN URBAN SOUTH AFRICA: CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS

K.K. Meso

University of Limpopo, South Africa

Abstract

As the industrial output and urban economy increases in South Africa, immigrants from other third world countries and surrounding rural areas begin to flock into the urban space in search of socio-economic opportunities. Accordingly, jobs and employment opportunities in the formal sector begin to decline given the fact that cities are inundated by a glut of immigrants who are assumed to be predominantly income less, vulnerable and uneducated inter alia. The survival of these indigent urbanites is contingent on the informal sector which is characterized by various informal trading activities including street vending, hawking, traditional healing, shoe repairing and general dealing. However, these contemporary livelihood strategies do not exist independent of the multiple challenges that impinge on their growth and sustainability. Such challenges comprise various stressors and shocks ranging from political, economic, societal and climatic stressors and shocks. Considering the incipient nature of the informal traders, various impediments associated with access to micro-business funding also negatively affect the survival of the informal businesses. However, a prospect that exists in the informal sector is freedom of entry into the market, which suggests that inasmuch as the market structure is perfectly competitive, it is commended for its ability of absorbing and sustaining the indigent urbanites. Nonetheless, the paper argues that contemporary urban livelihood strategies encounter multiple challenges, stressors and shocks that impinge on their abilities to contribute commendably towards sustainable urban livelihoods. Therefore, this paper uncovers contemporary urban livelihood strategies including their challenges, prospects and contributions. The paper concludes that notwithstanding the crucial contributions offered by informal trade, the urban informal economy and its multiple challenges are not overlooked as a possible hindrance to the success of contemporary livelihood strategies in South Africa.

Keywords: Informal Trading, Business Challenges, Stressors and Shocks, Livelihood Strategies, Urban South Africa.

1. Introduction

The practice of informal trading in most urban areas of developing countries is well-known for its idiosyncratic abilities of predominantly absorbing the unemployed and destitute urbanites (Boeckler & Bernt, 2012; Szakonyi & Urpelainen, 2015). Informal trading encompasses assorted unregistered economic activities initiated by entrepreneurs who typically trade petty goods and services within a space deemed to be public property (Ayyagari, Demirguc & Maksimovic, 2011; Beck, Lu & Yung, 2014). However, there is no firm universal consensus around informal trading and its contributions towards livelihoods in towns and cities. Additionally, the contributions of informal trading towards urban livelihoods engenders contestations given divergent informal sector prospects and impediments (Fairoz, Hirobumi, & Tanaka, 2010; Dolan & Rajak, 2011; Meyers, 2011; Fatoki, 2013; Szakonyi & Urpelainen, 2015). Accordingly, the paper argues that informal trading encounters numerous impediments such as economic, climatic, political, social and innumerable external stressors and shocks. These constraints impinge on the abilities of informal trading to contribute commendably towards urban livelihoods notwithstanding their capacity to absorb and seemingly sustain the indigent urbanites (Kandahar & Minna, 2008; Fairoz et al., 2010; Szakonyi & Urpelainen, 2015).

Nevertheless, informal trading in urban areas has gained popularity in the Small, Medium and Micro-Enterprises (SMMEs) discourse across the globe given its distinctive quality of absorbing majority of indigent urban dwellers (Raeymaekers, Menkhaus, & Vlassenroot, 2008; Turaeva, 2014). However, urban livelihoods such as informal trading continue to be confronted by challenges such as perfect competition which results in congestion of informal traders, homogenous goods and services, price taking, and limited government intervention inter alia. These aforesaid issues negatively affect the contributions of informal trading towards creating urban livelihoods (Rasanayagam, 2011; Turaeva, 2014). Further challenges include lack of start-up capital, business education, collateral, bookkeeping skills and marketing amongst others. Moreover, developing countries like Nigeria are no exception; they are renowned for their small-scale, labour-intensive and low technology manufacturing abilities in the informal economy (Raeymaekers et al., 2008; Akpan, Essien & Isihak, 2013). The experience in West Africa is also similar, informal trade absorbs majority of the unemployed and unskilled in the informal sector (Michael, Renate & Jann, 2013). Succinctly, the practice of informal trading amongst these countries engenders contestations around their ability to contribute towards urban livelihoods, predominantly because of the multiple challenges, stressors and shocks they encounter (Raeymaekers et al., 2008; Akpan et al., 2013; Beck et al., 2014).

Discourses around informal trading in emergent countries like South Africa are currently in motion where there is a ubiquity of income poverty, unsustainable livelihoods and unemployment (Dorward, Kydd, Morrison, & Poulton, 2005; Louw, Vermeulen, Kirsten &, Madevu, 2007; Szakonyi & Urpelainen, 2015). Informal trading in South Africa is noticeable through small-scale economic advancement practices where the indigent and unemployed are contingent in order to survive (Szakonyi & Urpelainen, 2015). In addition, the practice of informal trading is permeating in urban cities given the ease of entry into the informal sector inter alia. Understandably, given the inadequate absorptive capacity of the formal sector to employ a plethora of indigent urbanites in South African cities, informal trading exhibited through street vending, hawking and general dealing inter alia becomes a source of survival for the urban poor (Dorward et al., 2005; Louw et al., 2007; Akpan et al., 2013; Szakonyi & Urpelainen, 2015). Given this background, the paper seeks to uncover the various prospects and challenges faced by informal trading in South African cities in an attempt to understand the problems associated with the growth and longevity of these informal businesses.

2. Conceptualising the challenges facing informal trading

Informal trading endures a plethora of challenges that affects its growth and sustainability (Akpan et al., 2013; Beck et al., 2014). However, economic barriers and acquiring start-up capital through savings or loans are the most pressing challenges that cut across a variety of factors (Akpan et al., 2013; Lauermann, 2013; Szakonyi & Urpelainen, 2015). Capital contribution is a crucial part of any business both formal and informal because it provides an opportunity to acquire assets and coordinate factors of production that are a prerequisite for business success. Thus, a large amount of informal traders face the challenge of access to capital, savings and loans (Nguimkeu, 2014; Deressa, 2009; Akpan et al., 2013; Szakonyi & Urpelainen, 2015). In addition, ownership rights are a primary requirement to serve as collateral for bank loans and funding from a variety of formal institutions. Given the fact that most informal traders are unable gain access to formal credit from banks or an equivalent funding institution, the solution becomes informal loans sharks, moneylenders, family members and friends (Lauermann, 2013; Akpan et al., 2013; Szakonyi & Urpelainen, 2015). Accordingly, high interest rates are typically charged on such loans which the informal traders struggle to repay thereby increasing their debt. These challenges assist in the exacerbation of income poverty, deprivation and vulnerability amongst street traders in urban South Africa.

Additionally, perfect competition, congestion and jealousy amidst street vendors more often than not jeopardizes their capacity to work collectively and ultimately has

deleterious implications on the businesses ability to increase or maintain their income levels (Dorward et al., 2005; Louw et al., 2007; Szakonyi & Urpelainen, 2015; Turaeva, 2014). Given the ease of entry into the market, informal trading tends to become omnipresent in the urban central business district (CBD). Therefore, homogeneity of goods and services, limited product differentiation and competition from new informal traders will most likely lead to a drop in consumer demand resulting in varying and lower profits thereby positioning informal trading in a state of vulnerability and undefined growth prospects (Francis, Nassar, & Mehta, 2013). On one hand, suppliers possess a degree of power over informal traders by not providing discounts given the fact that informal traders purchase products in small quantities. On the other hand, higher purchase prices and limited product/service differentiation perpetuates competition, mainly for perishable goods sold at lesser prices in an attempt to avoid loss through spoilage (Francis et al., 2013; Hansen, Ju Kim, & Mehta, 2015; Szakonyi & Urpelainen, 2015). In a quest to eliminate competition amid informal traders and ensure repeated clientele, traders habitually provide goods on debt to their customers that rarely repay and sell their goods and services at prices below the going market price. Ultimately, traders incur losses and operate on a deficit thereby negatively contributing to the growth and longevity of informal traders (Francis et al., 2013; Turaeva, 2014; Dorward et al., 2005; Louw et al., 2007; Hansen et al., 2015; Szakonyi & Urpelainen, 2015). Further, literature indicates that there is a nexus between informal trading and the existence of multiple stressors and shocks.

3. The multiple stressors and shocks of urban livelihoods

According to Chambers and Conway, (1992) sustainable livelihoods are ones that can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance their capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base. Therefore, what determines the formation of urban livelihoods is the ability of their different kinds of livelihood strategies to adhere to the aforesaid definition of sustainable livelihoods. As a result, this section is organized into different subsections that engage the determinants and possible challenges of urban livelihoods. These are; climatic, economic, political and stressors and shocks.

3.1 Climatic Stressors and Shocks affecting Urban Livelihoods

Climate-related hazards are perceived by a multiplicity of Scholars as being responsible for the demolition and depletion of urban livelihoods which are spearheaded by destitute urbanites (Deressa, 2009 Lauermaann, 2013; Akpan et al., 2013). The ramifications of the aforesaid results are typically an abrupt loss of livelihoods assets, food insecurity, and wrecked homes followed by a loss of sense of place and belonging (Twomlow, Mugabe,

Mwale, Delve, Nanja, Carberry, & Howden, 2008). Additionally, fluctuating climate trends more often than not lead to shifts in urban livelihoods with variegated outcomes, such as from informal trading and micro-entrepreneurship inter alia to illegal Street vending crime and piracy (Twomlow et al., 2008). Accordingly, climate change is one amid a plethora of stressors that forms dynamic and differential livelihood trajectories given its ability to abruptly and negatively affect urban livelihoods (Deressa, 2009). The determinant of the formation of urban livelihoods is the ability to cope with and recover from climate change amongst other stressors. The indigent urbanites are fronted by multiple deprivations such as chronic poverty as a result of climate change manifested through floods, storms and perennial rainfalls which erode the physical assets of the urban poor primarily in the informal sector (Twomlow et al., 2009).

3.2 Economic Stressors and Shocks affecting Urban Livelihoods

There is a general consciousness that resilience in an economic subsystem requires the capacity of people to mitigate, adapt to and recover from stressors and shocks that affect the longevity of their livelihoods (Dorward et al., 2005; Louw et al., 2007; Szakonyi & Urpelainen, 2015). On a broader scale, typical economic shocks encompass international and domestic price fluctuations, engendered by commodity demand or domestic market prices (Raeymaekers et al., 2008; Turaeva, 2014). Continuingly, these stressors tests the ability of urban livelihoods particularly ones in the informal sector to withstand the repercussions of general price fluctuations thereby contributing deleteriously to the formation of urban livelihoods (Suffin et al., 2013). Nonetheless, urban livelihoods initiated by indigent urbanites more often than not operate in a perfectly competitive market structure which tests their longevity in creating livelihoods that are sustainable (Szakonyi & Urpelainen, 2015). In addition, perfect competition is characterized by free entry and exists into the market, mostly homogenous goods and services, paucity of government intervention and the inability of market participants to influence the market price. These circumstances characterize urban livelihoods and eventually position them in a vicious cycle of tentative and undefined growth prospects (Turaeva, 2014). Shortly, the successful achievement of urban livelihoods is contingent on the ability to deal with and recover from the aforesaid stressors, shocks and the disabling market circumstances. As a result of economic shocks, most individuals sell their productive assets to survive, meaning that they are prone to become less productive in subsequent periods and even more vulnerable to future economic shocks (Suffin et al., 2013).

3.3 Political Stressors and Shocks affecting Urban Livelihoods

Understandably, urban livelihoods do not exist independent from the political environment. As a result, multiple stressors and shocks ranging from civil unrest, protests and political instability encumber urban livelihoods (Dorward et al., 2005; Louw et al., 2007; Szakonyi & Urpelainen, 2015). Majority of urban livelihoods, particularly ones in the informal sector are vulnerable to political shocks given their purported inability to withstand riots, looting, destructive strikes and other similar occurrences (Szakonyi & Urpelainen, 2015). Informal traders generally have a limited capital and asset base. Majority of these entities are survivalist like street vendors, home-based entities and hawkers. Literature indicates that the occurrence of a strike, service delivery protest or civil unrest impinges on the production process of the informal trading activity (Szakonyi & Urpelainen, 2015). In the event of the aforementioned political disruptions, informal trading is likely to be stagnant suggesting that buying and selling becomes affected thereby negatively impacting on the financial returns and profit margins given the longevity of the civil unrests and/or political disruptions (Dorward et al., 2005; Louw et al., 2007). Urban livelihoods that are initiated by indigent urbanites are usually vulnerable to shocks and stressors given the fact that they possess limited/inadequate assets to surmount political interferences, shocks and stressors as compared to formal and developed business establishments.

4. Societal Stressors and Shocks affecting Urban Livelihoods

It is argued that the prevalence of a variety of societal illnesses, medical conditions and diseases such as the HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and cancer amongst others, have deleterious economic impacts that impinge on the longevity of urban livelihoods (Christiaensen & Todo, 2013; Nguimkeu, 2014). Continuingly, given the fact that the former diseases is responsible for majority of deaths amidst the vulnerable urbanites inter alia, it has left most dependents of the victims of HIV/AIDS vulnerable, food insecure and poverty stricken (Christiaensen & Todo, 2013; Nguimkeu, 2014). However, a shift towards curbing deaths that are primarily caused by HIV/AIDS requires behavioral changes and HIV/AIDS education amidst the destitute and uneducated urbanites (Sonobe, Akoten, & Otsuka, 2011; Nguimkeu, 2014). The determinants of urban livelihoods are the ability, capacity and willingness of urban dwellers, particularly the ones engaged in the informal urban sector to cope with and recover from the aforesaid societal stressors and shocks (Sonobe et al., 2011; Nguimkeu, 2014). Thus, development literature records that any policy making effort aimed at ameliorating poverty is inextricably linked to dealing with the aforesaid societal scourges.

5. Maintaining and Enhancing Capabilities and Assets

Maintaining and enhancing ones capabilities and assets is a crucial determinant of urban livelihoods (Christiaensen & Todo, 2013). However, the assets pentagon that is crafted by the Department for International Development 1992, suggests that there are five assets which are crucial to the formation of any type of livelihoods namely; human capital, financial capital, natural capital, physical capital and social capital. The former encompasses skills, ability, knowledge, labour and good health that together enable people to peruse different livelihood strategies in order that they may achieve varied livelihood objectives (Nguimkeu, 2014). However, different households are contingent on the amount and quality of labour available; this varies according to household size, skills level, leadership potential and health status (Rasanayagam, 2011; Turaeva, 2014).

On the other hand, defining and conceptualizing social capital engenders contestations amid multiple scholars (Rasanayagam, 2011; Turaeva, 2014; Beck et al., 2014). However, in the context of the sustainable livelihoods framework, it refers to the social resources through which individuals accumulate in a pursuit of their livelihood objectives (Rasanayagam, 2011; Turaeva, 2014). Continuingly, it is accepted that networks and connectedness, either between individuals with shared interests that increase peoples trust and capability to work collaboratively and augment their reach to wider institutions including but not limited to political or civic bodies (Rasanayagam, 2011; Turaeva, 2014). Additionally, membership of more formalized structures and institutions which often entail adherence to mutually-agreed or commonly accepted regulations and norms can be understood as a strategy through which social capital can be achieved (Beck et al., 2014). Social capital further encapsulates relationships of trust, reciprocity, kinship and exchanges that enable co-operation. Thus, the achievement of urban livelihoods is determined by the availability and viability of social capital.

According to Chambers & Conway (1992), natural capital as a determinant of urban livelihoods refers to the natural resource stocks from which resources flow and services useful for livelihoods are derived. There exists a large disparity in the resources that make-up natural capital, from intangible goods such as the atmosphere and biodiversity to divisible assets which are directly utilized for production purposes such as land and trees (Beck et al., 2014). Importantly, considering the sustainable livelihoods framework, the nexus between natural capital and the vulnerability of livelihoods is mostly close. Majority of the shocks that demolish the livelihoods of the destitute are natural processes that destroy natural capital, fires that destroy forests and vegetation, and floods that destroy various assets. Thus, the sustainability of urban livelihoods is determined by resilience of most livelihood strategies

and the capacity to cope with and recover from such impinging stressors and shocks (Beck et al., 2014).

Physical capital as a determinant of urban livelihoods consists of intrinsic infrastructure and producer goods needed to support and sustain livelihoods (Suffin et al., 2013; Boeckler & Bernt, 2012; Szakonyi & Urpelainen, 2015). Such Infrastructure encompasses changes to the physical or built environment that will assist people to meet their basic needs and enable them to be more productive particularly with regards to their divergent livelihoods strategies (Deressa, 2009). The following components of infrastructure are usually essential for sustainable livelihoods, these are; affordable transportation, secure shelter and buildings, adequate water supply and sanitation, affordable energy, and access to information (Chambers and Cornway, 1992). Succinctly, a lack of or inadequate access of any of these infrastructures will result in livelihoods being vulnerable and less competitive (Deressa, 2009; Nguimkeu, 2014).

Financial capital signifies the financial resources that people utilize in an attempt to achieve their livelihood objectives (Szakonyi & Urpelainen, 2015). Furthermore, there are two main sources of financial capital namely; available stocks and regular flows of money. The former suggests that savings are the preferred type of financial capital because they do not have liabilities attached and usually do not entail dependence on others (Deressa, 2009; Nguimkeu, 2014; Szakonyi & Urpelainen, 2015). These can be held in several forms namely; cash, bank, deposits or even liquid assets such as jewelry and livestock. Credit organizations are also some institutions which provide financial resources. In conclusion, regular inflows of money which usually exclude earned income refer to pensions, remittances and other transfers from the state. Thus, it is crucial that livelihoods possess the aforesaid different types of financial resources in order for them to withstand shocks and stressors (Suffin et al., 2013).

6. Prospects of urban livelihoods

Logically, informal trading in the urban informal economy is presented with prospects and an opportunity space for growth and development notwithstanding the enumerable stressors, shocks and impediments that encumbers its progress (Ayyagari et al., 2011; Michael et al., 2013; Suffin et al., 2013). The informal urban business sector is largely perfectly competitive; it becomes ideal for various informal businesses to flourish provided the suppliers exploits and seizes all of the opportunities as they present themselves (Ayyagari et al., 2011; Michael et al., 2013; Suffin et al., 2013; Deressa, 2009; Nguimkeu, 2014; Szakonyi & Urpelainen, 2015). Moreover, it is crucial to note the contemporary urban livelihood strategies are fronted with the perfectly competitive market structure. Inasmuch as

conventional economists argue that perfect competition hinders the longevity of informal trading, it still gives birth to open space for competitiveness (Sonobe et al., 2011; Christiaensen & Todo, 2013; Nguimkeu, 2014). That is, free entry and exit of market participants in the informal sector allows any individual with an idea to penetrate the market and introduce a product or service for in the urban sector. Fathomably, one can argue that the absence of barriers to entry and exit perpetuates the ever mushrooming informal traders in the urban economy. It is better to have ubiquitous informal traders that compete amongst themselves than to experience poverty amid idle urbanites who can penetrate the informal sector in urban areas (Louw et al., 2007; Sonobe et al., 2011; Christiaensen & Todo, 2013; Nguimkeu, 2014). Additionally, participants of the informal sector are not registered to pay tax which one might regard as trivial in that they do not have the opportunity to contribute to government revenue and the composition of the gross domestic product (GDP). However, an opposing view is that the ability to avoid paying taxation creates an opportunity space for indigent petty traders, hawkers, general dealers and vendors inter alia in the informal economy to have enough disposable income (Ayyagari et al., 2011; Michael et al., 2013; Suffin et al., 2013). This action will enable urban livelihoods to be more resilient and surmount multiple stressors and shocks that affect urban livelihood strategies (Ayyagari et al., 2011; Michael et al., 2013; Suffin et al., 2013; Dorward et al., 2005; Louw et al., 2007). The competitive nature of the informal economy creates a unique space for innovation and ingenuity. However, local governance should play a leading role in support of these various livelihood strategies in order that the local economy would flourish.

7. Contributions of informal trading

Divergent stressors, shocks and challenges are globally accepted to be influencing factors that affect the positive contributions of informal trading towards urban livelihoods (Ayyagari et al., 2011; Michael et al., 2013; Suffin et al., 2013; Dorward et al., 2005; Louw et al., 2007 ;Szakonyi & Urpelainen, 2015). Various social, economic, political and climatic shocks and stressors impinge on the capabilities of informal trading to contribute meritoriously towards urban livelihoods (Dorward et al., 2005; Louw et al., 2007). However, whereas informal trading is renowned for its ability to absorb a plethora of destitute and unemployed urbanites, it is still fronted by multiple informal sector impediments and an unregulated environment that encroaches on its prospect of creating urban livelihoods that are resilient and immune to a plethora of shocks and stressors (Lauermann, 2013). Additionally, ease of entry into the informal sector within which informal trading operates is often congested thereby increasing competition amongst informal traders which eventually leads to uncertain growth prospects (Dorward et al., 2005; Louw et al., 2007).

Literature indicates that there is a relationship between poverty, unemployment, livelihoods and informal trading in a number of countries (Sonobe et al., 2011; Christiaensen & Todo, 2013; Nguimkeu, 2014). Though the practice of informal trading is regarded as being crucial given its ability to create means of support in most urban cities, the quality and longevity of these means are derisory base on different stressors and shocks that form part of the informal economy (Christiaensen & Todo, 2013; Nguimkeu, 2014). Research further indicates that informal trading in cities contributes 46% of employment and 40% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in developing countries (Louw et al., 2007; Sonobe et al., 2011; Christiaensen & Todo, 2013; Nguimkeu, 2014). These statistics confirm the focal contributions of informal trade in the developing world. Notwithstanding the positive contributions offered by informal trading, the informal sector within which informal business operates is characterized by countless challenges that negatively affect the positives contributions of informal trading towards urban livelihoods (Szakonyi & Urpelainen, 2015). In addition, policy makers in these countries take cognizance of the central contributions offered by informal trading through absorbing majority of the indigent urbanites inter alia (Turaeva, 2014). However, in-as-much as the contributions of informal trading towards urban livelihoods remains contested amidst scholars, impediments fronted by these entities are not overlooked in the SMMEs literature (Dorward et al., 2005; Louw et al., 2007; Szakonyi & Urpelainen, 2015). Informal trading in urban cities has gained popularity in both the developed and developing countries given their unique capabilities of absorbing the unemployed, uneducated and indigent urbanites apart from the multiple informal sector challenges that negatively contribute to their abilities to create decent and sustainable livelihoods.

8. Conclusion and recommendations

This article has reconnoitred various contemporary urban livelihoods that form part and parcel of the informal economy including their various prospects, challenges and contributions. It has observed that these livelihoods comprise divergent informal trading establishments including ubiquitous miscellaneous trivial trades. Notwithstanding the incipient nature of the urban informal economy; these livelihoods have absorbed majority of indigent urbanites and vulnerable families. However, informal trade encounters numerous stressors and shocks that affect its development and longevity. The paper concludes that notwithstanding the crucial contributions offered by informal trade, the urban informal economy and its multiple challenges are not overlooked as a possible hindrance to the success of contemporary livelihood strategies in South Africa. Continuingly, it is crucial that the urban local government in conjunction with relevant stakeholders creates a conducive environment for urban livelihoods to flourish. Over and above the fact that urban livelihoods

would tend to pollute the urban space; they still account a large majority of jobs and temporary employment for the impecunious urbanites. Therefore, it is essential that support agencies, municipalities and strategic business oriented organization relentlessly assist urban livelihoods in their quest to alleviate poverty.

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PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY AND DECENTRALISATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: IT'S AUTHENTICITY TOWARDS EFFECTIVE PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY IN MUNICIPALITIES

M.M. Mashamaite

P. Hlongwane

University of South Africa, South Africa

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to assess the extent in which decentralisation promotes democratic governance and participatory democracy thereby attaining effective public service delivery. The promotion of citizen participation in development is the key role of the South Africa's government. In South Africa participation is repeatedly advocated to political discourse, its practical application always remains below expectations. The basic principle of participatory democracy is that all citizens should participate in public meeting on matters concerning public affairs, but in reality, not all citizens participate. The current governance system has reviled a classical concept of participatory democracy in South Africa by means of maximum public participation in government decision making through consultation. This paper is based primarily on the review of the relevant literature to explore the cyclical relation of decentralisation, participatory democracy and public service delivery. The main findings of this research are as follows: The political and administrative decentralisations are crucial aspects towards achieving democratic and participatory governance which is developmentally orientated. The South African national government does not fully support decentralised local government through capacity building to ensure effective and efficient participatory governance. Accountability and transparency as key tenets that underlie democratic governance can be attained in situations where the citizenry is well informed and educated about participatory governance. Furthermore, the decentralised structures of government in South Africa are dysfunctional, which leads to the inability of these structures to achieve the developmental objectives as it relates to participatory and democratic governance.

Keywords: Citizen participation, Decentralisation, De-concentration, Decision-making, Participatory democracy

1. Introduction

Since the 1970s, decentralisation in various forms has often been identified as a missing link between poverty-reduction and anti-poverty efforts in developing countries. This is accompanied practically the world over by a feeling of disillusion with centralised governance (Manor, 1995:83) and mounting criticism against a model of development that centres on large projects and on centrism. Centralised governance has not exactly covered itself with glory. The state's poor record of accomplishment has much to do with the feeling of dissatisfaction with centralised paradigms of governance. Rondinelli (1999:1) describes decentralisation as transfer of responsibilities for planning, management, and the raising and allocation of resources from the central government and its agencies to field units of the central government, semi-autonomous public institutions, regional authorities, or non-governmental, private or voluntary organisation.

Decentralisation is a process whereby the authority inherent in the national sphere of government is cascaded to the lower sphere of government for better service delivery. It can be encapsulated in the idea that decentralisation “brings government closer to the people”. In this regard it is assumed that information flows are better within a geographically confined area, so that people will be able to see much quicker whether the local authority is attending to the needs of its constituents. South Africa has embarked on the political and administrative decentralisation of government to promote democratic governance and participatory democracy. It is the contention of this paper that decentralisation has to be implemented in such a manner that it will yield the desired results, and based on this notion, the success of decentralised governance could be reflected through democratic participation and good governance at the local government.

The main focal area of this paper is on the South African local government, which is the sphere of government where the local communities are be able to engage with their political leaders hence political decentralisation remains essential. This should provide a platform for the community to influence the allocation of resources through active participation in the integrated development plan (IDP) processes at the local government, which explains why administrative decentralisation is central to democracy and accountable governance. Active participation of the South Africa citizenry at the local government could be hampered by certain demographic factors. For instance, the rich people in South Africa are actively involved in decision-making processes at the local government and they influence the allocation of resources on the one hand (McEwan, 2003:477). The poor people are excluded deliberately from the key decision-making processes on the other hand (McEwan, 2003:480). Women are underrepresented in the local government structures and

decision-making forums, which raises the questions about the effectiveness and inclusiveness of the participatory democracy (McEwan, 2003:480).

The paper assesses the extent in which decentralisation promotes democratic governance thereby attaining developmental state or governance, especially, at the local sphere of government in South Africa. In order to achieve this objective the following problems are identified and answered in this paper:

- It is not yet known whether decentralisation contributes towards participatory democracy and developmental governance in the South African local government.
- It is not yet known whether the national government supports the participatory mechanisms at the local government in order to achieve satisfactory level of public service delivery.

The method considered relevant in addressing the aforementioned problems in this paper is the review of the relevant literature or documents. The findings of the various researchers on participatory democracy in South Africa, especially at the local government are critically analysed. Additional information obtained through media reports such as newspapers and television programmes are collated and synthesised in order to arrive at plausible conclusions. The principal conclusions drawn in this paper are stated as follows: the South African government is not taking adequate initiatives to build the capacity of the local governments. It is also evident that transparency and accountability as pivotal democratic principles that underpin decentralised governance could be achieved in circumstances where the citizenry is educated and informed about participatory governance. The developmental objectives of the South African local government remains elusive since the decentralised spheres of government are dysfunctional and ineffective.

2. Framework for democratic decentralisation

The operational framework for democratic decentralisation should be set to reach and involve the citizens at the local level. In order to achieve this, political and administrative decentralisation should be introduced to set the scene in for participatory democracy.

2.1 Political decentralisation

Political decentralisation can be seen as a top-down process, which by delegating power can help to reduce the centre's control over the social, economic and cultural life of citizens. Political decentralization aims to give citizens or their elected representatives more power in public decision-making. It is often associated with pluralistic politics and representative government, but it can also support democratisation by giving citizens, or

their representatives, more influence in the formulation and implementation of policies. According to Heller (2001:132), political decentralization, in contrast to administrative decentralisation, is not concerned primarily with increasing efficiency improving service delivery by the government, removing bottlenecks and reducing delays, increasing the ability to recover costs but with the devolution of power to the grassroots and leading to the formation of “local-level” governments.

The concept of political decentralisation however strongly rests on the perception that the selection of representatives from local electoral jurisdictions allows residents to know their political representatives better. Again, this process affords elected officials an opportunity to know and understand the needs and desires of the residents or citizens better. The main argument in favour of political decentralisation is that decision-making power is conferred to local governments, which is essentially a necessary condition for promoting democracy and good governance. Decentralised government can provide space for people to participate in local development. It can ensure a more efficient allocation of resources, enhance local resource mobilisation and improve local governance, therefore, paving the way for more effective poverty reduction strategies. The other arguments in favour of political decentralisation is decision-making power will be in the hands of local-authorities who are more aware of the local situation and hence are in a better position to take judicious decision. Political decentralisation can contribute to some key elements of good governance, such as increasing people’s opportunity for participation in economic, social and political decisions; assisting in developing people’s capacities; and enhancing government responsiveness, transparency and accountability. Nevertheless, more often than not, political decentralisation fails to achieve its objective because of the complex phenomenon involving many geographic entities and societal factors. Nath (2000:2) mentions that the geographic entities may include the international, national, sub-national, and local levels and the societal actors include government, the private sector and civil society. Political decentralization often requires constitutional or statutory reforms, the development of pluralistic political parties, the strengthening of legislatures, creation of local political units, and the encouragement of effective public interest groups. National governments are however often reluctant to fully undertake political decentralisation as it implies relinquishment of power and have to be accompanied by the devolution of financial resources to make political decentralisation work.

Political decentralisation efforts often fail in absence of efforts towards strengthening of accountable local government institutions and fostering popular participation. If the people do not exercise democratic control over the central state, it is unlikely that decentralization of the state will be accompanied by increased political power of the people. The devolution of

power and authority to the local sphere of government should be matched by the readiness of the government to listen to the voices of the people in order to allow them to influence decision-making processes (Madzivhandila & Maloka, 2014:654). Like Ghana, in spite of having some success with political decentralisation it has to strengthen devolution by introducing greater accountability and democracy (Mello, 1999:102). Political decentralisation has also other setbacks. It can result in the loss of economies of scale and control over scarce financial resources by the central government. Political decentralization requires a constitutional, legal and regulatory framework to ensure accountability and transparency. It also necessitates the restructuring of institutions and developing linkages with civil society and the private sector (Nath, 2000:2). Simultaneously, political decentralization necessitates universal participation and new approaches to community institutions and social capital.

2.2 Administrative decentralisation

Administrative decentralisation aims at transferring decision-making authority, resources and responsibilities for the delivery of select number of public services from the central government to other levels of government, agencies, and field offices of central government line agencies (Yuliani, 2004: 3). The main challenge is that decentralisation in the South African local government is not reciprocated by allocation or equitable distribution of resources, especially to the municipalities that are not financially sustainable (McEwan, 2003:480). Robertson (2002:6) states that administrative decentralisation is often simultaneous with civil service reform; it seeks to redistribute authority, responsibility and financial resources for providing public services among different levels of government. It is the transfer of responsibility for the planning, financing and management of certain public functions from the central government and its agencies to field units of government agencies, subordinate units or levels of government, semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations, or area-wide, regional or functional authorities (Stanton: 2009:37). The three major forms of administrative decentralization, namely de-concentration, delegation and devolution, have different characteristics.

De-concentration: According to Stanton (2009:40) de-concentration is often considered to be the weakest form of decentralization and is used most frequently in unitary states to redistribute decision making authority and financial and management responsibilities among different levels of the central government. Edoun and Jahed (2009:5) argue that the de-concentration is merely shifting responsibilities from central government officials in the capital city to those working in regions, provinces or districts, or it can create

strong field administration or local administrative capacity under the supervision of central government ministries.

Delegation: delegation is a more extensive form of decentralization. Through delegation central governments transfer responsibility for decision-making and administration of public functions to semi-autonomous organizations not wholly controlled by the central government, but ultimately accountable to it (Edoun and Jahed, 2009:5). Yuliani (2004:3) argues that governments delegate responsibilities when they create public enterprises or corporations, housing authorities, transportation authorities, special service districts, semi-autonomous school districts, regional development corporations, or special project implementation units. Usually these organizations have a great deal of discretion in decision-making. They may be exempt from constraints on regular civil service personnel and may be able to charge users directly for services.

Devolution: a third type of administrative decentralization is devolution. When governments devolve functions, they transfer authority for decision-making, finance, and management to quasi-autonomous units of local government with corporate status (Robertson, 2002:6). According to Stanton (2009:42) devolution usually transfers responsibilities for services to municipalities that elect their own mayors and councils, raise their own revenues, and have independent authority to make investment decisions. In a devolved system, local governments have clear and legally recognised geographical boundaries over which they exercise authority and within which they perform public functions. This type of administrative decentralisation underlies most political decentralisation. The South African government seems to view decentralisation as a technique of administrative organization than as a genuine long-term policy. If decentralisation is a policy, it can help to change the operation of existing political systems, but if it is thought of primarily as an administrative technique, it is likely to lead to rationalisation of administrative structures. Practically, decentralization in South Africa has most often been conceived and implemented as an administrative technique. Indeed, when colonial powers controlled most of Africa, they often sought to disrupt traditional ties in order to consolidate their centralised power(Adeyeye, 2009:7) argues that in some cases a colonial power did try to preserve an existing administrative model, but this approach too was adopted primarily to strengthen colonial power, rather than foster self-governance.

3. Decentralisation, democracy and citizen participation in the South African context.

In its simplest form government decentralisation is the transfer of both authority and responsibility for public functions from the central government to subordinate levels of government (provincial and local). There are certain themes that run through the arguments for decentralisation. One of the most important ones is associated with democratisation. It can be encapsulated in the idea that decentralisation “brings government closer to the people”. There are a number of connected strands within this line of argument. It is argued that local government is more likely to be accountable to its constituency (Wittenberg, 2003: 6). The perception is that the closer the government is to the local people, the better the flow of information to the residents (people) and it will be easier and quicker for the people to see whether the local authority (government) is addressing their needs. The other argument is decentralisation increases the opportunities for people to become directly involved in government decision-making process. Kauzya (2007: 4) indicates that decentralisation can be political decentralisation, which focuses on the transfer of the responsibility and authority for political self-determination from the central government to subordinate levels of government in particular for the formulation and implementation of policies. He indicates that administrative decentralisation that seeks to redistribute authority, responsibility and the financial resources for providing public services among different levels of government are critical. It is arguable that administrative decentralisation has perhaps progressed further in most countries than any other area of government decentralization.

In most instances of administrative decentralisation, the national government has provided funding to the local government, for the specific purposes of carrying out overall national programmes, and provided strong oversight of the local government activities in carrying out the programs (Heller, 2001: 131). As a result such activities resulted in the transferring of significant responsibility, but rarely authority, and left the local government in the position of normally being implementers, rather than designers, of projects and consequently with little autonomy in local development. Decentralisation contributes to deepening democracy when it expands the scope and depth of citizen participation in public decision-making processes. Expanding the depth means incorporating previously marginalised or disadvantaged groups into public politics. South Africa’s constitution, government policy, and accompanying legislation specifically conceives of local government as developmental, and as having a key role to play in redistribution, the promotion of local democracy through citizenship participation, and the empowering of marginalized groups as outlined by section B of the White paper on Local Government (South Africa, 1998a).

Houston and Liebenberg (2001:1) state that participatory democracy in South Africa is necessitated by great transformation in budget preparation, policy formulation, legislative and planning processes. They indicate that the aforementioned transformation process has led to the creation of more participative and consultative forums at national and local spheres of government, e.g. the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC). Decentralised local governance contributes to democratic development in terms of enhancing participatory development strategies (Edoun and Jahed, 2009:5). Decentralisation is an important aspect for the promotion of participatory and capable democratic development. The local authorities have to develop suitable models to allow for the effective citizen participation whereby the citizenry can further contribute to good governance as cited by Mapuva (2010:5). According to Buccus, Hemson, Hiks and Piper (2007:7) participation is interwoven with development of the people which contributes towards strengthening the state. Since participation is regarded as a reflection of good governance, it could be stated that citizen participation in the activities of the government is the reflection of decentralised development orientated state. Participatory democracy is based on the notion that the people who are affected by the circumstances are in the proper position to transform it. This can be achieved by ongoing communication and citizen involvement in decision-making (Gaster & Squires, 2003:29). Participation at a decentralised level requires a certain degree of consultation between the public officials and the citizens.

Consultation involves encouraging people to articulate their concerns and suggestions about the ongoing projects, services rendered as well as proposals in which case the relevant information is obtained by the decision makers for usage in decision making forums (Gaster & Squires, 2003:29). Active citizenry can make significant contribution to the “effective institutional development and democratic decentralisation, enhance the responsiveness of governing institutions, increase the information flow between government and the people, make development projects more suitable, enhance accountability, transparency and integrity- all of which constitute good governance” (Mapuva, 2010:8). In support of this view, Heydenrych (2008:705) asserts that active participation by the citizens is a demonstration of a healthy democracy and emphasises the fact that participatory democracy advocates the notion that citizens do not only participate in governance when they are afforded the opportunity but it is their democratic right. The challenge facing the local government officials is that they do not know how to best integrate the citizens into decision-making process. This situation defeats the purpose of stabling decentralised spheres of government where it is actually anticipated that citizen participation would be embraced and supported.

Mapuva (2010:11) argues that participatory democracy suggests that the citizens will have a platform to deliberate and challenge policies whereby public officials will endeavour to consider their inputs and concerns. Furthermore, he demonstrates that citizen participation is not a single criterion for good governance but effectiveness in service delivery is also a key feature of good governance. The increased demand for quality services has led to the need for citizen participation in local governance (Mapuva, 2010:9). In fact, participation is necessary to ensure that local government deliver the best possible services with the limited resources. This can be achieved when the existing participation mechanisms are effective.

4. Mechanisms of public participation in democratic state

Public participation can be attained through the following mechanisms, namely: integrated development planning and budget, ward committees, izimbizo/public meetings, and petitions (Houston & Liebenberg, 2001:1; Buccus et al. 2007:11). Gaster (2003:121) argues that it is anticipated that the local government councils would support participatory democracy by involving the citizens in decision making via the existing structures and processes. It is imperative at this stage to assess the role and deficiencies of each participatory mechanisms identified above in order to determine the extent to which they contribute towards a developmental and participatory democratic state.

4.1 Integrated Development Planning (IDP) and budget

Section 25 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act (32 of 2000) requires the South African municipalities to adopt the integrated development plans and ensure that those plans are accessible and available for perusal by the members of the public (South Africa, 2000:36-38). According to Houston and Liebenberg (2001:13) the municipalities display great commitment to the development and budgetary planning through integrated development plans. However, they maintain that integrated development plans are hampered by lack of participation, insufficient resources and senior council officials who are poorly trained. Madzivhandila and Maloka (2014:656) share this view as they state that participation in the IDP processes is impeded by the fact that municipal officials lack the requisite skills and competencies, whereby ill-informed communities who attend IDP meetings as passive actors also exacerbate the situation. Whilst it is anticipated that municipalities should utilise the integrated development plans to encourage public participation, Buccus et al. (2007:18) assert that there is no real consultation that takes place between the municipalities and their constituencies regarding the integrated development plans, and this situation results in the failure to meet the needs of the communities.

Again, it is necessary to indicate that the technical language utilised in the policy and budgetary processes makes it difficult for the citizens and to a certain extent for the councillors to actively participate and make substantial contribution therein (Mapuva, 2010:51). Krafchik (2001:134) demonstrates that citizens have a crucial role to play in budgetary planning but they are impeded by lack of requisite knowledge and skills in budget and financial matters. Lack of access to information, illiteracy among the citizens and unfamiliarity with municipal processes and conventions dissuade the citizens from policy and decision making forums (Mapuva, 2010:51).

4.2 Ward committees

Section 73 of the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act (117 of 1998) provides for the establishment of ward committees to make the local councillors aware of the various issues affecting the ward (South Africa, 1998:52-54). Silima and Auriacombe (2013:54) state that ward committees should improve public participation by the citizenry in the decision-making processes. In fact, the ward committees should sensitise the local councillor about the needs and concerns of the citizens, and play a monitoring role of service delivery to the community (Silima and Auriacombe, 2013:54). The Local Government: Municipal Structures Act (117 of 1998) section 73(3) requires that the ward committees be sufficiently representative thereby ensuring representation of women in the ward committees (South Africa, 1998b:52). Silima and Auriacombe (2013:55) argue that ward committees can only function optimally when perceived by the citizens as the legitimate structures representative of the local people. This indicates that ward committees need to be inclusive in their composition. Every citizen should be able to take part in the activities of the ward committees irrespective of their political affiliation or opinion. McEwan (2003:480) asserts that women are underrepresented in the local government structures such as ward committees, and they lack information about decision-making and resource allocation processes because the local government officials do not cascade information to the communities. Madzivhandila and Maloka (2014:655-656) indicate that “party politics” impedes the proper functioning of the ward committees. It is therefore, necessary to ensure that ward committees are not utilised for party political ends. Having said this, depoliticisation of ward committees could ensure that they are not utilised or manipulated for electioneering by any political party. There is also a need to clarify the role of the ward committees as recommended by Buccus et al. (2007:16).

4.3 Public meetings/Izimbizo

Izimbizo and public meetings provides a consultative forum between the local council and the citizens. “Izimbizo are the most common mechanisms through which ordinary citizens experience public participation” (Buccus et al. 2007:19). Public participation should be based on the real will of the local council to consider the inputs of the citizens in decision-making process. Silima and Auiracombe (2013:51) point out that the citizens embrace the notion of public participation but their major challenge is that they are consulted during izimbizo after decision have been finalised. This could be a move by the local council to minimise the element of resistance to the decisions by the members of the community. In support of this assertion, Gaster and Squires (2003:29) state that consultation tends to be a way through which the local authorities obtain approval for decisions already taken. Brynard (1996:43) recommends that citizens should be part of the decision making process from the initial stages of the process in order to promote communication and interaction between the local government and the community.

4.4 Petitions

According to the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act (32 of 2000) section 17 (2) the municipalities are required to establish mechanisms and procedures that would facilitate public participation which includes the receipt and consideration of petitions and complaints by the citizens (South Africa, 2000:30). A failure by the local authorities to heed the petitions and public complaints could result in reduced confidence in the public officials within the local government. For example, the Tshwane Barekisi Forum submitted petitions to the Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality about the ongoing harassment of the street vendors or hawkers by the Metro police officials in the city of Tshwane and no positive response has been received from the municipality (Ngema, 2014). Citizen participation without real consideration of the pleas, thoughts and concerns of the public may not be regarded as ideal situation for democratic governance.

Mapuva (2010:9) asserts that when the citizens question or repudiate controversial decisions and policies, the public officials tend to adopt punitive measures in order to threaten the vocal members of the communities. It has also become a common practice in South Africa that when members of the community embark on service delivery protestations they would be met by police intervention instead of being addressed amicably by the local officials. This is evidenced by the brutal killings of the two protesters by police officials in Mothutlung area near Brits on the 14th of January 2014 during a protestation against lack of water in that

area. This is one of the many instances where police intervened to suppress the voices and concerns of the poor and vulnerable multitudes (Tau, 2014:3). A failure by the local authorities to listen and respond to the concerns and need of their constituencies undermines the real essence of democratic governance and participation. It is pivotal to determine the importance of participation in promoting accountability within the local governance.

5. Enhancing accountability through participation

The direct involvement of the citizens in issues that concern them increase accountability and guarantee citizens a certain degree of responsiveness to societal needs by the public officials (Mapuva, 2010:11). Silima and Auriacombe (2013:43) indicate that accountability and effectiveness have become crucial mantras in the public institutions and administration. They agree that citizen participation through existing mechanisms improves the decision-making processes whereby government officials could be more responsive to public needs and contribute to the enhancement of management of resources within the local government. This could also mean that the citizen would be best positioned to hold the public officials accountable for their actions. Citizen participation should directly influence the day-to-day operations and activities of the local government.

The local citizens should know their political representatives at the local spheres of government so that they could hold them accountable in instances where service delivery appears to be lacking. In order to attain this ideal, Silima and Auriacombe (2013:48) contend that an enabling environment needs to be created in order to achieve accountability in governance. This is an indication that all the constraints that hamper the various participatory mechanisms should be addressed accordingly. The citizens should be able to exercise their democratic right to participate and contribute to the establishment of accountable and transparent government. Some of the common limitations to the success of participatory democracy are discussed in the subsequent section.

6. Limitations to participatory democracy

The local councils within the municipalities are vested with decision-making powers which tend to be centralised and exclusively concentrated on the local councils (Gaster, 2003:121). This creates a situation where the communities are not able to influence the decisions of the local authorities. Brynard (1996:46) states that the citizens lack motivation of taking part in the participation process due to the intricacies involved in the local governance. This could be further exacerbated by the fact that citizens do not exercise their

rights to democratic participation and do not comprehend the procedures and processes involved in decision making process (Mapuva, 2010:51).

According to Brynard (1996:47) and Mapuva (2010:51) the degree of illiteracy among the citizens affect and impede their level of participation in governance. The low levels of education could lead citizens to believe that that they are incapable of influencing the budgetary processes and allocation of resources in service delivery. Effective and meaningful participation of citizens is impeded by the fact that ward committees have limited decision making powers, lack of skills and knowledge, insufficient resources and information (Silima & Auriacombe, 2013:51-52). This raises questions about the level of administrative decentralisation within the local government. There is a need to cascade resources to the lower structures and build capacity in order to achieve reasonable levels participation.

According to Irvin and Stanbury (2004:59) the lack of proper representation and authority in decision-making forums tend to lead to failure to reflect on the needs and views of the citizens which culminate in great discontent. The unfulfilled expectations create frustrations and bitterness (Brynard, 1996:46). In such circumstances, it is not uncommon in the South Africa that the citizens would embark on protestations against the local government.

The manipulation of participation process for selfish and individualistic gain in decision-making is a setback to good governance and participative democracy (Irvin & Stanbury, 2004:60). This situation could emanate from party politics that are pervasive in the functioning of ward committees as cited by Silima and Auriacombe (2013:51). The party politics could lead to a situation whereby the existing mechanisms of participation at the local government are easily manipulated for electioneering or garnering support for a particular political party. Buccus et al. (2007:22) provide evidence in this regard whereby service delivery for the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) ward in Sesonke area was deliberately halted by the African National Congress (ANC) council due to party political differences. This type of situation is not in consonant with the object of participatory democracy because political tolerance is important for democratic governance.

The relevant strategies and tactics for address the limitations or dilemmas of public participation should be devised and implemented. Some of the few ways through which participatory challenges could be eliminated are mentioned in the next section.

7. Overcoming dilemmas of participatory democracy

The process of dealing with the shortcomings identified in the democratic participation requires time, effort and dedication. Recommendations on how to best address the dilemmas of participatory democracy are stated below. King, Feltey and Susel (1998:320) state that it is imperative for the local government to restructure participation. They maintain that this could result in genuine participation of the citizens since the members of the community would be involved at the inception of decision-making process. This could also minimise the practise of legitimising decisions already taken by local authorities, through superficial consultations. It is necessary to ensure that the citizens in both rural and urban area are given the relevant information about the options available to them so that they could participate in in decision-making process (Brynard, 1996:42). There is also a need to improve the communication channels between the citizens and the local government in order to ensure free flow of information. Brynard (1996:42) recommends that the local government need to educate the citizens about the significance of participation to encourage inputs from the citizens. In support of this notion, Silima and Auriacombe (2013:52) assert that it is imperative to promote meaningful participation through training and imparting of requisite skills and knowledge to the citizenry. This could reflect positively on the local government in an effort to attain its developmental objectives. In summary, Irvin and Stanbury (2004:56) argue that “informed citizens become citizen experts, understanding technically difficult situations and seeing holistic, community wide solutions”.

Buccus et al. (2007:25) contend that ward committees must be allocated sufficient resources and members must be equipped with knowledge and skills. This requires a more decentralised process to ensure that resources are cascaded to these structures. King et al. (1998:325) hold that the public managers have to be re-educated in order to gain their cooperation in the participation processes. In addition, administrative structures and procedures need to be adjusted to achieve greater democratic participation. The appropriate representation of citizen in the participatory democracy could be attained by adopting voluntary citizen participation panels which are deemed as successful in concluding decisions (Irvin & Stanbury, 2004:59). The voluntary system may also look in terms of full representation of all the groups. Perhaps, it must be acknowledged that not all citizens would be able to participate in decisions making process even when they were afforded the chance, as cited by Brynard (1996:42). Finally, laying strong ethical principles and values could perhaps assist in the reduction of selfish and individualistic interests in the activities of the participatory structures, particularly those individuals who manipulate the processes for political reasons. It is therefore, critical to depoliticise the participation process within the

ward committees. Success in overcoming challenges to participation could lead to the realisation of developmental goals of the local government in democratic governance.

8. Developmental power of participatory democratic governance

According to Tsatsire, Taylor and Raga (2010:276), developmental local government implies that the local government has made a commitment to collaborate with the local government to collaborate with the community and the various interest groups that represent citizens to identify the viable methods and strategies through which their socio-economic and material needs could be achieved and enhance their lives. They reveal that developmental state has four intertwined attributes, namely: “maximizing social development and economic growth; integrating and coordinating; democratic development and economic growth; and leading and learning”. Silima and Auriacombe (2013:47) postulate that the necessary structures that are indispensable for a capable state have been established but the ongoing challenge lies on the inability to function by those structures which indirectly impede the state’s capability to attain developmental goals. This suggests that when decentralized institutions are not able to function optimally due to lack of resources, skills, abilities and training, the community may not experience the real benefits of the decentralized government. The situation may also culminate in the superficial participatory democracy where the community does not have the impact on the decisions of the local government.

Silima and Auriacombe (2013:46-47) mention that the citizens could only feel empowered when they are drawn into decision making by raising complaints or proposals, setting performance targets and indicators, which is also a way of holding the local authorities accountable to their commitments in service delivery. The main object of development should be on training the local people so that they could think independently and deliberate relevant decision making issues that have impact in their lives (Silima & Auriacombe, 2013:57). Mapuva (2010:52) cites that when the local councilors are not well trained, it becomes hard for them to disseminate the relevant information about ongoing local government projects and activities especially where such programmes have to be financed from public funds. Tsatsire et al. (2010: 57) point out that the creation of a single service could result in a more responsive government which is development orientated.

9. Conclusions and recommendations

This paper contends that political and administrative decentralisations are indispensable processes for successful participatory and democratic governance. Development will remain elusive for the South African local government in as much as resources are not sufficiently devolved to the local municipalities that are not financially

viable in rural areas. Therefore, viable strategies and tactics have to be put in place and implemented in order to support decentralized government institutions to fulfil their mandates and promote good governance. In South Africa, decentralisation is implemented in a manner which does not yield the desired results for the citizens. Whilst it is expected that the local government would make it easier for the citizens to participate and influence decisions, instead the citizens are manipulated through consultative forums such as public meetings. Public meeting are used to lobby for support on decisions already taken by the public officials at local spheres of government (Gaster & Squires, 2003:29; Silima & Auriacombe, 2013:51). Public officials at the local government are eluded by the integration of community in decision-making processes.

The mechanisms for public participation are not fully supported by the government in order to ensure their efficiency and effectiveness towards promoting participatory governance. Ward committees are utilised as local structures for specific political parties instead of representative and consultative body through which the local people could communicate to their local government (Buccus et al., 2007:16-22; Madzivhandila & Maloka, 2014:656). It is important for the government to take decisive steps to ensure that ward committees are inclusive, fully resourced and depoliticised. The local government is not responsive enough to the complaints and needs of the people which suggest that the level of citizen participation in South Africa is poor. The government ignore the voice of the citizens until they embark on violent protestations for better services and many other issues of concern. Although the literature indicate that decentralised and participatory governance leads to greater accountability and transparency, it is vital to ensure that the citizen are well informed in order to hold the public officials accountable. One of the main dilemmas facing participatory governance in South Africa is that the citizens are illiterate and ignorant (Brynard, 1996:46; Mapuva, 2010:51). A panacea to this problem could be the initiative to train and educate the citizen about their right to participate in a democratic government.

Decentralisation becomes a futile exercise when government institutions lack the capacity to execute devolved powers and functions. This situation makes it difficult for the local government to communicate effectively with their constituencies about issues that affect them because no information is shared between them. Since evidence suggest this to be a major problem in South Africa, it then casts a cloud of doubt about the authenticity of the current system of decentralisation and participative democracy. Perhaps, it is about time for the South African government start restructuring the current system in order to achieve good governance and genuine participation. Finally, evidence suggests that South Africa is not able to achieve the developmental objectives due to the inability of local structures to function towards the fulfilment of this mandate. There is probably a need for the government

to review the current developmental strategies tailored for empowering the local government officials and the local communities.

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SOUTH AFRICAN LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: ISSUES, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

P.H. Munzhedzi

University of Limpopo, South Africa

Abstract

The White Paper on Local Government of 1998 introduced the concept of “developmental local government” which encourages the commitment of the local sphere of government to working with its citizens and groups within the community to find viable ways to meet their social, economic and material needs, and improve the quality of their lives. The South African government has identified Local Economic Development (LED) as a key component in its pursuit of a developmental local government agenda particularly because LED seeks to promote collaboration with other stakeholders in the local communities. With local government in South Africa being accordingly mandated to give effect to the LED function; has this sphere of government been fulfilling its LED mandate successfully? This paper attempts to respond to this question by way of using existing literature to evaluate the implementation of LED programme in South Africa. To this end, it is argued that often South African municipalities lack adequate leadership, financial and human resource capacity required to adequately implement the LED programmes. The paper concludes by recommending measures that could be implemented by municipalities so as to harness local resources including the sort-after skills of immigrants in their area of jurisdiction. This also includes the enhancement of intergovernmental relations, beefing-up of skills base and developing a long-term land strategy is essential to address challenges associated with LED in South Africa.

Keywords: Local Economic Development, leadership, capacity, resources, entrepreneurship

1. Introduction

The notion of a developmental state is defined within a framework of four principles, namely: maximisation of social and economic development, integrated and co-ordinated development activities, citizen participation and lastly, strong leadership-building capacity (Meyer & Venter, 2013: 95). Economic stability and a favourable environment for business opportunities are considered to be necessary preconditions for successful and sustainable development at a national level, but every country consists of multiple local and regional economies, each different in its own way, and each needing to be nurtured with a unique set of interventions (Swinburn, 2007: 2). The concept of LED has evolved as a policy approach

since the early 1970's as a response by local government (Ababio & Meyer, 2012: 7), to the enormous challenges facing this sphere of government. Rogerson (2009: 35) is of the opinion that the principal challenge for LED is to develop means of optimising local resources and local knowledge to benefit all residents in a specific geographical area. This may be actualised by actively analysing a specific local economy and its opportunities, and ensuring that obstacles to development are better understood by government and communities. But, as Nel and John (2006: 225) puts it, the commonly held view within municipalities that LED is only "a local government prerogative" has often had the effect of marginalising independent initiatives emanating from the community or the private sector. National economic growth or the decline thereof is dependent on local economic performance, and one way of restructuring a national economy is to invest in restructuring local economic bases (Malefane, 2013: 673).

According to Nel and John (2006), LED plays an integral role to the South African government's drive to establish "developmental local government" in the country. The National Resources Institute (NRI) (2006:16) also indicates that LED initiatives must promote local ownership, partnership formation and assist in the creation of an enabling environment to stimulate new opportunities for economic development. Also critical is that LED must attempt to improve governance, and create income generation opportunities for the local populace. Local communities are recognised as the most important resource for LED and strong leadership on the local level is essential (Ababio & Meyer, 2012: 8). Other aspects of importance include the optimal utilisation of local resources including but not limited to land and infrastructure, maintenance of a quality natural environment, and creation of public-private partnerships (Department of Provincial and Local Government, 2006: 7). In addition to the said local resources, government may also harness the sought-after skills of immigrants which may include entrepreneurial, artisan and professional skills. The LED process ought to have a holistic and integrated approach in that it must address both the economic and social challenges faced by the people of the area (Blakely, 2002: 55). The bulk of local resources need to be prioritised towards those projects which best supports the area's primary vision (Ababio & Meyer, 2012: 11). This paper which is based on a review of the relevant literature, seeks to evaluate the implementation of LED programme in South Africa. The paper further seeks to identify challenges associated with LED and develop measures in which such challenges could be addressed. LED is conceptualised below so as to offer a comprehensive understanding of the concept.

2. Conceptualising local economic development

Globally, no universally accepted definition of the concept LED exists. According to Trousdale (2005: 2), the concept LED could in broad terms be defined as all those economic actions and initiatives, carried out by the members of a specific local community so as to achieve improved quality of life and to create sustainable and resilient local economies. On the other hand, Sibisi (2009:5) defines LED as a process by which public, business and non-governmental partners work collectively to create better conditions for economic growth, employment generation and sustainable development as a whole. It could also refer to the capacity of a local economy to create wealth for all its residents (Bartik, 2003: 2). Ruecker and Trah (2007: 15) posit that LED is an ongoing process by which all stakeholders from public and private sectors work together to create local unique locational advantages. Blakely (2002:159) in support of Bartik, defines the broad goals of LED as that of creation of jobs, economic stability through diversification, and a process driven by local people and local knowledge systems. Basically, LED is a locality-based response to the challenges of globalisation and devolution, and to local-level opportunities and crises (Nel & Rogerson 2005: 1). The key role local government has to play in LED is reflected in Scheepers and Monchusi's (2002: 82) definition which define LED as "a process managed by municipalities in accordance with their constitutional mandate to promote social and economic development". Trousdale (2005:2) views LED as a participatory process where local populace, from all sectors within a specific area, work together to activate and stimulate local economic activities, so as to ensure a resilient and sustainable local economy. LED is the total of all economic activities by all relevant stakeholders within a specifically defined geographical region, working together in partnership to create economic development and ultimately, improvement of quality of life for all residents in the area (Meyer & Venter, 2013: 94). This paper posits that other definitions above are just but a part of what LED is all about. Basically, LED is a process whereby all stakeholders which are not restricted to government but to other players including the private sector, non-governmental organisations (NGO) and local communities work together to stimulate local economies so that it can create business and employment opportunities. The role of government as one of the role players is discussed below.

3. The role of government

Former President of the Republic of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, emphasised in his 2006 State of the Nation Address the need for cooperation between large enterprises, government and development partners to ensure that the benefits of economic growth filter down to the lower end of the dual economy (Malefane, 2013: 675). However, Xuza (2007) is

of the opinion that South African national government has been jaded in providing leadership and direction when it comes to LED (Xuza, 2007). Provincial departments of economic development are often charged with the task of allocating and administering funds for LED development and, given the autonomy with which local government has been endowed in South Africa, this can result in conflicts between municipalities and provincial officials as to who has the “real” authority to make decisions about LED initiatives that happen to fall within a municipality’s geographical domain (Ingle, 2014: 475). Beside the conflicting roles challenge, Malefane (2013: 680) posits that during the period 1994-2003, the Department of Trade and Industry’s funding for Small Medium Micro Enterprise (SMME’s) inevitably favoured established SMMEs (often white-owned), rather than emerging SMMEs in the second economy (often black-owned).

In local government, SMMEs are an integral part of local economic development strategies. This challenge has not only had a negative consequence on the growth of SMME’s, but on economic development in general. Rogerson and Rogerson (2012:45) believe it is a “worrying trend” that municipalities’ LED efforts are often undermined by National and Provincial Government policies and processes. Worryingly, municipalities often fail to take advantage of their intergovernmental relations roles and as a result rely on SMME development support interventions from national and provincial spheres of government (Malefane, 2013: 671). SMMEs have the potential to reduce the existing huge unemployment, generate income for local populace, create assets, contribute to skills development, reduce the rate of crime and (often violent) service delivery protests, and attract investments in local municipalities. It is paramount that appropriate municipal institutional structures exist for successful development and implementation of LED (Meyer & Venter, 2013: 91), and that the skills of immigrants in a particular locality must be integrated through collaborative efforts. Even though LED ought to be a collaborative effort, literature review on SMME and LED suggests that a large amount of support is sourced from government, predominantly as a result of its regulative and facilitative role (Malefane, 2013: 674). Creating an environment in which the overall economic and social conditions of the locality are conducive to the creation of employment opportunities is the ultimate responsibility of local government (DPLG, 2006: 7). However, the private sector, through its increasing role in public-private partnerships (PPP) is becoming significant. The intended objectives of LED are conversed below.

4. Objectives of local economic development

Poverty alleviation is often high on the agenda regarding any LED strategy (Ababio & Meyer, 2012: 7). McIlrath (2004: 91) asserts the core functions of local government

concerning LED as local policy formulation, formulation of LED strategies, co-ordination and integration of local economy, providing support to SMME's, creation of a positive economic climate, facilitating of the implementation of sustainable LED projects, job creation through infrastructure development. Essentially, local government is the coordinating agency of LED whereby local initiatives by local communities are encouraged to help themselves within a support framework of government and its partners. Malefane (2009: 167) cautions that LED may not thrive without a substantial investment in social upliftment, environmental protection, good governance and a commitment from all stakeholders including the private sector). DPLG (2006: 7) notes that the ultimate objective of government is to support local economies in realising their optimal potentials and making local communities active participants in the economy of the country.

It is also paramount that government should seek to leverage, integrate and co-ordinate resources for maximum effect and avoid duplication of roles by stakeholders. Access to market opportunities must be available at the local economy, for example infrastructure for informal traders (Van der Heijden, 2008: 126). Alleviation of poverty and inequality, the upliftment of rural people, disadvantaged communities and SMME development are the main objectives of LED plans (Bartik, 2003: 16). However, Nel and Goldman (2006: 53) are of the opinion that for each project, risks that could hinder progress must be identified and then consider methods to contain or manage these projects. The increase in unemployment, poverty and inequality has highlighted the need to find alternative development strategies to find solutions for development at the local level (Phutiagae, 2007:133). LED exist solely for that purpose, namely, to create income generation opportunities particularly for rural women, human capital building programmes, provision of social and community facilities, and youth development projects (Ababio & Meyer, 2012: 12). The legislative and regulatory frameworks which guides the implementation of LED programed are discussed below.

5. Legislative and policy framework

Effective legislative and public policy framework are vital for LED success (Ababio & Meyer, 2012: 12). According to the Education and Training Unit (ETU) (2012), national and provincial governments must support local government by formulating suitable policies providing funding and research support. For these reason, various pieces of legislation give evidence of the South African government's commitment to create a supportive environment within which LED can prosper.

The South African government's position on local development can be traced back to the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) of 1994. The RDP is based on the

assumption that, in order to foster the growth of local economies, broadly representative institutions must be established to address LED needs (African National Congress, 1994:83). The RDP positions people at the centre of development by underlining the need for opportunities for people to develop themselves to improve their own lives and those of their communities. The RDP basically provided municipalities the function and responsibility to attract local investment and skills development to counter low productivity and unemployment (ANC, 1994). The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996 (hereafter referred to as the 1996 Constitution) is the foundation, and provides for a developmental model of local government. Local government is not only responsible for service delivery, but also for socio-economic development of its communities. In terms of Sections 152 and 153 the very 1996 Constitution, “municipalities must provide and manage their administration, budgeting and planning processes to give priority to the basic needs of communities” (Republic South Africa (RSA), 1996; Meyer & Venter, 2013: 96). Furthermore, section 152 of the 1996 Constitution states the objectives of local government in promoting participatory social and economic development.

The Local Government Transition Act, 1996 (Act 97 of 1996), refers to LED as a municipal strategy for promotion of economic and social development, and includes job creation initiatives. This constitutional mandate has been further strengthened by the White Paper on Local Government of 1998 which formally introduced the concept of developmental local government in South Africa and the involvement of local communities in their local government programmes including LED (RSA, 1998). The White Paper also indicates that it is the responsibility of the private sector to create jobs and that government’s role is to provide an enabling environment (Triegaardt, 2007: 3; Meyer & Venter, 2013: 96).

The Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, 2000 (Act 32 of 2000) outlines the importance of drawing up a comprehensive Integrated Development Plan (IDP) to guide the process of a developmental local government. Malefane (2013: 675) is of the opinion that within the local sphere of government, the need to restructure structural local economic inequalities between rural and urban areas has led to the development of IDPs (of which LED forms a core component) approach with which municipalities are expected to give more attention to the economic welfare of local communities. Section 26 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, 2000 (Act 32 of 2000) also requires that an IDP must contain a LED Strategy (RSA, 2000). A Policy Guidelines for Implementing LED in South Africa was compiled in 2005 with the aim of eradicating poverty and promoting economic growth (RSA, 2005). A more comprehensive policy called the National Framework for Local Economic Development in South Africa (2006–2011) was introduced, and it is a product of a technical team from the Department of Trade and Industry, the South African Local Government

Association (SALGA) and the Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) (DPLG, 2006). Later, the New Growth Path strategy was developed in 2010, which aimed to create 5 million jobs and reduce inequality, poverty and unemployment from 25% to 15% in 2020 (Chabane, 2010).

Recently, the National Development Plan (NDP) was adopted as an overarching policy of government and the focus areas being job creation, infrastructure development, quality environment, improvement of urban and rural spaces, skills development, health care, good governance and national unity (RSA, 2011). More emphasis on the NDP is often put on economic development so that the triple challenges in South Africa could be addressed, namely, unemployment, poverty and inequality. The foregoing legislative and policy frameworks discussed are by no means the only ones to consider, but they give a general indication of policies and legislations that guides economic development in general and LED in particular. The relationship between immigration which may play a crucial role in economic development and LED is explored below.

6. Immigration and local economic development

The finding of the study conducted by the Human Science Research Council (2012: 31) posits that the resistance of immigrants by local South African is often due to local economic and public resources competition. More often than not, businesses owned by immigrants are a step ahead of those owned by locals in that they are often “cheaper” in price. To this end, local businesses cannot compete and they end-up closing and renting them out to immigrants. According to Kalitanyi and Visser (2010: 376), a significant number of immigrants have successfully applied their entrepreneurial flair in establishing small enterprises and employing workers, often to the envy of their local counterparts. This paper posits that there must be an integrated strategy that seeks to integrate local and “foreign” businesses so that they may share skills and mentor each other and operate from the same business module. The position of this paper is that the locals may learn extensively from the experiences of immigrants in so far as business management is concerned.

Entrepreneurship has the potential to broaden the economic base, contribute substantially towards economic growth and strengthen the process of wealth creation (Petrin, 1994:7; Khawar, 2007:3). Massey (1998:6) maintains that entrepreneurship the world over contributes substantially to the social and economic development of a country, while also addressing issues such as unemployment and poverty alleviation. Kalitanyi and Visser (2010:) add that entrepreneurship plays a major role in reforming and revitalising economies because it establishes new businesses and helps existing ones to grow. Moreland (2006:6) argues that self-employment constitutes the most important aspect of

entrepreneurship. Immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa have no access to finance and credit. However, as Fisher (2005:4) notes entrepreneurs need to be creative: real entrepreneurs can start something out of nothing which is basically what businesses owned by immigrants are doing.

7. Local economic development challenges in South Africa

Local government has achieved limited success with its developmental mandate (Meyer & Venter, 2013: 91) including creating favourable environment for business and employment opportunities. The private sector and the NGOs have not played a satisfactory role in partnering with government in the stimulation of local economy so that it can create business and employment opportunities. The following are some of the challenges relating to LED in South Africa.

7.1 Municipal organogram

The reporting lines in many municipalities may hamper the progress of LED. Often than not, LED is the sole responsibility of the LED unit which in most cases does not report directly to the municipal manager (Khumalo & Thakhathi, 2012). The challenge becomes when other units of the municipality do not cooperate with the LED unit either because they attach less value to the whole programme or that they are not quite conversant with the entire LED processes. In their study, Khumalo and Thakhathi (2012: 52) found that in areas where LED was directly represented in the top management of the municipality, its implementation was taken seriously by other units of the municipality. The study further asserts that if ever LED is not represented in the top-management; there is often poor working relationship between the LED unit and the rest of the functionaries within the municipality. Minimal support from other departments and sections of the municipality may mean that the LED unit finds itself operating more as a driver than as a facilitator of LED programme.

7.2 Human Resources capacity

There's often inadequate recruitment processes in the LED unit. Ingle (2014: 479) is of the opinion that in far too many municipalities the post of LED Officer (where it exists at all) is seen as a virtual sinecure and is occupied by the most unsuitable candidates imaginable. Where senior officials in a municipality lack capacity, this deficit trickles down through the institution's organogram as ever less competent individuals are hired and competent ones move elsewhere in frustration. Appointment of unsuitable candidates may often leads to inadequate implementation of the LED programme. Lack of adequate

organogram and suitably qualified personnel may also manifest in the lack of prioritisation of LED to such an extent that in some of the municipalities, the LED unit is staffed by one person (usually the LED officer).

7.3 Financial resources

Another issue related to the question of human resources inadequacy is insufficient funding. The government's supportive role is often expressed through financial and non-financial mechanisms. Non-financial support includes but not limited to the control of inflation, reduction of tariffs and exchange controls, offering of tax incentives, investment in economic infrastructure and SMME development through adequate policy framework (Malefane, 2013: 677). Some of the government institutions which contribute positively to LED are Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), Small Enterprise Development Agency (SEDA), and the newly established Department of Small Business Development. In addition to non-financial support, South African SMMEs have access to credit from commercial banks (Turner, Varghese & Walker, 2002: 22). However, Turner et al (2002: 22) cautions that credit granting tends to be in favour of SMMEs in the formal, rather than the informal sector, since informal sector SMMEs do not usually meet credit requirements. In certain cases, it was not necessarily the issue of a lack of prioritisation of LED that caused staff shortages, but a lack of funding for the programme. The generally poor attention paid to the LED unit may often contribute to low budget allocations. In recent years there have been sharp attacks on the desirability and efficacy of foreign aid for developing countries (Moyo, 2009; Polman, 2010). Other scholars also argue that it is far from clear whether donor finance always furthers the cause of LED. However, if properly used; donor funds may play a positive role in the promotion of LED.

7.4 Ownership of land

Agriculture and tourism are but some of the areas in which investments regarding LED could be made. With regard to tourism, the findings in Khumalo and Thakhathi's (2012: 54) study revealed that some projected tourist trails pass through designated land, which therefore affects the implementation of potential projects. Their study also found that the economic potential of LED initiatives in agriculture and tourism is hampered by the problem of land ownership. Large pieces of land are either privately owned or solely owned by traditional leaders, preventing municipalities from fully exploring the tourism and agricultural opportunities available. Hendricks (2010:12) asserts that the black poor are perpetually landless, while vast pieces of land are owned by white farmers and government's efforts to address this issue have not succeeded. The land question affects opportunities for agriculture, especially for the rural populace, and housing for the urban poor.

7.5 Lack of Coordination

Meyer and Venter (2013: 108) posit that the lack of an integrated approach to LED restrains the provision of diversified economic opportunities to communities. This lack of coordination often results into limited economic impact. In most cases, entities that should be operating as partners seem to be functioning as competitors, hampering the speedy implementation of LED programmes. Meyer and Venter (2013) are also of the opinion that there is little interaction between local government and sector departments (from national and provincial) in respect of LED particularly regarding the specific roles of the said sector departments. Central to this challenge is the absence of a working relationship between the funders and implementers of the programme (Khumalo & Thakhathi, 2012). Without proper coordination, a project could be approved for funding, but getting the finances to the intended beneficiaries takes a long time. This may results in a situation where some LED projects may feel that there is simply not enough funding for LED. Khumalo and Thakhathi (2012) also indicate in the study they undertook that at times different players operate in the same localities, all contributing to LED implementation, but without any coordination between their activities. Lack of coordination may results into duplication of roles and the implementation of LED programmes become more costly than it would otherwise have been.

7.6 Local leadership

Local leadership is critical and essential for the success of LED. Local leadership is inclusive of government officials, local communities and the private sector. In essence, government leaders are expected to take the lead in coordination and facilitation of the LED programmes, while other leaders from the community and private sector contribute through prescribed means (Meyer & Venter, 2013: 108). Lack of requisite leadership particularly at local government sphere is detrimental to the success of LED programmes in the area.

8. Proposed solutions to local economic development challenges

8.1 Provision of adequate funding

To address lack of funding as a challenge to effective LED policy implementation, government in its entirety ought to channel more funds to this cause. Often, municipality budget allocations for LED are quite minimal and thus inadequate in creating business and employment opportunities (Khumalo & Thakhathi, 2012: 58). This paper argues that the importance of LED should also equate to funding if implementation is to be successful. It is further argued that a simpler way for accessing LED funds should be developed. Khumalo and Thakhathi (2012) also suggest that LED funds be channelled directly to local

government, where implementation takes place. However, Cahill (2005:1) states that there is a need for local governments to maximise the use of internally generated resources and skills to reduce dependence on external funding.

8.2 Long-term land strategy

Section 25(5) of the 1996 Constitution stipulates that “... the state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land in an equitable basis”. In concurrence to this assertion, Meyer and Venter (2013: 100) posit that municipalities with large rural areas that fall under the jurisdiction of traditional authorities should develop mechanisms to allow traditional authorities to participate in the development of LED strategies and projects. Municipalities may also acquire unused and unoccupied land particularly from traditional authorities and proclaim it for the purpose of development including LED.

8.3 Reporting structure

There's a need to review existing municipal organogram and ensure that LED unit heads are placed in the section 57 level of managers category, and this may assist the LED units to get the attention and recognition like their peers. Khumalo and Thakhathi (2012: 58); Meyer and Venter (2013: 111) correctly asserts that making an LED manager/director directly accountable to the Municipal Manager may serve as a relief to other factors plaguing LED policy implementation. An LED directorate or unit is necessary to ensure that a municipality fulfils its developmental mandate. The organisational structure may differ from one municipality to another, depending on the size of the municipality and its locality (Meyer & Venter, 2013: 98). Of paramount importance is that the presence of an LED manager in the senior management of the municipal administration may play a significant role in influencing the prioritisation of LED in the municipality.

8.4 Enhancing Inter-Governmental Relations

A need for a workable Inter-Governmental Relations (IGR) policy framework exists, and such a policy should be made enforceable by setting out penalties for non-compliance with the policy. At times other sector departments (from national and province) did not necessarily excuse or simply absent themselves from IGR meetings, but sent junior representatives who could not make binding decisions instead (Meyer & Venter, 2013: 99). LED unit should also work closely with other directorates within the municipality to ensure the alignment of efforts and to avoid duplication of work. This author also concurs with the recommendation by Meyer and Venter (2013: 99) that an LED portfolio committee be

established to facilitate oversight regarding the implementation of LED programmes. LED-related functions of a LED portfolio committee could include: providing political direction and oversight over the development and implementation of the LED strategy, and also mobilise communities by encouraging active citizen participation.

8.5 Enhancing human capacity

Introductory LED skills training for all councillors, ward committees, senior officials and Community Development Workers (CDWs) to create improved awareness is particularly paramount because these stakeholders play a significant role in LED implementation. These officials ought to be more involved in the LED units and require specialised training (Meyer & Venter, 2013: 110). However, it should be noted that at times skills development programmes are implemented independently, without supporting mechanisms. For example, young people are offered training through learnership programmes in various public and private institutions, but are often not absorbed into fulltime employment. Skills development interventions ought to be designed with focus on the current and future needs of the economy. Meyer and Venter (2013: 99) correctly postulate that the focus should also be on critical skills in South Africa including but not limited to agriculture, mining, manufacturing and tourism so that they may be able to attract, maintain and expand local businesses. Enhancing human capacity may also be effected through harnessing skills of immigrants either through mentoring programmes or collaboration efforts between locals and immigrants. This may assist in the transfer of knowledge and skills particularly being observant of the successes of businesses owned by immigrants from elsewhere in the world including China, Nigeria, Pakistan, India and Somalia.

9. Conclusion

Despite South Africa's good legislative and policy frameworks regarding LED, evidence gathered through literature review suggest that the triple challenges facing the country, namely, unemployment, poverty and inequality still exists. The LED programmes coordinated by municipalities have not made a remarkable dent on the said challenges. Malefane (2014: 671) also concurs that the implementation of LED, which, among other interventions, necessitates support of SMMEs, is an intervention whose potential remains unexplored. Johnston, McCarthy, Schlemmer and Bernstein (2004: 5) further posit that the SMME sector, which has had major LED successes internationally, is performing poorly in South Africa, when compared with countries in the same income category, namely Chile, Thailand and Mexico. This paper concludes that the active involvement in the LED programmes by immigrants particularly those with scarce skills so that they may positively contribute to the failing programme implementation. The service delivery regarding LED

often constituted of three main role-players, namely, government, the private sector and local communities. It is worth noting that government as the only role player may not effectively implement the LED programmes particularly because the role of government is that of facilitation and developing policies that guide the implementation. Robust and inclusive local economies are key components of successful LED implementation, and require coordinated efforts of all spheres of government, private sector and the local communities.

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ENHANCING EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION AND INVOLVEMENT IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE

T.S. Setati

M.J. Mafunisa

University of Venda, South Africa

Abstract

Studies promoting employee participation identify at least one of three notions about the organizational change process. First, participation in the change process is said to increase employees' commitment to change and to break down barriers to change. Second, employee involvement is argued to release the creative potential of employees, enabling the organization to identify changes or ways of changing that will enhance organizational performance. Third, participation has been viewed as a control mechanism reducing the need to monitor organizational changes after they are made (this mechanism reinforces the change). Assessments of participation have concluded that involvement programs would increase employees' support for work- place changes. This article starts by defining employee participation, employee commitment and employee involvement. It is argued that a relationship exists between employee involvement and employee commitment. This relationship, if sound, contributes to the attainment of institutional goals and objects. The article then focuses on the six dimensions of employee participation. These dimensions include formal-informal participation, direct-indirect participation and access in decisions. The article also identifies three dimensional model of commitment, viz. affective, continuance and normative. It is concluded that employees be allowed to actively participate in decision making in order to reduce turnover, absenteeism and increase productivity.

Keywords: Employee motivation, Participation, Public service, Employee commitment

1. Introduction

Studies promoting employee participation in organisations identify at least one of three notions about the organizational change process. First, participation in the change process is said to increase employees' commitment to change and to break down barriers to change. Second, employee involvement is argued to release the creative potential of employees, enabling the organization to identify changes or ways of changing that will enhance organizational performance. Third, participation has been viewed as a control mechanism reducing the need to monitor organizational changes after they are made (this

mechanism reinforces the change). Assessments of participation have concluded that involvement programs would increase employees' support for work- place changes (Delaney & Sockell, 1990).

This paper starts by defining employee participation, employee commitment and employee involvement. It will be argued that a relationship exists between employee involvement and employee commitment. This relationship, if sound, contributes to the attainment of institutional goals and objects. The article then focuses on the six dimensions of employee participation. These dimensions include formal-informal participation, direct-indirect participation and access in decisions. The article also identifies three dimensional model of commitment, viz. affective, continuance and normative. It is concluded that employees be allowed to actively participate in decision making in order to reduce turnover, absenteeism and increase productivity.

2. Defining concepts

It is essential to define the following concepts in order to establish a common ground for understanding.

2.1 Employee participation

Participation is defined as "the degree to which a person participates or continually engages in organizational activities" (Allen, Lucero & van Norman, 1997). Employee participation can be defined as the degree to which an employee participates or continually engages in organizational activities. The organizational activities include budgeting and planning.

2.2 Employee commitment

Employee commitment refers to the psychological attachment and the resulting loyalty of an employee to the organisation. Commitment suggests more of an attachment to the employing organization as opposed to specific tasks, environmental factors, and the location where the duties and responsibilities are performed (Mowday, Porter & Steers, 1982).

2.3 Employee involvement

Employee involvement refers to employees taking part or having a say or share in decision making, with no attempt to quantify their impact on the process (Wall and Lischerson, 1977). Employee involvement is seen as management initiated, attempting to secure the direct involvement of individual employees in various schemes designed to

secure employ commitment, motivation and loyalty so as to contribute to the achievement of organisational goals and objectives (Leopold & Harris, 2009: 474). It can therefore be argued that a relationship exists between employee involvement and employ commitment. This relationship, if sound, contributes to the attainment of organizational goals and objects

3. Staff participation in organizational change

Although change can seem attractive to public managers impressed by the case for organizational survival, individual public employees may feel threatened for a variety of reasons. Employees may fear the unknown, threats to their relationship at work, threats to their financial security and threats to their daily routine (Lord & Hartley, 1998). Employee involvement and participation programmes have long been regarded as a way to decrease employees' resistance to change and increase organizational adaptability, hence productivity. Studies that promote employee participation identify three notions about the organizational change process.

First, participation in the change process is said to increase employees' commitment to change and to break down barriers to change. Second, employee involvement is argued to release the creative potential of employees, enabling the organization to identify changes or ways of changing that will enhance organizational performance. Third, participation has been viewed as a control measure reducing the need to monitor organizational changes after they are made (this mechanism reinforces the change). Assessments of participation have concluded that involvement programs would increase employees' support for workplace changes (Delaney & Sockell, 1990).

The main aim of involvement policies is to break down "them and us" attitudes and increase employee commitment and involvement. The psychological literature on organizational change emphasizes that ownership or involvement in change would be integral to success (Lord & Hartley, 1991).

4. Classification of participation types

Different classification schemes reflecting conceptual distinctions can be found in the literature, as is shown in the literature search conducted by Cotton, Vollrath, Frogatt, Lengnick-Hall & Jennings (1988). Six main dimensions of participation are identified and discussed below.

The first three dimensions: formal-informal, direct-indirect and the degree of access or influence organization members have in making a decision, were formulated by Dachler and Wilpert (1978). de Leede and Looise (1994) define the content of the decision involved. The

duration of the participation was added by Cotton, Vollrath, Lengnick-Hall and Yennings (1988). Finally, the degree of force was mentioned by Locke and Schweiger (1979). These six dimensions are listed below.

4.1 Formal-Informal Participation

Formal participation has an explicitly recorded system of rules, regulations and agreements imposed on the organization. Three bases of legitimization for formal participation can be distinguished: legal bases, contractual bases and management policies. A policy is defined as the declaration of intent. Informal participation in contrast is a non-statutory consensus emerging among interacting members. Informal participatory schemes are based on a consensus among interacting social units or individuals and become legitimized through practice and evolving norms, traditions or customary procedures (Dachler & Wilpert, 1978). The degree of formality or informality of participation is closely linked to the underlying values of the designers, to the goals and objectives which participation is to serve, and to the particular organizational and societal context in which the participatory system exists.

4.2 Direct-Indirect Participation

Direct participation involves immediate personal involvement of organizational members while indirect participation involves mediated involvement of organization members in decision making through some form of representation (Dachler & Wilpert, 1978). Gill and Krieger (2000) note that whilst in earlier days the emphasis was on indirect representation, since the beginning of the 1990s a focus on direct forms of participation can be seen. This shift has gone hand-in-hand with a rediscovery of the human factor in work organizations, which can be seen as a response to the increasing competitive pressures facing organisations and the growth of human public resource management (HRM). The combination of the first dimension (level of formalisation) and the second (way of representation) leads to a matrix containing four different types of participation: direct-formal, indirect-formal, direct-informal, indirect-informal (De Cuyper & Loutsch, 2002).

4.3 Access in Decisions

Access is the amount of influence organization members can exert on a decision (Cotton, et al., 1988). Dachler and Wilpert (1978) describe participation as a continuum reflecting the different forms of access that organization members have, or the amount of influence they can exert on a decision. Heller, Drenth, Koopman and Rus (1988) speak in

this perspective of the "Influence-Power-Continuum". Along this continuum the following behaviours can be found:

- a) No (advance) information is given to employees about a decision
- b) Employees are informed in advance
- c) Employees can give their opinion about the decision
- d) Employees' opinions are taken into account
- e) Employees can veto a decision
- f) The decision is completely in the hands of the employees

Of critical importance in this regard is the point at which employees in organizations gain access to the flow of information relevant to a particular decision. In behaviours b) through d) all information handling remains with management and the function of participating organizational members is to receive and provide information. However, the psychological meaning of these behaviours is likely to differ. In behaviour e) organization members can manipulate information and enforce their preferences. The capacity of employees to veto a decision implies a decision-making arrangement in which participation exclusive to management ends, and a new organizational influence and power system emerges involving processes like bargaining and negotiation. Behaviour f) represents the complete power equalization as all members of an organization have equal access to the making of a decision and an equal potential to influence the decision (Dachler & Wilpert, 1978).

4.4 Content of the decision involved

Locke and Schweiger (1979) noted that the outcomes of participation might vary in terms of content of the decisions involved. The types of decision which might be included in participation schemes would generally fall into four broad categories: routine personnel functions (e.g. hiring, training, performance evaluation); work itself (e.g. work methods, job design, speed of work); working conditions (e.g. hours of work, rest pauses) and organizational policies (e.g. profit sharing, fringe benefits).

4.5 Duration of the Participation

This dimension on duration of employee participation concerns whether the participation has a permanent character (Cotton, et al., 1988). Short-term, incidental participation often concerns a once-only definition of policy goals by management and

employees (representatives). Most forms of participation however are based on long-term commitments between management and employees or have a permanent character (de Leede & Looise, 1994).

4.6 Degree of Force

Participation in decision making can be forced or voluntary (Locke & Schweiger, 1979). The force is applied by legislation or government decree; partially forced participation would occur in cases where it results from a contract between management and labour but where management legally is compelled to bargain; voluntary participation would occur where management initiates the idea of participation and the employees agree to it or vice versa.

5. Employee commitment in organisations

Recent years have witnessed an upsurge of interest in the relevance of work attitudes for employee behaviour in organisations, particularly the impact of employee work commitment on job performance, absence, tardiness, and turnover (Cohen, 1992; Randall, 1990; Whitener & Walz, 1993). With the changing economic climate in many countries, concern has been expressed about maintaining or even enhancing employees' commitment to the job and the organisation (Caldwell, Chatman, & O'Reilly, 1990). Some empirical studies have focused on the effects of demographic factors, such as job level, tenure, and longevity (Cohen, 1992), or job characteristics, including job scope, variety, and challenge (Griffin, 1991) on employee commitment and involvement.

Given that how an organisation treats its employees may have a substantial influence on their attitudes towards both their jobs and the organisation itself, exploration of linkages between employee perceptions of rewards and the support they receive from their organisation is of considerable interest, both theoretically and practically (Shore & Tetrick, 1991). It can therefore be argued that a relationship exists between employee involvement and employee commitment. This relationship, if sound, contributes to the attainment of institutional goals and objects.

Meyer and Allen (1991) describe a three-dimensional model of commitment: affective, continuance and normative. They argue that affective commitment is based on how much individual 'wants' to remain in the organization. Continuance commitment refers to an awareness of the costs associated with leaving the organization. Normative commitment reflects a feeling of obligation to continue employment. Employees with a high level of normative commitment feel that they ought to remain with the organization.

5.1 Affective Commitment

Several studies, describe the term commitment as an affective orientation of the employees toward the organization. Employees with affective commitment continue service with organization because they want to do so. Porter, et al., (1979) describe affective approach as the relative strength of an individual's identification with and involvement in a particular organization.

Mowday, et al.,(1982) argue that an individual who is affectively committed or emotionally attached to the organization (i) believe in the goal and values of the organization, (ii) works hard for the organization and (iii) intend to stay with the organization. Meyer and Allen (1984, 1990, 1991) correlate affective commitment with work experiences where employees experience psychologically comfortable feelings (such as approachable managers), increasing their sense of competence (such as feedback). The development of affective commitment involves recognizing the organization's worth and internalising its principles and standards.

5.2 Continuance commitment

When employees enter into the organization, they are bound to maintain a link with the organization or committed to remain with the organization because of lack of alternative opportunity or awareness of the costs associated with leaving the organization. The cost associated with leaving includes attractive benefits, the threat of wasting the time; effort spent trying to secure another job and disrupting personal relationship.

Allen and Meyer (1990) state that continuance commitment develops on the basis of two factors, viz. number of investment individuals make in their current organization and perceived lack of alternatives. This investment can be anything that the individual employee considers valuable such as pension plans, organizational benefits and status that would be lost by leaving the organization, which makes them stay with their current employers (Meyer & Allen, 1984)

Similarly, lack of employment alternatives also increases the perceived costs associated with leaving the organization and therefore increase the continuance commitment of employees to the organization (Allen & Meyer, 1990). Kanter (1968) defines continuance commitment as that type of continuance which occurs when there is a profit associated with continued participation and a cost associated with leaving". Somers (1993) suggests that continuance commitment can be sub-divided into high sacrifice commitment ("personal

sacrifice” associated with leaving) and low alternative commitment (“limited opportunities” for other employment).

The approach of continuance commitment develops when an individual recognizes that he/she lose investments (the money they earn as a result of the time spent in the organization), and/or perceives that there are no alternatives or other course of action. When an individual considers the expenses and threats linked to leaving the organization, this form of commitment is considered to be calculative (Meyer & Allen 1997). Meyer and Allen (1991) also specified that individuals whose most important connection with the organization is based on continuance commitment stay with the organization simply because they have no choice. Whereas affective commitment is, where individuals remain with an organization because they want to and because they are familiar with it and they have emotional attachment with it.

5.3 Normative Commitment

Normative commitment develops on the basis of earlier experiences influenced by, for example family-based experiences (parents that stress work loyalty) or cultural experiences (sanctions against “job-hopping”) (Allen & Meyer, 1996). Normative commitment can increase through beliefs that the employees have that employers provide more than they can give. The normative aspect develops as individuals’ perception of their moral obligation to remain with a specific organization, irrespective of how much status improvement or fulfilment the organization gives the individual over the years (March & Mannari 1977). Normative commitment/obligation is seen as a result of the receipt of benefits (which encourages a feeling that one should reciprocate), and/or acceptance of the terms of a psychological contract.

6. Perceived organisational support

Eisenberger, Fasolo and Davis-LaMastro (1990) and Eisenberger, Huntington, Hutchison and Sowa (1986) argue that employees develop generalised beliefs about the extent to which an organisation is supportive of its employees. Earlier work by Buchanan (1974) found that managers’ beliefs that the organisation recognised their contribution and could be depended on to fulfil promises were positively associated with affective commitment. More recently, Meyer, Allen and Gellatly (1990) have shown that organisational “dependability” enhances affective commitment. Eisenberger et al. (1990) observed a positive relationship between affective commitment and the extent to which employees believe the organisation provides them with needed support, values their contribution, and cares about their well-being. The above authors did not directly explore links between these

variables and continuance commitment; although they suggested that perceived support would also enhance this form of commitment by creating an atmosphere of trust in the organisation's willingness to fulfil its obligations towards employees. Although it is logical to assume a relationship between employee perceptions of organisational support and their levels of organisational commitment and job involvement, there has been little empirical research on the relative influence of perceived organisational support (POS) on the two distinct forms of organisational commitment. In the only direct investigations of the link between these variables, Shore and her colleagues (Shore & Tetrick, 1991; Shore & Wayne, 1993) found strong positive correlations between POS and affective commitment, but a lack of association between support and continuance commitment.

7. Satisfaction with rewards

Lincoln and Kalleberg (1990) are of the opinion that the rewards offered by an organisation may have a powerful effect on employees' attitudes towards their job and the organization for which they work. In this context, it is important to distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic rewards. Intrinsic rewards are those that exist in the job itself, such as variety, challenge, and autonomy whereas extrinsic rewards comprise elements such as pay and fringe benefits, promotion or advancement opportunities within the organisation, the social climate, and physical working conditions. Intrinsic rewards will probably be more salient for affective commitment (and, it is argued, job involvement), whereas extrinsic rewards are more likely to be important in relation to continuance commitment to the organisation (O'Reilly, Chatman, 1986 & O'Reilly, Chatman, & Caldwell, 1991). Consistent with this reasoning, it is anticipated that satisfaction with intrinsic rewards would be positively associated with job involvement and with affective commitment, but would have little bearing on continuance commitment. In contrast, satisfaction with extrinsic rewards is expected to be important mainly for continuance commitment, but would play a relatively small role in the prediction of job involvement and affective commitment.

8. Levels of employee involvement

Hartford (2013) argues that it is imperative for management, especially in the public service to apply some form of employee involvement if they hope to retain workers that they have made an investment in the form of training and salaries. If this is done, and the public servants are satisfied, the myth about public servants being the laziest set of employees can be responded to. Public servants should demonstrate a greater sense of commitment to the service and noted productivity should increase while absenteeism should decrease. Once this happens a successful public service would be witnessed.

9. Conclusion

If employees are allowed to actively participate in decision making it could and would reduce turnover, absenteeism and increase productivity. Not only does participative decision making contribute to productivity, but it also allows management to have a better understanding of the mind-set of the staff and put better policies in place that would address the concerns of the staff members. Public servants should be consulted more often on the issues that they are faced with on a daily basis. The article focused on the six dimensions of employee participation. These dimensions include formal-informal participation, direct-indirect participation and access in decisions. The article also identified and discussed three dimensional model of commitment, viz. affective, continuance and normative. It is concluded that employees be allowed to actively participate in decision making in order to reduce turnover, absenteeism and increase productivity.

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XENOPHOBIA AND MIGRATION: UNDESIRABLE ATTITUDES AND ATTACKS ON FOREIGN NATIONALS IN SOUTH AFRICA

N.E. Mathebula

University of Limpopo, South Africa

Abstract

People migrate to other countries around the world for various reasons. The harsh socio-economic circumstances in the neighbouring Zimbabwe, Mozambique and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in general could be one such reason. As a result citizens of these countries search for better jobs, living conditions and other economic and social opportunities in countries such as South Africa and Botswana. This consequently brings contempt and subsequently violent attacks by South Africans believing that foreign nationals compete with them for better socio-economic prospects. There is also a belief that most foreigners are involved in criminal activities. This paper, through a literature review, desktop analysis and using the Kingdon's Multiple Streams Theory, attempts to unearth and understand the phenomenon of xenophobia by examining some of the root causes and its policy implications. Xenophobia can generally be understood as a deep-rooted, illogical hatred towards "foreign nationals" by the host community. Due to the nature and scope of xenophobic occurrences in South Africa, the paper focuses only on Zimbabwean nationals as victims, which is referred to as 'Afrophobia'. The paper further examines the policy interventions on [im]migration and border management as mechanisms for influx control of illegal foreigners as a matter of contention amongst South African citizens. The paper then concludes that while foreign nationals can play a major role in providing scarce skills and boosting economic growth amongst other benefits, there is a need to tighten control measures on migration by both government and the business sector.

Keywords: Xenophobia, Kingdon's Multiple Streams Theory, Policy, Foreign nationals, Migration

1. Introduction

The point of departure for this paper would be to cite the preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) which explicitly states that '.....South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity'. This was coupled by a reassurance by the words of Archbishop Desmond Tutu (1998) when he said that South Africa should move towards a glorious society where people are not discriminated because of their biological irrelevancies. Despite all this being said, in the years 1994, 1995, 2008 and 2015 South Africa witnessed horrific and violent attacks against foreign migrants particularly those from the African

continent. This of course calls for the revisiting and rethinking of migration policies and a mind-set shift on attitudes against foreigners. Literature suggest that victims of xenophobic or Afrophobic attacks in South Africa are foreign nationals mainly from the neighbouring Zimbabwe and Mozambique (Smith, 2015) as they look for better living conditions, jobs and political peace and stability which is lacking in their mother countries. The Kingdon's Multiple Streams Theory (KMST) is used in this paper as a lens through which to reflect and zoom on the phenomenon of Afrophobia which is viewed as xenophobia in the contextualisation misnomer and its policy implications. The concept Afrophobia can well be captured by the words of Crush (2000) in Gopal (2013:126). Gopal argues that the negative attitude of South Africans towards non-nationals is largely oriented towards other Africans. To this end, the paper attempts to conceptualise and place within the South African context and Africa in particular the concepts of xenophobia and migration. This conceptualisation and contextualisation will assist the current discourse in the understanding of the terminology which the paper unpacks through the application of the KMST. The paper further outlines a brief background of Zimbabwe as a case study to view issues related to migration and xenophobic attacks in relation to foreigners from that country in South Africa. Xenophobic attacks that took place in South Africa necessitate a pragmatic shift in migration policy and border management which the paper will discuss later. This paper further attempts to draw from various sources of literature the trends, attitudes and consequences of xenophobia and conclude by proposing recommendations to address this societal ill.

2. Conceptualising and contextualising xenophobia and migration

The nature of xenophobia and the prevalence of migration in South Africa calls for scholars across different fields of study, practitioners, and the third sector of the society to look into, and engage in order to find at least an operational definition on the conceptualisation of these concepts. This is so because the variety of conceptualisation models and interpretation in most instances lacks synergy thus has the potential to mislead decision-making processes in the dialogue. This section of the paper provides what is mainly dictionary meaning of xenophobia and migration due to the scarcity of scholarly debates and literature on the subjects.

2.1 Xenophobia

Conceptualising an elusive and highly contested concept for such a term as xenophobia necessitates tracing both its ontological and epistemological being. The concept is a combination of two words; xeno and phobia which are of the Greek origin. Xeno literally refers to a stranger or foreigner while on the other hand phobia in Greek means fear. Xenophobia in this context can therefore be understood as an excessive and irrational fear

of foreigners which tend to create anger, hatred and violence toward foreign nationals or simply anything perceived to be of foreign nature. Just like with racism, foreigners are despised because of their colour and place of origin. Xenophobia can further be understood as an unreasonable fear and hatred on people and objects alleged to be foreign which manifest itself in aggression and the willingness to destroy its presence presumably to and restore anxiety and fear by the host community. Yakushko (2008:8) defines xenophobia as a form of attitudinal, affective, and behavioural prejudice towards immigrants and those perceived to be foreign. To this end it can be deduced that the South African context of xenophobia somehow differs from the epistemological contextualisation and the ideals and realities on the ground. The xenophobic occurrences in South Africa are characterised by attacks on black (African) foreigners, something this paper refers to as Afrophobia. This is so because other foreign nationals from outside the borders of the African continent are not targets and therefore not the victims of this social-ill. It is worth pointing out that xenophobia has ‘discriminatory potential’ which is activated when ideology such as nativism, ethnocentrism, and nationalism is connected to a sense of threat on a personal or group level (Yakushko, 2008:9).

2.2 [Im]migration

Migration is not only a South African phenomenon but one of the contemporary issues of the globe that spills over boundaries (Chisholm, 2007; Yakushko, 2008). It therefore presents challenges for the nation state as it raises issues of increased interconnectedness. Literally, migration refers to the movement of people from one place to another. In essence, there are two forms of migration. First, is the movement within the borders of one country while the other is the movement across the boundaries of one country to another. In the context of the current discourse, migration seeks to refer to the movement of people from other countries to South Africa for the purposes of finding work, better living conditions, taking up permanent or semi-permanent residence due to socio-economic and political unrest in their countries of origin. It must be pointed out that South Africa is within a continent with governments and states that are socially and economically challenged and prone to political conflicts thus are major driving forces for migration within Africa or even across the borders of the continent. It is for such reasons that a country such as South Africa with better socio-economic offerings and a relatively stable political environment experiences an influx of migrants from neighbouring countries. Whether the migrants enter through the borders of South Africa legally or illegally is another issue. Although migration can be sometimes viewed as a problem, it is worth pointing out that South Africa accrues underappreciated benefits from the [im]migration process. Migration may however create and impose certain social and economic challenges on the state. To

comprehensively question the phenomenon of xenophobia and migration and the policy implications, this paper applies the Kingdon's Multiple Streams Theory.

3. Kingdon's multiple streams theory to understanding xenophobia and migration

Schurink (2009: 807) states that a theoretical framework is used to inform the research design and guide the methodological approach. Public Administration as a discipline and applied science has to relate to theory/ies applied in practice (Thornhill & Van Dijk, 2010:97). The Kingdon's Multiple Streams Theory (KMST) is used in this paper to understand undesirable attitudes and attacks on foreign nationals in South Africa and the policy implications thereof. The KMST has its origins in the work of the American political scientist John Kingdon. The theory has usually been used in the analysis of national policy development with the aim of understanding policy and decision making processes under conditions of ambiguity (Rossiter & Price, 2013). Interestingly, the KMST has not been used in the context of low income countries and African countries in particular. However, according to Riddle (2009: 938) the theory can be extended and has the potential to lead to the formulation of several theoretical propositions. In using the KMST, this paper acknowledges chaos and irrationality amongst policy-makers. Therefore the KMST can be used as a framework to predict for future policy trends (Lovell, 2010) in migration policies and the implications and potentials for xenophobic violence and attacks in South Africa rather than being imposed as an absolute answer to the challenge.

This section of the paper outlines the structural elements as proposed by the KMST and rigorously expanded by various authors with a view to understand xenophobia and its African phenomenon (that is Afrophobia). Traditionally, the KMST consist of the following structural elements; the problem stream, the policy stream, and the political stream (Burgess, 2002; Young, Shepley & Song, 2010; Larkin, 2012; Rossiter & Price, 2013). However, there are additional elements such as; policy window and coupling (Zhou & Feng, 2014), policy entrepreneur (Rossiter & Price, 2013), and window of opportunity (Riddle, 2009) which Lovell (2010) refers to as the coming window. Due to the nature and scope of the current discourse, the traditional elements of the KMST will be discussed in relation to migration, xenophobia and policy issues together with the solutions stream as advocated by Teodorovic (2008).

3.1 The Problem Stream

The problem stream seeks to evaluate the notion of political and social problems which calls for the creation of new policies if it can reasonably be argued that they are solving a problem (Lovell, 2010). According to Rossiter and Price (2013: 855), the problem

stream relates to the manner in which issues are acknowledged as challenges requiring a policy response. Central to the problem streams, Kingdon (1995) asked this question;

‘Why do some problems come to occupy the attention of decision makers rather than other problems?’

The response to this question relates to a manner in which policy makers learn about conditions around them through indicators, crisis, experience and research (Rossiter & Price, 2013). However, according to Zhou and Feng (2014:2), these mechanisms of learning about conditions must be urgent and easily attract government official's attention to addressing the problem. In this view there is no doubt that given the severity and its magnitude, xenophobic attitudes and attacks on foreign nationals must be viewed as a societal problem that requires policy intervention. According to Porter (1995) in Teodorovic (2008), for a societal condition to be a problem, it must be perceived as such and be seen as a condition enabling government action. There is enough evidence pointing out that the recent crisis of xenophobia in South Africa reached policy makers and conditions around the matter required adequate thoughtfulness. However, the 2015 xenophobic attacks was responded to by government and policy makers using short-term solutions such as the deployment of the army and police to hot-spots without questioning the sustainability of those measures (Rahlagu & Lindeque, 2015). Of course, the 1994/5 and 2008 xenophobic violence could have been used as a lesson whereby policy makers could have responded to the problem through policy interventions and other sustainable measures such as community education.

3.2 The Policy Stream

According to Rossiter and Price (2013:857), the policy stream describes activities relating to the identification of potential policy solution(s). It is along these lines that this paper firmly argues that the recurrence of xenophobic violence in South Africa rings a bell to policy makers for the formulation or even the amendment of existing policies on migration particularly by the Department of Home Affairs. The policy stream contains all the possible solutions to the problems as brought to the picture by policy experts, scholars, government officials and politicians (Chow, 2014: 56). As said before, this paper argues for South Africa's revisiting and the rethinking of the migration policies and border management as solutions for xenophobic attitudes and violence.

The policy stream advocates for the legislator to produce alternatives and proposals which are viable and seek to address the realities and ideals on the ground (Burgess, 2002). This is so because such policy must be technically feasible and value accepted for it to survive. The Immigration Act, 2002 (13 Of 2002) is a one typical examples of a piece of legislation that needs to be revisited if the South African border entries are to be protected from illegal entry. In that view, ideas may be proposed, developed, reworked and combined on an ongoing basis (Rossiter and Price, 2013) on xenophobia and migration until such time as they receive the necessary attention for a lasting solution. A common error that is usually committed by policy makers is taking time to respond to matters of national importance by procrastinating until the problem manifests itself again as the case is with xenophobia and migration issues.

3.3 The Political Stream

Similar to the problem stream, the political stream can be understood as flowing along independently of the problem and policy streams composed with public mood, campaigns from pressure groups, elections, partisanship, change in administration, change in jurisdiction, turnover in positions which has the potential to gradually strengthen the urgency of the problem (Burgess, 2002; Young, Shepley & Song, 2010; Krolczek, 2013; Chow, 2014; Zhou & Feng, 2014). According to Burgess (2002) the political stream reflects the ongoing breakdown between policy and monopoly. As such, it can be argued that xenophobia within a state will give rise to the questioning of political leadership. It must be borne in mind that politicians are responsible for policy making including policies which are at times may not favourable to all the citizenry within a republic. The recent xenophobic attacks in South Africa resulted in finger pointing whereby high ranking politicians refused to take responsibility and therefore be held accountable. It is for such reasons that migration and related issues of xenophobia are rapidly moving up the agenda of political concerns in places such as Europe (Martins, 2011). Although the political stream of the KMST seeks to separate the problem stream and the policy stream from the political stream, one should call for the integration of the streams if policy initiatives are to address the problem such as xenophobia and respond to migration matters.

3.4 The Solutions Stream

Besides the orthodox structural elements of the KMST of the problem stream, policy stream, and the political stream, Teodorovic (2008) proposed the solutions stream. This is in line with the view that in as much as all streams can be applied to a societal problem such as xenophobia or Afrophobia in context of the South African prevalence, solutions must be sought for.

4. Zimbabwe as a case study

Zimbabwe is in turmoil with problematic human rights record, substantial economic decline and serious crisis of governance (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2002). These crises have led to socio-economic, political and humanitarian problems which resulted in people moving to other countries for better prospects. South Africa is one such a country that receives large volumes of foreign nationals from Zimbabwe. The ZANU-PF led government has significantly failed to provide the masses of the people with human security, economic and social peace (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2002). According to Chitiyo and Kibble (2014:8), the adoption of a multi-currency system resulted in a tax base decline and reduced the fiscal policy space which consequently resulted in low levels of investment especially in the manufacturing sector. It is for these and other reasons that Zimbabwean nationals flock to South Africa both legally and illegally and be viewed to be competing with nationals in almost all sectors of the economy. This brought contempt and anger and consequently xenophobic attacks with the belief that foreigners compete for jobs with hosting communities as well as commit crime.

5. Migration policies and border management in South Africa

South Africa has struggled to develop and effectively implement policies for managing migration and its border posts. This is not a South African challenge alone as countries such as the United States are at the same helm (CDE, 2011). The challenge for the integration and effective policy making and implementation with effective border management is associated with high costs (CDE, 2011) which cannot supersede the economic and security realities and ideals. Despite all this, a country needs to promulgate policies and manage its borders for the sake of national interest, peace and security. According to Martin (2011), the South African government has drastically failed to manage the borders and promulgate effective migration policies because of resource constraints resulting in porous borders with people who lack proper travel documentation. In this context, it is therefore necessary to develop a migration management system that puts the country's national interest first; maximises economic growth of the country and the region in general; assists foreigners in realising their rights and benefits; while minimising the side-effects of immigration. However there are challenges such as demography and economic opportunities that radically increase migration which places tremendous pressure on policy makers to manage migration and the borders. According to Carneson (2011), other major issues to the management of borders and migration policies particularly for developed and developing countries is the involvement of low-skilled labour from Zimbabwe who are often attractive to employers because of their willingness to work hard in jobs that are undesirable

to local citizens. Under such circumstances, it can be deduced that since migration is old as mankind itself, the management of borders and the policies surrounding migration should be dynamic and flexible to take into account for the changing migration trends. The Immigration Act of 2002 was promulgated to regulate the issues related to migration and border management which is the focus of the next section.

5.1 *The Immigration Act, 2002 (13 of 2002)*

The Immigration Act was promulgated with the objectives to promote a human rights-based culture in both government and civil society in immigration control, facilitating and simplifying the issuing of both temporary and permanent permits while also discouraging illegal foreigners. The Act further seeks to regulate the influx of foreigners. Central to the current discourse on migration and xenophobia, in terms of section 2 (1) (e) of the Act, xenophobia should be deterred and prevented across all the three spheres of government, organs of state, and most importantly at a community level. One is tempted to pose a question given a piece of legislation which seeks to promote peace between foreign nationals and South African nationals: what then ignited xenophobic attacks and violence in the country? In as much as segregation against foreigners takes place at the community level, there is a sense that the people on the ground lack sound knowledge of government policies and therefore end up taking conscious and criminal decisions. The early dawn and the 2008 xenophobic violence in South Africa should have served as a valuable lesson for the purposes of policy making through revising the statutes coupled with community awareness. Hence section (2) (e) of the Act aims to educate communities and organs of civil society on the rights of foreigners, whether legal or illegal and refugees, and conduct other activities to prevent xenophobia. It can therefore be drawn from the prescripts of this section that perhaps it is not a matter of policy but rather its implementation which has been found to be wanting. Furthermore, in terms of section 47 (1) of the same Act, the Department of Home Affairs is responsible for setting up an anti-corruption unit charged with the task of preventing, deterring amongst others; xenophobia. The past recurrences of xenophobia in the year 2008 and 2015 caught the South African government by surprise due to the lack of detection mechanisms in place instead of the temporary and unsustainable measures such as the deployment of police and the army to the hot-spots. If and when a unit dedicated to the detection, prevention, and deterring of xenophobia is set up, government will not resign to the shameful and a fake sympathetic reception of African foreigners. Xenophobia as the Act states, is encountered and prevented within government and civil society.

6. Xenophobia in South Africa: attitudes, trends and consequences

Chilshom (2002:3) states that South Africans are strongly xenophobic and possess stereotypes on foreigners who are viewed as being responsible for crime. Foreigners are also viewed as a problem and pose a threat to jobs, therefore citizens acquire tough and forceful action against them. It must however be pointed out that foreign nationals, particularly the unskilled ones are not necessarily threatening the jobs the locals. According to Martin (2011:11) migrants are often attractive to local employees because of their willingness to work hard for low-wage jobs (Yakushko, 2008:7) which are usually shunned by locals.

Immigrants move to other countries of the world for completely varying reasons. Therefore the prevalence and nature of xenophobia is different both in form and character in different countries. However, little do people know of the consequences of these xenophobic attitudes both on migrants and the host community. According to Yakushko (2008:1) xenophobia is associated with a declining public and economic security, overpopulation, pollution, increased violence, depleted social resources, eroded community values, and terrorism. A major subject of contention in South Africa with the contempt in which mostly Zimbabwean nationals are hated for is the competition for jobs and commission of crimes. There are other causes triggering violent xenophobic attacks as it has been mentioned before. For example, when there is a threat that foreigners are taking jobs for the locals, this kind of prejudice produces political xenophobia (Yakushko, 2008), which equally calls for the promulgation of policies to discriminate against foreigners. Xenophobia is also associated with political instability. It was at the helm of Zimbabwe's political crisis that many of the citizens moved to South Africa in large numbers. Coupled with its political meltdown that resulted from sanctions and boycotts, Zimbabwean citizens moved to South Africa with prospects of jobs with higher earnings, peace and political stability. This consequently resulted in South Africans reacting with hostility and cohesive force and felt threatened because of a perceived economic and social strain.

South Africa is one country with high prevalence of unemployment and the moving in of immigrants particularly Zimbabweans is targeted as a convenient scapegoat. Additionally, foreigners are viewed as crime perpetrators and drug-dealers (Solomon & Kosaka, 2014) without crime-rate statistics highlighting the fallacy as claimed by advocacies. According to Yakushko (2008) other cases of xenophobia relates to competition for access to limited resources and mainly stereotypes directed to citizens from outside the borders of the country. These stereotypes, prejudices and resultant discrimination have the potential to dent the image of the state thus detrimentally affecting relations with the world. Furthermore,

due to the benefits associated with immigration, the economy is at a risk of not performing to expectation if the unrecognised contribution by immigrants is not recognised as important.

7. Discussion and mapping the way forward

Preventing another xenophobic violence erupting in South Africa, government, the business sector and civil society need to act by committing running awareness campaigns at community levels. This paper further recommends that the academe should contribute theoretically by engaging in the discourse of xenophobia and related issues such as migration in order to surface new frameworks and models to better understand these phenomena. This will assist policy making processes in order to come up with practical solutions informed by research. However, all this might fail to materialise if nothing is done on the alteration and a pragmatic shift of attitudes of the general citizenry. It only appeals to one's conscious of doing the right thing instead of the bad. South Africans are enclosed within the artificial borders and the attacks on foreigners are not necessarily because of poverty, unemployment and political stability but a lack of continentalism which results in Afrophobia and nativism ideologies. Policy must go beyond detecting, preventing and deterring and be more practically to the surrounding conditions driving migration of foreigners to South Africa. Finally, what is more important for South Africans is to demonstrate solidarity with all Africans in general and the SADC in particular.

8. Conclusion

This paper attempted to understand the phenomenon of xenophobia and migration as closely interrelated concepts. Due to the complexity of the discourse, the paper only used secondary literature and the Kingdon's Multiple Streams Theory to unpack some of the attitudes and violent attacks from an outsider's perspective. Although one might argue from a perspective of a perpetrator instead of a victim, the fundamental principles enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) and other pieces of legislation should at all-time take supremacy in the regulation of migration, border management and the treatment of foreigners within the republic. Literature has shown that migrants whether legal or illegal, skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled confer many benefits to economic growth that it is usually unrecognised. Perhaps for South Africa it may be necessary to review the implementation regime regarding migration policies and educate the citizenry in general about these matters.

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THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS EAST AFRICA IN THE POST-2008 ERA: BUSINESS [UN]USUAL?

K.B. Shai

University of Limpopo, South Africa

Abstract

The relationship between the United States of America (hereafter referred to as the US) and African continent have been the hotbed for scholars and practitioners, inter alia. A quick review of the literature on the discourse of International Relations reveals that the slave trade, World War I and II, Cold War, anti-colonial struggles and war on terrorism have served as the key imperatives of the US-Africa relations. However, a critical analysis of the studies about US-Africa relations suggests that these imperatives have changed the foreign policy of Washington towards Africa in varying degrees. The missing link about this literature is that it largely refers to the 'US foreign policy towards Africa' and it is silent about the 'foreign policy of Africa towards the US'. This premise can be understood within the context of the national and regional divisions of the African continent. The lack of unity and common purpose among the African states and regions naturally denies Africa of an opportunity to develop a robust guiding tool for its international relations. The nonexistence of the 'foreign policy of Africa towards the US' is a direct vindication of the thesis of this paper; that in the context of US-Africa relations the agency is moved from the African states to Washington. Therefore, this Afrocentric paper largely uses thematic content analysis and critical discourse approach in their broadest form in order to examine the foreign policy of the US towards East Africa post-George W. Bush era. Hypothetically, the historical sensibility of this paper forces it to contests the notion that Barack Obama has changed the US foreign policy towards East Africa since his election as the President in the year 2008. In conclusion, this paper builds on the notion that since independence to date, the foreign policy of the US towards Africa and East Africa in particular, has not changed. It has indeed maintained the posture of 'neglect' and self-selfishness.

Keywords: Foreign Policy, International Relations, Diplomacy, Kenya, Tanzania, United States of America, East Africa, Africa

1. Introduction

Historically, Africa and East Africa in particular has never been on the priority list of the US foreign policy makers (Waters, 2006:46; Mkandawire, 2010:6). The marginalisation of Africa in the US was not limited to the political circles. It was also evident in the production and dissemination of information through academic and popular publications. More often than not, Africa was pinned with negative labels such as a 'dark continent' and even a 'hopeless continent' (Soriot, 2014:36-37). This negative labelling of Africa was largely influenced by the cycle of violent conflicts, poverty, hunger, diseases and rampant corruption which had become a common feature of most African states (Jerven, 2015:84-86). In this context, Obama has warned that '[S]o long as parts of Africa continue to be ravaged by war and mayhem, opportunity and democracy cannot take root' (United States, 2013). But parts of Africa, which are characterised by persistent conflicts and endless wars are not reflective of the whole of Africa as a continent.

While it is true that epidemics such as HIV/AIDS, political and economic instabilities have been a common denominator of the emerging patterns and trends of the African society, it must be pointed out that such a situation was at times exaggerated by the Western media, politicians and academics (Malherbe, 2013). The practice of exaggerating Africa's setbacks has a long history within the American circles as a means of weakening African countries and economies by creating panic and eventually, justifying foreign intervention by the big powers such as the US, Britain and France (Ewi and Els, 2015). In this context, Africa had to be projected as a continent that is in despair and in dire need of Euro-American assistance for the purpose of building sustainable political institutions and viable social and economic structures. Positive stories about Africa hardly attracted adequate attention of the American politicians, scholars and media practitioners. However, if recent reports about Africa on the international media are anything to go by, it is safe to state that the perceptions of the Western populace about this continent are shifting towards the positive side (The Associated Press, 2015). It is now common to hear and/or read about narratives such as 'Africa is on the move' and 'Africa is rising' (Gerard, 2015:6; Ngcaweni, 2013:56-61). The change of heart in terms towards positive reporting about African can be attributed to emergence of scholars who analyses the continent's economies with contextual, on-the-ground research (Jerven, 2015:84).

It is against this background that this paper seeks to use East Africa as a test case to critique the US foreign policy from an African perspective (Asante, 2003; Mazama, 2003; Chilisa, 2012). While the primary focus of this paper is on East Africa, the researcher's

conviction is that a deeper understanding of the US foreign policy can be generated through an analytic tapestry which is located within a broader African continental context. In line with the periodisation method, the year 2008 is used as a starting point for this study because it has served as a watershed moment in the political history of the US when an African-American was elected for the first time as the president of that country. Given that Obama has presided over the Presidency of the US for the past seven years, this period is considered by the researcher to be sufficient for one to make a fair conclusion in addressing the following central questions:

- How did the Obama administration represents a catalyst of change or continuity insofar as the US foreign policy in East Africa?
- To what extent did the new narratives about Africa affect the US foreign policy towards East Africa and the African continent at large?

Inasmuch as the primary focus of this paper is on the post-2008 era, it is believed that a deeper understanding and sound conclusion on the two critical questions can be arrived at if the analysis of this paper is located within a historical context.

2. Conceptual background

The thesis of this paper is anchored on the concept 'foreign policy'. There are varying and competing explanations of this concept within both political and scholarly circles. Therefore, this paper now pauses to briefly explain the meaning of foreign policy in the context of this research. In their scholarly treatise on International Relations, Goldstein and Pevehouse (2010-2011:78) explain foreign policy as the strategy that a government uses in its interactions in the international arena. In this regard, this study considers foreign policy as the nature of practice and conduct of one nation state's international affairs in the political, security and socio-economic arena with intent to protect and preserve its national interests. Some scholars term it 'international relations policy' while others call it 'foreign relations policy'. This means that foreign policy provides an official framework that guide how one nation state's international relations and cooperation is managed. Some politicians and analysts have qualms with the usage of the word "foreign", arguing that it ignores the fact that foreign policy is rooted from within the country (national level) and presents it as if it's a farfetched idea that has got nothing to do with overall domestic policies of the country (Spies, 2009; Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2009). Instead, they propose that better ways of explaining and understanding the domestication of foreign policy need to be explored. In the end, this study is not concerned in providing a universally acceptable definition of what is called foreign policy, but it deduces that the essence of

varying descriptors ranging from foreign policy, foreign relations policy to international relations policy is common. The only not-so-important matter is the question of semantics. This research submits that foreign policy is an extension of the macro domestic policy framework of the nation state which is espousing it.

Scott and Garrison (2012:138) observe that ‘international policies affect relations between or among nations, such as trade, war, educational exchanges, disaster relief efforts and so on’. Bearing this in mind, it is important to note that foreign policy is not done by a single person as opposed to the tendency among analysts and opinion makers to pin such policies with the labels of the president who presided over the administration that conceived or adopted them. It is not uncommon to find descriptors such as “Obama’s Africa policy” and the “foreign policy of George W. Bush” in the literature of International Relations and Public Affairs. But such assertions can be misleading to a layman in the field of International Relations because in theory and practice, foreign policy is made by a conglomeration of people who come into play when making decisions concerning such matters. In the context of the US, such people or groups include the Head of State (President), the Secretary of the State, Department of State and other departments concerned with foreign policy (e.g. Defence, Secret Services) and Congress. These institutional groupings occupy active and varying roles in foreign policy making and implementation of any state, either from first or third world. Yet, there are non-governmental formations from the private sector and the civil society who also influence foreign policy processes in one way or the other. But the composite of the above mentioned government institutional groups are formally and primarily mandated to conceive and execute foreign policy in the best interests of the US.

Meanwhile, it is not uncommon for undergraduate students of International Relations in African universities to confuse foreign policy, diplomacy and international relations. The three concepts are different, but they are intrinsically linked. In this study diplomacy is viewed as an instrument of foreign policy and is therefore, understood as the art craft and practice of negotiating between and among representatives of different states in the international political and economic system. Its main function is to facilitate international relations as a practice and phenomena as opposed to the discipline. In the spirit and context for the support of the above, A. Du Plessis as cited by Dlomo (2010:3) asserts that diplomacy ‘is the master institution of international relations and represents a pacific approach to the management of international relations in pursuit of order and justice; within a foreign policy context’. Du Plessis adds that diplomacy is also ‘a political instrument with which to maximise the national interest of states and to pursue foreign policy goals and objectives’. From the foregoing, it is clear that the meaning of the notion of ‘foreign policy’ is distinct from closely related concepts such as international relations and diplomacy.

3. Globalising the US-Africa policy in retrospect

Essentially, the derivative of glocalism appreciates the essence of the link between globalisation and localisation (Tien and Talley, 2012). This is a manifestation which is also evident in the formulation and implementation of US foreign policy. Thus, at the international stage the official foreign policy of the US can be summed up into three pillars, namely:

- Promotion of democracy and rule of law;
- Access to natural resources for fortifying economic prosperity; and
- Promotion of peace, security, stability and development (Shai, 2010).

The aforementioned pillars foregrounds the multiplicity of the overlapping principles of US foreign policy around the globe, but such have been given regional and national effect depending on the political, historic and material conditions of the receptive continent/ region and nation state. Equally important, these pillars have largely defined the content and direction of the US foreign policy since the end of the World War II to date. While varying administrations ranging from Bill Clinton to George W. Bush, just to mention a few, have come and gone; they have not introduced major changes to the substance and content of the US foreign policy. This claim has been echoed by Albright (2000:2) and she maintains that '[T]he fundamental purpose of America's foreign policy has not changed in more than two centuries. It is to protect our citizens, our territory, our livelihood, and our friends'. The only changes that were evident during the change of leadership in the US were at the rhetorical level. This should be understood within the context of the complexity of the foreign policy processes in the US. The complex nature of foreign policy processes in the US requires stringent and rigorous professionalisation of the diplomatic practice (Paxen, 2014). The professionalisation of diplomatic practice in the US is critically significant for maintaining stability and continuity whenever the ruling party or president changes. In contrast, Pahad (2013:32) notes that to date 'the US has failed to understand its role in the new world order and there has been a lack of strategic coherence and consistency in US foreign policy'. Shai and Iroanya (2014:910) suggest that such lack of strategic coherence and consistency display itself through the US appetite for sponsoring 'both its allies and their enemies across the board'. Shai and Iroanya (2014:910) also see this controversial tendency as laying a fertile ground for the germination of seeds for political and economic instabilities instead of sustainable democratic environments.

4. The Obama moment and its meaning for us engagement in East Africa

From the literature on the diplomatic history of the US it is evident that Washington's engagement in Africa in the post-World War II era has been generally characterised by the (ab)use of regional powers (also known as pivotal states) (Mitchell, 1998). For both strategic and political reasons, the regional powers such as South Africa (in Southern Africa), Nigeria (West Africa), Egypt (North Africa and Kenya (East Africa) were identified and (ab)used by successive US administrations as the launching pads of Washington's engagement in their respective regions. The pivotal states of Africa are normally manipulated by the US in order for them to position and conduct themselves in a manner that prioritises the goals of Washington at the expense of the interests of their people. The political, economic and diplomatic leverage of Africa's pivotal states implies that developments (be it violent conflicts or economic growth and development) have a great potential of spilling over to other nation states in their respective regions. This observation is supported by Ngcaweni (2013) who wrote that '[M]ost developing regions have leading countries that anchor growth and stability'.

Despite the rich history flowing from the foregoing, there have been impressions in certain circles that under Barack Obama, the US engagement in East Africa seems to be at significant stage of metamorphosis. This argument was articulated at two levels: firstly, the year 2013 decision of Washington to send Obama on a state visit to Tanzania, instead of Kenya (its traditional ally) was interpreted in certain circles as signalling the re-orientation of the US foreign policy in East Africa (Collinson, 2013; Honan 2015). This paper recognises the importance of high level state visits in the solidification of inter-African relations and international relations in general. The truth of the matter is that Obama had an opportunity to visit Kenya in 2006 during his tenure as the Illinois Senator, shortly before he was elected the President of the US. Therefore, personal ties and networks had already been initiated at that level. Notwithstanding this, Kenya has had great relations with the US before and during the Obama's presidency. So, the target of Tanzania for the 2013 Africa itinerary was basically a strategic move by the US to enlarge its pool of partners in the war on terrorism within East Africa and the Horn of Africa as a whole. As it is the case with Kenya and US, Tanzania has also been a victim of a series of terrorism attacks (Perl, 1998:1-2). That the year 1998 was marked by the bombing of the American embassy in Dar es Salaam is a critical factor that has fortified mutual affinity and solidarity between the US and Tanzania.

It is worth noting that China's largest trading partner in Africa is Tanzania (Reuters, 2015). Official records projects that Chinese companies in Tanzania totalled 500 by the end of the year 2013 and with time, this number has prospects of increasing enormously (Reuters, 2015). This economic development is a bitter pill to be swallowed by American foreign policy makers because recent scientific discoveries have pointed that Tanzania has a potential to become one of Africa's oil producing countries (Ngcaweni, 2013:58). Hence, an economic affair have a potential for sparking bilateral relations in non-economic sectors, which may either be of political and diplomatic nature. For Bridgman (2013), '[A] new season of focused attention on economic ties is definitely apparent, even if largely due to the competition the US is seeing from China, India and others investing in the infrastructure and development of African economies outside of the World Bank and other traditional avenues where the US holds sway'. Additionally, Tanzania is a historic leader of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) and an active member of the East African Community (EAC), Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the AU (Magolobela, 2014). To this end, Tanzania's membership to several regional organisations on the continent makes it a possible asset for championing the national interests of the US across Africa. As such, the recent active involvement of Washington with Dodoma (Capital of Tanzania) is a desperate attempt of the US to dilute the vast economic presence of China in Tanzania, East Africa and Africa as a whole. This is also meant to confuse the possibility of Beijing (Capital of China) to use its economic foothold in Tanzania to extend its spheres of influence in East Africa, Southern Africa and Africa at large.

5. A cross country analysis of Kenya and Tanzania: emerging issues for the US-Africa policy

While the indictment of the top leadership of Kenya by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the recent past has compromised the image and prestige of Nairobi (Capital of Kenya) in diplomatic circles, it is contended that Obama's visit to Tanzania was never really meant to 'snub' the former as largely dubbed by the media (Collinson, 2013). In reality, Kenya and Tanzania are deemed by American foreign policy practitioners as complementary allies of the US and not competitive friends. Beside all of the above, it should be noted that Obama deliberately avoided making persistent visits to Kenya during his first term of office because he did not want to give conservative Republications (in the Congress) a reason to cast fresh aspersions about his American nationality and therefore, his suitability to serve as the President of the US (Kornacki, 2011). It is against this backdrop that Obama has again visited Kenya in July 2015, dated as the few remaining months of his second and last tenure in terms of the constitution of the US. Considering that Obama is now finishing his second term, such a move carries no or less cost in terms of political risks. In spite of varying

speculations about the reluctant visit of Obama to Kenya during his presidency, Ngcaweni (2013: 58) reminds us that 'Kenya is widely regarded as the economic powerhouse of the East African region and has the potential to drive economic development well into the next decade'. The economic and political status of Kenya in East Africa is well-understood by the American foreign policy makers and there is no way in which the US can isolate Nairobi in favour of lofty foreign policy goals such as justice and democracy, just to name a few.

Moreover, there has also been a suggestion in certain quarters that the first address to the African Union (AU) in July 2015 by the sitting head of state in the US is indicative of a departure from the tradition of sub-contracting the US foreign policy to regional imperial states such as South Africa and Kenya. Instead, the Obama address to the AU have been viewed as a switch to continent-wide engagement, an approach whose seed was first germinated during the 2014 US-Africa summit in Washington, which has been hailed as the largest event that an American president have held with most African head of states and governments (Magolobela, 2014). It is the well-considered view of this paper that the US foreign policy approach in East Africa and Africa at large is consistent. Thus, regional clients remain key for the launching of the US foreign policy in their respective regions. The intermittent continent wide engagement through the 2014 US-Africa summit, and 2015 AU address simply reinforces the existing normal channels of engagement between the US and regional powers and by extension their respective regions. Furthermore, this research embraces Bridgman's (2013) observation that a meeting with the AU leaders 'underscored the importance of the African Union leadership in advancing development and democratic norms across the continent'. The foregoing dovetails with the promotion of democracy and the rule of law as one the cornerstones of the US foreign policy towards Africa (Shai and Iroanya, 2014).

6. Tanzania's domestic policy framework: a magnet of US engagement in East Africa

Tanzania has successfully moved away from the status of a socialist-orientated one party state to a capitalist-inclined market based economy in the 1990s (United States Agency for International Development, 2004:i). While the agenda for economic reform in Tanzania has heralded it as one of the fastest growing economies in sub-Saharan Africa, it is also true that the capitalist economic policy framework has made it impossible for the much-spoken about economic growth to be translated into meaningful economic development. Hence, contemporary studies show that 'Tanzania is ranked 164th out of 177 countries in the U.N. Human Development Index' (Imperial College London, 2015). The irony between the pro-Dodoma accolades by the US and Tanzania's level of economic

development is evident of the hypocritic nature of Washington's foreign policies in Africa and thus, their self-serving nature.

The change of politico-economic identity of Tanzania has naturally carved a safe space for Dodoma in the mapping of the US foreign policy in East Africa. Like Kenya and the majority of African states, Tanzania is perceived to have fairly embraced the values and practices ranging from economic liberalism and political pluralism which are valued highly in the US policy and political circles. There is also a perception that peace in Tanzania is an essential attribute that qualified her as the American reference for regional (East African) issues and as a model for development strategies (Magolobela, 2014). On the other hand, the position of the US foreign policy machinery is that Tanzania is a beacon and model of democracy, peace and security which must be replicated all over Africa. Tanzania's move towards the politico-economic values and practices that are held in high regard by the US tacitly made Dodoma to become an appealing additional partner in the engagement of Washington in East Africa and beyond. Contextually, it must be noted that Tanzania is officially a multiparty state, but in reality and practice it remains single dominant party state under the rule of Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). Its political landscape is not levelled and worse, rampant corruption can be observed in the midst of the fragmented and weak civil society (USAID, 2004:5). This political situation gives credence to this research's conviction that there is a wide chasm between theory and practice insofar as the US foreign policy towards Tanzania is concerned.

In contrast to the American myth that Tanzania is a peaceful country, Shaba (2007:6) posited that 'Tanzania is currently witnessing a surge of fundamentalism from all walks of life in the form of Islamic militants, evangelical revivalism and even witchcraft'. It is the well-considered view of this paper that the envisaged peace, stability and security in Tanzania cannot be sustained in the midst of economic injustices. Equally significant, it is argued that if the respect for public resources and constitutional values and principles do not find true and honest expression in the daily livelihoods of Tanzania's national and international relations, the complex web of the political, economic and corporate governance would be compromised and disintegrates gradually. This is a scenario that Tanzania, Africa and the US cannot afford to witness and it is not in the best interest of the shared goals and objectives of each of this parties. Hence, if Tanzania fails to consolidate its democratic gains and maintain its perceived stability, such a situation would invalidate its position of being a US anchor for the promotion of democracy, peace and security in East Africa and other regions of the African continent.

7. Conclusion

It is concluded that the US-East Africa affair still manifests into slave-master relationship post-independence. In short inter-African relations are largely dictated by foreign big powers including the US, UK and France. This unfortunate situation implies that an inter-African relation is the extension of the foreign policy of Western big powers. Given the geographical diversity of Africa's five regions, the US foreign policy towards each of them is bound to be unique. In the case of East Africa, it has been established that the priority of US foreign policy practitioners has sequentially been: (i) the promotion of peace and security; (ii) promotion of democracy and rule of law and (iii) access to energy resources for fortifying economic prosperity. The last positioning of the latter on the priority list of the US foreign policy makers should be understood within the context that East Africa is largely not rich in energy resources. However, research findings predict that though poor, countries such as Tanzania have a potential to produce oil. Most of the activities of the US government in East Africa has been on the promotion of peace and security; and democracy and the rule of law. This policy direction is informed by the fact that East Africa is bedevilled by both military and non-military security threats and serious challenges to issues of political governance.

This paper has stated correctly that the discourse on International Relations has always been approached from an American perspective. The emphatic reference to 'US foreign policy towards Africa' may suggest that the analysis of this paper is falling on the same trap by following the same line of thought. However, the silent and envisaged narrative of the 'foreign policy of Africa towards the US' is beyond the scope this paper. While this paper seriously appreciates the diversity of East Africa and Africa as a whole; it also affirms the homogeneity of African culture as expressed through 'compassion, reciprocity, dignity, harmony and humanity' (Nussbaum, 2003:21). That being said, the exclusive focus on Kenya and Tanzania as the test cases for studying the current US foreign policy towards East Africa was influenced by the perceived demotion of Nairobi in favour of Dodoma, as on-the-ground agency for Washington's praxis in that region. In the final analysis, the US foreign policy towards East Africa as espoused by Obama cannot be seen as a representation of obvious continuity or complete change from his predecessors' foreign policy. The purpose, content and approach of the US foreign policy in East Africa has been maintained; with an additional set of variables depending on regional and continental dynamics.

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MUSHROOMING LOCAL INFORMAL BUSINESSES: A CATALYST FOR LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA

L. Tala

S. Zhanje

University of Limpopo, South Africa

Abstract

This paper sheds light on the role of mushrooming informal businesses as vehicle for local economic development. Using reflective analysis we argue that business enabling environment is the requirement for the development and recognition of this sector. The findings show that informal businesses are more prominent in the realisation of local economic development. Informal businesses are more responsive in job creation and poverty alleviation; however, they are not the only means of resolving these socio-economic challenges. The impact of informal businesses in closing the gap of skills shortage outweighs that of traditional channels. We need to leverage and support this hub that makes the economy alive. The locals benefit by being owners of these informal businesses, they enjoy the profits generated which are either ploughed back to expand their respective businesses and or also use as extra income to uplift the standard of living of their families and community at large. The informal business owners will benefit by taking advantage of social capital and networks at their disposal. Social networks empower informal business entrepreneurs to establish Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) as an alternative strategy of accumulating capital. ROSCAs enable micro-finance institutions embark of group lending when providing loans to the informal sector since they lack collateral, thereby minimising the agency problem, adverse selection and moral hazard. The use of bulk buying strategy enables the informal businesses to be more competitive in their pricing strategy which empowers locals to enjoy affordable prices and simultaneously enjoy relatively an increase in purchasing power. The informal businesses also have linkages with the formal businesses when they acquire goods for resale and in the process contribute to local economic development through the payment of VAT which then is transmitted by the government to benefit the disadvantaged in the community through service delivery. Informal businesses provide an opportunity to locals to learn business skills and there by become more skilled. The participation of locals in the informal business also improves the dependency ratio, since the owners become independent and support their families. This is a breeding ground for creativity and innovation.

Keywords: Local Businesses, Informal Businesses, Local economic Development

1. Introduction

This paper explores the role of informal businesses from the perspective of promoting local economic development even though this area has not received much attention as a separate aspect of informal sector. We attempt to overcome this problem by analysing the role of existing informal businesses in South Africa. The South African economy is characterised by a dualistic economy where by the first (formal) economy and the second (informal) economy co-exist with up to 40% of the population that is unemployed and dependent on welfare grants and the informal sector to survive (Patterson, 2008). Surprisingly, despite the fact that significant economic activities take place within the informal economy and that the populace derive its livelihood from it the sector has been side-lined at policy level (Agrisystems-Led Consortium, 2008). The crowding out of the informal economy as result of government policy was noted by UNCDF (2007) in Purshottama and Wallis (2012) which pointed out that, from an African perspective, national governments still dictate economic development of their respective regions and localities but such interventions in most cases have been implicit and discrete rather than based on explicit LED strategy.

In South Africa LED strategy and guidelines are well documented at national level but the limited funds allocated to LED and given that LED is yet to be embedded in municipal practice hinder the effectiveness of such policy (Patterson, 2008). Given the economic environment prevailing in local municipalities it is therefore imperative to look at the role of the mushrooming informal sector with critical lenses. It is worth mentioning that it is the intention of this paper to go into detail about informal businesses rather the thrust of this paper is to review the contribution of the informal sector and make recommendations. The paper is not an empirical study or research about the contribution of informal businesses but it focuses on conceptual issues regarding the contribution of informal businesses into the economy.

The remainder of the paper is organised into the following sections. Section 2 provides a brief overview of local economic development. Section 3 describes the existence of informal businesses providing the background for context. Section 4 reports on policy and practice underpinning developmental policies. This is followed by section 5 which presents the activities of the informal sector. Section 6 reviews existing empirical evidence on the informal sector. Section 7 presents recommendations whilst section 8 concludes with closing remarks.

2. Overview of local economic development (LED)

The LED being implemented in South Africa was initially influenced by experiences of urban entrepreneurialism in developed countries which included the USA and the UK and South Africa also internationally recognised the belief that partnership formation and collaboration is one of the most critical ingredients in LED (Nel and Rogerson, 2005). Several studies have examined several aspects of local economic development, such as Moyo (2007) and Malefane (2011) who looked at the leadership challenges for successful local economic development in South Africa, and the roles of South Africa's local economic development Agencies respectively. In South Africa, the initial academic contributions to Local Economic Development (LED) began in the early 1990s and there were limited cases of applied LED in both large cities and numerous small towns in the early 1990s and was accelerated through the activities of the forum movement of the 1990s (Nel and Rogerson, 2005). The concept of community/locality based development was implicit in the 1994 Reconstruction and Development Programme (Nel and Rogerson, 2005). Nel and Rogerson (2005) holds that the LED practice was effectively enshrined in the 1996 Constitution where local governments were mandated to pursue economic and social development by establishing pro-poor local development strategies. The pro-poor LED strategy, welfarist approach or state intervention was advocated for whilst South Africa embraced neo-liberalism and this made LED in South Africa to be dual in nature and enabled pro-poor and pro-growth interventions to occur in harmony (Nel and Rogerson, 2005). Even though LED is a pro-poor strategy in South Africa it evolved overtime since its inception but encountered constraints along the way. Non local government actors were marginalised in South Africa variant of LED, initially South Africa failed to adhere to internationally recognised belief that partnership formation and collaboration are important variables in LED, shortage of skilled staff to implement LED, financial constraints, the enormous economic developmental backlogs which existed and the poor understanding of how to respond to challenges, huge additional LED responsibilities on a sphere of government, and coupled with the fact that LED was seen as unfunded mandate that local government was required to pursue, was detrimental to LED efficacy (Nel and Rogerson, 2005).

It is worth noting that LED also became popular in many developing countries in the 1990s and since then has been implemented in many industrialised countries over a number of years. Kanyane (2008: 699) asserts that LED is an international strategy for local economic development. According to Kanyane (2008: 700), the broader aim of the LED is to create employment opportunities for a local community, alleviate poverty and redistribute resources and opportunities to the benefit of all residents. In the same vain, the World Bank (2015) holds that LED is the process by which public, business and non-governmental

sectors work collectively to create better conditions for economic and employment generation with the objective of building up an economic capacity of a local area to improve its economic future and the quality of life for all. Kanyane (2008: 700) further emphasises that LED is a multi-dimensional and multi-sectorial process through which the skills, resources and ideas of stakeholders are combined to stimulate local economies to respond innovatively to changes in the national and global environment to attain, as an end result, job creation, poverty alleviation and the redistribution of wealth. LED enables communities to persistently improve their investment climate and business enabling environment in their endeavour to enhance competitiveness, retain jobs and improve incomes (World Bank, 2010)

The development of local economies is at the heart of South African government policies, since most South Africans are in local areas and marginalised in economic terms. These areas are the hub of the majority of South Africans who are poverty stricken, with high levels of unemployment due to lack of resources and opportunities. The government of today is trying to redress the imbalances by taking into cognisance the development of local communities hence the adoption of LED strategy. This is an opportune that will help to water the local pastures and make them green. The custodians of the LED are local people who are expected to work together for the betterment of their lives within a developmental environment expected from local municipalities.

The government of South Africa upholds the development of local communities and the following policies and policy papers are the backbone which make LED a reality. Pattersen (2008:4) identified the following key policies and policy papers as influential into the realisation of LED:

- The constitution (1996)
- White paper on Local Government (1999)
- Local Government: Municipal Systems Act (2000) A policy paper on Integrated Development Planning
- LED Guidelines to Institutional Arrangements (2000)
- Draft LED Policy (2002)
- Policy Guidelines for Implementing LED in South Africa (2005)
- National Framework for Local Economic Development (LED) in South Africa (2006-2011)

Moyo (2007:220) asserts that part of the responsibilities of a developmental state includes the promotion of social, economic, cultural development of all communities. In view of this

the government of South Africa was not in the wrong direction by introducing LED. One can see that the government is clear about the development of local communities through their engagement with the support of local municipalities. It is against this background that the government emphasised the development of local economies as the heart of economic prosperity. Local communities have resources that are untapped and not recognised; hence the government introduced LED to enable local communities to be part of the mainstream economy. Consequently, the new LED (2014 – 2019) framework has noted that informal sector and township economic development has been neglected in the past hence these must be included in the IDP and LED officials must manage these new focus areas. LED is considered to be a key component in the Integrated Developing Planning (IDP), a tool which assists municipalities to achieve their developmental mandates (Nel and Rogerson, 2005).

3. The existence of informal businesses/sector: back ground and context

In South Africa Rogerson (2004) observed that there are two factors that have led to the emergence of informal trading which are firstly the economic climate with high unemployment and lack of formal sector job creation forcing thousands to seek a living in the informal economy. Secondly, the granting of economic rights to the previously excluded non-white majority as well as changes in legislation that came with the end of apartheid. The Department of Economic Development, Environment and Tourism (2013) identified the key drivers of informal trading as urban migration; unemployment; limited education and training opportunities; diminishing rural livelihoods and other factors.

Mohr (2012: 203) stated the following reasons behind people engaged in informal sector:

- They cannot find employment in the formal sector
- They are engaged in illegal activities
- They do not want to pay tax

It is worth looking at the definition of the informal businesses/ sector/ economy so as to give clarification of the type of business this paper is focusing on. Stats SA (2007) in Research Support to the Limpopo Centre LED (2008) defines informal sector as a sector consisting of those businesses that are not registered in any way. They are generally small in nature, and they are seldom run from business premises. Instead, they are generally run from homes, street pavements and other informal arrangements.

According to Mohr (2012:203) the informal business may be defined as all unregistered and unrecorded economic activities that normally escape detection in the official estimates of GDP.

The Department of Economic Development, Environment and Tourism Limpopo Provincial Government (2013:9) defines the informal sector as referring to economic activities carried out by individuals and or groups involving the sale of legal goods and services within public and private spaces. Such spaces are generally unconventional for the exercise of such activities. Informal trading is generally, unorganized and not always registered as a formal business activity. It is clear from all the above definitions that the essence of informal business is carrying out activities of economics in nature that are illegal since informal businesses are not registered. From the business point of view, one can say that the owners are creative and they identify the market, since there are customers for their activities and they in turn meet the needs of such customer. The spaces that are occupied are unconventional as per definition, thus the owners do not want to see an empty space and this pose a challenge for town/zone/ and /land planners in the sense that these activities are real and more relevant to the communities

In view of the definitions of this sector of the economy, it is imperative to look at the schools that are shedding light into enhancing understanding of the causes and characteristics of the informal sector as well as informing the definitions of this sector

3.1 Dualistic school of thought

According to the Dualistic school the informal sector is comprised of marginal activities distinct from and, not related to the formal sector, that provide income for the poor and safety net in times of crisis. The persistence of the informal activities is due largely to the fact that not enough job opportunities have been created to absorb surplus labour, due either to slow rate of economic growth and or a faster rate of population growth (ILO, 1972, Sethuraman 1976, Tokman, 1978).

3.2 Structuralist school of thought

The Structuralist school holds that the informal sector should be seen as subordinated economic units (micro- firms) when workers serve to produce output and labour costs are low and so, increase the competitiveness of large capitalist firms. The nature of capitalist development (rather than a lack of growth) accounts for the persistence and growth of informal production relationships (Mosser 1978, Castells & Portes 1989).

3.3 The Legalist school of thought

The Legalist school, borrowed its perspective from de Soto (1989)'s theory which subscribe to the notion that the informal sector is comprised of 'plucky' micro-entrepreneurs who choose to operate informally, in order to avoid the costs, time and effort of formal registration. Micro-entrepreneurs will continue to produce informally as long as government procedures are cumbersome and costly.

3.4 The Illegalist school of thought

The 'Illegalist' school holds that informal entrepreneurs deliberately seek to avoid regulations and taxation and in some cases deal in illegal goods and services. This perspective is associated with the notion that the informal economy in an underground or 'black' economy. According to these theorists, informal entrepreneurs choose to operate illegally, in order to avoid taxation, commercial regulations, electricity and rental fees and other costs of operating formally (Maloney 2004).

4. Policy and practice

Deducing from the above schools and the theoretical perspective that are underpinning the formulation of policies and practices that shape the enabling environment which makes the informal sector thrive. The ideologies applied and political priorities advocated for by any country have a tendency of influencing local economic development and economies. This in turn exerts pressure on economies which are continually faced with a challenge whether to prioritise solely the objective of economic efficiency, environmental sustainability or social cohesion (through pro-business and pro-poor approaches). Fig 1 below shows a spectrum of policies that governments may advocate for depending on its macroeconomic objectives that it would like to pursue.

Fig 1 below shows a spectrum of policies that governments may advocate for depending on its macroeconomic objectives that it would like to pursue.




Fig 1: Approaches to Policy and Practice (Adapted from Hague et al, 2011)

The diagram depicts the possibility of economies implementing policies with economic efficiency orientation whilst on the other extreme end policies may focus on social cohesion and good environment or a mixture of the two. With respect to the vertical dimension in the diagram there can be contest of the application of market led ideologies versus other policies such as the command system which intend to fill in the gaps created by the market system. In practice policy formulation and implementation is balanced against social and environmental aims, market system and pro-poor ideologies in order to promote sustainable economic growth and hence local economic development (Hague et al, 2011).

Although pro-business competition approach aims to realise the goal of prosperity through economic efficiency, sector targeting and area regeneration approach aims at boosting sectors in which the market has failed to yield results. Whereas the eco-modernisation approach promotes the use of new environmentally friendly technologies. On the other hand pro-poor local economic development complements the other three

approaches by explicitly prioritising poverty reduction through creating an environment in which informal business flourish among others. In response to the challenges of unemployment, poverty and inequality the government of South Africa implemented pro-poor local economic development policies confirmed by the policies and policy papers that were influential into the realisation of LED as indicated earlier in the paper.

5. Activities of informal businesses

LED is a process; within this context development is viewed as a “people- driven process” which means active involvement of all the stakeholders and empowerment for sustainability. Behind LED is crippling unemployment, poverty and inequality leading to disempowerment of the marginalised portion of the population. The most vulnerable being youth in general and women in particular. Underpinning this burden has been a complex set of factors including a decline in mining, closure of some industries, wave of retrenchments due to sluggish economic growth globally hence decline in consumer confidence and a rise in dependence ratio.

Against this background we see mushrooming of informal businesses, in the inner-cities, pavements are lined with hawkers, empty lots are rapidly transformed into informal markets Rogerson (1996: 172). SEDA (2008) found that informal trading takes place in public open spaces which includes street and pavement, pedestrian streets and also trading on intersection streets and transport interchanges; special purpose markets such as flea markets, craft market, converted or renovated buildings, and satellite markets; periodic markets, seasonal and night markets; mobile markets which includes caravans, bakkies, bicycles, mobile containers, and trolleys; spaza shops and stationery or fixed containers. As mentioned earlier that the owners of the informal businesses do not want to see an empty space.

Similarly (Rogerson, 1996:172) has observed that informal or shack settlement areas have been identified as the zones of greatest spatial growth for new informal enterprises, the advance of the informal economy is wide spread across the geographic zones. This means informal businesses are found anywhere, as long as there is space that is not used and people are passing by. Informal businesses are found at the robot crossings as well selling different items to motorists others having an opportunity to market the skills that they possess and hence the rise of the informal economy is evident in a host of new street/pavement centred activities (including flea markets, hawkers, taxi drivers, street barbers, shoe shiners..., the proliferation of home based enterprises such as child-minding,

spazas, hairdressers, the showing of videos (Rogerson, 1996:172). The Department of Economic Development, Environment and Tourism in Limpopo Province (2013) substantiate the location of the informal by asserting that areas of pedestrian movement and deviation attract the highest concentration of traders in the Limpopo Province. Therefore, informal sector activities are an integral part of the economy and our lives depend on such economic activities (Rogerson, 1996: 172). It is worth mentioning the observation by Budlender (1994) in Rogerson (1996) that informal economy exhibits a sexual division of labour with women concentrated in trade, food preparation, and dressmaking and childcare activities, though this observation is beyond the scope of this paper.

6. The review of existing empirical evidence on the informal sector

Charman et al (2015:5) emphasised that establishing how street traders operate does not equate to an understanding of the significance of street trade within the local informal economy. This talks directly to the need to go deeper into understanding the impact of this sector into the growth of the economy regardless of its legal status.

Charman, et al (2015:2) argue that informal enterprises could help address some of South African's core challenges of creating employment and stimulate economic growth in marginalised areas. Maloney (2004) in Charman et al (2015) further asserts that the informal economy contributes to employment in marginalised communities both through business generation but also through transfer of skills and experience to informal workers. With respect to empirical evidence Foure (2013) in Charman et al (2015) noted that the informal economy presently has little to no influence on the economic development agenda in South Africa. On the contrary Naude (2008) in Ligthelm (2013:73) observed that the informal sector appears to be a buffer (or safety net) against slipping deeper into poverty. Ligthelm (2010: 131-132) observed that the small businesses (often called informal) serve as convenience shops primarily for the lower income groups, attracting a sizeable portion of household expenditure in less developed urban areas.

The distinct benefits derived from the informal business operations include longer and flexible hours of operation, product offerings in small quantities and provision of credit (Ligthelm, 2010:142). This characteristic makes the informal businesses to be regarded as "businesses of community interest". Schnider (2003) in Davids (2011) holds that the significance of the informal economy in terms of size is estimated to be 14% - 16%, 21% - 30 % and 35% - 44% of the Gross Domestic Product for developed economies, transitional economies and developing economies respectively. Also Thurlow and Davies (2009) as cited by Davids (2011) identified significant linkages that exist between informal activities and the national economy which includes:

- Income and expenditure flow – Informal businesses earn income when they sell goods and services to the formal economy
- Financial flow – informal businesses may borrow funds from the formal conventional financial institutions to meet their day to day operational requirements of their businesses
- Social transfers – the owners of formal businesses receive transfer payments in terms of social grants which can be used to boost their capital base
- Tax – although informal businesses are exempted from paying direct taxes, they contribute to the government's revenue through payment of indirect taxes with respect to purchases made from the formal economy

To understand the significant contribution of informal trading, SALGA (2012) pointed out that the Limpopo Province has the largest informal economy in South Africa which contributes about 35% of the total economic activity as compared to just an excess of 20% with respect to Free State, Mpumalanga, KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern Cape. The study commissioned by the Department of Economic Development, Environment and Tourism in Limpopo Province (2013) was meant to identify challenges faced by informal traders and producers and in the process suggested policies, strategies and programmes that could be implemented to address such challenges. The recommendations from the study included the introduction of supportive municipal by-laws, provision of market stalls, intensification of youth involvement support in the formal sector and provision of basic business training. The study revealed that the informal sector in Limpopo in the year 2012 contributed 3.62% of the regional's GDP although this is below the estimated contribution at country level according to Schnider (2003) in Davids (2011), the informal sector in the province supported about 22.6% of the province's population and the annual wage bill of informal workers (60% female) was estimated at R1.96bn. Approximately 35.92%, 36.98%, 11.43%, 5.09% and 1.44% of the respondents in the study stated that their monthly turn-over ranged between R501 to R2 000, R2001 and R5 000, R5 001 to R10 000, R10 001 to R20 000 and above R20 001 respectively.

The study also revealed that 58%, 29%, 11% and 1 % of the goods traded by informal businesses were sourced locally within the municipality, within the province, in other provinces and internationally respectively even though 94.58% of the informal traders did not have access to credit most possibly due to lack of collateral whilst 0.86% and 0.29% informal traders received some form of support from the Limpopo Business Support Agency (LIBSA) and Small Enterprise Development Agency (SEDA) respectively.

7. Recommendations

The informal economy can contribute to furthering the satisfaction of basic needs, self-reliance and sense of purpose in life and work for participants. The creation of fertile conditions, as the requirement from local municipalities can help to promote the realisation of improved living standards, redistribution and empowerment of local communities. Furthermore, previous studies' recommendations varied from the advocating for the regulation and facilitation of linkages between the informal and the formal sector, building permanent market places especially for the retail informal sector, enactment of municipal by-laws conducive to informal business survival, to the provision of business training and support and so on. These studies include amongst others, Thurlow and Davies (2009) as cited by Davids (2011) and Department of Economic Development, Environment and Tourism in Limpopo Province (2013).

Shane (2003) distinguished between five types of experience as general business experience, functional experience (in marketing, product development and management), industry experience, start-up experience and vicarious experience (through observing parents, friends and associates in the informal sector). One can conclude that the success of the informal sector depends on such work experiences were the formal sector can tap in.

We propose guidance and training of the owners of this vibrant sector which is valued more by local communities. The training we propose in this paper should be able to enhance the skills needed to exploit opportunities with respect to decision making, selling, negotiating, planning, organising, leading, controlling, and communicating and problem solving. The owners are able and free to innovate for their benefit and the benefit of their communities, thus require recognition. We acknowledge the fact that some informal businesses are for survival but recognition can elevate them to establish businesses with long-term goals. Therefore, the informal business must be essentially the policy focus and its contribution to economic growth must not be underestimated.

It should be noted that general work experience can promote informal businesses if owners start businesses related to their former occupations (applicable to retrenched workers). Diversity of experience might be considered to be of utmost importance when establishing informal businesses since prospective informal traders would have been exposed to a greater number of novel venture ideas. Informal business owners should take advantage of social capital which simply refers to the ability of actors to extract benefits from their social structures, networks and relationships (Davidsson and Honig, 2003). It should be noted that social capital can exist at country level (in the degree of trust in government/municipalities and other institutions) and at the community level, that is the

quality of social networks within the locality. Parker (2009) maintains that social networks can involve the extended family, communities and organisational relationship. Social capital confers social legitimacy upon informal trading, reveals information about opportunities, customers, suppliers and competitors and facilitates access to resources such as cheap capital while providing psychological aid such as helping informal businesses to whether emotional stress and to keep their businesses afloat (Abell et al, 2001). Therefore, social ties can leverage support and trust needed for resource mobilisation and acquisition, given that 91% of the informal traders in the Limpopo province do not belong to any association (Department of Economic Development, Environment and Tourism, 2013).

As reported in Department of Economic Development, Environment and Tourism (2013) study, 94.58% of the informal traders are not able to access credit possibly due to lack of collateral, the agency problem (lender's inability to observe the borrower's characteristics, effort and profits) adverse selection (the inability to discriminate against risky borrowers) and moral hazard (ex-ante moral hazard-unobservable actions of the borrower which affect the profitability of the firm after the loan has been disbursed, ex post moral hazard-difficulties that emerge after the loan is made and borrower has invested, the borrower may decide to take the money and run once project returns are realised) (Armendariz and Morduch, 2010).

At rudimentary level the informal business traders should consider the formulation of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) which are usually groups of people built on mutual understanding amongst friends possibly with similar interests who mobilise funds within the group which will then be distributed in turns to support business ventures of the members. Alternatively members can form bidding ROSCAs which allocate the pot (funds) to whosoever is willing to pay most for it. The other possibility is to form credit cooperatives which have a formal constitution and a degree of legal status. Credit cooperatives gather funds from community members who are able to save and then the funds are allocated to those who would like to invest a lump sum. In this case members do not have to wait their turn in order to borrow and there is no need to bid and members are themselves regarded as shareholders (Armendariz and Morduch, 2010).

The paper advocates for the establishment of microfinance institutions whose sole mandate is to finance the informal sector. These microfinance institutions could take advantage of Group lending which capitalises on joint liability and adopt the Grameen Bank Model (pioneer of Group lending methodology) so that it can suit the South African context (Armendariz and Morduch, 2010). With progressive lending and cross reporting financial institutions are able to mitigate the agency problem, adverse selection and overcome moral

hazard. The Grameen Bank model has since been refined to form the Grameen Bank model 2 where problem loans are now routinely renegotiated without invoking group pressure and joint liability. Alternatively microfinance institutions should encourage informal business to build up financial collateral through the save and then borrow strategy. Micro saving enables informal businesses build up assets over time. Microfinance institutions may target women in their endeavour to maximise profits since women are likely to be compliant than men and women are likely to repay than men (Armendariz and Morduch, 2010). For the strategy to yield results men need to be brought into the fold through education and training to instil the sense of obligation since from the 2013 study conducted by Department of Economic Development, Environment and Tourism revealed that 53% of informal businesses were male owned whilst 47% were female owned. Another strategy is to let microfinance bank officials visit communities and gather information concerning informal businesses rather than sit in their offices and wait for prospective borrowers to come and fill in relevant forms (Armendariz and Morduch, 2010). The information gathered by bank officials should to be correlated with the information on the loan application form in order to minimise funding of non-existent projects and fund projects they deem to be viable after frequent visits to communities.

8. Conclusion

This paper contributes to the small but growing literature in this area in almost all developing countries and academic debates. While we do not wish to claim that our methodology of reviewing existing literature sufficiently explain the role of this sector in promoting local economic development, however, this paper does provide interesting evidence on the lingering role of informal businesses and their impact on economic growth of the country. The informal business must be essentially the policy focus in a country like South Africa plagued with high rates of unemployment, poverty and inequality. Above all, the contribution of this sector to economic growth must not be underestimated. This segment of the economy can contribute to furthering the satisfaction of basic needs, self-reliance and sense of purpose in life and work for participants. The creation of conducive business environment by local municipalities can help informal businesses to thrive, realising in the process spin offs such as improved living standards, redistribution and empowerment of local communities

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HOW THE VESTIGES OF COLONIALISM CONTINUE TO HINDER MUTUAL TRADE AMONG THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES

N.S. Modiba

University of Limpopo, South Africa

Abstract

The paper examines why after so many years of independence it is still difficult for African countries to convincingly trade with one another more than they do with their counterparts from the West. The paper is both conceptual and empirical in nature. Document study and interviewing techniques were used to collect data from three of the African countries regarded to be the economic superpowers of Africa. Research findings reveal that firstly, the vestiges of colonialism are preventing African countries to ever trust each other to the level of doing serious trade with one another. Secondly, instability in various spheres of African countries, discourages local and regional trade within the African states. Thirdly, underdevelopment in the form of infrastructure makes foreign markets more accessible compared to the local ones. As part of the conclusion, the researcher recommends that African countries have to genuinely embrace the 21st century as an African century in all respects to strengthen their economic ties. Such a change of focus is likely to alert African countries to the need of trading more with themselves than concentrating their energies on the foreign markets.

Keywords: Vistiges, Colonialism, Mutal Trade, African Countries, Master Slave

1. Introduction

The master-slave relations and bond take ages to sever if ever such ties indeed do unbundle. This is to be figurative referring to how many African countries continue to be hugely connected to their former colonisers instead of creating and strengthening ties within themselves as countries in the continent of Africa. It does not require a rocket scientist to notice and observe that the more African counties are being recognised, accepted and acknowledged by their foreign allies, the happier they feel other than when they are being welcomed and acknowledged by their fellow African countries. Somehow this can be understood and equated with self-hate by African countries themselves (Freire,1990: 170). The danger of such a practice is the perpetuation of subjugation by foreign countries to African ones. This is something that occurs in a subtle manner which makes it difficult for everyone to notice. This can be explained and understood in terms of the vestiges of colonialism which many of African countries still suffer and endure as part of their historic baggage. Nkuna (2015:120 has a point when noting that colonialism has instilled in Africans

and their countries a sense of self-hate and inferiority complex. That is why they despise anything and everything that is of African origin while anything and everything that is European in origin and nature is hailed to be of quality and highest class and standard. Colonialism was more of a psychological warfare to the Africans than only a subjugation and exploitation of mineral resources. There is no gainsaying the point that as a result of colonialism even economic trade within the African countries is difficult to sustain. One of the underlying reasons is that much as African countries attempt to trade with one another, their souls and spirits are not in the African trade but with their erstwhile masters (Yukl, 2006). As such, there is no proportionality in the way African countries themselves demonise their own commodities vying to impress their former colonisers overseas. Such a tradition and practice by African countries of neglecting markets offered by fellow African countries could better be comprehended in the context of African people and their countries not being fully liberated mentally from the yoke of colonialism which they had been subjected to down the years. The sad part is that African people and their countries are yet to realise that they are victims and that they need help. The fact that countries that are being regarded to be the economic superpowers of Africa, such as Nigeria, South Africa and Algeria trade less with their fellow African countries and more with their erstwhile colonial masters, has to be a genuine cause for concern for Africa as a continent, her people and African countries at large. What emerges to be embarrassing and frustrating is when such economic superpowers of Africa persist to trade in large measure with their erstwhile colonisers from overseas and less with themselves and their fellow African countries. This depicts and evinces these countries to be hugely suffering and enduring the vestiges of colonialism although it is a while since colonialism has been de-legitimised (Nkuna, 2015:120).

2. Theoretical considerations

Welman, Kruger & Mitchell (2005:12) retort that a theory represents a mental view of a phenomenon or a system and that it normally forms the basis for a chain of reasoning. This signifies that when one advances a particular argument on a phenomenon such as how the vestiges of colonialism persist to impede and hinder continental trade, with a theory in place, one's argument is likely to hold substance. The critical theory has been selected as the theoretical perspective that underpins this paper. The choice of the critical theory to underscore this paper rests on the relevance the researcher finds in it in terms of sufficiently illuminating issues of the vestiges of colonialism and how they persist to obstruct mutual trade between countries of the same continent and facilitate trade between the colonised countries and their former colonial powers. Apart from enabling the researcher to frame this study, the critical theory helped the investigator to make meaning from the whole notion of mutual trade within the African countries which is occurring in a small scale compared to

when trade is taking place between African countries and their counterparts in Europe. Higgs and Smith (2010:67) advise that knowledge and how we understand truth, including scientific truth, moral truth and historical truth should not be separated from everyday life. This implies that comprehending the trend of how trade is occurring within countries of the world, the context of the manifestation of that trade is as essential as the state of affairs itself. The critical theory assists in arriving at the root cause of the trade imbalance between countries (Van Niekerk & Van Niekerk, 2009:12). The other relevance of critical theory for this paper can be traced back to its emphasis of business ethics. In the context of this paper, that would imply the study of good and bad behaviour by human beings especially in the manner in which they interrelate and interact. Critical theory has a potential of uncovering whether the process of carrying out trade within countries is characterised by lack of moral compass of what is right and what is wrong. The legitimacy and credibility of the critical theory as regards the vestiges of colonialism that continue to plague African countries when they have to trade with one another, is not in doubt. Critical theory stands out when it advises against separating “real life testing” from scientific theory. The appropriateness of the expressed statement in this paper is to emphasise that scientists are bound by social reality and norms as much as the rest of us are. Historical reasons and living conditions countries of Africa experience, somewhat force and compel them to approach and involve themselves in trade the way they do.

The researcher contends that not every theory other than the critical theory could productively and profitably illuminates and delineates a problem of this paper like the chosen theory. The problem of this paper is about explaining the opportunity missed by African countries by putting little emphasis on trade between themselves and more emphasis on trading with their erstwhile colonisers. Critical theory advocates for the critical reflection on society in order to discover the hidden assumptions that maintain the existing power relationships that keep the societal members or sovereign nations perpetually enslaved though in a different form and guise. Critical theory was selected to undergird this paper because the basic contention of critical theory is that all ideas come from human beings and all human beings are influenced by the world and the context they live in (Higgs & Smith, 2010:67). In the context of this paper, continuous trade of African countries more with their former colonisers and less between themselves could be traced back to African countries not creating time and space to interrogate and break the shackles that keep them perpetually enslaved to their former colonial masters instead of asserting their own trade autonomy. What by and large African countries are displaying is the demonstration of the learnt socio-economic oppression which has to be reversed sooner rather than later. Obviously, all countries of the world stand to be emancipated from trade imbalance

immediately they become conscious of how trade oppression operates. This suggests that how nations or countries normally think and act is the product of many years of being subjected to conditions and circumstances that either facilitates trade autonomy or an entrenched and perpetual trade dependence instead of maybe trade interdependence (Freire, 1990:172)

3. Problem statement

Booth, Comb & Williams (1995:51) advise that there is a distinction between the research topic and the research problem. The stated authors maintain that the researcher risks wasting the reader's time where she fails to distinguish a topic to read about and a research problem to solve. The above explication implies that with a research topic the investigator gathers data about it while with the research problem the researcher strives to have it ultimately solved. The prerequisite of the investigator solving a research problem is to understand it better. Booth et al (1995:63) avows that no skill is more useful than the ability to recognise and articulate a problem clearly and concisely. On the basis of the above the problem of this paper relates to explaining the opportunity missed by African countries by putting little emphasis on trade between themselves and more emphasis on trading with their erstwhile colonisers. It has to be emphasised that this practice by African countries of despising each as regards regional or continental trade, in favour of taking their goods to foreign markets has devastating effects. One of which is the failure by African countries to push back the frontiers of poverty and diseases affecting and afflicting African population.

4. Research questions

In this paper, the research questions addressed are anchored on the critical theory as the theoretical perspective that underscores the paper (Higgs & Smith, 2010:88). The research questions are as follow: What is the role and significance of a clearly formulated foreign trade policy in developing and promoting continental trade more than off-shore trade with erstwhile colonisers? What are the ideas, concerns and positions of fellow African countries regarding the shifting of the trade focus from Europe back to Motherland of Africa?

Broad as they are, the above questions can be broken down into the following sub-questions:

- (i) How has trade with the former colonies delayed Africa?
- (ii) Who genuinely benefits most from that trade partnership?
- (iii) How best to break free from such an unequal trade partnership?

- (iv) What kind of political leadership does Africa require to survive the trade imbalance?
- (v) When will Africa be economically independent from its former masters?
- (vi) What do African leaders require to lead in the interest of their own populations?

5. Research methodology

This paper is qualitative in nature. There are many reasons that necessitated that the paper follows a qualitative research approach as against the quantitative line of thinking. In the first place the problem which the paper pursues, namely, attempting to explain the opportunity missed by African countries by putting little emphasis on trade between themselves and more emphasis on trading with their erstwhile colonisers, was found to be researchable along the qualitative school of thought as against the others (Creswell, 2010:156 & Mouton, 1996:80). The choice of the qualitative research methodology was also triggered by the fact that the paper is being underscored by the critical theory. The researcher found a need to create a synergy between the critical theory as the theoretical perspective that underpins the study as well as the qualitative approach as the overarching research methodology (Babbie, 1992:129). It has to be stated that the combination of the two helped immensely in terms of illuminate issues of the vestiges of colonialism that continue to impede and obstruct mutual trade between countries of the same continent, namely, Africa. Partnering the qualitative research approach and the critical theory enabled the researcher to make an in-depth understanding of how despite many years since colonialism formally ceased to exist its effects remain firmly in place. Such effects are still so severe such that African countries find it difficult to cooperate and successfully trade with each other. To conclude this item of research methodology. there is a need to divulge that document study as well as interviewing techniques were utilised to collect data relevant for this paper. The said data collection tools emerged very helpful in terms of accessing data pertaining to the vestiges of colonialism as they gag and prevent maximum trade within the African countries (Leedy, 1993:66).

6. Findings and discussion

Findings arrived at in this paper are in relation to the research topic whose focus is how vestiges of colonialism continue to hinder mutual trade within the African countries. The critical theory as the theoretical perspective that undergirds paper has been sufficiently instrumental in assisting in the analysis of data to ultimately emerge the findings. Findings and discussion for this paper are the following : vestiges of colonialism are obstructing and averting African countries from ever trusting each other to the level of doing serious trade

with one another, instability in various spheres of African countries discourages local and regional trade within the African states and underdevelopment in the form of infrastructure makes foreign markets more accessible compared to the local ones.

6.1 Vestiges of colonialism as a barrier

The first finding is a confirmation that the master-slave relations or bond take ages to sever if ever such ties indeed ever unbundle. This is a stark reminder of how currently African countries find themselves always attracted to their former colonisers with whom they fought bitterly over their independence. Immediately independence was granted, and African countries were allowed to be on their own, they came face to face with reality. It dawned on them that it is difficult to fight for freedom and win it but even more difficult to rule over the country (Madue, 2013). One of the main reasons why African countries do not want to break away from their erstwhile colonisers is the realisation that their colonisers still have something to offer them. Whether this is a reality or myth, it is the question for the next time. As of now the point at issue is that African countries trade more with their former enemies than with themselves. Obviously this is a challenge to be surmounted. Whether African countries themselves will ultimately be able to sever the historically established ties with their erstwhile colonisers, it is a matter of wait and see (Tsheola, 2002).

Zwane (2015:10) raises a valid argument in contending that structurally nothing has changed in Africa since the collapse of colonialism. This is to signify that African countries and their leaders are by and large presiding with dignity over the mess of colonialism inherited from their former illegitimate rulers. That African countries have amongst others inherited colonial policies, colonial infrastructure and colonial administration is no critical factual inaccuracy. It is just a truth beyond dispute. It could be contended that the challenge of being a copycat by African countries and its people, keeps Africa as a continent always bereft of originality which is a sign of critical, independent and reflective thought on issues of sustainable development and calculated progress. It is again a point beyond dispute to emphasise that formally, colonialism may have been outlawed but that practically it continues to wreak havoc on the lives of many of Africa's people. The reality that in the main Africans are not assertive and confident enough about what has as its source being Africa, attests to the actuality that the vestiges of colonialism are alive and kicking in ourselves to the level where anything and everything whose genesis is in Africa and not Europe holds little or no appeal at all to us as Africans. Small wonder then that it has to be easy for African countries and their leaders to marvel and celebrate their trade with their former rulers as against doing the same with their fellow African brothers in Africa or at least with Africans diaspora. This predicament and contradiction of African countries having attained self-rule

and yet still being hanger-on to their former colonial masters ought not be countenanced. As regularly being stated by African leaders who are patriotic enough about Africa and its people, 21st century was supposed to be an African century. Although as of now that is not the case, time still allows that something be done in that regard. Despite the point that we are 15 years into the 21st century, if ever concerted efforts could be mustered by African themselves and gravitate towards one continent, one destiny one future. For African countries to succeed in this regard a devoted resolve and determination that are free from hypocrisy are necessary (Mbeki, 2003).

6.2 Instability as a hurdle

The trend throughout the world is that the stability of a country determines the level in which that land would be able to attract foreign investments or not. The fact that the majority of African countries are characterised by either political crisis, political anarchy, political upheavals or economic instability, is not helping the course in an attempt to bring Africa together as one continent in the area of trade. Of all the countries of Africa, those that experience and enjoy economic and political stability are fewer than those experiencing political turmoil. For instance, as of now, it is Botswana and South Africa which could be placed in the category of stable countries. The other 52 countries, inclusive of South Sudan which has just being granted a sovereign status, are not politically and economically stable, not at all. The reality is that instability defining and characterising African countries is part of the vestiges of colonialism. A classic example is Mozambique which even today it is not at peace with itself but it is at peace with its former colonial master, namely, Portugal. What is astonishing, is that trade between Mozambique and Angola as both former colonies of Portugal is not as high as between those countries themselves but it is up with their erstwhile coloniser, namely Portugal. If that is not an indication of the vestige of colonialism, what is it? Another excellent example is that of Lesotho which is not enjoying absolute peace with itself and some neighbouring African countries, but it enjoys sufficient peace with Britain as its former colonial master. Lesotho as a country, is known to be characterised by instability which normally forces some of its neighbours like South Africa to now and then intervene. Once again, if failure to enjoy absolute peace and sufficient trade by Lesotho with fellow African countries, is not a confirmation of being mired in the vestiges of colonialism, then it means the vestiges of colonialism have no meaning. A fundamental question to pose is : what is the source of anarchy and political upheavals characterising some African countries and not others. The response to such a question is not far- fetched. The review of literature is explicit to the effect that a large amount of the enemies of Africa and Africans are themselves. This is to imply that where there is an instability in an African country, yes third force may be part but the chief culprits of that crisis will be African themselves for various

reasons ranging from greed to just being conditioned to disorder, quarrelling and mutinous activities (Gobillot, 2008). The contribution of colonialism is not being shielded in this regard. The reality is that it is more than 21 years since all African countries obtained their independence. This statement is being expressed basing everything on the point that South Africa is the last country of the continent of Africa to be free. This is despite South Sudan who had just recently broken away from North Sudan. This is again not forgetting and ignoring the political turmoil in Libya, Egypt, Central African Republic and other African states as a result of dissatisfaction over the lack of democracy., The reality is that free economic activities in the form of trade occurs successfully in an environment of peace and stability where the rule of law is respected by every resident (Cunha, Filho & Goncalves, 2010). Since one of the causes of failure by African countries from trading with one another just like how they do with their counterparts in Europe, relates to lack of stability, such a predicament has to be surmounted. A point beyond dispute is that Africans themselves have to face that challenge head-on oppose it and defeat it. Failure to do so will continue to plunge Africa in poverty, diseases, unemployment and other maladies when Africa is one of the world's well endowed continents with natural resources to benefit all her people. That there should be any African going to bed having not eaten as a result of lack of food has to be a concern for all the people. Taken for granted , instability could bring with it a new culture and life style in the country, where people get used to it to the level where they regard that to be part and parcel of their daily living. With such a state of affairs, trade between countries becomes very much difficult to take place. Perhaps as African countries, there is a need that we quickly learn how foreign countries keep on addressing the challenge of instability so that their economies do not suffer from it at least maybe from other factors. The argument of instability as one of the concerns and barriers to why trade between African countries is ever minimum instead of being to the maximum level has a sense. The remedy to it is by African countries to stabilise their environment through creating the necessary political climate and atmosphere which will enable investors never to look back upon deciding to do business in that country. A lasting and durable solution though as regards African countries lies in trade within themselves. But a precondition for that to occur and in large scale, is enabling trade conditions that are easy to create and maintain in a stable land where free economic activities could be pursued in an environment free from political tensions and animosity.

6.3 Underdevelopment of infrastructure

The habit and tradition of looting state resources every time when a new party comes into power, has not delayed the advancement and development of African states less. As long as the occurrence of large scale trade is dependent on the availability of a huge

infrastructure, then it means African states will always be in a disadvantage position. The question to pose is: why is Africa's infrastructural development lagging behind in comparison with other countries of the world. There are many and varied answers to such a question. The first response would be that having an underdeveloped infrastructure is not the phenomenon experienced in Africa alone. This is to signify that other countries of the world do have such a predicament. It has to be stated that countries of the world are classified into three categories as regards their level of development. There are countries of the world that fall within the category of developed countries. Others fall under the developing countries. The last category is that of underdeveloped countries. The question is what is responsible for such distinctions within countries of the world. Once again, various responses could be secured for such a question. However, it suffices to reveal that normally countries that were at one stage colonised are nearly underdeveloped in as far as infrastructure goes. Obviously, this can be explained in terms of the former rulers of those countries having impoverished them due to only being concerned about the extraction of those countries' natural resource to the total ignorance of the development of those countries' infrastructure (Thornhill & Van Dijk, 2010). Had the infrastructure in the colonised countries be developed, then upon getting independence, those countries were going to be able to make quick progress with their economic activities. A critical interrogation of why many if not all African countries are having a backlog of infrastructure, leads to the response that it was a deliberate strategy to keep African countries always politically independent and economically dependent on their former rulers, The reality is that this is a diabolical deed in the sense that it ultimately reduces the poor of the poor in that impoverished country to perpetual and entrenched poverty of the last degree. Fortunately for those in power, they are able to grab whatever has been left by the former colonisers and help themselves with it when the masses on the ground are starving and wallowing in poverty owing to lack of good governance (Kouzes & Posner, 2007, Sebola, 2012). The other reason behind infrastructure in African countries being at its lowest ebb can only be explained in terms of the African leaders whose greed led them to take financial resource earmarked for infrastructural development and either make it disappear or connive with the contractors to do a shoddy job regarding the improvement of the infrastructure. So, the contradiction pertaining to infrastructural underdevelopment by African countries is multifaceted. In some countries as it has being argued such a state of affairs is to be blamed on the colonial rulers of those African countries while on other African countries, the delay in the improvement has just being internally generated. Despite this or that reason for infrastructural underdevelopment, the buck stops with every country for the status of infrastructure there. To sum up this hurdle of the underdevelopment of infrastructure which is hailed to be obstructing trade within the African countries, given that all countries of Africa have been free and independent from

colonial rule for more than a decade, any country whose development of the infrastructure still leaves much to be desired, has itself and its political leadership to blame for such a state of affairs. It has to be revealed that although the issue of the underdevelopment of infrastructure is being given as an obstacle towards trade within African countries, the reality is the drive in the African countries to trade in foreign markets is still too strong in many of the African countries. There is even a suspicion and an insinuation that if it were to happen that all the cited challenges were to be removed overnight, still trade within African countries would not commence on the spot given many years of the development and nurturing of the trade and economic ties with the foreign lands other than within the domestic markets (Omano, 2005, Qwabe, 2013).

7. Conclusion

Scapegoating of the existence of trade hurdles and parading of all the obstacles being externally generated will not always be convincing especially to those who are naturally critical, reflective and independent-minded about minimal trade by African countries between themselves. The expressed statement serves to emphasise the absolute need for the African countries to perform soul-searching and self stock-taking as regards when are they ready to learn to build their economies from inside-out other than from outside to inside. This is the case because unemployment, diseases, poverty, starvation and other maladies keep on increasing in Africa yet trade with the former colonial masters is proceeding unabated but with little or no material benefit for Africa and her people. The three countries that are anticipated to lead the way as regards forging strong economic ties among the African countries themselves, are the economic superpowers of Africa, namely, Nigeria, South Africa and Algeria. Owing to their past historicity, the mentioned countries still trade more with their former colonial masters than with their fellow African countries. A good case in point is South Africa whose trade with its former colonial master, namely, Britain surpasses any in African soil. That in itself goes to confirm and attest that, the vestiges of colonialism are likely to be with South Africa and other economic superpowers of Africa, for a considerable time still to come. The researcher is of the conviction that African economies could turn a tide if African countries could with enthusiasm, determination, focus and vigour explore doing more trade with themselves and maybe to the only small scale with foreign markets.

8. Recommendations

On the basis of the findings discussed, the following recommendations are made:

There is a need for African countries to sever or lessen economic ties with their former colonial masters. Down the years such trade relations have being characterised by imbalances. Worse, such economic ties benefitted Africa less and their former masters undeservedly more. There is a need by African countries to stabilise their countries as a way of creating an enabling economic environments which will make sustainable economic activities to thrive. There is also a need for Africans to be emboldened to learn to be proud of themselves and their countries. Lastly, there is a need that adequate attention be placed on the advancement of underdeveloped infrastructure because today's economies thrive on the availability, safety and reliability of a country's infrastructure.

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THE PROJECT INTERGRATION MANAGEMENT IMPERATIVE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

M.D.J. Matshabaphala

University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa

Abstract

The South African government has since the onset of the democratic dispensation experimented with a number of development models in the effort to intensify the government's development agenda. This is with reference to initiatives such as the Reconstruction and Development Programme right up to the National Development Plan. The provisions of the National Development Plan further led to the necessity of the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme. The Comprehensive Rural Development Programme is a programme geared at taking various development interventions to the poorest of the poor communities in the Republic of South Africa. This initiative is still at the pilot stage. All the designated sites stand to learn some lessons on the implementation of the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme from the pilot sites. This article focusses on the Muyexe Comprehensive Rural Development Programme as a pilot site. The Muyexe Comprehensive Rural Development Programme is making a difference in the lives of the people of Muyexe. But then again, this programme is also presenting manifestations of lack of integration in the delivery of what is regarded as of public value to the rural communities. This article highlights some of the gaps in the integration imperatives in some of the projects in the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme.

Keywords: Implementation, Comprehensive, Project Intergration, Rural Development

1. Introduction

Governments all over the world are engaged with the project of delivering public value and public goods to communities through various agencies of government and also in partnership with the private sector, and in some instances with the assistance of some organs of civil society. The one domain where there had been challenges of backlogs is that of rural areas. With the governments alive to these deficiencies, there are indications of a number of governments developing strategies for the enhancement of the quality of life in the rural areas (Hobbs, 2009: 8). With the onset of a democratic dispensation in the Republic of South Africa, the South African government committed itself to creating decent living conditions for the people, in both the urban and the rural areas. Through the Reconstruction Development Programme, the South African government got underway with initiatives for the restoration of the dignity of a people who have historically been disempowered as a social

echelon on the plains of development. With this programme, there were notable improvements in the lives of rural communities in South Africa. Quite a number of rural communities started to have access to basic needs such as jobs, infrastructure, access to clean water, energy and health care services (Zulu and Mubangizi, 2014, 425). For vibrant, equitable and sustainable rural communities and agrarian transformation, the South African government launched the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme (CRDP). This initiative, in the main, is predicated on the impulses of mobilising rural business initiatives for rural development through land reform and agrarian change. This initiative is geared at empowering rural communities through three distinct phases. The first phase of the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme entails the meeting of basic human needs, as in ensuring that communities get access to health services and facilities, educational services and infrastructure, sporting facilities and development programmes.

The second phase of the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme is dedicated to Large Scale Infrastructure Development. This component of the Comprehensive Rural Development is meant to create and facilitate an enabling environment for mobilisation of both economic and human capabilities. The economic capabilities such as agricultural activities and industrialisation require the kind of infrastructure that would be more of enabling than a handicap or barrier to economic development. Work in the area of infrastructure development is already underway in some of the sites of the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme (Tsheola, Ramonyai and Segage, 2014: 395).

The third phase of this initiative focuses on rural industrial development and the credit financial sector. This phase further entails the development of Small and Micro Medium Enterprises (SMME's) and the village markets. In more ways than one, this phase of the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme is geared at growing the rural economies of the rural areas in South Africa, with a view to complementing the activities envisioned in the first phase of the programme. It is expected that through job creation that the quality of life in the households of the areas targeted by the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme will be enhanced. Once people start getting an income, receiving foods and start acquiring assets and start building and or improving their human settlements infrastructure, there inevitably will be an improvement in the quality of their lives (Maxneef, 1991: 14).

2. Project management body of knowledge

Effective and efficient implementation of programmes and projects requires application of knowledge, skills, tools and techniques to programme and project activities.

This article dwells on the application of knowledge, as in the application of the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK) in the roll-out of projects in the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme. The Project Management Body of Knowledge constitutes the theoretical framework for conversations and discourses in programme and project management. The knowledge areas that constitute the Project Management Body of Knowledge are discussed in this article with reference to their application to the projects in the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme. Project Scope Management refers to the importance of clearly defining the scope of the projects in the programme (Kerzner, 2003:264).

In the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme, the scope of the projects is clearly and satisfactorily articulated for each and every province. The major challenge is for the project managers and their teams to stick to the scope and the plans of the projects that they are responsible for. On the Project Stakeholder Management area, it is expected that the project leadership needs to know as to who is involved in the project, and what the needs and interests of all involved are. Furthermore, the project leadership needs to know what those involved and those with an interest in the projects are bringing to the projects (Burke, 2007:292).

Literature on Project Management Body of Knowledge further avers that there is a need for an understanding of the nature of people that are in the project teams and also those who form part of the stakeholder community. This is particularly most pronounced in the discourse on Project Human Resource Management as one of the Knowledge areas of the Project Management Body of Knowledge. This type of knowledge provides a better understanding of people who are either supportive of the projects in the programme or those who are resistant to the implementation of the projects in the programme. Related to this is the project leadership challenge, where project leaders are expected to provide leadership to both the project teams and the broader stakeholder community (Schmidt, 2009:179).

The literature on Project Management Body of Knowledge further highlights the importance of Project Communication Management for the enhancement of systems for project information management. This comes across as a major challenge in the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme, given the deficiencies on the communications infrastructure. A project communication plan can make communication quite easier if it is well-structured and well-conceptualised. The other knowledge areas highlighted in the discourse on Project Management Body of Knowledge are areas such as project quality management, project cost management, project procurement management

and project risk management. These knowledge areas in more ways than one are related to the Project Integration Management knowledge area.

3. Project integration management

This article focusses on the Project Integration Management Knowledge area, as alluded to in the topic. Conversations on Project Integration Management show concerns for ensuring that all the steps and procedures are followed in planning (Burke, 2010:52). The concerns raised in the discourse on Project Integration Management knowledge area come across as crucial and critical in the roll-out of projects in the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme. Discussions on this knowledge area also highlight the importance of integrating implementation with planning, for successful implementation of the projects in the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme. This further suggests the imperative of good project leadership. A leadership that will facilitate processes of project integration from project initiation right up to project hand-over. It is in the context of this knowledge area that this article engages with the deficiencies of integration of programmes and projects in the Muyexe Comprehensive Rural Development Programme, which happens to be the pilot for the implementation of the CRDP nationally.

4. The muyexe comprehensive rural development programme

The history of the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme in Muyexe, a rural village of 900 households outside Giyani, in the Limpopo Province on the North-eastern corner of the Republic of South Africa, goes back to a moment when one day, Minister Gugile Nkwinti, the Minister Land Reform and Rural Development read an article in a newspaper on a story of a poverty-stricken woman trying to feed her child suffering from malnutrition. The Minister was disturbed by what he had read. The Minister subsequently dispatched three teams of officials to Giyani, with the assistance of the local municipality. The teams went in search for villages that fitted the description of the poorest of the poor. Of the three villages that had been targeted, Muyexe village won the day as the poorest village in South Africa at that time (Hlungwani, 2009:1). Muyexe was found to be a village without basic services such as water, energy, roads and proper modest shelter (Hlungwani; 2009,1). Muyexe village, in development parlance was in a state of absolute poverty. Absolute poverty refers to a situation of either no income or very low incomes. A situation defined by lack of minimum standards of nutrition, malnutrition and disease. Absolute poverty is also defined by high rates of infant mortality, low life expectancy and illiteracy. These are some of the conditions that the community of Muyexe was subjected to prior the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme interventions.

President Jacob Zuma subsequently made a commitment to bring about improvements in Muyexe's socio-economic infrastructure, as the first instalment of his administration got underway. The Muyexe Comprehensive Rural Development Programme was to be used as a pilot, so that lessons learnt from the implementation of the programme in Muyexe could be used in the development of the economies of the other rural areas in South Africa.

5. Economic domain

One of the intentions of the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme, as envisioned in Phase Three of the programme, is to facilitate the mobilisation of economic resources in the rural areas for rural economic development. In the Muyexe Comprehensive Rural Development Programme, initiatives are already underway for the development of SMME's and the attendant infrastructure that would enable the development of these initiatives. There is some notable and visible movement on the local economic development front. Small scale agricultural enterprises are already engaged with their activities of supplying the local communities and retailers in the local towns such as Giyani with their produce. Some of the produce from these enterprises are found to be satisfying some of the basic needs of the local communities. Some of the enterprises are serving as sites of social networking, where people meet, socialise and share ideas on how best to grow their businesses (Vermaak, 2014: 1189). These enterprises are also providing some people in the village with jobs. The number of households with income keeps on growing. The one problem with this development however is that the planning for these local economic development initiatives is not integrated into both the provincial and the macro national economic system, as this would help broaden the scope of these enterprises and initiatives. The broadening of the scope of these initiatives through integration can assist with the multiplication of opportunities for people in both the local and the national economy.

Throughout the history of rural development, it is observed that the non-integration of local economic initiatives with the enterprise of economic activity and development beyond the boundaries of the rural settlements often ends up with the collapse of the rural communities' economic initiatives as the local entrepreneurs get demoralised (Nesamvuni and Tshikolomo, 2014:1198) . This often results in the de-development of rural areas as some of the most resourceful social capital migrates to areas where there are opportunities for personal growth, thus further compounding the problem of skills shortage in the rural areas.

6. Human capabilities

Phase One of the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme focuses on the meeting of the basic needs of the rural communities. These needs are looked at from the health, education, sports and creation fronts. In the recent past years, the people of Muyexe found it difficult to access health services and facilities for their health needs; they had to travel well over forty kilometres to Giyani. Today a modern health facility has been built in Muyexe, for the health needs of the people in the village as envisaged in the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme.

In education the state of the schools estates was far from satisfactory. Today there are projects on the improvement of the school's infrastructure, as in the project of improving the ablution facilities in the schools. This is the area where is supposed to be an integrated approach between the departments of Education and Health, and as it were, we are having government departments working in the same area parallel with each other and with separate resources (Nkondo, 2014: 1171).

At the entrance to the village from the Giyani side is a sports stadium that is still work in progress. At the beginning of the project a lawn surface was installed, and only to establish later on that the facility can make do with an astro turf as the lawn was burnt out by the searing heat in the area.. The Giyani Local Municipality is already assisting the community in this regard. For the people of Muyexe, this is yet another delivery on one of their basic needs by the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme.

7. Protection capabilities

According to the Human Scale Development model, one of the fundamental human needs is that of protection. The concept of protection in the context of this article refers to the protection of people, their assets, and their cultural and heritage resources (Maxneef, 1991: 17). This suggests that there is a need for an integrated approach to the protection of people and their assets and resources. The people of Muyexe have for years on end been exposed to poverty. The government minimised this situation through the social security system. There is a Drop-In centre for indigent families and child-headed households where they can collect food parcels at the close of each day. This however proved to be inadequate as a result of the escalating cost of living and the growing dependency syndrome in the community. Through a number of projects that are currently underway in Muyexe, wherein, at least one person from each household has to be employed by one of the projects, the community is finding protection from poverty through the jobs in the projects.

Progress has been made in the construction of a Cultural Centre that is meant for the protection of the cultural heritage of the local community and the neighbouring communities. This facility is expected to host a number of cultural events, as another domain of satisfying the communities' need of freely participating in their own cultures. This could have come in handy with the integration of activities and programmes in the areas of agriculture, health and education.

Development initiatives need to factor in the sustainable development component to ensure protection of not only the natural environment, but the broader community of life. This too, requires an integrated approach between departments and other players in the initiative. Providing guidance on how communities can protect their environments requires leadership, more especially in the area of education, economic development, more especially in relation to responsible utilisation of resources. Teachers can help with the education of the pupils about the environment. Another dimension to this contribution on the integration imperative is that of the role of the law enforcement agencies, more especially in the enforcement of the environmental protection legislation. The law enforcement agencies can join forces with their counterparts in education in educating the communities about the need to protect the environment (Baguley, 2008:79).

Like many other communities in the surrounding areas, the Muyexe community also had a problem of crime. This problem was addressed through the establishment of a satellite police station in the village. Other than the problem of crime, the Muyexe community was also exposed to the wild animals that occasionally escape from the Kruger National Park and prey on their livestock. The fencing that divides the park and the Muyexe village was reinforced, and there has thus been a reduction in the number of attacks by wild animals on their livestock.

As stated earlier on, the mobilisation of the community's protection capabilities requires an integrated approach more especially among the government departments that have been identified as the key or lead departments in the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme and other stakeholders in the organs of civil society. This is another area that the other sites identified for the roll-out of the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme need to be alive to as they ready themselves for the challenges that lie ahead.

8. Leadership and governance

The implementation of the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme as an initiative that is comprised of a number of projects, requires integration of projects for

efficiency and effectiveness and above all, good governance. The Department of Land Reform and Rural Development was given the task of playing the lead role in the roll-out of the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme. The issues raised in the initial stages of this arrangement were that this department was usurping the functions of the other government departments. The Giyani local municipality at some stage found itself also relegated to the lower rungs of the governance pecking order when in actual fact it was supposed to play one of the leading roles as an agency at the coalface of the delivery of some of the public goods in the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme (Hofisi, 2014:1133).

The result of this development was that different departments were running parallel with each other, instead of integration of activities and projects in the programme. This also led to the compromise of the project communication management imperative which happens to be crucial in the implementation of programmes of the magnitude of the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme. One of the best ways of saving on the resources is for departments to communicate and jointly engage in the planning of activities, more especially where they will be working in the same area and also in communicating from the same page messages to the clientele publics. The department of Land Reform and Rural Development should have facilitated the integration of activity plans coming from different government departments as the lead department between departments and also the local communities (Schmidt, 2009:10) . The role of the local communities is also found to be important, more especially for the buy-in, legitimacy and support. The other challenge is that of the capacity of the local people to provide leadership on the ground in the delivery of the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme. The Muyexe community feels that they have been overwhelmed by the intervention without the requisite capacity to sustain the initiative into the future. As it were, they are of the view that there is a need for leadership capacity development for sustainable development in the area. This further suggests that the mobilisation of the economic resources and capabilities in Muyexe, needed to be integrated with the human capabilities, more especially in the area of capacity development. The Muyexe people emphasized the significance of the need for leadership capacity in the programme for sustainability. This is with reference to the leadership that will facilitate the harnessing and integration of resources for the common good throughout the duration of the programme. This is one of the lessons that can be learnt from the Muyexe experience as a pilot project for the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme initiatives in other parts of the country.

9. Conclusion

The idea and concept of the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme is a good one, given the positive feedback that it is getting from the pilot site of Muyexe. The community is appreciative of their basic needs being met and the requisite infrastructure for meeting such needs also being put in place. The community is also excited by the idea that the programme also entails the development of rural industries and village markets for local economic development. It would however enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the programme if there was consolidation of integration of projects and activities in the programme, given the fact this is a government initiative and the clientele communities are almost the same. Project Integration Management is important more especially for proper planning, implementation and monitoring of the implementation of the projects in the Programme. It can assist in the cost-effective utilisation of public resources.

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DESCRIBING PRE-2009 XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA: A HUMAN RIGHT PERSPECTIVE

K.B. Shai

K.A. Mothibi

University of Limpopo, South Africa

Abstract

Human rights are inherent and inalienable rights of people in order for them to be treated with equality, dignity and respect. Human rights are normally entrenched by law – whether international or national law – with the United Nations (UN) as the custodian for their promotion, protection and realisation. States on the other hand have a responsibility to ensure the enjoyment of human rights by all citizens and as such are expected to make provision for the respect, promotion and adherence of human rights into their domestic laws and policies. It is therefore necessary that care should be taken that one's enjoyment of his/her human rights should not infringe upon the rights of others. It should be taken into consideration that it is not every country in the world where these rights are respected and preserved. Many of the conflicts and/or economic and political instabilities in Africa are as a result of deliberate infringement of the other people's rights by another group. These conflicts often occur at a large scale thus contributing towards the deterioration in the adherence, promotion and protection of human rights, especially of the victims. The outbreak of xenophobic attacks in South Africa during the year 2008 and 2015 is a case in point. Many foreigners were physically attacked by the local people who allegedly used them as targets to voice their dissatisfaction and frustration against the declining national economic situation. It is against this background that this Afrocentric paper triangulate literature study and interviews in order to describe the context of the 2008 xenophobic attacks in South Africa and highlight how such attacks amounted to the violation of the human rights of victims or foreigners. This is addressed in the context of the international discourse on racism, xenophobia and related intolerance which traces its origin from the Conferences on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance held in Durban in 2001 and its follow-up conference, also called the Durban Two, held in Geneva from 20 to 25 April 2009.

Keywords: Xenophobia, Human Rights, Attacks, Racism, Foreigner.

1. Introduction

There is extensive recent literature on xenophobia in South Africa and some of its related aspects that are discussed hereunder. This includes the works of scholars such as Michael Neocosmos (2008), Christy McConnell (2009), Janet McKnight (2008), Kate Lefko-

Everett (2008), and those commissioned by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) and Institute of Security Studies (ISS), among others. The common feature among these studies is that they all attempt to unearth the underlying causes of May 2008 xenophobic attacks in South Africa. The findings of the surveys conducted immediately after the attacks attributed the level of violence to issues such as increasing unemployment, poverty, corruption, poor service delivery, inter alia. This position was further echoed by policy analysts, media commentators and public intellectuals. However, the government has viewed such xenophobic violence from a different angle and instead blamed a “hidden hand” in the spate of the pogroms (Njeri, 2008). For this paper, a “hidden hand” theory denotes an explanation of an event as a by-product of invisible external forces (Golunov, 2012). This was an initial viewpoint of Thabo Mbeki’s administration, but it was later discarded by the group which was appointed by the government to conduct an investigation into the causes of xenophobia. The contrasting positions of the government and independent research organisations show the extent of the journey that South Africa has to undergo before finding a lasting solution to xenophobia. It is argued that the causes of the 2008 attacks against foreigners are complex and cannot be reduced to one or two factors (Reuters, 2008).

Arguably, the theory of a “hidden hand” can be credited with an element of truth given the timing of the attacks and their systematic organisation. This also makes sense given the rich history of the involvement of the West in the destabilisation of the African societies (Orkin, 1986; Wafawarova, 2008; Shai & Iroanya, 2014). The 2008 attacks started a month before the hotly and closely contested run-off presidential election in Zimbabwe between Robert Mugabe (ZANU-PF) and Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC). Because of the fact that most of the African immigrants in South Africa are the Zimbabweans (who are mainly the victims of the economic and political crisis) who are likely to support the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), the idea would have been to intimidate and force them to go back and vote for a party (regime) friendly to Western powers (Simba, 2009). Having been on a self-imposed exile in South Africa on the same month, Tsvangirai addressed some of the Zimbabweans living in Alexandra, North of Johannesburg to go back home and vote for him to bring about a positive change (Simba, 2009).

The fact that the 2008 pogroms have been chiefly documented as ‘xenophobic attacks’ does not mean that position is a last word in giving an account of the nature of that violence. Their somewhat contrasting views on certain aspects of these attacks have actually laid a fertile ground for the current study and others to be conducted in the future in this area. It is on record that the xenophobic attacks that broke out in Alexandra Township on 11 May 2008 and later engulfed the whole country have left approximately sixty three (63) people dead and thousands of people displaced. The victims of the attacks under review

have mainly included foreign nationals from African countries such as Nigeria, Malawi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi, Somalia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Mozambique and Zimbabwe claimed a larger component of the victims of the attacks for obvious reasons. They are the immediate neighbours of South Africa, whose borders with them are long and porous. It is important to note that even though some Pakistani and Chinese were victimised during these attacks, the people who bore the bigger brunt of the whole catastrophe are the African immigrants. The foregoing should be understood within the context that African immigrants in South Africa are proportionally larger than their Chinese and Pakistani counterparts. Whereas these attacks have largely been described as xenophobic, the fact that some South Africans have also suffered casualties casts doubts on this notion, but it does not mean that it is not true. For example 21 South Africans from the Pedi, Tsonga and Venda minority groups were allegedly killed. Hence, they were mistaken for foreigners (Karrim, 2009). This means that the 2008 xenophobic attacks probed a need to revisit the definition of xenophobia, since the violence of that year bended the demarcation of ethnicity, nationality, tribalism, gender and creed. This situation has tempted the then President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki to attribute the aforesaid violence to criminality (Reuters, 2008). Even though the scale of the attacks featured some obvious elements of criminality, the generally accepted understanding that the attacks were motivated by anti-foreigner rhetoric is symptomatic of the xenophobic sentiment. From a scholarly point of view, these researchers are of the view that the term Afrophobia captures the essence, context and realities of the anti-foreigner attitudes in South Africa.

2. Xenophobia and the Typologies of Foreign Nationals: A Conceptual Framework

There is no generally accepted definition of the term xenophobia. This has been the case due to the many manifestations and complexity of this phenomenon. At times, the term xenophobia has been interchangeably used with racism. The fact of the matter is that along with cultural exclusion, racism can be another form of xenophobia; provided the anti-foreigner behaviour has racist undertones. Xenophobia is defined as a phobic attitude towards the strangers or of the unknown. It denotes a fear and deep-seated dislike of people not known or foreign to one's self. According to Hjrem (1998: 341) Xenophobia: "is a negative attitude toward, or fear of, individuals or groups of individuals that are in some sense different (real or imagined) from oneself or the group to which one belongs".

However, the hostile attitude disposed to African migrants in South Africa is a cause for concern and its conceptualisation adds confusion to the current academic discourse on xenophobia. Historically, all Africans in Southern Africa have moved from one place to the other and the only people who can claim indigeneity to this land are the San (Ezakwantu

Gallery, 2015; Kalahari Meerkat Project, 2015). Unfortunately, this is an area that remains untapped in opening a dialogue about continental integration in Africa. If properly explored, the common history of most nation states in Southern Africa can help to deepen the understanding of oneness and the importance of solidarity thereof. This is a key if the problem of xenophobia in South Africa and Africa as a whole is to be addressed irrevocably and amicably. Neocosmas (2008) argues that academic groupings such as the Native Club stress nativism as the essence of indigeneity. He further contends that this synergy is too dangerous as it appropriate privileges to certain segments of the population on the basis of birth and race.

In this context, foreign nationals can be classified into four categories: refugees, illegal migrants, asylum seekers and economic migrants. The 1952 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defines a refugee as any person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political [affiliation], is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country. This is furthered to include any person not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. In contrast, a person who is seeking to be recognised as a refugee is an asylum seeker. Illegal immigrants are those persons who are in the country without the legal or proper documents such as Identity Documents (IDs) or refugee cards. Equally, economic immigrants entail the category of foreign nations who are in South Africa for work or business reasons.

2.1An Introspection of the pre-2008 Xenophobic Behaviour

Xenophobia is not a new thing to South Africa. It has historical roots that date back to the colonial era. For instance, the colonial and apartheid policies in South Africa sought to divide and rule the Africans through the use of any available or existing mechanisms including racial prejudice. The demarcation of African states through artificial boundaries disjoined the people of the same cultures in different countries (Shellington, 1995). For its part, as an off-shot of colonialism- the apartheid regime intensified a perception among South Africans that there is no other Africa except South Africa. This was intended to appease South Africans and prepare them to make sacrifices that would sustain their country's isolationism as long it was in the best interests of White supremacy (Ramalepe & Shai, 2015). This perception has alienated the perception of South Africans in relation to their fellows from other African states.

The anti-foreigner attitude and sentiment has been transmitted from the apartheid era to the new democratic dispensation in South Africa. It does not happen at the individual level

alone, but it also features in the relations between foreign nationals and states institutions. It is therefore not surprising that there have been numerous reports of xenophobic incidents in South Africa since the early 1990s. The then Chairperson of the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), Pityana (1998) points out that the public discourse in the post-apartheid South Africa has been dominated by the view that our country is unique and this stance has fuelled that anti-foreigner behaviour. This exceptionalism relates to the fact that South Africa is regional economic superpower, beacon of democracy, reconciliation, peace and hope. This kind of frame has actually tempted some public commentators to label South Africa as Africa's United States (US). Some political luminaries are also possessed with this belief, which has in return shaped and altered their thinking paradigm. In his first speech to parliament for example, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) leader and then Minister of Home Affairs, Chief Mangosutho Gatsha Buthelezi said: "If we as South Africans are going to compete for scarce resources with millions of aliens who are pouring into South Africa, then we can bid goodbye to our Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)" (Goggins, 2009). In the same speech, he drew a link between increasing levels of organised crime in South Africa and the daily flow of illegal migrants. This official statement captured then a silent feeling of South Africans who saw the influx of illegal migrants into the country as a threat to its political stability and economic well-being. It also cultivated and instilled anti-foreigner sentiments and feeling among South Africans.

2.2 Revisiting the Causes of the 2008 Programs

It has been mentioned above that xenophobia is not a new development in South Africa. Much has been written about the effects of crime, porous borders, corruption and poor service delivery on the state of xenophobia in South Africa overtime and it is less important to repeat that. However, what is more catchy about the 2008 xenophobic attacks is their scale and the fact that South African citizens have also suffered casualties. Surely, the extent in which universal human rights like 'the right to life' were disregarded in regard to foreign nationals has also drawn the attention of the international community and an outcry by human rights international organisations such as the Human Rights Watch. Their nature has stimulated numerous snap surveys that tried to find quick answers about the root causes of such anti-foreigner violence in that year. The findings of such surveys have actually raised more questions than answers and this paper attempts to address some of those. This paper concurs with the universal understanding of poverty (of the locals) as the source of the 2008 attacks among other grievances, but it juxtaposes the time factor and the race card played during the perpetration of this pogroms. Since poverty has been there for ages, why now-2008? Mjuri (2009) categorically stated that there is causality between penury (poverty) and xenophobia in South Africa. Penury is the shortage of common things such as food, clothing,

shelter and safe drinking water, all of which determine the quality of life. This kind of situation is one of the factors that have been advanced generally as the source of the anti-foreigner violence. Paradoxically, it would appear that penury is not limited to the townships where these attacks were rife. It is argued that increasing unemployment is among the economically active citizens is liable for the 2008 attacks to a certain extent. This view was buttressed by the team of researchers from the HSRC (2008) who wrote that: "Competition for resources such as water, sanitation and health services together with employment and business opportunities is also a key dimension to the recent spate of conflict". According to the HSRC, most of the people who planned, instigated and orchestrated the attacks belong to the age group of 26 and 33 years. These are the people who constitute a large percentage of the unemployed population and they reside in the townships, in slums and ghettos. Their location is the end-result of the settlement patterns of the apartheid era that kept the Africans in areas adjacent to the industrial sites and cities, where they can be recruited or drawn as a cheap labour. This is also a major concern South Africans whereby foreign nationals accept and are willing to work as cheap labour. The foregoing narrative perpetuates xenophobic violence since it germinates anti-foreigner perceptions among the natives.

This paper contends that the scarcity of water, sanitation and health services is just some of the tributaries that overflowed the main existing tensions over joblessness. Logic has it that if people have decent jobs, they would then afford to build or buy proper shelter (with running water) for themselves and still access better health services. Even though unemployment is a main challenge for post-colonial African state and it cut across all areas and age groups in South Africa, it appears that there is a general feeling among South Africans that foreigners are taking their jobs and this deprives them of a better life in the new South Africa after being so disadvantaged for quite a long time under the National Party (NP)-led White minority rule (Harris, 2002).

Whether the above view is a myth or reality, the key issue is that some of the foreign nationals are educated and stand a better chance of getting decent jobs as compared to the majority of South Africans who have been historically and educationally marginalised through the Bantu Education system. But those who were attacked are mostly foreigners of low level skills. Foreign nationals have shown intense competition with South Africans on casual labour and seemingly, they are the favourites of the employers (Harris, 2002; Yakushko, 2009). Based on the foregoing analysis, it is safe to argue that foreigners do not necessarily take jobs from the locals, but their willingness to accept hard and low paying jobs

can be a matter of contention. A report produced by the South African Liaison Office (SALO) (2008:2) posits the fact that foreign nationals:

“were prepared to work for lower wages, and to do jobs that South Africans may have felt were beneath their dignity, or unacceptably exploitative, fanned the flames of the accusations that South Africans were losing out as a result of the jobs that were going to these migrants”. It is alleged that unlike South Africans, foreign nationals can do menial labour without considering their level of education. This fact was succinctly captured by The Africa Health Placement as cited by Mapumulo (2009) when it cried that “[A]llow the people that guard our cars at mall parking lots who are trained doctors in their countries to help us”. This further illustrates the long road ahead of foreign nationals to enjoy their right to work, as outlined below.

There is no doubt that although some South Africans suffered casualties as a result of the attacks, foreigners were the main targets. At the end, no one benefited and what was left is “loss situation” for both rival parties. It is needless to mention that the use of violence did not address the concerns and grievances of those who were responsible, (directly or indirectly) of the attacks. This should be understood in the context that ‘desperate poverty drives its victims to desperate solutions’. This is something that needs to be looked at quite critically to prevent the recurrence of xenophobic attacks as evidenced again during the year 2015. In relation to the above stated view, Mokoena (2009) narrated the account by South African resident of Hillbrow (Johannesburg) about the hostile relations between South Africans and foreign nationals:

“Foreigners provide cheap labour for the middle class South Africans and the capitalists. For example, Zimbabweans (both males and females) demand an amount of five hundred rand (R500-00) per month for the jobs that were previously done by South African women at a minimal rate of one thousand and five hundred rand (R1500-00). Even when the employer adds more workload and working hours they will just agree without bargaining for increased wage(s). At times a foreigner would perform duties that are done by three individuals under normal circumstances. This includes baby-seating, transporting children to and from school and gardening”.

Arising from the above account, it is clear that the 2008 attacks flowed from the perception or reality that foreign nationals are ‘stealing the jobs of South Africans’. African immigrants became the soft targets because they are vulnerable and are making remarkable strides in the informal economy. Non-African foreign nationals are mainly in business and they hardly compete for menial jobs with South Africans (Lefko-Everett, 2008). Beside the fact that it is rare for non-African foreign nationals to compete with locals over menial labour,

their small population fully explains why they suffered very few casualties during the attacks. Even though they (both African and non-African immigrants) can secure appointments for casual labour, the fact that there is no minimal wage in this sector (at least in practice) means that foreign nationals are subject to perpetual poverty and thus exposing them to opportunistic attacks. Notably, rights at work are uncommon in the construction sector and the casual labour as whole in South Africa (Msinga, 2009). Hence, the lower economic status and limited education of the majority of the employees in the construction sector traps and set them for exploitation by their employers. As such, the lower class status of the foreign nationals in the casual labour industry weakens their negotiating power to demand living wages, which are normally required by the South Africans. The prevailing situation in the casual labour industry in the context of employer-employee relationship exposes foreign nationals to a certain level of hatred by the locals. According to Neocosmos (2009) it is not unusual for the powerless to direct their frustrations on the weakest- children, women, elders and the outsiders in particular. It is this paper's contention that Neocosmos's view cast a light about one of the reasons foreign nationals became the targets of would-be suspects of the xenophobic attacks during the year 2008 and subsequently, 2015.

McKnight (2009) stated that the xenophobic violence stems from fear by the so called native South Africans who herald the view that their jobs, women and resources are threatened by the inflow of foreign nationals into the country. It is alleged by some of the locals that foreigners are preferred by some South African women because they are caring, resourceful, good lovers and possibly, provide them with a lot of gifts. In addition to their multi-skilled will and availability to do all sorts of jobs, some South African women describe foreigners as being creative and innovative people who also create jobs for South Africans. Some of them like Cape Somalis run business enterprises and it seems that the prices of their products and services are affordable or reasonable as compared to their South African counterparts (Davids, 2009). It would not be a perception deficit to argue that the above have a potential of uniting the local business community to come up with the dirty tricks like the use of "third force" to destabilise foreign owned business enterprises. Under these circumstances, it is clear that the resourceful foreign nationals would be more attractive to the South African women, who are mainly unemployed and have less prospects of getting well-paying jobs. This situation has been worsened by the fact that the majority of the African immigrants who entered South Africa are men. This view bores well with the suggestion that "it is men in the 26 to 33 age group in particular and from 33 upwards who appear to be the most overtly antagonistic towards foreign nationals, seeing them as a source of direct competition, in a variety of arenas from access to South African women, access to local business opportunities and access to formal employment" (HSRC, 2008).

This prevailing situation has laid a fertile ground for the outbreak and the escalation of the 2008 anti-foreigner attacks. Whatever way you look at it, it is important to acknowledge the contribution of the time factor in the outbreak and escalation of the horrific attacks under study. It is important to note that 2008 xenophobic attacks coincided with the intensity of the global economic meltdown and South Africa was also affected by this. Although South Africans were used to live in poverty, the global economic meltdown deepened their economic hardships (Davids, 2009). Equally true, the 2008 xenophobic attacks coincided with the electricity crisis in South Africa that featured through the popular “load shedding” and the townships were the hardest hit by this energy insecurity. To a certain extent extend, the foregoing assertion can be contested because “load shedding” would normally hit an area at a scheduled time despite the fact that it is rural, township or urban. While it may not be in the forefront of the public’s mind, the fact that the xenophobic attacks summarily began at the beginning of winter season features well as it is linked to increasing oil and food prices and the shortage of proper shelter among South African township residents in particular. According to the HSRC (2008) report on Citizenship, Violence and Xenophobia in South Africa, during winter “the experience of these housing conditions [shacks and ghettos] is harshest, and ... there is an annual cycle of violence in Phomolong (Mamelodi) around winter [for example]”. Unlike the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) houses that are said to be overtaken by foreigners, shacks and ghettos are not electrified and this becomes a serious problem in winter when the locals have to make fire for food preparation in the early hours of the cold morning before heading to schools, work, and employment market centres.

In short, the bitter cold conditions of the Gauteng region have partly triggered the attacks against foreigners as each winter reminded them of the perceived or real corruption in the allocation of RDP houses. Arguably, this corruption mainly benefits the foreigners at the disadvantage of certain South Africans who have been on the waiting lists for ages. What seems clear as highlighted above is that, housing is a major source of animosity between South African locals and foreign nationals. Considering that the truthfulness of any idea is never absolute, it is this paper’s traction that there are a lot of major issues that fuel xenophobia. Thus, it would be very difficult to single out one factor as major in midst of the cauldron of competition in the economic sector and the perceived crime caused by foreigners. Despite the alleged and widely reported corrupt relationships between foreign nationals and government officials over housing, some of the South African poor have also contributed to their misfortunes (McConnel, 2009). Some are renting their low income houses provided by the government to foreigners in order to get a regular (monthly) income

while others sold theirs. After selling or renting their houses, South African locals would then opt to stay in the slum area and thereby perpetuating the problem of housing in South Africa.

Accordingly, the failure of the government to manage cross border migration and communicate the state of its economy to the nation under the global economic recession has heightened the frustrations of the South African township residents who resorted to the violence as an ultimate measure to alleviate their plight (Majavu, 2009). Since South Africa is linked to international market, Mohlaloga (2009) points out that its economy was negatively affected by the global economic meltdown and this has also affected negatively, the pace of service delivery in the country. It is not surprising therefore, that this global economic disaster inaugurated an enabling environment for the mushrooming of corruption scams around housing delivery in South Africa. The lack of information and understanding of the dictates (i.e. globalisation, market liberalism) of the international economic system have partly contributed to the victimisation of foreign nationals who were misperceived as an immediate burden to the South African economy and the major source of the difficult living conditions of the South African township residents. In the light of these convictions, the media has failed to help the government to contain the spread of the attacks by mainly concentrating on the reporting of the wave of atrocities and very little, on the efforts of the government and the civil society reverse such. In general, the media was instrumental in covering the xenophobic attacks and this had indirectly and unintentionally incited imminent violence in other areas where people believed and identified themselves with the cause of the first group of people (Alexandra) who orchestrated and instigated violence against foreign nationals during the year 2008.

2.3 The impact of the attacks on human rights

Xenophobia whether at a small or large scale, is violation of human rights and threatens South Africa's young democracy. Xenophobia is an abstract social problem and in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 in South Africa, it cannot be criminalised. The take of this paper is that it is not reasonably practical to criminalise the mere hatred and bad attitude towards foreigners if it is not violent or seek to incite violence. However, its manifestations like the use of violence against aliens can be criminalised and prosecuted in any honourable court of the land. This means that the judiciary (Department of Justice and Constitutional Development) is very critical in ensuring that the rights of foreign nationals are observed and respected. At the core, the Department of Home Affairs, Police, Correctional Services, International Relations and Cooperation should recognise, emphasise and strive for founding values of our constitution which includes non-racialism, non-sexism, equality and freedom from prejudice on the basis of culture, religion or creed (South African

Constitution, 1996). Contrary to this, there have been reports of the violation of the rights of the aliens by the officials of some of the state institutions mentioned above (Majavu, 2009).

3. Methodology

This paper has mainly relied on the review of literature related to xenophobia in South Africa and textual content analysis of media and government publications on this subject. This was complemented by the informal interviews with international students and others concerned or affected by the state of xenophobia in South Africa. The choice of the University of Venda as the location for the few interviews was informed by the fact that universities are the macrocosms of the societies that they serve. Related to this, the lack of funds coupled with the sensitivity of xenophobia has limited the paper to an outsider's perspective. The perpetrators of the attacks were not easily accessible to the researchers. Since the epistemic location of this paper is the Afrocentric paradigm, its presentation, analysis and interpretation highlights both empirical and non-empirical features (Maserumule, 2011; Asante, 2003; Chilisa, 2012). This premise is heavily influenced by the paper's dual focus on collectives (foreign nationals in particular) and scientific theories and philosophies. For ethical reasons and fear of victimisation some of the respondents preferred that their anonymity be upheld and in this case, the research used pseudo-names. It is important to also appreciate that this paper has benefited immensely from the Africa day seminar organised by the Limpopo Premier's Office at the University of Venda, in May 2008, shortly after the historic attacks.

4. Conclusion

This paper has attempted to retrospectively look at the human rights challenges facing foreign nationals in South Africa within the context of the evolving academic and public discourse on xenophobia. The foregoing portrays that xenophobia is a historical conundrum in South Africa. Although, xenophobic attacks have been sparked by the poor service delivery and poverty, it is not incorrect to state that the primary source is a 'mixed bag' or rather a complexity and combination of various factors that are intertwined. This includes unemployment, corruption, problem of housing, increasing crime levels, overcrowding, competition over business opportunities and women, porous borders, and the government's silent diplomacy towards Zimbabwe, among others. Generally, the dire situation of the South African township residents was worsened by the global economic recession and this has in fact triggered the outbreak of the xenophobic attacks. In summary, the xenophobic attacks were an expression by the poor South Africans on the lack of confidence on the willingness, capacity and capability of the government institutions to resolve their problems and grievances. It was also a disapproval of the perceived

contribution of the government officials to a bigger problem. The involvement of the third force in the attacks cannot be ruled out. But if this fact is true, the mastermind, either domestic or external took advantage of the prevailing situation of poverty to get a buy-in of frustrated and unemployed South Africans whose culture is historically violent (Bowman, Bhamjee, Eagle & Crafford 2009).

Due to the difficulty of drawing a water-tight distinction between economic, social and cultural rights, the situation on the ground tells that the May 2008 xenophobic attacks have epitomised the systematic and recognisable gross violation of the rights of foreign nationals, even those that are conceptually guaranteed by various domestic legislations and international legal instruments. It is important to recall that there are notable contradictions on the provisions of certain domestic legislations, constitution and existing international instruments on the question of the rights of the refugees and other groups of foreign nationals. This is an area that indicates that the problem of xenophobia is exacerbated not only by ordinary people, but by the people and institutions from all the corners of the society. Noting that no one's idea is inherently greater than others, this paper does not insinuate that no one or institution is against xenophobia in South Africa. Instead, it suggests that more need to be done by government, business and civil society if the scourge of xenophobia is to be defeated amicably and irrevocably. In this context, the 2008 and also 2015 xenophobic violence in South Africa was strongly condemned by the government, business and civil society. As such, there is a need to move from rhetorical actions to aggressive practical actions against xenophobia.

5. Recommendations

In order to prevent the recurrence of xenophobic attacks that continues to pollute democratic South Africa, the following policy recommendations are advanced:

- All laws with xenophobic motivated clauses should be revised
- The army should be redeployed to the border to help control the flow of illegal immigrants
- There should be regular and independent monitoring of the all the processes regarding the allocation of RDP houses and government low income houses
- Together with the civil society, the government should lodge an offensive against organised crime and corruption
- Open a dialogue among South Africans and foreigners to avoid coming up with wrong solutions for the problems and grievances of both

- Clear the myths around foreign nationals and recognise their contribution to the economic well-being of South Africa by infusing African Studies in the school curricula
- Consciountise the locals about the factual backgrounds of the human rights of the foreign nationals and the situations of their countries' of origin
- Use the media to communicate what our economy or government is able to provide and the plans in place to eradicate poverty and fast track service delivery
- Integrate African value systems like forgiveness and ubuntu on policy interventions

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URBAN HUMAN SETTLEMENTS GOVERNANCE PARADOXES IN A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA: SOCIAL COHESION OR SOCIAL EXCLUSION?

T.M. Lukhele

J.P. Tsheola

University of Limpopo, South Africa

Abstract

Post 1994, human settlement development was, and is still central to the reconstruction of the apartheid spatial planning inherited by the democratic South African government. However, the current governance of human settlement in terms of house distribution seems to create class divisions instead of integrating the residents in the urban areas of the country. In this regard, access to well-developed and affordable land persists to be one of the major challenges in the delivery of inclusive and integrated urban settlement in the country. That is, in the face of the fast-growing urban areas in the country, the well-located land has become an expensive commodity, to an extent that stiff competition for land and increased land value make it difficult for the state and developer to acquire such land for the low-income and poor communities. Thus, it has become difficult for the government to deliver affordable housing on expensive land; hence the vast majority of poor people are increasingly locating on the urban periphery which is distant from the city centres and, in many instances, isolated from socio-economic opportunities and facilities. Most of these residents are relatively poor, and live in the informal settlements with no access to basic services. While on the other hand, the high and middle class are located in well-service residential areas with provision of in-house services, particular in the suburbs and gated-communities. Such disparities bring questions to the governance of human settlement in the democratic South Africa; as whether is the promotion of social cohesion or perpetuation of social exclusion. Therefore, the paper argues that the current governance of human settlement in the country does not offer opportunities for restructuring and integrating the cities and towns, but instead, is seen to replicate the apartheid spatial patterns of social exclusion among the different socioeconomic classes of households in the urban areas.

Keywords: Human settlement; Social exclusion; Social cohesion; Informal settlement; Gated communities

1. Introduction

Since the inception of democracy in South Africa, human settlement development has been central to the reconstruction of the apartheid spatial planning inherited by the democratic South African government (Landman, 2010; Onatu; Harrison & Todes, 2015). In this regard, the government has established and introduced a number of programmes and policies to enforce the good governance of human settlement in the country. However, in spite of all the policy frameworks in place, there are still huge disparities and divisions in the urban and spatial landscape of the country. That is, the urban landscape in South Africa is still characterised by both racial and class polarisation (Crankshaw, 2007), where by the poor Black population is concentrated in the townships and informal settlements while the Black and White middle-class population is found in the suburbs and gated communities in the outskirts of the towns and cities of the country. It is mentioned that this current “racial mixing in the middle-class neighborhoods was likely hastened by policies such as Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) and affirmative action programs, which sought to deracialize the South African class structure” (Selzer & Heller, 2010; 154). However, some of the White population could not live side by side with the Black African, and as a result, upon the arrival of the Black middle-class in White-only area, the White middle-class left the neighbourhood (Crankshaw, 2007). On the other hand, the Black poor class is on day to day basis experiencing the harsh living conditions in the informal settlement.

2. The current urban landscape and spatial disparities in South Africa

Twenty one years into democracy, the urban landscape in South Africa is still characterised by socio-spatial disparities (Harrison & Todes, 2015). Unlike the apartheid spatial arrangement which used to prevent the Black Africans to live in city centres, in the democratic South Africa the majority of black people are found in the Central Business District (CBD) in almost all the towns and cities of the country. This situation is believed to come as a result of the relaxation of the apartheid policies like Group Area Act of 1950, which is perceived to have reduced the importance of CBDs, and at the same time leading to more polycentric patterns of development in the urban areas of the country. That is, as business and white residents moved out of CBDs and inner-city areas, these places reoriented towards the needs of lower-income black residents and informal trade grew, while the White moved to the outskirts of the cities (Harrison & Todes, 2015). Similarly, Goebel (2007) also notice that there is a growing black and poor population in the inner district of major cities in the country. Surprisingly, it is alleged that most of the White population who used to live in the city centres feared the massive arrival of Black populations after the apartheid spatial regulations were abolished in early nineties, and as a result, moved to less

accessible, and more protected areas (Herve, 2009) in the outskirts of the cities. This segment of white population together with some affluent black individuals is now found in the suburban residential areas which are in a form of gated communities. In geographical terms, this class of residents is a distance away from the low-class Black population which is mainly concentrated in the informal settlements and former Black townships. But still, in spite of the black middle class moving into the former white only neighbourhood, Crankshaw (2007) maintains that racial segregation is still persistent given that with the arrival of the Black middle class into middle-class White neighbourhoods, some of the White middle class left those places. The author therefore contends that these dynamic sets in motion of a constant racial transition in which racial and class segregation are reinforced. Therefore, such development pattern is ironical considering that governance of human settlement as enshrined in the Breaking New Ground policy, seeks to promote more compact and socially cohesive cities (Klug, Rubin & Todes, 2013) in the country.

3. Understanding the governance of human settlement from a policy framework perspective

The governance of human settlement in the democratic South Africa could be clearer understood from the policy framework perspective. There is a number of human settlement related policy frameworks which have been introduced since the dawn of democratic South Africa. What seems to be common in these policy frameworks is that all of them seek to redress the apartheid socio-spatial disparities, and promote the building of social cohesion.

3.1 The Urban Development Framework, 1997

Though the Urban Development Framework of 1997 calls for the rebuilding and upgrading of the townships and informal settlements in the urban areas of South Africa, in reality there seems to be slow progress, if any, towards the upgrading of the townships and informal settlements. Up to date, the plight of the people living in townships and informal settlements seem to be worsening, given the persistent outcry on poor service delivery in these areas. That is, the Black poor population in urban areas of the country are still suffering from the adverse living conditions in the townships and informal settlement while the affluent class is enjoying full house services in the suburban gated residential developments (Herve, 2009). However, it is still the government's priority to ensure that the townships and informal settlements in the urban areas of the country are transformed into sustainable, habitable, productive, and environmentally healthy and safe urban environment that is free from crime and violence (Department of Housing, 1997).

3.2 Development Facilitation Act, 1995

In relation to the governance of human settlement in the country, the Development Facilitation Act (1995) has established guiding principles which seek to redress the apartheid spatial planning. The principles include that which on one hand, requires developers and planners to discourage the phenomenon of urban sprawl; where housing development occurs in the outskirts of the urban areas, and on the other hand, supports housing development which contributes to the formation of more compact towns and cities; and the one which call for the contribution to the correction of the historically distorted spatial patterns of settlement in the country (Republic of South Africa, 1995). However, there is a persistent of urban sprawl in the cities and towns of the Republic of South Africa as a result of the market driven residential development in a form of gated communities. In this regard, the high and middle income households are mainly found in the suburban enclave communities while the poor and low income households remain in the informal settlement in the periphery of the urban areas.

3.3 Framework for an Inclusionary Housing Policy, 2007

The Framework for an Inclusionary Housing Policy was established to give direction in relation to the distribution of inclusive houses development. Central to this policy framework is the integration of households of different income and mix of house tenure and types. As such, the policy framework states its objectives as follows: “To make a contribution towards achieving a better balance of race and class in new residential developments; to provide accommodation opportunities for low income and lower middle income households in areas from which they might otherwise be excluded because of the dynamics of the land market; to boost the supply of affordable housing (both for purchase and rental); to mobilize private sector delivery capacity to provide affordable housing; to leverage new housing opportunities off existing stock at the same as contributing to the densification of South African cities, and to make better use of available sustainable human settlement infrastructure” (Department of Housing, 2007; 11). Despite all these objectives seeking to enable more socially integrated forms of affordable housing, scholars assert that such policy had a limited effect in reducing income and ethnic segregation and that inclusionary housing policy is ineffective in weak housing market environments (Klug et al, 2013). Through the weak housing market environment view, which is also the case in South Africa, it could be argued that most of the poor Black people in the informal settlements could not afford to buy nor rent formal housing structures in the urban areas, and as such, the current inclusionary housing policy is seen to have little impact on improving the quality of life of the poor Black population in the country.

3.4 The Comprehensive Plan for the Development of Sustainable Human Settlements, 2004

The Comprehensive Plan for the Development of Sustainable Human Settlements, commonly known as the Breaking New Ground (BNG) emphasis the promotion of the achievement of a “non-racial, integrated society through the development of sustainable human settlements and quality housing” (Department of Housing, 2004; 9). To achieve these objectives, the BNG call for the involvement of the private sector in the delivery of the human settlement. As a result, there has been an increase of the gated residential development in the outskirts of the towns and cities of the country (Klug et al, 2013). Such new patterns of private sector-driven residential development are seen to perpetuate the socio-spatial divisions and urban sprawl in the cities and towns of the country. Therefore, it is noticeable that the interest of the private sector in the governance of human settlement is not on the creation of social cohesion but more on providing housing for the middle-income class and excluding the low-income class.

4. Different housing types for different socio-economic groups

The socioeconomic divisions in the urban areas of the country if further perpetuated by the provision of housing assistance modelling which seem to create class division among the people in the urban areas. That is, the current provision of housing in South Africa is categorised in terms of three different income groups. Namely, the low-income houses, the credit linked houses, and the bonded houses (Onatu, 2010). Similar, in most instances these housing groups are not located in one neighbourhood.

4.1 Low-income houses

The low income houses are meant for the households who have a monthly income of R1 up to R3500 per month (Department of Housing, 2007). In essence, this segment of household is considered relatively poor, and is the group which qualify for the RDP state houses. As such, the standard of the housing provision for this societal group is seen to be inferior in relation to the middle-income households, primarily because the RDP house model has been widely criticized for being inadequate, particular for big size households (Klug et al, 2013).

4.2 The middle-income houses

The middle-income houses refer to the households, who have a monthly income of R3501 to R7000/R8000, and this income relates to the “credit linked” and is also known as the gap housing (Department of Housing, 2007). In most instances, the beneficiaries of this

housing are the public servants. With regard to this housing, the government provides a direct subsidy to act as a guarantee, thus covering part of the risk due to the financial weakness of the households concerned (Hervé, 2009).

4.3 Bonded houses

The bonded houses are meant to cater for households who have an income higher above the middle-income category. According to Onatu (2010), the access to bonded houses is available for anyone who can afford to pay on the spot or, more likely, qualifies for a home loan through the commercial banks in the country. That is, typically is meant for households which have a monthly income of more than R15 000 (Department of Housing, 2007). Let alone that the located of these range of houses is not in the same neighbourhood, the configuration and quality of these housing provision is not the same. As such, this situation may be seen as a determinant of social exclusion than of social cohesion.

5. Stiff land price in the inner city constrain the development of low-cost housing

Given that the price of the land commodity in the inner cities and the surrounding areas in the urban areas of the country is very high, it has become difficult for the government and the developers to acquire land for residential development for the poor low-income population (Klug et al, 2013). As a result, Goebel (2007) argues that the most new development of low-cost housing continues to be on the urban periphery because the inner city land is expensive and often controlled by powerful business interests. That is, for the government to acquire such land, a high market price should be paid, which in most instances could not be afforded by the state. Consequently, the government would consider developing land at the periphery of the cities. Therefore, on this note, is noticeable that the governance of human settlement in the urban areas of the country is predominately market driven (Goebel, 2013), and such model seem to favour the better-off urban residents in the expense of the low and middle-income residents. Basically, the stiff price for land property is seen to be creating the exclusion of the poor people in the urban land market.

6. New patterns of market-driven housing development

As a result of the BNG policy framework which calls for the involvement of the private sector in the delivery of housing (Department of Housing, 2004), there has been an increase of the enclave residential areas in the outskirts of the towns and cities of the country. To this extent, the new patterns of market-led growth are seen to be largely focused on residential enclaves (Klug et al, 2013) in a form of gated communities. This pattern is seen to not only result in urban sprawl but also to the exclusion of the poor low income group in the urban

areas of the country given that the low-income Black population could not afford to purchase nor rent in these places. As a result, this may be seen as a form of social exclusion in the urban areas. In this regard, the affluent Black population have been seen to move into formerly white-only suburbs, but these areas remain exclusive, often gated and social interaction among different race and ethnic groups remains limited (Goebel, 2013). This proportion of residents in the urban area enjoys the privilege of full house services, and the provision of social and economic facilities in their vicinity. While on the other hand, the Black poor households continue to suffer from the poor service delivery in the townships and informal settlements of the urban area. Against this background, scholars have thus been sceptical of the possibility of bridging the divide between the various residents and the different communities under the current market-driven urban conditions (Goebel, 2007; Landman, 2010 and Haferburg 2013). In this context, one of the weaknesses of the market-driven housing development model is that it ignores the housing needs of the poor Black people who are daily experiencing hardship in the informal settlements.

7. The plight of the poor people in the urban informal settlements of South Africa

According to the Statistics South Africa (Stat SA) (2011), about 14% of the total population of around 52 million in South Africa live in the informal settlement. This population is, on everyday basis, suffer from various socioeconomic challenges, and often become exposed to hazardous unhealthy conditions. The challenges include among others, inadequate access to clean drinking water; sub-standard sanitation and non-flushing toilets; lack of electricity supply; lack of access to sporting and recreational facilities; and most importantly, the lack of provision of health-care and policing services (Richards, O'leary & Mutsonziwa, 2007). In addition, it is also indicated that residents in informal settlements were more prone to diseases such as HIV/AIDS than were residents in formal suburbs (Richard et al, 2007). With this scourge in the informal settlement in the country, it is evident that the governance of human settlement twenty one years into democracy has not adequately address and or limit the existence of informal settlements in the country. As such, the existence of the informal settlement in the country is seen to be an ongoing indicator of poor human governance in the country.

8. Conclusion

Twenty one years into democracy, there has been noticeable changes in the urban landscape of the towns and cities of the country. To this extent, spatial disparities and socio-economic disparities have emerged in almost all the urban areas of South Africa. Arguable, the formulation and establishment of policies in relation to the governance of human settlement, which is central to the reformation of the spatial urban landscape of the country,

are seen to have perpetuated the disparities inherited from the apartheid legacy, though in a new form which is class division. In this regard, the Breaking New Ground policy framework encourages the involvement of the private sector in the delivery of housing in the urban areas. Consequently, the market driven pattern of housing delivery is seen to be creating class division among the residents in the towns and cities of the country, in a form of enclave residential developments which are located in the outskirts of the city. As such, the governance of human settlement delivery is seen to be exclusive of the poor Black population who are living in adverse situations in the informal settlement and townships. Despite, the high land price in the cities and towns of the country has resulted to failure in the acquisition of land for residential development of the poor Black population. Therefore, it could be argued that the current governance of human settlement in the country does not offer opportunities for restructuring and integrating the cities and towns, but instead, is seen to replicate the apartheid spatial patterns of social exclusion among the different socioeconomic classes of residents in the urban areas.

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PUBLIC LIBRARIES ROLE OF INFORMING HOST COMMUNITIES ABOUT DEMOCRACY AND RIGHTS OF AFRICAN FOREIGN NATIONALS LIVING IN SOUTH AFRICA

M. Ntsala

L.A. Makgahlela

University of Limpopo, South Africa

Abstract

The recent xenophobic attacks indicated that there are challenges facing South Africans which should be addressed by all citizens. African foreigners have been accused of creating problem to South Africans as they take South Africans jobs, access services meant for locals and their businesses thriving. The local individuals who believe they have the right to benefit from a democratic South Africa draw lines between themselves and non-citizens who should not have such a right. Such individuals may not be aware what democracy means. It is in this context that information professionals are challenged to inform people about democracy and how it relates to refugees. Information professionals will have to repackage the country's acts, policies and conventions, etc. on refugees' rights. Repackaged information allows users to effectively and efficiently use information. Accurate information enhances knowledge and understanding of the local communities about refugee situation as well as filter inaccurate information about refugees. Public libraries are expected to provide venues where people discuss issues such as xenophobia and democracy. In addition the library can facilitate talks between host communities so that host communities learn about refugees' reasons to leave their countries, the rights of the refugees and lifestyles to mention a few.

Keywords: Information, Development, Democracy, Xenophobia, Public libraries

1. Introduction

Throughout history, migration has been a fact of life. The reasons people migrate are varied and often complex. People migrate because of factors such as (i) environmental migration: - natural disasters such as earthquakes, hurricanes and flooding to mention a few; (ii) social migration: - escape political strife such as fleeing after clashes between tribal groups, fearing conflict zones forcing them to seek shelter in other countries; (iii) economic migration: - better quality of life and live closer to family. The terms "migrant," "refugee," and "immigrant" are loosely and interchangeably used in literature and media to refer to a person who is a "foreigner". There are some people who move to another country for purposes of work, and they are called immigrants and migrants. Immigrants constitute an economic form

of migration, refugees a political form (Hein, 1993:44). In 1951, the United Nations defined "refugee" as a person who "owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of that country." Since the 1970s, refugees have posed a growing problem in the Third World and formed an increasing proportion of the migrants arriving to the First World. On the African continent most of the countries have experienced internal conflicts and victims from these countries are refugees in the neighbouring countries (Nga'nga, 2010:13). Moreover, every developed country has experienced an influx of immigrants seeking better opportunities (Sitole & Mamogale, 2015: 14).

The presence of immigrants at a time when South Africa is experiencing an economic meltdown, high unemployment rate, poor service delivery, and economic inequality have strained relations between immigrants and the local communities. In the seeming competition for scarce resources, South Africa's poor view foreigners as rivals for jobs, houses and the amenities anticipated with the end of apartheid (Lawyers for Human Rights, 2017). The reason for the local people having this attitude is evident; having the majority of their own people living below the poverty line; an additional migrant or refugee to them seems to add further to their poverty and misery (Nga'nga, 2010:14).

A study by the Migrating for work Research Consortium cited by Sitole & Mamogale, (2015: 14) shows that "because of its stability, highly developed infrastructure and first world amenities, South Africa has attracted international migrants including many professionals – such as doctors, lecturers and formal business people". Mabaso (2015) in 'The Sunday Independent' newspaper column of 26 April warns that South Africans need to accept that the better we do as a country, the more immigrants we will attract, regardless of whether we tighten security at border posts and make work permits and citizenship requirements more stringent. South Africa is economically and socially attractive to African immigrants.

Lawyers for Human Rights (2015) year remarked that there is "selectivity in the prejudice". Migrants from culturally akin such as Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are regarded more positively than those from neighbouring Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Migrants from further afield, especially Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Somalia scored the worst in a 2010 'favourability' index by the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP). Zimbabwe make up the largest group of foreign nationals in SA, estimated at 1 million to 5 million, who sought refuge in SA following Zimbabwe's economic meltdown (Nhdlangisa & Leburu, 2015: 16).

In the context of post-apartheid South Africa, those who believe have the right to benefit from promised – but as yet unrealised–fruits of liberation draw lines between themselves and non-citizens who they believe should not have such a right. When people of South Africa voted they all wanted democracy. Democracy was going to give them jobs and improve their quality of life. When the democracy they fought for failed them many communities in different parts of the country went on violent service delivery protests. Based on misunderstandings host communities may harbour on refugees in South Africa, the following questions need to be asked:

- What role should the library and information services sector play in order for discussions on the presence of refugees in South Africa be?
- What information should the host communities have in order to understand South Africa's obligation to refugees?
- When repackaging information about refugees, which formats are efficient and effective for use by host communities?

2. Scope of the study

The study focused on the role of libraries in informing host communities about democracy and the fact that South Africa has a constitution and other legal obligations to support refugees who are in the country. This study is addressing the information needs of the host communities and of refugees.

2.1 The Library and Information Services (LIS) Transformation Charter framework

The Department of Arts and Culture (DAC) on public libraries reiterates how all public libraries should be community centres, sensitive to local needs and be able to meet information needs through quality services informed by input of the local community services based on the foundational principles of freedom of information and access for all (2014: 58). It further explains that public libraries should fulfil their important contemporary function of offering a public space where activities of various types are offered and taken up in pursuit of:

- Community and other useful information provision
- Participatory democracy and active citizenship;
- Social cohesion and the fostering of appreciation of cultural diversity; and
- Information literacy to allow citizens to participate in the knowledge society.

Simply put, the DAC (2014) urges public libraries to offer library venues and facilities so that topical issues and subjects of potential interest could be discussed by both host communities and refugees. It is undeniable that refugee problem is one subject of interest affecting South Africa, and should be addressed along with democracy and laws relating to integration of refugees within South African communities.

Satgoor (2015:1) commented that post-apartheid South Africa has the responsibility to provide free and open access to information to all its citizens to ensure that history does not repeat itself. It is also important to develop a society and individuals that are informed, able to exercise their democratic rights and play an active role in society. The Bill of Rights, enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, is upheld as a cornerstone of South African democracy. It clearly articulates the fundamental rights of South Africans, including access to information, which forms the basis of the mandate for the South African library and information services (LIS) sector.

International Federation of Library Associations (IFLA) during South African Library Week opening on 13 March 2015 sent the message to Library and Information Association of South Africa (LIASA) members that community member should have access to, and be able to understand, use and share the information that is necessary to promote sustainable development and democratic societies and libraries can promote and support citizens active participation in the life of their communities and connect their users also to the array of activities being arranged in their libraries.

In 2014 Lyon Declaration on Access to Information and Development was launched by IFLA in Lyon France. Its aim is to influence positively in the United Nations Post-2015 development Framework. IFLA therefore calls upon the Member States on the United Nations to make an International commitment to use post - 2015 development agenda to ensure that everyone has access to, and is able to understand, use and share the information that is necessary to promote democratic societies. Library and Information Association of South Africa (LIASA) is one of the 523 signatories of the Declaration.

LIASA on 22 April 2015 reacted to xenophobic attacks by stating that; "LIASA strongly condemns the xenophobic attacks and all the hate crimes that the country is currently experiencing. Section 9 of SA constitution guarantees the right to equality and prohibits unfair discrimination, while section 10 protects the right to dignity. Institutional and individual members of LIASA are urged to create an environment that fosters dialogue against anti-discrimination, counters intolerance, hate crimes and promotes a strong and humane approach to addressing issues of diversity. LIASA members are encouraged to continue embracing Batho Pele principles and Ubuntu, where every person is worthy of

equal respect and where a person's human interest, value and human dignity prevail". Local communities should know that South Africa, like all countries that are signatories to international and regional conventions and protocols on refugees, is obliged to offer protection to people who have fled persecution and instability to seek sanctuary within its borders.

3. Libraries tacking of information and democracy

Mabaso (2015) complains that "libraries are largely uninvolved in teaching South Africans to eschew anti-immigrant sentiment and embrace nationals from fellow AU member states as part of the African family of nations". Democratic rule requires an informed populace. The key to an informed populace is by utilising a nation's information infrastructure to most fully disseminate and gather needed information to and from the citizens of that nation. It is accepted and confirmed by Atuti (2008) as cited in Raju & Raju (2010:2) that a significant catalyst in the growth of democracy is access to information. Atuti (2008) argues that if libraries are important sources of information and knowledge for everyone, then libraries are an end in their own right in a democratic society. Given the support in the literature, it would therefore be safe to claim that the public library has a critical role to play in the nurturing and growing of a democracy. According to McCook (2010: v) democracies need libraries. Raju & Raju (2010: 5) agrees that the LIS sector, as mentioned above, is a significant agent that can contribute to the promotion of democracy in South Africa. An informed public constitutes the very foundation of a democracy; after all, democracies are about discourse- discourse among people. American Library Association libraries must allow unfettered dialogue and guarantee freedom of expression. Public libraries serve as gathering places for the community to share interests and concerns. It is important for the public librarians to facilitate a meeting between refugees and host communities and for all to state loudly and clearly that xenophobia cannot be tolerated in any democracy (in Kranich, 2001).

For South Africa's new democracy to thrive there must be interventions from relevant stakeholders, particularly the government and its agencies. Kargbo (2014: 368) suggests that public librarians could work together with national elected officials, government functionaries, local government officials, academics, and researchers in the promotion of democratic governance. Smith (2010:15) sees benefits if communities participate in democratic processes. Informed citizens are deemed to make better citizens and are more likely to participate in politics, more likely to have meaningful, stable attitudes on issues, better about to link their interests with their attitudes, more likely to choose candidates who are consistent with their own attitudes, and more likely to support democratic norms, such as extending basic civil liberties to members of unpopular groups.

Mabaso (2015) iterates that the library as an indispensable institution in any self-respecting society should drive communities to greater sophistication in politics, social development and new humanism that recognizes the oneness of all nations. Librarians are expected to collect many information resources from the government and direct patrons to them. This means “librarians are a keystone species... and have to attend civic association meeting, community development” (McCook, 2000: 98). In addition, public librarians should help educate people about their civic rights and the operations of democratic governments in the communities in which they find themselves (Kranich, 2001). Moreover, Kranich as cited in Bhatti (2010:1) avowed in the “Libraries: the Cornerstones of democracy” that: “An informed public constitutes the very foundation of a democracy. Libraries are the cornerstone of democracy in our communities because they assist the public in locating a diversity of resources and in developing the information literacy skills necessary to become responsible, informed citizens who can participate in our democracy”.

Advice from Atuti (2008: 3) is that librarians should inform the host communities about the legislations and chapter 9 institutions, established to support constitutional democracy. In Kenya, for example, during the constitutional review process, the public library went out of its way to acquire copies of constitutions for various countries for users to read and understand the democratic practices elsewhere. Legislators too made numerous enquiries and frequent visits to the National Library to obtain information to enable them make contributions in parliament and at constitutional discussion forums. For example, political parties’ manifestos are freely available and accessible to the public in libraries. Civic and civil society publications are equally disseminated by public libraries in Kenya. Such literature forms the basis for opinion formation and decision-making. Users are increasingly accessing political party’s websites through public library Internet services – to be informed and propagate the political royalties and positions (Atuti, 2008:4).

McCook (2000: 37) explains that there are many layers of communities within any given community. The communities with which the libraries find themselves most often are working or the communities that choose to work with the librarians are most likely not the communities that choose to include poor people. This is not an act of commission, but an act of omission. It is hard to get poor people to the many meetings at which vision statements are formed – not just for the library, but also for the community as a whole. Poor people are simply working too hard to be able to exercise their chance to participate in the democratic process in a way that is sustained enough for their voiced to be heard (McCook, 2000: 38).

Without time to participate in community discussions, poor and working class people seldom have their particular needs heard in community forums. Without tools of discourse, even if they make efforts to be heard, they still are not. Librarians striving to develop comprehensive community involvement in planning must realise that to include poor and working class people there must be special effort. The involvement of the poor and working class in community development and democratic process is critical if their needs are to be factored into decision making (McCook, 2000: 37).

Kranich (2000) argues that democracies are about discourse. In the quest to fuel discourse, libraries make an essential commodity available to that discourse and that is, information and knowledge. In the process of making information and knowledge available, libraries guard against the tyranny of ignorance. ...” .. Everything which bars freedom and fullness of communication sets up barriers that divide human beings into sets and cliques, into antagonistic sects and factions, and thereby undermines the democratic ways of life (Dewey, 1998: 340 cited in Kranich, 2001).

4. Repackaging of information

It may always not be possible to provide information people need. According to Ward (1994) there may be cases where no pertinent sources exist for some inquiries; with some obscure inquiries, the source may exist, but understanding it might be beyond anybody's expertise, as with fragments of lost languages. In simpler cases, one or more suitable, intelligible, credible sources exist, and the problem of understanding the information reduces an attempt to bring a source and the inquirer together. There is a possibility of government documents such as legislations, policies and many more being difficult to understand. If language is a barrier it means information is not accessible. If information is not accessible it cannot be efficiently and effectively used to address problems and for taking decisions.

One crucial barrier to overcome if access to information is to be achieved is understanding (cognitive access). Understanding in this context means that once a suitable information source has been provided, another condition for successful access is that the inquirer has sufficient expertise to understand it. If not, then some combination of two remedies is possible: explanation and education. Explanation would involve additional interpretation of the information, a translation, perhaps, if the existing information source is in foreign language or an explanation by someone with more expertise, either on an informal basis or by the creation of a new summary that is easier to understand. These efforts means information is repackaged.

Writing in 1996, Sturges and Chimseu (1996), in response to the question what exactly is being discussed about when repackaging is suggested, stated that it is part of a process which is known most correctly as “information consolidation” (in Stillwell, Athol and Burton 1999: 45). Sturges and Chimseu (1996) enlarge and in doing so give an indication of the process involved in repackaging:

The consolidation process begins with the study of potential users, selection of primary information sources and the evaluation of the information content. Analysis of the content to permit restructuring (condensation, rewriting, etc.) and packaging or repackaging of the restructured information can then follow. The diffusion or dissemination of the packages should be accompanied by feedback from users to enable evaluation and adjustment of the process to take place.

The rationale behind the term repackaging is “making information available to illiterates” and other groups for whom the usual format used for conveying the information would pose a barrier to access (Stillwell, 1999:42). Kargbo (2014: 370) suggests that oral skill is important to public librarians. This means that library service could effectively shift from the exploitation of print towards the repackaging of information for transmission in oral form. They should also participate in the deliberations that address the interests and concerns of the community. Libraries should be at the forefront, hosting debates and panel discussions on the xenophobic violence and what we could do to prevent its recurrence (Mabaso, 2015).

Earlier work by Iwhiwhu (2008: 2) indicates how repackaging can take many forms. Popular theatre is one familiar form that is connected with popular culture and indigenous knowledge systems. Drama, story - telling, and the use of songs are examples suggested by Rosenberg (1987). Drama workshops can be held in libraries as these workshops have proved effective in countering commonly held perceptions of refugees and asylum seekers, often gleaned from the tabloid.

Story telling is also encouraged. Matenge (2013: 1) cites Chinua Achebe who suggested that through story, the face of humanity can be revealed. As we listen and exchange personal stories, we create opportunities that allow us to recognise our common humanity and embrace avenues for dialogue and understanding of our lived experiences.

Smith (2010: 6) in Samek (2008) lists the ways in which librarians around the world engage in “persuasion and consensus building” through efforts such as petitions, manifestos, resolutions, rallies, boycotts, alternative conference programmes, publishing, lobbying and daily information exchange, all of which are strategies to address inequities

and contribute to democratic engagement and functioning democracies. Libraries should be at the forefront, hosting debates and panel discussions on the xenophobic violence and what we could do to prevent its recurrence (Mabaso, 2015). A good example is what is happening at Lithgow Library where they host national refugee week information session. The celebrations allow communities to gain a better understanding of the different situations that force people into becoming refugees while promoting a culture of welcoming and acceptance in the community (Lithgow Library, 2015).

The Kurdish population in Iraq have previously experienced forced displacements and thus share a greater feeling of solidarity for refugees than host populations in general. Sympathy has been shown by local people setting up small or associations in support of refugees (International Media Support, 2014: 8). Such discussions may remind South African that equality is the hard-fought for cornerstone of democracy, and there is no space for any violence against people based on their race, nationality, gender, sexual orientation or identity, ethnicity, disability, religion or creed. "When South Africans fighting for equality were being persecuted by the Apartheid government, it was many of our neighbours in Africa who gave safe refuge to those fighting the cause of freedom," says Sonke's Communication Manager, Czerina Patel, "All South Africans have a responsibility to speak out against violence meted out against vulnerable or marginalised people, but also to ensure that South Africa's international reputation as a country that embraces equality and human rights is not damaged by those who seek to oppress on the basis of difference."

According to McCook (2000:v) in the United States, libraries have greeted the self-determination of succeeding waves of immigrants by offering safe havens and equal access to learning. However, Preer (2001: 62) warns that libraries are "simultaneously ignored and taken for granted" in their role as supporters and developers of social and information networks, in general, and with regard to their ability to nurture democratic engagement. This was echoed by McCook (2000: 98) when she said "Because most public librarians are government employees, they may be initially be perceived by the public as part of the government bureaucracy and without a stake in the local community. The librarian's demonstration of awareness about current issues obviates this perception (2000: 98). The multicultural nature of the South African nation as described in the Constitution (South Africa 1996) implies that community services such as public libraries should offer collections and services that meet the needs of diverse communities equitably (IFLA, 1998:1). However our libraries do not carry enough material of African countries and writers from the continent, and even less on the assistance that South African freedom fighters received from other countries during struggle (Mabaso, 2015). Bhatti (2010) agrees that there is shortage of literature about the role of libraries in peace promotion.

5. Data collection methods

This study used secondary sources as well as popular magazines as current information was crucial in the introduction. The researchers were cautious in dealing with information in popular magazines as they do not undergo peer review. They were used because they provide general information about a topic. An attempt was made to support information from popular magazines with scholarly articles and books.

6. Limitations of the study

There is not much current literature on refugees in South Africa. Researchers had to rely on materials written about other countries in Europe, Syria and also some African countries. Terminology confusion is another challenge as in the literature terms such as foreigners, refugees, immigrants and migrants are sometimes used as synonymous.

7. Recommendations

The issue of democracy which South Africans have to 'share' with refugees should be addressed by all sectors as indicated in the Libraries and Information Services Transformation Charter of 2014. The literature from various reports has indicated that some host communities need information on the presence of refugees in South Africa hence librarians' are expected to make such information accessible.

Libraries have to collect print government sources such as legislations, policies, reports from various non-governments' organization on refugees in order for both host communities and refugees to be better informed. Librarians have to provide resources and facilities whereby the host communities and refugees share stories and experiences. Refugees will have a platform to relate the conditions which led them to flee their countries. Information repackaging is core to ensuring that all citizens have access to information. To ensure access information will be orally and written in simple languages, translated and be in suitable and appropriate formats preferred by users.

8. Conclusion

Public libraries have to facilitate discussions where politicians and people who are knowledgeable could share information with local host communities. Moreover libraries have to support local communities by making sure that their book collection reflects multiculturalism. Democracy will prevail when both host communities have information, knowledge to resolve conflicts and appreciate the role of South Africa towards refugees.

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INFORMAL SMALL BUSINESS AS SOCIO-ECONOMIC ADAPTATION STRATEGY OF MIGRANTS LIVING IN LOW-INCOME TOWNSHIPS AND VILLAGES OF SOUTH AFRICA

A.A. Asha

University of Limpopo, South Africa

Abstract

The informal small business sector is generally regarded as one of the key contributors to socio-economic transformation in the low income and poverty stricken areas. Recently in South Africa, this sector has been expanding dramatically in the low income areas despite several challenges and constraints facing the sector, inter alia: killing and looting; xenophobic attacks; armed robberies during violent service delivery protests; lack of adequate protection; and aggressive business robberies. In spite of such risks, most migrants have continued to engage themselves in informal small business activities including spaza shops and street trading. The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of informal small businesses as socio-economic adaptation strategy of migrants living in low income areas. The study was based on analysis secondary data from journal articles and relevant existing documents. The paper concludes that several factors influence the role of informal businesses sectors as socio-economic adaptation strategy of migrants living in low income areas, especially concerning their economic survival and social integration. As a result, migrants are exposed to emotional injury and lack physical strength to cope with socio-economic vulnerabilities.

Keywords: Informal Small Business, Migrant, Socio-economic Adaptation, South Africa

1. Introduction

In recent decades the issue of migrant small business has attracted attention in many international and national literatures. There has been an on-going debate and extensive discussion regarding the role of migrant owned small businesses contribution to the local economy. In general literature on migrant entrepreneurship shows some evidence on possibilities for significant contribution of migrant owned businesses to the local economy job creation and promoting entrepreneurship (Phayene, 2013; Radipere, 2012). However, few studies have focused on migrants owned informal small businesses as an adaptive strategy. Hence, this paper attempts to contribute to an understanding of the role of informal small business as an adaptive coping strategy of migrants. According to Council of Europe, in a broad sense, a 'migrant' includes migrant workers, family members, asylum seekers, political refugees and other refugees or illegal migrants (2002). There are also different dimensions

in the integration (adaptive coping strategy) of migrants, mainly social integration and economic survival (Ibid).

This paper critically engages with the role that informal small business sector plays in addressing migrant's economic survival and social integration needs in South Africa. It further assesses challenges and constraints that have been hampering the important role of migrant owned informal small business in the context of South Africa. The paper is structured as follow: firstly, the nature of informal small business sector; secondly, migrant's engagement in the informal small businesses sector; thirdly, social and economic significance of informal small business sector; fourthly, challenges facing informal small business sector; and finally, conclusive remarks towards promoting informal small businesses in the low income townships and villages of South Africa.

2. The nature of informal small business sector

Informal small businesses include varieties of activities ranging from street vending to in-house business. According to the George Municipality, in-house business refers to a house based business operating mainly from a residential house (Donaldson and Smith, 2011). In house business ranges from retail to service production including variety of activities operating from the residential house such as: clothing; food processing; beverages; hairdressing; childcare, publishing, shebeen service; skills training; and so on (Ibid). One of the prominent in-house businesses is a spaza shop. Von Broembsen cited in Perk (2010:448) describes a spaza shop as 'an informal business run from a room in a shack or small house where customers stand outside and purchase basic groceries over a counter, to the less common and more sophisticated grocery group'.

In-house business, specially the spaza shops, has attracted a huge number of migrants who left their countries of origin due to various reasons including political, social, religious and economic challenges. Migrants in South Africa operate spaza shops by renting the shop area from the owner of the house (Ntema and Marais, 2014). The rental contract takes the form of both a verbal agreement and an affidavit as a proof for a certain period of time depending on the agreement which usually runs for two to five years. Regarding space or facilities, unlike formal businesses, the informal small business sector does not necessarily require a large space or business complex with facilities. This makes it most affordable by low income groups that are desperate to start their own business.

A study conducted by Ntema and Marais (2014) shows that spaza shops are convenient and easily accessible for locals to buy household items such as bread, pre-paid air time, paraffin, milk, cigarettes and soft drinks. The respondents of the study who are

customers of spaza shop run by migrants indicated the following strength these types of shops: were easy and convenient or not far from residential areas; have the correct and needed stocks; and open for longer hours per day. On the other hand, the respondents also highlighted their concerns with regard to spaza shops. These concerns include the fact that spaza shops run by migrants sell expired goods; they are non-registered; and the migrants sleep in-side their shops (Ntema and Marais, 2014).

The other character of informal small business is that it involves people with different backgrounds and in most cases involves those who look for economic survival strategies because of their deprivation as a result of lack of income or no means of survival. It would seem that running an informal small business is not difficult because the skills and knowledge can be acquired through informal ways without attending any tertiary education. In fact, running an informal small business demands strong commitment and some sort of exposure to the social network.

An informal small business is that it requires a small amount of seed money or initial capital to run the business. As a result, it is mostly preferred by the people who have low income. Willemse (2013) indicated that most of migrants involved in the informal business spend a relatively small amount of money to start their business which they mostly obtain from their own savings. It is also apparent that migrants get seed money from their relatives or close friends. Likewise, stocking is also not too complicated as compared to formal businesses. It can be purchased from retail and whole sale distributors located close to the townships and villages.

3. Migrants engagement in informal small business

Migration broadly refers to the movement of individual or household from one place to the other in the form of permanent or temporary settlement (Posel, 2010) whereas migrants are people who move for different reasons including students, refugees, tourist, job seeker, and trafficked person (Matlou and Mutanga, 2010). For the purpose of this paper, migrant refers mainly to asylum seekers and refugees who fled their country of origin due to different reasons such as political, economic, religious or natural disaster.

The history of migration dates back to the old biblical days and it is by no means a new phenomenon. Recently the world has been witnessing mass migration mostly from conflict affected and poverty stricken areas of Africa and Asia to the economically well doing countries of Europe, Australia, and North America. As a result, migration has become one of the major issues of concern for many countries around the globe. For instance, the current trend of unmanageable influx of migrants to European countries from Africa and Middle East

has created a huge crisis in management of migration policies and provision of support to vulnerable migrants. As a result, the problem of xenophobia, shortage of basic services, instability and violence are some of the challenges facing hosting countries. Though the crisis of migration has been generally attributed to instability and violence in migrant's countries of origin, the major driving force behind migration could be linked to escaping bad governance and poor economic situations in order to search for a better life in a foreign land. Matlou and Mutanga (2010) describe 'economic migrants' as asylum seekers and refugees who fled their country of origin mainly to escape poor development situation (poverty) in their countries.

South Africa is one of the African countries which accommodate large number of migrants including asylum and seekers and refugees. Kalitanyi and Venter (2010) indicated that there is a growing movement of foreign migrants and refugees into the country most of them are coming from SADC region and others coming from the rest of Africa and Asia. The influx of asylum seekers and refugees into democratic South Africa has increased significantly in the past years (Greyling, 2015). Therefore, it is important to understand the reasons why migrants choose South Africa as their country of destination in Africa. This issue is not simple as there are many push and pull factors that contribute to migration to South Africa. In general, most migrants consider South Africa as a land of opportunities despite certain challenges including crime. The major reasons why majority of Africans leave their home countries for South Africa includes political insecurity, perception of business opportunities, economic reasons, and visitations (Kalitanyi and Venter, 2010). Despite the presence and enforcement of various legislative and regulatory frameworks, the influxes of migrants continue to increase from time to time. As indicated above, migrants mainly leave their country of origin because of political and economic reasons. In this regard, it can be argued that South Africa's relatively stable political situation and better economic circumstances compared to other most African countries could attract migrants from different countries with bad governance and poor economic growth. Migrants choose in most instances some of the illegal ways to enter into the country through different border points that the country shares with other neighbouring countries.

Most migrants who reside in South Africa engage themselves in informal small business as their socio-economic adaptation strategies. The Immigration Act allows migrants to have socio-economic right in relation to seeking employment and the right to basic education and health services (South Africa, 1998). Based on this provision of the Act, asylum seekers and refugees have been engaged in various informal small business sectors, in particular to the street trade and in house businesses in the low income townships and villages of the country. It is evident that migrants in South Africa are involved

in range of activities (Kalitanyi and Venter, 2010). One of the factors influencing migrant's decision to engage in informal small business sectors is their low educational background. Study in South Africa indicates that majority of migrants have a qualification equivalent to primary and high school (Kalitanyi and Venter, 2010). Despite the low level of education, migrants ability to make intelligent business decisions are not hindered, for example by locating themselves in informal trading markets in close proximity to their clients (Willemse, 2013). On contrary, Perk (2010) indicated that effective management of spaza shops require applying management functions and management skills. In practice, most migrants lack such knowledge and skills but they are motivated and engage in informal small business. Serrie cited in Kalitanyi and Venter (2010) argues that entrepreneurship is a strong tool for immigrant's economic and social integration and is a means by which immigrants without education or skills can escape out of poverty.

Other factors which motivate migrants to establish their business in South Africa as Rogerson cited in Kalitanyi and Venter (2010) identified includes: proximity to homes (mostly for migrants from SADC); strong market potential; and network of family and friends. In addition, other factor influencing migrant decision to operate informal small business is the inherent nature of such businesses. As indicated in earlier section, informal small business has several advantages such as: opportunities to be self-employed; requires reasonable initial capital; does not need large space or facilities; and only needs some basic experience.

On the other hand, there is a growing concern regarding the ownership of the informal small business and the extent to which informal businesses run by migrants benefit the local people in low income townships and villages. Regarding the former, it is apparent that most migrants own and run some sort of either street or in house businesses. For example, migrants own spaza or tuck shop by renting from locals and register in their names. There is growing number of migrant entrepreneurs who own and run different types of informal small business. There were confusions regarding whether asylum seekers and refugees can run their own informal small businesses. De Beer (2014) indicated that the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) on September 2014 passed judgement in favour of the asylum seekers and refugees right to be self-employed meaning that they have the right to trade and make living in informal sector. It is indicated that 50 percent of spaza shop owners are foreigners (migrants) in South Africa (De Beer, 2014). The increasing numbers of foreign spaza shop owners are due to lack of significant regulations in respect of in-house businesses and in general policies focused on regulating street trading (Ntema and Marais, 2014). To some extent having fair, appropriate and integrated regulatory measures might help to address such challenges. Other problem associated with ownership is that residents in low income townships and villages opt for renting their shop rather than operating by

themselves because of fear of competition in business and lack of appropriate business skills. In most cases, the residents benefit from rental collections while employment opportunities are limited as the shops are run predominantly by family members.

4. The socio-economic role of informal small business

Small businesses are increasingly recognised as potential sources of innovation, local economic growth and job creation (Cant and Edris, 2005). South Africa has recognised small business sector as a significant sector for promoting local economic growth and job creation. In this regard, developmental local governments should play a leading role in deriving the local economic growth through promoting various local economic development in their area of jurisdiction. Developmental local government is encouraged to design integrated development planning process which identifies key issues such affects the local communities. In their integrated development plan, which also includes local economic development and small business promotion, the local authorities are required to identify the most pressing issues that affect community and design strategies to improve the living standard of poor and unemployed local people in South Africa. The White Paper on Local Government (1998) clearly stipulates that local authorities should work with communities in addressing socio-economic needs of the community including job creation and income generating opportunities for the people in municipal areas (South Africa, 1998).

The role of small businesses within developing economies is tremendous. Tambunan (2006) identified that a) they are large in number and scattered, therefore, they are significant in addressing the needs of local urban and rural areas, b) they are labour intensive, c) they are mainly based on personal savings of the owners, supplemented by gifts or loans from relatives, government entities or from local and informal money lenders, traders, input suppliers and payment in advance from consumers, d) it provides opportunities for the development of new and emerging entrepreneurs in local areas.

The informal sector is gaining momentum in international discourse and the role of such sectors has been more recognised as there is a shift in thinking from the traditional to the new perspective (Ingle, 2014). The traditional view discouraged the establishment and development of informal sectors in many countries. However, the new perspective takes into consideration the need to further enhance informal sectors as a key factor to socio-economic transformation. In South Africa, the informal small business has generally been considered as a potential contributor for promoting local economy in the previously disadvantaged townships and rural areas which are predominantly populated by black African people. Historically, townships and rural areas in South Africa had a limited market and business

opportunities due to legacy of apartheid. Today, this situation is changing mainly because of the rapidly increasing nature of informal small business.

Informal small businesses play a critical role in the South African economy. Perks (2010) indicated that spaza shops can assist in economic growth and reducing the unemployment rate in the country. Willemse (2013) adds that informal street trading contributes to the informal economy of South Africa by providing the unemployed with income generating and employment opportunities. The informal sector specially involves poor and destitute people thereby playing a major role in addressing poverty and inequality at the local level.

Regarding spaza shops, De Beer (2014) indicated that the spaza shop industry plays a major role in the South African economy, contributing R70 billion per annum. Notably, 50 percent of the shop owners are foreigners (migrants). It can be argued that spaza shops owned by migrants contribute to the overall economic growth of the country.

The other benefit of migrant owned informal including spaza shops is their importance in creating job opportunities and in transferring necessary business skills. In this regard Kalitanyi and Venter (2010) revealed that African immigrant businesses have not only created job opportunities by employing South Africans in their business but also encouraged the transfer of business skills from migrant entrepreneurs to the South African employees. Additionally, spaza shops help those who are engaged to improve their livelihood through improving the level of income and by enhancing their chance to build both tangible and non-tangible assets. For instance, spaza shops usually rent home garages or run spaza shops in some informal buildings.

Indirectly, informal small business contributes towards expansion of market and investment in low income townships. They also assist migrants to earn some income to support their extended families whereas the remittance sent by migrants improves local economies of migrants' original countries. For migrants, participating in informal business provides the only means of generating an income to escape poverty as well as to develop a sense of economic independence. Through this, they might be able to support their families on the relatively small income that they earn (Willemse, 2013). Finally, in terms of social networking, informal small businesses strengthen social networking and information of exchange as people develop more interest to interact and benefit from the selling and buying processes. This also helps in integration process of migrants into the local community.

Regarding small businesses contribution to the local people, these businesses have critical role in creating job opportunities and income. Njiro and Compagnoni (2010) argue

that small business sector contribute significantly to job creation and income generation, and provide employment opportunities for an increasing number of youth population. The most common reasons for youth unemployment include lack of skills and limited opportunities. In South African context, it is evident that most of the affected group by unemployment is the young population who have no work experience or lack skills. Small businesses are expected to create job opportunities to unemployed people including youth (Ndedi, 2009). However, with over 20 years of new economic and democratic dispensation South African unemployment is still high and young population accounts for higher percentage. The ability of small businesses to create job is constrained by a number of factors associated with finance and logistics. Issues such as lack of adequate government support for informal businesses, inadequate skills for networking and managing could be cited as major problems. It is important that small businesses owners should have innovative practices in promoting that small business to be effective in creating job opportunities for other people. This raises a concern why small businesses are not effective in creating job for unemployed young local people. There are some evidences with regard to job creation of small business to unemployed local people, nevertheless, most of the jobs created are not sustainable and they do not provide adequate wages and benefits to the locals who are employed in such sectors. In most cases, such business have informal nature of survivalist and included spaza shops, mini-supermarkets, beauty salons, taverns and street vendors. Since such businesses are run and managed by family members.

Hence, it can be argued that several measures are needed to promote informal small businesses to be effective in creating job opportunities and income for South African poor, especially unemployed youth in rural areas of the country as well as in poverty stricken townships and neighbourhoods. Some of these strategies could be: government should support the promotion of small businesses through various means including infrastructure development; more focus should also be given to local areas where the market opportunities are limited and unemployment is very high; training and skills development opportunities for younger people could also promote the spirit of entrepreneurship and good work ethics among young people in previously disadvantaged areas; more investment should be promoted in such areas to develop the physical infrastructure to attract potential entrepreneurs; priority must also be given to encourage self-help development approach thereby to reduce dependency mentality on government and institutions; last but not least financial assistance for starting in formal small businesses by the local people could assist in encouraging potential small business owners.

5. Challenges facing informal small businesses

In general South African government must encourage people to become entrepreneurs and to create small enterprises (Kalitanyi and Venter, 2010). To that end, it is necessary for government to address critical challenges that informal small businesses are facing in the country and facilitate enabling an environment at the local level to encourage the establishment and development of the informal sector. Informal small businesses owned by migrants in South Africa are affected by various constraints. The biggest challenge of the migrant owned small business is killing and looting as well as xenophobic attacks which disrupt the relative peace and security in the country (Hall, 2015). Informal small businesses are vulnerable to looting and armed robberies during instances like service delivery protests by local people or even in normal situation. Xenophobic attacks and lack of adequate protection also causes small business owners, especially the migrants to be vulnerable to such shocks. According to Callaghan (2014) xenophobic attacks affect the earnings of informal traders.

The other challenge facing migrant owned informal small businesses is aggressive business robbery and linked murder which targets mostly spaza shops and small grocery stores. Gastrow (2010) indicated the reasons why foreign owned spaza shops are at the risk of robbery. These include the fact that: the spaza shops are largely successful; they keep cash, cigarettes, prepaid airtime vouchers which are easy to rob and sell; are located in crime spot areas; and the response for victims is inadequate due to social isolation. Other constraints include lack of available financial assistance, lack of proper operational infrastructure and inability to maintain sufficient stock levels (Willemse, 2013). Migrants also lack awareness about regulations related to informal small businesses. This creates opportunities for brokers and corrupted officials to make money during the process of getting their business licenced.

In addition to business robbery, there are also several challenges and constraints that are faced by local informal business owners, especially the street traders that constitute mostly of women. These include the fact that many street traders lack financial assistance from banks or financial institutions; crime and theft of goods; and lack of access to formal training (Arnold, 2012). Perk (2010) adds that local owners of informal small business, especially spaza shops, lack critical management skills such as purchasing, financial and information management functions.

6. Conclusion

The aforementioned discussion highlights that people who are running informal small businesses have inadequate understanding of the legislative and regulatory frameworks in relation to their mandates and responsibilities in the informal small business sector. Hence, it is suggested that the relevant government departments should take appropriate measures to put regulatory frameworks in place and create awareness on regulatory matters. There is a need to introduce fair regulations in an integrated manner regarding in-house business, specifically spaza shops given the mushrooming of such businesses in low income townships and rural areas. The regulation has to include both business and health regulations (Ntema and Marais, 2014).

The analysis on ownership of informal small businesses indicates that there is a need to further develop capacity of local people to further establish and operate more informal small businesses in the local areas. This paper argued that there are many desperate people who need to be encouraged to establish and operate informal small business as a means of a survival strategy. It is further suggested that local authorities take the following measures: encourage the establishment of new informal small business and ensure the provision of formal training in business management skills including procurement, accountancy and information management.

It has been argued that informal small business face numerous challenges including shortage of financial assistance as well as business robberies and xenophobic attacks linked to murder. In light of this, government should encourage the private sectors and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to financially support the small business sector. Additionally, this paper calls for continued strong measures from government to protect informal small business owners and their businesses from xenophobic attacks and robbery. Government should work hand in hand with business owners and communities to address such challenges at the local level.

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THE MANAGEMENT OF WATER RESOURCES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: A MINI-REVIEW OF ZIMBABWE AND SOUTH AFRICA

J.R. Gumbo

University of Venda, South Africa

Abstract

The advent of democracy in South Africa in 1994 ushered a review of the Acts dealing with management of water resources. Thus this review is about the water law reforms in South Africa and Zimbabwe and the benefits to the previously disadvantaged groups. The review will document the new water laws in Zimbabwe and South Africa based on literature. The National Water Act (Act 36 of 1998) was enacted to supersede the Water Act (Act 36 of 1956). South Africa is divided into 9 water management areas (WMA) and each WMA is supposed to be managed by a catchment management agency (CMA). The National Water Act (NWA), provided for the initiation of water management institutions, CMAs and the Water User Associations (WUAs), with an oversight of water resources and management. Whereas in Zimbabwe the Water Act (No. 31 of 1998) replaced the old Water Act of 1927. In the this water law the water resources now belong to the state and were delegated to Department of Water Development who in turn established the Zimbabwe National Water Authority to manage and develop the water resources. The Department of Water Development was to remain the oversight body and responsible for regulatory issues. As in South Africa, the country of Zimbabwe was divided into seven catchments, which were stakeholder managed, and was part of the Zimbabwe National Water Authority. This review will discuss the successes of water management at catchment level in both countries and the challenges they face.

Keywords: Catchment management; Public participation; Good governance; Gender balance

1. Introduction

Water is one of natural resources that play an important role in our lives, the environment and in socio-economic development. Thus, it is important to judiciously manage this precious natural resource for our immediate benefit and the benefit for future generations, for sustainable development (Brundtland Commission, 1987). Hence the reforms in the water sector were in response to the Brundtland Commission, promote

integrated water resources management (IWRM), and decentralize water management from government to community based management institutions (Chikozho, 2002; Swatuk, 2005). The objectives of the water reforms were to recognize the inaction of water and land, manage water in a holistic manner by taking into account the hydrological cycle, valuing water as an economic good, promoting equitable use of water and its sustainability.

According to Chikozho (2002:4-5) the three basic principles in the water reform sectors were:

“(a) Decentralization of management responsibility to the catchment or river basin level

This has mainly entailed a physical partitioning of the country into hydrologically defined catchment areas for more integrated, holistic, participatory and sustainable management of the resource.

(b) Promotion of equitable access to water for all citizens

This comes as a realisation of the fact that in some countries water is not equally accessible to all groups. Some groups are better positioned to access and utilize the water and reap some economic benefits. Because water can be utilized to produce some economic benefits, it can be used as a vehicle for poverty alleviation.

(c) Water is both a social and economic good

According to FAO (1995:4), this principle was a basic acknowledgement of the fact that despite its widespread scarcity, the majority of societies do not treat water as an economic good or service. If water were treated like other commodities it would be priced to at least cover its cost of supply, including storage, treatment and distribution so as to ensure its continued availability.”

The advent of democracy in South Africa in 1994 ushered a review of the Acts dealing with management of water resources in line with the ethos of the Brundtland Commission. The National Water Act (Act 36 of 1998) was enacted to supersede the Water Act (Act 36 of 1956). South Africa was initially divided into 19 water management areas (WMA) but this has been reduced to 9 WMAs due to financial and technical viability of Catchment Management Agencies (CMAs) and regulatory challenges in overseeing too many CMAs (DWA, 2012). The proposed nine WMAs are Limpopo, Oliphants, Inkomati-Usuthu-Pongola, KwaZulu-Natal Rivers, Vaal, Orange, Eastern Cape Coastal Rivers, Western cape South Costal Rivers, Western Cape west Costal Rivers. Then at a local level, Water User Associations (WUA) were established and are still being established, and some

were formed with the de-establishment of irrigation boards (Faysse & Gumbo, 2004). The WUA are cooperatives that are formed by individual members who are interested in utilizing water for their common good and water related activities as per the guidelines of the NWA.

Whereas in Zimbabwe the Water Act (No. 31 of 1998) replaced the Water Act of 1976 which had also replaced the old Water Act of 1927. The water reforms were also similar to those of South Africa. In this water law the water resources now belong to the state and were delegated to Department of Water Development who in turn established the Zimbabwe National Water Authority to manage and develop the water resources. At catchment level, seven catchment councils were established from the decentralization of the Department of Water Development through the merger of Regional Water Authority and Department of Water Affairs. At local level, sub-catchment councils, water user association and water user boards were established by interaction of local stakeholders (Chikozho, 2002).

2. Managing water resources at catchment level

In South Africa, each of WMA was supposed to be managed by a catchment management agency according to the Government Notice No 1160 (1990). The National Water Act (NWA), provided for the initiation of Water Management Institutions, CMAs and the Water User Associations (WUAs), with an oversight of water resources and management. To date, only eight CMAs have been established and of these only two are operational namely Inkomati CMA and Breede Overberg CMA, in Mpumalanga and Western Cape respectively. The first catchment management agency to be established was the Inkomati CMA and is located in the Inkomati WMA, north-eastern part of South Africa boarding Swaziland and Mozambique (Chikozho, 2005) and this will be realigned into the proposed Inkomati-Usuthu-Pongola water management area. The Breede Overberg CMA will also be realigned into the proposed larger Breede-Gouritz CMA (DWA, 2012).

The primary aim of the CMAs is to manage water resources in their area of jurisdiction, take on functions that are delegated or assigned by the Department of Water Affairs and report directly to the Minister of Water Affairs (NWA, 1998). The CMA board is composed of stakeholders who represent the interests of water users, technocrats, local and district municipalities, local and provincial governments and environmental inclined groups (DWA, 2000). Thus, during the establishment of CMA all these stakeholders participated in the consultation process. The CMA responsibilities were to develop Catchment Management Strategy (CMS) on how best to manage and develop water resources in their sphere of jurisdiction, coordinate other Water Management Institutions, ensure the sustainability of water use, the promotion of cooperative governance and promotion of community

participation in water resource management (Schreiner and Van Koppen, 2002). The CMS document must be in line with the first and second National Water Resource Strategy documents (DWA, 2012).

In Zimbabwe there are seven catchment areas that were demarcated along major river basins and there are Mazowe, Manyame, Sanyati, Save, Mzingwane, Gwayi and Runde, these water resources are managed by Catchment Councils (CC). The composition of the Catchment Council involved all the stakeholders in the particular catchment, water users, farmers and local municipalities. The main functions of the CC according to Makurira & Mugumo (2005:169-170) were: "prepare a catchment management plan in consultation with the stakeholders for the river system; grant permits for water use; supervise the performance of sub-catchment council; resolve conflicts within their areas of jurisdiction". On a localized level, sub-catchment council were established to manage water resources and their functions were Makurira & Mugumo (2005:170) "regulate and supervise the implementation of water user permits, including groundwater use; monitor water flows and use in accordance with allocations for the CC; promote catchment protection; monitor water discharge; provide representative for the CC; assist in data collection and participate in catchment planning and collect rates and fees for all water use permits issued.

4. Managing water resources at water user level

In both countries, South Africa and Zimbabwe, Water User Associations have been established to manage water resources in localised area. At local level, a third of their water management institution is the water user associations (WUAs). The WUAs are either established along a water resource, part of a river or aquifer or they may transform an existing irrigation board into an all-inclusive Water User Association. The Irrigation Boards (IBs) are to be transformed into Water Users Association (WUAs) which are expected to invite all users to be incorporated in the defined area of jurisdiction, whether they have a formal water entitlement or not (Faysse and Gumbo, 2004). This transformation from IBs into WUAs was designed to enable better participation by 'historically disadvantaged individuals' (HDIs) in the management of water resources (the term 'HDI' refers to all those who were deprived of certain rights during the apartheid regime, i.e., blacks, coloured, Asians and disabled people, as well as women). The central tool to manage water will be user-driven institutions organized in two levels: the Catchment Management Agencies and the Water User Associations. The purpose of WUA is to enable people within a community to pool resources such as money, human resources and expertise so to carry out water related activities more effectively.

5. Public participation during the consultation phases

The concept of multi-stakeholder platforms (MSP) or catchment management agency (CMA) have been entrenched in developed nations and are a byproduct of the formulation of new Water Acts as they delegate and promote the good governance of water resources at local level (Faysse, 2006). But the most important action is the interaction between different groups and among groups within the CMA on how best to consolidate their positions and influence. Stakeholders are defined as ‘those who have an interest in a particular decision, either as individuals or representatives of a group. This includes people who influence a decision, or can influence it, as well as those affected by it’ (Hemmati, 2002 in Faysse, 2006). During the interaction of various stakeholders there is the element of social capital. The World Bank (1999) defines social capital as the ‘institutions, relationships and norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society’s social interactions. Social capital is not just the sum of the institutions, which underpin a society- it is the glue that holds them together.’ With indigenous communities this concept of social capital is the basis of ‘Ubuntu’.

The issue of public participation is important in having an inclusive water institution such as the process of establishing the Catchment Management Agencies, consultation with various stakeholders is important. In the case of Inkomati CMA, the DWA regional office in Nelspruit and local consultants assisted with the consultation and public participation (Chikozho, 2005). The majority of the stakeholders were previously disadvantage individuals and groups (less knowledgeable about water issues), large and powerful commercial farmers, industrialists, commercial forestry companies (more knowledgeable about water issues). After seven years of consultation and strategizing, the Inkomati CMA was finally established in March 2004. A similar consultation and public participation process, spearheaded by the DWA regional office in Cape Town, assisted with the establishment of the Breede Overberg CMA.

As in Zimbabwe, the process of public consultation and participation was followed in the establishment of the catchment councils (catchment water management level) and sub-catchment councils on localized level. However the study of Makurira & Mugumo (2005:173) showed during these consultation phases, the different stakeholders/actors have their own agendas and financial interests “stakeholders will have different agendas, and it will take time for them to sit down to develop a management plan openly and honestly; financially powerful stakeholders will always want to dominate the process, while protecting their own interests; political influence should always be kept at minimum levels; management systems that are financed from stakeholder involvement are more likely to succeed than externally supported programmes; implementation of reforms should not take too much time, as

problems will be experienced, no matter how much time was put into preparation; reforms are costly and time-consuming. Stakeholders will need to be convinced of the immediate and long-term benefits of their participation before they fully commit themselves to the process”.

6. Water institutions seen as places of encounter and power struggle

Power may be defined as the ‘capacity of a person or a group to obtain leverage so that, in the relationship with another person or group, the components of the interaction are favourable to the former over the latter’ (Crozier and Friedberg, 1977 in Faysse, 2006). The power relationships may be further refined as follows: The power to impose one’s ideas during the discussion and control the decisions taken eventually; the power to control the implementation of these decisions and the power to stay away from the negotiation process. For example in Brazil, during forestry management forum, some of the stakeholders do not participate in the discussions openly for fear of reprisals and retribution (Castellanet, 1999 in Faysse, 2006). Thus the end result of such poor stakeholder interactions is the sidelining of weaker participants and the emergence of powerful participants will eventually co-own the decisions.

7. Water institutions used as opportunities for capacity building

A trade off may be made with the more powerful participants, and in return the weaker participants may be offered opportunities for capacity building on a long term basis. In return the large commercial farmers may agree to provide training opportunities for emerging farmers as during the transformation of Umlass irrigation into Mlazi Water User Association (Faysse and Gumbo, 2004).

8. Water institutions used as opportunities for poverty alleviation

The water institutions such as WUA can be a powerful tool to fight poverty by enabling the indigenous communities to access financial and marketing information from different government departments (Schreiner & Van Koppen, 2002; Swatuk, 2005). This basis of this assistance:

- from the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry for the management of water resources
- from the Department Land Affairs to increase the security of land tenure amongst farmers;
- from the Department of Agriculture for the provision of extension support and advice in increasing production;
- from the Land Bank for a production loan;

- from the National Agricultural Marketing Council to receive advice on products and marketing;
- from the Department of Public Works for the establishment of community assets such as storage facilities;
- from the Department of Trade and Industry for training in managing a business and facilitating market access.

It can be seen from this example that WUAs hold a lot of potential with regard to the pursuit of cooperative governance. However, it is important that the mechanisms for cooperation among government departments be clear and unambiguous if the system is to serve WUA members adequately.

The NWA recognizes the importance of women's voices in water management structures. To put this to effect, it makes provision for the establishment of WUAs as vehicles for achieving poverty reduction and gender equity. Gender quota alone is not enough to bring about gender equity and poverty reduction in WUAs because the required enabling environment for the empowerment of rural women is mostly not created. Without implementing the necessary programs for empowerment of women, women are not getting any benefits from their involvement in WUAs because they did not own land and water rights in their individual capacity (Mjoli et al., 2009). Men who owned land and water rights had the power to influence the decisions on the allocation of water resources. The top-down approach of establishing WUAs for poor black farmers is not in line with the vision of the National Water Act which envisaged a bottom-up process driven by water users.

10. Conclusion

The water reforms in South Africa and Zimbabwe has resulted in the formation of new water institutions that contribute to the management of water resources on a catchment and localized level. This has benefited the common person in having access to water resources and using the water resources for their mutual benefit. However the stakeholder consultation and participation is noble but powerful interest groups may hijack the consultative process for their own ends.

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ASSESSING THE CAPACITY OF AFRICAN LEADERSHIP IN COMBATING CORRUPTION

M. Kanjere

University of Limpopo, South Africa

Abstract

This article argues that there is paucity of research conducted to probe on African leadership capacity in dealing with corruption. Corruption in Africa has reached a stage whereby it is difficult to be addressed by formal institutions only, as such institutions are sometimes implicated in corrupt activities. Corruption manifests itself in different forms, such as in manipulation of public policies, taking bribes, nepotism, and use of public resources for personal benefit, disregarding the law and defeating the ends of justice. It perpetrates poverty, erodes the valuable and meagre resources of the continent and divide the society. Therefore, the purpose of this article is to assess the capacity of African leadership in combating corruption. The article uses qualitative research approach to conduct extensive literature review to elucidate corruption. One of the major findings in this research is that there is lack of political commitment on the part of African leadership to combat corruption. The research also discovered that there are certain countries in Africa that have successfully curbed corruption, and they are therefore presented as examples of best practice. Furthermore, this article presents an ethical leadership framework for combating corruption as one of the interventions that can be considered, and also as its contribution to the discipline. The article concludes its arguments by stating that corruption can be curbed in Africa, through the implementation of correct strategies, measures and political commitment.

Key-words: Corruption, Capacity, Ethical leadership, Moral standards, Ethics

1. Introduction

Corruption remains one of the most significant challenges to good governance, sustainable economic growth, peace, stability and development in Africa (Institute for Security Studies: 2015). Therefore, the fight against corruption has to remain as the top agenda of African leadership. However, little has been done to combat corruption as it runs against the moral fibres of many societies. Holloway (2015) argues that corruption has developed faster than the systems of democracy, which promote transparency, accountability and integrity. It has resulted in massive degradation of human rights, poverty and misery. Therefore, the question that remains is, does African leadership have enough capacity to combat corruption? Durojaye and Mirugi (2012) state that efforts by African governments to combat corruption have not yielded positive results due to weak support

from institutions such as the judiciary and failure to punish culprits of corrupt practices. For instance, in Tanzania, a list of prominent politicians and police officers who were implicated in corrupt activities relating to elephant poaching was released to the president, several years later, no further investigations were conducted and no arrests were made (Wilson-Spath 2014). This shows how some African leaders may disregard the laws of their countries and send the wrong messages to the population about ethics. Lack of ethics serves as the breeding ground for corruption.

Corruption Watch (2015) defines corruption as the abuse of public confidence or resources for personal gain. Corruption can also be classified into different categories such as grand, petty and political corruption depending on the amounts of money involved, the sector and the level at which it occurs. Therefore, grand corruption occurs at the higher level of governance, petty at everyday life and political in instances whereby policies and state organs are manipulated by decision makers for personal gain (Transparency International 2015). The focus of this article is therefore on grand and political corruption that occurs at government level in most African countries.

Punt (2005) pointed out that corruption stories fill up newspapers headlines in many African countries. Ssonko (2010) maintains that scandals involving public officials have often captured the world attention; most of these scandals are as a result of the deteriorating ethical behaviours of the public officials who have indulged themselves into all sorts of malpractices. For example, in South Africa, newspaper headlines are saturated with corruption stories occurring at the highest echelons of government and in enterprises. Van Vuuren (2014) agrees that in South Africa, elite networks within government and business appear to be destabilising anti-corruption efforts by using security agencies to deal with political conflicts.

Anti-corruption initiatives and legislation are developed across the continent, but the results thereof are minimal because governments are not fully committed in combating corruption. Institute for Security Studies (2015) stipulated that the capacity of governments to monitor, assess and respond to corruption is limited, and that the political sensitivities also makes it difficult for government to deal with corruption. Mungazi and Walker (2015) maintain that corruption has become part of government operations; hence there is a veil of secrecy which is common to most African governments. Githongo (2015) also agrees that political corruption is at the very core of the African state which is in most instances patrimonial in nature as it is driven by the elites that are very close to the states' apparatus and who in some instances control such apparatus. He further indicated that the major incidents of grand corruption and looting that have the most macro-economic consequences

in Africa, could not have taken place without the help of skilled intervention of west-bankers and lawyers. Therefore, corrupt activities in Africa are complex and they occur across various sectors. Punt (2005) argues that corruption occurs in all the sectors, but its impact is felt in the public sector where it is most destructive. The public sector is the area where delivery of services takes place, it is the place where the public's confidence lie, therefore if the public sector is corrupted, a lot of things in the country can go wrong. The public sector is the area that if well-guarded can foster moral principles in society. Society needs principled and ethical leadership which can facilitate good governance and effective delivery of services. Toor and Ofori (2009) agree that leadership ought to be ethical in order for it to be effective and successful over the long term.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that there are some positive initiatives in Africa to combat corruption, which include amongst others, being signatories to global anti-corruption agreements. Furphy (2015) states that most African countries are signatory to the global anti-corruption agreements such as United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), which is ratified by 145 countries. The convention agreement came to force in December 2005 and it has become the first legally binding global anti-corruption agreement representing a significant achievement in the fight against corruption. Furthermore, at the regional level, there are various anti-corrupt initiatives under African Union (AU). Olaniyan (2004) states that through the adoption by the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (Anti-Corruption Convention) that has signified a great regional and national step towards combating corruption.

Institute for Security studies (2015) states that some countries, such as Rwanda and Tanzania, have made significant advances in reducing corruption. But others, including Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa and Sudan, have made meagre progress. Most countries have anti-corruption agencies, but these agencies are effective in countries that have minimal political interference but high political commitment to fight corruption. Such agencies also have greater autonomy as compared to the agencies which are operating in high corrupt areas. Countries that have managed to curb corruption are those that have managed to emphasis ethical conduct and are thus presented as models of best practice. Sebudubudu (2014) mentions that Botswana has managed to curb corruption and closely control it through social pressures that evoke ethical and moral codes.

Therefore, this paper provides a detailed review of literature pertaining to the capacity of African leadership to combat corruption. It presents ethical leadership framework as one of the interventions that has to be considered in combating corruption alongside other

strategies. The paper assesses the capacity of African leadership in combating corruption in order to:

- determine whether there is enough capacity in Africa to combat corruption
- investigate the evolution and effects of corruption in the continent
- develop a framework for combating corruption

2. Research methodology

The research approach used in this paper is qualitative. Leedy and Ormrod (2014) state that qualitative research involves capturing and studying the complexity of phenomena in recognition of the fact that a phenomena has many dimensions. Therefore, in this research, the researcher conducted an extensive literature review to understand the state of corruption in Africa and to assess the capacity of African leadership to combat it. Discourse analysis was used to analyse the secondary data collected. Babbie and Mouton (2008) state that discourse analysis is historically located, it can be used to trace the origin and evolution of a discourse so as to better place it in the context of its current position. Therefore, an evolution of corruption was conducted in this research so as to understand its current manifestation in the modern African society. The research also probed the previous researches conducted in corruption.

3. Previous research on the efforts of African leaders in combating corruption

One of the prominent researches around the area of corruption in Africa was conducted by Olken and Panda in 2012. The research was based on literature analysis and was titled 'Corruption in developing countries'. The research endeavoured to answer the questions such as How prevalent is corruption in developing countries? What are the costs of corruption (i.e., is corruption actually harmful)? What factors influence the level of corrupt behaviour? For example, is corrupt behaviour responsive to economic incentives and market forces, and in what ways? Are there other effective approaches that can be brought to bear on corruption, such as technology, and how might corrupt officials react to such changes? (Olken and Panda 2012).

The focus of the research was on bribes given to government officials and on the theft of state owned resources by public servants, who were supposed to protect such resources. Therefore, the research did not look at the capacity of government leaders to combat corruption. The knowledge gap that exists in the area of the capacity of government leaders to combat corruption will be addressed through this paper.

One of the major findings of this paper was that corruption is rampant in the developing countries, and that it has a negative effect on the economies of Africa as it leads to a decrease in business activity and makes certain government projects unviable (Olken and Pande 2012). Furphy (2010) also pointed out that corruption in Africa is a crime against development as it remains a major obstacle to achieving much needed progress and that it is pervasive in both developed and developing countries. Corruption defeats the efforts of governments to lead with integrity, especially if it occurs at the high level of government echelons. It is a complex issue with a vast array of determinants and effects that are often context and country specific. Olken and Pande (2012) also found out through their study that corruption can have efficiency consequences on the government's ability to provide goods and services. The study also discovered that corrupt officials react to basic economic concepts, such as a positive response to incentives and the negative response to threat of punishment. The research did not generate any recommendations but it pointed out that researchers in various spheres have identified several innovative ways of measuring corruption, and that the economic theory offers significant guidance on how to design anti-corruption policies.

4. Evolution and spread of corruption in the African continent

Ezeanya (2015) argues that corruption is an alien culture if viewed from the pre-colonial perspective of African history. Africa was founded on strong ethical values which emphasised social justice and compliance to the rule of law. Therefore, corruption was systematically introduced in Africa through colonialism. Colonialism is an international system that was introduced by powerful nations into Africa, whereby dominant nations would exploit the resources of Africa, collect revenues through unlawful taxation and enrich themselves at the expense of the natives. Iweriebor (2011) agrees that the colonial states were machinery of administrative domination established to facilitate effective control and exploitation of the colonized societies.

The system used the native chiefs to collect taxes in the villages and allowed them to retain part of the money. Therefore, the system propagated corruption and divided the communities at the same time. This is because some community members or ethnic groups were elevated to certain positions whilst others were confined to lower ranks. Das (2006) assented that colonialists all over the world followed the system of divide and rule. He further stated that in Rwanda the Belgian rule used the Tutsi dynasty to collect taxes and to administer justice, whilst the Hutus remained at a lower level.

Colonialism served as a breeding ground for corruption which is rampant in most parts of Africa. Lesetedi (1998) consents that colonialism is the source of corruption

which is now entrenched in African society because of the methods that the colonialists used to subdue and control the colonised people. The system allowed the colonial masters to reserve certain positions in both government and private sector for the elite in society. Gumede (2012) maintains that in the majority of African former colonies, the colonial elite centralized political, economic and civic power, exclusively reserving top jobs in the public and private sector, as well as education, only to fellow colonials. Mulinge and Keba (2015) agrees that colonialism made Africa lose its ethics, values and norms that governed its pre-colonial societies because of brutality and repression.

During colonialism institutions that could have served as watchdogs against corruption, the judiciary, police, security services and rule of law, selectively served the interests of the elite classes. Most of such institutions were adopted by Africans when they gained independence from the colonial regime and in the process inherited the corrupt ways of governance. Chiwunze (2014) states that following the attainment of political independence in many African countries in the 1950s mainly from the British, French and Portuguese governments, Africa's new governments inherited deeply corrupt institutions, laws and values from colonial governments.

Post-colonial governance perpetrated the colonial ways of governance by practicing ethnicity, tribalism and nepotism. Chiwunze (2014) disputed that post-colonial African governments rid themselves of corrupt tendencies, instead they embraced and entrenched themselves in deeply compromised governance systems by distributing jobs and government tenders along political lines or ethnicity. Keba (2015) concede that corruption is on the rampant in Africa; a continent that faces an increase in poverty, joblessness and low educational skills. He further agreed that corruption has to be eliminated so as to foster a solid economic development policy that precludes any political and social sustainability across the continent. Gumede (2012) suggests that an independent anti-corruption structures led by agencies should be instituted as such agencies will be able to ensure that corrupt officials are brought to book and that police and public watchdogs are able to make a follow up on exposed cases. Nevertheless, Chiwunze (2014) maintains that corruption is very difficult to combat in Africa.

6. Perspectives on the capacity of African leadership to combat corruption

The fight against corruption remains a myth as long as there is no political commitment at the top leadership level (Ethics Institute of South Africa: 2015). African governments have to show commitment and zeal to fight corruption, not a lip service. This is because a number of institutions and policies are developed in the pretext of fighting corruption, but little is done, and calls for combating corruption remain to be empty slogans

that breed cynicism. Many African countries have anti-corruption policies which are scarcely implemented. Corruption Watch (2013) states that one of the reasons corruption is on the increase is because the existing laws have not been adhered to or implemented to their fullest extent, although the framework is strong, with several pieces of domestic legislation already in place. They further explained that there is a certain degree of political will to clean up corruption, though not enough will to ensure that the intention is translated into action. For an example, Van Niekerk and Olivier (2012) pointed out that in South Africa, government has put in place numerous pieces of legislative framework, policy measures and anti-corruption strategies which look good on paper but which are not fully implemented. Whilst different governments show limited will to combat corruption, perpetrators escape without being called to account.

Ethics Institute of South Africa (2015) states that a recent report by the Public Service Commission in South Africa reported that there is a glaring lack of capacity and expertise needed to investigate and resolve detected or reported incidents of corruption. Githongo (2015) agrees that lack of capacity to monitor and ensure compliance to ethical codes undermines anti-corruption initiatives in Africa. Therefore, if the root cause of corruption and the ways in which it spread in society is not identified and dealt with, corruption will continue to be elusive. Furthermore, governments will have to be committed to combating corruption by building the necessary capacity. Gumede (2012) consent that if the root cause of corruption is not clearly understood, most well-intentioned corruption busting remedies in Africa are likely to fail. Africa has to realise that the moral fibre of the nation has gone down.

Holloway (2015) illustrated this thought by giving the following example; "In Africa the manifestations of grand corruption are undisputed but the petty corruption is largely accepted. Buying an official a chicken in return for a free government service is regarded as normalcy. A chicken may well be a small price but the practice has substantial ramifications for the moral fibre of the societies". Therefore, this implies that a fight against corruption has to start within the society, which will in turn become vigilant against corrupt practices at the leadership. Holloway (2015) contends that African leadership does not understand transparency, accountability and integrity. Leadership that promotes ethical conduct at all government levels, tend to be successful in combating corruption. Toor and Ofori (2009) state that leadership which lack ethical conduct can be dangerous, destructive and even toxic. Leaders have to uphold moral principles in their decision making processes and in their operations. Phiri (2008) suggested examples of African leaders that took a fight against corruption to another level. He stated that Zambia under President Levy Mwanawasa managed to position itself as a leader in a fight against corruption. Anti-corruption journalism

was also promoted to such an extent that journalists persistently and consistently reported on corrupt activities which amongst others prompted the government to investigate and prosecute Chiluba and his accomplices. Thus, the anti-corruption campaign in Zambia acclaimed international accolades and it serves as an example of best practice in the fight against corruption. The gesture also confirms that corruption can be curbed where there is moral commitment to combat it. Salim (2012) also discussed two examples of political leaders that took the lead in fighting corruption within parts of the world previously infamous for graft. These leaders are Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, President of Liberia and the first female head of state in Africa, and Atifete Jahjaga, President of Kosovo and the first female head of state in the Balkans. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and Atifete Jahjaga showed incredible leadership in historically volatile regions of the world where men have traditionally dominated the political sphere. These ladies also attest to the fact that corruption can be combated through a committed, dedicated and ethical leadership.

7. Ethical leadership framework for combating corruption in Africa

Ethical leadership is the type of leadership style that promulgates values and accepted norms of society such as respect for human rights and justice, trustworthiness, honesty, integrity, accountability and transparency. Van Buren (2015) defines ethical leadership as a process of influencing people through principles, values and beliefs that embrace what is defined as a right behaviour. Leaders are expected to make moral judgements and to uphold justice. Thus, grand corruption occurring at the governmental level has negative impact on society and can lead to gross human violations. Egbedi (2015) agrees that corruption is a violation of human rights because its effects manifests in the suffering, deprivation and death of citizens. She further argued that when public funds meant for infrastructure development are diverted into the pockets of a few, citizens bear the brunt. It is therefore imperative that African leadership act in an ethical manner. Ethical leaders are expected to make decisions that will uphold human rights and justice; they are expected to demonstrate a high level of integrity. Tejavaniya (2007) cautioned that when leaders act in an unethical manner, the public becomes cynical and suspicious, people morale suffer and confidence in government becomes shattered. Nevertheless, Halloway (2015) observed that many African governments have realised the negative impact of corruption and are making progressive steps to curb it. Conferences in the region are also flagging the problem of corruption high. Therefore, this paper proposes the following ethical leadership framework which can help to combat corruption in Africa. The framework has been developed from extensive literature review;

7.1 Ethical leaders' servant hood attitude

Ethical leaders are expected to serve society and not to steal from it. Daft (2008) maintains that lack of courage amongst leaders is what allows greed and self-interest at the expense of society. He further suggested that leaders should sometimes look deep within themselves to find the strength and courage to resist temptations and stand for moral principles. This is because acts of stealing from society deter progress in Africa and in some countries lead to coup de tat and violent protests. It is through ethical leadership that efforts to combat corruption can yield expected results. Githongo (2015) observed that considerable efforts that have been made across Africa to address corruption over the last decade and a half, have yielded mixed results. Leaders have to develop a servanthood attitude towards their work which will make them to be accountable and transparent in their interactions with the society. The moral fibre of every society is dependent on the exemplary conduct of its leadership. Ssonko (2010) argues that there has been a genuine demand that public sector institutions should strengthen their ethical conduct, integrity, transparency, accountability and professionalism. This will assist in protecting the public resources and curbing public protests that are rife in the continent.

7.2 Building of citizens' moral fibre

Githongo (2015) pointed out that lack of success in tackling corruption in Africa has forced observers to question whether excessive emphasis has been placed on the role of the political elite and not enough on bottom-up approaches based on empowering citizens to force even the most inflexible executive branches to reform. Thus, it is essential to build the moral fibre of the citizens; the government that is committed to combating corruption has to engage the public on moral issues and it should in turn be the embodiment of ethics. The public can develop its moral fibre when the government takes it in its confidence by being transparent. Transparency is one of the major solutions to corruption as it compels the government to provide the citizens with the information which they are entitled to. Thus, media plays an important role in informing societies about corruption. Holloway (2015) states that media has targeted corruptive activities through investigative journalism, and as a result, many communities are mobilising for change.

7.3 External societal watchdogs

Active citizenship should be encouraged in Africa, whereby technology could be used to capture the acts of corruption and be used again to prevent frauds in various government departments. Olken and Pande (2012) agree that technology innovations can be used to

make it harder for fraudsters to tamper with important government information. It could also be used to enhance communication that enhances whistleblowing.

7.4 External agencies

Ssonko (2010) concede that combating corruption is instrumental to the broader goal of achieving more effective, fair and efficient government. Hence, many governments have put in place different independent agencies that play an oversight role, such agencies include the Ombudsmen, Auditors General, Public Protectors, Human Rights Commissions, Inspectors General and Public Accounts Committees just to mention but a few. However, the success of these agencies is inhibited by political interference and lack of capacity. Wanjala (2012) pointed out that if political interference cannot be curbed when fighting corruption, agencies will undergo a number of transitions. He provided an example of Kenya whereby anti-corruption agencies were disbanded through legislative framework to protect certain prominent officials in government. In other instances other agencies were reconstructed and their autonomy disrupted through mergers and absorption; he then concluded that combating corruption in Africa is mission impossible.

Nevertheless, anti-corruption agencies that are autonomous can still be used to combat corruption in Africa. This will ensure that legislative gaps that deal with issues of corruption are addressed because in some cases, corruption thrives because of legislative gaps. The agencies should therefore ensure that various public offices dealing with corruption are functional and that corrupt officials are brought to book. Weak corruption fighting agencies are tend to be undermined by not enforcing their recommendations and judgements. Thus, internal and external anti-corruption controls have to be developed and enforced in every country so as to strengthen the capacity of existing institutions. This will in a way also help in preventing the manipulation of policies and some legislation by unethical leaders. Such acts of unethical conduct may place the democracy of some countries at stake. Matsoso (2005) maintains that democracy of many African states is under threat due to ever increasing corruption in the continent. Hence, it is imperative that African societies take it upon themselves to combat corruption through law enforcement, compliance and dedicated efforts to follow up on reported and perceived corruption.

8. Conclusion

Africa was founded on high moral values and ethics; it was not founded on corrupt activities which have recently become one of the defining factors of African leadership. It is therefore imperative that the African societies reflect on pre-colonial practices and leadership styles that preserved the indigenous societies. Through extensive literature review this

articles has discovered that corruption has a negative impact on the management of valuable resources and development of the continent. It has also discovered that some countries have taken major strides in combating corruption at a leadership level whereas some countries are still playing a lip service to the whole debacle of corruption. Therefore, lack of political commitment to combat corruption has serious implications on the capacity of African leadership to curb it.

It is against this background that this paper proposed ethical leadership framework as one of the interventions that African leaders should consider in curbing corruption. Unless corruption is addressed at top government level, societies will continue to suffer and development in Africa will occur at a snail's pace. A fight against corruption should be steered at the top level and should be the prerogative of every responsible citizen to curb it. Research has indicated that in Africa people tend to look at grand corruption as being the real corruption whilst overlooking petty corruption. It would therefore be of interest to the body of knowledge to investigate why petty corruption is more tolerable than grand corruption. This is because corruption has negative implications irrespective of whether it is petty or grand.

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SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND URBANIZATION OF CITIES: THE PRAXIS IN THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNANCE SYSTEM OF SOUTH AFRICA

L. Mmotlana

N.J. Mokoele

University of Limpopo, South Africa

Abstract

The paper aims to question the praxis of municipal governance in addressing the social movement of people into cities. Urbanization in South Africa was shaped historically by the apartheid policies of oppression to control the movement and settlement of black people. The advent of the new democratic dispensation triggered the vast movement of people into urban areas. Thus, more than two-third of South Africa's population dwells in the urban areas. The question remains: what is the underpinning reason for the movement of people from their countries or villages to cities of South Africa? The general notion that cities harbours a various economic opportunities and improved standard of living, has led to the rampant influx of people both skilled and unskilled into urbanized areas. However, the notion of better life and the realities that most migrants are confronted with connotes paradoxical nature of urbanization. This in-turn has caused an avalanche of social-ills with the mushrooming of slums, informal settlements, squatter camps, urban poverty and various diseases. Notably, the influx of migrants into cities and all the predicaments that come with urbanization, demonstrated the failure of local government to address the social movement of people. It has been argued that a more urbanized country will promote development; however, most cities of South Africa demonstrate that urbanization has not yielded its envisaged outcome. The paper argues that the current manifestation of population movement, the shortcomings of these adequate planning, interventions and municipal governance system in addressing population movements demonstrate a faltering democracy and the government's failure to address the multifaceted needs all its citizens. Thus, the paper concludes that simultaneous urbanization and fluidity of population movements requires a government to refocus its economic growth points to rural areas in order to reduce the movement of people to urban areas.

Keywords: Urbanization, Migration, Local government, Municipal governance

1. Introduction

The achievement of political independence and emergence of industrialization in South Africa made to become one of the most populous and urbanized countries in Africa (Epstein, Edward, Bruner, Peter, Gutkind, Michael, Horowitz, Little, McCall, Mayer, Miner, Plotnicov, Schwab & Schack, 1967). The overcrowding of cities in South Africa gave rise to the rapid development or the concept of urban bias (Epstein et al., 1967). Nearly two-thirds (62 per cent) of the total population of the 50 million live in urban areas in South Africa (Turok, 2012). Thus, South Africa is one of the most urbanized countries in sub-Saharan Africa, after the small states of Reunion, Gabon and Djibouti (Turok, 2012). Over the year, there has been an unprecedented movement of migrants into South Africa. Consequently, the estimated number of illegal immigrants in 2011 was approximately five million, including three million Zimbabweans (Turok, 2012). A massive presence of illegal immigrants within the country demonstrates the inability to manage migration. Furthermore, this influx of immigrants posed multifaceted challenges within urban centers, local municipalities remain in quandaries.

Rural-urban migration is the contributing factor to the declining number of people living in the rural areas while a large number of people reside in the cities. Thus, urban planning became profound in addressing the dilemmas that local government are confronted with. According to Ruhiiga (2014) planning for urbanization requires constant tracking of the demographic vicissitudes within their cities and the regional context of rural-urban migration. This calls for immediate and intermediate urban policy that facilitates orderly development along a pre-determined spatial trajectory that should inform the actual practice of growth (Ruhiiga, 2014). Municipalities having being constitutionally empowered to be a leading force for development, they have nevertheless been wary of addressing population movements or acknowledging human mobility as a fundamental driver of or response to development (Landau, Segatti & Misago, 2011). This hesitancy partly develops from a belief among many policy makers mainly including the local and national, that immigration and migration are exclusively matters of national policy concern; such may include the Spatial Development Framework and the National Development Plan (Landau, Segatti & Misago, 2011), though others have idealistically hoped that amplified human movement would merely be a temporary extension of the country's democratic transition.

2. Urbanisation and migration in South Africa

The demise of apartheid led to the first post-apartheid census in 1996, showed that just over half of the population of South Africa (55.1%) lived in urban areas, however, the number grew to 57.5% by the year 2001 (Kok, Wentzel, van Zyl & Cross, 2008). In relation to urbanization and migration, Statistics South Africa's (2003) report classified the of types of enumerator areas based on density of the settlement, thus showing that South Africa is one of the most urbanized countries in Africa. There is a growing recognition internationally that urban and rural areas are not mutually exclusive categories, boundaries are blurred and there are many interlink (United Nations, 2003; Tacoli & Satterthwaite, 2003; Kok et al., 2008). South Africa's experience of urbanization was perceived unusual in several respects. Until the 1990s there was extensive government intervention in the process, first to accelerate a particular form of temporary rural–urban migration, and subsequently to restrict people moving to the cities. A wide range of policy instruments, laws and institutions were used to influence household mobility, including racially discriminatory government controls on people's ability to own land and settle where they wished (Turok, 2012). The process of urbanization in the late 19th and early 20th centuries was closely associated with industrialization to improve pepole's standard of living. The subsequent Mineral Revolution (Epstein et al., 1967; Yudelman, 1984) stimulated rapid industrialization and the rampant national and certainly international migration, particularly to the Witwatersrand now known as Gauteng, and centred on the country's largest city of Johannesburg (Potts, 2013). Gold mining remained the mainstay of the economy in South Africa for decades, and was almost the only source of export revenues. In the 1930s the gold mines were estimated to account for 50 per cent of state tax revenues, and as much as 50 per cent of the country's population obtained its livelihood directly or indirectly from the mines (Epstein et al., 1967, Yudelman, 1984; Turok, 2012).

Historically, most labor came from the neighboring African states, particularly Mozambique, however on a temporary basis, establishing a pattern of circular migration that would have huge significance for the country in the later years (Turok, 2012). Despite the enormous development of the mining industry between 1889 and 1969, it is remarkable that there was no real growth in black wages over this period (Wilson, 1972). Growing rural–urban migration, gold exports and increasing urban demand for rural produce prompted investment in the country's transport and communications infrastructure. The rate and dynamics of urbanization in cities and towns of South Africa differed from one another because their economic bases were distinctive (Potts, 2013).

According to Kok and Collinson (2006) migration levels have been remarkably constant at around 12% over the three periods (during apartheid (1975–1980), a period of political transition (1992–1996), and a post-apartheid period (1996–2001)). A closer examination of 1996 and 2001 census data revealed several important trends (Kok et al., 2008). Per-chance the most important has been a movement of people to cities experiencing economic growth, particularly the Gauteng metropolitan areas, and some of the rapidly growing secondary cities. Both economic growth rates and population growth rates were variable in other metropolitan areas and secondary cities. While both were faster than average in the Cape Town and eThekweni metros, others experienced net or absolute decline (Kok and Collinson, 2006; Kok et al., 2008). Similarly, there has been a net move away from the economically declining Eastern Cape and Northern Cape regions to the Western Cape, and to the north-east of the country (Tomlinson et al., 2003). There has been a pool of major drivers and dynamics shaping urbanization and migration in the current period, the rural context and its dynamics as well as the international migration. Since 1994, the most notable trend has been the large scale movement of black people off farms owned by others mainly whites. A significant study by the Nkuzi Development Association and Social Surveys (Wegerif et al., 2005) found that some 2.4 million people were displaced from farms between 1994 and the end of 2004, of whom 942 303 were evicted. The remainder left of their own choice, but often as a consequence of difficult conditions on the farm (Atkinson, 2007). Ironically, numbers displaced were higher than in the 1984 to 1993 period, when some 737 114 black people were evicted from farms, and a total of 1.8million were displaced. While some workers moved to other farms, some 3.7m of those displaced and 1.6m of those evicted between 1984 and 2004, moved off the farms altogether (Kok et al., 2008). An estimated 67% of those who were evicted have settled in and around urban areas, usually in backyard shacks or poorer parts of townships (38%) or in informal settlements (29%) (Wegerif et al., 2005). The migrant labor system was a key feature in the economic development of South Africa and was associated with legislation that inhibited and controlled the urbanization of African people. The assumption was that, this propensity would disappear in the post-apartheid period, as people would be able to settle permanently near the places where they work. However, Posel (2003) argues that there is no evidence to support the assumption that circular labor migration ended or even declined during the 1990s (Kok and Collinson, 2006; Kok et al., 2008).

Deteriorating economic conditions in home countries, e.g. high unemployment rates, low wages, and growing urban and rural poverty, have compelled many migrants to leave their countries of origin in search of better lives (Wegerif et al., 2005; Kok et al., 2008).

Political tensions, marginalization of minority ethnic groups, civil war and ecological deterioration in some sending countries have also contributed to migration (Wegerif et al., 2005; Kok et al., 2008). South Africa's dominant economic position in the region has made the country a preferred destination not only for regional migrants, but also for migrants from the rest of Africa. Furthermore, economic prosperity and attempts to entrench South Africa into the global economy and high rates of emigration have led to increasing opportunities for skilled migrant workers. The impact of HIV/AIDS on rural livelihoods, already threatened by poverty, food insecurity and insecure access to social services, has increased cross-border movements in the SADC region. The existence of social networks in both South Africa and the sending countries is an important factor facilitating migration to South Africa (Crush, Williams & Peberdy, 2005; Wegerif et al., 2005; Kok et al., 2008).

In 2004, the Department of Home Affairs deported slightly more than 167 000 undocumented migrants of whom 49% were Mozambican and 43% Zimbabwean. In 2005 a total of nearly 210 000 undocumented migrants were deported (DHA 2006). The 2001 Census showed the total foreign-born population in South Africa as 1 025 072, including 687 678 from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, 228 318 from Europe and 41 817 from the rest of Africa (Crush et al., 2005). The 2007 Community Survey found that 2.7% of South Africa's population was born outside the country, about half (46.8%) of which are located in Gauteng (Kok et al., 2008). These figures however are likely to represent an undercount since undocumented migrants often choose to be invisible and would not readily participate in official censuses and surveys (Kok and Collinson, 2006). In South Africa, the annual number of visitors from other SADC countries has increased from around one million in the early 1990s to over five million in 2005 (Crush et al., 2005). Wentzel & Tlabela (2006) posited that the bulk of this cross-border traffic consisted of people moving temporarily to South Africa for various non-work related reasons (e.g. tourism, visiting relatives, medical services, shopping and education). From a historical perspective, there are wide fluctuations in the trends of documented immigration to South Africa. The attribute to this trend has been a shift in policy and implementation of legislation towards a more restrictive fortress stance. Although some groups of cross-border migrants who are working in South Africa are moving to farms and mines, the bulk of migration appears to be directed to the cities. There is also localized evidence that migrants who locate themselves into farms later move on to the cities (Wentzel & Tlabela, 2006), thus cross-border migration is likely to be a contributing factor to metropolitan and large city growth in South Africa.

3. The paradoxes of urbanisation and migration

There are prospects and threats that most urbanized areas are facing in relation to the mushrooming of slums, informal settlements and squatter camps. It was envisaged that cities hold a better life for all. Thus, the advent of democracy in South Africa has experienced an unprecedented movement of people towards urban areas with the notion that cities have vast employment opportunities, better health care, and education facilities and improved standard of living. However, the hasty pace of urbanization and inherited backlogs from the apartheid regime, housing everyone in the cities remains a nightmare to development planners. A large number of inhabitants in urban areas without housing call for a policy framework that address the problems associated with migration (Crush et al., 2005; Turok, 2012). Almost a quarter of households in South Africa live in informal dwellings or traditional housing. This amounts to approximately 3.4 million households (Statistics SA, 2010). Majority of informal settlement residents are more likely to experience overcrowding, poor access to services, and vulnerability to hunger (Statistics SA, 2010). Shack areas are also more vulnerable to flooding, fires, soil instability and water-borne pollution (Turok, 2012). Over the period 2002–2010, the proportion of informal dwellings nationally fell by about 10 percent (from 26 to 23 per cent of all households) (Statistics SA, 2010). This was a significant achievement in some respects, reflecting government provision of about 1.5 million low-cost houses over the same period, nearly four times the level of private-sector house-building (Crush et al., 2005, SACN, 2011; Turok, 2012). The national housing programme has been funding the provinces and selected municipalities to deliver approximately 220,000 housing opportunities per annum, including 160,000 housing units and 60,000 serviced sites. The absolute number of households living in informal housing essentially rose slightly between 2002 and 2010 because of underlying population growth and a fall in the average household size. Thus, the housing programme has struggled to keep pace with the growing level of need (Turok, 2012). The challenge of household growth has been greatest in the metros because of migration and continuous urbanization. The proportion of households in informal dwellings rose very slightly in Gauteng to 22.2 per cent, despite substantial house-building. The proportion fell slightly to 18.8 per cent in the coastal metros (Turok, 2012).

Although households in the metros and secondary cities have better access to piped water (off- or on-site) than elsewhere, the position in the Gauteng province has actually deteriorated over the last decade. The scale of the backlog is bigger in the former Bantustans, where more than half of the population has no piped water. Yet these areas

have had the biggest proportionate increase in access to piped water between 2002 and 2010 (Turok, 2012). Sanitation is another basic need, important for hygiene and safety as well as human dignity. The standard indicator is the number of households with no access to toilet facilities or just a bucket toilet (Kok, 2006; Turok, 2012). However, the rate of improvement in Gauteng over the period 2002–2010 has been far less than elsewhere in the country, narrowing the rural–urban gap. Admittedly, there was less scope for improvement than elsewhere because of the small proportion lacking toilets to begin with. It has been difficult for the metros to eliminate the problem because household growth has not been accompanied by equivalent budget allocations and service expansion. Electricity is much safer, cleaner, healthier and more reliable for cooking, heating and lighting than paraffin, wood, coal or candles (Turok, 2012). Over the period between 2002 and 2010, there have been substantial improvements in electricity access, especially in the rural areas. Yet the level of access has declined in Gauteng because household growth has not been accompanied by equivalent expansion of services.

The emerging understanding is that municipal budgets and services have not kept pace with urban population growth over the last decade, especially in the Gauteng province. The proportion of households lacking permanent shelter and related facilities has remained broadly unchanged, when conditions elsewhere have improved quite significantly. Bearing in mind that the lack of relative improvement implies a substantial rise in the absolute numbers of households lacking formal housing and services, this means that there are more poor people and communities in the major cities vulnerable to environmental and social hazards than there were a decade ago.

4. The praxis of municipalities in South Africa

South Africa's experience since 1994 holds important lessons for other countries undergoing urban transition. Formulating progressive policies, passing laws and creating city-wide municipal institutions are not enough to harness the potential of urbanization and to ensure integrated urban development. Broad policy aspirations and sectorial programmes need to be translated into focused city-level strategies that deliberately align housing, transport, land-use and economic decisions within a long-term vision of a better future. Such strategies also need to engage local communities, the private sector and other stakeholders, in order to channel their energies in common and constructive directions (Turok, 2012). A broader lesson from South Africa's historic experience is that the processes of urbanization and industrialization are politically mediated and may not automatically improve the livelihoods of rural migrants. People moving to cities may have to organize themselves to press for the removal of barriers that prevent them from securing better living and working

conditions through access to urban labor markets and well-located land on which to settle. The creation of constitutional rights for the poor can help to promote their cause, especially if backed by political will and sufficient government resources to meet their basic needs. Equally important are determined city-level leadership and investment plans to manage urban development more effectively, to boost jobs and livelihoods, and to work with poorer communities to improve essential services. South Africa's urban development policy as it appears in the government's white paper highlights a vision governed by a series of long-term goals.

Pillay et al. (2006) highlighted four types of urban areas, the tribal areas; the rural formal/commercial farming area, the urban formal area and the urban informal area. South Africa cities are economically competitive internationally. They are centres of economic and social opportunity with vibrant urban governance. These cities are managed by democratic, efficient, sustainable and accountable metropolitan governments. The issue of environmental sustainability marked by a balance between qualities of built environment and open space, as well as a balance between consumption needs and renewable and non-renewable resources remains essentially an ideal. The same applies to good housing, infrastructure and effective services for households and business which would provide a basis for an equitable standard of living (Ruhiiga, 2014). Integrated planning is meant to ensure that planning determines which projects are approved and which elements become the focuses of development within urban environments. Several considerations appear to underpin a viable urban development policy in South Africa. Landman (2010) raises doubts about current urban development patterns which appear to worsen levels of inequality and poverty. The Development Facilitation Act (RSA 1995) provides guidelines on the supply of infrastructure.

Government and the private sector should seek to integrate cities and towns by focusing infrastructure on centrally, well-located land to ensure that apartheid patterns are not reinforced. Undoing the apartheid city should focus on linking the component parts of the city through high-density activity corridors, township upgrading, urban infill, development and integration of apartheid developed buffer zones, inner city redevelopment; and development and provision of adequate open spaces for recreational purposes (Ruhiiga, 2014). These are meant to negate apartheid induced segregation, fragmentation and inequality. For most of the metropolitan areas, urban infill programmes linked to low-cost and middle-class housing have been initiated in spite of opposition from certain sections of civil society. The focus is on integrated planning, rebuilding and upgrading the townships and informal settlements, planning for higher density land-use developments, reforming the urban land and planning system, urban transportation and environmental management (Ruhiiga, 2014). Municipalities

have responded to migration, development and urbanization by having four core priority areas. The first deals with improving housing and infrastructure which involves upgrading and the construction of housing, restoring and extending infrastructure, and increasing access to finance, social development, and designing habitable urban communities (Department of Housing, 1997).

The second pillar deals with promoting urban economic development in order to enhance the capacity of urban areas to build on local strengths to generate greater local economic activity, to achieve sustainability, to alleviate urban poverty, to increase access to informal economic opportunities and to maximize the direct employment opportunities and the multiplier-effect from implementing development programmes (DOH, 1997). Since 2009, Gauteng Province has seen massive infrastructure developments around the main national highways and the completion of Gautrain has had a major impact on the construction industry. Creating institutions for delivery requires significant transformation and capacity building of government at all levels and clarity on the roles and responsibilities of the different government spheres (Ruhiga, 2014). The Integrated Development Plan should include and have planning for migration as an integral part of formulating strategies including the spatial development framework.

5. Conclusion

This paper concludes that planners of urban areas should create urban environments in which there is interrelation between the cities and the suburbs that feed them in order to stimulate rural productivity. Population change and urbanization are inter-linked processes in time and space. The focus on the spatial development frameworks has provided the vehicle for analyzing policy and planning against the practice on the ground. It has been shown that there are inherent limitations in the country's urban policy design and the translation of this into planning interventions. The paper shows that population change and the resulting socio-economic forces that drive urbanization cannot ignore the major role played by rural-urban migration which in turn has impacted on income distribution in metropolitan areas. The practice of implementing the urban policy is beset by challenges centred on the inadequate reform of the urban land market, municipal service delivery, and questions about management capacity. Simultaneously, continuing urbanization is witnessing the expansion of informal low cost settlements on the urban edge, a development that contradicts the long term goal of achieving a compact urban form. The insinuation of this paper is that municipal practices and urban policy need an urgent review if it is to be used as a platform for informing planning and practice. Such a review is justified given that its neoliberal platform may not be appropriate for addressing South Africa's urbanization trajectory. Planning and

practice also need to be reviewed so that population change and resulting socio-economic forces that underpin urbanization are adequately used in informing the components of the SDF's. But for this to occur there is an urgent need for a land reform programme aimed at regulating the land market and freeing land for orderly human settlements. Further research is needed in the area of urban spatial ordering, urban regeneration, adaptive planning regimes and the restructuring of municipal urban governance.

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SMMES SUPPORT PROGRAMMES FOR ROBUST LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA

C.M. Maloka

University of Limpopo, South Africa

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to examine the significance of Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMMEs) support programmes as a recipe for robust local economic development (LED) in South Africa. SMMEs are purported as the driver of socio-economic transformation in majority of the developing countries including South Africa. These enterprises are viewed as the engine of economic growth and development, and are inextricably linked to job creation and income generation for the most disadvantaged members of the society. SMMEs can become an important economic subdivision that can accelerate local economic development by creating jobs and alleviating poverty. Therefore, the promotion and development of SMMEs has become the focus of considerable interest of government in South Africa. As such, various policies and strategies have been introduced by South African government to support and develop SMMEs with the aim of addressing the scourge of unemployment. The support for SMMEs promotion in local government epitomise a portion of LED strategy aimed at locally based economic development. This article argues that, SMMEs support remains paramount to LED. However, if such support systems are not in place or accessible to SMMEs, the realisation of robust local economic development will still remain a dream. The researcher uses a desktop study in which the literature is reviewed to establish the significance of SMMEs support programmes for robust LED in South Africa.

Keywords: SMMEs, Local economic development, employment, SMMEs programmes

1. Introduction

The significance of SMMEs in local economic development in the majority of developing countries including that of South Africa is undisputable. SMMEs have been accepted as a strategy through which the growth and development objectives of local economies can be realised (White Paper on the National Strategy on Small Business Promotion and Development, 1995). These enterprises are perceived as the auspicious source of employment and income in South Africa. Evidently, SMMEs are believed to be contributing nearly fifty-five percent (55%) of the country's overall employment and forty five percent (45%) to the Gross Domestic Product (Ramukumba, 2014). Hence, the role of

SMMEs in South Africa has been repeatedly acknowledged at the highest political level (Malefane, 2013). The political support has provided a fertile ground for legislative, policy development and strategic focus for SMMEs support. As such, government in South Africa has positioned numerous legislative and policy frameworks with the aim of supporting this sector in order address the triples challenges (poverty, unemployment and inequality) facing local communities in the country. These include the White Paper on the National Strategy on Small Business Promotion and Development, 1995; National Small Business Act 102 of 1996; Integrated Small Enterprise Development Strategy, 2005 and Local Government Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. Local governments in South Africa are required through legislative obligation to promote the local economy.

SMMEs development support becomes a critical strategy for robust local economic development. The paper argues that, SMMEs support remains paramount to LED. However, if such support systems are not in place or accessible to local enterprises, the realisation of strong local economic development will still remain a dream in the pipeline. The purpose of this paper is to examine the significance of SMMEs support systems towards local economic development in South Africa. The paper is structured into five different sections. The first section provides a definitional basis of SMMEs and LED in South Africa. The subsequent section provides a discussion on the rational for SMMEs support programmes in South African localities, followed by an overview of strategies and institutional arrangement for SMMEs development and promotion in South Africa. The significance of SMMEs support programmes in LED in South Africa is also examined. Lastly, conclusion and recommendation are provided.

2. Definition of small, medium and micro enterprises in South Africa

The National Small Business Act (Act 102 of 1996) gave formal acknowledgment to the existence of SMMEs in South Africa (Republic of South Africa (RSA), 1996a). The Act defines SMMEs as “a separate and distinct business entity, including cooperative enterprises and non-governmental organizations managed by one owner or more individuals which, including its branches or subsidiaries, if any, is predominantly carried out in any sector or sub-sector of the economy”. SMMEs thus according to the Act are classified into five, namely: survivalist enterprises, micro enterprises, very small enterprises, small enterprises and medium enterprises. SMMEs are usually classified in terms of their employee criteria. Enterprises are normally classified as SMMEs when having less than two hundred and fifty (250) employees. These kinds of enterprises represent assorted groups with variances relating to the economic sectors such as mining, construction, manufacturing, tourism, agriculture, trade, retail and services (Ndabeni, 2006). SMMEs are found in both the

formal and informal sectors of the economy. Dockel (2005) pointed that SMMEs are defined primarily for two main reasons: for statistical and policy purpose. Apart from these reasons, however, organising economic entities in such a manner is beneficial for attaining information on the size of each class and its contribution to the local economy, and for taking better focused development measures.

3. Conceptualising local economic development in South Africa

The tasks of local government in South Africa include the promotion of social and economic development of all the communities (Phago & Tsoabisi, 2010; Sibanda, 2013). Such responsibilities necessitate for a locally based planning approach such as local economic development. The notion of LED is motivated by the need to use local resources to create jobs and stimulate local economic activity. LED is defined as a result oriented approach based on local initiatives (Rogerson, 2003; Kanyane, 2008). It encompasses identifying and using local resources, ideas and skills to improve economic growth and development in municipalities. The World Bank (2005) view LED as being all about local people working together to achieve sustainable economic growth that brings economic benefits and quality of life improvements for all in that specific community. LED in South Africa is concerned with building robust and comprehensive local economies that exploit local opportunities, address local needs and contribute to overall developmental objectives (Meyer-Stamer, 2003; Rogerson, 2005; Kongolo, 2010). The Constitution of South Africa (1996), however, makes it obligatory for local municipalities to promote LED (RSA, 1996b). This promotion takes several approaches including creating favourable economic conditions, building skills, supporting local businesses and promoting opportunity (Helmsing, 2003; Malefane, 2013). Significant to this approach is supporting SMMEs as the source of wealth and job creation in municipalities.

4. Rational for promoting small, medium and micro enterprises

The National Strategy on the Promotion and Development of Small Business in South Africa identifies three important factors that influenced the development of SMME support programmes. These factors include among others employment, economic redistribution and economic competitiveness.

4.1 Employment Promotion

The recent estimate of 25.2% of unemployment in South Africa suggests a need for government intervention (Statistic South Africa, 2014). Hence, support for the promotion and development of SMMEs has received enormous attention from government and private

sector with the aim of addressing the problem of unemployment (Mathibe & van Zyl, 2011; Ramukumba & Ferreira, 2015). The contribution of SMMEs towards employment creation and local economic development cannot be overstated, particularly within developmental local government context. The fundamental rationale for promoting SMMEs is because of their potential to stimulate employment opportunities (Chimucheka, 2013; Ramukumba, 2014). These enterprises are acknowledged as a solution to which economically disadvantaged communities with low skills can gain access to economic activities and earn income (Chimucheka, 2013). SMMEs are more labour intensive as compared to their larger business counterparts; hence the support for SMMEs would result in an increased level of employment. Thus, the establishment of new SMMEs is seen as part of the solution to address developmental problems such as unemployment. As such, government has acknowledged the role of SMMEs in job creation through a number of legislative and policy imperatives.

4.2 Economic redistribution

The second justification for government intervention in the SMMEs sector is that these enterprises are viewed as an important instrument for facilitating economic redistribution (Kesper 2001; Njiro & Compagnoni, 2010). One of the main objectives of the National Strategy for Promotion and Development of SMMEs is to address the economic inequalities that resulted from apartheid government. Thus, SMMEs are understood as a vehicle through which the previously marginalised or disadvantaged groups can also enjoy the benefits of economic opportunities that exist in their local communities (Chimucheka, 2013). This group of people have been labelled as those segments of the population that had been disadvantaged by apartheid and segregationist development policies before 1994. Hence, SMMEs could be the solution to the problem of income inequality between population groups in South Africa. However, it is argued that SMMEs does not offer the only strategy for addressing racial income disparities (Kesper, 2001; Dockel, 2005). It is noted that it would be inappropriate for government to rely on these enterprises as the primary means for economic redistribution. This is because the majority of black-owned businesses are very small and produce marginal income to their owners, SMMEs alone cannot be expected to considerably shift the pattern of income distribution. It is further stated that, even if SMMEs could successfully direct wealth to black entrepreneurs, this does not necessarily mean that income inequalities would be reduced; instead, one likely outcome may be the enrichment of fewer black South Africans at the expense of the majority of the blacks (Kesper, 2001). Nevertheless, the support for such businesses is deemed necessary.

4.3 Economic competitiveness

The third basis for government intervention in SMMEs is that they have the ability to promote economic competitiveness of local economies in terms of growth and even towards exports (Mmakola, 2009; Njiro & Compagnoni, 2010). SMMEs appear to have advantages over their large-scale competitors in that they are able to adjust more easily to market conditions, given their broadly skilled technologies (Ndabeni, 2006). These enterprises have the ability to sustain difficult economic situation because of the flexible character. It is argued that SMMEs are the main drivers of innovation, sources of competitive advantage and local economic development in South Africa (Rogerson, 2005). According to Urban & Naidoo (2012), SMMEs contribute to the national product of the country by either manufacturing goods of value, or through the delivery of services to both consumers and/or other enterprises. This includes the provision of goods and services of good quality at a cheaper price.

5. Strategies for SMME's development initiatives in South Africa

Globally, SMMEs are viewed by scholars and policymakers as the ideal way to promote sustainable development. SMMEs are crucial to initiate growth and development of the economy in a given country including South Africa (Rootman & Kruger, 2010). The significance of SMMEs has resulted with the development of various legislations, policies and strategies to expand and integrate them into the mainstream of economic activities. The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) released the White Paper on the National Strategy on the Promotion and Development of Small Business in 1995. The strategy identified key developmental objectives which included employment, redistribution and the improvement of competitiveness. The introduction of such strategy in South Africa was seen as an important mechanism of the democratic government's effort to improve the well-being of the majority and government's promise to the process of developing and improving SMMEs (Rogerson, 2010). The primary aim is "to create an enabling environment" in terms of the national, regional and local policy frameworks for SMME development. The strategy had been the initial and most important attempt by South African government to promote SMMEs. However, the strategy did not achieve its expectation (Dockel, 2005). As a result, a decade later, the DTI released the Integrated Small Enterprise Development Strategy that takes into consideration the successes and failures of the first ten years of the implementation of the 1995 strategy (Mmakola, 2009; Winks, 2008). The strategy focuses on three key areas including the increase in the supply of financial and non-financial support services, creating demands for small enterprise products and services and reducing small business constraints and challenges. The financial support for SMMEs development involve expanding accesses

to finance through a number of intermediary organisations such as micro credit outlets banks and NGOs providing loans, national credit guarantee fund, seeds loans, equity funds and institutional capacity building. On the other hand, the non-financial support would include services such as marketing, business training, mentoring, technology assistance and procurement advices. Therefore, such services should be made accessible to SMMEs owners in order to address and deal with challenges that are currently hampering the development of SMMEs.

6. Institutional establishment for SMME's support in South Africa

The National Small Business Act (Act 102 of 1996) and its Amendment Act (Act 29 of 2004) provides for the establishment of the national institutional structures for SMMEs support and guidelines for organs of state to promote small business in South Africa. The main objectives of such establishments are to integrate SMMEs into the mainstream of the South African economy. Consequent to SMMEs legislation, institutional structures have been formed to address the needs of the South Africans as a whole including both urban and rural SMMEs. The essential participant in this regards include the Centre for Small Business Promotion (CSBP) established through the DTI at the national sphere of government, Ntsika Enterprise Promotion Agency (NEPA), Khula Enterprise Finance Limited (KEFL) and Provincial SMMEs Desks (Diale, 2009). The CSBP gave birth to NEPA, which is now been replaced by the Small Enterprise Development Agency (SEDA). SEDA was established in 2004 when the National Small Business Act was amended to merge NEPA with the National Manufacturing Advisory Centre and Community Public Private Programme (Mmakola, 2009; Rogerson, 2004).

The strategic objectives of SEDA relate to the promotion of competitiveness and capabilities of small business through co-ordinated service programmes and projects. The key services provided by SEDA include helping with business registration, compilation of business plans, facilitating access to market for local SMMEs, finance, technology, providing small business training and mentoring (Njiro & Compagnoni, 2010). Other institutions include the National Youth Development Agency (NYDA) targeted at young entrepreneurs. Additionally, the CSBP gave instructions to all nine provinces in South Africa to form Provincial SMMEs Desks at the provincial sphere of government. The purpose of these desks is to give SMMEs support in all the provinces. The local business service centres also provide support to SMMEs. These are community-based or non-government organizations that assist SMMEs with various support services, varying from business advice, training, incubation of businesses and so forth. An accreditation of these institutions is done by NEPA (Rogerson, 2004). However, studies have revealed that majority of SMMEs owners

are not aware of government incentives which can help them grow and sustain their businesses (Ramukumba & Ferreira, 2015). It was also found that staff responsible for business support programmes appears to be incompetent, and therefore, deliver poor quality services. However, if such issues are not corrected, government's efforts of promoting and developing SMMEs would be impaired.

7. SMMEs support programmes for robust led in South African municipalities

The majority of local communities in South Africa are met with numerous challenges including that of unemployment, poverty and inequality. Hence, it becomes the responsibility of local government as well as communities to address such challenges facing their localities. SMMEs are therefore purported as having the potential to address such challenges in the local economy (Phago & Tsoabisi, 2010; Sibanada, 2013; Tsoabisi, 2014). They are seen as having the ability to create jobs, generate household income and eventually contribute to poverty reduction. According to Chew & Chew (2008), SMMEs are at the centre of any local economic development process. Therefore, the establishment of such enterprise in the local area is crucial for the creation of new jobs for the poor and enable them to earn income that is required to meet their basic necessities. SMMEs are also regarded as the primary source of tax revenue in the local economy such as income and property tax which could allow governments to fund pro-poor services such as health care, clean water and education (Ndabeni, 2006; Chew & Chew, 2008; Kongolo, 2010). Empirically, SMMEs in South Africa generate about 35% of the GDP; contribute 43% of the total salaries and wages, and employs about 54% of all private sector employees, hence their impact are felt more on the local economies (Urban & Naidoo, 2012). The creation of new jobs in small businesses, however, results from very active process of expansion and contraction in the small business sector (Sibanada, 2013).

As such, the prioritization of SMMEs support and development has become the focal point of LED programmes in municipalities (Ndabeni, 2006; Malefane, 2013). The promotion and development of SMMEs in South African local government is regarded as a crucial strategy to enhance economic development in a way that both generates jobs and empowers previously disadvantaged individuals (Mmakola, 2009). The role of local government in SMME support focuses on the establishment of an "enabling environment", facilitating and promoting relationships rather than directly providing support services (Sibanada, 2013). LED strategies are undertaken as a set of programmes designed to make their areas more exciting or attractive places for SMMEs activities. Thus, municipalities should design support systems that cater conditional needs of local SMMEs. This will ensure

that specific local economic development interventions are introduced to effectively promote SMMEs development.

The incorporation of SMMEs in LED planning could possibly be a solution to the challenges of poverty and unemployment. However, Ndabeni (2006) indicated that the lack of LED plans within some municipalities does not support development of SMMEs. Malefane (2009) further stated that the execution of LED strategies, among other interventions, requires support for promotion of SMMEs, which is an intervention whose potential has not been fully exploited. The problem facing municipalities seems to be the degree to which municipalities have the ability to fully take the advantage of the opportunity intrinsic in SMMEs to exploit their impact on local economies. Tsoabesi (2014) pointed that insufficient resources and lack of experienced staff are some of the reasons mentioned for the failures of the implementation of LED. SMMEs have not fundamentally promoted poor people in South Africa, so there is a need to develop SMMEs. Therefore, municipalities should take advantage of scheme for promoting SMMEs that are provided by other institutions such as SEDA to develop their economy.

According to Tsoabisi (2014), LED strategy is not about what municipality do, but what the three tiers of government do collaboratively with municipalities in promoting local economies through useful and effective SMMEs. The effectiveness of the local economy relies on a strong link between three tiers of government. The involvement of both provincial and national government in municipalities is necessary in the formation and continued support of SMMEs. LED promotes partnership between municipalities and local role players, large enterprises should realise the importance of corporation with government and civil society. Large businesses should arrange themselves in such a way that they support SMMEs through advisory means and assist to grow the local economy by sub-contracting and tendering from local business (Ladzani & Netswera, 2009). This is because LED strategies give municipalities and the private sector, including SMMEs an opportunities to work together to improve the local economy.

8. Conclusion and recommendations

The purpose of this article was to examine the significance of SMMEs support programmes as a formula for robust local economic development in South Africa. The paper was structured into five different sections. The first section provided a definitional basis for SMMEs and LED in South Africa. The subsequent section provided a discussion on the rationale for SMMEs support programmes in South African localities, followed by an overview of strategies and institutional arrangement for SMMEs development and promotion in South Africa. The significance of SMMEs support in LED in South Africa was also examined. It was

revealed that SMMEs are inherent in LED and it becomes the responsibility of local municipalities to ensure that the challenges faced by SMMEs are responded to within a regulated and supported framework for SMMEs. Thus, SMMEs support programmes becomes paramount to the success of any local economy if challenges of unemployment, inequality and poverty are to be addressed in South Africa. However, it is not only the responsibility of municipalities to provide support for SMMEs, other role player such as the national, provincial government and private sectors need to work together with the municipalities to find optimal ways of promoting SMMEs as well as addressing their challenges. Municipalities must also take advantages of the support programmes provided by other institutions such as SEDA to promote their locally based SMMEs. As such government should, including municipalities ensure that local people especially SMMEs owners are informed about the availability of SMMEs support incentives and benefits for their development.

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WHO BENEFITS FROM INEFFICACIOUS GOVERNANCE? A CASE OF THREE COUNTRIES IN AFRICA

N.S. Modiba

University of Limpopo, South Africa

Abstract

The paper sets out to explore the genesis of poor governance by African countries. The paper is a positional and empirical in nature. Document study and interviewing techniques were used to collect data from three African countries whose state of governance is largely inefficacious. Those countries are Lesotho, Burundi and Sudan. Research findings reveal that firstly, poor governance could be a product of following an alien governance and administration models. Secondly, ignorance of the ontological epistemological, axiological, life and world outlook of people on the ground have a potential of rendering a governance and an administrative system inefficacious. Thirdly, lack of participatory and transformative system of governance and administration could inject a spirit of dejection and malevolence in institutional incumbents. As part of the conclusion, the researcher recommends that African countries have to genuinely begin to stop pleasing their enemies and opponents through ill-treating and failing to take their own citizenry serious. Such a change of focus and attitude is likely to put African governance back on the route of selflessness and Ubuntu that were shown when fighting for liberation or independence.

Keywords: Vistiges, Colonialism, Mutal Trade, African Countries

1. Introduction

The desire for clean and effective governance is an aspiration of every citizenry. Such governance brings about an administration that by and large is characterised by institutional efficacy. That occurs where the principles of good governance such as transparency, openness, consultation and participation are observed in the process of service delivery by organs of state and their institutional incumbents (Fox, 2010 & Theletsane, 2014). Many African countries inclusive of Lesotho, Burundi and Sudan continue to be hugely mired in administrative bungle due to diverse factors. One of the reasons relates to the tradition by some African leaders of placing inadequate attention to strong governance and administration (Moyo, 2015:16). Masina (2015:24) contends that where there is a healthy and responsive governance and administration, the delivery of services to the civilians will be satisfactory. With that state of affairs, there is unlikely to be complaints by the citizens about the reservations of positions for people with correct political ideology. As long as there is a will power by the rulers to be genuine servants of their people, being

guided by the courageous leadership, the nature of governance structures and systems created to render a service to people are likely to be effective and efficient (khoza, 2015:43). Owing to colonialism, some African countries persist to operate with inherited meek and strange governance patterns, which are based on their erstwhile colonial masters (Tisdall, 2015:15). The danger of such a practice is the perpetuation of subjugation by foreign countries to African ones. This is something that occurs in a subtle manner which makes it difficult for everyone to notice. Nkuna (2015:120) has a point when remarking that colonialism has instilled in Africans and their countries a sense of self-hate and inferiority complex. That is why anything and everything that is African is being despised by African themselves, while anything and everything that is European is hailed to be a quality and also having an appeal to Africans. Brilliant governance and administration are indispensable especially where the government is not paying any lip service to the concept of service delivery to its electorates. It has to be stated in no unequivocal terms that inefficacious governance and administration benefit no one (Yukl, 2006, Motsepe, 2015:5). One of the underlying reasons why Africa still experiences governance and administration that are indescribably inefficacious after more than two decades of independence, is because of placing little attention to issues of governance and administration by African countries. Siswana (2007:182) has a point when asserting that conspicuous indicators of inefficacious governance and administration are the dysfunctional institutional systems and structures. A good case in point is the Southern African Development Community Tribunal, the African Court of Justice and the African Court on Human and People's Rights that are hugely ineffective. Small wonder then that the International Constitutional Court (ICC) has to come to the rescue. Shejavali (2015:34) observes that generally, there is unwillingness by African leaders to hold political cronies accountable for atrocities committed on their citizens at times even using state machinery. On the basis of above, the ICC becomes the only mechanism by which to seek justice. Another example of inefficient governance and administration is that of Sudan where 300 000 victims of violence under Omar al Bashir are likely to be finding a glimmer of hope in knowing that there is a court fighting for justice for them and for those who continue to suffer emotional, physical and psychological scars. In some instances the very institutional structures and systems which are accepted to be the core of efficacious governance and administration are found to be non-existent. The question to pose is : what is likely to occur with a government that operates without structures and systems which were supposed to be aiding that government to render a quality service? The answer is that such a government is likely to struggle to serve and service its people or fail as a result of lacking the foundation upon which its magnificent service delivery had to be based on, namely, a sound governance and administration (Khoza, 2015:43).

2. Theoretical considerations

Welman, Kruger & Mitchell (2005:12) retort that a theory represents a mental view of phenomenon or a system and normally forms the basis for a chain of reasoning. This signifies that when one advances a particular argument on a phenomenon such as inefficacious governance and administration, with a theory in place, one's argument is likely to hold substance. The critical theory has been selected as the theoretical perspective that underpins this paper. The choice of the critical theory to underscore this paper rests on the relevance the researcher finds in it in terms of sufficiently illuminating issues of how lack of efficacious governance and administration by African countries deny their own electorates the basic right of quality and decent services they are entitled to and how that persists to paint Africa as a dark continent where governments care more about themselves and less about their own electorates. Apart from enabling the researcher to frame this study, the critical theory helped the researcher to make meaning from the whole notion of inefficacious governance and administration and how the two compromise the dignity of the electorates in an event where they are being deprived of decent governance due to incompetence on the part of the government. Briefly, one of the principles of the critical theory is that very often truth serves the status quo. The other principle relates to the question of "why is it that certain groups of people are so privileged?". These fundamental principles of this theory were helpful in clarifying how lack of sound governance and administration perpetuate inequality between the citizenry. For instance, on the one side the rulers benefit from the absence of a healthy and a strong governance and administration in the sense that some of them may enrich themselves with the finances meant for the electorates (Motsepe, 2015:5). Lack of strong governance may make it difficult for the rulers to be accountable to their electorates. The selection of the critical theory in this paper, is informed by its encouragement of reflective and analytical thoughts as regards the experienced state of affairs of lack of inefficacious governance in some of the African countries. That the three chosen African countries in this paper, namely Lesotho, Burundi and Sudan are still having shaky governance and administration, has to be a cause for concern. The question to pose is whether the absence of efficacious governance is a deliberate or a demonstration of a sheer incompetence by those countries. It is the critical theory which is better placed to adequately and convincingly respond to such a question (Moyo, 2015:16). In this paper, the critical theory reveals that inequality in a country could be entrenched if the masses are docile and gullible and not standing up for their own trampled rights such as the absence of a healthy governance and administration that benefit the citizens. On that note, the critical theory serves as a basis for approaching, understanding and interpreting the whole issue of inefficacious governance and administration as occurring in some of the African countries.

Higgs and Smith (2010:67) advise that knowledge and how we understand truth, including scientific truth, moral truth and historical truth should not be separated from everyday life. This implies that comprehending the trend on how quality and decent services are denied to their legitimate recipients, the context of the manifestation of denial of quality and decent service, is as essential as the state of affairs itself. The critical theory assists in arriving at the root cause of the inefficacious governance and administration as experienced by many African countries (Van Niekerk & Van Niekerk, 2009:12). The other relevance of the critical theory for this paper can be traced back to its emphasis of public administration ethics. In the context of this paper, that would imply the study of good and bad behaviour by human beings especially in the manner in which they interrelate and interact as part of rendering a service to their fellow human beings. Critical theory has a potential of uncovering whether the process of inability to create structures and systems by African countries in order to serve and service their people well is deliberate or unintentional. The legitimacy and credibility of the critical theory as regards the worrying effects of inefficacious governance and administration by African countries as continuing to render a disservice to its people, is not in doubt. Critical theory stands out when it advises against separating “real life testing” from scientific theory. The appropriateness of the expressed statement in this paper is to emphasise that scientists are bound by social reality and norms as much as the rest of all the electorates. Historical reasons and living conditions which countries of Africa experience, somewhat force and compel them to think hard and long on when are they hoping to turn a tide as regards inefficacious governance and administration which are not benefiting their own electorates, not at all. The reality is that immediately the electorates’ cup of endurance is over, they are likely to revolt against their own elected governments which have been neglecting them for long with regard to quality and decent service delivery.

The researcher contends that not every theory other than the critical theory could productively illuminate and delineate a problem of this paper like the chosen theory (Allen, 2015:11). The problem of this paper centres around explaining the opportunity missed by African countries by taking their own electorates for granted through managing and leading the inefficacious governance and administration which do a disservice to their own electorates. Critical theory advocates for critical reflection on society in order to discover the hidden assumptions that maintain the existing power relationships that keep the societal members or sovereign nations perpetually enslaved though in a different form and guise (Higgs and Smith, 2010:72). Embracing critical theory by the researcher, centres around the theory advising against separating the context of inefficacious governance and administration between countries and the learnt social oppression countries which were once oppressed, have been subjected to during the era of colonialism. Countries of the

world require to be emancipated from inefficacious governance and administration sooner rather than later (Arden, 2013: 38). They do not have to wait for its unpleasant consequences. Burundi is a good case in point where the absence of efficacious governance and administration nearly plunged the country back into a civil war. That occurred with the president's unrelenting bid for a third term which confirms that governance and administration in some African countries are not taken seriously. The decision by the president brought Burundi on the brink of a cataclysm. What was worse was when the constitutional court was under duress to rubber-stamp the president's candidacy. This suggests that how nations or countries normally think and act is the product of many years of being subjected to conditions and circumstances that either facilitates the quality and decent service delivery to the electorates or an entrenched and perpetual neglect of the electorates despite their efforts of putting their rulers in office (Tisdall, 2015:15). On the other side, perpetual political wrangling occurring in Lesotho is as well a cause for concern. This is a demonstration and a confirmation of how inefficacious governance and administration do fail to stabilise the state and usher in a political and socioeconomic environment that allow regular elections that are being reinforced by multiparty contestations. Strong governance and administration are known to be avoiding political promiscuity. That is not the case with Lesotho, Burundi and Sudan. The said three countries are known to be experiencing a roll-back which is traceable to their lack of effective and efficient governance and administration (Motsepe, 2015:5).

3. Problem statement

Hofstee (2010:107) advises that there is a distinction between the research topic and the research problem. The stated author maintains that the researcher risks wasting the reader's time where she fails to distinguish between a topic to read about and a research problem to solve. The above explication implies that with a research topic, the researcher gathers data about it while with the research problem, the researcher strives to have it ultimately solved. The prerequisite of the researcher solving a research problem, is to understand it better. Hofstee (2010: 110) avows that no skill is more useful than the ability to recognise and articulate a problem clearly and concisely. On the basis of the above the problem of this paper centres around explaining the opportunity missed by African countries by taking their own electorates for granted through managing and leading the inefficacious governance and administration which do a disservice to the electorates. It has to be emphasised that this practice by African countries of despising their own electorates after they have voted them into office. is as old as mountains themselves. What is astonishing though about the discussed practice is that it appears to be more prevalent in Africa than in any other continent of the world. The question to pose is why in Africa? The response relates

to the point that due to the suffered colonialism in Africa, indications are that it has eroded and corroded in electorates any semblance of humanity and Ubuntu to the level where egoism in Africans is so strengthened such that electorates turn to operate without conscience with much of what they are doing. That is why electorates could be cruel against each other. Such an alien behaviour by Africans and their countries is having devastating effects to them and their countries. With that kind of disposition, Africa could take long to successfully push back the frontiers of poverty and diseases affecting and afflicting the African population.

4. Research questions

The research questions addressed in this in this paper are anchored on the critical theory as the theoretical perspective that underscores the paper (Higgs & Smith, 2010:88). The research questions are as follow : What are the roles and significance of governance structures and systems that are clearly crafted in line with the conditions and governance incumbents populating an organ of state in enhancing and reinforcing governance capacity and performance ? What are the ideas, concerns and aspirations of governance incumbents regarding the shifting and the strengthening of the administrative efficacy?

Broad as they are, the above questions can be broken down into the following sub-questions:

- (i) How are governance structures and systems created?
- (ii) Who genuinely benefits most from the functional structures and systems in place?
- (iii) How best to replace inefficacious governance with an efficacious one?
- (iv) How is an institutional stability linked to structures and systems of an organ of state?

5. Research methodology

This paper is qualitative in nature. There are many reasons that necessitated that the paper follows a qualitative research approach as against the quantitative line of thinking. In the first place, the problem which the paper pursues, namely, attempting to explain the opportunity missed by African countries by taking their own electorates for granted through managing and leading inefficacious governance and administration which do a disservice to their electorates, was found to be researchable along the qualitative school of thought as against the others (Dawson, 2006 & Levin, 2005). The choice of the qualitative research methodology was also triggered and orchestrated by the fact that the paper is being underscored by the critical theory. The researcher found a need to create a synergy between

the critical theory as the theoretical perspective that underpins the paper as well as the qualitative approach as the overarching research methodology (Hofstee, 2010: 115). It has to be emphasised that the combination of the two helped immensely in terms of illuminating issues of how lack of efficacious governance and administration by African countries deny their own electorates the basic right of quality and decent services they are entitled to and how that persists to paint Africa as a dark continent where governments care more about themselves and less about their own citizens. A good case in point for such a state of affairs happened when 30 million was looted from the state coffers during the cashgate between Malawi and South Africa in 2013. This occurred amongst others as a result of lack of efficacious governance and administration. That was manifested through the abuse of office, negligency by public officers in preserving money or other property, and through open money laundering (Masina, 2015:24). The example just referred to goes to exhibit and exposes the rife nature of the predicament of inefficacious governance and administration among the African countries. With the critical theory underpinning the paper, the researcher utilised it, to interrogate how electorates of the African countries normally understand lack of efficacious governance and the kind of discourses they normally engage themselves in. Furthermore, the theory was also applied to establish and determine the common reaction by electorates of African countries as regards inefficacious governance. Since this paper is qualitative in nature, there was a need to amalgamate both the critical theory and the qualitative research approach. That aimed at maximising the ability and strength of the critical theory towards the exposure of how inefficacious governance and administration rob the electorates of the quality services they are entitled to from their governments. Partnering the qualitative research approach and the critical theory enabled the researcher to make an in-depth understanding of how despite many years since colonialism formally ceased to exist, its effects remain firmly in place. Such effects are still so severe such that African countries find it difficult to cooperate and successfully serve and service their own electorates with aplomb and distinction. To conclude this item on research methodology, there is a need to divulge that document study as well as interviewing techniques were utilised to construct data relevant for this paper. To be precise, all the documents primary and secondary that contained information about the inefficacy of governance and administration by African countries were studied. To corroborate and triangulate the gleaned data, interviewing was conducted with each member of the identified three countries. Responses were audio-taped for transcription later-on. The said data collection tools emerged very helpful in terms of accessing data pertaining to how inefficacious governance and administration reduce electorates into sub-human beings denied of quality and decent services which they are entitled to by virtue of being dignified human beings (Glatthorn & Joyner, 2005).

6. Findings and discussion

Findings arrived at in this paper, are in relation to the research topic whose focus is who benefits from inefficacious governance?: The basis of the findings is the analysed data which were generated through the document study and the interviewing technique. The three Africa countries which were explored as regards inefficacious governance as per the purpose of this paper are Lesotho, Burundi and Sudan. The researcher selected these three countries for scrutiny in the area of inefficacious governance not because there is anything special about them. Furthermore, paying attention to these three countries ought not create an impression that they are the countries that are worse off as regards inefficacious governance. That is not the case, not at all. Suffice to disclose that the choice of these three countries was on the basis of the researcher having familiarised himself with issues of governance and administration in those countries, down the years. The critical theory has been sufficiently instrumental in assisting in the analysis of data to ultimately emerge with these findings. Findings and discussion for this paper are the following: inefficacious governance could result from of a particular country following an alien governance model to manage and lead its service delivery processes. It could result also from the ignorance of the ontological, epistemological, axiological, life and world outlook of people who have to benefit from that governance and administration. It could finally, emanate from lack of participatory and transformative systems of governance and administration that have generated a spirit of dejection and malevolence from governance incumbents.

6.1 *Alien governance and administration model*

The master-slave relations or bond take ages to sever or unbundle. This is a stark reminder of how some African countries are attracted to governance models which were utilised by their former colonisers. Upon independence, it dawned on African countries that it is difficult to fight for freedom and win it but even more difficult to rule over the country (Madue, 2013). Some African countries do not want to break away from their erstwhile colonisers because of realising that their colonisers still have something to offer them. Whether this is a reality or myth, it is the question for the next time. As of now the point at issue is that African countries have inherited structures, policies and systems to manage and lead their own service delivery processes. Developers of those structures and systems of governance and administration were being guided by their own backgrounds, culture, ethos, upbringing, fears aspirations etc. Those countries were efficacious with those governance structures and systems because they were not foreign to them. Immediately, the time for the colonisers was up, and they bequeathed governance and administration to Africans, Africans were supposed to have crafted their own structures and systems, the ones

which would enable them to be productive and efficient with their task at hand. Operating with structures and systems whose development was foreign to African countries, was a grave error. Whether African countries themselves will ultimately be able to sever the historically established ties with their erstwhile colonisers, it is a matter of wait and see (Tsheola, 2002).

Zwane (2015:10) articulates that structurally nothing has changed in Africa since the collapse of colonialism. This is to signify that African countries and their leaders are by and large presiding with dignity over the mess of colonialism inherited from their former illegitimate rulers. Amongst others, African countries inherited colonial policies, infrastructure and administration. The challenge of being a copycat by African countries and its people, keeps Africa as a continent always bereft of originality which is a sign of critical, independent and reflective thought on issues of sustainable development and progress. Formally, colonialism may have been outlawed but practically it continues to wreak havoc on the lives of many of Africa's electorates. Colonialism is internalised by some Africans to the level where anything and everything whose genesis is in Africa and not Europe holds little or no appeal to them. Small wonder then that it has to be easy for some African countries and their leaders to marvel and celebrate the persistent use of inherited colonial policies instead of having developed theirs that are not alien to the African soil. This predicament and contradiction of African countries having attained self-rule and yet still being hanger-on to their former colonial masters ought not be countenanced up to eternity. Some patriotic African leaders keep on reminding that, 21st century was supposed to be an African century. Although as of now that is not the case, time still allows that something be done in that regard. Despite 15 years into the 21st century, if ever concerted efforts could be mustered by Africans themselves and gravitate towards one continent, one destiny one future, Africa could become different and efficient (Mbeki, 2003).

6.2 Mismatch of governance and institutional incumbents

Stability of a country determines the level in which that country would be able to attract foreign investments or not. The fact that the majority of African countries are characterised by either political crisis, anarchy, upheavals or economic instability, is not helping the course in an attempt to bring Africa together as one continent in the area of efficacious governance and sound administration (Arden, 2013:56). A fundamental question to pose is : what is the source of anarchy and political upheavals characterising some African countries?. Literature review reveals that a large amount of the enemies of Africa and Africans are themselves. This is to imply that where there is an instability and inefficacy of governance and administration in an African country, yes third force may be part, but the chief culprits of that

crisis will be Africans themselves (Gobillot, 2008). The contribution of colonialism is not being ignored. The reality is that it is more than 21 years since all African countries obtained their independence. This statement is being expressed basing everything on the point that South Africa is the last country of the continent of Africa to be free. This is despite South Sudan which had just recently broken away from North Sudan. This is again not forgetting and ignoring the political turmoil that keeps on rearing its ugly head, in Lesotho, Burundi, Sudan and other African states as a result of dissatisfaction over the lack of democracy. The reality is that efficacious governance and sound administration bring about an environment of peace and stability where the rule of law is respected by every electorate (Cunha, Filho & Goncalves, 2010). Since one of the causes of failure by African countries from creating efficacious governance and healthy administration, relates to lack of stability, such a predicament has to be surmounted. Africans themselves have to face that challenge head-on, oppose it and defeat it. Failure to do so will continue to plunge Africa in poverty, diseases, unemployment and other maladies when in reality, Africa is one of the continents which is well endowed with natural resources to benefit all her citizens. No African has to go to bed having not eaten as a result of lack of food. Taken for granted, instability could bring with it a new culture and life style in the country, where citizens get used to it to the level where they regard it to be part and parcel of their daily living. With such a state of affairs, the opportunity of ever creating an efficacious governance and a healthy administration that suit the circumstances, conditions and the nature of institutional incumbents, may for ever be lost. Addressing the predicament of governance and administration through stable environments could enable African countries to prosper economically to benefit its electorates.

6.3 *Rigidity as a source of governance inefficacy*

Allen (2014: 9) remarks that as long as the creation of efficacious governance and a sound administration are not taken as a priority by African countries, replacement of underdevelopment with development may take a while to occur. The question to pose is : why is Africa's infrastructural development lagging behind in comparison with other countries of the world. There are many answers to such a question. The first response would be that having an underdeveloped infrastructure is not the phenomenon experienced in Africa alone. This is to signify that other countries of the world do have such a predicament. That is why countries of the world are classified into three categories as regards their level of development. There are countries of the world that fall within the category of developed countries. Others fall under the developing countries. The last category is that of underdeveloped countries. The question is what is responsible for such distinctions within countries of the world. Once again, various responses could be secured for such a question.

However, it suffices to reveal that normally countries that were at one stage colonised are nearly underdeveloped in as far as infrastructure goes. This can be explained in terms of the former rulers of those countries having impoverished them due to only being concerned about the extraction of those countries' natural resource to the total ignorance of the development of those countries' infrastructure (Thornhill & Van Dijk, 2010). Had the infrastructure in the colonised countries be developed, then upon getting independence, those countries would have been able to make quick progress with their economic activities. A critical interrogation of why many if not all African countries are having a backlog of infrastructure, leads to the response that it was a deliberate strategy to keep African countries always politically independent and economically dependent on their former rulers. The absence of efficacious governance and a sound administration were supposed to have been priority number one immediately African countries got independence. This was not the case. Even now it is still not a priority for some African countries to stabilise themselves with good governance and administration in order to have everything like infrastructural development flowing from them (Kouzes & Posner, 2007, Sebola, 2012). The other reason behind the absence of efficacious governance and administration in African countries is the rigidity of some countries by sticking to foreign governance models that are outdated and archaic. With some countries, such a state of affairs is to be blamed on the colonial rulers of those African countries, while on other African countries; the delay in overcoming rigidity is internally generated. Despite this or that reason for the lack of efficacious governance and sound administration, the buck stops with every country for the status of its governance structures and systems. To sum up, this hurdle of rigidity, which is the cause of governance inefficacy needs to be opposed and defeated. All African countries have been free from colonial rule for more than a decade. As such rigidity was not supposed to be an issue now (Tisdall, 2005:15). It has to be revealed that although the issue of inefficacious governance and administration is being given as an obstacle towards magnificent service delivery by African countries to their own electorates, the reality is that drive in the African countries as regards the rendering of service to their electorates appears to be at its lowest ebb for various reasons (Omano, 2005, Qwabe, 2013).

7. Conclusion

African countries need to deal with their challenges of inefficacious governance and administration sooner rather than later. This will enable them to improve their service delivery to their own electorates. Whether hurdles experienced by a country are internally generated or externally imposed, is not an issue. The question to ask has to be : what is it that every individual African country is doing to craft a governance and an administration structures that enable it to operate differently and in an efficacious manner?. African leaders

have to put their countries in a trajectory of forward development and movement. This is possible with sound governance and administration that are well tailored to governance incumbents and institutional conditions. Such healthy governance and administration have to be free from euro-centric models and general institutional rigidity. The postponement of creating efficacious governance and administration by African countries will allow unemployment, diseases, poverty, starvation and other maladies to soar. There are copious incidences and examples occurring in the selected countries of Lesotho, Burundi and Sudan, that confirm that as regards magnificent and brilliant governance and administration that enable a country to offer first class service delivery to its electorates, the selected countries are still lacking. Inefficacious governance benefits no one but those practising it.

8. Recommendations

The bases of these recommendations are the discussed findings which are as follow: There is a need for African countries to manage and lead their processes with efficacious governance and administration structures and systems that have been developed in Africa for the African electorates and their conditions. There is a need by African leaders to stabilise their countries as a way of creating an enabling economic environments which will make sustainable economic activities to thrive among African countries. That could occur through the creation of governance ethos that promotes mutual African economic integration. Lastly, there is a need of relieving efficacious governance and administration, the rigidity that obstructs its functionality.

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THE CHALLENGES AND EFFECTS OF MIGRATION ON THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF AFRICAN STATES

C.M. Mbajiorgu

D.G. Mbajiorgu

University of Limpopo, South Africa

Abstract

Human migration is not a new phenomenon globally. There are various reasons why people migrate ranging from poverty, civil and political unrest and economic hardship. However, in the recent years due to globalisation and trade agreements among states, there has been an inflow of migrants from economically weak states to more economically viable states. Similarly, in Africa, there has been an increase in migration due to economic reasons. Those who migrate include professionals who are skilled workers and non-professionals who are mostly part of the unskilled labour and informal trading sectors. The paper examines the general causes of migration in Africa and the effects of migration on the respective states' economies. The paper also looks at selected countries and the manner in which they regulate migration and business activities including both formal and informal businesses. In this instance, related regulatory laws were discussed. Finally, the paper recommends ways in which states should implement an effective monitoring mechanism to ensure that both formal and informal businesses contribute positively to the economic development of host states.

Keywords:

1. Introduction

Human migration is not a new phenomenon in the world (Massey, 1990:60-72). Migration refers to the movement of people from one place to another either within the same state or to another state (Kalitanyi & Visser, 2010:377; Kok & Collinson, 2006:4). Where people move from one state to another it is termed emigration and such people become immigrants of the host state. Migration can also take different forms such as voluntary and forced migrations, temporary and permanent migrations and legal and illegal migrants (Adamson, 2006:171-175). Voluntary migrations occur when migrants relocate from their countries of origin at their own discretion rather than due to uncontrollable factors such as wars and political unrest. Voluntary migrants are referred to as economic refugees as they are propelled to leave their locations due to economic opportunities (Akokpari, 2000:76). On

the other hand, forced migrations are caused by social and political problems such as armed conflicts, human rights violations, natural disasters amongst others (Rwamatwara, 2005:173). Permanent migrations occur when migrants relocate to another state for purposes of permanent settlement. While temporary migrations refer to instances whereby people migrate due to seasonal work, for study purposes and cross border trading (Adamson, 2006: 174-175; Peberdy & Crush, 1998:5). Finally migrations maybe legal or illegal, illegal migrations occur when migrants cross the borders of other states without the requisite travelling documentation and usually through illegal channels including those who are being smuggled or trafficked or who enter with either forged papers or none at all. On the other hand legal migrations refer to migrations by migrants who possess the requisite travelling documentation to cross the borders of another state and/or to remain within that state (Adamson, 2006:174).

From the above forms of migration one can deduce the fact that migration takes place based on a variety of reasons which include amongst others;

- Poverty
- Armed conflict (wars)
- Social strife
- Political turmoil
- Economic hardships.

The above reasons are a major cause of migration especially in Africa, where most countries due to years of civil and political unrest are plunged in poverty and economic crisis (Lubbe, 2009:1-8). Due to impoverishment, most African emigrants migrate to European and other Western Countries or to the neighbouring countries that are more economically viable. Such migrations not only provide economic well-being but also provide political stability (Kalitanyi & Visser, 2010:384-385). In Africa with specific reference to SADC, South Africa and Botswana has over the years seen an influx of legal and illegal immigrants due to their vibrant and fast developing economies (Campbell, 2007: 1-23); (Ngandwe, 2013:427-449). Furthermore, mass emigration to economically viable economies especially in Africa is also due to economic globalisation.

Economic globalisation refers to the increasing interdependence of world economies as a result of the growing scale of cross-border trade of commodities and services, flow of international capital and wide and rapid spread of technologies (Shangquan, 2000:1). This entails that countries find it easy to trade due to transnational trade practices and reforms. In the SADC region economic globalisation plays a vital role in encouraging cross-border trade.

According to Black et al, (2006:80-89), the end of apartheid, the integration of South Africa with the SADC region and SADC's reconnection with the global economy have brought a major increase in legal and undocumented cross-border flows and new forms of intra-regional mobility including transnational continental and regional trade networks, both formal and informal. These, resulted in informal traders or small entrepreneurs being among the most enterprising and energetic of contemporary migrants.

Economic globalisation has also resulted in countries promulgating immigration policy changes that are favourable to highly skilled workers (the so called "brain child"). In South Africa, the immigration laws allow the employment of foreign nationals only where there is a skills shortage or where nationals are unwilling to take up such employment (Ngandwe, 2013:433). In other words immigration policies seem favourable to immigrants that are believed to contribute to the economic growth and competitiveness of the host countries. Therefore, this article attempts to look into the challenges and effects of migration on the economic development of host African countries, taking into account the causes of migration, more specifically economic globalisation as a driving factor that sees people emigrate from less viable African economies to the more viable economies. Firstly, the article outlines the various reasons that propel people to migrate. Secondly, the article analyses the phenomenon of economic migration with reference to both informal trade and skilled profession and the impact thereof on the economies of host countries. Thirdly, the article discusses the internal immigration controls that host countries have adopted in ensuring that immigrants contribute favourably to the local economic development.

2. The main causes of migration in Africa

Africa has had its fair share of problem over the years, one of which is migration. Unfortunately in Africa, most migrations are forced migrations that are unavoidable (Makhema, 2009:8-9). Most forced migrations emanate from civil unrest, wars, political instability, poverty and economic hardships (Adamson, 2006:172-173). These factors are briefly discussed below in order to shed light on some of the reasons that lead to migration in Africa. Although these factors are various, they do overlap to some extent. Therefore, one or more are discussed as a unity.

2.1 Poverty, political instability, civil unrest and wars

In Africa, civil unrest and wars not only threaten personal security but also threaten human security as a whole (Mubangizi, 2007:7-8). According to Taylor (2002:31-32), human security

"is based on the idea that all human beings should be able to live a life of dignity and respect and that this can only be achieved when human beings are free from both political fear and socio-economic want". As a result, civil unrest and wars often lead to economic collapse as economic activities are abandoned, infrastructure is destroyed and social services are disrupted or neglected (Mubangizi, 2007:8). This then leads to poverty production, since the needs and interests of the poor are ignored by unelected and unresponsive leaders more concerned with self-enrichment thereby increasing poverty levels for the already impoverished societies (Harber, 2002:269-271). A good example of this instance is the case of Somalia, where years of civil unrest and political instability has seen Somalia becoming one of the poorest countries in the world, with over 900 000 people fleeing to other countries and over 1000 000 other people being displaced from their homes (UN, 2015). Taking into account the effects of civil unrest, wars and political instability, migration may be the only way out for most immigrants to escape poverty.

2.2 Poverty and economic hardship

At times poverty is not brought about by wars but due to lack of economic development, employment and other basic services. As a result, this leads to migration to more economically developed countries (Lubbe, 2009:2). Massey (1990:65) observes that economic conditions in developing countries are volatile, and families face serious risks to their wellbeing from many sources including economic recessions. Hence, sending different family members to geographically distinct labour markets represents a strategy to diversify and reduce the risks to household income. In other words, emigration to countries that are economically viable increases the chances of a household to grow its income through remittances (Taylor et al, 1996: 404; Yang, 2011:132-140).

These remittances are also used to uplift the economies of sending countries in various ways such as starting businesses and investing in education thereby contributing to economic development such as creation of employment (Castles, 2009:18-20; Taylor et al, 1996: 401-402; Klavert, 2011:4-5). Hence, the potential for remittances to contribute to national development priorities, including the reduction of poverty, is clearly a priority for policymakers across the continent. This entails that sending countries should adopt policies that will allow for less restrictive methods of money transfers including investment friendly climate by the diaspora (Castles, 2009:22). Having regard to the discussion alluded above, it is clear that increase in economic development in sending countries has the potential to diminish migration pressure and at the same time provide a platform on which the migrant diaspora can grow local economies (Lucas, 2004:149-150).

3. The impact of economic migration on host countries

Economic migration does contribute to the economic development of sending countries in various ways such as increase of household income, employment creation and business investments (Katseli, Lucas & Xenogiani, 2006:25-29). Now the question is what impact does economic migration have on host countries? To answer this question the impact of informal trade and professional employment on the economy of the host countries is analysed.

3.1 Informal trading

Informal trading is defined as the economic activity undertaken by entrepreneurs who sell legal goods and services within a space deemed to be public property, within the informal sector (City of Cape Town, 2013). The scope of informal trading in South Africa encompasses amongst others;

- Street / kerbside trading
- Trading in pedestrian malls
- Markets (flea & craft markets as well as special markets, e.g. sector based)
- Trading at transport interchanges
- Trading in Public Open Spaces
- Mobile Traders (roving, caravans, bakkies)
- Intersection Trading
- Special events (includes Night Markets and major events)

In other words, informal traders are allowed to sell their wares which may include clothing, curios, food, fresh produce, etc. in the places listed above. It is worth noting that illegal substances and goods are excluded from the scope of informal trading activities (Devey, Skinner & Valodia, 2006:4). Having defined the concept of informal trading and its scope, it is proper to look at the informal economy in terms of how big is this economy and who are those involved in informal trading.

As already indicated, in SADC, informal traders or small entrepreneurs are amongst the most enterprising and energetic of contemporary migrants and trading is a key means of livelihood for many households in some countries, and needs to be better understood and, wherever possible, facilitated by policy changes governing entrance, exit and customs duties (Black et al, 2006:89-90). As a result, informal trade presents a greater opportunity for income generation, sustainable livelihoods and poverty reduction (Black et al, 2006:125).

Hence, due to the opportunities that are presented by informal trading, cross-border trading is now a common feature in SADC. Countries such as South Africa and Botswana have become the main destinations of migrant informal traders (Peberdy & Crush, 1998:11-12; Crush, Williams & Peberdy, 2005:4-6). According to Peberdy & Crush (1998:20-25) immigrants in South Africa who are involved in informal trading do it for a variety of reasons including the following;

- The good value of the South African currency and the 'big' free market for trading
- South Africa's proximity to their home countries and the cheapness of travelling
- The attractions of a new democratic government and lack of corruption.
- Due to circumstances beyond their control (forced migrations) and need for survival.

These reasons indicate that the informal trade market is to a certain extent saturated by immigrants and they comprise a large percentage of this market. According to Willemse (2011:7-8), the number of informal traders has increased markedly since the demise of apartheid and about 2.2 million people were employed in the informal sector in 2010, with an estimated 46000 entering the informal sector in the first quarter of 2011. According to Meyer (2015), there were about 1 517 000 Informal businesses in 2013. Statistics South Africa has noted that in the fourth quarter of 2014 the informal sector recorded a quarterly gain of 41 000 jobs (Stats SA, 2014:IX).

Taking into account the above figures, it is clear that the informal sector plays a vital role in economic growth and employment. Since, South Africa has a large informal trade market; it suffices to conclude that immigrant traders who also form a significant percentage of informal traders contribute to the economic growth of the country. This argument has its basis on the fact that the informal trade market in cities such as Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town harbour a large number of immigrant informal traders (Kalitanyi & Visser, 2010:385-388; Hunter & Skinner, 2003:301-319; Peberdy & Crush, 1998:1-45).

In South Africa, immigrant informal traders can be categorised into temporary and permanent traders whether legally documented or undocumented. The temporary traders are those traders who often bring goods into South Africa to sell in informal and retail markets and may stay for periods ranging from 1 week to two months on average. According to Peberdy (2002: 35-49), cross border informal trading has the following characteristics;

- This sector of cross border trade involves a greater number of female than male entrepreneurs, thus promoting the economic empowerment of women;
- Most traders are aged between 25 and 39 years;

- Traders have a relatively high level of education for the country they come from ranging from secondary to tertiary education; and
- The businesses enable these entrepreneurs to meet the education, housing and other basic needs of a significant number of dependents.

To support Peberdy's findings, Mutopo (2010:465-477) states that Zimbabwean women who have over the years been involved in agricultural produce for subsistence purposes, have recently started trading their produce across the border especially with South Africa owing to the economic turmoil in Zimbabwe. She observes that these women often embark on periodically trips to sell their produce (Mutopo, 2010:466). Cross border traders are also involved in other entrepreneurial activities such as the selling of scarce goods within the South African market such as curios and handicrafts, wire to make wire goods, crochet work, traditional dresses among others (Peberdy, 2002:41-42). Therefore, cross border informal trading has both positive and negative effects on the host countries. The positive effects are that;

- It is significant to the movement of food and agricultural goods in the region;
- Cross-border traders invest the majority of their profits within the country in the (formal) retail and manufacturing sectors as they often buy goods to take to their home countries and contribute to tax through value added tax;
- Create employment through employing locals to assist in selling their wares; and
- The proceeds are used to build enterprises in home countries and towards education which may also lessen the number of future migrants seeking income-earning opportunities in other countries (Peberdy & Crush, 1998:1-45; Crush, Williams & Peberdy, 2005:1-39).

The negative impacts may include the following;

- Traders do not always pass through formal import and export channels and may be involved in smuggling of part or all of their goods;
- Traders trade illegally and do not comply with by-laws regulating informal trading (Peberdy, 2002:36-37).

Unlike cross border traders who move from one place to another, migrant informal traders who are resident in host countries are mostly found in major cities such as Cape Town, Durban and Johannesburg (Kalitanyi & Visser, 2010: 376-389; Hunter & Skinner, 2003: 301-319). These traders have established a base for themselves and they are involved in a number of businesses ranging from retail to service, for example, selling clothing, bags, hats, food stuff, curios and hairdressing (Hunter & Skinner, 2003:307-309).

Although the market activities of migrant traders are similar to those of cross border traders, the migrant traders had the propensity to establish more business base and usually moved from informal business to small and medium enterprises (SMMES) within a short time (Kalitanyi & Visser, 2010:382). Hence migrant traders unlike cross border traders contribute more to the economy of the host countries through;

Creating permanent employment for both locals and fellow immigrants. A study by Kalitanyi & Visser (2010:387-388) indicates that 82% of the interviewed African immigrant entrepreneurs employed South Africans in their businesses. Moreover, most immigrant entrepreneurs obtain their goods from local suppliers and this means investments in the local markets. Those entrepreneurs who establish formal business contribute towards taxes which lead to economic growth. Despite the positive aspects of informal trading by migrants, at times, these informal business have a negative impact on the host economy in the one or more of the following ways (Horn, 2011:2); The sector is 'unregulated' or 'unrecord-ed' and the businesses do not adhere to town planning laws;The business do not hold trading licences and this leads to tax evasion.The businesses are often a source of violent attacks where locals see foreign traders as encroachers in the already saturated informal market. A good example is the foreign owned spaza shops that have sprout out in South African townships over the years. Taking into account that the informal sector in South Africa is a livelihood strategy for many unemployed locals and competition of resources and customers is the order of the day, tensions between local and foreign spaza shops owners has led to xenophobic attacks and damage to property (Liedeman et al, 2013).

The above discussion suffices to conclude that foreign informal traders make significant contributions to the economic growth of host countries whether directly or indirectly through the purchasing and supplying of goods within the host countries. Furthermore, the activities of these informal traders provide an alternative competitive market to that of the formal sector. On the other hand, these informal businesses also cause harm to the host economy especially due to non-compliance with trade laws and therefore leads to possible loss of revenue.

3.2 The brain child or skilled workers

Over the years there has been an increased demand for highly skilled professionals especially in developed countries. This move has seen most developing countries losing skilled professionals; suffering the so-called 'brain drain' (Adamson, 2006:187). This entails that sending countries suffer loss while host countries often enjoy a globally competitive workforce who brings with it scarce skills and experience in the host job market (Dayton-Johnson et al, 2009:154-155). Hence, the competitiveness of attracting highly skilled

workers, the so called 'brain child' has led to many countries promulgating immigration policies that are receptive to highly skilled workers.

Lucas (2004:151) observes that the international mobility of highly skilled people takes a wide variety of forms and applicants for permanent residence are granted points or preference on the basis of education or occupation; temporary work visas are issued to those with unusual skills. The receptive nature of immigration policies when it comes to highly skilled workers is not limited to western countries. In South Africa, the immigration Act 13 of 2002 as amended allows for a scarce skills visa to be granted to foreigners who possess scarce, critical and special skills. In other words, the South African law allows the employment of foreign nationals only where there is a skills shortage or where nationals are unwilling to take up such employment (Ngandwe, 2013:433). Therefore, host countries benefit greatly from highly skilled workers by ensuring that the local workforce learns valuable skills and attributes from foreign skilled workers. Moreover, the attraction of foreign skilled workers place countries in a good position to benefit from foreign investments thereby growing the host economy.

4. Migration and regulatory immigration frameworks in host countries

According to Lucas (2004:163) the major policies determining the important features of today's global migrations from low to high income countries lie largely in the hands of the host countries. Hence, most countries enact their national immigration policies in response to their security and economic interests (Adamson, 2006:166). In other words, countries use border controls as a form of maintaining their sovereignty. This is done through limiting access to labour markets and public goods (Adamson, 2006:176). To this end Castles (2004: 857-870) states that there are three factors that drive migratory processes namely factors arising from the social dynamics of the migratory process, factors linked to globalization, transnationalism and North-South relationships and factors within political systems. These factors will in one way or the other influence the manner in which countries regulate their immigration processes. In order to provide clarity on how African host countries regulate the influx of migration in their respective territories with specific reference to business activities two countries namely, South Africa and Botswana were selected as examples.

4.1 South Africa

South Africa comes from a past marred with discrimination and inequality especially towards Africans. Therefore, it is no surprise that even immigration policies in the pre-democratic South Africa were biased towards the whites (Crush & McDonald, 2001:2-4). In this instance, Crush and McDonald (2001:2-4) identify four pillars of apartheid immigration policies namely;

- The successive white governments used racial and religious criteria to decide who would be allowed access to the country and on what terms;
- The system was underwritten by bilateral treaties which worked in favour of employers and governments and solidly against the interests of migrants and their dependents;
- The apartheid's draconian enforcement apparatus based on notorious pass laws and influx controls which gave the state the powers to police the country's external boundaries with minimal due process; and
- The cynical refusal to develop a refugee policy which meant that the state could not provide shelter on humanitarian basis to displaced people.

The above factors reflect a country that was not receptive to outsiders especially those who did not share the political ideology of the government. However, with the advent of democracy in 1994, South Africa saw an influx of immigrants. Crush, Williams and Peberdy (2005:6-8) observes that in 2005, South Africa had an estimated annual number of 5 million visitors from other SADC countries compared to around 1 million visitors in the early 1990's. This increase of visitors to South Africa indicates two major changes, firstly, that the new democratic government has found favour with its neighbours. Secondly, that the countries policies are now more human centred than under the apartheid regime. Hence, a study by McDonald et al (2000:822-823) revealed that some of the reasons that visitors to South Africa cited included looking for work, shopping, visiting friends and relatives, taking holidays, receiving medical treatment.

Despite these varied reasons for visiting South Africa, migrants from sending countries such as Zimbabwe and Mozambique often enter the country for work related and trading purposes (Kalitanyi & Visser, 2010:376-390; McDonald et al, 2000:813-841). This often presents a problem of resource distribution among the locals and immigrants who both end up competing for employment opportunities. Therefore, in order to regulate the inflow of

immigrants and the socio-economic of locals, government has since enacted legislative frameworks aimed at striking a balance between the country's socio-economic, labour market and territorial security and migrant inflow. For the purposes of this paper, the Immigration Act 13 of 2002 as amended and the Refugees Act 130 of 1998 as amended are discussed.

The preamble to the Immigration Act of 2002 provides in Paragraph (h)-(j) that the Act aims at setting in place a new system of immigration control which ensures that;

- The South African economy may have access at all times to the full measure of needed contributions by foreigners
- The contributions of foreigners in the South African labour market does not adversely impact on the existing labour standards and the rights and expectations of South African workers; and
- A policy connection is maintained between foreigners working in South Africa and the training of our nationals.

The above provisions have a direct link to the regulation of business activities within the South African borders. These provisions give rise to the temporary residence permits which include the visitors permit, work permits, business permit and asylums. It is common cause that most foreign cross border traders do not possess the requisites business permits due to the stringent conditions for obtaining one (s15, Immigration Act). As a result, the informal cross border traders utilise their visitor's permits to enter into South Africa and conduct business activities (Peberdy & Crush, 1998:30-39). Although unlawful to conduct business activities in this respect, most cross border traders go unnoticed due to poor monitoring. The cause for poor monitoring mechanisms especially concerning informal trade is due to the fact that the regulation of informal trading falls within the jurisdiction of local government (Schedule 4 Part B of the Constitution). Therefore, in the absence of efficient monitoring and enforcement of these regulations traders who do not lease municipal stalls trade free of charge without the required licences (City of Cape Town, 2013:16).

Another reason for poor regulation of informal traders is the fact that most foreign informal traders may not possess valid documentation to be in South Africa which is important for leasing municipal spaces for trading purposes. For example, the informal trading policy of the Inguza Hill Local Municipality provides that the applicant, if South African, must have a valid South African Identify Document, and for foreigners, they must produce a legitimate permit to be in the country. Furthermore, another reason that causes poor monitoring of business activities of foreigners is due to the fact that those who hold

asylum and refugee permits do not necessarily enter the country as businessman but as asylum seekers and refugees. As a result, it often becomes easy for such individuals to conduct businesses without the requisite business permits (Kalitanyi & Visser, 2010:382-385). Due to the growing number of political unrest in SADC, most immigrants have taken advantage of South Africa's human rights friendly policy and sought the status of refugee and asylum seekers (section 3 Refugee Act 130 of 1998). Section 27(f) of the Refugees Act provides that a refugee is entitled to seek employment. This then presents a stepping stone to seeking employment and conducting business in South Africa (Makhema, 2009:33-34). Most refugees find it difficult to comply with the conditions of obtaining a work permit and then enter into trading which has minimum exposure to their activities (Makhema, 2009:3). From the above discussion, it is clear that in South Africa, the regulation of business activities of immigrants is far from being effective due to the absence of proper mechanisms that regulate informal trading.

4.2 Botswana

Unlike in South Africa, Botswana has camps for refugees and asylum seekers (Makhema, 2009:25). Similar to South Africa, the Botswana Immigration Act 3 of 2010 provides for visitor's permits, and work permits. Business permits are also available for those looking to invest. However, due to the conditions attached to acquiring a business permit, formal businesses are only possible for financially stable individuals. Therefore, those that are unable to afford the business permit requirements are left with no choice other than to engage in menial jobs and informal trade. Since work permits are a requisite for employment, it entails that no person can work without possessing a work permit. Thus in Botswana, asylum seekers and refugees are generally not permitted to work or conduct any business except where the necessary permits and documentation is provided by the government (Makhema, 2009:29). Unlike in South Africa, refugees who enter Botswana have limited access to the outside market due to the refugee camp system (Ngandwe, 2013:440).

As a result, it is difficult to carry on informal trade especially with the stringent Botswana laws on street venting or trading (Masilo & Maundeni, 2014:16). One legislative framework which makes it difficult for informal traders to operate in Botswana is the Town Council (Hawking and Street-Vending) Regulations of 2002 under the Townships Act (Chapter 40:02) of 1955. These regulations require that street hawkers and vendors be registered in terms of regulation 3. Furthermore, street vending is limited to Botswana citizens, which makes the informal market discriminative. According to Molefe (2011:9) the other factor that makes street vending participants to regard planning regulations as

restrictive is the fact that the majority of them possessed a street vending license which restricts them to trade in certain areas considered not best for business. Therefore, from the above discussion, it is apparent that both South Africa and Botswana rely heavily on their immigration policies and local government by-laws in regulating the influx of foreign traders from taking over the local informal markets. However, as previously illustrated it is a cumbersome task to regulate informal trade especially with the current immigration laws that permit refugees and asylum seekers to seek employment. The South African situation especially presents a poor monitoring system especially considering the number of foreign nationals who cross borders on visitor's permits for the purposes of trading. Coupled with poor enforcement of informal trading regulations at municipal level, the situation is unlikely to change and the reality is that cross border traders will continue to saturate the local informal market.

In the case of Botswana, although refugee camps curb the influx of informal traders, it seems that the informal trade regulations that limit street hawking and vending to locals play a vital role in ensuring that the local market is not flooded by foreign traders. Finally, the large number of illegal immigrants entering both countries makes it difficult to control unregulated business activities (Campbell, 2007:1-23).

5. Conclusion

Human migration has become a common phenomenon in all parts of the world. People may be forced to migrate or may voluntarily do so and the pattern is usually from less economically viable countries to more developing economies. Both professional (skilled workers) and nonprofessional (unskilled workers) are involved in migration. The latter group are mainly involved in the provision of unskilled labour and in the informal trading sectors of the host countries. In Africa, most migrations are forced migration due to civil unrest, wars, political instability, poverty and economic hardship. Economic globalisation is also a contributory factor to migration in Africa. Economic migration contribute to sending countries' economic development benefit through increasing household income, employment creation and business investment. It also helps to facilitate economic growth and development in the host countries through employment creation and expansion of the economy due to informal traders procuring their goods locally, and payment of taxes . On the other hand, it also impacts negatively on the host countries because many of the informal traders trade illegally and do not comply with by-laws regulating informal trading. There is loss of revenue to the host countries because of tax evasion by illegal informal traders, non-adherence to town planning laws, and the stiff competition with the locals leading to tension between locals and

foreign informal traders which have led to violent attacks and damage to property in a country like South Africa.

Though migration provide economic well-being and political stability, high illegal and undocumented cross-border flows and migration from other African countries experienced by countries such as South Africa have resulted in these immigrants including refugees and asylum seekers moving into informal trading. Different African countries including South Africa and Botswana encourage immigration of highly skilled professionals through promulgation of favourable policies in order to build a global competitive workforce with scarce skills and experience in the host's job market, and be able to benefit from foreign investments as well. Like developed countries, African countries enact national immigration policies in response to their security and economic interest and to regulate migration into their countries and the activities of their immigrants, which is achieved through limiting access to labour markets and public goods. A study of South Africa and Botswana immigration frameworks as examples of African countries shows that South African immigration policies have until recently been human centred and less stringent. This created opportunities for influx of migrants from other African countries for work-related and trading purposes, with the resultant problem of resource distribution among the locals and immigrants who both ended up competing for employment and informal trading opportunities. Government has since enacted legislative frameworks (the Immigration Act 13 of 2002 as amended) to address the situation. However, poor monitoring and enforcement of regulations for informal trading sector which is within the jurisdiction of local government, see immigrants without the required licences trade free of charge. The situation is different in Botswana. Unlike South Africa, the country has camps for refugees and asylum seekers. Though its Immigration Act 3 of 2010 provides for various permits, the stringent conditions for procurement of business permit force people to engage in menial jobs and informal trade. The strict legislative framework and monitoring mechanism make it difficult for unlicensed individuals (including immigrants) to carry on informal trade. These have ensured that Botswana local market is not flooded by foreign traders. However, both countries still experience large number of illegal immigrations each year.

6. Recommendations

Most African states have good policies and laws covering various aspects of their statehood including immigration but lack the will power and the existence of effective monitoring mechanism to implementation and monitor such policies. Depending on the need of any of the states, the following recommendations will ensure that both formal and informal businesses contribute positively to the economic development of host states. African States

should tailor immigration policies and local government by-laws to regulate the influx of foreign traders from taking over the locals informal markets. Municipal officials should regularly monitor spaza shops to ensure their owners operate with the required licences. This will drastically reduce the loss of tax revenue by the state. Strict border control should be established with the armed forces sent to the borders to assist immigration officer at the border posts. This will drastically curb the current high rate of illegal border crossing being experienced by some African countries, including South Africa and Botswana. Even where there are regional migration and trade agreements between states for their citizens, such should be effectively monitored as well. Government should regularly amend their immigration laws and policies to meet its immigration needs at any point in time. More effective monitoring and regulatory mechanism should be developed to regulate informal trading in respective African countries. Heavy penalties such as restriction of further entry for a long period of time and payment of large sums of money to the host state by defaulters of the provision of such agreements should be imposed as a deterrent to others. Above all, the regulatory officers should be trained to be patriotic enough to discharge his/her responsibilities judiciously.

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EMERGENCE OF THE WAVE OF DEMOCRATISATION IN AFRICA AND ITS AFTERMATH: A FOCUS ON GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA

S.S. Mugambiwa

H.M. Tirivangasi

L. Yingji

University of Limpopo, South Africa

Abstract

Around 1960s most African countries attained independence from their former colonial masters. The period is well known as the second wave of democratisation. However, the democratisation of African states suffered an identity crisis during the transition processes from colonialism to liberalism. Maladministration, corruption and ill-governance characterised African politics during the first wave of democracy that is from the 1960s to early 1980s. Currently in the third wave of democratisation there is conflict between African states and the West on the meaning of the term democracy. While the West defines democracy for Africa on a Eurocentric view which in turn compromises proper governance of African states; Africans are of the view that the term is used to control them and ensure Western supremacy which protects European sinister economic and political interests. Those states which oppose the European conceptualisation of democracy are termed undemocratic and corrupt states. Paradoxically, their fate is compromised by imposition of economic sanctions and other stiff measures by the 'all powerful' western countries and in turn economic meltdown surfaces and dominates their political and government processes. Nonetheless, the most important question would be are those countries identified as undemocratic by the West really undemocratic? This paper will attempt to deal with the concept of democratisation in the post-colonial Africa vis-à-vis governance, human rights and corruption.

Key words: Democratisation, Democracy, Corruption, Governance, Colonial masters and Human rights

1. Introduction

Around the 1960s most African countries started to claim their political independence and in the 1980s most of them had gained total independence from their former colonial masters. However, even though these countries had gained independence, their style of

governance remained predominantly European. Apart from returning the European style of leadership, dictatorship and corruption characterised the newly born states of Africa. Hence, during this period, most African countries suffered from maladministration, poverty and corruption. Since most leaders who inherited leadership in their countries were corrupt and dictatorial it however in turn negatively affected governance. Adejumobi (2000) asserts that the years of political misrule and bad governance demonstrated by personalized political regimes and ruthless dictatorships left most African States politically paralyzed and economically drained with the majority of the people ravaged by poverty, illiteracy and disease. More so, the fact that the region has experienced and is still experiencing many coups, ethnic violence, civil unrests and extensive bureaucratic corruption seriously affect the standards of governance on the continent (Owoye & Bissessar, 2014). Upon realizing the effect of bad political leadership by African leaders, organizations like the Commonwealth and the United Nations began to emphasize and promote the issues of democracy, human rights and good governance (Adejumobi, 2000). However, the question would be whose democracy, human rights and good governance were they emphasizing on.

2. Historical background

African countries inherited liberal democracy from their respective colonial masters such as the British, French and Belgian among others. In the last decade of colonialism, independence became a certainty because most countries in Africa were moving on a common path of decolonization. Hence, the imperialist powers gradually began to institute democratic reforms in what had previously been structures of exploitation, despotism, and degradation (Fatton, 1990). The transition from colonial despotism to liberal democracy was accelerated in a few years. During this period there was no any fundamental transformation in the economic, cultural, or bureaucratic domains. According to Fatton (1990) the transition was in fact reluctant, repressive, and opportunistic.

With this background, the major challenges that have dominated the African continent are issues of democracy and good governance. Adejumobi (2000) asserts that governance is the exercise of political power to manage a nation's affairs. In many cases the exercise of political power has been abused to satisfy the interests of the ruling elite. According to Adejumobi (2000) state officials in many African countries have served their own interests without fear of being called to account. Hence, politics in Africa has become personalised with leaders only aiming to maintain their political power whilst paying little attention to issues of good governance. Therefore, one must admit that there is a crisis of governance in Africa, and the crisis is not entirely a product of poor leadership style of the

leaders but rather a longstanding problem that emanated from the transition from colonialism to liberalism.

3. What is governance?

Governance constitute of two aspects namely political and economic (Adesida, 2001). These two aspects are immensely important for every country. The political aspect focuses on the manner in which a nation is governed. Governance entails issues of transparency in the political process that is, how decisions are made, and the ability of citizens to participate in the political process. In addition, governance also encompasses the economic aspect. The economic aspect focuses on how societal resources are managed. Politicians as public managers have the duty to distribute resources equally to all. Adesida (2001) notes that in developing countries such as in most African countries where satisfying basic necessities of life is still a serious challenge, the definition of governance must be inclusive. Good governance must provide a platform where citizens freely participate in the decision making process. Regrettably, governance in many African countries is still far from “good” because the systems are not as open as they should be. Additionally, most governments are unable to satisfy the basic needs of their people. Hence, most African countries continue to suffer from poor economic policies and poor service delivery systems which leads to the skyrocketing service delivery protests for example in the case of South Africa.

3.1 Governance issues in South Africa

3.3.1 Service delivery crisis

In South Africa, service delivery has become a serious challenge. There are a plethora of causes which include dissatisfaction with the delivery of basic municipal services such as running water, electricity and toilets, especially in informal settlements and rampant corruption and nepotism within local government structures. Malungelo (2012) elaborates on the intensity of service delivery in Khayelitsha, South Africa. Protests were rampant in this area in 2012, during one of the protests, there were rocks lying on the road and metro police were all over the area. It was not clear what sparked the protest. It was also not the first time people from the area had taken to the streets. More so, in another service delivery protest in Khayelitsha, South Africa the OR Tambo Hall was set alight and the police were investigating a case of arson. The fire destroyed a kitchen, ceiling panels and caused extensive smoke damage (SABC news online, 2015). Furthermore, Areff (2015) asserts that in a service delivery protest in March 2015 about sixty (60) people burnt tyres on roads near Cape Town International Airport in a service delivery protest. Motorists were urged to use

alternative routes. Consequently, the escalation of service delivery protests is a sign of bad governance. It is a common phenomenon in South Africa. It is imperative to note that during the protests the infrastructure that is supposed to benefit communities is destroyed and the same people who are involved in the protests are also the first to cry foul after upon realising that the infrastructure is destroyed. Also, the reason why protests are widespread in many South African communities is because much is not done to address underlying issues in the area of service delivery. Akinboade, Mokwena and Kinfack (2014) are of the view that in South Africa local government is not serious about responding to people's challenges. One of the major problems is the poor communication between municipalities and the communities they represent. This is because municipal governments do not usually respond to people's concerns.

3.3.2 Corruption

'A handful of us – the smart and the lucky and hardly ever the best – had scrambled for the one shelter our former rulers left, and had taken it over and barricaded themselves in' Achebe (Achebe, 1988). This statement by the prominent African writer Chinua Achebe sums up the situation in African countries. In the South African scenario it can be noted that there is no wealth distribution which occurred and yet it is now forty six (46) years into democracy. Van Vuuren (2013) notes that in South Africa the economy since independence has been beneficial only to the few; they are numerous cases of corruption which have been reported at national level, provincial level and at district level. This can be highlighted by the current events which are happening in the South African parliament where the opposition has been accusing President Jacob Zuma of misusing the state funds in upgrading his Nkandla compound. Van Vuuren (2013) notes that business played a crucial role towards end of the apartheid; the end of the apartheid saw the dominance of the market capitalism. The business lobby groups concur with the government because their interest is protected. Business people they want the existing policies such as the macro-economic policies to continue because they allow business growth and the movement of money into offshore accounts. Policies such as Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) created the black capitalist with the ideal to fill the space created by the white minority instead of heading the companies themselves. The capitalist are silent as long their business interest are protected, corruption would not be accounted for.

3.3.3 Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment

The broad based economic empowerment is a policy document created with the intention to distribute the wealth of South Africans to South Africans. The Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) was implemented through the act 53 of 2003. The

BBBEE come as an extension of BEE. Ponte and Lance (2007) note that BEE is an attempt to marry together economic redistribution and micro economic policies. This is/was not possible because macroeconomic policies represent a different ideology (liberalism) and yet the redistribution of wealth is more consistent with socialist economic policies. The BEE was introduced in line with Reconstruction Development Programme (RDP), Tangri and Southall (2008) posit that the main objective of the RDP was to deracialise business ownership completely through the policies focused on Black Economic Empowerment. The majority of the African National Congress (ANC) has not obliged white companies to deracialise their companies through the policies that are focused on Black Economic Empowerment. The RDP was dropped in favour of micro economic policies such as GEAR and National Development Plan (NDP). ANC government knows what is good for the majority of the people, but it is a government which is caught up on an intricate position, where it was wants to meet the needs of the people and the needs of the investors

Thornley, Wood, Grace and Sullivant (2011) points out that BBBEE is an expansion and codification of the 1990s era policy of the ANC to promote black capitalism through the transfer of corporate ownership. The failure of BEE was going to be inevitable because ANC did not liberate itself economically from the grips of the white capitalist powers. The BBBEE places ANC on conflicting terms with the investors who are primarily white. It is also important to note that the ANC was people centred coming out of the oppression, but because of the pressures of the World Bank and the investors, ANC underwent an ideological shift from socialism to economic liberalism.

3.3.4 Microeconomic policies

Mhone and Edigheji (2004) points out that Mr Mandela in his inaugural speech stated the vision of the new government as follows: “My Government’s commitment to create a people-centred society of liberty binds us to the pursuit of the goals of freedom from want, freedom from hunger, freedom from deprivation, freedom from ignorance, freedom from suppression and freedom from fear. These freedoms are fundamental to the guarantee of human dignity. They will therefore constitute part of the centrepiece of what this Government will seek to achieve, the focal point on which our attention will be continuously focused. The things we have said constitute the true meaning, the justification and the purpose of the Reconstruction and Development Programme, without which it would lose all legitimacy” (RDP white paper, 1994).

RDP represented the soul of the black community, it symbolised social democracy. The RDP economic policy represented the original goals of the ANC’s goals and objectives of the 1955 freedom charter. RDP catered for the people’s housing, health care access

among other social services. The RDP was in line with the vision stipulated and cited by former president Nelson Mandela in 1994. However, in 1996 ANC introduced the Growth Economy And Redistribution (GEAR) which is market driven and market oriented; by so doing they were adopting the Washington consensus ideals. Despite the justification of GEAR, the policy itself is mainly influenced by the Bretton Woods Institutions. Saul & Bond (2001) notes that the World Bank provided staff and its own economic model to help ANC iron out an Economic framework which supports the interest of the capitalist. The hand of the Bretton woods institutions is completely visible, in light of the land policy which was undertaken by the new government of the ANC. The World Bank identified thirty percent (30%) of the land which was given to the black majority. The bank promoted the market oriented policy which apparently had failed in Zimbabwe (Saul and Bond, 2001). This resulted in less than percent (1%) of good land being distributed and ten percent (10%) being transferred to black people up to date. The change from RDP to GEAR represented a little success in terms of emancipating the black people. This ideological shift shows ANC's weakness and represents the weakness of Africans to exert control over their own development path. Despite the introduction of GEAR and other macro-economic policies, Mhone and Edigheji (2004) notes that RDP was a people driven process with its attention drawn towards meeting the immediate needs of the people.

4. Tracing the origins of Africa's obscure development path

4.1 The transition in Africa

Southall (2014: 229) points out that 'Africa experienced a democratization wave from 1989, but since then it suffered setback in a number of countries.' He also notes that transition in Africa was experienced differently; some countries engaged in multi-party elections, some discussed via conferences, some returned the incumbent back to power with some changes effected; whilst others engaged in guided democratization like in the case of Ghana (Southall, 2014). These transition phases resulted in different after experience consequences for individual countries. In Zimbabwe post democratization era, the state has found itself at loggerheads with the former colonial masters. The most underlying factor for this is the path to nation building which was chosen by the government of Mr Robert Mugabe. The Zimbabwean government chose nationalisation of all the country's resources which include land, minerals and companies. This way the Zimbabwean government believes that the unfortunate, poor black community will be emancipated and the inequality between whites and blacks will be corrected. However, the government of Zimbabwe suffered the consequences, both economic and international isolation from the prospective investors. The excuse of the western governments and America is democracy;

they argue that the Robert Mugabe regime has infringed the democratic rights of the citizens.

More so, the post democratization era in other African states was not all that rose, a number of African states experience coup d'état for instance in countries like Burundi, Congo and Sierra Leone. In addition some of the countries' liberation leaders and the newly elected presidents were assassinated under mysterious and unknown factors. Southall (2014:229) notes that "what makes democratic consolidation so difficult in some African states is not only the weakness of the state and the difficult economic conditions, but also the fusion of the state and party relations as well as relations between the state and society. It is difficult to rule a country the needs of the masses are not met. This is what rendered most countries ungovernable, and every day in Africa they are cases of disunity and civil unrest.

4.2 *The South African scenario*

Southall (2014:229) notes that South African transition does not simply mean the eradication of the authoritarian rule, but also constituted an anti-colonial, liberation struggle for the black majority. He argues "transition was more than democratisation it also entailed nation building, the deracialisation of resources as well as eradication of the legacy of apartheid in all spheres of the society." This notation points out to the surface what really transpired in South Africa. The ANC policy documents points out deracialisation of the economy and the distribution of the economy, but however, developments have pointed towards the facts which have been argued so far in the analysis of the macro-economic policies, BBBEE, and the existence of corruption in South Africa. The development in South Africa points out that little has been done in emancipating the black for instance, correcting the inequalities which exist between the whites and blacks. So far, what South Africa has done is to avoid the path which Zimbabwe undertook and resulted in detrimental effects to her economy. The major driver of the South African economy is the macro-economic policies which are in line with the western and capitalist interest. As long as South Africa is upholding the capitalist interest, her development path will continue in the same route. They are growing frustrations over the course in which the economy of South Africa has undertaken; the public show this with widespread disgruntlement evidenced by the daily protest over service delivery.

5. Democracy as a machinery of control

5.1 *The Eurocentric view of democracy*

It is neither unethical or a crime to ask the question ‘whose democracy?’ and who wants liberal democracy as a form of governance? This has become a norm where those who do not practise liberal democracy are placed in the category of countries which does not practice good governance and are termed undemocratic. Democracy has been used as a machinery of the West in inflicting and controlling Africa’s path of development. Chan (2002: 10) posits relevant questions when she asks “What is the relevance of ‘liberal democracy to a developing country? How to think of the desirability, feasibility, conditions and possibilities of liberal democracy for such a country where there is important need for economic development, cultural and a historical backdrop different from the west and a state of different capacities?” The western governments have always maintained leverage against developing countries through the use of democracy as an instrument of controlling states.

Nwauwa (2003) notes that during the Cold War, most super powers such as the United States and its Western allies preached the gospel of democracy globally as a means to suppress communism. In so doing they quite often supported and financed some well-known autocratic African regimes which were undemocratic. The nations include Zaire, Kenya, Swaziland and Sudan among others. The West through its governments and media turned a blind eye to human rights violations by these regimes because they supported or claimed to support their mechanisations. South Africa’s change from RDP to macro-economic is also applauded as feasible solution to solve economic challenges facing the country. This is due to the fact that the western capitalist interests are protected. The question would be “How can Africa develop its development path when the playing field is not level”. The western doctrine has made liberal democracy to be the only and unchallengeable good form of government (Chan, 2002). The western form of democracy has come to symbolise the good form of governance.

5.2 *The African view of democracy*

Raveloson (2008) defines democracy as the government of the people or the government of the majority. This definition is in line with Abraham Lincoln’s famous definition of democracy ‘the government of the people, by the people and for the people’ (Heywood, 2007). The definition has been expanded by the western philosophies to include such things as economy, human rights, social structural, institutional and political process (Ndegwa, 2001). He also notes that over the years, scholars have ignored Africa’s conceptualization of democracy. African states since the colonial era, were more concerned about the welfare of

their people, hence they were much in common with the communist form of democracy which uphold sharing of the economy and indigenization policies. Southall (2003) agrees with argument above, when he notes that African democracies were much in common with the communist world than the liberalist democracies of the west. The western type of liberal democracies protects the interest the minority and of the capitalist individualistic ideals whereas the communist democracy is more socialistic in nature. Fayemi (2009) notes that for this reason America and its western allies celebrated the collapse of communism in 1989. This symbolizes the victory of the liberal democracy. This historical event had severe effects on the development path undertaken by the African states thereafter.

6. The underlying challenges on the evolving African state

The fall of communism in 1989 witnessed the emergence of liberal democracy; most African states found themselves in a state of limbo. Smith (2007) makes a similar observation when he notes that 1989 marks the fall of the Soviet Union and brings a breakthrough for the western countries and United States of America to extend and maintain long lasting positions of hegemony within a generalised liberalist capitalist order. The fall of Soviet Union represented victory for USA and had serious implications for socialistic African governments which were headed by liberation political parties. Most African states relied on Soviet Union for financial and technical support. The fall of communism meant that USA and the western governments were the only source of aid in the times of need. The western governments used the weakness of the African states to impose liberal democracy in Africa. The countries which chose to continue pursuing the socialistic ideals such as Zimbabwe found themselves facing serious repercussions. Zimbabwe decided to emancipate its people by taking the land by force and also introducing strict indigenization policies. This course of action resulted in the imposition of sanctions towards the Zimbabwean republic. The crime of Zimbabwe is more highlighted by the Act introduced by the US senate called Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA). This act solidifies the economic embargo placed on Zimbabwe for perpetrating human rights abuse and rule of law. This is despite the stance taken by Africa in regard to the Zimbabwean issue. The crime of Zimbabwe has been its goal of seeking economic freedom for its people at the expense of the western capitalist world; hence it was set as an example.

Furthermore, among the countries that were affected by the fall of communism, South Africa is not an exception. The effects of 1989 collapse of the Soviet Union were dramatically evinced in South Africa where the unbanning of ANC and the release of Nelson Mandela were significant developments. The events marked the transition to democracy, a transition that has implications for the whole African subcontinent (Smith, 2007). It is

imperative to note that during this period the ANC was deeply rooted in communist ideals just like all other liberation movements. Soon after gaining independence, South Africa introduced RDP through a consultative process (Visser, 2004). However, RDP was soon abandoned two years into democracy in favour of macro-economic policies such as GEAR and National Development Plan (NDP). The South African scenario represents a deferent development path from the one pursued by the Zimbabwean government. ANC became submissive to the influences of the western government which favoured macro-economic policies. Macro-economic policies favour the capitalist multi-national companies and restrict government interference in the economy. Today South Africa's resources from land to minerals are still in the hands of the white minority and black elite, and yet majority of the black population is living in abject poverty.

The two case studies discussed above of the two countries represent different courses of development undertaken by different countries across Africa. The influence of the western hand in Africa's development path is visible. Most African countries which have chosen to distant themselves from the western ideology like Zimbabwe have suffered the consequences of economic downfall. On the other hand other countries which followed the western tailor made policies like South Africa have had a benefit of a stable economy yet marked with a society seemingly affected by widespread unemployment and inequality. The biggest challenge facing the African countries is to correct the inequality and removing the tainting legacy of colonisation era. As revealed by the entire discourse analysis, the major stumbling block in the path of Africa's development path is the visible western influence.

7. Conclusion

In a nutshell, this research has revealed openly how the major powers have used their mechanisation to ensure that Africa's development path goes in a certain predetermined direction. The power is now in the hands of Africa as a continent and Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) to forge the way forward. Despite having control over the political process and the economy, Africa still faces a serious challenge of governance. The consequences of correcting the errors done or imposed by the white settlers are there and have been noted. It is now in the hands of African leaders to unite in deciding which path to take as a united front. If this happens, economic sanctions and persecutions by the powerful nations would not be harmful. History has proven that individually the powerful nations can bully their way in trying to impose and protect their interests.

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WHAT'S IN A NAME? SOME PERCEIVED ATTITUDES TOWARDS SOCIAL WELFARE SERVICES IN LIMPOPO PROVINCE

S. Sithole

University of Limpopo, South Africa

Abstract

This article reports on the perceived attitudes of Limpopo Province (African) citizens towards social welfare services. The study relentlessly pursued the question, what are vernacular names of social welfare services and the attitude of Limpopo Province citizens towards these services. An exploratory, cross sectional design was followed. A sample of 7 participants was purposefully selected. Data was collected through a focus group discussion method. The findings were analysed and related with existing literature. It is quite apparent from the findings that social welfare services are stigmatised and people are not so positively inclined towards them. A conclusion and recommendations were made from the findings.

Keywords: Local Economic Development; Informal business; Xenophobia

1. Introduction

There has been much interest lately in South African social policy and social welfare in particular, especially that social security is a human right in terms of section 27 of the South African Constitution of 1996. Part of the reason for the interest emanate from the fact that social welfare is a strategic matter for both local and national government. Governments win and lose votes largely as a result of their delivery of services such as houses, water, sanitation, education and health. These, together with corruption, factionalism, money politics and delivery (my emphasis) failures continue to undermine the party and the state (Lund 2015:25) in South Africa.

Social welfare has been a subject of opinion (Mail and Guardian 2010; Doneva 2010) and research (Graham, Selipsky, Moodley, Maina and Rowland, 2010; Patel, Hochfeld, Moodley and Mutwali, 2012) in areas such as the public awareness of socio-economic rights (Mubangizi, 2005). Some studies focused on the relationship between child support grant and teenage pregnancy and the relationship between child support grant and poverty alleviation. There are those studies that surmise that social assistance reduces poverty (Dangor, 2012:27). The historical divisions that exist within the South African society give rise to inequalities that are a focus of much worry and concern to most citizens. Needless to say such inequalities, social ills and realities can influence people's views, perceptions and

attitudes about social welfare (Angus and Erskine, 2003: 63). Common discourse and perception, as well as 'popular' opinion seem to suggest that South African blacks are well disposed and positively inclined towards social welfare. This assertion is based on the fact that most black people, in South Africa and elsewhere is poor and live on governments' social welfare benefits and programmes. Such people attract labels and stereotypes such as being poor, lazy and dependent.

In fact, those who maintain this position may be 'guilty' of labelling in that 'it is not that the poor are more deviant than other people, but that they are more likely to be labelled deviant by those who have the power to label (Eadie and Morley, 2007: 552). Invariably, such labels and stereotypes become facts in the absence of scientific evidence to the contrary. As though to confirm the labels affixed to the poor, there seems to be few studies except opinions that seem to suggest that social welfare breeds dependency and laziness (Onyeani, 1990). On the contrary (Noble, Ntshongwana and Surrender, 2008; Noble, Wright, Barnes, Ntshongwana and Noble, 2005; Noble, Wright, Barnes, Ntshongwana 2010, Noble 2005; Surrender, Ntshongwana, Noble and Wright, 2007) have consistently found that joblessness had not become normalised and all categories of the workless have become motivated to seek employment. Sole dependency on social benefits had never been a permanent means of survival for them. Besides, these scholars attached to the Centre for the Analysis of South African Social Policy, also found no evidence or sign of a dependency culture among social welfare recipients in South Africa.

Needless to mention that except for these few studies (Noble and Ntshongwana 2008; Surrender et al 2010; Noble et al 2010), not much investigations were carried in South Africa to establish the attitudes of South African (marginalized) blacks in particular, towards social welfare; and this creates a gap in our general understanding of the perception of the society, blacks in particular, towards social welfare in South Africa. The dearth of literature in this area, however, spawned this study.

2. Rationale for the study

The advent of democracy in South Africa, accompanied by transformative policies, notably, inter alia The South African Constitution and the White Paper for Social welfare (1997), ushered in, for hitherto historically excluded people, more especially, black people, services that were previously either negligible or not available at all. It is noteworthy and commendable that the coverage of these services, unlike in the dreadful past, have been extended to the rural areas; and the reach of services has also increased considerably. For some unpleasant historical reasons, quite a considerable number of black people are visibly benefiting from social welfare services much to the chagrin of those who hold conservative

views, wittingly and or otherwise. And because a significant and unprecedented number of black people is benefitting from these, the assumption, flawed or biased, is that Blacks regard these services as a panacea or a silver bullet for all the man-made problems associated with historically and economically engineered poverty (English and Kalumba, 1996: 297). The loudest noise criticizing government expenditure on social grants predictably emanates from yester year beneficiaries of a racially exclusive social welfare state called by the despicable name in the world, Apartheid. Nelson Mandela, in his seminal speech during the Rivonia Trial (1964), as quoted by (English and Kalumba, 1996: 345) made the following observations about this racial social welfare state:

There is compulsory education for all white children at virtually no cost to their parents, be they rich or poor. Similar facilities are not provided for the African children, though there are some who receive such assistance. African children, however, generally have to pay more for their schooling than whites.

3. Research questions

The current study revolved around the following questions:

- What are vernacular names of social welfare services?; and,
- What are perceived attitudes of Limpopo (African) citizens towards social welfare services?

The reason behind these questions is simply that ‘popular’ opinion seems to be dim towards social welfare recipients in this country because of their drain on the country’s resources. Inarguably, black people in South Africa are the main consumers of social welfare services and there is abundant evidence to suggest that even in the United States as well as the United Kingdom, blacks constitute a large percentage of people on social welfare (Onyeani 1990; Ahmad and Craig, 2003:116; see Ayittey 1998:1-32) because of the following reasons:

higher than average unemployment levels (minority ethnic communities are concentrated in inner cities where recession and industrial restructuring have weakened older industrial sectors);

- poor prospects of decent education with the resultant poor job related skills;
- racism in the selection of people for jobs or redundancy;
- the greater likelihood of low paid work; inadequate health and housing provision;
- increasingly harsh restrictions on state financial help for refugees and asylum seekers (Ahmad and Craig, 2003:116)

Because black people are the largest consumers of social welfare, it is also assumed, unjustifiably and so uninformed, that they are positively inclined towards social welfare. These assumptions and stereotypes, however, remain untested, and it is the purpose of this paper to shed a little light on this subject.

4. Guiding theories

The study was guided by amongst others:

Blaming the victim theory. William Ryan (1976) points out that some persons no longer say of those who have not 'made it' that they are evil or responsible for their situations. We may even sympathise with them. But we say that because someone has been oppressed, because of all the injustices that have been done, he or she is in such a state of poor social functioning that nothing can be done to make things better until the person changes (Dolgoft and Feldstein, 2000:8).

Labeling theory: Labeling theory is based on the idea that behaviours are deviant only when society labels them as deviant. As such, conforming members of society, who interpret certain behaviours as deviant and then attach this label to individuals, determine the distinction between deviance and non-deviance. Labeling theory questions who applies what label to whom, why they do this, and what happens as a result of this labeling (Sociology Dictionary)

Theory of otherness: which is a set of ideas that demonstrates that labelling leads to disadvantage? The notion of otherness is used by sociologists to highlight how social identities are contested. This concept is also used to break down the ideologies and resources that groups use to maintain their social identities (Zevallos, 2011:3).

5 Research site

The site for this investigation was the Limpopo Province and a portion of its citizens were the respondents. This was a strategic province for this study because Limpopo, together with the Eastern Cape are assailed by abject poverty (Agyapong, Gyekye, Oludele and Akinboade, 2003) and most citizens would ipso facto be on social welfare. For the educated citizens, the majority employer is the government.

6. Research approach

The study followed a qualitative approach.

6.1 Research design

The study was exploratory and a cross sectional case study design was followed. The basic strategy of this design is to thoroughly describe a single unit during a specific period in time. A unit might include an individual, case, family, group, social agency or community (Tripod, 1982: 245; Bless, Higson-Smith and Sithole, 2013: 135-136).

6.2 The sample

The participants (7) were the University of Limpopo third year Social Work class of 2013, purposively selected. One needs to also inform that the sample consisted of Department of Social Development social work scholarship beneficiaries. The scholarships are cash transfers and ipso facto social welfare services. So in a way, students also benefited and were de facto and de jure social welfare beneficiaries.

6.3 Data collection

Data was first collected through observation and listening in the community. In almost all social spaces, people express opinions about social grants. And all that the researcher did was to note down these opinions and formulate questions from there. Basically, one could say one gets two diametrically opposed views on social welfare services, one positive and the other negative. These diametrically opposed views were tested on a sample of third year social work class of 2013. A focus group was constituted to explore these views.

6.4 Data analysis

Narrative data analysis and to some limited extent, thematic analysis were chosen to interpret and report the findings. Narrative data analysis involves collecting open-ended data based on asking respondents general questions and developing an analysis method from the data supplied by the participants. Narrative analysis uses stories people narrate or tell, analysing them in various ways to understand the meaning of the experiences as revealed in the story (Sapsford and Jupp, 2006). The process of data analysis was largely influenced by theories of post-structuralism. De Saussure has provided an important base for post-structural theories (Weedon, 1987: 22-5). De Saussure emphasized the productive character of language; and language constitutes those entities it describes (Rojek, Peacock and Collins, 1988:120). De Saussure theorized that language is a system of signs in which the signifier (the sound or written image) and a signified (the meaning) are in an arbitrary relationship with one another, though this relationship is fixed in language (Weedon, 1987:23).

For post-structuralists, meaning is constructed through discourses, which are always historically and contextually situated, and in any one context a number of discourses operate thus making possible competing interpretations of entities. Post-structuralists are concerned to apprehend the processes through which certain truths are claimed whilst others are marginalized (Healy, 2000:38-39).

7. The findings

The findings, emerged from questions raised by the interviewer, which essentially asked what each concept (social service or social welfare benefit) is called in the language (vernacular) from where the participants live and come from. The concepts or social service benefits were as follows:

7.1 Social assistance

Social assistance are government sponsored programmes in terms of the Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004. Social assistance is regulated through legislation and is the exclusive responsibility of the government. Social assistance is also financed through taxes and afforded by government to those inhabitants who have met with a contingency recognized by law (Strydom 2006:7). Within social assistance, the following benefits can be accessed by the citizens. The researcher gave the name of the benefit and asked the respondents to give an African equivalent of the benefit/ or service.

7.2 Old age pension

Section 2 of the Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992 makes provision for the payment of social grants to “aged persons”. This grant is paid from monies provided by the state and is not by contributions made by the beneficiary. It is therefore a form of social assistance and not social insurance. Respondents informed the researcher that another name associated with the old age pension is *Motla o dutse*. Loosely translated it means free money or receiving money that one did not work for and therefore does not deserve. The label or name used for old age pension is therefore consistent with the tenets of victim blaming, in that beneficiaries are alleged to reap from where they did not sow. The underlying meaning of this benefit, the author argues, indicates that most African people may not be aware that old age pension is paid from their taxes, and therefore they deserve it if they satisfy the means test. The latter meaning of undeserved benefits or undeserving poor has its origins in the conservative approach to social welfare which is based on scarcity, residualism and therefore stigmatizing because people feel that their tax money is used to improve the social

welfare of others. Alcock and Erskine (2003:64) articulate this very well, “Indeed the social welfare interests of one group may even conflict the social welfare interests of another”.

The respondents also reported that another name for old age pension is *mphiwa feela*, meaning free money which has the same connotation as *Mo tla o dutse*. The other most popular name used to refer to old age pension is *mudende*. *Mudende*, unlike the first two names used by the Sotho speakers, is universal amongst the African language speakers in Limpopo and beyond. Now the real meaning of the word and its origin is obscure, at least to the writer. However, one suspects that it derives from the Shona word, *tenda* which means thanks. The likelihood is that *Mudende* is from the Shona phrase, *ta tenda* which means ‘I thank you’. Asked whether the name suggest that the recipients were positive or not to this service, the researcher drew a divided response.

7.3 Child support grant

A child support grant is payable to a primary caregiver who must be 16 years or older and be a South African citizen or permanent resident, of a child to provide for the child’s basic needs (Department of Social Development, 2015). The participants intimated that the child support grant is called *Chelete ya Mbeki*. Loosely translated it means Mbeki’s money. This grant was introduced during former President Mbeki’s term of office. Child support grant is also called *chelete ya mokokotlo*. Loosely translated, it means back money which implies a lady has to lie on her back, fall pregnant and then access the child support grant. This terminology denigrates both the women and the grant. This connotation resembles the name given to child support grant in Kwa Zulu Natal which is *imali yeqolo* which also denotes money earned after lying on one’s back. Certainly, the label is negative and does not denote a positive attitude towards the grant. It also blames and stigmatises the victim for her poverty.

7.4 Land reform and housing provision

Part of the democratic government’s Reconstruction and Development Programme was to embark on land reform which is closely linked with the provision of housing. Provision of housing to all is one of the corner-stones of South African democracy in the Freedom Charter of 1955 (English and Kalumba 1996:336-340). As a consequence of that, the South African government made housing a basic human right enshrined in section 26 of the South African Constitution. In terms of this section, (1) “everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing and (2) the state must take reasonable legislative and other measures within its available resources to achieve the progressive realisation of this right”. To that end, the government provides low cost houses to the people who cannot afford

same. The government's attempts at providing low-cost housing is however hamstrung by amongst others, little or no availability of land, whose distribution has since been skewed in favour of a minority in the Land Act of 1913. Due to the scarcity of living spaces and adequately serviced settlements, ordinary (poor) people invade and occupy unused land to establish squatter camps or an informal settlements (often near their places of employment). One such settlement, the participants informed, is mbamba metjisi. This is a Shangaan/XiTsonga expression denoting 'fidget for a match box'. The name emanates from the fact that the informal settlement in question has not been provided with basic infrastructure such as electricity (water and sanitation) since its establishment. So when one lives in such an area, one always has to fidget for a matchbox in the darkness, regardless of one's smoking habits. This in the author's opinion is far from positive. It also denotes a notion of us and them as contemplated in the 'otherness' theory. Those who live in well-resourced areas, refer to the under-resourced as them.

Section 26 of the South African Constitution of 1996 provides for access to adequate housing. Access to housing and secure accommodation is an integral part of the government's commitment to reducing poverty and to that end the Housing subsidies and the People's Housing Process were initiated (Dupper, 2006:198-199). The National Housing Subsidy Programme ensures that ownership subsidies are allocated through the Housing Subsidy scheme to help households who are unable to satisfy their housing means independently (Dupper, 2006:198).

The People's housing process gave rise to the "RDP house". The RDP houses are low cost houses, not more than four rooms in size, that the South African government started building since 1994. They resorted under the Reconstruction and Development Programme that was steered by former Minister without portfolio, Jay Naidoo. Provision of these houses is meant to fulfil the constitutional obligation that everybody has a right to a house. RDP houses, according to the participants, have the following names:

Re leboga dintlo, papa (Thank you, for the houses, daddy).

The name denotes, 'we are grateful for the houses so provided, our father' as in our parent. There is a very positive sentiment in this name and it is also not derogatory at all. The name may mean that people who use this connotation are appreciative of government's intervention in the provision of houses.

The participants informed that the other name for these so called RDP houses is, *Re tla nabela kae?* Loosely translated, it means how far can we stretch (our legs)? The meaning contained in this expression is that the house is too small to give its occupants enough

space to stretch his body-metaphorically meaning that there is no space to accommodate all the occupant's family and belongings. It may also mean that the land on which the house has been erected is so small that it is not possible to extend it any further. It seems the beneficiaries are not aware that social welfare services are but a safety net, not meant to generate wealth or bring comfort to those who receive them. In another study, respondents were asked whether child support grant should be increased or not, and most felt that it should be increased (Noble et al 2008)

It turned out, from the focus group discussion, that houses have a lot of names. This may be so, most likely because shelter is a basic human need and therefore central to our existence (DuBois and Miley, 2002:13). Another name for these houses is, *Mme ga a mpone*. The expression *mme ga a mpone* literally means my mom does not see me. It is like the cat is away and the mice are certainly at play. Feminist literature alludes to the poverty of women and children (Dolgoft and Feldstein 2000: 367-373; Grabmeier, 2005: 62-66; Noble, Ntshongana and Surender, 2008: 16-17; Sithole, 2010) and it is therefore not a surprise that most beneficiaries of RDP houses are women, mostly young and allegedly prone to mischief according to the research participants. These houses, according to the respondents, provide shelter to the young ladies to engage in socially unacceptable behaviour in the absence of their parents. Apparently, the equally pejorative alternative to *mme ga a mpone* is *serope mperekele* loosely translated means my thigh works for me. Or I am my thigh's beneficiary. The implication here is that the beneficiaries of RDP houses are ladies who may not be gainfully employed and hence provide sexual favours to male partners in return for financial favours. Alternatively, this view may also hold, according to the participants, that the (ladies) beneficiaries slept through their favours. In other words they provided sexual favours to government officials in order to access these social welfare benefits. This finding attests to victim blaming, labelling as well as the stigmatisation of social welfare benefits, and in this case, housing in particular.

Hastings (2004:233-254) as well as Arthurson (2004:255-270) observed that rented houses for the poor in some countries in Western Europe were also stigmatized. In the UK, for example, there are estates with a reputation such that few people would choose to live there, and many avoid even visiting. Such stigma, (Dean and Hastings, 2000; Arthurson 2004: 255-270) blights the lives of such residents who live in such estates, affecting their educational, economic and social opportunities. On the flip side of *mme ga a mpone* and *serope mperekele* is what participants referred to as *tsola borokgo*, meaning take off your pants. Legend has it that all men are required to do when they visit their girlfriends who live in these small houses, is to take off their pants. It is like these are whorehouses, and this is definitely negative. Scholars in social policy argue that selective as opposed to universal

access to social welfare benefits is responsible for stigmatization of services. Simply because some receive the benefit while others do not ushers in inequality as well as them and us. The theme of mutual support or exploitation, depending on where one stands, is carried over into tana ni xixevo (literally meaning bring along relish). The implication here is that a man just needs to bring along a packet of meat to go with pap (porridge) because 'everything else is ready in this house'.

The participants seemed to enjoy churning housing labels. And since this was an exploratory study, the researcher gave adequate room to participants for freewheeling. Hence the excitement of the group when they gave this other name, *robala di padile, papa*. The researcher asked participants the contextual meaning of the phrase. The response was that it means 'just give up, it's late to go home now'. The expression denotes a married man who oversleeps at his girlfriend's low cost house and suddenly realise at the wee hours of the morning that he slept out and anger and resentment from his wife awaits him. The man receives solace from these words, 'well just give up, an offence has been committed'. The man is advised to hatch a plan to obviate the ensuing marital tiff. In the larger scheme of attitudes, this name is negative and may suggest that people may have a dim view of these kind of houses.

A small number of participants within the group were so desperate to add the following name tshipondokwa to the list. The name simply means a tiny house. Further research into this area will most likely demonstrate the relationship between tshipondokwa and swiyindhlwani swa pondo. The latter phrase, loosely translated, means small houses worth two pounds. This by no means is a negative connotation and one may safely infer that it denotes a negative attitude towards the house.

7.5 Health concepts

People's social welfare is an embracing concept that includes health. In the big five social services (health, housing, education, social security and personal social services) that responsive governments are duty bound to provide to their citizens, health is one of the most crucial one. The participants were asked to share African names related to health issues from their communities. The name that quickly sprang to one participant's mind was *waskhabetshe* (cabbage). This name is used in hushed tones to refer to an invalid person who became so as a result of ill-health or an accident. Saying that a person is a cabbage, may imply his lack of social significance. A Cabbage is used very frequently in meals on occasion of funerals and feasts. It has also served as staple food (relish) in very poor communities. People ate this vegetable until they had no appetite for it and they named it Johana 14:1 (John 14:1 NIV), which reads as follows: "Do not let your hearts be troubled"

the community is advised not to be troubled by a cabbage. In other words be steadfast even in the presence of adversity.

The reason for the stigmatization of the physically invalid probably stems from his presumed inability to fend for himself, and thus condemned to a life of perpetual poverty. This could be linked to Elwan (1999:iv) that the disabled comprise 15-20% of the poorest people in developing countries, and that they are more likely to have incomes below poverty level, and less likely to have savings and other assets than the non-disabled population.

8. Conclusion

The naming of most social welfare services, just like most phenomena in society, subscribe to the principle of duality; that because there is a head, it follows that there must also be a tail. Even though some social welfare services are referred to derogatively and others positively, findings from this study have indicated a strong proclivity towards the latter. This finding may suggest that the sample that took part in the study may have been biased against social welfare services because they are recipients and therefore beneficiaries. But the question is, if they are beneficiaries of services, why would they denigrate them. In other words, how does one begin to bite the very hand from which he feeds? This then, undermines logic, which leads one to the cautious conclusion that the participants were not positively inclined towards social welfare.

Whereas the study purported to look at the attitudes of black people towards social welfare in general, the participants spent more time providing African names of RDP houses more than anything else. On the basis of this development, one may infer that the participants, and by extension the communities from which they come, certainly have negative attitudes towards RDP houses. Nevertheless, one needs to be very careful not to generalize the findings from an unrepresentative sample to the entire black community. Notwithstanding this sample shortcoming, the author contends that the study increased our understanding of black people towards social welfare. Indeed it is not true that black people like social welfare and enjoy hand-outs. The truth is many years of unjust conquest of African people, colonialism, imperialism, slavery; Jim Crow and Apartheid have conspired to subjugate African people and rendered them largely economic misfits. In the same breath, Surrender et al (2010) opine that the key factors in reducing people's chances of finding employment seem linked to the structural conditions of the labour market and the wider economy rather than the motivational characteristics of the unemployed and the arrangements of the grant system.

Mwalimu Julius Nyerere also observed:

In traditional African society everybody was a worker...when I say that...everybody was a worker, I do not use the word 'worker' simply as opposed to 'employer' but also as opposed to 'loiterer' or 'idler'...Not only was the capitalist, or landed exploiter, unknown to traditional African society, but we did not have that other form of modern parasite- the loiterer or idler who accepts society's hospitality as his 'right' but gives nothing in return (English and Kalumba 1996: 296-297)

9. Recommendations

On the basis of the findings from this study, the following recommendations are logical:

- this study may be replicated in other provinces in South Africa or other parts of the African continent
- further studies in this area may use more representative samples to find whether we will arrive at the same outcome
- further research may focus on the direct beneficiaries of services to get the attitudes from the horses' mouth

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THE CURRENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY'S ROAD AGENCIES ON COMMON ISSUES: A CASE STUDY OF REGULATIONS GOVERNING TRAFFIC CALMING DEVICES IN TANZANIA

R.R. Mwaipungu

D. Allopi

Durban University of Technology, South Africa

Abstract

The paper attempts to look at the relationship between the East Africa (EA) road agencies, in terms of the co-operation in the regulations governing the design, construction and maintenance of traffic calming devices (TCDs.). The paper touches on colonial and post colonial EA countries' relationship for comparison purpose. It should be noted that, colonial masters managed to operate a number of institutions in all three former EA countries successfully, which currently are not successful. The paper argues that there is a lack of formal co-operation between road agencies and legislation governing TCDs in EA countries. Furthermore it noted the inconsistency in design, and construction of TCDs in EA countries. This can be attributed to lack of common regulations governing the design, construction and maintenance of these devices. The paper recommends a number of measures to be introduced with the aim of enhancing the relationship between road agencies in EA countries. To this end the paper put more emphasis on the significance of harmonising the regulations governing the design, construction and maintenance of TCDs by involving all stakeholders throughout EA countries.

Keywords: East Africa community, speed hump, rumble strips, speed bump, colonial era, traffic calming devices (TCDs)

1. Introduction

East Africa Community (EAC) five members are composed of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. These countries are linked by an active network of roads (Bureau for Industrial Cooperation (BICO) 2012: xi). To improve the performance and safety of road transport, EAC have started implementing road sector reforms. These reforms aim at ensuring that there is efficient provision of road transport with the ultimate goal of substantially reducing its current high transportation costs in the region, which one of its contributory element is traffic accident. Such reforms include the formation of regulatory

authorities and operational agencies, among these are road agencies. Road agencies are responsible for the management of TCDs, which are fundamentally concerned with reducing the adverse impact of motor vehicles on built environments. The paper methodology was based on qualitative approach, whereby the author employed observation, through condition survey of existing TCDs, personal opinion, literature review and unstructured interviews. The paper embarks firstly to elucidate briefly the history of East Africa (EA) co-operation. This is followed by bloc road agencies, and TCDs and their characteristics. The paper ends with the efforts shown by the EA countries in harmonising regulation governing the design and maintenance of TCDs. The paper draws mostly from the characteristics of the existing TCDs in Tanzania as typical of what shall be observed in the rest of EAC countries. The paper recommends conspicuous cooperation between EA countries road agencies in their areas of competency, and local community. One area which that cooperation can be exercised is that of TCDs.

2. The history of EA co-operation during colonial era

The former East African bloc, namely Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda have had a history of co-operation dating back to the early 20th century. The co-operation was forged by being under the British Empire, after the end of World War I. As early as 1897-1901, the Kenya – Uganda railway running from the port of Mombasa (Kenya) to Kampala (Uganda) was commissioned. This was the beginning of East African cooperation as the railway allowed for the first time the people of two countries to interlink and conduct business together. In 1905, the EA Currency Board and the Postal Union were established to ease business transaction and the correspondence between colonial government officials. The court of appeal for EA was set up in 1909 and the Customs Union in 1917 to accelerate the pace of regional economic integration and cooperation. Inter-territorial co-operation between the Kenya Colony, the Uganda Protectorate, and the Tanganyika Territory was first formalised in 1948 by the East African High Commission (EAHC) to deepen regional integration. This provided a customs union, a common external tariff, currency, and postage. It also dealt with common services in transport and communications, research, and education. Following independence, of Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya in 1961, 1962, and 1963 respectively, these integrated activities were reconstituted and the EAHC was replaced by the East African Common Services Organisation (EACSO). In 1967, the EACSO was superseded by the East African Community (EAC), which was the first regionally integrated body. This body aimed to strengthen the ties between the members through a common market, a common customs tariff, and a range of public services to achieve balanced economic growth within the region.

In 1977, the EAC collapsed after ten years of existence. The main reasons behind the collapse of are lack of strong political will, lack of strong participation of the private sector and civil society in the co-operation activities, the continued disproportionate sharing of benefits of the community among the partner states and lack of adequate policies to address this (East African Community n.d. cited in Magu 2014:59). Later, Presidents of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda signed the Treaty for East African Co-operation in Arusha, Tanzania, on 30 November 1993 and established a Tri-partite Commission for Co-operation. The EAC was finally revived on 30 November 1999, when the treaty for its re-establishment was signed and came into force on 7 July 2000, 23 years after the total collapse. A customs union was signed in March 2004, and came into effect on 1 January 2005. Burundi and Rwanda joined the EAC on 6 July 2009. Mattli (1999 cited in Magu 2014:61) argue that the challenge of our time is not how to keep nations peacefully apart but how to bring them actively together through institutional co-operations such as Road agencies.

3. Road agencies

Following is brief description of road agencies in each of EA countries, except Burundi which currently does not have a semi autonomous road agency, and roads are managed directly by the Ministry responsible with roads infrastructure. To stick to paper objective which is to show the level of co-operation existing between EA countries road agencies in terms of regulations governing TCDs, the description of EA countries road agencies will just centre on the laws which established these agency and their general functions.

3.1 Kenya trunk road agency

The Kenya roads Act 2007 and the sessional paper No.5 of 2006 on the development and management of the road sector for sustainable economic growth provided the legal and institutional framework for the management of roads in Kenya (Ministry of Road & Public Works (MOR&PW), 2006:6-7; Republic of Kenya Ministry of Road (RKMOR) 2012:1) and the establishment of Kenya National Trunk Roads Authority (KENTRA). KENTRA is a body of the national government of Kenya responsible for the design, construction, operation and maintenance of National Trunk Road, capacity building and technical assistance to counties (RKMOR 2012:18). Kenya trunk road link Kenya with other countries sharing borders with Kenya, among these are EA countries, particular Uganda and Tanzania.

3.2 Rwanda Transport Development Agency

Rwanda Transport Development Agency (RTDA) is a government institution affiliated to the Ministry of Infrastructure. RTDA is governed by the law No.02/2010 of 20/01/2010, which established RTDA and determines its mission, structure and functioning (RTDA 2013:1-6).

3.3 Tanzania National Roads Agency

The Tanzania National Roads Agency (TANROADS) is an Executive Agency under the Ministry of Works, established under section 3(1) of the Executive Agencies Act (Cap 245) and came into operation in July, 2000. The Ministry of Works through TANROADS is managing the National road network of about 33,891 km comprising 12,786 km of Trunk and 21,105 km of Regional roads in Tanzania Mainland. Tanzania's trunk road link it with all East African countries, as it share borders with Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda.

3.4 Uganda National Roads Authority

The Uganda National Roads Authority (UNRA) was established in 2006 by parliamentary enactment of the Uganda National Roads Authority Act. The agency became fully functional on 1 July 2008 (Rwanyekiro 2014).

4. Functions of East African countries road agencies

The general functions of the road agencies in each EA country are almost the same (MOR&PW 2006:6-7, RTDA 2013:3-4, Rwanyekiro 2014), these are to maintain, rehabilitate and develop such categories of roads as specified in their respective countries roads Acts and to perform such additional functions as the Minister responsible may, from time to time assign. In the execution of their functions the road agencies are required to ensure that they: i) development, rehabilitation and maintenance of the road network consistent with the economy and set standards; ii) that its operations are conducted efficiently, economically and with due regard to safety; and iii) that financial administration is conducted in accordance with the provisions of those Acts and regulations made there under. Further more road agencies are mandated to, advice the government on general roads policy, and contribute to the addressing of national transport concerns (Rwanyekiro 2014). Road agencies in East Africa are charged with, among other things, the supervision of construction, the scheduling of maintenance, and the prioritization of national road works (UNRA 2015). In this light, these road agencies in EA are responsible with procurement procedures of TCDs on the roads under their management.

5. Traffic calming devices

Developed in Europe, traffic calming (a direct translation of the German “verkehrsberuhigung”) is a system of design and management that aim to balance traffic on streets with other uses (Project for public spaces (PPS) 2013). Traffic calming device is the combination of physical controls to reduce the negative effects of motor vehicle use, alter driver behaviour and improve condition for non-motorized users (Swanson, Abraham, Smith, Smith, and Trip 1998:2). Traffic calming is a useful way of controlling drivers` speeds where speeds are either excessive and/ or in appropriate for the type and use made of a road (Northern Ireland Department of Transport (NI-DT) 2007:10). Justification for installing traffic calming is often based on improving safety by reducing traffic collisions. Whilst the number of traffic collisions on residential roads are often relatively low, and usually scattered over a wide area with highly variable annual accidents rates, the use of traffic calming devices enable an area-wide approach to be adopted to address isolated incidents (Ibid).

6. Traffic collisions

A traffic collision, occurs when a vehicle collides with another object. A number of factors contribute to the risk of collision, including vehicle design, speed of operation, road design, road environment, and driver skill, impairment, and behaviour. The paper limits itself on traffic speed as it is conspicuously affected by traffic calming devices and is a major contributory factor of traffic collision in East African countries.

7. Traffic speed

Dornstein (1998:3) summaries the effect of traffic speed on those affected as follows: i) the risk of being injured increases exponentially with speeds much faster than the median speed, ii) the severity of a crash depends on the vehicle speed change at impact, and iii) most crashes related to speed involve speed too fast for the conditions. The Road and Traffic Authority of the Australian state of New South Wales (RTA-NSW) (2008) asserts that traveling too fast for the prevailing conditions or above the posted speed limit is a factor behind 40 percent of road deaths in New South Wales. In Tanzania, inappropriate traffic speed accounts for 58.2 percent of traffic accidents (Masaoe 2007:46). Chiduo and Minja (2001:240) further argue that there is a clear evidence of the effect of traffic speed on accident rates and severity. Hence the need of TCDs for the intention of reduction of traffic speeds (Swanson et al 1998:2) as well as to improve safety for pedestrian and cyclists.

8. Types of traffic calming devices

Types of TCDs vary with techniques designed to lessen the impact of motor vehicle traffic by slowing it down, or literally “calming” it (PPS 2013). TCDs may be broadly categorised into five groups as follows: i) optical devices: speed limit signs, flashing lights, markings, ii) sound devices: rumble strips or chatter bars, rumble areas, iii) combined sound and optical devices: transverse thermoplastic strips , iv) obstacles to be avoided: flower boxes, plantations, trees, poles and posts, abrupt changes in road alignment , and v) obstacles which cannot be avoided : humps, troughs, steps. The paper deals with road humps, bumps, and rumble strips as are mostly employed as traffic calming devices in EA countries.

9. Classification system of traffic calming devices

Table 1 below illustrates the traffic calming devices classification systems.

Table 1: Traffic calming devices-classification systems

Category	Description
Informative	The road users are alerted to the fact that a particular kind of behaviour is expected from them, e.g. the minimum speed sign.
Suggestive	The road users are subconsciously urged to adopt a certain kind of behaviour, e.g. special paving construction.
Persuasive	The road user is more clearly persuaded to behave in certain manner, e.g. road humps
Obstructive	Specific (traffic) behaviour is physically forced on the driver
Vertical	Deflection devices are designed to change vertical the course or path of a vehicle as a result of a physical feature of roadway
Horizontal	Deflection devices are designed to change the horizontal course or path of a vehicle as a result of a physical feature of roadway
Signage and line marking	Signage and line marking can be used to regulate and/or calm traffic
Obstructive/Diversion	Devices are used to direct traffic
Integrated treatments	Are a combination of devices

Source: Minnema (2006)

The paper limit itself to persuasive and vertical traffic calming devices as are the widely applied devices in Tanzania and in the entire East African countries.

9.1 Persuasive and vertical traffic calming devices

Vertical traffic calming devices are also persuasive. The use of vertical deflection devices is commonly found where vehicle speeds are statutorily mandated to be low, usually 40 km/h. In addition to the effects that a device will have on speed, volumes and clashes, other effects to consider when installing vertical TCDs may include comfort, and ground clearance (Minnema 2006:17).


9.2 Comfort

Devices affect comfort levels by inducing vertical acceleration differently, such that vehicle occupants are generally unwilling to accept peak vertical acceleration in excess of 0.7g (where “g” stands for acceleration due to gravity and equals to 9.8 m/s²). For example speed bump induces high vertical acceleration at low speeds because they are significantly shorter than the wheelbase of a vehicle. Braaksma and Weber (2000) (cited in Minnema 2006:18) argues that the acceleration decreases with higher speeds due to absorption on the impact by the vehicle suspensions. According to (Swanson et al 1998:22) speed bumps are abrupt, and they are considered to be potentially hazardous for motor vehicles as they cause vehicles to jolt when crossed at the lawful speed limit. Speed hump generally can affect the degree of discomfort experienced by road users and the subsequent speed reduction effect (NI-DT 2007:47).

10. Ground clearance of a vehicle

Ground clearance of a vehicle can be defined as the space or distance from the lowest point of the vehicle to the level surface below it. The ground clearance is an essential criterion to be considered and effected during design, construction, and maintenance of TCD. According to Northern Territory Consolidated Regulations (NTER) (2015:1), a motor vehicle must have a ground clearance of: at least 100 mm at any point within 1 metre of an axle. Figure 1 shows the position where the ground clearance should be observed.

Figure 1: Ground clearance checking methodology




Source: NTER(2015)

10.1 Speed hump (SH)

The speed (road) hump (SH) was developed in the early 1970 in the Transportation Research Laboratories (TRL) in the Great Britain (Parkhill, Sooklall, and Behar 2007:1; Swanson et al, 1998:21). (SH) are the most widely used form of TCDs worldwide because they are effective at controlling speeds and are generally applicable to most road layouts (NI-DT 2007:47). SH are safe when crossed at designated speed limit.

Humps are the most effective device for roads where it is desired to maintain low speed, typical speeds resulting from SHs are 15-30km/h (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 1984: 190). Studies conducted by Institution of Transportation Engineers (ITE-USA) (2015a) shows that an average 18% reduction in traffic flow and an average 13% reduction in collision where SHs have been employed. Common speed humps shapes are parabolic, circular and sinusoidal (ITE-USA 2015a). Figure 2 shows the difference between speed bump and hump.

Figure 2: The difference between speed bump and speed hump



Source: Swanson *et al* (1998)

Humps should be placed at frequent intervals, with exact sitting depending on infrastructural criteria (intersections, schools). Appropriate marking and lighting of the obstacles can help promote safety (OECD 1984:190). Studies in Australia, United Kingdom, and United States have shown reduction in 85th percentile speeds when humps are placed in a series of 100 -170 m apart (Partington 2015; Parkhill, Sooklall, and Behar 2007:8; Swanson *et al*1998:21).

10.2 Speed bump


A speed bump (SB) is a bump on a roadway or is a raised pavement area across a carriage way. SB in Europe and USA just to mention few developed countries, are typically found on private roadway and parking lots and do not tend to exhibit consistent design parameters from one installation to another (Parkhill, Sooklall, and Behar 2007:1; Swanson *et al*1998:21). SBs in Tanzania are found on trunk roads and residential streets. The breadth of SBs is typically between 0.3 to 1 m (ITE-USA 2015b); contrasting with the wider SHs, which are typically 3.0 to 4.3 m in breadth. SB generally has a height of 70 to 150 mm (Ibid).

10.3 Rumble strips

Rumble strips or chatter bars are static warning systems, designed to bring about more attentive or slower driving at the approach to danger spots (OECD 1984:190). These are introduced as a series bumps or depression in the pavement across the roadway providing an audible rumble and a vibration to passing vehicles (TBS 2013:3, Swanson et al 1998:21, OECD 1984:190). The audible rumble and vibration creates an awareness of a condition for which a motorists must react, such condition includes; before humps or pedestrian crossing; at approaches to dangerous junctions; to give emphasis to warning signs, e.g. before sharp bends or at railway crossings. Figure 3 shows typical arrangement of rumble strips.

According to NI-DT (2007:68) rumble devices should serve to alert the drivers to a hazard ahead and not being a hazard themselves, hence pre-warning of the device is not essential and careful consideration should be given to the potential negative visual impact of the schemes.

Figure 3: Typical arrangement of rumble strips



Source: TBS (2013)

Regulations applied in design of traffic calming devices

10.4 Speed hump

The length and height of the speed hump determine the speed at which traffic will travel over the devices. Shorter breadth and greater height slow vehicles most drastically.

Table 2: Typical hump dimensions and spacing

Desired speed (kph)	Height, h, (mm)	Breadth, b, (m)	Spacing centre to centre (m)
0-10	150	2.0	30.0
11-25	150	3.0	40.0
26-35	100	4.0	50.0
36-45	100	4.5	60.0
46-60	100	5.0	70.0

Source: TBS(2013)

According to the desired speeds at designated road sections, the heights and breadth of the humps are as given in Table 2 (TBS 2013:4). The length of the humps shall be the width of the road. Where there is a need to maintain reduced traffic speed over a long section of the road e.g. road crossing residential areas, several humps have to be introduced at spacing relative to the designated speed.

10.5 Rumble strips

According to TBS (2013:7), the dimensions governing the construction of rumble strips are the height which has to be between 12 mm and 15 mm, the breadth shall be 200 ± 10 mm, and the space between individual strips have to be 200 mm. The length of the strip has to be equal to the width of road (ibid).

10. 6 Strips spacing and arrangement

The pattern of strips to be adopted depends on physical characteristics of the road and driver behaviour at the particular location (NI-DT 2007:68). TBS (2013:7) maintain that, rumble strips has to be constructed in sets of 4 strips as shown in Figure 3.

Table 3: Classification and arrangement of rumble strips

Approach speed of traffic (km/h)	Required type of strip set	Spacing of strips centre to centre (m)	Distance to strip set of next (lower) speed bracket, centre to centre (m)
Over 100	A	4.0	100
76-100	B	3.0	40
50-75	B	3.0	40
Less than 50	C	2.0	N/A

Source: TBS (2013)

These strip sets may be classified into types A, B, C with individual strip spacing of 4, 3, and 2 m respectively in correspondences with the projected reduction of traffic speed at the relevant road stretch as indicated in Table 3 (ibidem). Table 3 is not observed during the construction of rumble strips in Tanzania, and a characteristic of rumble strips varies with contractors or client. On some roads section, along the trunk road from Dar es Salaam, Tanzania to Malawi border or Zambia border , rumble devices have been used with the aim of reducing speeds, contrary to NI-DT (2007:67) who argue that any speed reduction is likely to be minimal and will be eroded with the passage of time.

11. Materials

TCDs may be constructed from asphalt concrete or other suitable materials approved by relevant authority. TCDs structures mostly employed in Tanzania are cement concrete,

cement asphalt and cement mortar bricks. Stone masonry, even where there are prevalent, are not used. Local residents in streets looking for quick solution to slow motor-vehicle in order to improve safety conditions prefer bumps than humps and material used in construction of these bumps are natural or artificial materials available locally, which range from soil, to gravel material. The quality of these bump are in question, and most of the time can be hard to negotiate in vehicles with low ground clearance. Characteristics of materials for construction of TCDs should conform to a set of regulation based on the type of traffic stresses which these structures have to transmit to subgrade during operation.

12 Maintenance, painting and marking of existing traffic calming devices

The effectiveness performance of TDCs is assured through maintenance. TBS (2013:10) insist that, regular inspection has to be conducted to ensure TCDs do not distort excessively in shape and size in the course of usage. Hump and rumble has to be reconstructed whenever any of the dimensions given in Table 2 and Figure 3 are in difference of much than 25 per cent (ibid). Painting and marking of existing road humps has to be done every six months or less in order to maintain their visibility to road users (TBS 2013:10). What is noted in most of TCDs along trunk roads in Tanzania is the absence of regular maintenance, painting and markings, which raise the question of the safety of these devices.

13. The characteristics of existing traffic calming devices in East Africa Countries

Speed hump, speed bump and rumble strips, throughout East Africa countries have wide range of variability, although Tanzania Standard (TZS) 1585 (2013:3) point out the need to standardize them. These devices differ in dimension, number, location, and spacing. No legislation governing the traffic calming devices has been enacted within each EA countries. In general the height of speed hump, bump and rumble strip should not affect the smooth maneuverability of the vehicle during mounting operation, unfortunately there is no such regulation governing vehicle ground clearance in TBS.


During the preparation of TZS 1585, TBS derived assistance from Kenya Bureau of Standard (KBS) specification, named Kenya Standard (KS) 774: 2000 (TBS 2013:3), which means what is there in TBS have been drawn from KBS experience. Through physical observation of roads in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, it can be said that there are no consistent characteristics of these devices within each East Africa countries. In worse cases, their location is influenced by nasty traffic accident, vocal politicians, or local residence in absence of Highway or Traffic engineers. According to ITE-USA (2015a) pavement undulations (speed humps, speed bumps, rumble strips) are not traffic control devices but

geometric design measures of the roadway and should be designed, installed, operated, and maintained using accepted engineering principles and prudent engineering judgment. Hence the need of harmonisation of regulations governing the design, construction and maintenance of TCDs within EA countries.

14. Harmonisation of traffic calming devices

Harmonisation of TCDs throughout EA countries is essential for the safety and convenience of the public travelling on the road networks whether for trade, tourism, or education to mention a few.

Figure 4: Detailed design of circular speed hump



Vehicle speed (km/h)	Radius (m)	Length (m)
20	11	3.0
25	15	3.5
30	20	4.0
35	31	5.0
40	53	6.5
45	80	8.0
50	113	9.5
55	180	12.0

Source: BICO (2012)


The BICO (2012) study recommends that the values shown in the Figure 4 to 6, on TCDs, should be used for the design of speed humps and rumble strips on a roadway passing through inhabited areas throughout EA countries. It should be stressed here that these devices are also required on roads passing areas not inhabited by people depending on the terrain condition.

BICO recommended vehicle speed shown in Figure 4 differ with those proposed by TBS (2013) as shown in Table 3. In general BICO didn't do much justice in their harmonisation recommendation regarding TCDs apart from giving their suggestion on dimension for few types of devices as shown in Figure 4 to 6. BICO say nothing on Speed bump, although they can be noted on certain trunk roads in Tanzania and are popular on residential and commercial streets throughout Tanzania towns and cities.

Harmonization process of TCDs should be detailed and involves all stakeholders, such as EA institutions of engineers, engineers' registrations board, and contractors' registration board just to mention a few.

Figure 5 show another type of road hump with a flat-topped surface. This type of road hump are ideally for pedestrian crossing, and normally are found near schools or public places. The grade indicates the percentage of approach slope to the flat-topped surface in tune with vehicle approach speed.


Figure 5: Detailed design of flat-topped speed hump



Vehicle Speed (km/h)	Grade i (%)
25	12.5
30	10
35	7.5
40	6
45	5
50	4
55	3
60	2.5

Source: BICO (2012)

Figure 6: Detailed design of rumble strips



Source: BICO (2012)

Figure 6 shows the plan of rumble strips and cross section details of a strip. D stands for the distance between rumble strips in metre and the appropriate speed in km per hour at each

selected D. these strips as recommended by BICO has a passage at the shoulder of carriageway for cyclist and for rain water drainage.

15 Relationship between road agencies in EA countries

Mattli (1999 cited in Magu 2014:61) argue that the challenge of our time is not how to keep nations peacefully apart but how to bring them actively together through institutional co-operations such as Road agencies. Currently there is no visible co-operation between EA countries road agencies. Co-operation such as union of EA road agencies and annual meetings where issues of common interest like TCDs can be tabled and discussed. This was further stressed by TANROADS Engineers (Eng. Hosea Machaka and Eng. Najib Yahya) on 27 July 2015 through personal conversation.

16. Community support and participation

A successful traffic calming program must include; enforcement, education, engineering, and community involvement (Swanson et al1998:2). Community support and participation is an integral part of a successful traffic calming program (Ibid). If local residents are involved throughout EA countries under respective road agencies, the chance for problem resolution and a successful traffic calming program shall be greatly improved. Effective participation of local residents can be achieved by making local residential leaders as knowledgeable as possible on traffic engineering and enforcement principles through training and awareness program through media. Furthermore, road agencies in EA countries should come together to promote a road safety culture, again through public training and sensitizing.

17.Conclusion and recommendation

- There is a need for co-operation between road agency in EA countries, through doing things together in workshops and in the field. The co-operation can go further by forming association of road agencies and creating and sharing job opportunities. Co-operation should not end there, but should also involve local communities throughout EA countries, through excursions to note and share experiences.
- The survival of the co-operation between road agencies should not depend on interpersonal relationship between the political leaders rather on the institutional structures. Stresses should be placed on clearly spelled out legal framework and openness, where all involved benefit from such union.

- The harmonisation of guidelines on design, construction and maintenance of TCDs for EA countries should be detailed in the manual concerned to embrace all categories of TCDs and all stakeholders.
- For consistency, TCDs should be implemented only to address documented safety or traffic issues supported by a traffic engineering review and not based on politicians or local resident's desire.
- TCDs installed on urban areas should attract community support and involvement so as to increase awareness and creating an atmosphere of acceptance and ownership.
- TCDs are recommended only on location where the speed limit is 50 km/h or less, and are not appropriate where the 85th percentile is 70 km/h or more. Hence local studies are required to establish the appropriateness of the location before installation exercise commence.

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THE NEXUS OF DEMOCRACY, WOMEN EMPOWERMENT AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION: A SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE

N.J. Mokoele

University of Limpopo, South Africa

Abstract

The apartheid regime has bequeathed an inerasable dent of women disempowerment and marginalisation in the mind and hearts of most South African, and twenty one years of democracy, women's voice remain unheard. Twenty one years on, South Africa continue to present an unequal representation of women in planning, governance and labour market. The argument is based on pragmatic evidence that women's cumulative working time continues to outnumber that of men in most developing countries and South Africa is no exception. Despite the stereotypes, there has been an increase in women representation in South African government with the notion that they will be bias to policy that favour them. Twenty one years into democracy, vast number of women remains marginalised and the route to women empowerment remains dark and unachievable. The paper argues that gender integration in planning and governance is fundamental for development and foster the achievement of women empowerment and democracy. That was echoed by the message of the former President of the Republic of South Africa Nelson Mandela that, until women are emancipated from all form of oppression, freedom and fight against women disempowerment and poverty will remain a dark and unachievable and thus, connotes a faltering democratic system. Therefore, a holistic investigation of the nexus between gender discrimination and democracy is profound in accomplishing women empowerment. The paper concludes that women empowerment as a social phenomenon requires a social movement to address the underpinning predicaments that continue to disempower women.

Keywords: Democracy, Women Empowerment, Gender, Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment

1. Introduction

During the apartheid regime, South Africa was characterised by inequality, poverty, selective development initiatives, marginalisation of women and gender discrimination. The concept of development was used to marginalise the black majority and the maintenance of dominance by the white minority. Further, the cultural and traditional customs factors in the

manifestation of women disempowerment and marginalisation (Kalabamu, 2005). However, in the new democratic indulgence, the ruling party (African National Congress (ANC)) recognised the injustices induced by the National Party during the apartheid administration. In order for ANC as the ruling party to heal the past discriminations, it is imperative to foster participation of women in the development initiatives. However, the United Nation International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) held its conference in Cairo during September 1994 with the aim to integrate women empowerment with other global predicaments of population and environment in the development lexicon. Integrating gender in the mainstream of development has profound implications in the quest to women empowerment. Women empowerment is not only a burning issue in South Africa, but the global problem. Thus, a democratic state must present the principles of equality and empowerment (Bassiouni, 1998). Further, a democratic state that does not inculcate women's predicaments in the mainstream of development presages a faltering democracy.

It was stated that educating women does not only serve multifaceted purposes including empowerment, harbouring economic growth and the potentiality to mitigate poverty. This notion was echoed by the former President of the Republic of South Africa Nelson Mandela during the opening of the first democratic parliament that, until women are emancipated from all form of oppression, freedom and fight against poverty will remain the largest part unknown. The improved standard of living and women status are key component of a vibrant democracy that serve the needs of the previously marginalised citizens. The nexus of women empowerment and democracy is profound in questioning the praxis in improving women's status. The section that follows deals with the pieces of legislative enacted to promote gender equality (the Constitution of South Africa, 1996 and Employment Equity Act, 1998, Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act, 2003).

2. Legislative prescription governing gender equality

The adoption of the Constitution of South Africa (henceforth referred to as Constitution) 1996 was to correct and heal the past disunions concocted by the apartheid regime and to establish a society constructed on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights. Furthermore, chapter 2 of the Constitution section 9 (1) states that "everyone is equal before the law", and thus discourages unfair discrimination (Ndinda and Okeke-Ozodike, 2012). Through the Constitution, all the citizen of South Africa are afforded equal rights regardless of their gender, race and ethnicity (Sebola, 2009, Sebola and Khalo, 2010, Ndinda and Okeke-Ozodike, 2012). Consequently, the Constitution corrects all forms of inequalities and discrimination that women endured over the years by affording all citizens equality rights. The affordability of equality rights and equality before the

law presents an important avenue to improve the status of women. This affordability open the gates to witness the indulgence of democracy and women empowerment within the country. Furthermore, Sebola (2009) stated that the Bill of rights is the foundation of democracy in South Africa. South Africa's democracy is entrenched on the democratic value of human right, equality and freedom.

The introduction of the jurisprudence of Ubuntu by the constitutional court was to develop a fundamental right in terms of the cohesive values and ideas to an open democratic society (Keevy, 2009). According to Keevy (2009: 20), "Ubuntu is a shared value and ideal that runs like a golden thread across cultural lines" which is enshrined in section 35 of the Constitution. Ubuntu as enshrines in the Constitution is rooted on the principle of respect, humility and love amongst persons. Thus, the successful mainstreaming of Ubuntu in all citizens provides the potentiality to inculcate democracy into the South African populace. Despite the commitment of the government to empower women and deepen democracy through different pieces of legislations; tradition, culture and the hierarchical structures within households remain prominent factor the conditions the women disempowerment (Jewkes, Levin and Penn-Kekana, 2003, Kalabamu, 2005; Keevy, 2009), consequently presaging a subverting democracy (Tsheola, Ramonyai and Segage, 2014). This is echoed by Ramaphosa (1998), and Tsheola et al. (2014) who argue that unless democracy is applied to the lives of ordinary people, it will remain an indefinable and untested concept.

In order to affect democratic rights, Employment Equity Act (1998) was promulgated to afford everyone the right to fair labour practices regardless of gender and race. The Employment Equity Act, 1998 in its preamble recognises that as a result of South Africa's previous discriminatory policies and other discriminative legislations and practices, there are disparities in the employment occupation and income within the labour market (Sebola, 2009). Furthermore, it is stated in Employment Equity Act, 1998 that every employer must put steps that promote equality in the work place (Employment Equity Act, 1998). However, in order to improve women's participation in the labour market, Affirmative Action policy was enacted. Sebola (2009: 1106) stated that "the purpose of the Affirmative Action policy was to ensure that suitably 'qualified' people from the designated groups (women, African people and people with disabilities) have equal opportunities and are equally represented in all occupational categories and levels in the workplace of a designated employer". Regardless of the introduction of the Employment Equity Act, 1998 and Affirmative Action policy in the South African society, Sebola and Khalo, (2010) argued the not much has been achieved in terms of equality in the workplace, especially when focusing on the advancement of the designated groups into the labour market. This raises a concerning question about the

implementation and monitoring of policies within South Africa to eradicate the ramifications of the past apartheid regime. The promulgation of such policies and legislations connotes that the improvement of women's status within the labour market and households holds the potentiality to realise the deepening of democracy in South Africa. However, tradition plays an important role in uplifting and marginalising women.

The multiparty government was initially elected based on meritocracy in its ability to correct the prejudice and discriminations of the past administration. The ANC's commitment to increase the representation of women both in the labour market, governance, National Assembly and development planning created an avenue to deepening democracy. The commitment was further demonstrate when the ANC promulgated the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act, 2003 (BBBEE Act). Ndinda and Okeke-Ozodike (2012) stated that BBBEE is one of the most important legislative prescription in monitoring gender transformation. The objective of act can be achieved through the promotion of economic transformation to enable black people to own and manage old and new enterprises (bbbee, 2003). Section 2 (d) of BBBEE act aims to increase the extent to which black women own and manage existing and new enterprises to improve their economic opportunities and skills training. The improvement of women's accessibility of economic opportunities and skills training presents an important potentiality to empower them. With all these potentialities afforded to women, the question remains that twenty one years of democracy where is South Africa with regard to women empowerment. However, despite the "good" legislations, tradition and continue to obscure the achievement of gender equality particularly in rural areas.

3. Tradition and gender inequality in rural areas

The Constitution, 1996, Employment Equity Act, 1998, BBBEE, 2003 and other pieces of legislations have made a profound impact on women's representation at a macro level of the country. Post 1994, the implementation of Affirmation Action policy, South Africa has seen a vast increase of women in the labour market and as Members of Parliament. Thus, the commitment to redress gender discrimination has yielded positive results at a national level in terms of increasing the representation of women. The increase of women the in the labour market has the potential to empower women and poverty. Despite the achievements that came with the internationally celebrated legislative prescription in South Africa, much is still unknown about their impact on a micro scale of rural household (Villoro, 1998; Tsheola et al., 2014). The legislative prescription has failed to dislodge the traditional patriarchies that continue to disadvantage women within rural households. Even after 21 years of democracy, women are still marginalised in decision making. Despite the plethora of

legislative prescription the address gender equality, women are still not mainstreamed in decision making and planning. According to Bassiouni, (1998), the manifestation of women disempowerment and discrimination presages a subverting democracy. Women empowerment and poverty eradication becomes central components to a growing democracy.

The tribal meetings (kgoro) still condition the manifestation of gender discrimination in rural areas. Tribal meetings are convened to discuss the developmental trajectory of the village. However, the lack of women's engagement during development initiatives in rural areas makes the notion of resolving poverty and women disempowerment to remain a dream. The traditional patriarchies which manifested the marginalisation of women, remains a major challenge. Men are still the main decision maker within households and in the society. Thus, the legislative prescription failed to dismantle the patriarchies at a micro level scale of a household. Men's attitudes towards gender equality continue to be rampant in addressing the manifestation of poverty and women disempowerment in rural areas. The manifestation of gender discrimination that continues to disempower women regardless of the plethora of legislative prescripts within the country suggests that we are shooting at a wrong target. Gender discrimination, marginalisation of women, women disempowerment and gender inequality in rural areas are social phenomenon, thus require a social movement or revolution is addressing these social ills. The next section focuses on the challenges that continue to condition the manifestation of gender discrimination.

4. Challenges that perpetuate gender discrimination

It was stated in the introduction that, women have always been marginalised and discriminated by cultural, traditional customs and the apartheid regime. The inferiority complex that women are engulfed condition the perpetuation of gender inequality (Nna and Nyenke, 2005). In developing counties, women have always been viewed as household manager and not as pioneers in governance and developmental planning. Gendered discrimination in the labour market is rampant. The Employment Equity Commissions 10th Annual Report findings reflected on the underrepresentation of women in the senior management positions. This is due to the lack of attention towards gender transformation (Hicks and Segooa, 2011). Thus, the underrepresentation of women in the labour market poses a serious threat in the quest of empower them. The underrepresentation of women in the labour market connotes that bulwark of legislations underpinned by the Constitution, 1996 failed to demonstrate the pragmatic evidence of their "goodness" on the lives of the ordinary South Africans (Ramaphosa, 1998, Villoro, 1998; Tsheola et al., 2014).

Furthermore, women are still vulnerable to many kind of discrimination within households. The lack of women access to land resources hinders the improvement of quality of life within households. Kassie, Ndiritu and Stage, (2014) argue that female head household only access land indirectly through their male household member. This demonstrates that women are still exclusion and discriminated within households. Hicks and Segooa (2011) stated that despite the fact that women have benefited more from house subsidies, 90% of the land reform benefited men.

5. Nexus of women empowerment and democracy

In 1995, the Beijing platform of action signed by government in the commitment to inculcate gender perspective in all form of development initiatives to resolve women disempowerment. The Millennium Development Goals (MDG) adopted in 2000 by United Nations (UN) aims to achieve gender equality, women empowerment and eradication of poverty by 2015 (Kotze, 2009). Gender equality and women empowerment has always been on the MDGs since its inception during the Beijing conference on women (Kotze, 2009). The year 2015 is set as the year that checks the achievement of the MDGs. Despite the fact that South Africa has done well in improve the women in education, labour market and women in the top management (MDG report, 2013). Even after many years since the inception the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the implementation and the achievement of gender equality and women empowerment remain the largest part unknown. Since the inception of MDGs to date (2015), the achievement of women empowerment remains a goal yet to be seen. Thus, the United Nations shifted from MDGs to Sustainable Development Goals. The third MDG is to promote gender equality and empower women. Bearing in mind the women's vulnerability to poverty, it is imperative to inculcate women in the mainstream of development. The manifestation of gender inequality and women disempowerment demonstrates a faltering democracy.

Nna and Nyenke (2005:424) stated that "gender connotes the emotional and psychological attributes a given culture expects to coincide with physical maleness and females". Gender inequality emphasis gender difference between men and women and thus addresses the stigmatisation that connote women as inferior and weak (Nna and Nyenke, 2005). Thus, gender inequality in South Africa poses a serious challenge that the imposition of gender difference has detrimental reverberation in quest to achieve women empowerment and drastic reduction in poverty. However, if gender inequality, gendered discrimination and dismantling traditional customs are not dislodged from the grass root (within the households); women empowerment and democracy will remain theoretical concepts without any pragmatic evidence on the ground. However, it can be argued that the persistence of

gender inequality, women marginalisation, and women disempowerment connotes a new a form of apartheid.

Scholars argued that educating women within a country will not only promote economic improvement, but will address the social ill and help to resolve poverty in rural areas (Nna and Nyenke, 2005; Kotze, 2009; Hicks and Segooa, 2011). The improvement of literacy amongst women has always been a necessary condition to promote women empowerment. It can be stated that an educated nation is an empowered nation. The enrolment of women in basic education has been increasing over the years from 88.4% to 94.6% in 2002 and 2011 respectively (MDGs country report, 2013). The increment of women's enrolment in schools demonstrates that the cultural stereotypes that marginalised women in are dismantling. Education can play a profound role in dismantling the past traditional patriarchies that marginalised women for many decades. Furthermore, improved educational statues of women help them to compete with men at the same footing in the labour. Affirmative Action states that only suitable and qualified citizens from the designated groups should be prioritised in the labour market, thus, affording educated and skilled women with opportunities.


Political parties and politics are the engine in uplifting women status, deepen democracy and improve women empowerment in South Africa. There is notion that political parties can play a profound role to achieve gender equality and women empowerment irrespective of their geographic location (Nna and Nyenke, 2005; Shale, 2005). Political parties are the gateway to women's participation in government affair, policy formulation and implementation. The participation of women in political activities act as an avenue to dislodge the gender stereotypes that perpetuated women disempowerment and deepened poverty in developing countries. Dislodging the cultural and traditional barriers that marginalised women is paramount in achieving women empowerment in South Africa. The parties should be able to develop Real Avenue for women to take up leadership role. Thus, political parties play a critical role for women to participate in planning and policy formulation (Shale, 2005). The engagement of women in decision making has the potential to empower women and address the cultural stereotypes that perpetuate gender inequality and poverty in South Africa.

5.1 Women in politics

According to Shale (2005), political parties and government (Members of Parliament) should play a profound role in mainstreaming women into decision making. Thus, equal representation in leadership positions provides an avenue achieving women empowerment. Furthermore, women remain to be underrepresented in government, especially in the higher

managerial position, legislature and political parties (Nna and Nyenke, 2005; Shale, 2005). The limited influence of women during policy planning and implementation perpetuates subordination of women, gender inequality and women disempowerment (Nna and Nyenke, 2005). Figure 1 demonstrates the increasing representation of women in the National Assembly from 1994 to 2009. The improvement of women in the National Assembly serves multifaceted purposes in dismantling the predicaments that disempowered women for centuries. Figure 1 shows that in 2009, 44 % of the National Assembly was represented by women. The notion to increase women's representation was to deepen democracy and to influence policy the will help empower women. But the question remains: what is the impact of increasing women representation in the National Assembly on the lives of the ordinary women? Are women in the National Assembly influencing policy to their benefit or their goal of improving women status has changed? Twenty one years of democracy where are we now?

Figure 1: Proportion of women in the National Assembly by election years



Source: MDGs Country Report 2013

South Africa politics can play a very huge role during policy formulation. Thus, political parties that are gender sensitive can play a profound role in empowering women. The engagement of women in social dialogue helps dislodge the deep-rooted traditional and cultural stereotypes that marginalised women for centuries. Women's political participation has the potential to promote empower them (Shale, 2005). However, despite the role that politics can play a role to empower women, there is still an underrepresentation of women in government and many political parties. The ruling party promotes equal gender representation in government to empower women. Despite the commitment of the ruling party in promoting gender representation in government, during reshuffling, in most cases women are replaced by men (Shale, 2015). This connote that there is still male domination

in government which continue to marginalise women. Thus, women's voices are very limited during policy planning and implementation. A legislative framework is required that ensure equal gender representation in government and in political parties as a measure to promote women empowerment.

Gender integration creates a platform to empower women from the grass root. Gender integration ensures that the local community take ownership of the development that has been provided. The lack of gender integration during planning of service delivery derails the efforts to empower women. However, the radical feminism is opposed to the political and cultural discrimination of women considers this as the first and fundamental form of oppression and form of domination (Chant, 2006; Chant, 2009). Chant (2006) argues that the oppression of women will cease to exist through dismantling of the patriarchal structures within households by a revolution. This revolution actualised, a new society has to be constructed that will free women from exploitation, form of sexual obligation, cultural ideologies, colonial patriarchal structures and stereotypes that marginalised or trapped for many centuries (Chant, 2006). Consequently, women empowerment as a social phenomenon, requires a social movement the advocates the liberation of women. However, women are an untapped resource that can help in alleviating poverty in rural areas. The empowerment of women has the potential to eradicate poverty. This is due is the fact that they are affected by poverty more than man. Discrimination of women demonstrates subverting democracy. In that light, these shows that multifaceted challenges that South Africa have due to the marginalisation and discrimination of women. The past cultural and traditional ideologies disadvantaged women within households were imposed by men. The involvement of men in the revolution and social movement are of paramount importance to dislodge the colonial ideologies, patriarchal structures and stereotypes that trapped omen for many centuries.

5.2 Women in employment

South Africa has inherited a culture where are marginalised from labour force. The unremunerated work that women do within then households plays a crucial part role in order to enhance the quality of life for the family. Most developing countries like Nigeria, women are comfortable with the household chores and the certain functions that they have to do within the society. However, men have always taken advantage over women to exploit then within the household. Too many household responsibilities are undertaken by women while men do very little to help them (Kalabamu, 2005; Stier and Mandel, 2009). In many cases, women turned to combine both the remunerated and unremunerated work, thus impose a huge burden on them.

Table 1: Employees by sex, excluding agriculture, 1996–2010 (thousands)

Year	1996	1999	2005	2010	2012
Male	4 191	5 300	5 509	5 802	5 929
Fem	3 227	3 987	4 216	4 652	4 929
ale					
Fem	43%	43%	43%	44%	45%
ale share					

Source: MDGs Country Report 2013

The equal representation of both women and men in leadership positions is paramount in dismantling the traditional stereotypes and colonial ideologies about women. The improvement of women's representation in the labour present an important omen in empowering them. Table 1 presents the percentage of women share as employee excluding those in the agricultural sector in the period between 1996 and 2012. Table 1 show that women share of income in 1996, 1999, 2005, 2010 and 1012 were 43%, 43%, 43%, 44% and 45% respectively. The period between 1996 and 2005 show that the percentage of women's share of income has been stagnant at 43%. This shows that the advent of democracy in South Africa did not immediately yield the improvement in women standard in the labour market. However, despite the slight improvement over this period, majority of women continue to be paid less than their male counter parts. Figure 1 demonstrated the improvement in the women's representation in the National Assembly in order to affect policy formulation and empower women. Thus, twenty one years of celebrating democracy in South Africa, women remain underrepresented in labour market, national assemble and continue to be paid less than their male counter parts. The notion to achieve the women empowerment in 2015 remains pipe dream yet to be realised. The manifestation of underrepresentation of women, the labour market, National Assembly, share of the national income connotes a subverting democracy.

6. Conclusion

The paper concludes twenty years of democracy, South Africa has promulgated bulwark of legislative prescription in fighting discrimination and afford all citizens with equal rights. Regardless of the bulwark of legislations, South African continues to experience multifaceted challenges and the goal to achieve women empowerment remain unseen. The Constitution, 1996, Employment Equity Act, 1998 and BBBEE, 2003 are amongst other that tries to improve women representation and achieve women empowerment. Years into democracy, women remain underrepresented in both the labour market, National Assembly

and in planning. However, politics continue to play a pivotal role in improving women's status. The improvement of women in politics presents the potentiality to empower women. Despite this improvement, women continue to face multiple cultural predicaments in the quest to empowerment. Gender stereotypes and households patriarchies remain entrenched in the African households. Thus, the quest to empower women needs a social movement to challenge the existing status quo within the households. This is due to the fact that women empowerment as a social phenomenon requires a social movement to address it successfully.

Furthermore, cultural globalisation shows that the world is increasingly becoming similar. Globalisation plays a huge role in changing the gender role within society. Thus, globalisation is bringing a new world order where equality between men and women is important. The media influence in the society can have a profound impact in dislodging the gender roles from a young age. Furthermore, media can be used as an avenue to change gender role within households. However, the engagement of men and women in development initiatives is paramount in dismantling traditional customs.

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EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP PRACTICES IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN PUBLIC SECTOR: IMPLICATIONS FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE

N.S. Matsiliza

Cape Peninsula University of Technology, South Africa

Abstract

Leaders in public organisations are challenged to improve their performance in serving the interests and general welfare of people. Diverse scholars in various management fields have researched good and bad leadership styles and theories with little emphasis on the effectiveness of leaders in the public sector. This paper examines the extent to which leadership effectiveness can be observed in the public sector with the aim of identifying ways of improving governance. Transformational leadership is explored to help us to better understand the nature and character of public sector leadership in a changing environment. Leadership in the public sector is viewed in a different manner from leadership in the private sector: a higher expectation is placed on public leaders when it comes to how they behave and hold power. For the purposes of this study a qualitative approach was followed, and literature was reviewed using secondary data. The study reveals that the effectiveness of a leader should be based on different quadrants, such as ability to create a vision, strategic thinking, responsiveness, managing change, responsibility and accountability. The paper finally argues that effective leadership practice can lead to good governance. The findings and recommendations of this study can serve to contribute towards public sector leadership discourse.

Keywords: Leadership, Practice, Public sector, Good governance

1. Introduction

Africa needs leaders who believe in democracy, not simply as an electoral mechanism of gaining power, but as a means by which legitimate power is achieved, and responsibly and accountably exercised on behalf of the people. Elections are conducted in all African countries and elected leaders claim to represent the will of the people, fears and aspirations of the constituency, but they tend to ignore the needs of the people while in their daily exercise of power (Normore and Eber, 2013: 195). Africa needs leaders who respect and are respected, who trust and are trusted by those who elected them, and are thus secure and confident in their leadership.

Leadership practices in Africa have gone through a process of transformation from the reigns of autocracy and military rule to democratic and transformational practices. The few states that are striving for a democratic governance system are continually challenged in different spheres, namely political, social, cultural, economic and global factors. Very few countries have practised democracy in the public sector context; and, as a result, there are postulations that democracy is an ideal and not an absolute concept. However, an examination of the literature suggests that some key features that differentiate public sector leadership from private sector leadership are worth noting. One of the main challenges of the 21st century is the creation and advancement of effective public and non-profit organisations. By being effective, public agencies should be able to reach their goals and objectives without wasting public resources.

Effective managerial leadership is a crucial variable that leads to enhanced organisational productivity and improved organisational performance. Werner (2011:353) posits that effective leader seek out situations that desire change, does the right thing, and apply change through personal influence. A leadership focus also plays an integrating role among various human resource management components, including recruitment and selection, training and development, performance management, public service ethics, and succession planning. To evaluate and to participate effectively in organisations of the future requires a broad-based understanding of the political, philosophical and practical dimensions of public managerial leadership. Using a qualitative approach, this study cites various leadership theories and cases. The paper covers the following aspects: conceptualisation, theoretical framework, and effective leadership, implications for good governance, conclusions and recommendations.

2. Conceptual framework

2.1 Leadership and management

The performance of public agencies and departments are directly related to quality of leadership. In today's changing environment, organisations desire that most members of management possess, among other competencies, some leadership traits in order to improve performance and manage effectively and efficiently. There is already a considerable body of knowledge on leadership, and this knowledge can be applied productively to increase managerial effectiveness. However the systematic consideration of elements that constitute leadership and management has been transformed from its intellectual heritage of the nineteenth century to a self-conscious activity of the twenty first century. The concept of leadership has been explored differently in different fields of scholarship and is generally accepted as the process whereby one individual influences others to direct efforts and ability

willingly towards attaining defined sets of organisational goals (Nel, Werner, Haasbroek, Poisat, Sono and Schultz, 2008: 356). According to Kahn and Louw (2013: 69) leaders are expected to possess the ability to influence their subordinates, and improve people's competencies through training and skill development while motivating them to realise the institutional vision and strive to achieve the mission.

Management, on the other hand, is an activity that is about coping with a complexity of practices and procedures to make organisations, especially large organisations, work. Leadership is about setting direction and coping with changes in the organisation. Management and leadership can be applied, as processes, in different scenarios of an organisations, but they can be undertaken by a single person. Organisations can be managed completely by planning – in other words by setting goals and targets for the future and by formalising strategies for achieving plans (Werner, 2011: 353). By contrast, leading an organisation involves establishing direction and developing a vision for the future. Management achieves its goals by creating an organisational structure, allocating tasks to people and devising a system to implement tasks. Teelken, Ferlie & Dent (2012: 25) assert that the role of ideal managers may be associated with classical bureaucratic features such as:

- controlling the organisational resources that they do not own;
- using merit to appoint people in positions;
- considering salaries and permanency; and
- using written rules and procedures to govern the structure of organisations, with conception separated from execution.

However, the above management principles imply a rigid organisational structure with no room for leadership guidance. Similarly, the notion of a bureaucratic organisation with a rigid management approach is expected to be slow in responsiveness to change (Shafritz, Russel and Borick, 2011: 269). To alleviate fears of rigid bureaucratic approach, it is also imperative that public agencies explore the option of integrating management with leadership style in a transformative context. According to Christie (2010: 37), leadership is often a debated concept linked to various aspects portrayed through success rather than weakness. There certainly are examples of leaders who are controlling individuals, ineptly dealing with multifaceted issues and gaining support with limited moral obligations. In respect of moral obligation, leaders should be honest, open and transparent and be responsive to social and cultural demands of the constituencies they serve. They should uphold societal values, manage without any bias and be professional at all times (Schwella, 2015: 29). Leaders are

expected to show support to their followers, and consult them for advice that leads to decision making by also recognising the 'spirit of Ubuntu'.

Rogers and Reynolds (2003:58) assert that leadership and management should not be considered as a restrictive area in one of the manager's roles. Frontline managers have a role to lead, and they also look to their senior managers to provide leadership in their organization. However, integrating management with leading in public agencies can be complicated, especially when senior managers, who are supposed to be leading, are pressured to increase their own accountability and focus more on performance outcomes. Naidoo and Thani (2013: 1) assert that the South African democratic leadership and management in the public service are challenged by citizens to improve service delivery. Conservative managers that are against transformation may want to stick to some apartheid tactics of commanding instead of leading. Some will prefer delegation to avoid accountability. Conservative leadership and management styles always conflicts with transformative, participatory and adaptive leadership styles. On the other hand, conservative leaders are synonymous with coercive power; where those who get drunk with power can take the position to coercively summon subordinates to get things done.

Similarly, government pursuit of new public management and managerialism has been viewed as an attempt to augment performance where both management and leadership styles are crucial factors for change. Therefore today's leadership styles should be blended with management to enhance good governance (Naidoo & Thani, 2013). This implies that leaders are not only expected to have a constituency and followers, but also need to help followers to achieve their goals and to assist organisations to realise their missions (Werner, 2011: 365).

2.2 Governance

The concept of governance has been explored in different ways by various scholars in diverse fields. Heywood (2007: 6) has delineated the conceptual field of governance by asserting that it refers to various ways through which social life is coordinated. However, while governance can refer to a process that involves a wider range of actors than government, government refers to formal institutional processes that operate at the national level to make the law and maintain public order in the best interests of the general welfare of society (Schwella, 2015: 13). Tshiyoyo (2014: 134) asserts that governance also imply that a society has a major role to play in governance. The involvement of society cannot be ignored or underestimated especially on issues of sustainable development and governance. There is a strong network of governmental and non-governmental organisations engaging society in diverse interests such as sustainable development with many expectations of leaders to

drive the process. Wang, Wart and Lebrede (2014:362) are of the view that leaders for sustainability are involved in promoting an array of concrete environmental, economic, and social practices, over time, by a broad array of actors including council members, citizens, state legislators, and public administrators who ultimately have a variety of mutually supporting beneficial outcomes in communities. However, societies are not always able to identify the seriousness of socioeconomic and political issues affecting them until change agents from NGOs and socially active groups engage them on how to address those issues through sustainable development.

2.3 Research methodology

This study adopted a qualitative research methodology, using mainly secondary data. The researcher investigated the discourse and metaphors of leadership through critical discourse analysis. Critical discourse analysis is concerned with analysing the content modes of communication along the lines of structures and mechanisms, and investigating how social structures are reproduced or changed through the interaction between discourse and social practice. According to Bell (2014: 365), discourse analysis is an approach that is applied to forms of communication other than talk – and in this respect it is more flexible than conversational analysis. For the purposes of this study, secondary data was used including books, articles for accredited journals, policy documents and report. Literature review was conducted in order to analyse and understand effective leadership discourse in the public sector based on the real life situation (Brynard, Hannekom & Brynard 2014: 34). The fundamental question of this study is whether there is a relationship between the assumptions that underpin effective leadership and those that underlie the ideal principles for good governance in the public sector.

3. Theoretical framework

The relationship between leaders and followers can be understood in the context of transformational leadership discourse. In respect of transformational leaders, there is an idealised influence that implies that followers respect, admire and trust the leader and emulate his or her behaviour (Van Eeden, Cilliers & Van Deventer, 2008: 254). The theory of transformational leadership assumes that leaders have values and are committed to achieving their vision (and making sacrifices in this regard). On the other hand, transactional leadership involves social exchange where followers have to be rewarded for their work by leadership, based on merit and performance that is contingent on the fulfilment of the transaction. In this analysis of management, we can trace the early development of leadership in the new public service and in the aftermath of the New Public Management (NPM). By looking at the traits of leaders, their behaviour and skills, we can trace the

theoretical development of the idea of leadership through charismatic and early transformational leadership.

A leader in this context must set the right tone in giving direction, while managing change and transformation by positively influencing educational resource management, improving health standards and providing equal opportunity to all the citizens in the provision of public programmes. Hoffman (2013:558) contends that leadership theories unravel the relationship behaviour and performance in organisations. Transformational and charismatic leadership has an impact on followers. However, there is another spinoff of transformational leadership theory called authentic and ethical leadership. George (2010: xxxii) posits that authentic leaders are followed because they influence people while they remain truthful and genuine about who they are. In other words, they are not imitating a certain leaders, and they are relevant for the effectiveness of public agencies. Authentic transformational leaders motivate followers to work for transcendental goals that go beyond immediate self-interest. Transformational leaders therefore influence right-doing in the direction of self-development.

Warrilow (2012) identified the following components of transformational leadership style:

1. Charisma or idealised influence: the degree to which the leader behaves in admirable ways, and displays convictions and takes stands that cause followers to identify with the leader as one who has a clear set of values and acts as a role model for the followers.
2. Inspirational motivation: the degree to which the leader articulates a vision that appeals to and inspires the followers with optimism about future goals, and also imperative for the current tasks in hand.
3. Intellectual stimulation: the degree to which the leader challenges assumptions, stimulates and encourages creativity in the followers by providing a framework for followers to see how they connect to the leader, the organisation, each other, and the goal in such a way that they can creatively overcome any obstacles in the way of their mission.
4. Personal and individual attention: the degree to which the leader attends to each individual follower's needs and acts as a mentor or coach, and pays respect to and shows appreciation of the individual's contribution to the team. This fulfils and enhances each individual team member's need for self-fulfilment and self-worth, and in so doing inspires followers. Transformational leaders move followers to transcend their own self-interest for the good of the group, organisation, or country.

5. Table 1: Comparison of management and leadership

Management	Leadership
Produces order and consistency	Produces change and movement
Does planning and budgeting	Deals with vision building and strategising
Deals with organising and staffing	Sees to aligning people and communicating
Is responsible for controlling and problem solving	Is responsible for motivating and inspiring

Source: Adapted from Werner (2011)

4. Leadership effectiveness in the public sector

4.1 Creating a vision

Tracy (2010) identified a total of seven qualities of visionary leadership and, out of these, considered vision to be the most imperative. Public leaders can only drive organisational strategies and policies through projected future plans aligned to their vision. Rogers and Reynolds (2003) characterise a visionary leader as having a flexible orientation that can innovate and solicit resources while focusing on external environmental changes. Lazenby (2014: 260) agrees that vision is the building block of policy directives and strategic planning in public sector agencies. Leading and managing at the same time in the public sector is challenging and puts more pressure on leaders' roles and responsibilities. Notably, leaders need to adapt and cope while operating in a field with many pressing factors, such as political, economic and social challenges. Managing and leading without a vision in the public sector can be defined as a challenging task. The vision of leaders should provide a motivation to work and serve as a stepping stone to accountability towards the public.

In situations where executive directors of public agencies are also involved in policy-formulation, there is a great deal of merged commanding the roles and duties of leaders with quality managerial styles behaviours in delivering public services. A case in point, is the restructuring of the public enterprises like SAA, Transnet, Eskom and ISCOR, where visionary chief executive officers (CEOs) are required to apply both transformative management and leadership styles to achieve their key performance targets. Transformational leadership fits well with the idealised attributes of public sector leadership in the sense that the public service environment needs motivators and mentors to administer public affairs. A motivational leader will address the self-interest of the followers by exchanging rewards or recognition for cooperation and compliance during the performance management cycle. Avalio and Yammaino (2013: 44) are of the view that the more effective transactional relationships between the transformational leader and the followers is constructed and it can

often influence defined key performance requirements at work. In this regard, performance management can be used as a strategic tool, and not as a compliance mechanism only. One of the main purposes of a performance management system is to enable managers to evaluate and measure individual performance and productivity by, among others, clarifying the roles, responsibilities and expectations (Bass, 2006: 20). The leader gets things done by making, and fulfilling, promises of recognition, pay increases, and advancement for employees who perform well. By contrast, employees who do not do good work are penalised.

4.2 Responsiveness

Teelken et al. (2012: 28) assert that a typical public sector leader is one who focuses on social technology while managing change. Leaders are compelled to respond to social demands such as basic needs and service delivery. Public organisations are always influenced by macro environmental factors. Leaders need to possess adaptive skills and methods in order to manage change while adapting to the new ways of learning. Smith & De Cronje (2005: 24) assert that a crucial challenge for adaptive governance during periods of rapid change seems to be the mobilisation of social memory that will link the past and the present in order to avoid moral decay and the abuse of citizens' trust by public leaders. One of the high-order attributes needed to curb wrong-doings is the consideration of ethos by public leaders. Mafunisa and Kuye (2008: 421) agree that public servants must conduct themselves in an ethical and professional manner when they discharge their public duties. Similarly, Matshabaphala (2008: 245) is of the view that leaders in the public sector need to lead with improved cooperation and reward those who maintain moral standards.

4.3 Strategic thinking

Leaders can improve their leadership skills through thinking in improved ways. Strategic thinking and problem solving are two imperative aspects in public organisational management. Executive officers are responsible for the overall management of strategies in order to maintain business and realise objectives associated with the mission of the organisation. Strategic outcomes-oriented goals require competence in conducting strategic planning, policy management, control and budgeting in public service. In the complex climate of local government, managers cannot allow themselves to be chained to a horizontal mind-set defined by 'sideways' thinking (Malone, 2015: 9). According to Malone (2015: 8), thinking sideways can be regarded as a natural human tendency to stay within a thought that we find most comfortable. This study recommends that leaders must occasionally scan the environment in which they operate and consider present and future opportunities and risks in order to survive in the ever-changing public sector environment.

Public sector leaders should practise strategic thinking in order to achieve efficient and effective organisations. Managing change in an organisation is an intervention that involves the solving of problems. This implies that there should be a detected problem or a felt need to do something about a situation which is considered unsatisfactory. Dissatisfaction with the status quo and a search for reasons for the inadequacies of the current state are important. Problem solving is therefore about change.

4.4 Managing change

Public sector leaders should be in possession of strong managerial skills to manage change and transformation. A contingency plan of action including resources to support the plan is critical. A structure to support the change effort as well as implement, measure and evaluate the plan is paramount. Masilela and Mthiyane (2015: 46) assert that strong central executives are responsible for leading the planning and coordination of functions, while managing transformation. Change management means planning, organising, leading and controlling the perceived or real effects of the change phenomenon. While it may sometimes be difficult to predict accurately what tomorrow will bring, one knows for certain that tomorrow brings change. There must be best ways to manage change with best practices at an individual level. It is important to accept psychologically that change is inevitable, and that situations around us are changing just as we ourselves are changing. This awareness and predisposition to change is the first mental preparedness, change management best practice. This is so because it creates in us the readiness to change and negates any resistance to change by allowing us to maintain a positive attitude. It is important to celebrate and learn from the process and results, in order to celebrate the new way of doing things.

Embarking on a continuous improvement programme is imperative, especially in the area of service delivery (Matshabaphala, 2008). Leaders also manage personnel resources by creating the third condition for team effectiveness, namely an enabling structure. An enabling structure is created through the manner in which work is designed, the promotion of core norms of conduct, and the way team composition is organised.

4.5 Responsibility and accountability

Responsibility and accountability are crucial attributes of a leader in the public sector. Public sector leaders are obligated to be answerable for their actions and the decisions they make while discharging their duties. There are several prescripts and legal rules that enforce accountability, as provided by the South African Constitution (Act 108 of 1996). Mafunisa and Kuye (2008: 421) argue that the complexity and the growing size of public agencies has

complicated the enforcement of accountability measures in South Africa. Leadership in the public sector is intertwined with responsibility and accountability that influence a particular pattern of governance designed to increase the likelihood that leaders serve the people. Mthiyane and Masilela (2014: 65) argue that public agencies are led by bureaucrats who are responsible, not just for implementation, but also for making policy decisions. They further observe that, within agency roles, executive power relations and politics have been the central focus during the Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma administrations in South Africa.

Using the case of the Presidency (SA) as the locus of power, this study argues that it is the role of the Presidency to provide strategic guidance, while having explicit systems of adaptation and strategic leadership. Responsible leaders sometimes operate through governance processes open to people they serve, usually through opening political competition, broadening legitimate public participation and establishing legal principles and practices which limit the capacity of rulers to subvert these developments. Khan and Louw (2013: 70) agree with the idea that leadership should be regarded as responsible rather than a rank or privilege. Leaders should be responsible and accountable not only to their selves but also to their constituencies without shifting the blame to others when they have performed less. Typical policy flaws are examples of limited and lack of caution on responsibilities and accountability, as in the case of the discontinuation of the Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP) as a short-lived experiment. Another example is a sign of political inconsistency in the ruling party during the re-call of President Mbeki.

5. Implications for good governance

Many scholars have paid attention to issues of governance abroad and in South Africa. Governance is portrayed by the interaction of multiple influential actors such as government, the business sector, non-governmental organisations and communities. Leaders representing these actors in governance should hold various competencies and skills that assist them in being effective and strive for good governance. Effectiveness refers to the extent to which government is able to achieve its objectives (Schwella, 2015: 27). Notable effective leadership is needed to uphold principles of good governance. Schwella (2015: 26) asserts that good governance is associated with effective institutions and constitutionalism, while bad governance seems to thrive under conditions of arbitrariness and authoritarianism. Good governance principles are observed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (1997) as:

a) Participation: This principle promotes the inclusion of all people either through direct participation or representation in structures. This notion of participation can be built as a human rights issue and through freedom of speech.

- b) Rule of law: This refers to a system of rules and legal prescripts of human rights that are applied uniformly and fairly to the citizens.
- c) Transparency: This means information must be accessible to those who are concerned and affected.
- d) Responsiveness: Responsible persons in governance, such as leaders, must attempt to listen to the needs of stakeholders and serve them.
- e) A consensus orientation: This principle speaks to the ideal situation that stakeholders must be properly consulted and also that a broad consensus must be reached.
- e) Equity: This principle aims at promoting the ideal that people must be provided with an opportunity to improve their well-being.
- f) Effectiveness and efficiency: This principle implies that organisations must provide results and deliver without any waste of resources.
- g) Accountability: This principle requires that actors in governance must be answerable for their actions.
- i) Strategic vision: This requires leaders and managers to commit themselves to a long-term perspective and human development.

There is a connection between the proposed attributes and skills of effective leadership and the principles of good governance listed above. If public leaders can focus on being effective, these principles of good governance can be transferred from the realm of the ideal to reality. Different executive roles which implies that governance structures such as the Presidency, cabinet, agencies have focused more on governance issues aligned to transformational roles, such as their responsibilities, adaptive skills, strategic imperatives and performance. However, governance structures in South Africa have been impacted by factors such as globalisation, economic downturn and trade and national realities. South Africa has witnessed the forces of change in the post-apartheid era during the Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma administrations.

The proposed effective leadership principles can be applied to reinvent South African governance structures with prospects of moving in the desired direction towards good governance. Whereas the South African government displayed good and disappointing codes of governance in the post-apartheid era, the country was rated in the fourth place in 2014 for improving governance by the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) (Ibrahim Index Report, 2014). This recognition for improving governance is a motivating factor for

South Africa and other African states. However, much has to be done by public agencies to achieve their objectives while simultaneously aspiring to practise good governance. The Ibrahim Index of African Governance measures the governance of countries in a number of categories such as rule of law, accountability, security and safety, national security, public participation, human rights and gender equality.

6. Conclusion and recommendations

This paper examined the extent to which leadership effectiveness can be observed in the public sector with the intention of improving governance. It was noted that qualities of effective leadership, as portrayed by public leaders for creating a vision with a powerful drive for success and to attain their true potential in responding to the needs of the constituency, focus on strategic thinking and decision making, and being responsible and answerable for their actions. Leadership effectiveness can also assist public sector to practise principles of good governance. The suggested practice for leadership effectiveness is the one that encompass integrative and transformational leadership, visionary leaders, responsiveness, strategic thinking, responsibility and accountability. This study recommends that public agencies should be fully transformed in order to install effective leadership, while simultaneously adapting to the changing environment. However, the proposed effective leadership can also be used as a vehicle towards the practice of good governance. At the moment good governance seem to be purely a dream that can be attained if we exclude corruption. As it stands now, African states including Southern Africa are battling with amelioration of leadership while fighting corruption. However, in many developing states societies are challenged with corruption and this is fighting the means of effective management and good governance. In the overall, this study concludes by affirming that there is a relationship between the assumptions that underpin effective leadership and those that underlie the ideal principles for good governance in the public sector. This study recommends that the suggested effective practice should be understood and be inculcated in public service at the best interests of the public without contravening constitutional and public law.

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CONTRIBUTION OF TOWNSHIP IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS FOR GENERATING INCOME AND SAFETY NET FOR LOW-INCOME NATIVE HOUSEHOLDS

A. Xoyane

Z.I. Mantenta

W.N. Mofokeng

L.B. Mzini

North West University, South Africa

Abstract

Does migrant entrepreneurship benefit the low-income household? This question has conflicting arguments between the households and the government of South Africa. This paper assesses the contribution of migrant entrepreneurship for improving income generation in the low-income households. It also evaluate whether migrant entrepreneurs generate income and safety net for low-income native households. Data is obtained by means of a qualitative research to comprehend the impact of the migrant entrepreneurs. Semi-structured interviews were conducted in the Emfuleni Local Municipality (ELM) administrative office and with 25 migrant entrepreneurs renting space in local households in Boipatong, Bophelong, Sebokeng and Sharpeville. The key findings of the study indicate that the booming informal township trade dominated by foreign nations has led to poverty reduction, job creation, skills transfer and opportunities of income generation for previously disadvantaged township communities. However, trade regulations, laws and policies need to be revisited, revised and redeveloped to better suit the incorporation of informal trade into the formal trade economic sector.

Keywords:Immigrant entrepreneur, Income generation, Safety net, Spaza shop

1. Introduction

Does immigrant entrepreneurship benefit the low-income household? This question has conflicting arguments between the households and the government of South Africa. This paper assesses the contribution of immigrant entrepreneurship for improving income generation of the low-income households in the townships of the Emfuleni Local Municipality. Immigrants have high rates of entrepreneurship relative to native-born citizens. Such business ventures require immigrants to obtain support to gain access to capital. However, access to capital seems to be a major constraint to all aspiring entrepreneurs. Lack of capital access has channelled immigrant entrepreneurs to operate their businesses

by renting a room or by erecting a container in the host households. The business ventures undertaken in a township incorporate: manufacturing (carpentry), retail (spaza shops) and hair and beauty businesses. Furthermore, the business ventures have raised media attention as migrants have been accused of stealing the jobs of South Africans, in an economy which had a high unemployment rate. The sections below describe the methodology undertaken for gathering data. The following concepts are discussed, namely: immigrant entrepreneur, income generation and safety net. A brief overview of immigrant entrepreneurship is also discussed. The last part presents the findings of the study undertaken by reporting the experiences of the traders, community members and the municipality.

2. Research methods

A qualitative research was used for this study to collect data in the locale of the ELM. In terms of the theoretical part of the study, literature review on migrant entrepreneurs and low-income households was conducted using the previously published work on the topic. This included sources such as journal articles, municipal reports, desktop research and university library. The researchers also visited both municipal offices to gain more insight on the study. A questionnaire was designed and distributed to a sample comprising 25 participants of the immigrant entrepreneurs. A questionnaire was used to obtain qualitative data from 25 foreign traders renting spaces to low-income native households in the ELM. The participants were selected from four townships falling under the administrative office of Emfuleni Local municipality, namely: Bophelong, Boipatong, Sharpeville and Sebokeng (Zone 17). Semi-structured interviews were conducted with the Local Economic Development (LED) unit in the ELM. The researchers' observation also enhanced a better understanding of the research study while conducting qualitative data through sampling, questionnaires and interviews. Photographic images were captured to showcase the study undertaken.

3. Conceptualisation

This section provides a briefly provides a background about the concepts immigrant entrepreneurs, income generation, the meaning of safety net and spaza shop.

3.1 *Immigrant entrepreneur*

Migration management in South Africa is guided primarily by the Refugees Act (1998) and the Immigration Act (2002, amended in 2004) and has also been integrated in several key policy working documents in the past two years. Immigrant entrepreneurialism

emerged around 1970; and in 1980 the concept re-emerged as a popular topic in the social sciences, researchers began to pay particular attention to the role of immigrants in terms of the economy (Gag & Payne, 2014:61). An entrepreneur is someone who discovers market needs and launches a new firm to meet those needs (Moore, Petty, Policy & Longenecker, and 2010:5). Most immigrants come from the SADC countries (Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe) and are attracted by Johannesburg. Zimbabweans are the largest group of non-nationals residing in South Africa, and their number is estimated at 2 million, including both regular and irregular migrants (Gindrey, 2010).

Rettab (2001:17) indicates that immigrant entrepreneurs consist of two types of migrants, namely: the first-generation group and the second-generation group. The first-generation group consists of traditional immigrants who were directly recruited for employment reasons. They were employed in the mines, hotels and as professionals. The second-generation group consists of young dependants born and got educated in the host country. The second generation is also characterised by refugees who attained status to live in the host country. Guler (2005:4) further identifies the two factors that promote recruitment into entrepreneurial activities among immigrants. Firstly, it is the situational constraints immigrants are confronted with, such as the political instability, food insecurity and wars in the country of origin. Secondly, immigrant entrepreneur is caused by lack of resources as they fled from their country of origin. The increasing number of immigrant-owned businesses in Gauteng leads to increased attention on immigrant entrepreneurship. Immigrant businesses are established to serve as a safety-net and for income generation among low-income households.

3.2 Income generation

The term income generation was used only by economists to explain the intricacies of a nation's economy. But currently the concept is used quite widely to cover a range of productive activities by people in the community. Such people are the foreign nationals. In the context of poverty the term is associated with obtaining money for promoting livelihoods. Such income may be acquired in different forms. Firstly, income generation is used to measurable the value on the goods and services people produce. Secondly, income may be generated by astute investment of existing resources. Thirdly, skills may be applied whereby a person is employed as a gardener and afterwards the person receiving a service will pay the service provider (UNESCO, 1993:3).

Income generation is critical to women's empowerment and independence. Income Generation interventions attempt to address poverty, unemployment, and lack of economic opportunities to increase participants' ability to generate income and secure livelihoods. The third form of income generation is witnessed by the day-labourers who are seen in the street corners of the suburban areas with boards written "Painter or Carpenter". Most of the day-labourers are immigrants and they are skilled in vocational skills. Income generation forms part of the safety net for vulnerable communities.

3.3 Safety net

The safety net is a term used to describe a condition which prevents individuals from falling into poverty beyond a certain level. Safety nets are provided for improving food security. A safety net can be unemployment benefit; healthcare; homeless shelters and welfare services (Devereux, 2002:657). In South Africa, safety net programmes are developed as part of the broader social protection agenda, aimed to address risks, vulnerability and social exclusion. They also help prevent them from adopting damaging coping strategies and depleting their assets (Devereux, Sabates-Wheeler, Guenther, Dorward, Poulton & Al-Hassan, 2008). In South Africa, social grants have been created a safety net for poor South Africans whereby an amount of R240, 00 is provided for children with unemployed parents. The following are examples of safety net instruments, namely: cash transfer or food vouchers, food distribution in kind; universal food subsidy; and employment-based safety nets (Food and Agriculture Organisation, 2011). These are offered by government to low-income households such as the indigent households, child headed households, the elderly and the disabled communities (Chebelyon-Dalizu, Garbowitz, Hause and Thomas, 2010).

3.4 Spaza shop

Spaza shops form part of South Africa's large informal economy that mainly result from lack access to formal employment or lack of skills, education and qualifications for formal jobs. These types of retail businesses are mainly home-based, operate long hours and provide household items such as bread, airtime, beverages (milk, soft drinks) to local residents at very low price. Hence community members prefer them for accessibility and affordability

4. Immigrant entrepreneurs' context in southern Africa

The discussion originates from role played by immigrant entrepreneurs in the townships. The discussion is motivated by the current state of conflict fuelled by xenophobic

attitudes in South Africa. Immigrant entrepreneurs operate as street traders whilst some rents a space in the townships in the local low-income households. The authors looked at the immigrant entrepreneurs operating in the townships. Allie (2014) announced that the past five years has seen a new wave of traders from mainly Bangladesh and to a lesser extent countries like Pakistan, Egypt and Ethiopia – trying to squeeze into what has become an increasingly competitive market. South Africa has been a magnet for immigration in recent years, with many of those coming to Africa's second-largest economy to set up small family businesses in bustling townships (Allie, 2014). The study conducted by the researchers at the University of Western Cape's Political Science Department and the non-profit organisation Sustainable Livelihoods Foundation indicates that eight urban sites studied between 2010 and 2013 showed that nearly 50% of spaza shops were operated by foreign entrepreneurs (Allie, 2014). Immigrants use their renowned trading skills to establish the spaza shops. Most of these trading's run in a small grocery shops and are operated in the crime-ridden areas. African immigrants have been met with and exposed to severe manifestations of hostility to their presence in South Africa (Kalitanyi & Visser, 2010:377), although their businesses are not welcomed in the township.

5. Findings: Responses from the participants

The sections below provide a summary of the interviews conducted in the ELM, with the immigrant entrepreneurs and the ELM. The details of the immigrant entrepreneurs are reported in Table 1. The section is followed by the responses from the municipality.

5.1 Characteristics of participants

Table 1 presents the summary of the selected respondents interviewed within the three townships of the ELM. The field work noticed that there is domination of young immigrant traders from Ethiopia followed by Mozambicans, whilst the Bangladeshi and Somalia are the least groups interviewed. Immigrant entrepreneurship is managed by males as compared to female traders and that is witnessed in the streets of South Africa. It is very rare where one can pinpoint the couple of the groups presented in this study. In most cases, the husbands immigrate to South Africa to seek for work, whereas their spouses and children remain in their home countries in order to nature the family. The money earned from the business is then sent home to their dependents. The opportunity for them to be accepted in the township business enables them to ensure that they work very hard and save enough money to send back home. The participants reported that their intention to seek economic security and participation in South Africa is related to the political instability in their country of origin. Throughout the interviews it was found that the participants lacked opportunity to enter higher education since most of them do not have legal documents to enter the higher

education sector. Such barriers allow them to resort to immigrant entrepreneurship. However, most obtain employment from their existing network, since their network is broad as compared to the native communities.

Table 1. Demographic profile of migrant entrepreneurs (N=25)

Value label	Number of participants	Percentage %
Gender		
Males	24	96%
Females	1	4%
Age		
18-25	16	64%
26-35	9	36%
Marital status		
Single	24	96%
Married	1	1%
Place of Origin		
Ethiopians	13	52%
Mozambicans	8	32%
Somalis	2	8%
Bangladeshi	2	8%
Level of Education		
Primary	5	20%
Secondary	20	80%
Years of residence in ELM		
Less than 1 year to 5 years	9	36%
More than 5 years	16	64%

Based on the interviews conducted 70% of immigrant entrepreneurs have been operating for only less than 5 years with 68% being retail and 32% personal care (hair salons). Most of these informal businesses are home-based and owners pay rent to local people offering them trading spaces. Their target market is mainly community members from low-income households and 68% immigrant trades offer their customers lower prices, starting from as low as less than R5 to not more than R70. Moreover, more than 95% operate from dusk till dawn, all seven days of the week and throughout the month. This means more affordability, convenience and accessibility for their target market. The businesses also generate income and safety nets for low-income households by paying rent for their businesses.

5.2 The Municipal Responses

The authors of this paper take into account the role of the municipality in a quest to help improve the economic, social and environmental well-being of its communities and their citizens. Municipalities are required to establish a legislative, planning and policy framework that supports sustainable development in its communities. Furthermore, municipalities are

required to promote and participate in strategic partnerships with private sector and non-government organizations. ELM was asked if there are policies and laws that regulate immigrant traders in the municipality. It was found that the municipality has the policies and laws that regulate immigrant traders, however, the municipality struggles to implement due to lack of enforcements caused by unregistered immigrant traders. The municipality was asked if it is aware of the lease contracts between the locals and foreign traders. The response indicated that the municipality is aware “to a little extent”; however, some leases are done with the municipality through those who are eligible to trade, whereas some are done directly with private parties or individuals.

In the public debates over state immigration reform, sufficient and accurate information about the tax contributions of undocumented immigrants is often lacking (Gardner, Johnson & Wiehe, 2015:1). The ELM was asked to identify the details of the foreign owned businesses. The municipality indicated that it does not have the exact data since most of the foreign owned businesses are not registered with THE South African Revenue Services (SARS) and with the municipality informal trader’s data base. However, it was indicated that there is less than 20% of the registrations received. Most of the businesses are operated informally in the townships, and the majority are in the informal business operating in the spaza shops and hair salon business. Another question posed to the municipality inquired about the impact of immigration on the growth, poverty and GDP of the ELM. The response indicated that there is a negative impact as many of immigrant household do not pay or contribute towards the municipal services provided to them. Mostly, rent in the backyards and operate illegally and their businesses are not registered.

A follow-up question posed to the municipality inquired about the implications of township foreign traders on the ELM labour market. The response given indicated that the immigrant business contributes less on job creation as most of the jobs created are not accounted for in the SARS and in the Department of Labour. It was also indicated that the income generated by immigrant businesses is not banked in accordance to the terms of the banking association in South Africa. The municipality was asked if it developed regulations for foreign owned spaza shops, salons in the townships. The ELM response indicated that it use policies such as town planning schemes (Land use management) and municipal By-laws to grant or refuse the applications. The role of the Municipality is to regulate the space or area at which the businesses are conducted. In terms of the trading spaces, it was reported that the Building Control approves all applications and inspects structures and usage of buildings. The spaza and salons in the township areas are also regulated under the same legislation. Regrettably, it was noted that the structures at which the foreigners conduct businesses do not follow compliance requirements.

Mostly, it is indicated through media that the immigrants steal houses from the locals. So, the municipality was asked if it has measures developed to protect the local people from losing their property (stands and houses) to foreign traders. It was reported that the municipality receive complaints about such incidents and that the municipality struggles to assist directly as there is no proof of the transactions. However, an intergovernmental relationship exist whereby the municipality reports the matter to the municipal courts to summon and close such illegal business in order to maintain law and order and to protect legitimate local businesses. In terms of building control all applications are required to have a Title Deed and with that, the business must be registered under the owner of the property.

6. Contribution: Immigrant effects to low-income households

In a society, there are structural barriers that can prevent immigrant entrepreneurs from competing with the local residents on an equal basis. Some of these immigrants are pushed into self-employment. The study conducted by Vinogradov and Elam (2010:360) showed that lack of employment may push immigrants toward self-employment. Self-employment refers to working for oneself instead of an employer and drawing income from a trade or business one personally operates (Nestorowicz, 2011:3). The main question for this study was to discover whether the immigrant entrepreneurship benefit the low-income household. The growing number of the immigrant entrepreneurs plays a substantial role in today's economy and in the employment market and they are becoming the engine of economic development in every society throughout the world (Quyen, 2013:5). Over the last decade, African immigrants have been met with and exposed to severe manifestations of hostility to their presence in South Africa.

A significant number of these migrants have successfully applied their entrepreneurial flair in establishing small enterprises and employing workers, often to the envy of their local counterparts (Garg & Phayane, 2014:62). This indicates a vital role played by migrant entrepreneurs in job creation and poverty alleviation. The contributions of immigrant entrepreneurs to low-income native household can be described according to the different indicators. In this paper the authors identified the following indicators, namely: income generation through monthly rentals; skills transfer, job creation and employment opportunity; poverty reduction; provision of credit to local customers; convenience; accessibility; and availability of necessary everyday-used products. The respective indicators are discussed below.

6.1 Poverty reduction and Income generation through monthly rentals

Globally, many mechanisms have been devised for reducing poverty and protecting food security such as agricultural insurance, offering temporary employment opportunities on public works programmes, giving food aid or cash transfers to targeted individuals or households (Devereux, 2015:2). However, such interventions take time and community members become impatient and opt for easy money activities within the informal sector, by selling snacks, cold drink and sweets in their households and street corners. Immigrant entrepreneurship is seen as a strong tool for escaping poverty. It also promotes social integration whereby skills are transferred to those without education or technical skills.

Revenue generation is another role of entrepreneurship (Kalitanyi & Visser, 2010:379). The study found that the local landlords have profited greatly from the steep increase in rent brought about by immigrant entrepreneurs in the households and in the township shopping centres. Income Generating initiatives are like a bridge between two islands (UNESCO, 1993:4). Income generation interventions address poverty that is why it is considered a structural determinant. The income generated helps to provide economic empowerment to participants. The income generated also builds social capital among the low-income households. Garg and Phayane (2014:62) indicate that the African immigrant entrepreneurs from Nigeria and Senegal prefer to employ South Africans. In the context of immigrant entrepreneurship, income generation can be associated with social protection which seeks to promote food security among the low-income household by:

- stabilising incomes: mitigating seasonal stress, managing risk and insuring against shocks;
- raising incomes: promoting agriculture and enhancing rural livelihoods; and
- enhancing social justice: empowering poor farmers, pastoralists and landless labourers (Devereux, 2015:2).

6.2 Skills transfer, job creation and employment opportunity

Immigrant entrepreneurship has become an important socio-economic phenomenon, as it plays a critical role in economic development. It creates jobs through new business ventures that contribute to wealth creation in the country. Job creation is a formidable challenge for the South African government (Kalitanyi & Visser, 2010:376). Immigrant entrepreneurship in the US creates new wealth and jobs (Garg & Phayane, 2014:61). The interviews conducted confirm that many immigrants create employment not only for themselves but also for South Africans. Local communities are employed in the salons as

hairstylist and as office managers. It was found that job retention is lacking in these sectors as it is characterised by low income earned. So employees last for less than a year.

Entrepreneurial activity is a prerequisite for the success of economic growth, development, social well-being, job creation and political stability in a country (Botha, Fairer-Wessels & Lubbe, 2006). These entrepreneurs have aided economic recovery by fostering commerce and economy (Garg & Phayane, 2014:61). It was also indicated that these sectors transfer skills, but the developed skills always create new businesses and this does not sustain the small sector; as there is duplication of businesses in the location. Evidence of multiple immigrant shops is seen in the streets of the ELM and around South African municipalities.

6.3 Provision of credit to local customers; convenience and accessibility

Fluctuations in food supplies or prices magnify food insecurity in poor and vulnerable households (Devereux, 2015:2). Township immigrant entrepreneurs come into place as they are able to offer credit to the locals which the large retail shops cannot afford. In terms of convenience, most of the immigrants work a punishing 16-hour day, seven days a week, and most have a mattress and washing facilities in a modestly furnished room attached to the shop.

6.4 Availability of necessary everyday used products and affordability in terms of lower prizes

In order to meet with this increase in demand for consumer goods and services there must be an increase in entrepreneurs who are willing to supply these goods and services to satisfy the general public (Manyi, 2010). Entrepreneurship plays an important role in today's economy and the employment market and becomes the engine of economic and social development throughout the world (Constant & Zimmermann, 2006:279). It also creates technical and innovation changes, thus encourages economic growth (Quyen, 2013:5). Studies on immigrant entrepreneurship, in both the USA and Europe, have recognised the significant contribution of immigrants to SMME activities as they have a direct impact on a host economy (Garg & Phayane, 2014:63).

They are regarded as risk takers. Immigrant entrepreneurs target markets that are abandoned or neglected by local entrepreneurs and large chain stores. For example the study conducted by Wong and Primecz (2011:69) found that in Budapest, Chinese entrepreneurs had significantly contributed to the development of local markets, and also filled the gaps in local markets with much sought-after goods. This is the case with in the

ELM; immigrant entrepreneurs have also vacated unused spaces in town and in the locations. In Sebokeng Zone 14 a Shoprite retail shop was burnt down in 2010, and that left a gap to the community, and the community had to catch a taxi to purchase their household items.

Immigrant entrepreneurship also brings about an increase in the purchasing power in many communities in South Africa. This was also witnessed with the Chinese business migrants in Hungary (Garg & Phayane, 2014:63). Their existence has created investment opportunities in the townships. In the ELM there are six shopping complexes built, namely: The Evaton, Palm Springs, Thabong Malls; Sebokeng Plaza and Mandela Square Plaza and the Sharpeville complex. These complexes started being small but today they are highly renovated just like the suburban malls. Such shops attract community members as they sell contemporary clothes and the current clothing. Their shops attract access to low-income households as there are cheaper consumer items. Immigrant entrepreneurs are also investors (Rath, 2006:6). They often occupy business premises that would otherwise have been left vacant, thus providing the owners of the premises with a return on their asset (Garg & Phayane, 2014:66). It was also found that the individual incomes of informal workers are often low, cumulatively their activities contribute significantly to gross domestic product (GDP) (Crush, Skinner, and Chikanda, 2015:11). Gauteng is the leading province in terms of the number of SMMEs in both the formal and informal sectors. This clearly shows that SMMEs are really taking a lead in business enterprises in the country.

7. Criticism

A notable characteristic of these immigrant entrepreneurs is their willingness to take risks (Garg & Phayane, 2014:61). The study conducted by Liedeman, Charman, Piper and Petersen (2013:1) stated that there has been a decline of South African spaza shops since 2005 and claims that this is caused by fierce competition between South African spaza operators and businesses that are run by immigrants. There are few studies that have considered the extent to which immigrants contribute to job creation in South Africa. Such studies could help to change the negative perceptions about immigrants held by some South Africans, many of whom believe that immigrants take the jobs that should be done by South Africans (Kalitanyi & Visser, 2010:388).

Local shop owners have complained about the influx of immigrant competitors who they say have impacted on their trade. Local spaza owners always complained that their business has suffered since the immigrant entrepreneurs took over in the townships (Allie,

2014). Other complaints captured that the local businesses has been slow since the foreigners started opening up as they keep their prices low. They are able to keep their prices down because they group together and this enables them to buy at lower prices when they stock their merchandise (Allie, 2014).

8. Conclusion

Through qualitative research study, this paper has assessed the critical role of small informal economic practices by immigrant traders in the South African local economic development. Key findings indicate that the booming informal township trade dominated by foreign nations has led to poverty reduction, employment, job creation, skills transfer and opportunities of income generation for previously disadvantaged township communities. However, trade regulations, laws and policies need to be revisited, revised and redeveloped to better suit the incorporation of informal trade into the formal trade economic sector.

The study found that immigrant entrepreneurship is now a particularly significant element of the changing economy and landscape of the throughout South Africa and the ELM and the inner-city of the City of Johannesburg is no exception. The importance of immigrant entrepreneurship is not different from the non-immigrant entrepreneurship in an economy. They both provide economic importance in a given country. However, it can be confirmed that immigrant businesses make important contributions to the economy. The economic importance of immigrant entrepreneurship is the creation of new jobs. The creation of a new business has gone a long way to create jobs among immigrant and the general society as a whole. Their presence in the township has been an increase in the quantity and quality of goods and services produced. The goods and services offered are also enjoyed by community mainly because of the reasonable prices and it is convenient. The respective businesses also contribute to combating social exclusion and improving the living standards of disadvantaged groups in host townships. Lack of business skills transfer among the generations has led to discontinuation of family businesses and the trading spaces remained abandoned. The emergence of immigrant entrepreneurship in the township led to revitalising abandoned office space and local markets by supplying new products and services at competitive prices.

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THE DECLINE IN AGRICULTURAL EFFICACY: LIVELIHOOD DIVERSIFICATION AS AN OPTIMUM STRATEGY FOR ATTAINING LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; SOUTH AFRICAN RURAL CONTEXT

S.M. Maake

University of Limpopo, South Africa

Abstract

Purpose of this paper is to ascertain whether the mushrooming local informal businesses are indispensable to the people at the local level with regard to attainment of Local Economic Development (LED) in peculiar. The paper perorates by arguing that for an LED to accomplish sustainable rural development; local government should extend its support towards supporting emerging enterprises and promote land reform for a sustainable agricultural development. Fewer rural households are currently depending on land and natural resources to work, survive and improving living standards than it was the case 50 years ago. Earnestly, agricultural activities have played a pivotal role in food security and income growth in rural areas. However, there is a clear perpetual diminishment in agricultural productivity and outputs. The decline is as a result of erratic climatic conditions, limited agricultural opportunities, as well as high rate of migration especially of potential work force from rural to urban areas. Consequently, rural people tend to explore other opportunities in order to supplement agricultural earnings as a means to improve their living conditions. Methodologically, the paper is theoretically arguing that attaining Local Economic Development (LED); creation of employment opportunities, rural entrepreneurship, alleviate income poverty, and mobilization of local resources; livelihood diversification should be considered and promoted as an optimum strategy at the grassroots. Livelihood diversification entails the process whereby rural people construct diverse portfolio of livelihood activities concurrently in order to raise their standard of living. Concomitantly, these livelihood sources range from activities which are purely agricultural and overlapping non-farm activities such as remittances, social welfare, and entrepreneurial growth of small businesses. Pithily, the paper reveals that achieving livelihood diversification is largely predetermined by adequate and concrete infrastructural development in rural areas having nostalgically considered prospects and challenges of livelihood diversification.

Keywords: Local Economic Development, Livelihood Diversification, Sustainable Agricultural Development, Rural Infrastructure Development

1. Introduction

It is undoubtedly clear that agricultural activities have and still plays a crucial role in ensuring food security and income generation. Policy makers have been perpetually faced with a conundrum in respect of formulating comprehensive approaches which meant to alleviate food insecurity and hunger in developing countries (Senadza, 2014). Counter to the challenge, most rural dwellers opt to construct diverse portfolios of livelihood activities ranging from on-farm and non-farm concomitantly. This strategy of livelihood diversification has been embraced greatly especially within developing countries in endeavor to overwhelm socio-economic issues at the local level (Ellis, 2000; 2011). Agriculture has immensely discerned to be one of the main sources of livelihood in South Africa, particularly in rural areas. However, it is plagued with various problems which convolute the trajectory for living and income growth (Ambimbola & Oluwakemi, 2013). As a consequent of agricultural problems such as soil infertility, erratic climatic conditions, limited agricultural activities and seasonality among others, rural people start to heed on non-farm livelihood strategies such as local trades, repairs, traditional healing and social grants in an attempt to transform their socio-economic status. Clearly, fewer rural households have currently depending on land natural resources to work, survive and improve their living standard than it was 50 years ago (Senadza, 2014). In other words, agriculture, which was heavily renowned to be major source of income in rural household, is gradually decline as a result of emerging challenges faced by the agricultural sector.

It is against this background that the attainment of LED in South Africa should be fostered in rural areas through encouraging local resource mobilization and local enterprise. Scott (2012) attested that the accomplishment of LED in developing countries is determined by the potentials and ability of local people to engage into rural entrepreneurship and local resource mobilization. Thus, livelihood diversification as an optimum strategy should be spurred amongst rural people through rural entrepreneurship, which is believed to be renowned in the contemporary society. Moreover, entrepreneurship is believed to have the ability to create job opportunities that are sustainable. Therefore, with rural entrepreneurship in the vicinity, sustainable development will be achieved in South Africa (Scott, 2012). On the contrary, livelihood diversification could be seen as a controversial rural development strategy in South Africa largely because is being believed to be, inciting the rampant gap between the rich and the poor (Cinner & Bodin, 2010). According to Jacobs & Makaudze (2012), the disparities between the rich and poor has greatly a consequent of unfair distribution of assets as well as the slow pace of redistributive land reform programme in the South African democratic dispensation. Notwithstanding the denounces, It is worth noting that despite near-consensus on the potential of diversification in increasing rural incomes

and improving socio-economic standard holistically, most rural development studies have been confined to exploring the common diversification patterns and determinants in rural areas with limited attention to the actual impact of such strategies on food security (Kantor, 2009).

In United States of America's Rural Economic Development Centre is discerned to be one of the few organizations which encourage entrepreneurship in rural areas. The institute is indispensable for supporting self-employment as a source of income and jobs in rural areas. Moreover, it develops relationships and support system for rural entrepreneurship as economic development (Scott, 2012). Rural entrepreneurship appears to be a hopeful socio-economic strategy for local people and attainment of economic development. In order to control the 'brain drain' philosophy and rural urban migration, it is assumed that owning a micro-enterprise may be one of the only ways to allow people to stay local (Scott, 2012; Madzivhandila, 2014). One of the challenges faced by rural dwellers the inability to access credit facilities to start-up businesses (Vilks, 2014). Livelihood diversification has been discerned to be an optimum strategy for LED in South Africa with specific reference to rural entrepreneurship (Saunders, 2014). It is however significant to consider the fact that sustainability of rural entrepreneurship is contingent upon improved infrastructure in the vicinity. It is a controversial point that rural settings are spontaneously characterised by infrastructural inadequacy in developing countries (Ellis, 2011). Through literature review, the paper reveals how to secure livelihoods through rural entrepreneurship strategy which still lacks necessary support for sustainability especially on women in the rural communities. Furthermore, the paper demonstrates the trajectory to be conformed in order to attain livelihood diversification with immense attention on the approaches of entrepreneurship. Indispensably, there will be clear depiction of prospects and challenges of livelihood diversification and rural entrepreneurship. Subsequently, the paper seeks to ascertain whether these ever mushrooming local informal businesses are indispensable towards enhancing socio-economic standard in rural areas.

2. Agricultural decline in African rural communities

Two decades into a democratic dispensation after the apartheid regime ended; redistributive land reforms have neither reversed nor secured sustainable livelihoods for resource-poor farmers and farm workers in South Africa (Jacobs & Makaudze, 2012). Controversially, agriculture remains one of the main sources of living in rural settings of Nigeria (Ambimbola & Oluwakemi, 2013). Among other factors, lack of agricultural arable land or soil infertility, erratic climatic conditions, infrastructural inadequacy, declining agricultural market opportunities and failure of land reform, heavily exacerbate the

deterioration in agricultural practices by rural society (Ambimbola & Oluwakemi, 2013; Senadza, 2014). Notwithstanding a fact that agricultural sector account to approximately 20 % of the economy, there is a vivid decline in agricultural dependence with specific reference to securing means of living in developing economies including South Africa (Jacobs & Makaudze, 2013). The deterioration of agriculture in rural communities generally spurs the practice of livelihood diversification as business imitative which are believed to contribute to the accomplishment of LED in South Africa. LED encourages local people to engage into vibrant and feasible livelihood strategies for socio-economic transformation. Essentially, LED stimulates local people to improve their living standard through taking advantage of available local resources (Senadza, 2014).

A prevalent perception that, the means of living in rural areas are heavily contingent upon agricultural activities is gradually fading away in most developing countries (Babatunde & Qaim, 2009). Jacobs & Makaudze (2012) have corroborated that there is a clear and observable decline in farm-based livelihoods especially in underdeveloped countries within Africa, Asia and Latin America, albeit at a slower and/ or faster pace. According to Jones (2008), as the basic source of livelihood and employment, agriculture often fails to ensure revenues comparable to incomes from other type of work. Therefore, development of rural area must not rely on agriculture alone, but should involve the stimulation of entrepreneurship in other areas of business. Conversely, one could agree that decline in agricultural significance showcase a visible livelihoods trajectory in which most rural people in Africa are obliged to conform to the practice of livelihood diversification (Saunders, 2014). A number of rural development orthodoxies have also highlighted that many rural households across the developing world diversify their income portfolio, which basically means they do not earn income solely from farm sources but rather combine their farming activities with at least one off-farm activity (Babatunde & Qaim, 2009; Senadza, 2014). Thus, the traditional view that rural economies are purely agricultural is then deemed obsolete. It is therefore significant to note that rural areas do not disregard the significance of agriculture yet considering other better opportunities outside the agricultural environment (Babatunde & Qaim, 2009). Therefore, this raises a controversial question as to why agriculture diminishes its value or rather starting to face a firm counterpart? Controversially, livelihood diversification has been a renowned living strategy in the post-apartheid epoch South Africa.

The conceptual literature has clearly depicted that most African countries have failed to meet to meet the requirements for a successful agricultural revolution, and productivity in agriculture lags far behind the rest of the world. Given this statement, it is upon rural individuals and household to ensure that seek better opportunities outside agriculture in order to solve especially a general issue of food insecurity (Ellis, 2011; Jacobs & Makaudze,

2012; Ambimbola & Oluwakemi, 2013, Saunders, 2014). Considering the decline in agriculture, the paper seeks to reveal how to achieve economic development through encouraging rural entrepreneurship at local level. Rural entrepreneurship strategy is deemed important largely because reduces the workload of the state in creating job opportunities and alleviate income poverty in most relative households within rural areas (Le & Raven, 2015).

3 Exploring Livelihood diversification in South Africa

Livelihood diversification is defined as process by which rural families construct a diverse portfolio of activities and social support capabilities in their struggle for survival and in order to improve their standard of living (Ellis, 2011). A livelihood encompasses income, both cash and in kind, as well as the social institutions (kin, family, compound, and village), gender relations and property rights required to support and sustain a given standard of living. In other words, livelihood diversification could be regarded as a way of poverty relieving strategy and an action to generate income in the household by taking advantage of available resources. In accordance to the poor rural areas in Europe and Africa, the studies conducted by Ellis (2000) corroborated that livelihood diversification can be an alternative to improve living conditions in these areas. Therefore, rural development can no longer be based only on traditional agricultural activities for manifold motives including income generation and also take into cognisance the arduous effort from non-farm activities “Diversification among rural households is mainly influenced by differences in resource endowments such as land, labour, capital including access to markets and institutions” (Barrett, Reardon & Webb, 2001:326). The practice of livelihood diversification is well informed by ability and access to resources within the household.

Literature revealed that households may have similar endowments and opportunities but do not always select the same portfolio of activities. According to Barret, Bezuneh, Clay & Reardon (2005), although rural households pursue different types of livelihood strategies, some households are able to access more remunerative strategies than others. Some households depend entirely on their own farm for income, while others are able to source income from a combination of income earning activities. Differences occur in preferences for income, consumption, wealth and status and risk in addition to subjective elements such as enterprise styles. However, a household's ability to adopt more profitable diversification strategies is also determined by it having the skills, location, capital and social connections to pursue other related activities (Hussein & Routray, 2012; Senadza, 2014).

Notwithstanding infrastructural inadequacy, household endowment and other necessary pre-requisites, rural household are incredibly stimulated to practice livelihood

diversification with specific cognisance to its potential towards income-poverty reduction (Ellis, 2011). Livelihood diversification can, however, become essential and effective through the selection of actual strategies by a household with immense consideration based on some of the factors explained below. Diversification may be used as a risk management and survival strategy in instances where the absence of markets compels self-provision of some goods and services by households (Hussain & Routray, 2012). Furthermore, diversification of labour activities and income is largely determined by the absence of markets. It is therefore important to pay immense attention on access to market as a determinant. Apart from income augmentation, numerous studies have also indicated that where physical access to markets is costly and causes product markets failures, households construct livelihood diversification in order to satisfy own demand for diversity in consumption. Moreover, “earnings from diversification where access to credit is non-existent can be able to overwhelm relative capital impediments, purchasing power, equipment improvements on one’s farm” (Barrett et al., 2001:321). Being adjacent to urban markets may widen opportunities for diversification into rural non-farm activities such as peri-urban areas where possibilities exist for earnings from commuting (Jones, 2008). However, it should not be disregarded that in some cases, closeness to urban areas further incites high competition from factory-made substitutes sold in rural market centres. This may lessen the extent to which rural households can diversify (Ellis, 2011).

Moreover, climate variability has an impact upon farm production particularly for smallholder farmers (King, 2008). Persistent diminishing returns from agriculture which threaten income may prompt household to practice livelihood diversification (Madzivhandila, 2014). This implies that a key motivation for diversification is environmental uncertainty in relation to erratic rainfall or drought which makes diversification “a form of self-insurance” (Barrett et al., 2001:322). This basically implies that the decision to diversify may also be driven by the need to cope with climatic variability or extreme weather patterns such as drought. Diversification is therefore discerned as a natural response to climatic risk and transactions costs in lower potential agricultural areas (Haggblade, Hazell & Reardon, 2007). In instances where crops fail or livestock die, households respond by reallocating labour to other pursuits such as formal employment, off-farm and informal employment off-farm. Ellis (2011) revealed that off-farm employment provides cash income in labour earnings and grant those with rural non-farm incomes superior coping capacity.

Notwithstanding diversification is a natural response to climatic risk evidence, non-farm activity is relatively high in areas of better-than-average agricultural productivity, which underscores the importance of taking into consideration intersectoral linkages (Ellis, 2000; 2011). Depending on the context, this implies that non-farm livelihood diversification maybe

exercised to complement farming activities instead of replacing thereof. Climate variability has dual impacts on the process of diversifying (Haggblade et al., 2007). This means that the variation may drive households towards conducting diversification or rather precludes from it (Ellis, 2011). The availability of assets such as savings, land, labour, education, access to market or employment opportunities and other public goods can be seen as a primary factor in determining a household's capability to diversify (Cinner & Bodin, 2010). Furthermore, opportunities to diversity vary among households with differences in resource endowments such as land, labour, capital and access to markets and institutions playing a central role in the extent to which diversification occurs (Barrett et al., 2001). The extent of diversification in the household portfolio of activities is determined not only by asset portfolios but also having the necessary skills, location, capital, credit and social connections to pursue other activities (Hussein & Routray, 2012; Vilks, 2014). Consideration should also be given to how assets can be complemented, given that some of assets are only effective if combined with others (Barrett et al., 2001:318; Ambimbola et al., 2014).

Diversification may also be carried out as a coping response to the loss of capital assets needed for undertaking conventional on-farm production (Harris & Gibson, 2008). Consequently, households face a decrease in terms of availability of arable land, increased producer/consumer ratio, credit delinquency and environmental deterioration; diversification can be an immediate response (Madzivhandila, 2014). The choices that people employ regarding the use of their asset portfolio in pursuing income, security, wellbeing or other productive and reproductive goals define their livelihoods. A study by Webb & Block (2001) on diversification revealed that level of assets owned such as livestock ownership is positively and significantly associated with income diversification, even controlling for level of income in developing countries. Assets are not only an essential factor of production representing the capacity of the household to diversify but indicators of improved household income (Saunders, 2014). Rural entrepreneurship appears to be a nascent strategy to alleviate income-poverty in rural economies.

4 Push and pull factors of livelihood diversification

Livelihood diversification is carried out for the purpose of coping against insufficiency. In other words, rural household diversify their livelihoods in cases whereby there is a failure in harvest owing to drought or pests, loss of a job or rather a need to pay emergency bills. Fundamentally, diversification of livelihoods may be undertaken as an ex-post (after the event) coping response to shortcomings in other activities (Ellis, 1998; 2000; 2011). Some diversified activities may build on exiting skills, experience and information. For example, home-based work complements domestic chores. Ellis (2000) elucidated that some rural

households diverse their livelihood activities for the purpose of changing new activities with higher returns so to be incremental particularly if the new occupation is untested. The new activity is adopted as an addition to the household portfolio rather than a substitute for existing activities (Niehof, 2004; Ellis, 1998). Succinctly, some households in developing countries engage into livelihood diversification due to seasonality. Ellis (2000) clearly avowed that crop farming, some gathering, and making crafts for festivals are seasonal activities. Therefore, in the off-seasons, such diversified activities provide a way to use labour and other resources and to earn income (Ellis, 2000).

Accomplishing sustainable livelihood diversification has always been one of the ambitions in democratic South Africa. There has been an increasing awareness that livelihood diversification plays a strategic role in rural livelihoods systems and households (Niehof, 2004). According to Barret et al. (2001), livelihood diversification has now deemed as a norm and people collect their income from variety of livelihood sources. “Livelihood diversification may be associated with success at achieving livelihood security under improving social and economic conditions” (Ellis, 1998: 2). Literature has depicted manifold reasons why many rural people engage into livelihood diversification. According to Ellis (2011), rural people practice livelihoods for many reasons such as dealing with risk and uncertainty. The process of spreading activities across several sectors helps to pervade risk and manage uncertainty. For instance, farmers may decide to produce a range of crops rather than specializing in just the most profitable one (Niehof, 2004). Moreover, diversification is a reflection of rural poor household’s coping and managing the risks and uncertainty (Ellis, 1998).

5 Rural entrepreneurial approaches to livelihoods

Rural entrepreneurship refers to an action within which a business opportunity is discovered and exploited within rural setting (Le & Raven, 2015). In fact, numerous scholars and orthodoxies have identified alertness to opportunities as the essential factor defining rural entrepreneurship (Barret et al., 2005; Babatunde & Qaim, 2009; Ellis, 2011). In essence, an opportunity entrepreneur is someone who decides, with little provocation, to set up a business, in some cases by giving up their position as a paid employee. A necessity entrepreneur, on the other hand, refers to someone who engages in entrepreneurship because no other (or better) external sources of income are readily available (Vilks, 2014). Studies have shown that women’s participation in the labour market has increased in most developing countries. Current study by Le & Raven (2015) revealed that women entrepreneurship development is becoming a focal point of rural development. Their study has corroborated that entrepreneurship education has higher effects among Master of

Business Administration (MBA) female than male students respectively. Given the background, their focus on impact of curricula to build self-efficacy in potential female entrepreneurs has shown that pedagogical approaches need to be tailored to the specific entrepreneurial motivations by gender.

Women's increased participation in the work force and subsequent higher engagement in entrepreneurial activities has turned the attention of researchers toward female entrepreneurship and its effect on national economies (Vilks, 2014). Regardless of gender disparities, rural entrepreneurship should be fostered among rural communities in order to accomplish economic development. The literature reveals that supplementary sources of income are needed because farming activities often do not generate full-time employment for all family members, nor sufficient household income (Kantor, 2009). Furthermore, the current lack of attention to the needs of women-owned business across developing countries is limiting their growth potential especially in rural areas where resources are constrained (Le & Raven, 2015).

As one of the entrepreneurial approaches, microfinance plays a pivotal role in encouraging small businesses development in rural economies. Conspicuously, lack of credit facilities remains one of the factors weakens decision to engage into rural entrepreneurship. Scott (2012) avowed that women empowerment, particularly in rural areas, is a way out of poverty circle but having no access to start-up resources remains a stumbling block of rural entrepreneurship. One method for encouraging entrepreneurial and small businesses in developing countries has been through micro-financing (Le& Raven, 2015). Several studies have concluded helps to bring poor people out of poverty trap, although not all (King, 2008; Scott, 2012, Senadza, 2014). Makina & Malobola (2004) found that micro financing was especially beneficial for women-owned businesses in rural areas where programs have been targeted. Although it has helped many people in rural areas in starting up their businesses, micro financing has a limited effect on empowering women in particular, creating upward mobility, and contributing to long-term economic growth (Le & Raven, 2015). Generally, micro financing has positive influence on the social capital and normative influence especially in facilitating holistic empowerment.

Social capital can be regarded as a network and cohesion which prevails among people in the locality (Makina & Malobola, 2004). It provides a clear channel and platform for rural people to interact as well as to encourage entrepreneurship at local level (Makina & Malobola, 2004; Saunders, 2014). By thus doing, there is a clear opportunity for attaining sustainable economic development in the local setting. Self-help groups have been identified through literature as part of entrepreneurial approaches to livelihoods (Scott, 2012; Le &

Raven, 2015). Self-help groups have been studied as a way to increase chances to improve the living standard of rural people. They are deemed fundamental largely because are thought to increase mutual trust, a spirit of thrift, group cohesiveness among other attributes (Le & Raven, 2015). It has further attested that self-helps groups have been empirically found to increase socio-economic status in most developing economies. Consequently, self-help groups give rural people an opportunity to unequivocally articulate their business ideas when engaged into social capitals. Economic ties among members, the structure of the group network and women's participation in group meetings contribute collective action in promoting social capital and normative influence. Moreover, self-groups are found to be important especially in developing communication skills in rural areas. According to Ellis (2011) improving communication skills was related to better access to banks, to become successful micro-entrepreneurs. It is certainly significant as an emerging rural entrepreneur to be self-reliant in order to achieve sustainable economic development in local areas (Senadza, 2014).

Most rural communities are characterized by traditional norms and beliefs which in most cases compromise the rights of women (Kantor, 2009). Literature reveals that women, children and disabled people are mostly socially excluded groups and, this affects their participation in local economic development (Kantor, 2009; Ellis, 2000). According to Le & Raven (2015), many traditional societies tend to be male-dominated, especially in the work force and with deteriorating economic conditions; most women are seeking employment in rural areas. Noticeably, businesses that may have been unavailable for women in the past are now more accessible as a consequent of changing attitudes and greater availability of capital. In respect of study by Harris & Gibson (2008), the gender gap in entrepreneurship may be closing, however, there are differences between men and women entrepreneurs wherein most of women entrepreneurs are found to be risk averse than were men comparatively.

6 Local Economic Development in Rural South Africa

In many areas of the world, the reality of economic conundrum has persuaded a search for locally driven and innovative growth alternatives, which are referred to in the literature as LED (Binns & Nell, 2012). This epitomize that LED has been driven by a need to bring about economic transformation in most developing economies particularly in rural areas. The key features of LED are that it solicit to encourage economic growth at local level as well as to exhort people to diversify the local economic base into sectors that are usually wholly different from those which recent hardships has been experienced (Haggblade et al., 2007). In respect of the current devolution of authority and development leadership in South

Africa, the local government is obliged to seek innovative growth options to address developmental backlog and plug the employment gap that more traditional economic sectors seem unable to do. It is therefore in this context that LED, though local resource mobilization, is recognized by the government as a key vehicle for bringing about economic transformation and poverty alleviation (Binns & Nell, 2012; Le & Raven, 2015).

In the South African context, local action and LED, specifically, have been fostered by range of government policy documents, parliament acts and Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) in order to empower previously marginalized communities. In order to energize LED in South Africa, there has to be a firm enforcement of public works programmes which accounts to approximately 80 percent of the jurisdictional relative population (Saunders, 2014). Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) should be seen as a capacity building strategy especially for people in the vicinity so that can acquire skills which will be beneficial even after project completion. In other words, the program should employ people who come from the jurisdictional body or rather the municipality. Furthermore, the attainment of economic development in local areas should be determent by the arduous effort of local procurement as well as promotion of small-business strategies. Therefore, South Africa has to encourage livelihood diversification at local level with a specific reference to rural entrepreneurship which is believed to be an emerging livelihood strategy to generate income in developing countries (Scott, 2013; Senadza, 2014).

Local procurement and promotion of small-business strategies diminish the government's work load due to the fact that local people employ each other in case of well improving businesses (Scott, 2013). Energizing LED in South Africa involves extending support to both formal and informal business in local areas by the government. The support should entail the process of opening access to credit facilities in order that people can be able to manage their businesses financially. Additionally, the government should exert their effort in the encouragement of tourism based development in local areas. The literature concur that tourism-based development in areas seeking to restructure their economies is an important theme in academic discourse (Binns & Nel, 2012). Within South Africa, in addition to longstanding popular tourist destination such as Kruger National Park, the Garden Route and Cape Town, a wide range of other localities are now seeking to drive development through tourism promotion, often as an explicit part of their LED programmes (Binns & Nel, 2012).. Such interventions tend to have a community or pro-poor focus. An emerging trend is that local authorities, who are now regarded by national government as the champions' and deliverers of LED, are undertaking a 'set of programmes designed to make their areas more exciting or attractive places for purposes of consumption, entertainment (Binns & Nell, 2002). In South Africa, the potential of tourism to revitalize local economies at a crucial time

in the country's history has been seized upon by many local authorities and stakeholder groups who wish to use it as an LED strategy to create jobs and refocus their local economies (Jones, 2008).

7 Conclusion

LED will be a dynamic socio-economic strategy should agriculture be facilitated wholly with other potential rural entrepreneurship activities that are deemed to be imperative in the attainment of rural income augmentation and employment. Notwithstanding tremendous decline in agricultural productivity and outputs, on-farm activities continue to be an engine in the livelihoods of rural communities given arduous effort to accomplish land reform in South Africa. It has been realized that the slow pace of land reform programme retards the achievement of sustainable economic development particularly in rural areas of South Africa. The paper superficially revealed that relative African countries have failed to meet to meet the requirements for a successful agricultural revolution, and productivity in agriculture lags far behind the rest of the world. It could be recommended that for rural entrepreneurship to grow and become successful there has to be intensive intervention which enables the poor to overcome entry barriers and participate more in aspects of the rural non-farm economy. Conspicuously, training programmes and access to credit facilities are some obvious interventions and success to this is heavily contingent upon a maximum investment, state policy, regulation and co-ordination. In essence, there should be a clear spread of rural financial institutions that are self-sustaining on the basis of savings and loans organized according to conventional banking criteria.

Despite associated with manifold challenges, livelihood diversification through promotion of local small businesses could be perceived as prospective vehicle into the attainment of economic development and growth in rural areas. Entrepreneurship widens up the opportunity for rural people to escape persistent income poverty. Immense attention upon entrepreneurship as a strategy for LED revitalizes rural setting in a sustainable manner. Although it cannot be anticipated to drive the rural economy in a short run, there are niche markets to exploit which can provide opportunities that will benefit its growth through targeted interventions such as reduction of import duties, corporate taxes, administrative and bureaucratic requirements as well as improved communication and transport infrastructure. Clearly, some of these services can create business opportunities for people to engage in and also provide enabling environment in order that other business can grow in rural areas. This paper recommend that infrastructure development, training, information sharing should be central in the promotion of rural entrepreneurship. Moreover, LED can be met through encouraging optimal use of local resource as well as promotion of tourism development.

Lastly, socio-economic transformation in rural areas is an embryo to the encouragement of women and physically handicapped personnel to engage into entrepreneurship due to the fact that are chiefly skeptical to poverty conundrum in the local level.

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PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES IN SOUTH AFRICA: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES

K.I. Theletsane

Stellenbosch University, South Africa

Abstract

There is an ongoing debate in South Africa regarding the best practice and regulation of the activities of private security companies due to their involvement in policing activities. This is because these companies, although private, are involved in policing activities and yet are not subjected to the same regulations as the state police (The South African Police Service). Although the South African private security industry is well regulated by an Act of Parliament, there is no proper formal monitoring oversight body, unlike the South African Police Services with three oversight bodies and the South African National Defence Force with four oversight bodies. This lack of oversight has raised questions about the proper control of private policing in South Africa. This paper examines the activities of private security companies in South Africa and considers the extent to which they are regulated. The paper concludes that there is generally a lack of oversight and proposes that the government should introduce mechanisms to regulate private security companies.

Keywords: Private security companies, Oversight, Private security industry regulation authority, South African national Defence Force

1. Introduction

Given the scarcity of resources in South Africa, the state is not in a position to protect both national and private resources. With a high crime rate and rapidly increasing insecurity, South Africans are using private security companies (PSCs) to protect themselves and their assets. There are approximately 487 058 registered private security guards (PSIRA Report, 2014), almost double the 270,000 armed statutory forces, namely the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) with 78 707 personnel (DoD Annual Report, 2014) and the South African Police Service with 197 842 (SAPS, Annual report 2014). South Africa is among the countries with the highest number of private security companies.

It is thus obvious that on a daily basis the public is more likely to come into contact with private security than with SAPS officers (Minnaar & Mistry, 2004). South Africa is not unique in the use of private security. Globally, the private security industry has grown significantly; however, the growth of private security companies in South Africa has outstripped other countries. This is not surprising given the high crime rate in the country and

the public loss of confidence in the policing system. Although it is true that private security can and does fill certain vacuums, private security can never replace the public police in totality, as they have very different objectives. The aim of the public police is to protect the interests of the community and the state, whereas private security is profit driven. Private security is concerned with protecting the interests of the client in the best possible way. The bottom line is that PSCs are in business and they will only continue to provide a service as long as they are being paid. The government and civil society are concerned about the effective regulation of the industry. The aim of this paper is to address these concerns and the challenges of the industry in question.

2. Legislative framework

Private security companies are regulated by three key pieces of legislation: the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, the Firearms Control Act, 2000 (Act 60 of 2000) (FACA) and the Private Security Industry Regulation Act, 2001 (Act 56 of 2001) (PSIR Act). The PSIR Act establishes provisions for PSCs and serves as the founding legislation to establish a regulatory authority to oversee the execution and implementation of the Act. This regulatory authority is known as the Private Security Regulatory Authority (PSIRA) and aims to regulate the private security industry and to exercise effective control over the practice of the occupation (Section 3 of the PSIR Act). The mandate of PSIRA is to promote a professional, efficient and accountable private security sector, including:

- the authorisation of all licences for private security service providers and training service providers;
- compliance monitoring of all PSIRA-accredited bodies (security and training providers); and
- record keeping of all PSIRA-accredited bodies in a register (PSIRA Annual Report, 2014).

In terms of Section 6 of PSIR Act, this regulatory authority is governed by a five-person council, the chairperson, the vice-chairperson, and three additional councillors appointed by and accountable to the Minister of Police. All members will be appointed by the Minister of Police in consultation with the cabinet. PSIRA is a statutory body that is governed by its legislation and is required to report to parliament annually. PSIRA has drafted a binding code of conduct for security service providers (Code of Conduct for Security Service Providers 8(6)).

The PSIRA Act falls short of outlining the responsibilities of the council towards the Minister of Police. The Act is also not clear about the responsibilities of government regarding these

private security companies and, most importantly, there are no guidelines as to their use of force, nor any accountability mechanisms.

The regulation of PSCs is not unique to South Africa. The activities and functions of private security companies are regulated in most countries. The regulatory framework for the private security industry has become more extensive in many parts of the world. South Africa, as a developmental state, has legislation governing the security industry, both statutory and non-statutory. Every country is responsible for ensuring that domestic legislation protects both national and that security interests.

Section 199 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, (hereafter, the Constitution) states that the security services of the Republic consist of a single defence force, a single police service and any intelligence services established in terms of the Constitution. Section 199 (1) of the Constitution further states that the Defence Force is the only lawful military force in South Africa. Other than the security services established in terms of the Constitution, armed organisations or services may be established only in terms of national legislation. The Constitution further requires that the security services must be structured and regulated by national legislation and these security services must act, and must teach and require their members to act, in accordance with the Constitution and the law, including customary international law and international agreements binding on the Republic. In support of the Constitution, the Private Security Industry Regulation Act was established. This Act seeks to regulate the private security industry and exercise effective control over the activities of security service providers. It also aims to promote a legitimate private security industry which acts in terms of the Constitutional principles. However, the Act alone is not enough hence the need for oversight bodies.

The PSIRA Act gave effect to the establishment of Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA). In terms of Section 3 of the PSIR Act, its primary objectives are to “regulate the private security industry and to exercise effective control over the practice of the occupation of security service provider in the public and national interest and the interest of the private security industry itself”. This Act also aims, amongst others to:

- promote a legitimate private security industry which acts in terms of the principles contained in the Constitution and other applicable law;
- ensure that all security service providers act in the public and national interest;
- promote a private security industry which is characterised by professionalism;
- promote, maintain and protect the status and interests of the occupation of security service provider; and

- ensure that the process of registration of security service providers is transparent, fair, objective and concluded timeously (Section 3 of the PSIR Act).

In February 2014, a Bill was passed in South Africa titled Private Security Industry Regulation Amendment Bill. The Amendment Bill seeks to regulate foreign-owned private security companies operating in South Africa and also South African private security companies operating abroad. Section 38a (1) of the Bill states that any person who, within the Republic, recruits, trains, hires out, sends or deploys any other person to provide a security service outside the Republic must provide to the Director of the council on a monthly basis such information as may be prescribed regarding such recruitment, training, hiring out, sending or deployment within the prescribed time limits; and comply with the provisions of this Act. The Act does not spell out the implications for not providing information to the Director. The amendment bill also seeks to limit foreign ownership by providing the Minister of Police with the power to regulate foreign ownership and control of a business operating as a security service provider in South Africa. The Bill, however, falls short of specifying how these powers are to be utilised. The Bill, the PSIRA Act and the Constitution make no reference to private maritime security companies. This surprising as this sector is also growing due to crime happening at sea.

3. Private security industry in South Africa

Research shows that a high crime rate affects business and the economy negatively as it may lead to a decrease in business. However, unlike other industries which have been adversely affected by high crime levels, the security industry has grown considerably over the last two decades. The 2014 PSIRA report indicate that the industry is growing at a rate of 30 per cent per annum, and this is alarming. The fast growth of the private security industry in South Africa is an undisputable fact that one cannot ignore. According to Minnaar and Ngoveni (2004) the South African private security industry has grown at the rate of 30% per annum since the 1970s. The value of the private security industry in South Africa was R1.2 billion in 1970 and in 1997 the figure was put at R6 billion (Reynolds 2003), and in 2004 this value was R14 billion (Albert 2004). In 2007 PSIRA announced a turnover of R30 billion and in 2014 it was standing at R36 billion. This growth rate of the security industry in South Africa makes the industry one of the fastest growing industries in world (PSIRA Report, 2013).

It is estimated that 25 000 to 30 000 newly trained security officers enter the market annually (Berg 2004). According to Berg (2004) 102 168 new security officers entered the industry in the period December 1999 to June 2003. However, the industry has a large

personnel turnover. This is due to a surfeit of lower-end security officers, poor working conditions and low wages, among others (Minnaar 2007).

Table 1 below indicates the number of PSCs and number of registered security guards for the period 2001 to 2014. It is important to note that the table excludes inactive members of the PSCs. The table indicates the increase in the number of security companies registered and the numbers of active guards in the industry. It is interesting to note that although the number of PSCs fluctuates, the number of active guards keeps on increasing and this is evident from 2002 onwards. The number of registered Security Companies dropped from 9 031 in 2013 to 8 144 in 2014. The decline can be attributed to deregistration due to non-compliance.

Table 1: The growth of the private security sector in South Africa

Year	No of registered PSCs	No of active guards
2001	5 491	194 525
2002	4 521	222 717
2003	4 271	248 025
2004	4 212	269 773
2005	4 639	288 686
2006	4 763	296,901
2007	4 898	307 343
2008	5 504	339 108
2009	6 392	375 515
2010	7 459	387 273
2011	8 828	411 109
2012	9 364	427 174
2013	9 031	445 407
2014	8 144	487 058

Source: Information sourced from PSIRA Annual Reports 2001-2014

There are various reasons why the private security industry is increasing. There is a high crime rate in South Africa and the public have no faith in the policing system. According to James (1998:8) there are a number of reasons why the private security industry has expanded rapidly over the last twenty years:

- The growth of private security is directly related to the scaling down, and subsequent withdrawal, of the police from some of its functions. Most government buildings are guarded by private security companies in South Africa. Private security companies fill the gap created by this withdrawal.
- Private property has increasingly become open to the public. Much of public life has moved away from public streets to 'private-public' property (private property which houses

facilities extensively used by the public, such as shopping malls and entertainment centres). Owners of this property make use of private security to police the public who use such property.

- There is a perception that the police are unable to protect the public. If citizens believe the police are ineffective they will seek other forms of protection.

Prior to 1994, it was common to see police in the streets because of the political unrest at the time. After 1994, the South African public have seen the disappearance of visible policing and see more private security vehicles parked on the street corners. There are areas where visible policing is non-existent and it has been replaced by private security. There is an ever-increasing number of South Africans making use of private security companies to protect themselves, their families, their businesses and their homes (Minnaar, 2007). Only a small proportion of the population can actually afford comprehensive security services and this is obviously not the poor. As a result the poor will therefore continue to suffer at the hands of criminals as they cannot afford the services of private security, but have to rely on the state police for protection. The less wealthy or the poor have recently turned to vigilantism to substitute seemingly absent or poor policing (Abrahamson & Williams 2008; Baker 2004). The government also makes use of PSCs to protect and control access to major government buildings and some of the key points.

4. Challenges of private security companies in South Africa

Private security companies in South Africa are not without challenges. These range from the extent to which they are legally permitted to use force to the lack of oversight over the activities of the industry. There is a need to change the image of the industry, which appears not to be good. Despite being regulated, the South African security industry lacks an independent oversight body and this has raised questions about the control of the industry.

Questions about the control of the industry have arisen continuously, both in the public and political domains. Who has the ultimate authority over their actions, what are the reporting lines, and who is accountable? Given the number of PSCs and personnel in this industry, PSIRA alone, as statutory body, is not sufficiently equipped to control the private security industry and its activities. There are no means in South Africa by which PSCs are regulated by civilian oversight, as are the police, defence and other security sectors (Berg & Gabi 2011).

Comparatively speaking the SAPS and the SANDF as institutions have more internal and external accountability mechanisms that ensure compliance and respect for human rights standards, than the private security industry. The oversight bodies of the SAPS are the Civilian Secretariat for Police (CSP), Portfolio Committee on Police and the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID). There are currently 175 531 active SAPS members who fulfil an active policing role in South Africa (SAPS annual report 2014). Both the CSP and the IPID are mandated to oversee the police.

On the other hand, the SANDF has four oversight bodies which are, Defence Secretariat, Defence Commission, Military Ombudsman and Portfolio Committee on Defence. All these bodies are there to ensure that the SANDF is managed according to the Constitution and that the rule of law is respected. The total number of uniformed members of the SANDF is 78,707 (SANDF annual report 2014) and yet there are four oversight bodies.

The annual budget of the Civilian Secretariat for Police is R63 267 000 (SAPS Report 2014) and the IPID has an annual budget of R98 667 000 (IPID Report 14). By comparison, PSIRA has an annual expenditure budget of R174 341 000 and only a portion of this is dedicated to oversight. Many researchers raise concern over the lack of public knowledge about the parameters within which PSCs function. This includes, among others, what powers PSCs have to search and use force. Another gap in oversight relates to the role of PSIRA inspectors. While their role is guided by Chapter 5 of the PSIR Act, the legislation is not adequately clear about the frequency of inspections and under whose authority such inspections should be carried out (Jaynes 2012). In terms of PSIR Act the director may use his/her discretion to carry out inspections, but it is not sufficiently clear whether inspections can be carried out proactively.

Synchronisation of legislation and practical training is absent. Another challenge is related to training. Maintenance training is required for armed guards as per the PSIR Act and FCA. In terms of Firearms Control Act Regulation, 2005, PSCs must undertake periodic reviews of their armed employees' abilities and ensure that they "undergo at least one proper practical training session at least every 12 months", and that all armed guards attend at least one proper briefing session every 12 months to keep them up to date with all legislation "for the possession, carrying, safe custody and use of firearms and ammunition" (FCA Amendment Regulations, Section 2 (s)(ix)). The Amendment Regulations also include a requirement that the armed guards be assessed every 24 months in order to ensure that "they do not suffer from any condition that would render their continued possession of a firearm and ammunition as posing an unreasonable risk to any person". Excluded from the assessment is psychological or psychiatric testing. This immediately contradicts FCA

regulations which necessitate the criteria for firearm ownership to include being in a “stable mental condition” and not being “inclined to violence” (FCA 2000, Section 2 (d)). This is also contradicts the growing body of evidence which shows a relationship between exposure to repetitive trauma and stress and an individual’s tendency to irrational behaviour (Holly, Orcutt & King, 2003; Manzoni & Eisner, 2006; Leino, Selin, & Summala, 2011).

The PSIRA is responsible for the issuing of licences to private security guards and the Central Firearm Register, which is controlled by the SAPS, is responsible for issuing firearms licences. Given the important points of contact between the two bodies, it follows that the legislation and accompanying regulations would be aligned, but this is currently not the case (Jaynes 2012). The FCA requires a minimum age of 21 years for firearm possession (Section 2(a), which it is not in line with the PSIR Act. PSIR Act requires a minimum of 18 years for registration as a private security guard (Section 23(b).

In every PSIRA annual report, a number of criminal investigations against security guards and companies are reported. However, very little information is given about the reasons for investigations or the progress thereof (PSIRA Reports 2010-2014). Therefore the nature of the crimes is not known, and could threaten life or public safety. The report only states that the matter is in the hands of the SAPS and the National Prosecuting Authority for further investigation and prosecution. The report also does not give any indication of remedial action taken by the PSIRA itself, let alone accountability. This makes one wonder to what extent PSIRA has control over the activities of the industry. In the 2010/2011 PSIRA annual report 257 new criminal cases were recorded, while in the 2013 report there were 727 cases. This indicates an increase of more than 100 per cent. According to the report there is a huge backlog of cases and the report does not indicate any remedial action taken. The 2013 PSIRA annual report recorded that a total of 1,301 outstanding criminal cases were pending with SAPS (PSIRA Report 2013).

In South Africa, many PSCs find themselves carrying out traditional policing functions, such as making arrests. Without deliberating further on this matter, it would be sensible for “relevant legislation and policy directives to take cognisance of this fact, and cite PSCs as relevant actors” (Berg & Gavi, 2011). In terms of Section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act No. 51 of 1977 deliberates on the modalities of use of force when affecting an arrest. There is nothing governing the PSCs on the use of force except mention in their Code of Conduct, which states that a security service provider may only use force when the use of force, as well as the nature and extent thereof, is reasonably necessary in the circumstances and is permitted in terms of the law (Code of Conduct 8 (2b)). A solution could be for the PSIRA to use the International Code of Conduct and its references to the

United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force (Jaynes 2012). It is important that PSCs uphold the United Nations (UN) Basic Principles on the Use of Force and firearms by law enforcement officials (1990) regarding the use of firearms.

This confirms the need to hold PSC personnel to the same standard as law enforcement officers, particularly when it comes to the use of firearms. The UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force state that “law enforcement officials shall avoid the use of force or, where that is not practicable, shall restrict such force to the minimum extent necessary” (The United Nations, 1990).

The other big challenge is the storage of weapons by PSCs. In terms of Section 35(m) of the PSIR Act, PSCs must maintain a register of all company firearms and ammunition and ensure safe storage. In the event that the business closes down, the PSC involved must submit all firearms to the SAPS or destroy them. Although the FCA is very clear regarding the possession and use of firearms, it does not indicate whether the destruction of weapons by companies should be done under supervision or not. It outlines clear requirements concerning the possession and use of firearms. The Act requires all service firearms to be returned to the company for safe keeping on completion of a shift and that no firearms are to be taken home. Section 146 of the FCA states that “if a person who holds a licence issued in terms of Section 20 or who holds a licence, permit or authorisation contemplated in Chapter 7 or 8, ceases to carry on business for any reason, the firearms and ammunition in possession of that person must be kept in safe custody by the person and at the place designated by the Registrar, until they are disposed of as prescribed”.

Research by Gould and Lamb (2004) underlined areas of concern regarding PSIRA’s compliance with the Fire Arm Control Act. One of the critical concerns raised in the research is that in the event that a PSC is deregistered or goes out of business, all licences should be cancelled. However, Gould and Lamb (2004) reported that this is not always the case and this process is not properly monitored. It appears that some companies register and then deregister with the intention of obtaining licensed firearms illicitly (Lamb 2008). In the 2003 PSIRA report it is mentioned that PSIRA “had no means of checking the status of private security companies’ firearms after deregistration”. This is scary as some of these firearms may lead to a number of weapons in the hands of criminals.

There is no mention in any of sanctions or penalties that must be imposed on non-compliance with any standard, especially of the Code of Conduct. The Code of Conduct (2003), Chapter 5 (s 25(1a–e)) only mentions that PSIRA can do the following in respect of improper conduct by a security service provider:

- Issue a warning or a reprimand to anyone found guilty of breaching the Code of Conduct.
- Suspend the PSIRA registration as security service provider for a period not exceeding six months.
- Withdraw such registration.
- Impose a fine not exceeding R10 000, which is payable to the PSIRA itself.
- Publish (in a “name and shame” manner) details of the conviction of improper conduct and of any penalty that was imposed for the specific breach.

The biggest problem of oversight lies with accountability. As mentioned earlier in this paper, the main function of the SAPS is to protect the general public. On the contrary, the private security industry is profit driven and is directly accountable to their clients and certainly not to the public at large. In fact, the industry is accountable to the client only insofar as providing a security service and to their shareholders insofar as making money (Minnaar 2007). But when public funds, taxes and business levies are utilised by local government or non-profit organisations to contract private security companies to provide policing, (such as CCTV, foot patrols, investigation and arrests), questions of public accountability and monitoring of those activities are inevitable and in the public's interest (Minnaar 2007).

5. Conclusion

It is given that the state's resources to ensure the safety of all citizens are always limited. Therefore, the use of private security companies will always be necessary to supplement unavailable government resources and such companies will remain with South African society for many years. While the PSCs in South Africa are regulated by means of the PSIR Act, proper oversight mechanisms are lacking. There is no formal body to serve the South African private security industry as the IPID in the SAPS and Defence Commission in the SANDF do. This will continue to raise questions of who has absolute control over the activities of the PSCs. An oversight body is therefore necessary to monitor and control the activities of the PSCs and this body should report directly to parliament or be independent.

The aim of this paper was to highlight the challenges posed by private security companies in South Africa. The paper starts off by giving the background context to the private security industry in the country, its size and how it is growing. It went further to address the challenges regarding PSCs in South Africa. It is clear in this paper that, although there is legislation regulating PSCs, there are gaps in the legislation itself as well as

challenges in the implementation thereof. Unless these challenges are addressed, the PSCs will become uncontrollable.

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“THEY FORCE OUR LOCAL SHOPS OUT OF BUSINESS WITH CUT-RATE PRICES” – THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN-OWNED BUSINESSES ON THE LOCAL BUSINESSES AND LIVELIHOODS OF SOUTH AFRICANS

M. Lethoko

University of Limpopo, South Africa

M. Lerata, Regenesys Management, South Africa

N. Pangasasa, Regenesys Management, South Africa

Abstract

In South Africa, there are many stereo-types that communities have in terms of foreign nationals who own businesses. In some cases, the local people believe that the foreign business owners steal their jobs; they are drug dealers; they take local women and force our local shops out of business with cut-rate prices. The impact of migration and immigration into South Africa can be felt in all spheres of life: from health, social security, housing, education, infrastructure and in the business sector. The objective of this paper is to investigate the reasons why locals fail to run their businesses successfully and compete with the foreign nationals. It will also look into what makes foreigners to succeed in the same environment that the locals operate in. And lastly, what solutions can be proposed in order to enhance the competitive advantage of locally owned businesses.

Data was collected through face to face interviews with 40 local business people and 40 foreign business owners in the Tzaneen, Mangaung and Mbombela municipalities. The findings revealed the following: It was discovered that most South Africans acknowledged the fact that foreigners have more business skills than them; foreigners have the capacity of opening their shops for longer hours, which is something that locals do not do. The reason being that foreigners sleep in their shops and South Africans do not. It was also discovered that South Africans acknowledged the fact that it is difficult for South Africans to organise themselves so that they can buy in bulk like foreigners. The reason being that South Africans by experience do not trust one another, this is as a result of bad experience were people where swindled their money in this kind of organizations. The paper recommends the following: an introduction of entrepreneurship training in primary and secondary schools, financial assistance for locals, government's assistance in marketing and business sustainability.

Keywords: Entrepreneurship, Foreign-owned businesses, Locally-owned businesses.

1. Introduction

There is a growing emphasis on the importance of entrepreneurship and processes involved in the exploitation of innovative opportunities in South Africa (Hindle, 2010 and Welter, 2011). Studies have indicated that start-up businesses are highly dependent on the constraints in which entrepreneurs live and work (Schoonhoven & Romanelli, 2001). The same applies to informal businesses in most of the Black townships in South Africa. The collapse of apartheid allowed the influx of foreigners into South Africa from around 500,000 in 1990s to around estimated 6 million (Republic of South Africa: 2015). This has led to an increase in the competition for already scarce resources between locals and foreigners who own businesses (Ligthelm, 2006). As result, this article seeks to investigate the reasons why local business owners fail to run their businesses successfully and compete with the foreign nationals. It will also look into what makes foreigners to succeed in the same environment that the locals operate in. The article will give recommendations as to what can be done to assist local businesses to succeed and compete with foreign-owned businesses.

Schoeman, Botha and Blaaw (2010) define entrepreneurship as innovative creation by individuals and organizations. Others disagree and state that entrepreneurship is a discipline that can be taught and learnt (Schaper and Lekhotla, 2007). Notwithstanding these theoretical differences in definitions, experts have consistently singled out problems in the education system as being the root cause of low levels of entrepreneurial activity in South Africa (Acs, Arenius, Hay & Minniti, 2004). Insufficient education and training are one of the factors hindering entrepreneurial capacity in South Africa (Driver, Wood, Segal & Herrington, 2001). Not only is a negative individual mindset often cited as a hindrance to entrepreneurship, but it is also evident that entrepreneurship is often not viewed as a legitimate career choice (Driver, Wood, Segal & Herrington, 2001).

The 2011 South African census indicates that the total population is 51, 8 Million (Statistics SA, 2011). According to Basardien, Parker, Saheed Bayat, Friedrich and Appoles (2014), only 7.3% of South Africans are entrepreneurs. This shows that South Africa could still utilise entrepreneurship as a vehicle to reduce poverty, which currently stands at more than half at 57, 2% of the population of South Africa. In addition to the above Basardien et al (2014) estimate that 16% of South Africa's economically active population was engaged in the informal sector. It is argued that more than 50% of economic activity of those in the South African informal economy involves trade (Ligthelm, 2006). There is a considerable demand for goods and services within poor communities, especially in the absence of formal enterprises such as shopping malls.

On the other hand, in recent years South Africa has seen an increase in foreign owned shops in towns like Nelspruit and Tzaneen. Foreign owned shops such as those owned by Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis have sprung up in these towns due to what can be termed as economic globalisation and this has resulted in increased tensions between locals and foreigners. This business model used by foreign business owners is primarily based upon being price sensitive and is made possible through co-operative procurement and distribution. However, an important factor in this success lies in the differentiated social networks that South African and Somali informal business owners can access to support their business practices (Liedeman, Charman, Piper & Petersen, 2013).

2. Literature review

There are two main role players in the SMME sector in South Africa and they are local business people and foreign-owned businesses. According to Mulugeta (2008) more recently, it has been estimated that informal businesses account for 2.7% of retail trade, equating to R8 billion in values (Ligthelm, 2006). The industry has the potential of job creation and ability to provide a livelihood for poor people (Morris, Jones & Nel, 1997). In addition, local people are playing is to provide their closed businesses to foreigners and in the process; they can be paid rental money which can increase their disposable income. The property sector also gained a lot in that they provided accommodation for most of foreigners and this has resulted in most rental flats are mushrooming in most cities and towns alike (Liedeman et al, 2013).

According to Fatoki & Patswawairi (2012) the majority of the informal businesses in most townships are run by foreigners as compared to South Africans. Depending on their size, informal businesses are usually managed by 1 to 3 foreigners. Goods on offer are usually kept inside the Informal business except for some potentially hazardous products such as paraffin that are kept outside the shop. Customers are generally served through a small window like opening with the shop attendant being stationed inside the Informal business. Those who buy from Informal businesses are able to see products they may wish to purchase through the opening that is used to serve customers (Fatoki & Patswawairi, 2012).

In addition, according to Hunter & Skinner (2003) the arrival of foreigners in South Africa has revolutionized the informal business industry completely. In some instances, informal businesses have a wire gauze screen that allows customers to see products inside the shop. While generally one could say customers do not go inside shops which are owned by foreigners, the Chinese have revolutionized this by introducing walking in Informal businesses and general dealers around townships. These can be defined as “modern”

informal businesses that have self-service and walk in facilities replicating the models used by supermarket chain stores. They are well secured with a wider range and variety of products. Walk-in-self-service Informal businesses and informal businesses are now emerging as common practice within the industry. Products are well arranged and the informal business operates like a miniature supermarket (Hunter & Skinner, 2003).

In the past, governmental policies aimed at creating an enabling framework for more locals to start and own Informal businesses. However, in recent years other nationalities such as the Somalis, Pakistani, Nigerians, Zimbabweans and other nationalities now own and operate informal businesses, a phenomenon more commonly attributed to globalization. With superior business strategies displayed by foreigners, significant market share of locals were lost. This subsequently resulted in a series of violent attacks against foreigners, particularly the Somali owned informal businesses. To date more than 50 Somali nationals have been killed as a result of violence (Charman & Piper, 2011). Furthermore, this is currently the practice where most of this foreigners are bringing some of the retail goods that were not previously manufactured or produced in the host country, for example Somali and Chinese import some of the goods that are not known in South Africa in the form of toys, sweets, cold drinks and other consumable goods like cakes and many more (Fatoki & Patswawairi, 2012).

In South Africa, foreigners are seen to threaten the jobs of locals as well as undermining wages in an economy that has high levels of unemployment, poverty, and income inequality this is according to Fatoki & Patswawairi (2012). Nevertheless, foreigners contribute to the economy by purchasing goods and services, and importing skills. Thus, foreign entrepreneurship is one of the ways to boost the level of entrepreneurship and lessen unemployment and poverty, and in most instances the foreigner business owners have actually employed between one to three South Africans (Kalitanyi & Visser, 2010). A number of scholars have suggested that foreigners actually create jobs. Kalitanyi & Visser (2010), in their study of African immigrants in South Africa, discovered that 29/40 (73%) interviewed immigrant entrepreneurs from Nigeria prefer to employ South Africans, as do 36/40 (90%) immigrant entrepreneurs from Senegal and 14/20 (70%) other immigrant entrepreneurs from assorted African countries. A noteworthy number of 19/20 (95%) interviewed immigrant entrepreneurs from various African countries prefer to employ South Africans. In short, out of 120 African immigrant entrepreneurs interviewed 98 (82%) employed South Africans. Fatoki & Patswawairi (2012:139) also report that immigrant entrepreneurs employ native South Africans, suggesting that immigrant entrepreneurship can be one of the ways to combat the high unemployment rate in South Africa.

2.1 Foreign Entrepreneurship

According to Fatoki & Patswawairi (2012) and Dalhammar (2004), immigrant entrepreneurship is described as the process by which an immigrant establishes a business in a host country (or country of settlement) which is not the immigrant's country of origin. Immigrant entrepreneurship also refers to the entrepreneurship of recent migrants by means of establishing a business enterprise or engaging in self-employment. The term foreign entrepreneurship is interchangeably used with the term immigrant entrepreneurship. Four studies were conducted on these business concepts in Cape Town and amongst others, it was Fatoki & Patswawairi, (2012), Tengeh, Ballard, & Slabbert, (2011) and (Kalitanyi & Visser 2010) and (Rogerson 1997). According to these authors, this business concept means entrepreneurs who came to this country as immigrants and others came legally and others illegally and they have to make some means to survive, and because they cannot get formal jobs, they opted to be entrepreneurs and they sell goods in every corner of this country. Thus far, in South Africa, there is no official estimate of immigrant-owned businesses (Tengeh et al, 2011:20).

Dana (1995:57) contends that in recent years entrepreneurship has been a chief source of jobs; it has been connected to economic growth and is believed to guide economic growth. It is also extensively recognized that ethnic minority immigrants have a high propensity towards entrepreneurship and contribute to economic development (Basu, 2011:1). Foreign entrepreneurship is increasingly being acknowledged as a vital vehicle for economic growth and the regeneration of economies (Chand & Ghorbani 2011:593). Recent studies have highlighted the vital contribution made by immigrant entrepreneurs from India, China and other countries to innovation and job creation (Basu, 2011). Chrysostome & Lin (2010) assert that in countries that are main destinations for immigrants such as the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia, immigrant entrepreneurship plays a vital role in economic development. It creates employment through new business enterprises that contribute to wealth creation in the host country. If properly managed, South Africa can also benefit from immigrant entrepreneurship.

3. Research methodology

Welman, Kruger and Mitchell (2005) explain that a study design is the plan according to which we obtain study participants (subjects) and how the information should be collected from them. In this study, 40 local business owners from Mangaung, Tzaneen and Mbombela municipalities were interviewed with the purpose of collecting data in relation to the reasons

that have led to the collapse of their businesses. 40 foreign business owners were also interviewed with the aim of finding out what is it that they are doing to ensure that their businesses are sustainable. An interview schedule was prepared and in-depth, face to face interviews were conducted with 80 participants in total. Secondary data in a form of literature review of studies which have been conducted on the subject matter of this paper was also utilised in the paper. Content analysis was used in order to analyse the data that was collected during the face to face interviews. Welman, Kruger and Mitchell (2005: 221) define content analysis as “a qualitative analysis of qualitative data”. The basic technique involves counting the frequencies and sequencing of particular words, phrases and concepts in order to identify key words and themes. Babbie and Mouton (2010: 491) define the same concept as “a research method which examines words or phrases within a wide range of texts including books, book chapters, essays, interviews, speeches and informal conversations. By examining the presence of repetition of certain words and phrases in these texts, a researcher is able to make inferences about the philosophical assumptions of a writer, a written piece, the audience to which the piece was written and even the culture and the time in which the text is embedded”.

4. Discussion of the results from face to face interviews

The data for this paper was collected from 40 South African informal business owners and 40 foreign business owners.

4.1 Availability of Opportunities

All South Africans who took part as participants in this study, indicated that during the apartheid era, there were no opportunities for Black people in particular to open up businesses. The government of the day did not support their initiatives to venture into any business. Those who continued to operate their business after 1994 also cited the reason that the government was not doing enough and is still not doing enough to allow them to prosper in their business. Lack of financial support from financial institutions and government agencies like National Empowerment Fund (NEF) and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) were also cited as one of the stumbling blocks in making sure that informal businesses create opportunities for local citizens to grow and establish businesses. The reason being that they only concentrated on assisting their friends; and not giving financial assistance to all potential business people. Those that are supposed to give financial assistance are very strict when they have to give the money to them. Like the banks they also apply strict criteria before they can lend people money and most local people do not satisfy the criteria given.

4.2 Motivation for Starting Business

According to all participants, the reason why they started their own businesses was because of the following:

4.2.1 Retrenchments

According to 28 out of 40 South Africans who took part in the study, they indicated that the reason why they ventured into informal business was because they were retrenched from their previous employers. This resulted in those employees getting their retrenchment packages and hence they decided to start their own small businesses in order to survive.

4.2.2 Unemployment

Twelve (12) out of forty (40) participants indicated that they started their business because they were unemployed. They indicated that because of that unemployment many people resorted in establishing their small different business and they chose informal business. They also indicated that the reason why they established this informal business was that it was that kind of business that did not require a lot of start-up capital to establish, and it did not have any complications to start since you could start it in your own backyard. Ten (10) out of forty (40) foreigners also indicated that the reason why they came to South Africa to start their own businesses is because of the high rate of unemployment, instability and economic difficulties in their home counties.

4.3 Previous Business Experience

All the 40 South Africans who participated in this study indicated that they did not start their own businesses because of the love of doing business, as compared to foreigners who are currently involved in informal business. All 40 foreigners also indicated that they were involved in business ventures in their own countries before, and that they have entrepreneurial skills.

4. 4 What could lead to the collapsed of your business?

This is the main question of the study and it was directed to South Africans who used to run the informal businesses, this was done with the purpose of finding out what exactly lead to the failure of them running the informal businesses. The following answers were given by all South African Informal business owners:

- Lack of business skills was cited as one of the fundamental causes why their business collapsed. Out of forty interviewed only five of them were involved in running the business before, even though it was not a formal one. The rest indicated that they have never been involved in business activities in their life time.

- They also mentioned that the reason why they failed is because everyone wanted to have a shop, which resulted in having too many shops in one street. Because of lack of regulations by local authorities they experience a large number of Informal businesses mushrooming in the township. This created a fierce competition amongst them.
- The other reason why they failed is because of lack of entrepreneurial skill like marketing their business, compiling financial statements to see if they are making profit or loss. Others also used their stock for home purposes and they did not record this all the time.
- Others were not taking money to the bank as a result they ended up using that money for other things which were not business related. Lack of financial management skills is a problem.
- The other thing that contributed to their downfall is the recession that was experienced during the 1980s. This was because of the sanctions that were directed to South Africa by most of the international world. This resulted in high inflation rate and things were expensive and customers could not afford buying their goods. This resulted in the drop in their sales and profits.
- Lack of government support for Small Medium and Micro Enterprise (SMME) was also one of the things that were mentioned.
- Lack of financial support from financial institutions.
- Establishment of big supermarkets and malls in the township during the late 1980 and early 1990 was also a problem that was raised by participants.
- It was also observed that those whose informal businesses were within 100m radius from the supermarkets and malls, their sales and profits dropped. They could not provide accurate figures since most of them were not keeping records.

4.5 What has led to foreigners to successfully turn around the informal businesses that were run by local people? Directed to South Africans

This question was directed only to the South African respondents. The reason for asking this questions especially to those informal business owners who closed down their shops and rented them to foreigners was to find out from them what are foreigners doing

right or different. All of the participants indicated the following as the reasons why foreigners are succeeding in running their informal businesses:

4.5.1 Plenty of entrepreneurial skills

They indicated that most of the foreigners have previous entrepreneurial skill, which they acquired from their countries of origin. They indicated that some of the foreigners have been taught business studies from early ages at school, and this was confirmed by some of these foreigners, especially those who are running wholesalers.

4.5.2 Assistance from their own governments

The respondents indicated that foreigners from Pakistan, Somalia and China have been given financial assistance from their respective countries to start businesses in South Africa. Another reason given is that foreign ambassadors encourage their fellow countrymen to assist one another in that they must help those who are starting up, and once the business is making profit, they move on to the next person. Their own countries also assist them in establishing wholesalers and these Informal business owners buy only from their fellow citizens.

4.5.3 Hours of Operation

According to South African participants the reason why foreigners are running these informal businesses at a profit is because they open up their shops early in the morning and close around 11 o'clock in the night. The reason being that they also stay and sleep in these shops, and most of the time there are at least two or three of them selling and they work on rotational shifts. The study also found out during observation that after hours, they also increase their prices since they are aware that people are desperate to find what they want. They mentioned that foreigners opened their shops everyday unlike South Africans who will close their shops on Saturdays to attend funerals or on Sunday when they have to go to church.

4.5.4 Profit Margins

According to all South Africans interviewed, they indicated that during the time when they were running their businesses they wanted to make huge profit at a go. For example if they bought an item for R5, they will try to sell it for R10, which is almost 100% profit. But with foreigners, when they buy an item for R5 they sell it for R6 or R6.50.

Their profit margin is less than 15%. However, they sell a lot of items in a week as compared to South Africans. This increases their sales and at the end of the month, they make more profit than South Africans. It was also discovered that they are sometimes even cheaper than big supermarkets like Shoprite.

4.5.5 Dedication and Commitment

The other thing that was mentioned during the interview is that foreigners are dedicated to their businesses since it is the only means of survival for them, and it is only a source of income for them. Unlike South Africans who will sometimes have other source of income like grants from government or their children being employed somewhere. In addition, foreigners don't have any extra mural activities like south Africans, who will sometime go to church, or go to the stadium to watch soccer etc. they are always at their shops at any given point in time.

4.5.6 Buying in Bulk

The other advantage that was mentioned is that when they buy their stock, they buy in bulk and this assist them in getting discount, this approach is assisting them to sell their products at affordable prices and their goods are selling fast.

4.5.7 Illegal Operations

South African participants also mentioned that some of the foreigners are involved in illegal activities like selling stolen goods, fake cigarette, and illegally imported goods, especially Chinese. No concrete evidence was provided to this effect, but according to South African Police Services (SAPS) statistics of 2012 it was revealed that most foreigners are involved in bringing illegal goods in South Africa.

4.5.8 Buying from their own Wholesalers

They also indicated that they have established their own Wholesalers and this is assisting them, since they buy on credit and only pay when they come to buy another stock. This is very difficult for ordinary South Africans to get in the existing Wholesalers like Jumbo Cash and Carry. This is assisting them to have enough stock at all times.

4.6 What is the role of SMME agencies and forums in ensuring effective running of Informal businesses?

South Africans who were interviewed indicated that currently this agencies are marked by corruption since officials working in this agencies do not want to provide financial

assistance if they are not going to benefit personally. The feeling from those who were interviewed is that these agencies are not doing enough to assist SMMEs.

4.7 Reasons for the collapse of South Africans informal businesses

The following reasons were given by the respondents:

4.7.1 Lack of Financial Support.

The respondents said that starting capital was not the problem when they initially started this business. The reason being that during that time, they had received lot of money as part of their retrenchment or retirement packages. But finance became a problem when they could no longer sustain their businesses. This came as a result of not compiling financial statement and daily financial recordings. If they had been doing this initially, they should have realized at an early stage that they are going to have problems in the future. The respondents also mentioned that daily shop takings were also used for household purposes and were not recorded in as part of expenses or drawings. For example if they wanted to make some food, someone will take a tin of fish and just cook it and no recordings will be made.

4.7.2 Lack of Business Skills

During the interviews, most of the participants indicated that they did not have any previous business skills and had never run any business before. It was discovered that local business owners were not aware of the business initiatives that are available, like National African Chamber of Commerce and Industries (NAFCOC) which was providing training to their members. All what they should have done was just to join this forum and it would have helped them to acquire business skills.

4.7.3 New Emerging informal businesses

The study found out that emerging new informal business in one street is also the main course of why the Informal business collapsed during that time. This contributed in the sense that sales volumes were reduced since consumers were buying their staff not from one business but had a choice to go to another shop. It was discovered that even the prices of this new emerging shops were lower than the original business owners.

4.7.4 Competition from Foreigners

Competition from foreigners was a last straw to those South Africans whose shops collapsed during that time. The study found out that foreign business owners buy their stock

in bulk, thereby getting discounts. This assisted them to come up with prices that were less than those of South African owners. South Africans could not compete with prices set by these foreigners. As a result of these high prices by South Africans, consumers started buying from foreigner's shops because their goods were cheap and South African shop owners have to close down since their prices were high and they could not compete with these foreigners.

5. Conclusion and recommendations

5.1 Conclusion

Based on the data collected and the literature reviewed, the study has made the following conclusions:

- Lack of Business Skills - The study found out that the majority of participants also cited lack of skills as one of the reason why their businesses failed. This was also cited as one of the reason in the financial summit in 2011 where it was emphasized that government agencies like Small Enterprise Development Agency (SEDA) etc., should make sure that they give business training to small businesses.
- Lack of Financial Support - The study also found out that lack of financial support from commercial banks, and other government agencies like National Empowerment Fund (NEF), Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) is something that should be reengineered. Since the current criteria that they use is not assisting. Things like Credit checks, current assets and liabilities, and collateral were mentioned as hindrance for small business to expand.
- Establishment of Malls in the Townships. - The study also found out that some participants cited establishment of Malls in the township also had negative effects on the informal business. Lighthelm (2006) has also discovered this.
- Proliferation of foreign owned businesses in the townships - It was found out that the arrival of foreigners in the township also contributed negatively to the survival of some Informal business owners who were still operating. The main reason being that their low prices, long operating hours and many other factors.
- Lack of Government Support. - It was also found out that there is lack of support from the government in the sense that they are not supporting small business even though the government admits that they create more employment than any other sector.

5.2 Recommendations

From the data collected and discussed above, this paper would like to recommend the following:

5.2.1 Emphasis of entrepreneurship in the school curricula

The South African basic education system should be changed in order to allow entrepreneurs to be identified at early stages. Currently learners are only allowed to choose their major subjects at Grade 10. During that time it is late for a child to concentrate more on his or her favourite subjects or subjects that he or she has passion for. It is therefore imperative that at pupils should be allowed to specialize at an early stage of learning. A psychometric test must be conducted with the aim of assessing the child's interest and strong points at that stage. Those that demonstrated that they have strong points in business should start specializing in business related subjects, and those who demonstrated interest in artisan field should start specializing in engineering related subjects.

5.2.2 Financial Assistance.

Commercial banks have demonstrated that they are not willing to assist emerging entrepreneurs in this country, and then it is up to the government to come up with incentives to those banks that will be able to assist a certain number of previously disadvantaged people with finance and ensure that their businesses are sustainable. The government must also ensure that government agencies like DTI (Department of Trade and Industry), NEF (National Empowerment Fund) change the way they operate. They must not require strict criteria when they have to prove loans to emerging entrepreneurs. What they need to do is to develop assessment criteria that will enable them to determine if a certain business plan or proposal will be sustainable.

5.2.3 Mentoring

Thereafter appoint a mentor who will walk with those entrepreneurs who has been identified to ensure that they stick to their plan and do not use the loan for other reasons. Once they have paid off the loan, that mentor can then identify another batch of emerging entrepreneurs and do the same thing. This process of mentoring should not end until the people who a mentoring are sure that these entrepreneurs will survive on their own. Constant evaluation and monitoring should be conducted on a regular basis. For this approach to be a success the government must have monitoring and evaluation mechanisms and tools that will allow them to diagnose at an early stages that the business is not doing good and corrective measures should then be put in place.

5.2.4 Review of current financial products offered by government agencies

The current financial products that are given by all financial institutions should be reviewed, an example is when you make business loan things like collateral should be abolished and the above mentioned approach should be implemented.

5.2.5 Legislative control of banks and their lending rates to SMMEs

Banks should be prohibited to charge high interest rate when they lend money for business purposes, and this must be in the form of legislation. As part of incentivizing those banks that are lending money to entrepreneur, the government must allow these banks to pay less company tax as compared to those that do not comply to this.

5.2.6 Training and Capacity Building.

The current financial Sector Education Training Authority (SETA) should take a lead in ensuring that those who are in business are given the necessary training and this should be compulsory. The current Skills Development Act requires that 1% of total remuneration of all companies should be taken to skills development. The government needs to increase the staffing capacity of the SETAs so that more business owners can receive the training that they need. Monitoring and evaluation mechanisms should be put in place to ensure that this is achieved. Training modules should be translated in the language of those who cannot read English or Afrikaans, meaning that they must be taught in their own home language. Further Education and training institutions must be capacitated with qualified people to teach business related studies starting from primary school to Further Education and Training (FET) Colleges and universities.

5.2.7 Government should play a meaningful role

Government must come up with legislation that will force those companies that do not want to comply with Skills Development Act 97 of 1998 and the proceeds must then be put on some kind of a fund that will ensure that those entrepreneur or aspiring entrepreneurs are given the training that is needed. Government should ensure that Small Business Development (SBD) ministry is fully functional in addressing issues of small business. This ministry should ensure that all government agencies like National Empowerment Fund (NEF), Small Enterprise Development (SEDA), Free State Development Cooperation (FDC) etc. fall under its umbrella, and they must reengineer their operations and stop working like banks, and adopt the above mentioned recommendations. As part of complying with the government's Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act No13 of 2005, new guidelines and strategies should be developed to ensure that there is synergy between government

agencies like National Youth Development Agency, and others. The government should also come up with legislation that will reduce the tax that is paid by those companies that are providing capacity building initiatives to aspiring entrepreneurs. Currently the government has introduced tax breaks for those companies that will be employing young people and this will also be applicable to those companies that are addressing the issues of small enterprise in this country.

5.2.8 Meaningful Regulation for Local Government.

The local government should make Local Economic Development as part of their Key Priority Area. This must be developed with the intention of making sure that they regulate local business to avoid having more informal business in the same area. Municipalities can do this by developing by laws and this will assist in unfair competition. Every informal business must register before they can operate and be given a certificate of registration before they can be allowed to operate. Metro police should be the ones who must monitor the enforcement of this by laws.

6. Conclusion

Data was collected from 80 respondents from Mangaung, Mbombela and Tzaneen municipalities. From the data collected, it is clear that local businesses have to change their business operations and strategies if they want to succeed and be able to compete with foreign-owned businesses. Local business owners need to learn the entrepreneurial tricks that foreigners apply in order to operate and sustain their businesses.

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SOUTH AFRICA AND XENOPHOBIA: REGIONAL PEACE STRATEGIES FOR XENOPHOBIA AND XENOPHOBIC ATTACKS PREVENTION

H.M. Tirivangasi

S.A. Rankoana

University of Limpopo, South Africa

Abstract

After 21 years into democracy, South Africa is still experiencing xenophobic attacks as one of its main social problems. Xenophobia in South Africa can be traced back to pre-colonial times and apartheid system but it is the nature of its current trends which have raised both domestic and international alarm. Xenophobia displays the inhuman or unpleasant disregard of human life. The continuous occurrence of xenophobia has serious implication on the regional peace. This is due to the fact that South Africa shares regional economic, social and political integration with Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries. South Africa shares a rich historical background with all these countries which resulted in the formation of this powerful regional block. For this to be ensured there has to be peace in all individual states. The South African xenophobic attacks, threaten to destroy the heritage and the history of brotherhood shared by SADC countries. As a consequence, the South African xenophobic attacks have become not just a South African problem but a regional problem. The present paper explains regional peace strategies which can be used to prevent xenophobia. The research question is what are the efforts of SADC to stop xenophobia and xenophobic attacks in South Africa? This secondary research provides answers to these questions.

Keywords: Xenophobia; Southern African Development Community (SADC); Policy; Peace strategies.

1 Introduction

The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was formed in 1980 as an offshoot of the Front Line States (FLS) to fight colonialism in the region. Its two key objectives are firstly to harmonize development among countries in the Southern Africa (excluding South Africa and Namibia), and secondly, to reduce economic dependence on South Africa. The treaty to establish Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) was signed in Windhoek after Namibia gained independence while South Africa was in the transition phase. The inclusion of South Africa in the block saw the dissolving of SADCC and

the creation of SADC with a mandate to promote regional integration and the development of a common foreign policy (Nkiwane, 1999; Nathan, 2006). SADC was committed to the formation of frameworks and mechanisms to promote regional solidarity and provide mechanisms to provide for mutual peace and security (Nkiwane, 1999). Nathan (2006) notes that SADC mandate went beyond political and security issues to include such issues as economic integration and poverty alleviation. It is the SADC's fundamental principles which compelled this researcher to engage in this research to find ways in which SADC can help stop or prevent xenophobic attacks in South Africa. This is motivated by the fact that SADC countries are a symbol of much cherished brotherhood which exists in most sub continental organizations like Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), European Union (EU) and East African Community (EAC).

Explaining the role of SADC in halting xenophobia will go a long way in finding solution to the problem. Xenophobia in South Africa threatened the peace of the region. The 2008 South African xenophobic attacks claimed 62 lives and left thousands of foreign nationals displaced in just about a week (Matunhu, 2011) and seven people died during the 2015 xenophobic attacks. Most xenophobia attacks in South Africa were perpetrated against blacks, Indians and Asian immigrants living in South Africa.

2 Xenophobia and afrophobia

Xenophobia has been defined by various scholars as the fear or dislike of foreigners (Ziebertz & Kay, 2009; Berezin 2006; Nyamnjoh, 2006). However this is no longer the case, xenophobia is now a global problem. It has evolved over time and warrants a clearer definition since following its present short definition will be an understatement. Moge kwu (2005) gives an anthropological definition of xenophobia, which defines xenophobia as the fear and dislike of foreigners as a result of poor intercultural communication on which members of one national culture do not understand, appreciate and accommodate members of another national culture among them. Xenophobia is grounded in the discriminatory attitudes and behaviour towards non-citizens which may result in violence, abuse and killings of human life.

Harris (2002) offers another definition of xenophobia which seems to be more of a reflection of the current trends in South Africa. He says that xenophobia is not just an attitude; it is an activity. It is not just a dislike or fear of foreigners: it is a violent practice that results in bodily harm and damage (Harris, 2002). He observes that xenophobia is not targeting all foreigners but rather a certain group. He notes that in South Africa, not all foreigners are uniformly victimised. Rather, blacks, Indians and Asians foreigners, particularly those from Africa are the target and they comprise the majority of victims. This

today marks what has come to be known as Afrophobia in recent xenophobic attacks which have hit South Africa.

Xenophobia is generally understood as a practice where hate or dislike is directed towards foreigners regardless of colour or race. This was not the case in South Africa, where violence and anger was directed against a certain group of people. Wutawunashe (2011) termed the xenophobic attacks in South Africa Afro-phobia, Africans loathing Africans. Afrophobia is not a new concept but it's a form of xenophobia which has been inspired by a series of events. Matsinhe (2011) explains that this is Africa suffering from the fear of itself. This research defines Afrophobia as strong hatred or insecure feelings towards fellow Africans deeply rooted in the frustrations over competition for the available few resources.

3 Xenophobic attacks in Southern Africa.

Olukoju (2008) traces the background of xenophobia in Africa to pre-colonial era. The social exclusion started in marriage arrangements in which some people would not marry in certain clans or families. The main reason for exclusion was that some clans or families were regarded as inferior and some were always viewed with animosity or as a threat to the clan as a whole. He notes that the rivalry for political supremacy was a major cause for animosity between neighbouring clans. The mfecane period in the 1820s and 1830s also known as time of trouble marks a period where non Zulu tribes were driven out of South Africa. The Zulu people under Tshaka wanted all the ports and fertile land for themselves hence they waged wars against their neighbours (Berge, 2000). Olukoju (2008) notes that the history of the subjugation or even enslavement of one group by another promoted mutual deep-seated animosity. For example, the Zulus ruled other Xhosas tribes while the Ndebele under Mzilikazi enslaved the Shona. Mzilikazi was a general in Tshaka's army but migrated north-west in order to move far away from the marauding Zulu impies. These pre-colonial facts informed the negative stereotypes about certain African groups. This also serves to show that xenophobia has always been part of Africa, the Xhosas hating the Zulus and the Shonas not liking the Ndebeles (Olukoju, 2008). This animosity between the tribes and the issues about one tribe dominating another can be used to pinpoint the origins of xenophobia in South Africa.

Xenophobia in South Africa is further traced back to the colonial era. Jager and Hopstock (2011) also note that xenophobia in South Africa is rooted in the apartheid system. They point out that during apartheid regime; xenophobia was expressed through laws and policies which separated anyone who is not white from the leading elite (Kruger, 1969). The apartheid government would put policies to protect their white minority agendas. This is where the culture of violence emerged from black people running in the streets in protest

and wedging violence as a way of speaking to the government. The culture of violence was seen across Africa during the colonial era, where in most cases the response against xenophobia was violence. Matunhu (2011) concurs that xenophobic attacks are the result of human nature to protect certain interest. He further argues that this nature is also found in animals. According to him there is nothing unusual about animals protecting their territory.

The post-colonial era is the current stage which has seen South Africa grabbing the headlines across the globe with an increase in xenophobic attacks since 1994. The xenophobic attacks have since tainted the picture of Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma's presidential terms. The most serious attacks occurred in 2008 and these were followed by the 2015 xenophobic attacks. These attacks can all be attributed to a number of factors.

4 The main causes of xenophobic attacks in South Africa

4.1 Economic woes

Bordeau (2010:6) states that in terms of economic strife; citizens often look for a scapegoat, or someone to blame for their poor financial situations. Most black South Africans are living in poverty and there is a high level of unemployment rate in the country. StatsSA (2015: iv) reveals that the current unemployment rate stands at twenty four percent (24, 3%). This has made the native South Africans to view other Africans as a threat. The 2015 xenophobic attacks were directed towards other Africans because of the threat they cause on them. Matunhu (2011) pointed out that xenophobia attacks denote a nature of human beings protecting their natural habitat. The natives see the foreigners as causing an unnecessary pressure to a situation already bad. The foreigners are seen as causing a huge burden on the Job market and also on service delivery in general. Bond, Ngwane and Amis (2011) notes that about thirty two percent (32%) of South Africans believe that xenophobic attacks are caused by foreigners' acceptance of cheap labour and blame them for taking all job opportunities. These sentiments reveal the fact that some South Africans are uncomfortable by the presence of the foreigners in the country.

4.2 Culture of violence

Neocosmos (2010) notes that xenophobia is not domicile to South Africa only but also in other parts of the world. The more disturbing thing about South African xenophobia is its violent nature. Valji (2003) notes that there exists in this country what has been termed as culture of violence. This defines where the use of violence has become normative instead of deviant and is viewed as a more acceptable response in conflict resolution. This can be the main cause of xenophobic attacks in both 2008 and 2015. Bond et al (2011) reveal that most

South African citizens are dissatisfied with the existing few employment opportunities and the declining levels of service delivery. They further stated that about thirty one percent (31%) of the interview respondents were angered by the crime, theft and fraud committed by the foreigners among other petty issues. The use of violence to drive away the foreigners become a more acceptable way of dealing with the situation. This can be traced back to the colonial times where people hold mass violent demonstrations against the apartheid government. In the post-colonial era, the South Africans have continued to practise mass demonstrations as a way of expressing their disgruntlement or grievances.

4.3 Leadership in crisis

The South African xenophobia attacks are continually occurring. This can be attributed to economic decline, lack of jobs and poor service delivery (Bond et al, 2011). This can all point to leadership crisis as the main catalyst of the recent xenophobia attacks. Since 2008 same factors have been cited and they continue to go unaddressed. Several scholars have connected poverty in South Africa and xenophobia attacks (Mpofu- Chimbga, 2013; Hamber, 1999). Furthermore there is failure by the government to realise that they is need to address service delivery in the country among other factors which are giving anger to the black community. The remarks by the Zulu King Goodwill Zwelintini that all foreigners should be deported are heavily regarded to have incited the 2015 xenophobic attacks (Bulawayo Bureau, 2015). The King's utterances (although taken out of context by the media) endangered the lives of foreigners in South Africa and also placed regional peace at risk. Traditional leaders should be welcoming and promote peace among the people regardless of the race or colour of skin. It is of paramount importance to note that when a Kings speak something people listen and any action they do people interpret and act upon it.

5. Statement of the problem

There is need to find a solution to xenophobic attacks in South Africa. The recent South African xenophobic attacks resulted in the loss of people's lives and vandalism of property. The foreigners especially blacks from the neighbouring countries continue to live in fear for their lives. Xenophobia does not only pose security threat to South Africa only but it fuels tension in the whole of SADC region. The other problem is that it threatens the region's economic, social and political integration, due to the fact that other nations would feel humiliated and dishonoured by having their citizens harassed and killed in the neighbouring country. Xenophobia threatens to destroy a rich history of brotherhood shared by the SADC countries since the colonial era. This makes xenophobia not a South African problem but a regional problem.

6 The objectives of the study

The overall objective of the study is to explain the efforts of SADC in the establishment of peace and harmony in South Africa and SADC as a region. The specific objective of this study is to contribute information towards permanent solution to curb the recurring xenophobic attacks in South Africa. The study seeks to establish the existing policy frameworks of promoting peace in SADC which can be used to inform policy in South Africa. This understanding would help in the creation of more appropriate national policies which can help to prevent further attacks.

7 Theoretical framework of the study

The discourse discusses xenophobia using scapegoat theory. Scapegoat theory is a theoretical framework which is used mainly in sociology and psychology disciplines. It locates xenophobia with social transition and change (Allport, 1954). The hate or hostility against foreigners is deemed to come as a result of the limited resources such as employment, housing, education, medical services and other public service which were entirely the expectation of the people during transition period (Tshitereke, 1999; Harris, 2002). Allport (1954) points out that frustrations lead to prejudice especially among disadvantaged people and in so doing they identify a scapegoat who are usually foreigners. At the turn of transition into democracy, the black majority had higher expectations of the new government. As time goes on they soon realise that their expectations were never going to be fulfilled (Tshitereke, 1999). This gap between the expectations and the reality was filled with frustration (Gomo, 2010). This made the black South African population to turn their anger on the immigrants living in South Africa. The immigrants became the scapegoat, South African people instead of directing their anger towards the government; they forged violence against the foreigners as a form of protest.

8. Research methodology

The results of this research come entirely from secondary data. In order to obtain data on xenophobia and SADC policy frameworks, discourse analyses was employed as the main data collection tool. Matunhu (2012) notes that discourse analysis is more of critiquing the literature and coming out with a new interpretation. Nunez (2011) concurs with Matunhu when he points out that discourse analysis is when scholars began looking beyond grammar and what was being said and start looking at what was not said. The researcher analysed data from secondary data sources such as internet, newspapers and books on xenophobia.

9. Results and discussion

Thorough discourse analysis applied in this study reveals that SADC can play a prominent role in preventing xenophobia in the region. Research information was extracted from specific documents created by SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation (OPDSC). The Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) 1 and SIPO 11 were found to contain very important information which if utilised by the SADC governments would lead to peace and sanity in its member countries including South Africa. The fundamental objectives of SADCC were also found to be vital and could inform the current organisation SADC in the process of finding preventative measure of dealing with xenophobia.

9.1 SADCC efforts to curb xenophobia

Nathan (2006) points out that SADCC was established with the intention of shielding the member states against the military warfare adopted by the South African apartheid regime. The aim of the apartheid regime was to use both economic and military power to launch offensive strike at the newly independent Southern African countries. The main motivation for forming SADCC was security. SADCC was formed with the intention of fighting apartheid. With the end of apartheid in 1994 and the coming of democracy South Africa was admitted into SADCC and as a result SADCC was dissolved resulting in the formation of SADC. The new organisation had to change its goal and mandate. For instance, they were no longer fighting apartheid but rather focused their efforts on the integration of SADC as a region (Saurombe, 2010). Also, it was mandated to initiate regional economic development and also face new challenges (Nathan, 2006). The South African xenophobia, as a new challenge facing SADC region, it cannot be left to tackled by South Africa alone.

9.2 SADC security sector

Van Nieuwkerk (2012) points out that SADC established its Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC) to also help combating xenophobia attacks in South Africa. In 2001, the SADC Heads of the State and Government signed the protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation on behalf of the member states in the areas mentioned above (Nathan, 2012). OPDSC was mandated with an objective of preparing a Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO). SIPO had three objectives firstly to provide guidelines for action (strategies and activities), shape the institutional framework for day to day activities of the organ and lastly to align SADC's peace and security with that of African Union (AU) (Van Nieuwkerk, 2012).

Thus in the SIPO objectives there is an opportunity to assist in curbing the problem of xenophobia and some peace related problems which may arise. The aim was to provide guidelines for actions, strategies and activities (Van Nieuwkerk, 2012). SIPO I, achieved this by establishing trust and confidence among the member states through sharing of information, particularly co-operation in various defence areas such as information exchange and sharing of the training institution. The SIPO I's objective if well implemented can be of benefit to the government of South Africa in the fight against xenophobia. It allows it to access information and also enquire from other nations on how to combat xenophobia. Considering the fact that one of the causes of xenophobia outlined is the existence of the hidden hand (Hickel, 2014). This requires co-operation of all SADC countries in terms of sharing intelligence if the organised crime like this is to be combated.

9.3 Regional Early Warning Centre (REWC)

Van Nieuwkerk (2012:10) notes that SADC under the guidelines of SIPO I managed to establish Regional Early Warning Centre (REWC). This body was tasked with helping to anticipate, prevent and manage conflict. This is another apparatus discovered by this study which can be used to combat violence such as xenophobia attacks in the region. The study found out that REWC with the cooperation of research on the state of affairs on the region, it can be used to combat xenophobia. REWC has a team of researchers from the entire SADC states at its disposal which means that before xenophobia occurs, there is ample time to form strategies on how to manage it before the citizens of the region are endangered. This does not place REWC at the centre of the South African politics but can help in informing new policy on how to counter such attacks. The effective use and funding of this centre will go a long way in solving pertinent issues which may arise within the nation's borders.

9.4 Strategic indicative plan for the ORGAN

The review of SIPO I resulted in the creation of a new document known as SIPO II. The SADC team of OPDSC reviewed the objectives, strategies and activities undertaken by the various sectors relevant to security and peace. Van Nieuwkerk (2012:10) points out that SIPO II was developed after noting the challenges confronting the region such as climate change, economic recession, unconstitutional changes of government, growing vulnerability of national borders, illegal migration, drugs and human trafficking, money laundering and maritime piracy. It is unfortunate that xenophobia was not one of the challenges cited as disturbing regional peace. This research can as well show that SADC in developing SIPO II it is well capable of developing a policy document or new strategic document which can put xenophobia as a prime agenda. The SADC's existing documents provides a point of departure for future trajectory as can be shown by the proceeding discussion of the tenets of

SIPO II which provides a gap for further discussion and ways in which to combat xenophobia.

9.5 Policing and public security

It is imperative to note that SIPO II contains different objectives for different sectors of the Organ such as Politics and Diplomacy, Defence, State security and Public security and Police. All these sectors can have one or two objectives relevant for maintaining peace in the individual state. However it is the police and Public security which is more vital in the fight against xenophobia. This sector, according to Van Nieuwkerk (2012) it focuses on the prevention of cross border crime and enhancing law and order by coordinating the activities of the region's police services and forces. The number one of SIPO II is to protect people of the region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order (Van Nieuwkerk, 2012). This objective clarifies that it is the mandate of SADC through its policing sector to find a lasting solution to the problem of xenophobia.

The sector on Public security sector clearly focuses on the safety of SADC people. The public security sector, according Nieuwkerk (2012: 11) seeks to address the threats associated with organised crime syndicates by coordinating the activities of law enforcement, public safety, correctional services and prisons, immigration, parks and wildlife and customs and refugees. This sector deals with specific areas where xenophobia attacks or incidents have been rife. This shows that with a clear utilisation of the SIPO II document, the SADC countries can help one another in maintaining peace and more so in compacting violence.

9.6 Creation policy framework

This research has noted that though SADC have the organs which are working tireless in creating such documents as SIPO I and SIPO II, they are not fully utilised. However, Van Nieuwkerk (2012:10) points out that SIPO II is not a binding policy document or legal framework but it is a guide to a collective behaviour. This is good but SADC can create even better legally binding documents which can encourage its members to contribute to ensuring peace in the region. The SADC countries can maintain their non-interference stance but policy frameworks which can help individual states maintaining peace are of paramount importance. SADC has already proven that they can stand by one another in case of international onslaught by western governments, as evidenced by the case of Zimbabwe. It is the right time that they learn of history of xenophobia and its effects and put necessary measures to combat it and put the matter at rest. Anything which is not

enforced by law is as good as nothing but ensuring that there is such measure ensures awareness.

9.7 Learning from other African countries

Zambia is a member of SADC and was a member of the Front Line States (FLS). The FLS was a group independent African states who were dedicated to bringing independence to all African states in the SADC region, and to the fight against apartheid government in South Africa. Zambia in the 1970s, was the home of the most liberation movements in the region which included ANC, SWAPO and ZAPU. Nkama (2015) points out that during this time Zambia committed its funds to the liberation of SADC countries by providing all necessary help required. It can be noted that the government of Kenneth Kaunda gave more scholarships to the freedom fighters at the expense of his population. The freedom fighters were also provided with accommodation, transport, and free medical aid, financial grants to meet both personal needs and security (Nkama, 2015). In order to counter xenophobic attack on fellow black Africans who were coming in need of help, Zambia introduced a subject called civics in the education system from grade (4) four. The subject taught the children about the history of the region. This pre-empted the young generation of people in Zambia of xenophobic tendencies. The children learnt to value their neighbours and also have good feeling towards them. This can be used to overcome xenophobia in South Africa through the use of the education curriculum system. This is a position which can be taken by the SADC as a region because all these nations share a rich history, not worth to be destroyed by detractors or lack of knowledge. Education is the best way to remove psychological fear or long withheld stereotyping which may have existed over the generations.

Oppong (2006) provides an interesting quote by the former President of Ghana and the father of Pan Africanism which supports Africa's brotherhood. Kwame Nkrumah stated that at long last the battle has ended and our country, Ghana, is forever free! We again rededicate ourselves in the struggle to emancipate other countries in Africa, for the independence of Ghana is meaningless, unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent (Oppong, 2006:39). This statement symbolises priceless sacrifices which were put thereafter by the then independent African nations in trying to gain the freedom of others who were yet to attain independence. South Africa is among the nations which benefited tremendously from this Assistance as discussed earlier.

10. Conclusion

Xenophobia is a social problem which has serious consequences on the SADC region as a whole. Xenophobia threatens the region's peace, economic, social and economic integration. It even threatens to destroy the rich history which binds the SADC countries in a hub of brotherhood and comradeship. The right regional measure for countering xenophobic attacks in South Africa is through effective regional co-operation. The success of winning the battle of xenophobia depends on the actions taken by SADC as a region.

Africa's struggles are no longer against the western colonialism but include fighting the monopolisation of the world economy by the dominant west. In this case the SADC as a region have to shield and maintain solidarity which is beyond political support but also be in a position to accommodate the neighbouring population. In this case South Africa is surrounded with countries which are performing dismally in economic terms due to various reasons. There is a need to show solidarity by teaching the public, the importance of accommodating other groups. Combating xenophobia should not be ignored but be tackled forever by introducing a curriculum designed to impose this measure. Teaching the new generation the oneness of Africa helps the new generation to appreciate one another and also combat xenophobia in the process.

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REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT SUPPORTING IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURSHIP TO IMPROVE FOOD SECURITY IN THE SEDIBENG DISTRICT MUNICIPALITY

Dr. L.B. Mzini

North West University, South Africa

Abstract

The paper assesses the framework regulating immigrant entrepreneurship in the Sedibeng District Municipality (SDM). South Africa and the United States of America have traditionally been a popular destination for low-skill and high-skill migrants. Such inflows are brought about by profound economic uncertainty and rising unemployment. These instances also lead to food insecurity and poverty. Entrepreneurship can be an engine to sustainable economic growth. It also improves self-reliance for low-skill migrants. Some immigrants settle for self-employment where they start a business because they lack other employment alternatives. This is witnessed by the expansion of foreign owned shops and informal retailers observed in the townships and the city centres of South Africa. The relative success of migrant-owned businesses is an important policy question. A qualitative method was undertaken to review the conditions regulating immigrant entrepreneurship. Interviews were scheduled with Local Economic Development (LED) Unit of the SDM. The study found that immigrant entrepreneurship is recognised as an important source for overcoming food insecure immigrants. Firstly, the results revealed that the immigrant entrepreneurs operate their business from a fixed business structure found in the shops and street trading zones found in Vereeniging and Vanderbijlpark. Secondly, findings also indicated that all entrepreneurs encountered problems in their trading zones. Lastly, despite all challenges, South African government still maintain positive perspectives in encouraging immigrant entrepreneurs.

Keywords:

1. Introduction

South Africa and the United States of America have traditionally been a popular destination for low-skill and high-skill immigrants (Fairlie & Lofstrom, 2013:1). Fairlie and Lofstrom (2013:1) further indicates that immigrant entrepreneurship has become increasingly important in the global context, as both immigration and foreign-born business ownership has grown steadily over the last decades. Immigrant entrepreneurship is a process by which an immigrant establishes a business in a host country which is not the immigrant's country of origin (Fatoki & Patswawairi, 2012:134).

As a result, the entrepreneurial activity of immigrants is gaining the attention of an increasing number of scholars. Recent findings show that immigrants are more prone to become entrepreneurs than indigents (Irastorza & Peña, 2014:35; Kalitanyi, & Visser, 2010:377). South Africa has been a migrant-receiving country for many decades. Since 1990 there has been a growing movement of foreign migrants and refugees to South Africa. The migrants have come primarily from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries, whilst some come from elsewhere in Africa specialising in the mining and agricultural sector and outside Africa such countries as China, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Some immigrants have established themselves in the informal and small enterprise economy due to economic uncertainty and rising unemployment. Like any entrepreneur, immigrant entrepreneurs also face major obstacles to adapt to a business environment. Policymakers in the host countries are aware of the implications caused by immigration and the quest for economic development. Hence the pursuit of this study inquires about the framework regulating immigrant entrepreneurship in the Sedibeng District Municipality (SDM). The section below defines the concept of immigrant entrepreneurship. The paper also gives a brief overview of the main characteristics of the policy measures implemented to strengthen immigrant entrepreneurship. The paper also presents a framework to analyse the regulatory framework governing the immigrant entrepreneurship activities.

2. Research methods

The study is set in the Sedibeng District Municipality (SDM) a category C district municipality in Gauteng province. The SDM comprises of three local municipalities namely, Emfuleni, Midvaal and Lesedi Local Municipalities. The Local Economic Development (LED) Unit of the SDM was chosen because of its role for promoting economic development as prescribed by Section 152 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. A qualitative research was considered for this study. The questionnaire was developed and designed to ascertain information about the eligibility and regulatory environment supporting immigrant entrepreneurship and ensuing food security in the SDM. The objective of the questionnaires was explained to the respondent by means of a telephone call and via email to send the questions. A local government was selected because local government interacts closest with communities. Local governments are responsible for providing regulating and providing infrastructure and to promote socio-economic development among vulnerable communities. Primary data was collected from the LED Unit of the Sedibeng District Municipality (SDM). Ethical considerations were taken into account to ensure confidentiality of respondents, consistency and reliable documentation of the research results.

2.1 Food security and immigrant entrepreneurship

A growing body of research on immigrant entrepreneurship has developed over the past several years. This is especially true for countries that are struggling to survive the economic recession (Irastorza & Peña, 2014:35). An immigrant entrepreneur is a business owner, having foreign origin, who engages into the act of economic innovation, organization creation and profit-seeking in the market sector (Vinogradov, 2008). Immigration is a complex phenomenon, characterised by a blurred boundary between the country of origin and the host country; the appearance of high and low skilled immigrants and global cities (Zhang, 2010:iii). Whilst undertaking entrepreneurial activities, immigrant entrepreneurs face obstacles that deny them access to the job market and also experience food challenges upon resettling in their host country.

Food is one of the most basic needs for human survival (Smith & Subandoro, 2007:vii). Food security is internationally defined as the condition whereby the nation is able to manufacture, import, retain and sustain food needed to support its population with minimum per capita nutritional standards (Labadarios, Davids, Mchiza and Weir-Smith, 2009:9). The World Health Organization (WHO, 2012) elaborates that “commonly, the concept of food security is defined as including both physical and economic access to food that meets people's dietary needs as well as their food preferences”. Food security is built on three pillars, namely: food availability, food access and food use (Labadarios, Davids, Mchiza and Weir-Smith, 2009:9). Food security is a complex sustainable development issue, linked to health through malnutrition, but also to sustainable economic development, environment, and trade (WHO, 2012). Food insecurity is not only about lack of food, but about broader economic and social circumstances that lead immigrants to the point of being food insecure (Soo, 2012:2). A sustainable economic environment is essential for vulnerable communities in order to live a meaningful life.

Normally people migrate for two economic reasons, namely: for work and opportunities to maximise incomes. Mostly, entrepreneurship emerges as an alternative to unemployment and a mechanism to overcome difficult labour market barriers for many foreigners (Irastorza & Peña, 2014:35). The interest in supporting immigrant entrepreneurship was raised in the latter half of 1990's (Quyen, 2013:1). Undoubtedly, this was partly connected to the high number of immigrants who are unemployed. Since then, entrepreneurship has been the most available means for economic and social survival for foreigners who are facing diverse challenges living in a completely different society (Quyen, 2013:1). Irastorza and Peña (2014:37) indicated that entrepreneurship is often conceived as an alternative to overcome the substantial labour market barriers faced by immigrants due to

their 'liability of foreignness. Entrepreneurship is also opted to seek self-realisation while immigrants face an uncertain future, and they take risks by giving up their status in their country of origin or by starting up a firm (Irastorza & Peña, 2014:35). Entrepreneurship allows the entrepreneur to see beyond the confines of resource constraints and locate opportunities missed by others (Keogh & Polonsky, 1998:4).

A growing number of immigrants have entered South Africa. Kalitanyi and Visser (2010:377) indicates that a significant number of these immigrants have successfully applied their entrepreneurial flair in establishing small enterprises to earn a living. These immigrants become self-employed or 'immigrant' entrepreneurs (Rath, 2006:1). In addition they managed to create employment for locals. Immigrant entrepreneurs normally trade in three forms, namely: by means of the middleman minority, the ethnic market niche and the ethnic enclave economy (Garg & Phayane, 2014:57). The premise of the middleman minority theory is that immigrant entrepreneurs are drawn to certain types of business sectors to earn money quickly (Garg & Phayane, 2014:57). The ethnic market niche theory is framed around the notion that immigrants find business start-up opportunities in market niches created by the interactions between opportunities in society and the characteristics of the immigrant group (Garg & Phayane, 2014:57).

The ethnic enclave economies theory is built upon the point of view that immigrant entrepreneurs typically find business start-up opportunities within immigrant communities and neglected business sectors in the broader economy. Some trade in the formal and informal economy and they offer retail or personal services required by local households (Garg & Phayane, 2014:62). Immigrant entrepreneurship comprises small stores confined to the lower segment of markets and their activities involve selling curios, retailing ethnic clothes and foods, motor-car repairs and panel beating, and operating hairdressing salons (Kalitanyi & Visser, 2010:379). A summary of the immigrants' business clusters according to their activities and origins is illustrated in Table 1. Immigrant small business owners are playing an important role among a wide variety of industries (Kallick, 2012:9). South Africa has received skilled and semi-skilled immigrants from Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe and from Indo-Asia countries.

Table 1: Immigrants' business clusters according to their origins

Sector	Activity	Origin of immigrant
Retail	Curio selling	Malawi, Mozambique & Zimbabwe
	Selling ethnic clothing	West Africa
	Food retail	West Africa
Service	Motor-car repairs/panel beating	Mozambique & Zimbabwe
	Hairdressing	All
	Operating restaurants	West Africa
Production	Traditional clothing	West Africa
	Wedding dresses	West Africa
	General tailoring	Malawi
Other business sectors	Nightclubs	West Africa
	Cafes	West Africa
	Several import/export	West Africa
	Music shops	Central Africa, West Africa
	Traditional healing	East Africa, West Africa

Source: Kalitanyi & Visser, 2010:379

The data presented above shows that there is widespread recognition of the significance of immigrant entrepreneurship in traditional industries ranging from small-scale retail to garment manufacturing (Saxenian, 1999:3). Fairlie and Lofstrom (2013) indicate that immigrant entrepreneurship is becoming increasingly important as both immigration and foreign-born business ownership has grown steadily over the last decades. Immigrant entrepreneurs are becoming visible also in high-value activities which characterise advanced urban economies (Kloosterman & Rath, 2010:101). They are mostly witnessed in the central business districts (CBD), in Johannesburg, Vereeniging and in the taxi ranks. This is supported by Kalitanyi and Visser (2010:379) as they argue that entrepreneurship is a strong tool for immigrants' economic and social integration and is a means by which immigrants without education or technical skills can escape poverty.

2.2 Factors driving entrepreneur motivation

Entrepreneurship is motivated by internal and external factors mostly associated with food security. The motivational factors can be classified into two categories which are "Push" and "Pull" factors (Quyen, 2013:13) and are presented in Table 2. The "pull" factors are characterized by positive values and spirits such as dream, vision, innovation or opportunity seeking; whilst the "push" factors force immigrants to entrepreneurial undertaking option in order to fulfil their "necessity" needs (Quyen, 2013:13).

Table 2: The pull factors and the push factors

Pull factors (Seeing opportunity)	Push factors (Necessity)
• Need for independence • Looking for challenges • Job satisfaction • Generate more income • Lifelong dream to be entrepreneur	• Achieving better work life balance • Pessimistic view in the labour market • Competitive life style • Identified gap in the market • Last resort

Source: Quyen, 2013:13

Internal motives such as need for independence, monetary motivation, need for self-realization, high achievement, flexible working time or desire for becoming one's own boss are considered as pull factors. External circumstances are considered as entrepreneurship push factors. Negative environment impacts such as unemployment situation, dissatisfaction in current job or lack of career prospects are key factors that “push” a person into business. However, the “push” factors are more significant to immigrants because unemployment is often higher among immigrants than among the majority population. According to Habiakare, Owusu, Mbare and Landy (2009:63), “immigrants do not enter business as a way of life but rather it is the best opportunities of making a living when life provides few alternatives”. In other words, entrepreneurship serves immigrants as a mean of economic survival and a fast method to social integration.

3. Challenges faced by immigrant entrepreneurs

Many migrant and ethnic minority businesses are relatively small and face the same challenges as other small enterprises. Immigrants face major obstacles to starting a business due to a lack of language proficiency, professional networks, knowledge of local business systems, start-up capital, and credit history (Desiderio, 2014). Immigrant entrepreneurs face challenges such as lack of finance; marketing and sales skills; working longer hours; cost of living and operation; language barriers; administrative and regulatory requirement; access to technology; management skills; access to information and advice (Manyi, 2010:31). Most frequently cited were the problems associated with acquiring visas and permits and dealing with customs (with SADC migrants experiencing greater problems) (Rogerson, 1997:3). They also face police harassments, anti-foreigner violence and invisible discriminations in the labour markets on a daily basis and being targeted by criminals and gangs (Landau, 2004). Manyi (2010, 31) further indicated that immigrant entrepreneurs lack awareness of administrative regulations and lack of familiarities on how business is traditionally carried in the country. Another potential barrier to business ownership among

immigrants is legal status. Legal status may affect the decision to start a business for several reasons. First, legal status is a prerequisite for access to many institutions which are important to entrepreneurs (Fairlie & Lofstrom, 2013:25).

Immigrant-owned businesses are visible and often become easy target for xenophobic attacks. These challenges still remain significant for immigrant entrepreneurship. The Centre for Development and Enterprise (CDE's) announced the policy recommendations on supporting entrepreneurship in South Africa in order to:

- develop new guidelines for supporting entrepreneurship;
- appoint a task team to find ways of reducing the costs of doing business in South Africa;
- establish a regulatory impact unit in the presidency;
- encourage immigrant entrepreneurs;
- build on the private sector's strengths with respect to implementation;
- ensure much improved information; and
- celebrate entrepreneurs as heroes (Bernstein, 2004:6-8).

The government has sought to promote entrepreneurship in order to achieve a variety of hoped-for benefits, providing a 'survivalist' cushion for people who have lost their jobs in the formal sector as a result of restructuring exercises; and driving economic growth and job creation (Bernstein, 2004:9). Numerous policies and programmes have been introduced and implemented to shift focus from immigration enforcement to integration. The section below reports about the regulatory environment that is supporting immigrant entrepreneurship.

4. Results and discussions

The content following this section will present the results and discusses the conditions for supporting immigrant entrepreneurship in South Africa with reference to the Sedibeng District Municipality. The discussion in the sections below will focus on the following aspects:

- policies and regulations for immigrant entrepreneurship in South Africa;
- local government and the immigrant entrepreneurship; and
- key levers as supportive mechanisms for immigrant entrepreneurs

4.1 Policies and regulations for immigrant entrepreneurship in South Africa

It bears repeating that government can fail to facilitate entrepreneurship through excessive or inadequate regulation (Bernstein, 2004:33). Legal environment refers to a set of laws, regulations, which influence the business organisations and their operations. Every

business organisation has to obey, and work within the framework of the law. International migration is a relatively new subject on the public and policy agenda of the South African government and has come to prominence as a result of a protracted and controversial process of drafting new immigration policy and legislation (Crush & Williams, 2005:1). There exists a great variety of business laws and regulations that may apply to different businesses, however none of them can be attributed specifically to immigrant entrepreneurs. Regulations are used to manage the collection of taxes and registration fees and enforcing labour legislation. The business law guides on: employment law, occupational health and safety standards, licences, environmental regulations, intellectual property rights (European Commission, 2008:4).

The markets in which entrepreneurs operate are regarded as social constructs embedded in specific socio-cultural and institutional contexts with different sets of regulations that differ across time and place (Kloosterman & Rath, 2010:112). Markets are regulated in different forms. The regulation may focus on products, suppliers, customers, contracts, and expected behaviour. Immigrants are widely perceived as being highly entrepreneurial and important for economic growth and innovation. This is reflected in immigration policies and many developed countries have created special visas and entry requirements in an attempt to attract immigrant entrepreneurs (Fairlie & Lofstrom, 2013:1). Regulations stipulate the conditions in which goods and services must be traded. Some regulations may be more difficult or easier for newcomers such as immigrant entrepreneurs to explore certain opportunities for businesses (Kloosterman & Rath, 2010:112). Regulation is contingent on prevailing models of allocating economic citizenship rights to economic actors and on the division of labour between market, state, and family (Kloosterman & Rath, 2010:112).

There is general agreement that entrepreneurship builds strong economies, provides employment and presents choices, while generating more opportunities. A successful business depends on the size of the market, geographical location, the position of the economy from a developmental perspective, and a robust economic policy of a government (Garg & Phayane, 2014:58). Different forms of regulations are made and multiple agents play a role in the processes, such as local, national or international governmental agents, unions, non-profit organisations, voluntary associations, and individual and their social networks (Kloosterman & Rath, 2010:112).

Regulatory frameworks applied in the global context are different for providing opportunity structures and different sets of incentives for immigrants to become an entrepreneur. In order to be successful in creating more and better growth and employment

governments need more entrepreneurs and a better climate for entrepreneurship (European Commission, 2008:4). In order to promote entrepreneurship all groups of society have to be involved. Some forms of regulation have a global sweep (Kloosterman & Rath, 2010:112). In Europe, a conference titled the “Ethnic Minority Businesses” was held in December 2003 and in March 2004 to steer the role of immigrant entrepreneurs. In Sweden, the immigration policy has enabled immigrants from different parts of the world to move to Sweden and work. Some students from India and other countries have been granted work permits. In Australia, immigrant entrepreneurs are recognised for generating significant economic growth and import-export activity across a broad range of industries (Collins, 2008:49).

4.1.1 Eligibility and regulatory framework

Policymakers continue try to figure out a way for enabling immigrants to start businesses in host countries. A set of policies were set to integrate immigrants in the local economy. The challenge for policymakers will be to recognize these mutually beneficial connections between immigration, investment, trade, and economic development. The South African Constitution provides guidelines about the role of local governments to promote economic development. Based on Section 152 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, the objects of local government are:

- to provide democratic and accountable government for local communities;
- to ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner;
- to promote social and economic development;
- to promote a safe and healthy environment; and
- to encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local government.

The objects of local government are translated in various legislations in South Africa. The SDM aligns itself with the White Paper on Local Government of 1998, which provides the developmental character of the system of local government. The Municipal Systems Act, 2002 (Act 32 of 2002) also provides transparent decision-making and citizen participation in the political and municipal processes. Immigrants are further supported by the South African Immigration Act, 2002 (Act 13 of 2002). Paragraph d) of the Immigration Act of 2002 guides that the economic growth should be promoted through the employment of needed foreign labour, facilitation of foreign investment in the, and tourism is promoted. However, eligibility of immigrant entrepreneurs is made possible by issuing a business visa which may be issued for a period not exceeding three years at a time. A business visa may be issued by the Director-General to a foreigner intending to establish or invest in, or who has established

or invested in, a business in the Republic. The holder of a temporary residence permit have less advantages as compared to the one issued with a permanent residence permit. Section 25 of the Immigration Act of 2002 indicates that the holder of a permanent residence permit has all the rights, privileges, duties and obligations of a citizen, save for those rights, privileges, duties and obligations which a law or the Constitution explicitly ascribes to citizenship. These policies are a point of departure for local government as they have a role in supporting economic development, while at the same time pursuing pro-poor policies.

4.2 Local governments and the immigrant entrepreneurship

In policies to support immigrant entrepreneurship, Desiderio (2014:6) outlines a variety of policies that seek to remove these obstacles and promote success among immigrant entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs (both most talented and well-financed) need supportive environment in order to flourish and prosper. Throughout the world governments have shifted its focus from immigration enforcement to integration. A supportive environment is essential for any business environment. Desiderio (2014:6) identifies two broad groups of policy measures to help immigrant entrepreneurship to thrive: namely: business-support programs and structural policies promoting an entrepreneurship-friendly environment. A municipality's future economic and social health depends on its being investor friendly, with incentives for new and existing business to put down roots and grow. Good planning and management must include long term thinking about spatial development and transport planning. The SDM was asked to elaborate on their legal frameworks for supporting immigrant entrepreneurship for a municipality; immigrant entrepreneurship is regulated through a "municipal by-laws and informal trading policy". The following sections also discusses on the aspects that confirms the support for immigrant entrepreneurship.

4.2.1 Informal Trading Policy and Municipal by-laws

The municipality was asked to elaborate on their legal frameworks for supporting immigrant entrepreneurship. The SDM reported that they developed the Informal Trading Policy which is linked to the principles of the Growth and Development Strategy of the Gauteng province. The SDM also reported that they do not have laws or legal prescripts that are designed exclusively for foreign nationals. The SDM indicated that it does not have legal instruments for regulating immigrant entrepreneurship except the enforcement of its bylaws around trading, municipal health services and building control which is applicable to all businesses including foreign owned businesses. The SDM further indicated that the central objective of the by-laws is to "achieve regulation through maintaining law and order in the local area. The by-laws are mainly concerned with the following aspects of informal trading: "general conduct of the informal traders; cleanliness; restricted or prohibited trading areas;

lease or allocation of stands; impoundment and removal; vicarious liability of persons trading; and offences and penalties”.

Street trading has been successfully entrenched in urban cities in developing countries in Africa due to the attractiveness of convenience, affordability and personalized services from known vendors. It was interesting to find out that immigrant entrepreneurs trading in the SDM were not harassed as compared to those trading in the CBD of Johannesburg, normally chased by Metro Police. In terms of regulatory framework the SDM indicated that there is law enforcement unit within the two local municipalities responsible to uphold the general guidelines. The law enforcing agencies are more regulatory in mind and not developmental. This has brought forth the idea that law enforcing agencies need to be educated of the significance of the sector such that their approach to informal trading be changed and thus assist in growing the sector.

4.2.2 Supportive environment for immigrant entrepreneurship

Many countries have used the targeted business-support programmes to directly target the immigrant entrepreneurs. Such programmes help them to overcome the specific challenges encountered in the host country especially to newly arrived immigrants, immigrant women or refugees. The programme is implemented in the context of comprehensive integration plans, as a part of the broad range of measures adopted to facilitate the successful insertion of immigrants in the receiving society (Desiderio, 2014:8). The paper also aimed to explore the context for supporting the environment for immigrant entrepreneurship enacted by municipalities to best promote immigrant entrepreneurship and for the establishment and survival of immigrant enterprises. The process of immigrating to and settling in a new country involves many life changes; one of the changes that are most apparent on a daily basis relates to food (Soo, 2012). Starting and running a business can be a challenging experience for immigrant entrepreneurs. Municipalities are required to provide a safe and secure for its citizens; where people live in a healthy environment; where the urban environment is well-managed. Most immigrant enterprises are located in the urban areas, comprising of low-skilled population and highly skilled immigrants. The study found that they are spread across the economy, with businesses in the services sector of the economy, including retail, real estate, finance, media and tourism (Collins, 2008:51). Others are professionals such as doctors, dentists and architects who run their own private practices. Low-skilled immigrants do not rely extensively on their own community resources. In this regard immigrant entrepreneurs tend to follow a more “individualistic” pattern of establishing and running their business.

Immigrants are particularly vulnerable while they seek accommodation and acceptance in the host country. Immigrants experience food challenges upon resettling in their host country and become economically disadvantaged. Immigrant households are more likely to be food insecure than non-immigrant households. Food security is linked to how immigrants perceive membership, reconstruct identity, and integrate successfully. Based on the objects of local government as laid in Section 152 (1) of the Constitution, a municipality is held responsible to ensure that the immigrant entrepreneurs are integrated in their local economic agenda. The SDM also reported that policy discussions are always undertaken through a consultative process. A consultative process included informal and formal business organisations, councillors, officials, civic organisations and development forums, as well as members of the public.

4.3 Key levers as supportive mechanisms for immigrant entrepreneurs

A municipality must ensure that the key levers for change management and support are considered. The key levers comprises planning, the allocations policy, the registration process, and the rentals policy (EThekweni Unicity Municipality, 2001:7) and are discussed in the following sub-sections.

4.3.1 Planning

Absence of legal mechanisms for entry and work in South Africa may lead to irregular migration within municipalities. Therefore a municipality must properly plan for new markets and trading opportunities, bearing in mind the economic needs of traders, the need for more vibrant land use, and the need for orderly town, spatial and transport planning, as well and health and safety (EThekweni Unicity Municipality. 2001:7). Many municipalities have not developed polices and a by-laws on the informal trading sector. The SDM also announced that the absence of strategic framework inhibits district and metropolitan municipalities and metros to align with their local policies, strategies and by-laws concerning the sector. In spite of the lack of a strategic direction some municipalities have been able to develop and implement their by-laws in their specific regions. For example, the City of Cape Town and the EThekweni Municipality showcase their plans for supporting immigrant entrepreneurs. The researcher thinks that the showcasing is witnessed by the influx of immigrants in the respective municipalities.

4.3.2 Allocations policy

Informal trading concentrates on economic activity undertaken by entrepreneurs who sell legal goods and services within a space deemed to be public property, within the

informal sector. A public space requires robust strategies to manage the allocated trading spaces. The study found that the allocations policy is central to the entire policy for the informal economy and it is the lever through which local government can steer management and support of the informal economy. The allocations policy was reported to be a strategy to maintain equity and access to the trading spaces particularly for immigrant entrepreneurs. Its implementation allows municipalities to provide opportunities for new entrants, in an economically sustainable and socially useful way. It also enables immigrant entrepreneurs to create jobs for the marginalised people. The SDM also indicated that the Department of Health is incorporated to approve trading permits. A granted trading permit is included into the municipalities' manual database for Informal Traders. The SDM further indicated that they intend to develop an electronic database that will assist in keeping track of informal traders. The electronic database system is envisaged to function like the one for the City of Johannesburg's electronic database because it allows for the City to keep track of monthly payments, allocation of stalls and the type of goods traded. In terms of allocating trading spaces, the SDM reported that the municipality in partnership with the Gauteng Provincial Department of Transport was able to allocate more stalls for traders in the Vereeniging, Bophelong Taxi Rank and Evaton Mall. Further developments are expected as the municipality has budgeted R200, 000 for Informal Traders' infrastructure in Thabong Mall and Palm Springs. Inclusive allocation of trading spaces was witnessed in the CBD of Vereeniging and Vanderbijlpark and throughout the malls built in the townships of the SDM.

4.3.3 Registration policy

A municipality is required to register small businesses working in public places. Registration is the action which gives permission to operate, and which provides access to services and support (EThekweni Municipality, 2001:7). Registering a business allows immigrant entrepreneurs to be free from the harassments caused by law enforcement officials and from the xenophobic attacks.

4.3.4 Rentals policy

Local government is moving towards dealing with informal traders as small business people. In the same way that built property has a value placed on it, depending on where it is located, so it is important to place value on different informal trading sites, such as pavements (EThekweni Municipality, 2001:7). Immigrant entrepreneurs rent their trading spaces in the informal trading stalls and in vacant office spaces in the town and in the townships.

5. Conclusion

The emergence of immigrant entrepreneurship can be seen as a result of necessity. The research also found that the immigrant entrepreneurs create both new jobs and important economic linkages that are central to the continuing success of the local economy. It is apparent from this study that immigrant-owned businesses from various parts of Africa have become a distinctive feature of the SDM small business economy. Immigrants maintained simple lifestyles, channelling their profits towards the growth of their businesses. There is therefore a need for local government to formulate policies, programmes and strategies that promote the inclusive local economic development. Migrants are actively involved in community development in the SDM. They also employ locals and enter into partnerships with young South Africans and share their experiences and business skills as a strategy for peaceful integration. Their integration into local economy also allows them to be food secured, as they need to feed themselves and their families. The income earned also allows them to send money to their family in the origin country. Their businesses are convenient to the local neighbourhoods.

Immigrant entrepreneurship is a valuable resource for increasing local economic growth. Surprisingly, until now, there has been relatively little basic information available about the number and characteristics of immigrant small business owners. Local municipalities will therefore need to plan and adapt strategies in creating an environment that is conducive for the small business initiatives. The study suggests that an institutional restructuring must be uplifted in order to re-integrate the regulation and control to re-integrate the regulation and control. The municipality may consider the performance guarantees in order to enhance the administrative and legal procedures for issuing trading policies. The lack of livelihood and the competition for limited resources gave rise to immigrant entrepreneurship and it is often opted for food security and self-reliance. However the right to economic participation is prohibited by police harassments and xenophobic attacks by local communities. There is a need for human resource training for law enforcement officials is essential in order to allow traders to enjoy their stay and to contribute meaningfully to the local economy. Municipalities must also ensure that the Bylaws are approved and reviewed in order to support and create new opportunities in a well-managed environment.

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ANALYSIS OF MICRO-ENTERPRISES AND THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARDS INCOME POVERTY REDUCTION IN SOUTH AFRICA

K.K. Meso,

M.G. Manamela,

University of Limpopo, South Africa

Abstract

Micro-enterprises are ubiquitous in the informal business sector of South Africa, predominantly in areas of economic opportunities. This can be justified by the soaring levels of income poverty, vulnerability and unemployment inter alia amid the destitute dwellers of South Africa. These business entities are purported to offer a safety net for the survival of the poor and unemployed youth amongst others. Additionally, they are regarded as being embryonic business establishments that have the potential to diminish the economic hardships of the income poor. Small, Medium and Micro-enterprises (SMMEs) discourses edify that majority of these nascent business entities are inundated by a plethora of impediments and an unconducive environment that encumbers their progress and sustainability. Challenges such as; start-up capital, collateral, business education and lack of stable markets are inter alia the most pressing issues facing micro-enterprises in South Africa. Thus, supporters of micro-enterprises take cognizance of the aforesaid draconian encounters that hinders their prospects of contributing positively towards income poverty reduction in South Africa. It is for these reasons that their contributions towards income poverty reduction remain inadequate. Nonetheless, commendation is given to the manner in which these embryonic business launches seem to have created majority of livelihoods. However, the sustainability of these livelihoods engenders contestations given the multiple impediments that impinge micro-enterprises and the informal sector within which they operate. The paper argues that micro-enterprises offer a deplorable means to an end for majority of the destitute in South Africa. It theoretically explores how micro-enterprises contribute towards income poverty reduction in South Africa. Continuingly, a theoretical analysis of the micro-entrepreneur will be included in this paper in order to enable an understanding of the motive and divergent push factors that influence entrepreneurs to initiate their own informal businesses. A more logical justification amidst scholars is that indigent entrepreneurs in South Africa are contingent on micro-enterprises or an equivalent business entity in order to survive. It concludes that micro-enterprises are to a large extent inadequate in reducing income poverty.

Keywords: Micro-Enterprises; Income Poverty Reduction; South Africa.

1. Introduction

Micro-enterprises are purported as being embryonic business establishment that have the potential to diminish the economic hardships of the income poor (Szakonyi & Urpelainen, 2015; Liedholm & Mead, 2010; Nichter, & Goldmark, 2009; Fatoki, 2013; Nguimkeu, 2014). They can either be inter alia new entrants, survivalists and emerging entities that have not yet grasped the skill of the business sector (Tapies, & Fernandes, 2012; Nguimkeu, 2014; Hansen, Ju Kim & Mehta, 2015). Amidst a variety of informal sector impediments, these business-entities diverge according to their size, scale, prestige and physiognomies. Furthermore, an individual that is income poor has no sustainable access to purchasing power to enable the consumption of basic needs, nutritious foods and non-food items (Rasanayagam, 2011; Stats SA, 2012). On the other hand, income poverty is measured through the national poverty lines (food poverty line, lower bound and upper bound poverty lines), including the international poverty line which is corrected for purchasing power parity (PPP) (Rasanayagam, 2011; Stats SA, 2012).

Micro-enterprises have offered a safety net for the survival of the poor and unemployed youths inter alia (Nichter, & Goldmark, 2009; Nguimkeu, 2014; Lauermann, 2013; Suffian, De Rue, Eckard, Copley & Mehta, 2013; Fatoki, 2013; Hansen et al., 2015). Conversely, one of the major stoppages of micro-enterprises are start-up capital for new entrants and working capital for existing ones because they cannot access the capital market nor meet the requirements of commercial banks for funding (Louw, Vermeulen, Kirsten, & Madevu, 2007; Fatoki, 2013; Lauermann, 2013; Turaeva, 2014). However, most families, especially the unemployed in developing countries like South Africa are resorting to the establishment of micro-enterprises as a response to dealing with economic hardships resulting from the unstable economic climate (Louw et al., 2007; Lauermann, 2013; Turaeva, 2014; Hansen et al., 2015). South Africa has been in an economic decline since the early 1970; thus, self-employment using a variety of life skills with limited access to economic resources and low levels of technology has become an alternative source of employment for many low-income households (Tapies, & Fernandes, 2012; Lauermann, 2013; Hansen et al., 2015). Poverty and inequality in South Africa has forced the majority of disadvantaged groups to be dependent on micro-enterprises. Therefore, emphasis on targeting business development and micro-enterprise support programs to reduce income poverty is suggested by the government of South Africa (Suffian et al., 2013; Hansen et al., 2015). Gauteng Province, being one of the most over populated province in South Africa also acknowledges the importance of promoting informal businesses as a tool for income poverty reduction as stipulated in the strategic framework for small businesses (Francis, Nassar & Metha, 2013; Lauermann, 2013). Accordingly, this paper explores micro-enterprises and the manner in

which they reduce income poverty in South Africa. It further takes a closer look at the multiple impediments that form part and parcel of the informal economy. It concludes that micro-enterprises are inadequate in reducing income poverty. Such entities offer an inadequate means to an end for the majority of the income poor. Thus, the recent introduction of the Ministry of SMMEs and other smaller organs of state that are directed towards dealing with growth and incubation of small businesses should place concerted efforts towards reducing the multiple challenges that encumbers micro-enterprise success (Francis et al., 2013; Louw et al., 2007; Suffian et al., 2013; Turaeva, 2014).

2. Objective of the Study

Micro-enterprises absorb a large proportion of the unemployed labour force in South Africa (Sonobe, Akoten, & Otsuka, 2011). However, the primary rationale and/or push factor behind the establishment of micro-enterprises apart from market opportunities is unemployment which becomes noticeable through income poverty amongst other things (Sonobe et al., 2011). Accordingly, income poverty is cross-cutting thereby affecting a variety of factors such as food security and access to basic needs inter alia. Therefore, the objective of the paper is to conceptually explore and determine the manner in which micro-enterprises contributes towards income poverty in South Africa (Fatoki, 2013). Moreover, the paper seeks to explore and study the micro-entrepreneurs themselves, including their divergent characteristics as viewed by different scholars. Additionally, various income poverty measures will be reconnoitred in order to understand the universal and national measurement of income poverty. Thus, this will assist in determining the kinds of returns offered by micro-enterprises and the manner in which they contribute towards income poverty reduction in South Africa.

3. Defining and Reconnoitring Micro-Enterprises

The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) (2005) stated that in South Africa, micro-enterprises are occasionally described as businesses whose annual turnovers are beneath the required vat registration limit. A further distinction is the “survivalist business” which is generally defined as providing income only below the poverty line. The Parliament of the Republic of South Africa (1995) records that a micro-enterprise is a business with (1) full-time equivalent of paid employee of less than 5 (2) total annual turnover of less than R150, 000 and (3) total gross asset value (including fixed property) of less than R100, 000. Furthermore, a micro-enterprise is a business with an annual turnover of less than R100, 000. Liedholm & Mead (2010) suggest that micro-enterprise are the tiniest of the small business sector and constitute a huge majority of the small business sector in both developing and developed countries. Nevertheless, micro-enterprises (both formal and

informal) in South Africa play a key role through sustaining many livelihoods and offering a safety net for the income poor (DTI, 2005). These ubiquitous entities are mostly renowned for ad hoc family-based employment particularly in the informal retail trade sector (Liedholm & Mead, 2010; Akpan, Essien, & Isihak, 2013; Fatoki, 2013).

These ubiquitous establishments can be new entrants, survivalists or emerging entities that indicate likelihood for growth (Liedholm & Mead, 2010; Fatoki, 2013). It is therefore reasonable to say that micro-enterprises are classified through their typologies and characteristics. Nonetheless, micro-enterprises are regarded as incipient entities of the small, medium and micro-enterprise (SMMEs) category and they usually operate on a small scale level (Liedholm & Mead, 2010). The size of these micro-enterprises can be justified by the fact that they are emerging entities characterized by a limited amount of capital, growth uncertainty and informality (Maloney, 2012; Guylani, Talukdar & Jack 2009; Akpan et al., 2013; Fatoki, 2013). Furthermore, the production process of such entities are narrow, often referred to as small scale; primarily because they have not yet mastered the art of the business industry (Maloney, 2012; Guylani et al., 2009; Akpan et al., 2013).

Micro-enterprises can be further characterized by their semi-legal nature and probability to operate unregistered (Liedholm & Mead, 2010). The semi-legality and unregistered nature of these entities poses a potential threat to their ability to benefit from micro-finance programmes and a variety of other business support opportunities (Nitcher & Goldmark, 2009). Furthermore, the informal sector within which micro-enterprises operates is often occasioned by an unregulated industry which eventually leads to a perfectly competitive market structure. These occurrences might lead to a micro-enterprise industry that is unfavourable to majority of survivalist kind of micro-enterprises (Nitcher & Goldmark, 2009; Hansen et al., 2015). Therefore, it appears to be imperative for these semi-legal and often unregistered micro-enterprises to seek formalization because it is evident that these informal entities are often prone to endure the challenges associated with the informal sector (Maloney, 2012; Hansen et al., 2015). Supporters of micro-enterprises acknowledge the uncertainty associated with such businesses considering the daunting informal, unregulated and often disabling environment within which they operate (Maloney, 2012; Nitcher & Goldmark, 2009; Hansen et al., 2015). Further distinctive features and characteristics of micro enterprises are seen through their number of employees and annual turnover.

Universal consensus has it that a micro-enterprise is characterized by a limited amount of workers/staff or employees and a small amount of turnover. Liedholm & Mead (2010) describes a micro-enterprise as a business consisting of five employees and a total

annual turnover of approximately R150 000. It is argued that the numbers of workers employed by micro-enterprises are few because of the size of these entities as well as the profit base produced by the micro-enterprises (Liedholm & Mead, 2010). It is widely noticed that majority of these entities are largely family owned and employ a low level of skills and technology. Furthermore, the low level of skills and technology may pose a threat to the growth and competitiveness of these establishments in their respective industries (Guylani et al., 2009; Hansen et al., 2015). Micro-enterprises are widely seen to be concentrated in low income low productivity activities, especially in petty trades and services (Liedholm & Mead, 2010; Szakonyi & Urpelainen, 2015). Therefore, the limited amount of turnover generated by these micro-enterprises can be justified by the fact that they are low productivity oriented activities often indulging in petty trades and services (Francis et al., 2013; Raeymaekers, Menkhaus, & Vlassenroot, 2008).

3. A Theoretical Analysis of the Micro-Entrepreneur

Understanding the unique qualities, traits and characteristics of micro-entrepreneurs is crucial to comprehend the holistic existence of micro-enterprises as well as their distinctive types and characteristics (Maloney, 2012; Szakonyi & Urpelainen, 2015). Okpukpara (2009) defines a micro-entrepreneur as an individual who is striving for economic independence, generates self-employment and opportunities for others through initiating, establishing and running an enterprise by keeping pace with his/her vision.

A common attribute of micro-entrepreneurs in most developing countries is that they are forced to become self-employed as no other option was left to ensure their survival (Okpukpara, 2009; Raeymaekers et al., 2008; Beck, Lu & Rudai, 2014). These micro-entrepreneurs tend to operate survivalist type of micro-enterprises because the motive behind the establishment of their businesses is poverty reduction and an attempt to create a better quality of life and standard of living for their families (Okpukpara, 2009; Raeymaekers et al., 2008; Maloney, 2012; Guylani et al., 2009). In addition, it could be avowed that another important feature of micro-entrepreneurs is their micro scale and their limited linkage with local markets. However, these features reduce their growth probability and profit margins as they will operate and cater for the local demand of goods and/or services that they offer. Furthermore, these micro-entrepreneurs do not have any brand capital or national exposure; they rather have an awfully low public visibility which places them in an area of less prominence because of these factors (Okpukpara, 2009; Raeymaekers et al., 2008; Maloney, 2012; Guylani et al., 2009; Szakonyi & Urpelainen, 2015).

Tapies & Fernandez (2012) define a micro-entrepreneur as an economic agent who unites or coordinates all factors of production without necessarily owning them. These are:

land, capital, labour and entrepreneurship which eventually assist in producing a product or service. Understanding these means of production and the qualities of the entrepreneur is extremely important to determining the types and characteristics of micro-enterprises as those factors shape the enterprise itself as well as its outputs and contribution to income poverty reduction (Tapies & Fernandez, 2012; Beck et al., 2014; Szakonyi & Urpelainen, 2015; Hansen et al., 2015).

Some of the characteristics or behaviours associated with micro-entrepreneurs are: opportunity driven, optimistic, emotionally resilient, high mental energy and industrious (Shaw, 2004; Francis et al., 2013; Raeymaekers et al., 2008; Szakonyi & Urpelainen, 2015). The qualities possessed by these individuals are important to the development and survival of micro-enterprises. However, it is important to highlight that most micro-entrepreneurs especially in developing countries do not possess most of these qualities because they are forced to engage in micro-enterprises as a result of unemployment and poverty (Shaw, 2004; Francis et al., 2013; Raeymaekers et al., 2008). Accordingly, this justifies why micro-entrepreneurs are trapped in the vicious cycle of income poverty. Therefore, the success and establishment of micro-enterprises cannot exist independent of micro-entrepreneurs (Shaw, 2004; Francis et al., 2013; Beck et al., 2014; Raeymaekers et al., 2008; Szakonyi & Urpelainen, 2015).

4. Exploring the Income Poverty Barometers

Income poverty is noticeable when a family's income fails to meet a federally established threshold that differs across many countries (World Bank, 2008). Typically, it is measured with respect to families not the individual, and is adjusted for the number of persons in a family/per household. Frequently, income poverty is defined in either relative or absolute terms. The latter measures poverty in relation to the amount of money necessary to meet basic needs. The former defines income poverty in relation to the economic status of other members in society (World Bank, 2008). Consider definitions first prior to exploring.

It is universally accepted that a community, household or individual that is not income poor has sustainable access to purchasing power, often in the form of monetary value to gain access to basic needs and foods that live up to the minimum nutritional requirement (Guyani et al., 2009). The universally accepted poverty line per person is \$2 each day (Hoogeveen & Ozler, 2005; Guyani et al., 2009). Furthermore, there are several poverty lines which are utilized, namely; the national poverty lines (the food poverty line, lower- bound and upper- bound poverty line which include food and non-food items) (Hoogeveen & Ozler, 2005). International poverty lines are also widely utilized which are \$1.25 & \$2.50 corrected for purchasing power parity (PPP). The food poverty line refers to the amount of money that

an individual will need to consume the required energy intake which is R305. The lower bound poverty line is R416 which refers to the food poverty line (R305) plus the average amount derived from non-food items of households whose total food expenditure is equal to the food poverty line (Hoogeveen & Ozler, 2005). Lastly, the upper bound poverty line is R577 which refers to the food poverty line (R305) plus the average expenditure of households whose income is equal to the food poverty line.

The measurement of this concept (poverty lines) is highly dependent on a number of variables (Hoogeveen & Ozler, 2005; World Bank, 2008; Stats SA, 2012; Hoogeveen & Ozler, 2005). Debates around whether the poverty line should represent an “absolute” level of household requirements or represent a “relative” index that has adaptability to general rising living standards and income is still at the forefront. There are still questions around the manner in which household size should be taken into account to form part of the criterion used to determine an effective income poverty line (Hoogeveen & Ozler, 2005; World Bank, 2008; Stats SA, 2012). Further critics argue whether different urban and rural settings or geographic areas should be adopted as part and parcel of this criterion (Hoogeveen & Ozler, 2005; Guylani et al., 2009).

5. Statistical Overview of South Africa’s Income Poverty Experience

In October 2012, Statistics South Africa released the results of its census, the third official census since the advent of democracy (the previous censuses were conducted in 1996 and 2001). It is therefore revealed that between the first and the most recent post-apartheid census, the population grew by just over 11 million to 51.7 million, and the average household income more than doubled from R48 385 to R103 204 (Stats SA, 2012). While these numbers offer cause to celebrate, they still reveal gross inequalities between the country’s historically defined population groups. Black households, for example, earn only 16 per cent of average white household income. While this is an improvement of 5.0 percentage points from the 2001 Census, the degree of inequity remains unacceptably high (Stats SA, 2012). When analysing the levels of social stability that South Africa experienced in 2012, these material realities cannot be ignored.

A key finding was that between 2008 and 2009, approximately 26.3% of the population lived below the food poverty line of R305 per person per month (the amount that an individual will need to consume enough food in a month) (Stats SA, 2012). Furthermore, 39% were living below the lower-bound poverty line of R416 and 52% were living below the upper-bound poverty line of R577 per person per month (Stats SA, 2012). Using the international poverty lines, 10.7% of the population were living on less than \$1.25 per day and 36.4% were living below the \$2.50 per day poverty line. The poverty gap, using the food

poverty line was 3.5% and the severity of poverty was 3.8% (Stats SA, 2012). The results stipulated above are largely instigated by the apartheid legacy which excluded black people from benefiting from economic opportunities.

6. Factors Determining Income Poverty Reduction

Employment in South Africa is one of the factors that inter alia determine whether people are secured a fixed amount of income (Gyulani et al., 2009). Moreover, access to employment means that the financial situation of majority of South Africans will have the potential to change. Nevertheless volatile prices of goods and services in the South African economic climate may be a stumbling block for majority of consumers. However, South Africa is confronted by the perpetual scourge of unemployment and economic downturn (Stats SA, 2012). As such, majority of people that are willing and able to work in South Africa cannot seem to find employment due to the overflow of graduates inter alia that bombard the corporate environment without access to employment opportunities (Stats SA, 2012). Additionally, employed individuals are secured of a salary/wage that illustrates the likelihood to reduce income poverty (Gyulani et al., 2009). Economic development research shows that inequality amongst South Africans remains to be high, and individuals that are employed in the unregulated/informal environment tend to be susceptible to live below the food poverty line of R305 per day as compared to those in the formal environment.

According to the DTI (2005), it is believed that South Africa operates in a free market economy that promotes business ventures and entrepreneurship. However, the aforementioned seems to benefit those that have the knowledge and business acumen. It is believed that the policy of 'Bantu education' intentionally failed to provide majority of disadvantaged black people with the technical and professional skills necessary to enter into business. As a result the, "work for boss' mentality still seems to be noticeable amongst majority of disadvantaged black people. Gyulani et al (2009) indicates that majority of people that own micro-enterprises would literally shut down their business provided a lucrative job opportunity presents itself. Therefore, this shows the kind of negative mind-set that most disadvantaged black people in South Africa have towards business.

Growing consensus amongst scholars indicates that financial education has proven instrumental to majority of individuals across the globe who own micro-enterprises to operate them effectively. In a South African context, illiteracy still remains to be high amongst different isolated townships and rural areas (Stats SA, 2012). Therefore, financial literacy presents the potential for an individual to make better use of their finances but given the unacceptably high levels of literacy, it become questionable as to how these illiterate

individuals will have the cognitive ability to comprehend the different financial techniques (Stats SA, 2012).

6. Contributions of Micro-Enterprises towards Income Poverty Reduction In South Africa

Micro-enterprise development in South Africa is focused on several key factors. It is seen as a catalyst for economic growth, job creation, and poverty alleviation. According to the most recent Small Business Annual Review, micro-enterprises make up about 65% of all enterprises in South Africa (Stats SA, 2012). The remaining percentage is contributed by big businesses and the public sector. Formal small Businesses employ 50-60% of the labour force, increasing to 75% when the informal sector is included (Stats SA, 2012).

According to Stats SA (2012), the importance of the promotion of microenterprises as a tool for poverty reduction is noted in the Strategic framework for Small Business. Most important is the broad scope of participants it will encompass, especially in the semi-formal and informal sectors which comprise very small, micro and survivalist enterprises. Shaw (2004) articulates that survivalist micro-enterprises mainly represent a set of activities by people unable to secure regular formal employment or access to the formal economic sector, while micro-enterprises often involve the owner, family members and at most four paid employees. Very small enterprises usually apply better business skills and are more organised, with greater potential for growth into the formal economy. These sectors predominantly comprise South Africa's micro-enterprise activities (Stats SA, 2012).

Arguably, micro-enterprise development contributes insignificantly to income poverty reduction in South Africa, but developing the sector is more complex and challenging than it appears on the surface (Stats SA, 2012). Jain (2006) states that the complexity is related to the multiple effects of apartheid's exclusion and discouragement of entrepreneurship culture among its black population which have led to a lack of positive outlook towards entrepreneurship in South Africa. Micro-enterprises operate on a small scale level, are unregistered and confronted by a plethora of informal sector impediments.

These problems eventually contribute negatively towards the economic returns of such indigent business-entities. Therefore, the foresaid is consistent with the argument of the study that micro-enterprises offer a deplorable means to an end for majority of the income poor. Microenterprises are offering a pitiable safety net for poor micro-entrepreneurs and only serve as a survivalist livelihood strategy with little or no growth prospects.

7. Conclusion and Recommendations

This paper has explored South Africa's pragmatic experiences on both informal and formal micro-enterprises, micro-entrepreneurs including the income poverty status as well as the determinants of income poverty reduction. It edifies that micro-enterprises in South Africa continue to be faced by draconian challenges of the informal unregulated business sector. Such challenges include but are not limited to; low education levels, low business management skills, income poverty, unemployment and food insecurity. As a result, micro-enterprises become the immediate business-entities that the poor people establish in an attempt to reduce income poverty. This means that micro-start-ups are formed without a well-defined market opportunity, business plan, business financing and collateral amongst other things. It can therefore be safely concluded that the multiple constraints in the informal business fraternity assist in the inability of micro-enterprises to contribute commendably towards income poverty reduction. Thus, it is imperative that business/entrepreneurial education coupled with financial and non-financial support initiatives from various strategic sectors of government and non-governmental organizations support the ever mushrooming micro-enterprises. It requires an inclusive and participatory bottom-up approach amid support agencies and the intended beneficiaries to alleviate the issues associated with income poverty.

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THE CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRACY IN BOTSWANA: LESSONS FOR AFRICA

K.B. Dipholo
University of Botswana

Abstract

Democracy is a loaded concept that is often used at the convenience of time. It derives its meaning for the purpose at hand hence it never will and can never be interpreted to universal satisfaction. Nevertheless, the idea of democracy encapsulates such features as accountability, transparency and representation that stand out as the cardinal principles of a healthy democracy. Principally, societies establish democratic governments for the protection and promotion of their rights, interests, and welfare. Democracy demands that citizens be free to participate in the activities of the state, suggesting that political freedom lies at the heart of the concept of democracy. It could be argued that people do not give power to government to oppress, harass, or trample on their interests and rights willy-nilly but rather to safeguard their fundamental rights and welfare. Thus, democracy as a system of government has been trending for a long time in the process becoming the supreme good in the management of public affairs and continues to be presented as an end in itself. It is generally accepted that democracy ensures political stability necessary for economic prosperity and the protection of rights. This perspective has tended to lull citizens into assuming that democracy will automatically results in good governance and universal benefits. This paper argues that in spite of opportunities inherent in a democracy, Africa's democracy is largely superficial and survives to a greater extent on the ignorance or passivity of its people in ways that suggest that democratic governance mainly legitimizes domination and rule by the elite with partial benefits for the rest of the citizenry. The paper uses Botswana as a case study, arguing that whereas Botswana has always been celebrated as the beacon of democracy in Africa, its democracy is confronted with challenges that threaten to render it a pseudo democracy. In conclusion, the literature review indicates that Botswana has done well in developing her democratic project but there is a lot that needs to be done to consolidate her democracy.

Keywords: Democracy, good governance, development, state, government, Africa, Botswana.

1. Introduction

Admittedly, Botswana has made significant strides in developing and consolidating her democratic project as well as recording higher levels of economic growth. Since attaining

political independence in 1966, Botswana has maintained economic growth levels uncommon in Africa and has had regular elections both of which are good ingredients for political stability. This stable political environment and impressive economic growth gave Botswana a positive image and made her a success story in Africa (Cook and Sarkin, 2010). Doorenspleet & Mudde (2008:171) posit that till the recent democratization wave, Botswana was the democratic exception on the continent and can be considered the 'senior' democracy in Africa.

Reference is usually made to the numerous accolades that Botswana has been awarded for good governance, transparency, low corruption levels and record economic growth. In effect, Botswana has been praised variously as a shining example of democracy in Africa, the African miracle' (Samatar, 1999) and a 'deviant' case in Africa (Doorenspleet and Kopecky, 2008; Theobald and Williams, 1999) among others.

Whereas the concept of democracy has no universal meaning, many have settled for its attributes and indicators as being a sufficient definition of the concept. Such indicators or attributes often include free, fair and regular elections, civil liberties including enjoyment of rights and freedoms, effective separation of powers and a free a vibrant media that enjoys editorial independence (Botlhomilwe *et al.*, (2011). However, while much of what has been written about Botswana is not idle compliment, it is nevertheless argued that this celebratory depiction of Botswana as an example of a shining democracy in Africa is often overstated.

This paper seeks to argue that in spite of opportunities inherent in a democracy, Africa's democracy has brought only artificial stability and marginal prosperity in ways that suggest that democratic governance mainly legitimizes domination and rule by the elite with partial benefits for the rest of the citizenry. Generally, very few Botswana citizens benefit from the fruits of the country's successes hence her well documented income inequalities (Good, 1993). The paper uses Botswana as a case study. The introductory part provides brief background information on Botswana's erstwhile image. The next section contextualizes the discussion by theorizing on democracy and its practice. This discussion is followed by a discussion on the relationship between democracy and development with a view to highlight that the existing tranquillity is largely a product of the connection between development and democracy in so far as they feed each other. The next section interrogates Botswana's presumed good governance credentials against a set of characteristics that defines good governance. Opportunities inherent in a democracy and related dilemmas for Botswana are discussed next. A conclusion is provided to summarize the main issues discussed.

2. Conceptualising theory and practice of democracy

According to Crick (1992), democracy is a relative term with no consensus of what it really means. It derives its meaning for the purpose at hand hence it never will and can never be interpreted to universal satisfaction. It could mean different things at different times to different people. However, in its simplest form, democracy is understood to mean rule by the people (Dipholo *et al*, 2014).

Crick (1992) identifies a number of usages of democracy in the modern world such as, a) the conflation of liberty and democracy in 'liberal democracy; b) the old style communist use of democracy pointing to their belief that their system is one of class rule, the rule of the working class (which is the Greek sense of majority rule), and c) the belief so common in the developing world that a regime is democratic, quite simply if it is ruled by people of its own nation and not by aliens. Botswana's economic achievement is not unrelated to its practice of democracy. According to Tordoff (1984), sound economic management is directly attributable to the most fundamental principle of democratic government, namely the norm of accountability. By accountability, it means that those who exercise power on a continuing basis are required to answer for their conduct to others who are entitled to judge it (Botlhale, 2012; UNESCAP, 2010). In Botswana, this form of accountability is evidenced and put into effect through political representation hence representative democracy. Representative democracy acknowledges that it is not practicable to use direct democracy where all citizens are involved in decision making (Lekorwe, 2000). What is also important to note is that Botswana's liberal democratic model blends the Westminster Parliamentary model and the chieftaincy - traditional institution of *Bogosi* (Molomo, 2005; Good, 2002). Central to the chieftaincy is the *The kgotla*, a kind of a village or community parliament (Dipholo & Mothusi, 2005) which plays a significant role in generating consensus for proposed actions since it is the place where all matters affecting the community are discussed.

According to Boutrous-Ghali (2002) democracy can be defined as a political system that is capable of correcting its own dysfunctions. But a true democracy cannot be restricted to this institutional framework alone. It also needs to be embodied in a culture, a state of mind that fosters tolerance and respect for other people, as well as pluralism, equilibrium and dialogue between the forces that make up a society. Unlike traditional conceptions which are exclusively restricted to the domain of the state, the concept of democratic culture requires all social, financial, governmental and non-governmental actors as well as the relationship which links or separates them to be taken into account.

These basic democratic principles constitute a fundamental source of common values that can be described as the common heritage of humankind. Without those values there can be neither democracy nor sustainable development. But the recognition of universal values does not mean that a veil should be drawn over the specific historical, religious and cultural characteristics that make up the genius peculiar to each society and each nation state. For the general principles of democracy can be embodied in different ways depending on the context. Thus, while democracy is the system in which sovereign power lies with the people (Adejumobi, 2002), the methods with which it can be exercised can vary depending on the social system and economic development peculiar to each country. Those methods also tend to change depending on political, demographic, economic and social change.

Democracy as discussed by Boutrous-Ghali (2002) cannot be conceived of without freedom, but it also entails the rule of law and the voluntary restrictions that result from it, in other words the existence of a common rule issued by those who have been chosen by the people to define its content. More concretely, justice is a precondition of democracy (Myers, 2002). Justice guarantees the exercise of democracy as it serves to enforce the principle of equality before the law, the right of all individuals to express their opinion within the society to which they belong and the right to be heard and to put their case. Democracy is therefore viable only if it has a reliable and independent judicial system. The second precondition of democracy is free participation of citizens which allows them to exercise their right to freedom of thought and to be different (Myers, 2002).

The general elections of 2014 in Botswana were the 11th since the country attained independence from Britain in 1965 and completed 49 years of democratic governance. On all accounts it is evident that electoral democracy has become a part of the country's political culture. On the whole, the electoral process has been successfully implemented and has helped to reinforce and maintain the separation of powers between the legislature, executive and the judiciary. However, as pointed out by Molomo (2000:96), the fact that one party, the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) dominates both the Executive and the Legislature, the separation of powers only exist in theory. Botswana has remained a one-party dominant democracy largely due to weak opposition parties and an almost non-existent civil society (Molutsi, 1998). Thus, the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has won all general elections since attainment of political independence in 1966. The fourth pillar of democracy, the media, has evolved from state-dominated to one that is privately owned which makes it capable of taking critical stance against the government on different issues (Molutsi, 2004). Botswana has also introduced in the past one and half decade various institutions such as the Ombudsman, Independent Electoral Commission and Directorate on Corruption and

Economic Crime aimed at safeguarding democracy, promoting transparency and guarding against corruption.

Tordoff (1984) argues that a number of factors of instability could undermine democratic success. They may operate individually or in combination, prominent being an exceedingly strong bureaucracy and powerful and overbearing executive. A related factor which threatens Botswana's democracy is the abuse of power by top officials (Good, 2002). If a democratically elected government deliberately and continuously infringes upon civil liberties of its citizens, such as the right to unhindered postal communications and freedom to travel, this would rightly be considered as a serious onslaught on democratic principles and rules. This scenario is persists partly because the civil society in Botswana is generally weak and unable to provide countervailing power in its role of promoting democracy. Harberson (1994: 53-54) contends that:

...the state should be overseen and checked by the independent eye of society, made up of a plurality of interacting, self-organized and constantly vigilant civil associations whose functions were to nurture basic rights, to advocate popular claims and to educate citizens in the democratic arts of tolerance and accommodation.

Unfortunately, the Botswana civil society is generally young and mostly funded by the state (Dipholo & Tshishonga, 2013). In any case, the Botswana state has often openly expressed displeasure with the conduct of some constituents of the civil society. For instance, during the official opening of the CIVICUS Fifth World Assembly in Gaborone, Botswana in March 2004, the former state president is reported to have remarked that, some NGOs encroach on the very well-being as well as independent identity of the developing world through rigid and self-serving interpretations of what supposedly constitutes international norms (Dipholo & Tshishonga, 2013). The state President is also reported to have castigated NGOs for being long arms of external states with agendas that threaten the livelihoods of the people they claim to represent. In similar ways, Botswana trade unions are persistently harassed by the state with the intention to stifle their operations and influence on democracy.

3. Democracy and development

As already stated, democracy is a loaded concept that is often modelled and used at the convenience of time (Dipholo *et al*, 2014). Dipholo *et al*, (2014) argue that democracy derives its meaning for the purpose at hand hence it never will and can never be interpreted to universal satisfaction. Thus, democracy means different things to different people at different times. Nevertheless, in its simplest form, democracy is understood to mean rule by

the people. However, the idea of democracy encapsulates key features that stand out as the cardinal principles of a healthy democracy. This means that all nation states claiming to be democracies should exhibit certain basic attributes that all democracies possess. Such attributes generally project an image and a pose befitting a democracy. Principally, societies establish democratic governments for the protection and promotion of their rights, interests, and welfare. Democracy demands that citizens be free to participate in the activities of the state, suggesting that political freedom lies at the heart of the concept of democracy.

Furthermore, Dipholo *et al* (2014) posit that democracy is pillared on the idea that citizens are the source of authority of government such that the powers of government should be based upon the consent of the governed. This being the case, it could be argued that people do not give power to government to oppress, harass, or trample on their interests and rights willy-nilly but rather to safeguard their fundamental rights and welfare. In particular, liberal democracy emphasizes that all persons have certain fundamental rights such as political freedom including safeguards against oppression of minority groups, freedom of expression, right to privacy and to a private sphere of life free from governmental interference and so forth, for which democracy is expected to protect (Adejumobi, 2002).

On the other hand, development generally means the whole range of economic, social and cultural progress to which people aspire. The environment, social justice, democracy, education and the sharing of knowledge are closely connected with development. In effect, as with democracy, development evokes different interpretations depending on context. Various theorists (Larrain, 1989, Esteva, 1997 and Kothari and Minogue, 2002) have over the years provided different understandings and interpretations in their attempt to demystify the concept of development. The South Commission Report (1990:10) defines development as:

a process that enables human beings to realise their potential, build self-confidence and lead lives of dignity and fulfilment. It is a process that frees people from the fears of want and exploitation. It is a movement away from political, economic or social oppression. Through development political independence acquires its true significance. And it is a process of growth, a movement essentially springing from within the society that is developing.

Perhaps this is why the right to development has a natural place among human rights. While a wider definition of development is essential in ensuring that all its constituents are taken care of, it also give rise to distortions and harmful ambiguity that creates room for opportunistic and situational interpretations for the sake of convenience. However, it has to

be emphasized that development comprises all efforts geared towards improving quality of life of the people from in all fronts. For example, helping people to escape poverty presupposes the satisfaction not only of needs directly connected with survival but of a whole series of needs as regards health, housing and education. This also presupposes a reinforcement of the ability of individuals and groups to take part in and influence decisions affecting them (Boutrous-Ghali, 2002). Theis (2010) argues that development is generally concerned with a particular set of goals among others, the distribution of resources and ensuring access to services, such as health, education, social welfare, poverty alleviation and income generation. In other instances, development is taken to mean a state of increased welfare and human development. Over the years understandings of development have been fused with elements of capacity-building and participatory development (Martunissen, 1997), the ability to make their own choices and decisions (Dipholo, 2002).

4. The interaction between democracy and development

The connection between development and democracy may not always be apparent but what is not disputable is that to some degree both impact each other. For instance, democracy would be more meaningful if it delivers development in the same way as development would be fulfilling if people rights, interests and welfare are protected and promoted. However, Adejumobi (2000) points out that the nexus between democracy and development has remained contestable to date. Yet, Adejumobi (2000) posits that liberal democracy provides the basic foundation for economic development in that libertarian values such as the protection of human rights, freedom of expression, the rule of law and so forth, create the institutional context and processes for economic development to take off.

Not only do scholars support the causal relationship between development and democracy, but the relationship has also been convincingly demonstrated in a large number of empirical studies (Lerner, 1958; Lipset, 1959; Huntington, 1991; Inglehart, 1997; Vanhanen, 1997). It is on the basis of this hypothesis that it is often remarked that development promotes democracy. In general, democracy provides political stability which in turn provides a stable investment climate and ensures mobilization of national energies and resources for economic development (Dipholo *et al.*, 2014).

Boutrous-Ghali (2002) argues that democracy and development are complementary and they reinforce each other, further arguing that the link between them is all stronger because it originates in the aspirations of individuals, people and the rights they enjoy. The interlinking of democratisation and development helps both of them to take root durably. For if political democracy, in order to consolidate itself, needs to be complemented by economic

and social measures that encourage development, similarly any development strategy needs to be ratified and reinforced by democratic participation in order to be implemented (Boutrous-Ghali, 2002).

The 1993 Vienna Declaration saw the rule of law or the primacy of law as the thread that can link the construction and consolidation of democracy to the construction and consolidation of development, as well as the way of consolidating their common bedrock: the respect of human rights. It is a fact that, if human rights are to be guaranteed and if democracy is to work, communities and individuals, both men and women, need not only have access to justice but also before that, need to be aware of the law and to understand it. Similarly, the lack of justice directly compromises development, first because it encourages mismanagement and corruption and second because it discourages investment and economic prosperity. There can be no development in a context of arbitrariness or in the absence of the rule of law. In order to construct and institutionalise democracy, there needs to be a minimum degree of certainty: one needs to know what rule is applicable and how it is applied.

Finally according to Boutrous-Ghali (2002) democracy and development can together contribute to the consolidation of peace. Most of the time democracies settle their domestic disputes by peaceful means. Moreover, in addition to this preventive role, the democratic framework has often proved effective in settling international conflicts peacefully. Democracy is a factor of peace and therefore encourages development, which itself tends to consolidate the state of domestic peace and consequently international peace since many wars originate from domestic conflicts. Democracy, development and peace form a trilogy, a common purpose.

5. Botswana: Good governance or persuasive fiction?

As is the case with most buzzwords, governance is one such word that is without a consensus as to its actual meaning. However, the language of governance is typically applied in relation to how institutions of the state conduct their affairs and manage public resources. In broad, governance is about the exercise of political power in the management of a nation's affairs. Joseph (1999:185) defines governance in reference to,

that aspect of politics that aims to formulate and manage the rules of the political arena in which state and civil society actors operate and interact to make authoritative decisions. In more operational terms, governance refers to those measures that involve setting the rules for the exercise of power and settling conflicts over such rules

In the simplest sense, governance would refer to the process of decision-making and implementation of decisions made. In this context, bad governance would be the equivalent of bad politics meaning the conduct of the state in relation to the management of public resources is wayward and hurtful to the larger economy. This is so because as opined by Lewin (2013), in most African countries resources especially mineral resources belong to the state hence the state is the main recipient of revenue accruing from such resources.

Lewin (2013:82) contends that Botswana has avoided bad governance or bad politics, with credit being given to the leadership which has designed and fostered the conditions of governance that have ensured stability and social and economic progress. Good governance as discussed by Oodira (2013), addresses the allocation and management of resources to respond to collective problems; it is characterized by the principles of participation, transparency, accountability, rule of law, effectiveness, equity and strategic vision. In practice these principles translate into certain tangible things – such as free, fair and regular elections; a representative, legislature that makes laws and provides oversight and an independent judiciary that interprets laws. They may also translate into guarantee of human rights and the rule of law and transparent and accountable public institutions. Good governance also decentralizes authority and resources to local government to give citizens a greater role in the conduct of state affairs and the management of public resources.

It is further submitted that good governance ensures that civil society plays an active role in setting priorities and meeting the needs of the most vulnerable people in society. When we speak of the quality of a country's governance, then, we mean the degree to which its institutions and processes are transparent, accountable to the people and allow them to participate in decisions that affect their lives. It is also the degree to which the private sector and organizations of the civil society are free and able to participate in national development. Oodira (2013) further argues that good governance is when the authority of the government is based on the will of the people and when the government is responsive to the concerns of its people. It is when open, democratic institutions allow full participation in political affairs and when human rights protection guarantees the right to speak, assemble and dissent.

Andrews (2010) posits that good governance is when government and government institutions promote the human development of all citizens irrespective of their social standing. In short, it distinguishes between the institutions and processes of governance and their content and quality. Since the third wave of democratization in the 1990's there are a number of democratic regimes that continue to rise and good governance has become an important criterion for a country's credibility and respect on the international stage. There are

compelling reasons to care about whether the quality of governance is good across the globe. For the good of their own people and for the sake of our common aims, the capacity of weak states to govern should be strengthened because countries that are well governed are both less likely to be violent and are less likely to be poor (Oodira, 2013).

A country that protects human rights and promotes inclusion is less likely to have citizens who are alienated enough to turn to violence as a means of addressing their problems. And a country where the poor have a voice in the government is more likely to invest in national policies that reduce poverty. When people's interests, needs and human rights are at the center of governance institutions and practices, there can be real progress in combating poverty. Good governance provides a setting for equitable contribution of benefits from growth (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008). It has already been stated that Botswana has been able to avoid bad governance or what is commonly referred to as the resource curse or the Dutch disease in reference to 'the deleterious effects that purportedly result from the real appreciation of the currency caused by a booming resource export sector (Corden and Neary, 1982). While this is commendable, there is fear that much effort is often directed at adding to a list of accolades on Botswana's exceptional progress in a continent synonymous with devastating famines running side by side with a persistent decline of economies and overall political degeneration (Molebatsi and Dipholo, 2014). In effect, Botswana's success story is often overrated and distorted largely due to the tendency to compare her with economies that have been ravaged by civil wars. There is also a tendency to ignore the reality that minerals and other resources that propelled this 'success story' do not necessarily benefit the majority of the country's population especially the poor. Persistent references to the country's foreign reserves that have grown side by side with poverty have tended to conceal the reality of poverty and underdevelopment in the country. This is because many scholars have tended to swim with the tide rather than be seen to be swimming against the tide, perhaps in pursuance of partisan interests or better still due to half-hearted attempts to subject her to honest and critical scrutiny. While credit must be given where it is due, the danger with such flattering representations of Botswana as an exceptional case is that it creates a sense of *déjà vu*, that all is well in the country resulting in cruel complacency and the marginalization of those who hold a critical opinion about the country's governance values.

The glorification of Botswana by classifying her as a deviant case in Africa; an African miracle or an exceptional case seems to paint Botswana as country like no other in Africa. While Africa has come to symbolize doom, hopelessness, diseases and wars culminating in what is known as 'Afro-pessimism', Botswana's rating in this context seem perfectly legitimate until critical interrogation is undertaken using a somewhat radical

approach to her political economy. <http://www.unescap.org>(1997) identifies 8 key characteristics that give good governance an innate character according to which each countries subscribing to good governance must abide by some or all. Thus, a country that makes claims to good governance should have these characteristics:

Participation – this is the informed involvement of citizens (both men & women) in the decision making process. Citizens should either participate directly through local institutions or indirectly through their representatives. However, participation through representatives may not automatically imply that their immediate concerns, especially for minority groups, are taken into consideration in decision making (Rifkin and Kangere, 2002). Thus, citizen participation requires conditions that foster freedom of expression and association to enable people and/or their local institutions to freely express their thoughts. An organized civil society would therefore come in handy to give the marginalized and vulnerable groups an informed voice. While freedom of expression and association are guaranteed in Botswana, in reality there exists some restrictions with the potential to dent her credibility on this front. The space for the exercise and enjoyment of this right is getting smaller due to the government aversion to criticism. Government actions that clearly run counter to the values of freedom of expression and/or association are often justified on grounds of national security. Cook and Sarkin (2014:476) comment that; ‘another issue of concern is the GOB’s [Government of Botswana] aversion to criticism and its efforts to eliminate disparagement of the government from public discourse’. The authors elaborate the limits of democracy in Botswana by citing the deportation of a critic of the government in the name of Kenneth Good, an Australian academic who had worked at the University of Botswana for over 15 years. The state president used his executive powers to expel the academic from the country without any explanation proffered to the nation. Since then the Government of Botswana has placed some foreign nationals on the visa list most of who are people considered critical of the government’s stance on a number of things. Declaring foreign nationals prohibited immigrants is reminiscent of undemocratic regimes of brutal dictators in the past which deported any foreign national who disagreed with the system. In 2014, the editor of the Sunday Standard newspaper Outsa Mokone was arrested and charged with seditious intent after the paper published a story about a concealed car accident involving the state president. This incident followed the cold-blooded shooting to death of John Kalafatis in a pre-planned intelligence operation by state security agents in May 2009 whose killers were dully convicted and sentenced to 11 years in prison but subsequent freed on a presidential pardon after serving only a few months of their prison term. Again the leader of the opposition party, Botswana Movement for Democracy (BMD)

Gomolemo Motswaledi dead from a suspicious road accident a few months before a hotly contested general election in 2014

Rule of law – Good governance is founded on fair legal regimens that are to be enforced impartially (Dingake, 2011). To ensure impartial enforcement of laws there is a natural need for an independent judiciary. It is noted that the impartiality, integrity and public confidence in Botswana's judiciary has for a very long time been beyond the confines of mediocrity. In a democracy where the judiciary plays a major role in adjudicating disputes about the rights, liberties and freedoms of citizens and the powers of government, it is essential that the process of appointing judges be independent from complete, unfettered control by the state president. Thus, the appointment of justices by the state president in accordance with Botswana laws does not augur well for an independent judiciary. The principle of judicial independence requires that the power of appointment of judges should not be dominated by the executive. This is because, if the executive enjoys an exclusive privilege in selecting judges, a risk always exists of misuse of the power of appointment. Sometimes political, nepotistic or other considerations may prevail over the merit criteria for appointments. Judges who obtain their position as a result of executive discretion or favor could be compelled to serve the interests of the appointing authority in a manner which might undermine judicial independence.

Transparency – transparency means that decisions are made in a manner that accords with legitimate rules and regulations and that information is freely available to allow citizens to make informed decisions. Botswana has done well on this front which is why Transparency International (Transparency International, 2008) and other international organs like the Mo Ibrahim Foundation which compiles the Ibrahim Index of Governance have consistently ranked her at the top of annual global transparency listing. However, a new trend has emerged which sees the government becoming more secretive in its operations. A number of key state institutions have been centralized and placed under the direct control of the Office of the President in particular the Department of Broadcasting Services was transferred from the Ministry of Transport, Works and Communications which is responsible for collating and broadcasting news and disseminating information. This move is believed to have been clandestinely initiated to give the presidency a free hand in determining the content of news broadcast to the nation. Other key institutions operating under the presidency include the Directorate of Corruption and Economic Crime charged with the responsibility to combat corruption and economic crime in the country; the Office of the Ombudsman whose principal officer is appointed by the president; the powerful Directorate of Intelligence Services whose officers are appointed on terms and conditions chosen by the president (Republic of Botswana, 2006) and many others.

Responsiveness – Good governance requires a government that is responsive to the needs of its people and serve people within reasonable time. Through her local government institutions which are presumed closer and responsive to the immediate concerns of the people across the social spectrum, Botswana has done well in this regard. However, minority groups have often decried discrimination. A telling case of disregard for minority rights was the conflict over land rights between the Botswana Government and the San living in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (Cook and Sarkin, 2010). The San experienced forced relocation from the reserve and those who went back into the reserve were intimidated and harassed with many having their livestock confiscated. This ill-treatment of the San culminated in termination of basic and essential services with a view to forcing the San to move to places with such services (Dipholo *et al.*, 2014).

Consensus oriented – Good governance requires that different class or group interests existing in a society be taken into consideration when decisions are taken. This requires that efforts must be made to reach a consensus on what is in the best interest of the whole society. Botswana is a democratic pluralist society in which the existence of groups is the political essence of society. Different ethnic-cultural interests and expressions, different needs and aspirations must all coexist and be at equilibrium. Equilibrium can be maintained when there is respect for views other than one's own. Whereas Botswana has done well on this front in accordance with the Afrobarometer survey findings, the same study also suggests that Botswana are yearning for more democracy to actualize the consensus-oriented value system so that the interests of minority groups are safeguarded (Afrobarometer, 2014). The case between San people living in the Central Kalahari Game reserve and the Government of Botswana mentioned earlier on points to an absence of consensus oriented decision making in that the San's objection to be relocated could not be entertained. In fact the state used its financial muscle to crush dissent and have their way. Surprisingly, human rights groups in particular, Ditshwanelo remained seemingly uninterested and showed little will to be on the side of this minority group under state persecution.

Equity and Inclusiveness - A society's progress and resilience depends on ensuring that citizens feel that they are an integral part of the society and have a stake in it. This requires the state to avail opportunities for all citizens including minority and vulnerable groups to improve the quality of their lives. However, sharp income disparities points to an uneven access and control of productive resources in the economy. Social inequalities in Botswana is a well-documented phenomenon going as far back as 1974 with the Rural Income Distribution Survey revealing that the poorest 40% of households had less than 12% of the national income, whilst the richest 20% had 58% of the national income (Republic of

Botswana, 1990). A similar study was conducted in 1994 which revealed that the income share of the poorest 40% stood at 11.6% whilst that of the richest 20% stood at 59.3% (Mogalakwe, 2003). With increasing levels of unemployment, this trend is expected to be maintained and even become worse enabling the government to introduce numerous social welfare programmes intended to cushion the poor against the effect of drought and hunger. These programmes included *namola-leuba* (Drought Relief Program) which has since been re-named *Ipelegeng* (self-reliance). However, the motive of these programmes and other charity initiatives like the distribution of blankets and other such freebies to poor people has been suspected to be for patronage purposes to ensure that the beneficiaries see the government of the ruling BDP as a compassionate government hence continue to give the party their votes during elections.

Effectiveness and efficiency – Good governance means actions of state institutions are geared towards meeting the needs of the society. Good governance also encompasses sustainability in the use of natural resources. However, it has already been highlighted that a majority of citizens are unable to meaningfully participate in the public affairs. Lack of participation tends to breed negligence and a poor sense of use of natural resources since people are convinced that they have no stake in these resources. When people doubt their ownership or control of resources in their vicinity, they are most likely to use it unsustainably because such resources are not considered theirs.

Accountability – This is a key cornerstone of good governance in which governmental institutions, the private sector and the civil society are expected to be answerable to the public. This implies that public institutions are accountable to those who are affected by their decisions or actions. In other words, the governed need to know what is done in their name (Botlhale, 2012). While the separation of powers in Botswana between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary provides fertile ground for meaningful executive accountability, it is argued that the executive is too powerful. In particular, the Constitution of Botswana confers almost unlimited power on the sitting president who is constitutionally immune from prosecution (Botlhomilwe and Molebatsi, 2014). Good (1999) posits that Botswana's democracy is highly elitist, power is excessively centralized in the presidency, secrecy and non-accountability in government are pervasive, and there is growing autocracy.

Overall, Botswana has done well to deserve the generous commendations from international organizations. However, such commendations have often been over-generous, stupefying and overly rhetorical with deleterious consequences especially in making the governors rest in their laurels and become too complacent in nurturing the democratic

project to the point where the country's leadership has become authoritative and control-oriented.

6. Opportunities and dilemmas

While Botswana has diverse small ethnic groups, there is a semblance of ethnic homogeneity due to the political domination by the mainstream *Tswana* ethnic groups. This has tended to pacify ethnic variances and minimize chances for ethnic conflicts of a large scale that could offend the existing political stability and peace. This has tended to afford the leadership some space to consolidate their power and to a lesser extent focus on delivering services without worrying about balancing ethnic scales. Yet this also present a dilemma in that it is pushing minority groups further away from participating in the political process. It is feared that in the long term the artificial harmony that exist in the country may explode when minority groups eventually demand recognition. Already, minority groups represented by such groups as Kamanako and SPIL (Society for the Promotion on Ikalanga Language) have successfully litigated the Government on issues germane to minority rights. Of particular note is the legal battle (*Kamanakao and Others v Attorney-General and Another* (2002) AHRLR 35 (BWHC 2001) waged by Kamanako against the Government of Botswana for equal recognition.) In the words of Cook and Sarkin (2014:470), 'the absence of ethnic conflict does not necessarily indicate that the Batswana are less prone than other peoples to ethnic violence'.

Batswana are generally regarded as a peaceful people who had never experienced internal turmoil. This is an excellent precondition for political stability, itself a prerequisite for economic growth and development. While this is a positive attribute, what is also problematic is that the people have become remarkably timid and easily manipulated by politicians who have an entitlement mentality. This is recipe for authoritarianism as it provides opportunities for the political and other elites to entrench their power by introducing reforms meant to consolidate and maintain their domination. A combination of these values and executive powers bestowed on the state president by the national constitution means that the executive has a free role in shaping the future of the country for good or bad while citizens look in bewilderment, unsure of their role in the future of their republic.

Botswana has established numerous oversight institutions with view to promoting good governance. These include the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) responsible for managing elections; The Directorate of Corruption and Economic Crime which is responsible for combating corruption and economic crime; the Office of Ombudsman which is tasked with investigating maladministration by public institutions. However, the reality is that these have been emaciated to the extent that they merely exist in name in ways that

merely legitimizes actions or inactions of the executive on matters germane to their operational spheres. It should be noted that persons heading these key institutions are appointees of the state president and this perceptually distorts their independence since they can be subject to the whims and caprices of the executive. For instance, the Secretary of the IEC is appointed solely by the state president and public perception is that the Secretary accounts to the President rather than the IEC with fears that the incumbent in effect does the bidding for the appointing authority. Molomo (2000) suggests that one way of ensuring the independence of the IEC may be that its Secretary be appointed by the IEC and be made accountable to it instead of the President. Their very existence lull citizens into believing that there are effective oversight institutions hence no need to worry.

7. Conclusion

It has been discussed that compared to much of Africa, Botswana has done commendably well to deserve the rave reviews she usually receives from international organizations. Botswana's long record of 'free and fair' elections, political stability and peace in a region ravaged by internal violence, relatively low levels of corruption and economic crime, political freedoms and the sound management of her resources means that the country has nurtured a reputation as an exceptional case. Botswana continues to benefit from this reputation in respect of assessing her quality of governance even when it is becoming apparent that her democracy is by and large flawed, superficial and rests much on the passivity of its humble people rather than the quality of her institutions. It has been shown that too much centralization of power in the presidency is in fact Botswana's Achilles heel. Attempts at decentralizing power are half-hearted, moving forward once and backward twice in ways that suggests that the future looks bleak.

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LEADERSHIP AND THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT IMPERATIVE IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE

M.D.J. Matshabaphala

University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa

Abstract

In the recent past there have been reports of pockets of excellence on the plains and pedestals of leadership and also cases of escalation of deficits on the integrity infrastructure in the public service. The lessons drawn from the public services in other parts of the world are suggestive of the imperative of men and women that will provide principled leadership in the public service. This is with reference to men and women of both character and competence with a clearly defined personal philosophy of leadership. This article is of the view that this can be realised through the conclusion of what can be referred to as the new social contract. The history of the concept of Social Contract tells us that social contracts were concluded between the state and the citizenry through a multiplicity of ways. The state would in the contract provide leadership in the provisioning of public value and public goods to the public and the citizenry would submit to the authority and leadership of the state.

This article postulates the de-escalation of the deficits on the integrity infrastructure in an endeavour to restore the trust and respect of the public in the public institutions through the public servants entering into agreement with themselves, for the restoration of character and competence in the public service. This would entail people in the public service committing to the virtues of altruism and utilitarianism in their discharge of their responsibilities and also committing to the evolving Grand National Narrative. The new social order requires a public service cadre that is committed to ensuring the public service is an efficient and effective machinery. This is with reference to a cadre anchored in principled leadership, borne of the contracts and agreements that they conclude and enter into with themselves.

1. Introduction

The universe of the public service the world over, presents us with a multiplicity of types of public servants and traditions, with their attendant leadership philosophies, commitments and obligations. This is with a view to either ensure good governance in the course of delivery of public goods to society or to render the machinery of public governance unworkable for a number of reasons. The South African public service comes across as no

different from the afore-mentioned. The different epochs in the history of the public service in South Africa reveal different political philosophies that informed and guided the ethos of the public service. The public service during the apartheid years for instance was anchored in the separate development narrative or apartheid philosophy. Some of the public servants, who did duty in the service of the apartheid establishment and its satellite homelands, did commit to the principles of the separate development narrative. The apartheid establishment also played its part in the socialisation of the public servants into the doctrines and ethos of the separate development or apartheid narrative. As it were, leadership development also entailed a conclusion of a social contract that is demonstrative of a commitment to the separate development narrative. With the onset of the democratic dispensation in South Africa, the public service universe demanded a cadre that is committed to the new and evolving social order. This development was suggestive of the imperative of a new social contract on the part of the public servants of the future (Adair, 2013:31).

A take on the nature of the post-apartheid public servants reveals that there are those public servants who are continuing to provide leadership at different levels of their work stations. They continue to deliver and multiply public value and public goods with diligence and commitment and the attendant show of character. These public servants present attributes of altruism and utilitarianism, as manifested in the various pockets of excellence in various government departments. Their energy and attitudes towards their work is suggestive of a cadre that is presenting principled leadership. The leadership that presents attributes of a people who have entered into a new social contract or agreement with themselves (Cole, 2003: 10). The public service is also found to be dogged by some public servants who are just a liability to both the government and the public. These are the public servants who are found to have in more ways than one contributed to the service delivery protests because of the low energy and negative attitudes they bring to bear at their work stations. Their behaviours are found to be motivated by negative psychological forces. Some of these public servants are also known for their unethical conduct on different fronts of the business of government.

2. Leadership and the social contract

Doing duty in the public service requires men and women of good will who would provide leadership in the business of governance. The concept of leadership by its very nature entails people entering into agreement with themselves on how they are going to prosecute the project of leadership. There generally is consensus among commentators on the concept of leadership on the understanding that the concept of leadership in the main entails people making a choice to serve and to make the world a better place for others and

the broader community of life. Making a choice to serve is one way of entering into contract with oneself to either give or to serve society. The decision to enter into a contract with oneself is often informed by a multiplicity of sources of authority, traceable to one's philosophy of leadership. The family, as one such authority, is also regarded as the first school of leadership, as it is in the family that people are socialised into what is regarded as desirable behaviours. This refers to the challenge of character development as beginning in the family. Desirable behaviours are expected to extend into a person's adult life and also into their work life. As it were, there is a need for people to enter into contract or covenant with themselves so as not to embarrass their families or family name in the course of the business of governance in the public service. This is the kind of commitment that needs to percolate into the public service and also be consolidated, in order to bring about improvements in the public service leadership infrastructure.

The community and culture also do serve as a source of authority in the leadership development agenda. Some people in the public service desist from engaging in certain undesirable behaviours as their cultures do not permit them to do so. In this regard, culture can be used as a source of reference in the process of concluding a new social contract for leadership development in the public service.

The concept of the social contract is widely associated with its use in political philosophy. The concept of the social contract is found to be predicated on the impulses geared at the search for leadership in the creation of public value and prosecution of good governance. Going back into the history of political philosophy, as far back as the ancient era and traditions of Socrates, we are introduced to some of the tenets of the social contract. Some of the tenets of the social contract in this era allude to a person's obligation to oneself and to fellow man. This is the line of thinking that further evolved into Plato's Republic of the philosopher kings, the guardians and the providers, wherein everyone had their obligations to society in one way or the other. Officials in the public service have an obligation to society. Once they are offered job, they sign up that they will honour their side of society's wide range of obligations to itself (Bennett, 2010: 11).

The widely debated Social Contract theories are those of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as expressed in the works of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Rawls. They each introduced a different dimension to the discourse on the concept of the social contract. Thomas Hobbes postulated the concept of the social contract as an escape from the brutality of the state of nature. This is the state where everyone is preoccupied with the betterment of their own situation. There today is a manifestation of this kind of ethical orientation in the public service. There are those public

servants who come across as arrogant and rude and can't function well in a team environment. They are also found to be lacking people skills, and yet people skills are key in the public service. The social contract was then seen as a way of humanity's moral and political evolution into modern and civilised way of living and handling of relationships in the delivery of services. For John Locke, society in the state of nature lived the life of liberty that required formalisation through the institution of government for the containment of the state of nature or the state of licence. Some people's behaviours in the public service today are bordering on the verges of rendering the public service the universe of licence and anarchy. The institution of government through the social contract would in this regard assist with the subjugation of the Law of Nature to the Law of God. John Rawls' concept of the social contract is found to be predicated on the Kantian doctrine of ensuring that there is liberty and justice for all, by way of simply doing the right things (Braun, 2004: 101).

3. The politics of liberation and the social contract

Liberation movements the world over anchored their political and where necessary, their military initiatives on the impulses of liberating people from the tyranny of their oppressors. In more ways than one, these movements' programmes were deeply steeped in the basic and universal principles of ethics. The universal principles of ethics are principles such the value of life, promotion of goodness over badness and the principles of justice and fairness. Most of the liberation movements were formed around the idea of justice and fairness for those subjected to conditions of oppression and the deprivation trap. That is why people who joined these movements had to take an oath that would commit them to the principles of these movements. These principles demanded principled leadership from the membership. This further suggests that members had to, by themselves, enter into a covenant with themselves to ensure that there is discipline and principled leadership. In the context of the fore-going, a person's political education can assist with a person's self-reflection in one's leadership development initiatives (George, 2011: 1).

The history of the South African liberation movements presents elements of the same approach. The majority of the members of the post-apartheid public service happen to emerge from the traditions and political education programmes of the ruling party. These are the traditions that provide a base for the new social contract that can assist in producing a public servant of the future who is of service to the new Grand National Narrative. But then again, today the public service universe has to deal with some people in the service whose behaviours are out of kilter with the historic teachings of the ruling party's political education. This comes across as confirmation of the observation that some people will go through

political education and political education will fail to go through them. Their behaviours have for years on end been the subject of the public's complaints.

In the face of all of these, there are those public servants who have truly entered into a new social contract with themselves, given the professionalism that they present in their places of work, as they are also providing highly principled leadership. This is the kind of leadership that continues to show commitments to ensuring people are having access to their basic needs (Braun, 2004:160). This is the leadership that is based on the new social contract and also the leadership that is committed to the creation and growth of public value. The leadership that is in observance of the rule of law and is guided by democratic principles (Tsheola, Segage and Ramonyai, 2014: 392).

The new National Narrative and the new social order require leadership in the public service that is based on the new social contract. A leadership that will guide society through times of uncertainty, hardship, the occasional service delivery related protests, the transformation imperative and the articulation of new beginnings. This is with a view to awakening new possibilities and opportunities in the way public value is prosecuted and delivered to the public (Kouzes and Posner, 2010: 43). In consort with John Rawls' concept of the contract, and his Kantian ethical orientation, this article refers to the leadership that is guided by the new social contract. This will be a social contract that will guide the leadership that will bring to bear, a caring and sharing attitude in the public service. The leadership that acknowledges people as an end in themselves and not as a means to an end (Groenewald, 2014:2). The public, in this era of contractual thinking, prefer to be served by politicians and officials in their communities and are recognised as local leaders in their own rights (Letsoalo, 2015: 5).

4. The new social contract and the realm of economic resources

The economic frontier of the public resources has for some years on end been one of the most pronounced problem areas in the public service. There has been an escalation in the number of cases where there has been a plundering of state resources through fraud and corruption. The problems of fraud and corruption have escalated to epidemic levels. Some public servants have gone to extents of forming syndicates and some have even joined forces with syndicates outside of the public service, with the main motivation of plundering state resources. Instead of being guided by the covenant and the new social contract, some public officials are found to be selling their authority for personal benefits outside the realm of fiscal processes (Masiloane and Dintwe, 2014: 181). There is a growth in dishonest practices of persons in the public service, the business community targeting state resources and some components of the organs of civil society.

As alluded to earlier on in this article, some people in the public service have entered into a covenant with themselves. They have made it part of their personal philosophy of leadership that they are not going to be involved in fraud and corruption as a matter of principle (Mafunisa, 2014: 1231). Some have made this commitment because principles informed their families, culture and in some instances politics as source of authority. As some people are given offices and positions of authority, they do carry out their responsibilities in a responsible manner. They are found to be exposed to all manner of temptations and yet they remain true to their convictions and principles on the plains of morality and personal philosophy of leadership. True and principle leadership also entails a person's commitment to one's triumph over temptation (Mandela, 2010: 406).

5. The new social contract and sustainable development

The history of the concept of development presents a deployment of resources in efforts to enhance the quality of a people's lives. In the course of the implementation of development initiatives, there emerged some disequilibrium in the handling and utilisation of resources for development. There was enhancement of the quality of life for some people and unfortunately in some instances at the expense of the broader community of life. Economic activities are being pursued in the quest for profits and sometimes at the expense of other people and their resources. Often times this tendency is challenged by the organs of civil society, in such a way that the project of leadership is being re-defined and escalated to another level. Today any discourse on leadership has to include its take on both the physical and the social ecologies as they inextricably intertwined. The discourse on leadership today includes people's responsibility towards the environment in its totality or the broader community of life. Today, taking care of the environment has to be based on principled leadership, where a person gets into agreement with themselves on their responsibility towards the environment.

Governments all over the world, as a sequel to the Brundtland Commission Report, started to take the issues of the environment serious, more especially with the growing problem of global warming. Most of the governments have gone a step further by way of promulgating legislation for the protection of the environment. The South African government also followed suit on this trajectory. Most of the policy documents from the Reconstruction and Development Programme era right up to the National Development Plan, provided frameworks for the protection of the environment, for the transitioning of development activities towards low-carbon economy.

With the legislation on the environment in place, all that is required is principled leadership in the area of environmental stewardship. It is established that environmental

stewardship is possible with politicians and officials in the public service demonstrate that they have gone into covenant with themselves and the broader community of life on the frontiers of environmental leadership (Jarbandan, 2014: 51). Providing leadership in the public service in most instances entails interaction with people, who could either be colleagues in the work place or members of the general public. It is further established that the communities that the public servants interact with, have their own worldviews and philosophies about how their environments function. As it were, leadership also entails entering into a covenant or a new social contract that would ensure that there is respect for communities' ways of life and how such communities mobilise both their physical and social capabilities for the upliftment of their well-being. This suggests that some people, more especially in the public service, need to desist from disrespecting the cultures of the communities that they are working with. Leadership in this regard would entail facilitation of the merging of the metaphysical, epistemological and ethical horizons towards an emotionally intelligent sustainable development. Leadership development today has to do with the development of competencies like emotional intelligence. The emotional intelligence that shows a person's ability to understand the emotional realities of other people and also the ability to show respect and relate to those communities (Goleman, 1998:324).

6. The new social contract and the philosophy of leadership

Throughout the history of the concept of the social contract, it emerges that different social contract models are anchored in particular social and political philosophies. This article postulates a gravitation towards Immanuel Kant's philosophy of ethics as the anchor for the new social contract for the public servant of the future. Ethics as a branch of philosophy is divided into two main approaches to ethical theory. The two main approaches are the teleological and the deontological theories of ethics. The teleological theories of ethics are largely concerned with the consequences of any human action; hence they are sometimes referred to as consequentialist theories of ethics. Immanuel Kant's theory of ethics falls under the category of the deontological theories of ethics. Immanuel Kant's theory of ethics is of the view that the intrinsically good thing or action is that which is done out of good will and duty to moral law (Wood, 2005: 5).

Contrary to other philosophies, the Kantian doctrine is predicated on the view that human beings are ends in themselves and not a means to an end. This further suggests that all human beings deserve to be served with dignity and respect. This is what the South African public has been yearning for in the recent past years. This article does however acknowledge that there have always been and there still are those public servants who, in keeping with the Kantian ethics were and are acting out of a sense of duty and principle.

They have always provided and continue to provide principled leadership in the course of discharging their duties and responsibilities.

The leadership challenge in the public service is that of the public servants who will provide principled leadership that is suggestive of a public servant that has entered into agreement with themselves (Ruiz, 1997: 26). This is the agreement that is based on the understanding that whatever actions that the public servants engage in, they are carried out of the spirit of good will, duty and principle, as leadership is also found to be about giving and sharing. It is about giving oneself to the people that a public servant is serving, as principled leadership in the public service is expected to be rooted in love (Farber, 2009: 3).

Principled leadership in the public service is expected to be always geared at the creation and multiplication of public value for the self and in the Kantian categorical imperative sense, creation and multiplication of public value for others. Principled leadership in the public service is expected to contribute towards the existential enlargement of the others. It has to be an affirmation of the self through the new social contract for the affirmation of the others as ends in themselves. As it were, the leadership development challenge for the public servant of the future entails the public servant that will provide leadership in an ethical and responsible way (Shongwe, 2015:10). This refers to a leadership that is guided by the values borne of the new social contract. Leadership development generally entails the development of both character and competence. Character development has to do with entering into covenant with the self on matters such as; patriotism, humility, integrity, credibility, fairness, respect, passion and all those leadership attributes that are associated with leadership success (Ruiz, 1997: 25).

On the leadership competence frontier, the public servant of the future needs to go into covenant with the self with regards to self-management and more broadly, contextual maturity (Groenewald, 2014: 1), more especially when it comes to interacting with colleagues, members of the public and the wider community of life.

7. Conclusion

In conclusion, this article is of the view that there is a need to for a new social contract in the course of providing leadership in the public service. It is through the new social contract covenant that the credibility and integrity of leadership in the public service can be enhanced and the public's trust restored. This article does acknowledge that there are men and women of good will in the public service who are providing principled leadership and from whom a lot can be learnt about leadership in the public service. But then again, there are those who definitely need to enter into agreement with themselves, as

postulated in the new social contract imperative for the public servant of the future, for the broadening of the horizons of ethical leadership in the public service.

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PERCEPTIONS AND EXPERIENCES OF IMMIGRANTS IN SOUTH AFRICA: WHO ARE THEY?

M.R. Mahlatji

M.A. Dikotla

University of Limpopo, South Africa

Abstract

Immigration continues to become a major issue and a source of political debate in 2015. It is important to recognise that a debate about immigration these days, is not about the level of immigration, or where people come from, but how to keep out immigrants and what to do with those who are already in the country. The Government of the day has been criticised for extending work permits to immigrants, when so many locals are unemployed. Different opinions from the general public are being made. Some people widely held belief that most crimes are committed by immigrants. Other people believe that employers prefer immigrants because of their cheap labour, thus most South Africans are unemployed. This is perpetuated by general negative perception that South Africans have towards the immigrants. However, how immigrants think South Africans perceive them is not known. Hence this paper seeks to investigate the perceptions and experiences of the immigrants in South Africa. A Question such as, "Are attitudes toward foreigners influenced by economic considerations or are they driven exclusively by non-economic issues? Do South Africans feel threatened by the labour-market competition of immigrants? More generally, who is against immigration, and why, remain to be answered. The distinction between how South Africans think about legal and illegal immigration is frequently lost in today's debate. Literature has been published on the negative attitudes towards immigrants by South Africans. Whether the immigrants perceive those attitudes as being answered is not sufficiently explored. Hence, this paper focuses on perceptions and experiences of immigrants.

Keywords: *Immigrants' attitudes, immigration, South Africa, Small traders, Social problems.*

1. Introduction

Migration is one of the defining issues of the 21st century and is an essential, unavoidable and potentially beneficial component of the economic and social life of countries and regions (Kalitayi & Visser, 2010: 377). Traditional migration configurations have changed different countries. Adepaju (2003:37) indicated that the traditional migration in West Africa has changed as countries are simultaneously origin, destination and transit for migrants. South Africa (SA) has also been a nation of migrants for many years. Prior 1994

South Africa experienced a labour migration from countries such as Lesotho, Malawi and Mozambique, in the mining and agricultural sector. The re-creation of South Africa in 1994 as an inclusive democracy in which the state, for the first time, represents all of the country's citizens has led to a new interest in immigration (Crush & Peberdy, 2000:103). Presently, there is an overall trend away from labour migration towards commercial by entrepreneurs who are self-employed, especially in the informal sector. The post-apartheid South Africa has received an influx of migrants from various parts of the region that is unlike the older flows of mostly unskilled mineworkers and farm labourers from traditional source countries (Adepoju, 2003b: 26).

Martin (2011:9) indicated that economic theory predicts that people tend to move from poorer areas to richer ones. This author also stated that 'migration is a process that governments learn to manage; it is not a problem that governments 'ever solve'. This supports the debate that migration these days is about how to manage those who are already in the country rather than focusing on what level it is and/or why they come to the country. McKinley (2006:1 as cited in Katilanyi & Visser, 2010:377) shared the same sentiments by emphasising that the focus should be on how to manage migration and deal with it effectively.

Mapisa-Nqakula (2006) added that the focus should be on the multidimensional international migration in order to identify appropriate ways and means of maximising developments and benefits and minimising negative aspects. This is because immigrants depend solely on how they are received in the country. There are various comments with regard to the availability of immigrants in a country. These comments would come from various levels of government and from people on the ground. South Africa is faced with such comments and reaction to the immigrants available in the country. For example, the then Minister of Home Affairs Mangosuthu Buthelezi, in his first speech to parliament proclaimed that:

"If we as South Africans are going to compete for scarce resources with millions of aliens who are pouring into South Africa, then we can bid goodbye to our Reconstruction and Development Programme" (Human Rights Watch, 1998: 20).

In his 'State of the City 2004' address, for example, Johannesburg's Executive Mayor, Amos Masondo (2004) reflected widespread sentiment in arguing that while migration contributes to the rich tapestry of the cosmopolitan city, it also places a severe strain on employment levels, housing and public services. Various allegations and comments are also made by some locals with regard to immigrants. Comments such as; "Immigrants are taking our jobs as employers prefer foreigners more than South Africans,

because immigrants settle for lower salaries and wages”, “The foreigners commit crimes and sell drugs to our kids”, are being made. On a positive level some comments include, “Foreigners are working longer hours (hard workers) and employ South Africans, ‘they succeed because they work as a team (collective entrepreneurship)’”.

Several studies have shown the attitudes of locals towards immigrants. It is not known how immigrants perceive these attitudes towards them. It is for this reason that this paper investigates the perceptions and experiences of the immigrants in South Africa. In order to put this paper into context, related literature on immigration, experiences, attitudes and perceptions of immigrants, legislative framework governing immigrants, and economic sector was reviewed. An empirical survey of immigrants working as street vendors and small traders was also conducted.

2. Immigrants and immigration in South Africa

As a result of long-standing patterns of labour migration, conflict and economic hardship in neighbouring countries, and South Africa’s peace and prosperity, the country has become a primary destination and transit point for migrants from throughout the region (Landau, Ramjathan-Keogh & Singh, 2005: 2). In order to understand perception and experiences of immigrants, it is important to first understand who the immigrants are and how their human rights are protected by law in South Africa. There are various definitions on what migration is. The Oxford English Dictionary defines migration as the movement by large number people from one place to another to live and find work. On the other hand Katilayi and Visser (2010:377) define Migration as “the movement of people across country (state) lines within the African continent for the purpose of establishing a new place or seeking peace and stability”. This paper adopts the latter definition. This suggests that even though South Africa receives immigrants beyond the boundaries of Africa, this paper considers immigrants to be only those who emigrate from the African continent to South Africa. People immigrate, in a country for various reasons. Hunter (2003) confirmed that most immigrate to South Africa for economic reasons. On the other hand, the study conducted by Posel (2004) indicated that increased immigration in SA was due to political insecurities and economic reasons.

Adepoju (2003:9) indicates that migrants play various roles in a country. For example, from West Africa (Nigeria & Ghana) bring professionals to staff the universities while countries such as Senegal and Mali focus on street vendors and small traders. Timberg (2005:5) argued that immigrants create employment for themselves and sometimes for unemployed South Africans. In most cases immigrants use entrepreneurship as a tool for economic, social integration and a means by which immigrants without education/ technical

skills can escape poverty (Serrie 1998). Kalitanyi and Visser (2010: 287-288) added that while many South Africans have to work for small business owners, many immigrants run their own businesses in this sector. As such immigrants contribute towards job creation in South Africa.

3. Legislative framework governing migration in South Africa

South Africa immigrants are protected by law like any other citizen. According to Landau, Ramjathan-Keogh and Singh (2004: 4), South Africa has made commitments to all who live in the country, regardless of citizenship, nationality, or country of birth. As South Africa considers plans for institutional reform and policy, there are strong reasons for including the rights of foreigners among the country's priorities which are as follows:

- South Africa is a country built through migration;
- Regional integration will increase the number of non-nationals in South Africa;
- While committed to tolerance and universal human rights, few South African citizens and politicians see foreigners as entitled to these rights;
- Denial of foreigners' rights affects South Africa's international reputation, economic prospects, and ability to deliver on its promise of freedom".

However, the concern remains how immigrants obtain access to South Africa, if ever they are legally registered or not. Although the current focus has shifted from legal or illegal immigration matters, to what immigrant do and how that impact on their wellbeing during their stay in South Africa. This paper also, does not distinguish or debate the legal status of the immigrants but considers how immigration is regulated in South Africa in relation to economic status. Political debates and policy changes associated with immigration are leading to a reconsideration of national identities and criteria for in national social, economic, and political communities throughout the world (Landau, 2004: 2). South Africa was also obliged to review its policies with regard to immigration. The Immigration Act, 13 of 2002 was amended by the Immigration Amendment Act, 19 of 2004. The Amendment Act was however only promulgated on 22 May 2014, by the proclamation in the Government Gazette. The revised Immigration Regulations also came into effect on 26 May 2014. South Africa's New Immigration law is an important legislation dealing with admissibility of foreigners into the country. According to this Act, generally, immigrants who are in a position to contribute to the broadening of South Africa's economic base are welcomed to move into the country and may apply for residence. Similarly applications by skilled workers in occupations for which there is a shortage in the country are encouraged but particularly applications by industrialist and/ or other entrepreneurs who wish to relocate businesses or establish new ones in South

Africa. The Act also list skills and business opportunities required in the country as scarce skills. This as such, allows immigrants to compete in the open labour market.

However, South Africa can only accommodate a certain number of immigrants specifically in the identified categories. The country has a vast reserve of unskilled and semi-skilled workers who are entitled to employment opportunities and to an economically viable lifestyle. Therefore foreigners in the unskilled and semi-skilled categories cannot be accepted as immigrant workers (Adepoju, 2006). Because of the considerable need for the creation of job opportunities for South African workers as well as for their training and development, this Act suggests that South Africa cannot afford to grant permits for immigration to persons who are not seriously committed to immigrating to the country with the aim of investing their assets, skills, knowledge and experience for the benefit of themselves and the people of South Africa.

The Immigration Amendment Act 19 of 2004 stipulates the use of quota work permits which maintains that there is a need to locate South Africans capable of doing jobs before sourcing out a certain of immigrants. In terms of its immigration policy, South Africa has noticeably prioritised and the rule is clear- any immigrant coming to South Africa for work will have to show that it is not in an occupation in which there are already sufficient people available to meet the countries' needs. This type of immigration accounts for a small number of migrants entering South Africa. If one can contribute to the economy through exceptional skills, one will be welcomed to migrate to South Africa.

Furthermore, the Immigration Amendment Act 19 of 2004 also stipulates that before immigrants can be offered business permits, they are required to commit that at least five South Africans will be employed. This might seem difficult in small business where the business may only require two or three employees. Based on this policy one might need to understand the different statuses of these types of immigrants. The question remains as to whether indeed the immigrants in South Africa are only professionals and skilled individuals who contribute to the development of the country. Some of the objectives and functions of immigration control are summarised as follows (with reference to Section 2 of the Immigration Act 13 of 2002):

- To attract investors, skilled workers, and tourists with enabling and predictable immigration environment;
- To maximise economic and labour opportunities for South Africans through migration;

- To foster the integration of migration into National Development Plan and other relevant national strategies

This shows that while South Africa is willing to take in skilled and professional people, it is clearly not interested in unskilled workers. Additionally, migration theorists have attempted to discuss patterns of migrations in terms of push and pull factors. Kirkwood (2009) pointed out that push factors are characterised categories such as unemployment, redundancy, and a lack of job or career prospects. This author added that the pull factors are the ones that draw people to start businesses and opportunity identification. It has already been stated in this paper that immigrants move from their country of origin for political and economic reasons. This paper concerns itself with economic reasons as determinants of attitudes and experiences of immigrants in South Africa. The subsequent section will therefore, focus on the attitudes of South Africans towards immigrants.

4. Attitudes towards immigrants

There are various determinants of attitudes towards immigration. Some theories emphasise the importance of economic competition, while others emphasise cultural and political and other aspects of life. In literature, theories relating to migration are summarised as follows (Pass & Halapuu, 2012 O' Rourke & Sinnott, 2006 & Quillan, 1995):

- Individual theories: place emphasis on individual drivers such as level of education, personal income, employment status, political involvement, and interpersonal trust. These theories suggest the attitude towards immigrants is determined by employment and personal income of South Africans. When South Africans are less educated, unemployed and with no or little income for their survival, they are likely to have a negative attitudes towards immigrants as they will blame them for their status. On the other side, if the South Africans are employed and can afford their daily needs, they may show positive attitudes towards immigrants.
- Collective theories: focus on the number of immigrants, level of unemployment, unemployment growth rate, and level of foreign investment. Generally, it is acknowledged that there is high level of unemployment in South Africa. Some allegedly state that the jobs are being created but taken by immigrants. People can no longer separate whether there is a job creation or not in the country. Hence, the scapegoating of immigrants by South Africans.

Timmer and Williamson (1998) mentioned that people's attitudes towards immigration might depend on their economic interests, with those who benefit as a result of immigration supporting it, and those who are economically hurt by immigration opposing it. Quillian (1995), Palmer (1996), Wilkes, Guppy and Farris (2008), and Ward, Masgoret and Vauclair (2011) conducted studies on how economic issues affect attitudes and experiences of immigration. These authors revealed a link between immigration and unemployment. In their study, Quillian (1996) and Palmer (1996) found out that attitudes towards immigrants are shaped by perceived threat and competition over limited resources. These authors indicated that prejudice against immigrants is known to increase during economic recession.

In their study conducted in the United State (US), Wilkes, Guppy and Farris (2008) found out that higher rates of unemployment are associated with a preference for a reduction in immigrant numbers. These authors emphasised that unemployment is the strongest predictor of anti-immigrant attitudes. On the other hand, Ward, Masgoret and Vauclair (2011) conducted a study in New Zealand and examined the association of immigrant density and unemployment with attitudes towards immigrants and immigrants' experiences. These authors indicated that unemployment trends were not found to be related to attitudes towards immigrants. They also found out that attitudes towards immigrants in New Zealand were largely positive especially in areas with high income. Sides and Citrin (2007) and Berg (2010) indicated that there is a small or insignificant effect of unemployment on attitudes to immigrants.

O'Rourke and Sinnott (2006) also investigated the determinants of attitude towards immigration. This author concluded as follows:

- Attitudes towards immigration are not a function of economic interests alone; rather, they also reflect nationalist sentiment among respondents.
- For labour market participants, standard economic theory does a good job of predicting individual attitudes towards immigration. The high-skilled are less opposed to immigration than the low-skilled, and this effect is greater in richer countries than in poorer countries, and in more equal countries than in more unequal ones.
- Noneconomic factors are much more important in determining the attitudes of those not in the labour force.

Paas and Halapuu (2012) focused on exploring people's attitudes towards immigration in 26 European countries. Outcomes of the study showed that the attitudes of European people towards immigrants varied depending on the personal characteristics, the country's

characteristics, and the attitudes of people towards country institutions and socio-economic security.

The study conducted by Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) maintained that there is little evidence that the effect of migrants on the personal situation of natives primarily determines native attitudes toward immigration. The study found out that “a respondent’s labour market position is not a powerful predictor of her immigration attitudes.” In fact, workers in different segments of the labour market share similar immigration preferences. Workers at all skill levels and industries express more support for high-skilled immigration than low-skilled immigration. The literature shows that immigration attitudes and experiences cut across all the countries of the world. Mattes, crush and Richmond (2000:1-3) noted that “immigration is not viewed as a public policy tool that could benefit South Africa. Immigrants and migrants (even the most highly skilled) are more often stereotyped as a threat to the economic and social interests of South Africans”.

5. Empirical evidence: experiences of the immigrants

In this paper the focus is on the explanation on economic issues as determinants of South Africans’ attitudes towards immigrants as perceived by immigrants’ themselves and how these relate or affect immigrants’ experiences.

5.1 Research Methodology

This paper used secondary source analysis and face-to-face structured interviews to collect data from the immigrants. The immigrant survey was carried out over a period of two months in four surrounding villages of Mankweng, Capricorn District of the Limpopo Province in South Africa. Researchers used snowball sampling method to sample 150 African immigrants residing at Ga-Mamabolo, Ga-Mothapo, Ga-Molepo, and Ga-Mothiba. A snowball sample is a non-probability sampling technique that is appropriate to use in research when the members of a population are difficult to locate (Maree 2007, Mouton 2001). Researchers collected data from few immigrants they could locate, then asked those individuals to provide information needed to locate other immigrants whom they know. As most of the studies were conducted in urban areas of South Africa, this study focused on the rural areas of the country. The said villages were chosen as they were easily accessible to researchers and having a considerable number of immigrants in their communities. Based on the framework of theories and literature, a set of questions were developed to explain attitudes and experiences of immigrants in South Africa:

- i. What is your Gender?

- ii. What is your highest formal qualification?
- iii. What is your country of origin?
- iv. How long have you lived in South Africa?
- v. Roles, experiences of the immigrants and how they think South Africans perceive them?

Qualitative data from the structured interviews was transcribed immediately after data collection. Based on recurring general statements common themes were identified and analysed. This implies that thematic analysis was used. According Liamputtong (2009: 285), thematic analysis is a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within research data.

5.2 Presentation of Empirical Results

In this part the researchers present and analyse the data that were gathered using structured interviews. Qualitative results present a comprehensive picture of perceptions and experiences of immigrants in South Africa.

5.2.1 Gender of respondents

The study found that majority of immigrants in the country is males 135(90%) while females are in their minority 15(10%). This is consistent with literature whereby African men work as migrant labourers with the aim of fending their families.

5.2.2 Number of years lived in South Africa

When asked how long they had been in the country, South Africa, most of them had been in the country for more than five years. Other immigrants could not state how long had they been in the country as they were in and out of the country for several periods. For example, one indicated that he had been in South Africa since 2004 but each year he spent between four to six months in the country and back home and vice versa. Even though this paper did not intend to determine the legal status of participants but it did come out. Legal status could not be verified as most stated that they were legal immigrants without evidence to show.

5.2.3 Highest formal qualification

Immigrants with higher levels of educational qualifications are presumed to be competent and productive in their organizations and businesses. The results of the study indicate that most immigrants do not have formal tertiary qualifications.

5.2.4 Country of origin

The most common idea is that immigrants usually come to South Africa to search for a better life. The results of the study revealed that immigrants are from different countries. Most of the immigrants reported that they come from countries such as Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Ghana, and Pakistan.

5.2.5 Roles, experiences of the immigrants and how they think South Africans perceive them

It is important to answer the question, what position do immigrants play in the country. Majority of South Africans believe that immigrants take their jobs, but this study proved otherwise. “Large number of our employees is South Africans” one responded was quoted as saying. This implies that immigrants play important role towards alleviation of unemployment, thus contributing towards the economy of the country. When asked about what perception they observe from South Africans towards them, majority indicated that they admire the human relations of South Africans. Some indicated that South Africans were supportive in terms of their establishment of their small business in various ways. The respondents indicated that if it was not for South Africans buying from their shops, their businesses would not be successful. They also indicated that they were learning from each other on how to develop successful business. This was indicated by one respondent when he stated that “We came to South Africa with some knowledge on how to do business, but we are learning more on how to do it in South Africa”. This notion is partly supported by Landen and Jacobsen (2004:46):

While there is widespread fears that immigrants are taking South Africans jobs, there are good reasons to believe that migrants could make a stronger contribution to the city’s economy. On aggregate 15% of all migrants surveyed report owning businesses in their country of origin, and presumably have the skills and entrepreneurial spirit to do so again in South Africa. These authors continue to argue that South Africa has much to gain from the immigrant communities but South Africans will only benefit from their resources if the country’s leaders and urban communities welcome the immigrants.

Unemployment rates and South Africans attitudes towards immigrants were associated with immigrant experiences. Majority of immigrants do not think they are

seriously discriminated against in their settlement areas. Findings showed that there was a positive relationship amongst immigrants and South Africans. Even though attitudes towards immigrant is widely discussed in literature as the major predictor of immigrant experiences, in this paper attitudes towards immigrants the case is different. Despite some negative attitudes, the immigrants still felt accepted in the country. One of the respondents indicated that “we do not trust each other, but they still buy from our shops and we sell to them”.

Findings also showed that immigrants who lived under village authorities felt safer. This is unexpected given the established relationship between low socioeconomic status and violent crime and research that has demonstrated that residents of lower socioeconomic status neighbourhoods perceive greater criminal activity, even if this is not objectively the case (Wilson, Kirtland, Ainsworth & Addy, 2004). Surprisingly, there was an element of discrimination and anti-immigrant attitudes by immigrant towards other immigrant.

6. Conclusion

This study has established that immigrants in Mankweng, Capricorn District are satisfied by the attitudes of South Africans towards them. This implies that most South Africans in this part of the country have positive attitudes towards immigrants. This finding is in contradiction with literature which reveals general negative attitudes of South Africans towards the immigrants and vice-versa. Furthermore, literature shows that immigrants who contribute towards South African economy are mainly those with formal qualification and working as professionals. This study revealed that immigrants without formal qualifications also contribute towards job creation through entrepreneurship. This is important role that can be emulated in other parts of the country. In other words their presence in the country is beneficial to both parties, i.e. South Africa and immigrants. The study did not intend to focus on the reasons why immigrants came to South Africa but reasons such as coming to South Africa for business and employment opportunities were indicated.

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WOMAN AND YOUTH OWNED ENTERPRISES IN SOUTH AFRICA: ASSESSING THE NEEDS, OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

T.S. Madzivhandila

M.S. Dlamini,

Small Enterprise Development Agency

Abstract

The high rate of poverty, inequality and unemployment in South Africa beyond the advent of democracy in 1994 has left the majority of population particularly women and youth stranded. On one hand, the recent statistics from Statistics South Africa first quarter show an unemployment rate of just over 25%, with youth of age between 15-34 years contributing an estimated 52.5% of whole unemployment proportion. On the other hand, women have always lived in deep trenches of poverty and inequality even before the dawn of democracy in South Africa. The scenarios above have inevitably forced the government of South Africa to put more emphasis on promoting women and youth entrepreneurship in order that youth and women can create employment opportunities for themselves and expand to also create employment for others. However, the high rate of unemployment seem to be increasing annually. For instance the establishment of institutions such as Small Enterprise Development Agency, Small Enterprise Finance Agency and National Youth Development Agency amongst other was done to reinforce and accelerate the development of entrepreneurship opportunities for those who do not have start-up investment both in terms of skills and finances but the majority of these enterprises do not grow beyond the start-up phase. The paper argues that more need to be done to assist and pave a suited environment for youth and women enterprises to grow and create employment opportunities to cater for the alarming unemployment rate that the country is facing. This paper creates a conceptual discussion on the specific needs, opportunities and challenges facing women and youth own enterprises in order that measures of improvement can be established. The paper conclude that a culture of entrepreneurship should be imparted to the south African community and that entrepreneurial education should be provided and integrated to the south African education system.

Keywords: Youth, women, entrepreneurship, South Africa, Needs, Opportunities, Challenges

1. Introduction

Promoting sustainable entrepreneurship development in the form of Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMME) is high on the policy agenda of almost all countries in the

world, as successful enterprises can generate additional employment opportunities and contribute significantly to the economic growth of a country (Cassia, Criaco & Minola, 2012). In other words, entrepreneurship development can aid economic growth, economic competitiveness, economic independence, self-esteem, job creation, social welfare, as well as political stability and national security of a country (Fonjong, 2004; Fatoki, 2014; Gănescu, 2014; Khumalo & Mutobola, 2014; Madzivhandila, 2014; Sanyal & Hisam, 2015). It is an observable fact that nowadays many countries are seeking to promote small and medium size enterprises to provide employment opportunities for their growing young population and to push for economic development. According to Osoro, Mokoro, Nyamongo & Areba (2013), SMME do not only create income and employment, but also generate wealth and contribute to the welfare of a nation's population in the long run. For instance in African countries such as Kenya, micro and small enterprises (MSEs) as they are known, are acknowledged as significant contributors to economic growth and are estimated to contribute 20% and 72% to the GDP and employment respectively. Furthermore, in countries such as Nigeria, even though the socio-economic impact of entrepreneurship on the sustainable economic growth of the economy is difficult to accurately measure or estimate, it is believed that such an impact is highly dynamic and significant. Entrepreneurship has been beneficial in Nigeria because its private sector comprising of small and medium enterprises provides diverse employment opportunities for about 50 percent of the country's population and 50 percent of its industrial output (Oyelola, Ajiboshin, Raimi, Raheem & Igwe, 2013). Again, entrepreneurship has been instrumental in economic growth, balanced regional development and job creation in most dynamic economies, where technology is changing at a faster rate and the product lifetime cycle is shrinking (Okurut, & Ama, 2013; Sharma, 2013; Bhat, & Khan, 2014). However, in countries such as South Africa, SMME development is faced with many challenges such as limited skills, infrastructure and finance. According to Turton and Herrington (2012), the rate of enterprise creation is very low in South Africa. For instance, the total Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA) rate decreased from 9.1% in 2011 to 7.3% in 2012. This challenge has thus perpetuated a problem of inability to create employment opportunities for the majority of unemployed citizens in the country, particularly the youth and women. Thus weak participation of youth in the entrepreneurial process and limited growth of women enterprise should be addressed if massive reduction of unemployment is to be realised.

The paper commences by giving a short discussion of the conceptual and contextual overview of women and youth entrepreneurship in South Africa. This is done by giving clear background on entrepreneurship as a concept and its application to women and youth

development in South Africa. The paper further address the needs and opportunities for women and youth entrepreneurship. Looking at the sought requirements for successful growth of SMME's which can ultimately contribute positively to economic growth and employment creation. The paper also tackles challenges facing entrepreneurship development in South Africa and beyond, with more emphasis to SMME's found in areas of limited economic potential such as townships and rural areas. Finally the paper concludes by proposing strides to consider towards sustainable women and youth entrepreneurship in South Africa.

2. Conceptual and contextual overview of women and youth entrepreneurship in south africa

In recent times South African Government have identified women and youth entrepreneurship development as one of the priority issues in dealing with high levels of unemployment and poverty in townships and rural areas (Madzivhandila, 2014; Sanyal & Hisam, 2015). Proper support and facilitation of development of enterprises owned by the said groups is essential in bridging the socio-economic inequality gap and bringing about sustainable economic growth and development in South Africa (Khumalo & Mutobola, 2014). Before exploring the contextual overview of these two phenomenon, namely women and youth entrepreneurship, it is utmost important to firstly provide a brief understanding of entrepreneurship as a concept. According to Oyelola *et al.* (2013) entrepreneurship is regarded as conceptualising, organising, creation and management of a new organization designed to pursue and nurture a business unique innovative opportunity into a potentially profitable and high growth venture in a complex and unstable environment. In other words, in pursuit of profitable growth, entrepreneurs exploit opportunities which exist in the environment or that may be created through innovation in an attempt to create economic value (Schoof, 2006; Kongolo, 2010; Turton & Herrington, 2012; Cant & Wiid, 2013). This can also include creation and management of new business ventures by an individual or a team. Also, the potential of the business idea, in terms of the existing and future demand for products or services can be of great importance as well in developing entrepreneurship opportunities.

Five variables that have great influence on entrepreneurship are addressed by Sanyal and Hisam (2015) as follows, the business environment; opportunities to start a business; personal characteristics necessary to start a business; risk taking and use of social networks. Oyelola *et al.* (2013) argued that, the processes behind successful

entrepreneurship development entails the act of risk-taking, invention, arbitrage and co-ordination of factors of production in the creation of new products or services for new and existing users in human society. In other words, the need for achievement, risk propensity and locus of control rank very high to the list of the entrepreneurial traits. However, people's attitude and behaviour towards entrepreneurship is also regarded as another critical aspect for the success of these process. Sanyal and Hisam (2015) wrote that, it is people's experience, knowledge and commitment that influence their decisions to become entrepreneurs and these factors have roots in their behaviours and attitudes. Sanyal and Hisam (2015) refers entrepreneurial behaviour as a way of thinking, reasoning, and acting that is opportunity-directed, and leadership-balanced. Thus, entrepreneurial behaviour is seen, rather, as a purely psychological phenomenon (Gănescu, 2014). This explains why, for example, Oyelola *et al.* (2013) highlighted that only a quarter of businesses worldwide are headed by women. This is because women have to cope with many factors such as discrimination, prejudices and certain skill deficiencies, but at the same time demonstrate successful management styles such as open communication and participative decision-making".

Women entrepreneurship has been associated for many years in South Africa and beyond with a mere route to move away from poverty because of fewer opportunities available to them in established labour markets (Fonjong, 2004; Schoof, 2006; Kongolo, 2010). In other words, the livelihood of women have always been derived from mainly microenterprise activities in the informal sector. These activities are done with a desire to improve the standard of living or move out of poverty trap. The push factors for women entrepreneurs explained by Okurut and Ama (2013), include unemployment, redundancy, recession, inadequate family income, dissatisfaction with being employed, or the need to accommodate work and home roles simultaneously. The pull factors include motivation for independence and the need to succeed better than others as entrepreneurs. Hence, Fatoki (2014) concurred that indeed in recent time the motivating factor for women entrepreneurs have gone beyond poverty alleviation to include attractions to business acumen, self-determination/autonomy, family concerns, lack of career advancement and the desire to make a social contribution. Women entrepreneurs' motivation for engaging in microenterprises currently include advancement and diversification of household income, creation of employment opportunities, and search for self-independence and personal growth. Sharma (2013) defines a female entrepreneur as a "woman or a group of women who initiate, organize and run a business enterprise". If properly coordinated and given proper support by both government and private sector, women enterprises can add value to

the creation of employment opportunities and economic growth, the same way youth enterprises are anticipated to contribute.

With unemployment high ranked among the most pressing socio-economic problems in most African countries, youth entrepreneurship has been identified as one of the it's best suited solutions (Sharma, 2013; Bhat & Khan, 2014). Youth entrepreneurship is at the heart of the entrepreneurial debate as the youth generally constitute a larger portion of many of these countries. Gwija, Eke and Iwu (2014) argue that, in a job-scarce environment, where unemployment is rife the need to foster entrepreneurship especially among youth is of prime concern. For instance, in the case of South Africa, where despite a number of government-pioneered interventions, the level of youth entrepreneurship, particularly in township areas remains unsatisfactory (Kongolo, 2010; Turton & Herrington, 2012; Cant & Wiid, 2013; Okurut, & Ama, 2013). Since the early 1990s, youth entrepreneurship has received great consideration in South Africa, and has even gained more focus after the establishment of Umsobomvu Youth Fund (UYF) in 2001. The continuous trend of high levels of unemployment among young people in South African reflects the difficulties young people face in finding a job. Furthermore, Gwija *et al.* (2014) argued that, on the basis of the current dynamic labour market in South Africa, many young people will not find jobs after completing their secondary education. Thus, cautioning them to consider self-employment as an option, instead of hunting for a wage employment. Hence, it is arguably safe to say, in South Africa, the low entrepreneurial activity among youth is one of the primary reasons why the country reports an overall low rate of entrepreneurial activity (Gwija *et al.*, 2014; Khumalo & Mutobola, 2014). However, there are many reasons why entrepreneurship activities are limited among young people in the country.

Some of the reasons for limited entrepreneurship in South Africa include culture, role models, work experiences, education and environment (Gănescu, 2014). Because of some of these factors, South African youth lag behind in setting up own business ventures compared to their counterparts from other countries (Fatoki, 2014; Gănescu, 2014; Khumalo & Mutobola, 2014). Other reasons for limited entrepreneurship activities among youth in South Africa is that, most of those that are engaged in the process appears to be motivated by economic necessity such as lack of employment, the need to supplement household income rather than the need to accumulate wealth, self-independence and efforts towards making the difference in their communities (Fatoki, 2014). In other words, young entrepreneurs in South Africa chose self-employment out of necessity rather than being motivated by attractive opportunities. This scenario suggests that most of the youth are pushed into entrepreneurship by the need to survive socio-economic harsh realities. Most of youth entrepreneurs in South Africa are not driven by entrepreneurial propensity associated

with their perceived level of entrepreneurial education, knowledge, and competence concerning new venture operation; their beliefs concerning entrepreneurial opportunities in the economy i.e., financial rewards, employment or the confidence in their ability to access the available opportunities such as self-employment and business risk (Fonjong, 2004; Schoof, 2006; Kongolo, 2010; Turton & Herrington, 2012). This challenge apply to more than just South Africa but also prevails in many other developing countries. In contrast, the motivators for entrepreneurship establishment by youth in developed countries include to be one's own boss, to obtain an alternative route for advancement, to obtain additional money and the desire for independence and flexibility (Kongolo, 2010; Turton and Herrington, 2012; Gănescu, 2014). Gănescu (2014) divided young entrepreneurs in to two groups, those who become entrepreneurs by necessity because they are unable to find other forms of formal employment or continue their education, and what can be called "vocational entrepreneurs" who seize a business opportunity". The latter are found to have natural disposition for innovation and change thus position them to be well suited for sustainable entrepreneurship (Gănescu, 2014). Their efforts can help to address problems associated with joblessness such as crime and depression, promoting innovation and resilience in other youth, the regeneration of the local community and the introduction of new economic opportunities and trends. They can also assist other young people to acquire the skills and competencies that they need to work and start new enterprises thus creating more employment opportunities. However, for this processes to unfold systematically, there are certain needs necessary to support and uplift women and youth entrepreneurship so that they can also create new advanced economic opportunities for themselves and others.

3. Women and youth entrepreneurship needs and opportunities

As already pointed out in the previous section, the key factors which influence women and youth entrepreneurship to have positive socio-economic impact include attitude, motivation and environment. However, a conducive environment particularly in terms of policy development is the most crucial among the three factors (Sharma, 2013; Bhat & Khan, 2014; Fatoki, 2014). Women and youth can possess positive attitude and high motivation ethos but if policies governing enterprise development are not conducive their efforts become futile. Bhat and Khan (2014) argue that, the economic, technological, legal and cultural environment in which entrepreneurs operate makes an enormous difference, often determining their original decision to start a new business as well as their subsequent chances of success. In other words, the policy environment of a country should promote women and youth entrepreneurship by focusing on the main factors that facilitate and stimulate, or hinder and impede, the entrepreneurial activity of these groups (Gănescu, 2014; Khumalo & Mutobola, 2014). For example, given the fact that Botswana's major policy

drive is diversification of the economy so as to create employment opportunities, addressing the environmental constraints under which microenterprises operate is of important policy concern to improve the livelihoods of the women and the youth, who are the main actors in the sector (Okurut, & Ama, 2013).

For the South African government to successfully develop the SMME sector, there is a need to find an appropriate policy mix of initialisers that correspond to the most important barriers and constraints that exist locally. Thus developing a tailor-made, holistic approach that responds to different economic, social and cultural situations as well as to particular entrepreneurial framework conditions and needs is required (Schoof, 2006). Bhat and Khan (2014) emphasised that, there is no one best way to foster entrepreneurship, it requires practical, targeted strategies, based on an understanding of the specific conditions faced by entrepreneurs in a particular area or region. For instance, South Africa need a policy mixture which will not only focus on funding, mentoring and training start-up SMME but deliberately setting standards to afford them branding, marketing and promotion opportunities of their products in order that they can compete successfully at the local and international markets. Okurut and Ama (2013) wrote that an introduction of special government credit schemes to provide external finance to SMMEs at subsidized interest rates and provision of specialised and focused capacity building to SMMEs is more than required. According to Khumalo and Mutobola (2014) the manner and extent in which a country supports and recognises its entrepreneurs determines the culture of entrepreneurship and ultimately, moulds the future of the economy. It is imperative that government provide a conducive environment in order that opportunities which comes with the benefits of entrepreneurship development can be realised.

In Africa, the contribution of entrepreneurship cannot be underscored. For instance, Ghanaian micro-enterprises employ less than 5 people, yet accounted for 70 percent of country's workforce (Oyelola *et al.*, 2013). Similarly, Kenya's private SMEs sector employed 3.2 million people and contributed 18 percent to the nation's GDP (Oyelola *et al.*, 2013). It is safe to say that, the creation and sustainability of new SMMEs is vital to the economic prosperity of a country or else it risks an economic stagnation. For instance, according to Gănescu (2014), Europe 2020 strategy recognises entrepreneurship and self-employment as key for achieving smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. In its support to entrepreneurship and self-employment, the European Commission focuses its efforts on business start-ups by unemployed and people from disadvantaged groups. Similarly, in South Africa entrepreneurship could create opportunities for women and youth that will develop their personality, identify new ways of employment and poverty reduction and transform the society in general. Furthermore, women and youth entrepreneurship could

make a significant impact on the economy not only in their ability to create jobs for themselves, but also in creating jobs for others. Mauchi, Mutengezanwa and Damiyano (2014) argues that, even though women often venture into entrepreneurship with little resources available to them to operate industries such as retail or personality services where the cost of entry is low, if they receive appropriate support such small ventures can grow bigger to create employment opportunities and contribute towards the economy. Thus, without targeted support both women and youth enterprises faces a lot of challenges which ultimately lead them to collapse.

4. Challenges facing entrepreneurship development in South africa

The most common challenges facing SMMEs in South Africa and across the globe include finance, and limited skills, marketing, management, social and human resources. According toKongolo (2010), these challenges constitute both internal (access to finance, management skills, networking, investment information technology and cost of production) and external (economic environment, markets, infrastructure, crime, corruption, labour and regulations) factors. Consequently, these challenges do not only lead to a high failure rate of SMMEs but they also contribute significantly to the prevention of the creation of new enterprises. However, Gwija et al. (2014) argue that, one of the most critical and major inhibiting factor to entrepreneurship development is the lack of awareness and inaccessibility of youth entrepreneurship support structures and initiatives in the community. Access to start-capital for setting-up new business venture and expansion capital for acquiring business resources that could aid growth opportunities is a big challenge, particularly for young people who come from less advantaged backgrounds. Mauchi et al. (2014) argued that in other countries, even though there are visible initiatives which create more economic opportunities for young people, it appears that they have no significant impact on reducing the high unemployment rate among these group. In other words, many SMMEs fail in spite of support from government and private initiatives that support and develop them (Turton and Herrington, 2012; Cant & Wiid, 2013). For instance, many small businesses within South Africa do not make it past the second year of trading with failure rates as high as 63 percent. Other common challenges facing development of SMME in South Africa townships and rural areas includebad roads, bribes by government officials, multiple taxes, epileptic power supply and rising overhead costs on transportation and communication.

SMME operating in areas of limited economic potential face a unique challenges including non-payment of outstanding accounts by clients; stiff competition and lack of market for their goods or services. Okurut and Ama (2013) noted the issue of location as the main contributor to the success or failure of small enterprises particularly those operating

informally. Cant and Wiid, (2013) argued that, the location of the business could simply be the reason as to why there are low demands for products as it is inconvenient for the consumers to purchase from the business. Also, the low demand for products could be that the SMMEs do not have sufficient knowledge of their target audience in order to market and adjust their strategies accordingly (Fonjong, 2004; Schoof, 2006; Kongolo, 2010; Turton & Herrington, 2012; Cant & Wiid, 2013; Okurut, & Ama, 2013). Furthermore, enterprises facing this kind of challenges struggle with issues of wrong pricing strategies which lead to low demand for products. For instance, if prices are too low, the results could be that consumers would perceive them to be of low quality and not up to standard and if the prices are too high, such may results in consumers seeking competitors' products (Cant & Wiid, 2013). Many of enterprises facing this kind of challenges are operated by women.

Women entrepreneurs are further confronted by constrains related to conflicts between work and family responsibilities, networking challenges, lack of education and management skills. According to Mauchi *et al.* (2014) work versus home conflict which is the tension caused by the dual responsibility of managing a business and maintaining a family is the main stumbling block for female business owners. Consequently, women entrepreneurs also suffer stress caused by time pressure, mental tiredness, balancing family and business life, physical tiredness and excessive expectations from men (Bhat, & Khan, 2014; Fatoki, 2014; Gănescu, 2014; Khumalo & Mutobola; Mauchi *et al.*, 2014). These challenges lead women to have a higher proportion of the businesses in industries with lower return rates operating in the informal sector such as services and retailing. Okurut and Ama (2013) argue that, women tend to lean towards engaging in enterprises which provide greater flexibility for balancing work and family responsibilities, and which are reinforced by gender and cultural beliefs, thus limiting them from other entrepreneurial opportunities. In most cases, women who are found in high impact enterprise arena such as manufacturing and construction possesses both high levels of self-confidence, bravery, communication skills and education (Khumalo & Mutobola, 2014; Mauchi *et al.*, 2014). The other common constrains facing women entrepreneurs to grow is the ability to secure credit. According to Mauchi *et al.* (2014), despite evidence that women's loan repayment rate is higher than men's, women still face more difficulties in obtaining credit due to discriminatory attitudes of banks and lending groups. Furthermore, women's inexperience of negotiating with the banks, inability to provide tangible securities and their lack of financial confidence to argue for what they are entitled to, are some of the problems they face in obtaining loans (Kongolo, 2010; Turton & Herrington, 2012; Mauchi *et al.*, 2014). Some of these challenges are also faced by the youth in South Africa, particularly the inability to provide tangible security by those found in townships and rural areas with limited economic base. Other barriers to successful youth

entrepreneurship include but are not limited to lack of information, knowledge, experience, appropriate premises, confidence and absence of support networks (Herrington, 2012; Mauchi *et al.*, 2014). Ironically, most of women and youth enterprises experience some of these problems not only during economic downturns but also during economic progress (Kongolo, 2010). Thus, it is imperative to tackle and provide both financial and non-financial support to these enterprises in order that they can improve their performance and contribute more meaningfully and sustainably to the society.

5. Strides towards sustainable women and youth entrepreneurship in South Africa

The solution to the challenges facing women and youth enterprises and ultimately the SMME sector as a whole require more than just a one size fits all strategy but a well-designed sector, area and context specific approach (Sharma, 2013; Bhat, & Khan, 2014; Fatoki, 2014; Gănescu, 2014; Khumalo & Mutobola, 2014). Fatoki (2014) argues that the first step to this approach is the development of the entrepreneurial mind-set, attitude and skills in order that entrepreneurs do not only perceive their activities as just jobs aimed at putting food on the table but as innovation hub where passion, zeal, comfort, personal advancement rests. Furthermore, Khumalo and Mutobola (2014) emphasized that, if a positive entrepreneurial culture can be carefully crafted, planted and nurtured over time in the very fabric of society, such will bear positive fruits in the long run. However, Gănescu (2014) argue that building a conducive entrepreneurial ecosystem can go a long way to change mind-set about entrepreneurship. The entrepreneurial ecosystem refers to all elements (individuals, organizations, and institutions) that favour or hinder the election of a person to become an entrepreneur or the likelihood to achieve success (Gănescu, 2014; Khumalo & Mutobola, 2014). Some of these elements include a strong and conducive culture; enabling policies and leadership; availability of appropriate finance; quality human capital; venture-friendly markets for products; a range of institutional and infrastructural supports (Gănescu, 2014). However, accompanying this processes, is the thorough development of a strong social networks.

Networks represent a means for entrepreneurs to reduce risks and transaction costs and also to improve access to business ideas, knowledge and capital. In other words emanating from these networks, SMME's can gain advice support acquire tacit knowledge, form strategic alliances, look for business opportunities and acquire credibility and legitimacy for themselves and their business (Sanyal & Hisam, 2015). However, Khumalo and Mutobola (2014) argue that successful policy implementation is one of the major aspects to facilitate

development of women and youth enterprises in South Africa. Entrepreneurship policy is cross-cutting in nature and therefore necessitates a collaborative multi-stakeholder approach on the part of government and society. Government should collaborate and integrate efforts of different ministries, for instance, education, Labour, Industry, Youth and Finance is vital for successful implementation of policies and programmes targeting women and youth enterprises (Bhat & Khan, 2014; Fatoki, 2014; Gănescu, 2014). Bhat & Khan (2014) suggested different robust and intensive entrepreneur training workshop programmes as an effective way to facilitate sustainable women and youth enterprise focusing on specific problems experience for practical application of concepts and procedure. However, Cant and Wiid, (2013) argued that training and workshop strategies have been applied for a long time with limited outcomes. Bhat and Khan (2014) suggested a paradigm shift in philosophy and pedagogy to put entrepreneurship development education as one of the main focus of interest in the education system starting at primary towards secondary and old age learning levels. In other words, small business education should be addressed to secondary or tertiary-level students and should form part of general educational courses whose objective is to raise awareness about considering entrepreneurship as a career option, and providing information on new business establishment (Bhat & Khan, 2014; Fatoki, 2014; Gănescu, 2014).

The current South African education system has not been able to promote independent thinking, creativity, innovativeness, risk taking abilities among learners and students in a way that builds them required entrepreneurial competencies (Gănescu, 2014). In many instances, knowledge about entrepreneurship as a career option is so infinitesimal that an educated youth comes to know about it after he/she has already wasted years together looking for a job and at the stage where entrepreneurship becomes a necessity rather than a choice (Bhat & Khan, 2014; Fatoki, 2014; Gănescu, 2014). According to Bhat and Khan (2014:3) "A country's competitiveness starts not on the factory floor or in the engineering lab but it starts in the classroom." Furthermore, Schoof (2006) reiterated that entrepreneurship awareness education is not only a means to foster youth entrepreneurship and self-employment but at the same time to equip young people with the attitudes (e.g. more personal responsibility) and skills (e.g. flexibility and creativity), necessary to cope with the uncertain employment paths of today's societies.

The youth in particular need to have an understanding that the main objective of the education is not only to get a government jobs but also to enlighten the mental faculties of a person in order to be innovative and creative (Sanyal & Hisam, 2015). Furthermore, both women and youth need to consider continuous entrepreneurial learning and development in order that their innovation and creative abilities to moulds, market and brand their products

can be achieved. Cant and Wiid (2013) wrote that SMMEs like any other business entity need to be aware of changes in the external environment such a technology which requires their product adaptability, new marketing and branding strategies (Cant & Wiid, 2013; Okurut, & Ama, 2013; Sharma, 2013). For instance, a brand as a means of marketing, need to constantly be revived in order to attract customers, however, due to their nature, many women and youth enterprises struggles to build a reputable brand name that consumers acknowledge and trust (Gănescu, 2014; Khumalo & Mutobola, 2014). As a result, competitors with established well-known brands are an issue that SMMEs need to overcome. On the other hand, even competition with other SMMEs need to be addressed as they may have trouble building their brand which differentiates them from competitors (Gănescu, 2014). Thus, government need to advance its support to SMME and also develop programmes to support branding and marketing of local products and services.

6. Conclusion

The creation and sustainability of new businesses is vital to the economic prosperity of South Africa and any other country. Whereas a mix of political, economic and social strategies are needed to bring about the required changes, there is a general consensus that the development of SMMEs constitutes one of the main pillars in this endeavour as they are expected to serve as the breeding ground or seedbed from which large firms will emerge. This paper discussed the context within which women and youth enterprises in South Africa operate, where different environmental and systematic stumbling block to these enterprises were identified. Some of the required needs of women and youth entrepreneurs identified include development of a proper and functional policy mix to support the enterprise and adoption of positive attitude and high motivation principles by entrepreneurs. The opportunities which women and youth enterprises can contribute to the society include significant improvement to the economy and alleviation of poverty which is deep rooted in the South African society. There are many challenges identified which are causes SMME neither to start nor to progress towards contributing to employment and economic growth in South Africa. These challenges revolves around marketing, management, social and human resources. Finally, the paper proposed some of the important recommendations to consider towards sustainable facilitation of women and youth enterprises in South Africa. The discussion highlighted the importance of inculcating the entrepreneurship culture to the society and integrating enterprise development to be part of the education system starting from primary to old age learning levels.

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BLAZING POLITICAL TENSION AND XENOPHOBIC ATTACKS IN SOUTH AFRICA: A PURE AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE

M.L. Mohlapamaswi

Capricorn High School, South Africa

M.P. Sebola

N.E. Mathebula

University of Limpopo, South Africa

Abstract

Over the past two decades, South Africa has seen an increasing number of foreign nationals from countries in the African continent. This movement is as a result of socio-economic opportunities unlocked by the dawn of democracy since 1994. After 1994, South Africa experienced high volumes of continental residents coming into the country for both stable social, economic and political motives. Some are political refugees seeking political asylum from South Africa whilst others have been driven out of their country by high rates of unemployment, political instability and poverty. These inflows to South Africa have been interpreted differently by the majority of South African residents. Some construed the arrival of the Africans as a fierce competition for jobs, business opportunities and the main stream economy. These could be seen as reasons for the blazing tension existing between South Africans and non-South Africans, which sometimes manifest itself into xenophobic attacks and violence. The challenge is that after 1994, South Africa did not enact and effectively implement sufficient and responsive immigration laws and policies that pertinently responds to its 'new' role in the African continent. The country needs a policy framework that will best address its complicated migration pattern that appears to be beyond the country's management capacity. The absence of sound migration policies perpetuates tension that was created by the Alien Control Act, 1991 (96 of 1991 as amended). This Act condoned movement of white non-South Africans which made migration legitimate for whites only. This paper is in nature empirical and qualitatively collected data through interviews. The paper therefore concludes that South Africa needs to through its 'political muscles' put systems in place for monitoring and controlling the movement of people both to and fro its borders. It is against the findings in this paper that recommendations are proposed.

Keywords: Blazing, Political tension, Immigration laws, Xenophobic attacks

1. Introduction

South Africa was an unpopular destination for the Africans during the apartheid era (Valji, 2003). However, the country's unpopularity was attributed to immigration policies of the country before 1994. Hence the migration policy was an instrument of racial supremacy (Khan, 2007). For operational purposes by then, the official and acceptable definition of an immigrant was that he or she had to be able to assimilate into the white population. There is no doubt that this definition excluded and severely disadvantaged non-white citizens. Black and African immigrants could only visit South Africa as temporary contract refugees under bilateral agreements between the apartheid government and the neighbouring countries (Crush & Williams, 2005). This type of contextualisation brought tensions and challenges especially to the African National Congress (ANC) as a party mainly rallying for liberation. The challenge lied in the inability of government to come up with migration policies that aimed at responding to the needs of the country and the role the country played on the African continent. South African is seen by most African countries as both a hub for economic activities in the continent, and also a unifier. The immigration policy of South Africa should therefore promote these two ideals. It was for these and other reasons that at the dawn of democracy in 1994, South Africa was viewed as an oasis in the African continent with opportunities that were not found in most African countries. A higher number of non-South Africans flooded to South Africa for both social and economic opportunities. The highest estimated number of Zimbabweans said to be living in South Africa in the year 2008 was estimated to be 3 million (Centre for Development and Enterprise, 2008). This is viewed to be the highest number compared to other foreign nationals living in South Africa.

There is no doubt that seven years down the line the number might have doubled given the worsening and deteriorating economic and political stance of the country. With this being said, South Africa is seen as an alternative where residents from neighbouring countries look to salvage a leaving and be able to support their families back home. When these people arrive in South Africa, whether documented or not, they are faced with grim reality of both high unemployment and ravaging poverty that South Africans are faced with on day to day basis. Some of the inhabitants from countries such as Mozambique, Somalia and Kenya to mention just a few were able to make an economic breakthrough in business and self-employment initiatives. These pockets of sporadic successes made by non-South Africans are interpreted by the locals as competition for jobs and other scarce resources like housing and basic infrastructural services like water and electricity (Hickel, 2014). This interpretation culminated into a blazing tension that ignites spate of xenophobic attacks in South Africa. In its pursuit to critically zoom into the blazing political tension and xenophobic attacks in South Africa using a pure African perspective, this paper starts by outlining the

methodology as adopted and utilised for data collection, literature review and discussing the findings. The paper concludes by making recommendations and final conclusions.

2. Research design and methodology

2.1 Approach

This article adopted a qualitative research approach. A qualitative study refers to research which produces descriptive data, generally people's own written or spoken words (Brynard, Hanekom & Brynard 2014). This enables the researcher to interpret and describe the actions of people through a variety of methods that are relevant to the design as outlined in the respective paragraph below. The qualitative approach utilised interviews to collect primary data in order to comprehensively understand the construct social reality faced by African foreign nationals in South Africa.

2.2 Population and sampling

The population of this study comprised both foreign male and female learners and teachers at the Capricorn High School, Limpopo Province. According to Bless, High-Smith and Kagee (2006:106), there are various sampling techniques that can be used. In this article, purposive or judgemental sampling was used. Purposive or judgemental sampling technique is selected on the basis of the researcher's own knowledge of the population, its elements, and the nature of the researcher's aims (Bless, Higson-Smith & Kagee, 2006; Mouton, 2014). This sampling technique was applicable to this paper since the participants were foreign nationals working in South Africa with the knowledge of xenophobic attitudes and how it manifests to them.

2.3 Data collection

The data was collected qualitatively. Interviews with foreign educators from Capricorn High School, Limpopo Province, were conducted. Field notes were taken to capture the experiences of the participants. Researchers in Public Administration most probably use interviews as a data collection instrument due to its flexibility to allow the researcher to explain the questions to the respondents if they cannot clearly understand (Brynard *et al.* 2014:42).

2.4 Data analysis

Data analysis is a process of manipulating and filtering data until it is ensured that only which is critical to the research remains, while the following should always be kept in mind:

- Topic of the research;
- Research questions and objectives;
- Contribution of the data towards the research; and
- Relationship of the data to the research topic (Brynard, *et al.*, 2014).

This article has ensured that the above is taken into consideration in analysing data which is presented below. The data was analysed thematically for presentation and interpretation. Qualitative data was categorised according to the themes as indicated by the data collection instruments and was manipulated according to such subjects.

3. Literature review

3.1 From apartheid to independent South Africa: migration and xenophobia

The movement of people in and out of South Africa did not begin after 1994 when the country attained its independence. Migration in South Africa can be traced back to the Jan Van Riebeeck era when he landed in the Cape in 1652. He actively encouraged migration by whites from Europe and practically allowed them free access to the territory (Nyamnjoh, 2006). The Dutch 'visit' was characterised by tension between the 'visitors' and the locals as often there were allegations of the others 'stealing' the locals' livestock. The relationship between the two nationals did not promote social cohesion as it was conflictual.

The discovery of diamonds and gold in South Africa around 1867 also saw a high number of migrant labourers from neighbouring countries such as Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe just to mention a few coming to work in the South African mines. The interaction between South African miners and non-South Africans was also characterised by territorial tension. The tension culminated in subtle xenophobic perceptions which were not as rife as it is experienced in South Africa today. Even within the borders of the country, people from the homelands experienced the same when they move to the mining towns and cities. Migration is therefore, an old phenomenon that was often characterised by ethnic tension which went with the socio-economic concerns of peculiar to specific times.

As South Africa gained independence, those socio-economic concerns re-surfaced in another form and culminated to a deep hatred for non-South Africans. After South Africa's independence, the ANC-led government, did not reconcile the existing immigration policy with the new role the country plays in the continent. The absence of a transformed migration policy that is relevant to the migration needs of the country perpetuates tension created by Alien Control Act. This Act, condoned movement of white non-South Africans. The Act was an instrument of racial domination because until 1991, the official definition of an immigrant was that he or she had to be able to assimilate into the white population. This definition was discriminatory and purposefully excluded other racial groups. Other racial groupings were then catered for by bilateral agreements only as temporary workers. The majority of the affected immigrants were from Lesotho, Mozambique and Malawi. Even black South Africans were accorded the same status of being declared as temporary workers in white

cities and towns where they were housed in the hostels. The construction of the hostels, and the regulations governing such accommodation, were provided for under the Natives (Urban Areas) Act 21 of 1923, which amongst other things, was motivated by the need to ensure that further labour requirements be met by housing African men in hostels and barracks in urban areas. These were used as instruments to exclude undesirable Africans especially those from the borders of South Africa from the cities and towns (Ramphele, 1993).

South Africa gained independence at the pinnacle of high unemployment, impoverishment and homelessness. In addition, the economies of countries in the continent also experienced low growth rates that are compounded by political instability and civil wars. The inhabitants from affected states are then pushed to seek better opportunities beyond the political margins of their lands. This trend is common to most African countries and will continue in the near future if both economic and political landscape in the continent remains unchanged.

3.2 The phenomena of xenophobia in the democratic dispensation

It is noteworthy that the outbreak in xenophobic violence and attacks in South Africa is strongly connected to the country's history which is characterised by violence and many societal ills (Charman & Piper, 2012). The xenophobic outbreaks during the years 2008 and 2015 respectively was mainly attributed to frustrations by South African citizens against the democratic government for the slow pace of transformation since 1994. South African citizens believe that high levels of unemployment and adverse poverty lines could be attributed to continuous inflows of immigrants from neighbouring countries such as Zimbabwe and Mozambique and therefore using such excuses as a scapegoat (Landau, Ramjathan-akeogh, 2005). For instances, the ill of most South African townships such as crime, lack of housing, HIV/AIDS and other diseases are all pinned on foreign nationals (Carneson, 2009).. With this being said, the 2008 xenophobic attacks left about 62 migrants murdered while some were raped and their houses and belongings looted and destroyed (Richards, 2009). There is no doubt that these kinds of manifestations have taken a shape of criminality while xenophobia is used as an umbrella. Once again, similar attributes and suspicious but unfounded factors were used to perpetrate the 2015 xenophobic violence in the country. One distinguishing features of these attacks was the fact that majority of the victims were immigrants mostly from the neighbouring Zimbabwe and Mozambique, something that most scholars refer to as *afrophobia*. All this and other xenophobia related hatred and violence necessitates a swift policy measure that could be used sustainably to prevent the occurrences in the future.

3.3 Policy implications

There is no that the South African policy-making processes have wriggled to develop and effectively implement policies for managing migration and its border posts for curbing xenophobia and related violence and attacks. Other countries around the globe are struggling in this regard as well. This feature is also common in countries such as the United States (CDE, 2011). The challenge for the integration and effective policy making and implementation with effective border management is associated with high costs (CDE, 2011) which cannot supplant the economic and security realities and ideals. Despite all this, South Africa needs to propagate for policy frameworks and strive to manage its borders for the sake of national interest, peace and security. According to Martin (2011), the South African government has severely failed to manage the borders and broadcast effective migration policies because of resource restraints resulting in porous borders with people who lack proper travel documentation. In this context, it is therefore necessary to develop a migration management system that puts the country's national interest first; maximises economic growth of the country and the region in general; assists foreigners in realising their rights and benefits; while minimising the side-effects of immigration. However there are challenges such as demography and economic opportunities that radically increase migration which places tremendous pressure on policy makers to manage migration and the borders.

According to Carneson (2011), other major issues to the management of borders and migration policies particularly for developed and developing countries is the involvement of low-skilled labour from Zimbabwe who are often attractive to employers because of their willingness to work hard in jobs that are undesirable to local citizens. Under such circumstances, it can be deduced that since migration is old as mankind itself, the management of borders and the policies surrounding migration should be dynamic and flexible to take into account for the changing migration trends. The *Immigration Act, 2002* (13 of 2002) was promulgated with the objectives to promote a human rights-based culture in both government and civil society in immigration control, facilitating and simplifying the issuing of both temporary and permanent permits while also discouraging illegal foreigners. The Act further seeks to regulate the influx of foreigners. Central to the current discourse on migration and xenophobia, in terms of section 2 (1) (e) of the Act, xenophobia should be deterred and prevented across all the three spheres of government, organs of state, and most importantly at a community level. One is tempted to pose a question given a piece of legislation which seeks to promote peace between foreign nationals and South African nationals: what then ignited xenophobic attacks and violence in the country? In as much as segregation against foreigners takes place at the community level, there is a sense that the

people on the ground lack sound knowledge of government policies and therefore end up taking conscious and criminal decisions. The early dawn and the 2008 xenophobic violence in South Africa should have served as a valuable lesson for the purposes of policy making through revising the statutes coupled with community awareness. Hence section (2) (e) of the Act aims to educate communities and organs of civil society on the rights of foreigners, whether legal or illegal and refugees, and conduct other activities to prevent xenophobia. It can therefore be drawn from the prescripts of this section that perhaps it is not a matter of policy but rather its implementation which has been found to be wanting.

4. Findings and discussions

4.1 Institutional tension

Tension of racial and xenophobic nature are institutionalised and widespread. They are common in government and workplaces that manifest themselves in subservience that is often a result of job insecurity. This sense of uncertainty subject foreign nationals to jobs that attract meagre incomes and exploitation. The host employers deliberately engage in these practices because these enhance their profit margins. On the contrary, foreign employees accept terms and conditions laid by their employers out of desperation and vulnerability. Even where their skill and level of productivity warrant an added incentive like a recognition in the form of a bonus or current wage rate, they are sometimes overlooked. They are treated as machines used to oil both formal and informal South African economies. Some of the practices happen because some of these people do not belong to organised labour. They are therefore not seen as a collective. They are treated and exploited as individuals.

Alongside the subservience imposed upon the non- South Africans by the socio-economic conditions in their countries of origin is supremacy developed by South Africans against the non-South Africans. This is spawned by the territorial advantage. South Africans are giving their counter-parts a treatment given to them by the apartheid system, a mind-set that the ANC government should have dealt with post-apartheid.

4.2 Rank and file treatment

The attacks for ordinary members is both institutional and individualised. They experience xenophobic attacks from ordinary South Africans by different households. In this category, foreign nationals are subjected to hard labour and all the grim tasks. These tasks include gardening, cleaning household's yards and houses, washing family clothing as well as painting. In the rural areas, most common tasks are herding cattle and ploughing fields. These chores are found by the South Africans to be physically draining and as such

relegated to non-South Africans. This trend, resembles what apartheid system did to the black South Africans.

The interaction of the host residents and non-residents in this category is characterised by a fierce tension, finger pointing, criminality and mudslinging. It is in this category that there is stiff competition for scarce resources. South Africans blame foreign nationals for taking their jobs whilst the others blame South Africans for indolence and laziness. Their relationship is driven by violent tension that often displays elements of criminality such as looting, burning of shops belonging to non-South Africans and in extreme cases, senseless killings occur. It is on account of these activities that foreign nationals are displaced as they flee from their dwellings to save their lives. The South African government will then react by constructing tents as a temporal solution to this dilemma. This creates a humanitarian crises as the affected are then left without adequate food supply, ablution system and have the schooling of their children interrupted.

These activities are gruesome and often attract international and regional reaction. This is the reason why the South African presidency had to deploy ministers and premiers to publicly denounce xenophobic attacks and visit hotpot areas on a mission to condemn the attacks. The government had to use media, both print and electronic to put across this message. This interaction brought an end to xenophobic uprisings especially in areas such as Durban (Kwazulu-Natal) and Alexandra Township (Gauteng). This intervention by the government is not a permanent remedy to the underlying xenophobic crises in South Africa. These attacks are likely to erupt again in the near future. The celebration of Africa month was intensified to put across the same message. Although these initiatives seem to have an impact on xenophobia, they need to leave a permanent foot print that will permanently alleviate xenophobic attacks, an exercise the researcher finds unattainable if the socio-economic concerns of the poor are not addressed.

4.3 Deportation

The deportation system used by the South African government does not promote values of respect and dignity as enshrined in the country's Constitution Act 108 Of 1996. The response measures applied by South African government such as *operation fiela* to raid places where hostel dwellings which are often occupied by foreign nationals does not resonates well with South Africa's supreme law. Although the South African government argues that these operations are not targeted at non-documented foreign nationals but criminals, the use of maximum force by South African Police Services and South African Defence Force impact on the safety of the affected people. This indirectly influences the manner in which South Africans treat other Africans, notwithstanding the fact that South

Africans come from a historical past characterised by intense hatred and intolerance that was practised on them by their white counterparts.

During apartheid, blacks were subjected to the hostile treatment that they currently transfer to foreign nationals. It shows that some South Africans therefore, did not make peace with their painful past. This problem is further compounded by low literacy rate in South Africa. Schooling teaches people to interact with others and raises the benefits of civic participation, including voting and organising (Tiky, 2014). This to an extent explains why high level of attacks come from settlements characterised by limited education and high levels of poverty like Alexandra. Alexandra or Alex is generally known, is one of Gauteng's oldest township characterised by lack of infrastructure, overcrowding and rampant crime. From this spectrum, competition for jobs, business opportunities and housing is fierce. Competition for economic resources is rife and gnashing and sometimes tragic and fatal. Vigilante killings, property destruction, political assassinations, *mafia-style* gunning down of 'enemies' and public executions, usually by necklacing become everyday occurrences (Davis, 1994). Although these acts are highly condemned by civil society and the government, are justified by the perpetrators as they claim that foreign nationals take their jobs. They claim that foreign nationals plunge them into deep poverty and deprivation. Although this claim is common to many, it cannot be justified as some of the foreign nationals are not in the employ of neither the South African government nor South African private sector. They survive on self-initiated businesses that grew over time. Even though the foreign nationals have proven their resilience against poverty, South Africans continue to consider foreign nationals a threat to the social and economic well-being of their country and often seen as 'job-stealers' (Crush, 2008). The irony is that is that foreign nationals are always willing to take any form of jobs given to them for the sake of survival and own livelihood, therefore accepting any work given to them even below the current wage levels.

Dirty and dangerous work is then given to foreign nationals. The nationals of the host countries refuse to undertake such jobs, despite high levels of poverty and unemployment (Nyamnjoh, 2006). This shows entitlement mind-set of people post 1994; that South Africans developed egoistic attitude against fellow Africans. This perception is also visible in rural areas where foreign nationals are given jobs to herd cattle, clean people's yards, harvest fields and a wide range of menial jobs that even the poor are not interested in taking despite being needy and deprived.

The sad part is that even when foreign nationals stand a high chance of being killed, attacked or have their small businesses torched and looted, some are likely to remain in South Africa as they come from war torn countries and find it unsafe to return to their

countries. In 1999, a fifth of Africans lived in countries battered by war (Hyden, 2013). These foreign nationals are therefore vulnerable and will continue to suffer in the hands of some South Africans who have an intense hatred for foreign nationals.

4.4 Social cohesion

Xenophobic attacks are impacting negatively on the sound relationship the country has with African countries in the region and beyond. This is because some South Africans have developed a toxic sense of possessiveness that dampens the spirit of unity South Africa aspires to spawn in the continent. Some South Africans believe in exclusion; 'South Africa for South Africans'. This results in domopolitics or politics of domus, of 'home as our place', where we belong, naturally and where others by definition do not belong however, 'needed but unwelcome prevails (Lentin & Titley, 2011).

5. Recommendations

5.1 Employment creation

Unemployment is both a cause and a result of poverty situation in which people find themselves. Unemployment rate in South Africa increased to 26, 4 in the first quarter of 2015 from 24.3% in the fourth quarter of 2014. This trend can be reversed by South Africans' willingness and drive to partake in self-employment ventures. Massive training on how to establish sustainable small businesses can alleviate the scorch of unemployment faced by many South Africans. The South African government should take a stand on de-stigmatising certain kinds of jobs that the residents take for granted because of low status associated with those jobs. This will impact on economic growth. If the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grows, more employment opportunities will be created and therefore alleviate poverty.

5.2 Decolonising the mind

Most South Africans still have a mind-set belonging to the past dispensation. The education system in the country especially in Life Orientation as a school subject should be expanded to include social cohesion and meaningful co-existence. Celebrating Africa day, addressing the nation on both print, electronic media and social networks are temporal intervention measures. A schooling system that resonates with the country's constitution will go a long way in alleviating xenophobic attacks that often erupt when least expected.

5.3 Poverty alleviation initiatives

South Africa's income distribution is highly skewed (Marais, 2011). Government should therefore, support poverty alleviation initiatives on sustainable basis, not as once-off

projects which are often given to citizens in the form of free houses and cash grants to mention a few. Reducing poverty is seen as the world's greatest challenge and South Africa is no exception. It is estimated that 12 million people in South Africa are poor and cannot afford basic needs. This article recommends robust strategies to fight poverty, such as spawning entrepreneurial skills amongst the people, which should be inculcated at school level. This will create a culture of self-reliance and self-sufficiency. The other challenge is the inequalities that exist in the country's labour market. There is a critical shortage of engineers, artisans as well as Mathematics and Science educators. There is a need therefore, to market Further Education and Training (FET) colleges. Some South Africans believe these institutions are for low grade school leavers. This perception needs to be corrected.

6. Conclusion

Migration is an inevitable human phenomenon. South Africans need to embrace this movement of people from one country to another. The government should also have a system in place to control and monitor movement of people in and out of the country. The presence of undocumented foreign nationals is an indication of a system that is failing to manage a sound migration process.

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EMPLOYEES' PERCEPTION ON EMPLOYEE ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME AS A MEANS TO COMBAT SUBSTANCE ABUSE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS-SEKHUKHUNE DISTRICT

R.M. Letsoalo

Z. Mpehle

University of Limpopo, South Africa

Abstract

Substance abuse is regarded as one of the problems that has an adverse effect in the productivity in a workplace, and as such preventative programmes need to be put in place either to deter employees from substance abuse or assist those already affected by such undesirable conduct. This explorative study was conducted in the Department of Public Works in the Sekhukhune District, Limpopo Province to gather employees' perceptions on the effectiveness of the Employment Assistance Programme assisting those affected by substance abuse with specific reference to alcohol abuse. As the study was qualitative in its approach, ten employees in the EAP were randomly selected and interviewed through a semi-structured interview schedule. The findings revealed that although the affected employees' behaviours have somehow changed for the better, the Department still needs to adequately address contributing factors to substance abuse within the work environment such as stress, oppression, unreasonable workload and favouritism that contribute towards substance abuse.

Keywords: Employee assistance programme, Substance abuse, Public works, Bill of Rights

1. Introduction

The Bill of Rights as enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Section 23, 24 and 27) emphasises that everyone has a right to an environment that is not harmful to health and wellbeing and a right to health care services respectively. It has, therefore, become imperative that organisations, whether private or public, put systems in place to ensure that the health of employees particularly in a work environment is not neglected but handled in an effective manner. Furthermore, Section 41(d) (vii) of the Public Service Act of 1994 as amended by Public Service Amendment Act 5 of 1999 entitles the Minister for Public Service and Administration to make regulations that will ensure that all institutions put employees' health and safety as a priority in the workplace. Occupational Health and Safety Act (1993), which emphasises that the employer should ensure that the

working environment is safe and free from hazards as way of caring for the health of employees. Thus this necessitates the employer not to only focus on the health of employees but also their physical and psychological wellbeing. It is incumbent, according to the Public Safety Regulations of 2001, that every head of department (HOD) of public institutions create and maintain a safe working environment for employees by establishing a health promotion programme through education, awareness and prevention programmes. It is of paramount importance that HODs introduce measures for monitoring and evaluation of the impact of any health promotion programme among departmental employees.

It is evident from these provisions that the South African government is taking safety and wellness of employees as an important aspect in a workplace precisely because personal safety and wellness has direct impact on an organisation's performance and productivity. It is on this premise that the EAP in the Limpopo Public Service was established in November 2000 by the Office of the Premier as mandated by the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) which was cascaded to Limpopo Department of Public Works (LDPW) in 2003. The focus of this study is on EAP as a sub-programme of Employee Health and Wellness Programme that seeks to address challenges such as substance abuse in the workplace in order to improve employees' performance and productivity.

This paper begins by exploring the rationale of the EAP in a workplace and continues to discuss the two EAP categories namely the substance abuse approach and the broad-brush approach with an intention to highlight the importance of one approach over the other. The paper further discusses the need for organisations to have policies guiding the implementation of EAP, and continues to state the research methods applied. The paper concludes by presenting the research findings and analysis thereof, and further submits recommendations.

2. Rationale for employee assistance programme

EAP is seen as a workplace programme aimed to assist employees with their substance abuse challenges for the betterment of their welfare and the growth of an organisation in terms of performance and productivity. An effective EAP needs to succor an organisation by reducing challenges faced by employees in and out of the organisation. In 2007 the Public Service Commission (PSC) conducted a survey at both national and provincial public institutions with an aim to establish if institutions are committed in improving the well-being of employees in a workplace, and to determine if these institutions are committed in the implementation of EAP. The survey revealed that generally public

institutions in South Africa are committed to improve the well-being of employees through EAP in order to deal effectively with individual's personal difficulties that may negatively affect them and their attitudes toward work. The survey reflected that the aims of EAP in organisations are to increase employee attendance at work, improve communication within an organisation, to prevent unnecessary accidents and personal conflicts, and to increase organisational and productivity (PSC, 2007:22).

Mogorosi (2009:344) agrees with the study by asserting that there are different reasons for the establishment of the programme which make the programme important, and some of them include reducing organisational costs by attending to employee challenges and problems at an early stage such as new employee acclimatization, reducing absenteeism, eliminating discrimination and substance abuse. Furthermore the EAP is seen as contributing to the efforts of organisation to humanise the workplace by meeting the needs of changing working environment and workforce, helping to improve employee work performance and the general well-being needs of employees. This therefore implies that the main reason for the establishment of EAP in a workplace is to improve employees' performance and productivity by addressing their personal and work-related problems that may hinder their performance.

3. Employee assistance programme approaches

EAP can be categorised into two types, which are the substance abuse approach and the broad-brush approach. The substance abuse approach is traditional and usually emphasises alcohol abuse which is limited to employee problems and job performance issues. Whereas, the most contemporary EAPs adopt the broad brush approach which is designed to include all problems which impact on an individual employee. It incorporates a wide range of familial, marital, legal, emotional, financial and psychological issues in addition to substance abuse (Albertyn & McCann, 1993:126).

The emergence of Employee Assistance Programmes (EAPs) as a response to workplace substance abuse, originated in the United States of America in the 1940s' (Hopkins, 1997:1216). However Riley & Zaccaro (1987) in Elliot & Shelley (2005:125) argue that the origin of EAP can be traced to the founding in 1935 of Alcoholics Anonymous (AA), an organisation that fostered the concept of alcoholism as a disease and promoted a long-term treatment for recovery. EAPs have been tailored and incorporated within organisations worldwide (Maiden, 1992:28). By the 1940s several major corporations were actively promoting helping relationships between alcoholic employees and Alcoholic Anonymous members. Employee assistance programmes have since evolved into a comprehensive

model for dealing with employee issues (Merrick, Volpe-Vartanian, Horgan, and Mc Cann, 2007:1265). The effects of substance abuse on the employee and his or her work are severe, which can result in a sharp decline in the quality and quantity of work. Because of the magnitude of the problem in South Africa, many employers have developed policies and procedures through the EAP to deal with employee alcohol and drug abuse (Grobler, Warnich, Carrel, Elbert & Hatfield, 2006: 400). It therefore becomes imperative that EAP policies need to be put in place in an institution that will serve as a guide on how to tackle employees' health and wellness challenges.

4. A need for clear eap policy

Smook, Ubbink, Ryke & Strydom (2014:5) argue that the negative impact of substance abuse on the workplace compel employers to develop workplace policies and practices to deal with the problem. A formal written policy in an institution is a signal that substance abuse prevention, employee health and wellness in and out of work environment should be an organisation's priority. McCann, Harker Burnhams, Albertyn and Bhoola (2011:211) stress that it is importance to have clear policies and procedures for dealing with work-place substance abuse and dependence, and that includes clear intentions, programme procedures and the type of services available. Cloete and De Coning (2011:4) define policy as a statement of intent or an action plan to transform a perceived problem into a future solution. This clarifies the duties, rights, responsibilities and privileges of all involved (i.e. management, programme staff, employees and union).

As stated by Hawks (2003) it is important to have an unambiguous EAP policy in an organisation to ensure that proper and clear directions and methods are outlined on how to deal with unacceptable behaviors caused by substance abuse, and need to be applied consistently throughout an organisation. For the policy to be effective an organisation has to ensure that there is proper understanding by employees of what the programme is for and how it needs to be implemented. Some of the ways to make employees know and understand what the programme is all about is to spread the information through wall posters, booklets and pamphlets, incorporating information into staff orientation and induction.

Bendererly and Hafer (1998:6) highlight that a formal written policy is a signal that substance abuse prevention and employee health are an important company priority. The employees and unions should be involved early in the process of developing the policy. These authors suggest that an effective policy should include the following:

- ✚ A rationale that explains the policy's justification, purpose, and goals.
- ✚ A clear statement of exactly what behaviours one expects from employees and how the EAP processes address the problem.
- ✚ Explicitly stated consequences for violating the policy, including procedures for determining if a violation has occurred and methods which an employee can appeal.
- ✚ Assurances that confidentiality will be protected, the policy will be administered fairly, impartially, and consistently, and employees will be helped to gain access to resources that provide needed help. Such efforts can range from offering information about locally available organisations to providing an EAP or a health plan that covers counselling and treatment programs.

For the policy implementation to be effective employees should know and understand the policy. The policy can be publicized through e-mail messages, newsletters, posters, payroll inserts and informational meetings. According to Parker (2007:23) the top three reasons why organisations introduce policies to help manage substance abuse at work are, among others, to promote safety at work, to support employee health and to address concerns over deteriorating employee performance. This is further attested by Mathlape (2003:37) who states that the establishment of EAP in South Africa is the most common intervention utilised in the workplace to address substance abuse challenges in order to improve productivity and employees' performance.

5. Research methodology

As it was the aim of this study to gather employees' perceptions on the effectiveness of the employee assistance programme in the Department of Public Works -Sekhukhune District, it was important to utilise the qualitative research approach to interview 10 EAP clients with substance abuse problem who were randomly selected from a population of 53 employees who are in the EAP with similar substance abuse problem in the Department. The sample represents 19% of the total population, and therefore is a fair representation that will assist the researchers to collect adequate data for generalisation. The method was appropriate for this study as it allowed the researchers to uncover rich and quality information through interview as compared to only quantifying the problem (Marshall and Rossman, 2006:36). A self-administered semi-structured interview schedule with closed and open-ended questions was a suitable data collection instrument. The benefit of using this schedule was to allow the researchers to get clarity from the interviewees and ask follow-up questions on pertinent issues of concern.

6. Presentation and analysis of findings

This section is divided into two: the first section is the presentation of the respondents' demographics, and the second one is about the respondents' utilization of the employment assistance programme

6.1 *Demographics of Respondents*

The first part of the interview schedule was designed to gather the biographical data of the respondents which includes age, educational background, gender and work experience. It was vital to collect such data as it provided the researchers with the necessary information on the respondents' background.

Age: Fifty percent (5) of the respondents were between 36 and 50 years old, and the other 50 % ranges between 51-65 years. This information suggests that most of the EAP clients in the Department were at middle and late adulthood. This does not in any way mean that only employees in these categories are affected by substance abuse as substance abuse cuts across all ages. However, as stated by Robertson, David and Rao (2003:2), it has been proven that substance abuse affects people differently depending on their age and on the length of exposure and engagement in the activity. That is, when one has been exposed to substance abuse from a tender age that would have dire consequences as one grows older.

Gender: All respondents were males as most of the clients with substance abuse problem on the Departmental data base were males. This result is a direct indication of the Department's population which is male dominated due to the nature of work performed such as bricklaying, carpentry, painting, electrical and mechanical services. The great number of males can also be influenced by the cultural belief that men are more susceptible to substance abuse than women as men are allowed to drink alcohol as soon as they are deemed to have reached the manhood stage. The culture in the community affects the organisational culture.

Educational qualifications: Seventy percent of respondents' qualifications range between grade 5 and 11. This can be attributed to the fact the duties they does not require any formal qualifications as they are assistants to the artisans and perform intensive labour

work. Twenty percent (2) of the respondents have grade 12 with 10% (1) having gone beyond grade 12 and are all in the administrative directorate.

Years of experience: Out of ten respondents, only one had a working experience of less than 10 years, two had a working experience of between 11 and 20 years whereas the majority of the respondents at 70% had 21+years of experience. This results attest that most of the respondents are old having served many years in the Department but with no formal qualification. Two respondents indicated that boredom as a result of being in the same place for a long time, doing the same thing and getting paid a meager salary made them vulnerable to substance abuse.

7. Utilisation of employment assistance programme

This second part was designed to ascertain the reasons respondents were on the EAP data base, to determine whether participants understand the programme, causes of their problems and their expectations of the programme. Getting the respondents' views concerning the programme is essential as it will assist researchers to attain the intended aim of the study.

7.1 Method of Referral to the Programme

The respondents were asked how they ended up in the programme, whether they referred themselves or by someone. The researchers wanted to establish the reasons for them to be referred to the programme. All the respondents were formally referred by their supervisors to the programme because the employees' substance abuse impacted negatively on their performance as they were often absent from work. Some were referred because they had serious challenges on financial management issues, and some were referred because of their violent and aggressive behaviour. As stated by Khorombi (2006:87), formal referral occurs in a situation where a supervisor or a manager refers an employee with personal problems contributing to poor performance to EAP

7.2 Probable causes of substance abuse

Eighty percent (8) of the respondents indicated that work related issues such as stress, oppression, workload and favouritism contributed towards the problem. Family related issues such relationship and financial problems were also highlighted to be contributors towards substance abuse. It is noteworthy that twenty percent (2) of the

respondents were in denial as they did not see themselves having substances abuse challenges.

7.3 Employees' awareness of the programme

The researchers wanted to find out if respondents were aware of the EAP services in their Department and what are their needs and expectations towards the programme. Nine of the ten respondents were aware of the programme even before they were referred. The concern though was that after they were referred to the programme they discovered that their needs and expectations were not met. For an example, one respondent believed that the programme will pay his debts which led him to abuse alcohol as a way of relieving the frustration and the burden that comes with it.

7.4 Resources in the EAP

The majority of the respondents (70%) believe that the lack of human and financial resources impacts negatively to the programme. For an example, one respondent said, *"The programme is not well staffed because you cannot access the services if the only coordinator is on leave"*. The whole Department has only one practitioner who has been trained as a social worker that attends to all 53 clients and their various challenges, which is quite overwhelming for her. According to respondents, they were told by management that the organisation does not have adequate budget to have additional professionals to assist in the programme. The issue of resources is further expounded upon by Govender (2009:16) who maintains that for EAP to be effective it needs sufficient financial as well as human resources. Organisations should be clear about the investment value of EAP as it will drive employers to see a need of allocating sufficient human and financial resources.

7.5 Adherence to principle of confidentiality and appropriate EAP model for the Department

All respondents acknowledged having read the statement of confidentiality during the consultations, an indication that the Department takes ethical issues seriously. Sixty percent (6) of respondents raised a concern of confidentiality as in most cases they are not sure if the information they share with practitioners during EAP consultations remains within the consultation room, as a result respondents are not free to open up to practitioners on more personal issues. Keeping information confidential is critical precisely because the organisation will keep the programme credible to the current and prospective users. The EAP is likely to be more effective only if employees trust that services rendered are provided within appropriate professional boundaries of confidentiality and privacy.

7.6 Model Preference

The issue of which EAP model the Department is using was also important for the employees. Thus the largest group (70%) of the respondents prefer the offsite model than the current in-house model. The off-site model is when an organisation contracts an external service provider to render EAP services. Their preference of offsite EAP is based on the fact that the model will offer them a privilege to access diverse and professional staff such as doctors, nurses, psychologists, psychiatrist and physiotherapist, other than accessing one social worker as the situation is currently in the Department. For an example, the Department has one coordinator dealing with three programs EAP, OHS and HIV/AIDS and a Social Worker by profession. She therefore has to attend to all clients issues even on areas where she does not have the expertise. The respondents' preference of offsite EAP is also based on the assumption that external vendors may be more professional in their approach by not attaching any stigma to any person because of the distant client-provider relationship. Again, the issue of trust is problematic with internal practitioners; suspicions from respondents are that practitioners may consciously or unconsciously divulge their clients' confidential information to other staff members.

7.7 Substance abuse services rendered by EAP in the Department

Since 100% of the respondents has substance abuse problems which in turn has a rippling effect on the organisation such as absenteeism, poor working relationships, financial problems, it was therefore important for the researchers to find out the kind of services they receive from EAP. Half of the respondents (5) stressed that they receive intervention services which included counselling and referral to the Treatment Centre with little preventative and after-care services. Thirty percent (3) of the respondents who were admitted to the treatment (rehabilitation centre) indicated that there were no follow-up sessions or after care services after they were discharged from the centre. None of the respondents ever attended an awareness or preventative programme on substance abuse in the Department. Lack of preventative programme or primary prevention strategy as well as after-care services in the Department contribute to the high caseload of substance abuse as well as relapses.

7.8 Challenges experienced by respondent while utilising the service

Employees highlighted that they experienced challenges when utilising the services such as not being attended to timeously, interference from supervisors. This led the employees to believe that the off-site model will be more appropriate since the supervisors will not have access to the EAP professional. Lack of follow-up sessions due to shortage of personnel as there is only person servicing the whole district with three service centers. The centralisation

of EAP office to District is also time consuming to the employees due to travelling from District to Cost Centre and vice versa.

8. Summary of the findings

The majority of the employees in the Department are in their middle age and late adulthood who, in most instances, are facing demanding life challenges that make them susceptible to stress and other related conditions. To ease themselves from and cope with these conditions they resort to substance abuse. This is in agreement with a study conducted by Sherer (2006) that concluded that challenges and work demands in employees who are from mid-30s up to mid-50s and 60s are more likely to drive them to substance abuse.

The Department has more male workforce than females both at a junior, middle and senior management level due to its nature of work. Most of the EAP clients had no formal qualifications and in the technical field. There were no EAP clients from the middle and senior management only junior level. Although the EAP within the Department is a broad brush approach which is supposed to address a wide range of issues pertaining to health and well-being of employees such as alcohol/drug addictions, stress, marital concerns, family/child issues, emotional, legal, financial problems and death/grief counselling, the lack of human and financial resources hampers the effectiveness of the programme. Shortage of staff which lead to inconsistent follow-up and aftercare programme as well as budget constraints were the most challenges highlighted. The respondents identified only general counselling and HIV/AIDS as the services mainly rendered by EAP in the Department.

Based on the above challenges respondents prefer or favour an off-site or external model than the in-house model precisely because this model is perceived to be the solution to issues of lack of resources and confidentiality which are currently perceived as a stumbling block to the effectiveness of the programme in the current on-site model.

9. Conclusion

Substance abuse is a challenge that is facing both public and private institutions, and if not properly attended to will have undesirable repercussions on institutional performance and productivity. It therefore becomes imperative that institutions have EAP to address challenges that are confronted by employees as far as substance abuse is concerned. For the battle to be won institutions need to be proactive in identifying employees that either

have problems at home or at work and assist such employees at the early stages of their challenges. For such employees to be adequately assisted there should be effective and unambiguous policies that will serve as a guide on how EAP needs to be successfully implemented.

9. Recommendations

Based on the findings the following are recommendations:

- For the EAP to be more effective there should be strategies developed and implemented on a strong recruitment drive of professional staff to ease the heavy load on the current single staff.
- Since budget is centralized, it will be advisable to decentralise it for the benefit of the programme and employees' health and wellness.
- If the shortage of staff persists, the Department should consider an off-site EAP model to ensure adequate attendance to employees' needs.
- To avoid being reactionary, the management of the Department should ensure that both the primary (prevention measures) and secondary (intervention and after-care services) strategies are developed, adequately implemented and periodically evaluated.

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MANAGING XENOPHOBIA IN AFRICA: MYTH OR REALITY? THE CASE OF SOUTH AFRICA

D. Chigudu

University of South Africa, South Africa

Abstract

In Africa like in other continents, citizens in host countries associate low-income immigrants with social disorder and a propensity to commit crime. Contrary to that perception, most immigrants tend to be hard-workers who observe the rule of law and yet they are often victims of crime. Developed countries have benefited immensely from immigration. South Africa seems to be taking the same route. For that reason xenophobes must be transformed into xenophiles, xenophobia into “xenophilia” showing love of diversity. South Africa has had a high influx of immigrants from the Middle East, Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Angola, Liberia, Uganda, Cameroon, Sierra Leone, North and South Sudan, Mozambique and Somalia owing to social, political and economic push factors. Citizens of the host country who are not economically well placed perceive the influx as a threat to their strained economic base. This presents xenophobic management challenges. Globalisation’s predominant features include dependency of countries on foreign skills and labour mobility which South Africa as one of the fastest growing economy on the African continent cannot do without. South Africa has had overt xenophobic management challenges in 2008 and recently in 2015. It has been argued that the country’s covert xenophobic management challenges occur daily in both public and private sector invoking thoughts about the sincerity of the government in dealing with the matter. Some scholars and researchers argue that, South African immigration policy appears to have been actively hostile towards foreign nationals while others view government as striving to root out elements that are xenophobic in nature. This paper seeks to search for a solution to demystify the question of whether South Africa’s management of xenophobia is a reality or a myth. This is likely to help re-define national policies and procedures that may appear to be obscure and locate the position of South Africa’s governance as non-xenophobic whether overtly or veiled.

Keywords: xenophobia, immigration law, migrants, nationals, foreign nationals.

1. Introduction

The dislike of foreign nationals in an overt or covert manner is xenophobia. The concept is premised on the fact that foreigners should have a lower social status than that of nationals and dictated by the politics of exclusion (Matunhu, 2011). The dislike can escalate

into violence that destroys life or property. The demise of the socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was a result of xenophobia and ethnic cleansing that took place in the 1990s. Bosniaks, Croats and Albanians became negative towards the Serbs (Fetzer, 2000). For this reason, Serbs viewed Croatia during the reign of Franjo Tudjman as fascist comparable to World War II Ustase regime which perpetrated genocide on Serbs. Also, as far back as the period 1641-1853 Japan had a policy that entrenched xenophobic attitudes on foreigners. The policy was called Japan's national closure or "sakoku." This policy was highly exclusionary and had discriminatory overtones on all foreigners. The United Nations Special Rappouter for Racial Discrimination Report of 2006 was negative about Japan's xenophobic practices. These practices included difficulties in accessing social amenities based on physical appearances. America has not been an exception as noted by Fetzer (2000). Fetzer argues that, Americans tend to view foreign nationals with hatred, suspicion and fear although they value cheap labour provided by these immigrants. It explains why attacks against Haitians by Americans have increased since 1992 according to the United Nations, the Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International in the above author. Americans have also shown hatred towards Japanese, Chinese, Irish and of late, the Muslim immigrants. Outside America, the Swiss People's Party was reproached for fanning xenophobia and racism in a controversial poster during its 2007 elections campaign. It was alleged that the poster depicted a white sheep that was kicking a black sheep away from the Swiss national flag. The Swiss People's Party also proposed a law allowing judges to deport a convicted criminal below the age of eighteen's entire family once sentence was passed (Crush, 2000).

In the African continent and South Africa in particular, xenophobia is not a new phenomenon. The South African immigration policies have not been friendly to the foreign nationals especially towards particular groups (Reitzes, 2009). The legacy of the South African discriminatory practices has continued to influence how foreign immigrants are profiled in legislation and policy. Bond et al (2010:10) observe that, "Regrettably, immigration law remains one of the apartheid legacies that South Africa maintains, with slight changes, from which xenophobic attitudes grow and explode." Thus, there are practical implications in terms of treatment and perceptions by those charged with implementation and the citizenry. Clark (2009) a United Nations Development Official argues that, there are exaggerated fears that migrants may take jobs, lower wages of the locals and impose an economic burden to the fiscus. In 2008, xenophobic attacks resulted in the death of 62 people (21 South Africans) with 100 000 displaced, dozens raped, millions of rand worth of goods looted, taken or destroyed by locals and about 670 people wounded (CoRMSA,2008). A total of 135 separate cases of violence were reported (Bekker et al, 2008). Most of the migrants in South Africa come from Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Rwanda,

Sudan, the Middle East, Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda, Liberia, Burundi, Sierra Leone and Cameroon (Gomo, 2010). According to Crush and Williams (2001) South Africa believes it plays host to millions of undocumented migrants from the rest of Africa with the Department Home Affairs claiming close to 10 million illegal immigrants (Crush, 2008).

Answers to the questions how does South Africa manage xenophobia and why does xenophobia recur in this country have not been investigative enough leaving many to wonder if the management is a reality or myth. As Bond et al (2010: 2) aptly put it,

“Oftentimes, answers to the question ‘why’ are not sufficiently probing. Blaming individual xenophobes, neighbourhoods and communities, reverting to national/ethnic generalisations, turning to cultural explanation, and simple denial – these are the kinds of problems that researchers encounter (sometimes falling victim to themselves) without a foregrounding of the deeper, root causes.” This paper seeks to plug the gap from which the misconceptions about the management of xenophobia seem to emerge. This is done by locating practical measures taken by the government of South Africa if any, the legal framework and adherence to international law among other variables.

2. Background information

According to Matunhu (2011), South Africa has the largest economy on the African continent. Migration patterns in Table 1 below indicate that from 1990 when South Africa attained its political independence from the apartheid regime there was an influx of African immigrants into the country in search of employment.

Table 1: Temporary Legal Labour Migration to South Africa, 1990-2000

Temporary Legal Labour Migration to South Africa, 1990-2000			
Year	New Work Permits	Renewals	Total
1990	7,657	30,915	38,571
1991	4,117	32,763	36,880
1992	5,581	33,318	38,899
1993	5,741	30,810	36,551
1994	8,714	29,352	38,066
1995	11,053	32,838	43,891
1996	19,498	33,206	52,704
1997	11,361	17,129	28,490
1998	10,828	11,207	22,035
1999	13,163	10,136	23,299
2000	6,643	9,191	15,834

Source: Department of Home Affairs Annual Reports

The country is a constitutional democracy with 80 % of the people in the country being religious (Tevera and Crush, 2003) who believe in the biblical scripture, “thou shalt love your neighbour as you love thyself” (Mataar, 2009). Paradoxically, the South African

Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) identified in 1997 xenophobia as a prime cause of concern to human rights and democracy in the country (Naylor, 2001).

Landau and Jacobson (2004) note that, the South African Human Rights Commission embarked on an educational programme known as the Roll Back Xenophobia (RBX) Campaign in October 2008. The unanticipated outcome was a marked growth of intolerance towards foreign nationals by the nationals. Although the then President Mbeki together with the Congress of South African Trade Unions had earlier in 2001 warned against perpetration of xenophobia (Crush, 2000) in May 2008 xenophobic attacks originated in Alexandria. Alexandria represents informal and impoverished settlements that lie in Johannesburg and Khayaelitsha in Cape Town.

South Africa subscribes to the pan-African principles of 'humwe' in Zimbabwe, 'ubuntu' in South Africa also known as 'Ujamaa' in Kenya and Tanzania. These principles defy xenophobia as they regard African people as one. Matunhu (2011) and Crush (2000) contend that, South Africans hated foreign nationals who contributed to the country's development by accepting jobs despised by nationals. These jobs include mining, farming and construction industry. According to Chimanihire (2007), some of the jobs taken by foreign nationals include but not limited to skills strategic shortage sectors namely, engineering, nursing, and teaching of mathematics, natural sciences and medicine which are crucial for socio-economic development. However, it is not a guarded secret that, xenophobia attracts mistrust, promotes cold wars, breeds criminality and scares away potential investors and tourist.

In an article by Gomo (2010; 3), "The Tourism Business Council of South Africa acknowledged that 'there is panic among tourists across the globe...', after the 2008 xenophobic attacks. Tourism contributes 8% of annual GDP and employing about 1 million people. In the same vein, South Africa's economy had always been dependent on migrant labour" Duncan (1998) in SAMP (2008) argues that interest groups quote discredited figures of foreign nationals who live in South Africa then attribute the figures to various forms of crime without proof. To Amisi (2009), xenophobia is made worse by neoliberal globalisation's negative impact which compels developing countries to retrench employees, privatise state companies, commodify the people's rights and cut down on social spending. But SAHRC (2004) in Amisi (2009) views xenophobia in South Africa as a 'particularly racialised expression' affecting more black African foreign nationals compared to other race groups.

Despite the observations above, international law is unambiguous about treatment of people irrespective of colour, race, creed, ethnicity or other forms of discrimination. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 2 states that:

“Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.”

Articles 5 and 6 further state that; “no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.” It is for this reason that, Crush (2008) laments that tolerating xenophobia or xenophobic tendencies require urgent global attention as it is a serious development issue. The media sometimes builds a negative atmosphere unknowingly by portraying migrants in negative terms when they use national and racial stereotypes as shown in Table 2. Certain terms used like ‘alien’ have serious negative connotations. For instance, the Oxford Dictionary has defined alien as “...unacceptable or beings from other worlds” while ‘kwerekwere’ refers to slurred speech characterized by biological deformities. Media have a critical role in shaping perceptions and mentalities of nationals towards migrants. Gomo (2010:35) argues that,

“... such derogatory terms present foreigners as elements from another planet invading South Africa, and do not deserve sympathy but should be removed from society as they are not part of ‘us’.” In South Africa, foreigners who do not originate from Africa are regarded more as business partners, investors, and tourists or in the category of sport, yet those from Africa are regarded either as criminals, drug traffickers, illegal migrants or job seekers who must not be tolerated (Gomo, 2010). Foreigners are believed to be staging stiff competition among the nationals on available opportunities such as women and jobs hence living lavishly to ‘their’ detriment. There is a notion that, South Africans never had an opportunity to enjoy their independence as foreign nationals quickly moved in to occupy better space. In the apartheid epoch, they were treated as lesser human beings and now it is their turn to treat others in the same way. It is worth noting that, foreign nationals in South Africa are expected to be protected from xenophobia by the Constitution. Specifically, Article 14 of the Constitution provides that, “all the people shall be equal under the law, and that there shall be no discrimination in political, economic, or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin.” In spite of this provision, the world has been surprised by xenophobic attacks on black foreigners living in South Africa in recent years.

Table 2 Description of foreigners by the media in South Africa

Description	Percentage
Foreigner	48
Refugee/Asylum Seeker	9
Foreign National	6
Alien	3
Immigrant/Migrant	17
Illegal Immigrant	2
Kwerekwere	2
Others	13

(N=1034) Adapted from Gomo (2010:34)

3. Methodology

This study is based on the constructivist paradigm as it does not agree with the concept of objective human knowledge. Instead, knowledge is constructed as we explore the environment. The truth about how xenophobia is managed in South Africa does not wait lying somewhere for people to discover it. Rather it is constructed through social interaction with the realities of overt xenophobic attacks as happened in 2008 and 2015 as well as covert tendencies as may have been there since 1994. The constructivist paradigm, is an epistemology (a theory of knowledge, built in many theoretical perspectives)-(Crotty, 1998; Creswell, 1998). The interpretive perspective will inform this constructivist paradigm through interpreting previous qualitative and quantitative studies done on the subject of xenophobia in the Republic of South Africa. The same methodology was used in Greece to study how teachers experienced and understood rising xenophobia in the age of austerity (Chalari, 2012). However, discourse analysis was the main data collecting method in this study. It essentially involves literature analysis and brings out new interpretations. Spurr (1993) contends that, this method involves analyses of data from various sources including books, internet and newspapers on the subject in question. This data collection method helped to interrogate South Africa's position in the management of xenophobia as myth or reality?

4. Contextual analysis of xenophobia in South Africa

Thomas (2000:48) posits that “xenophobia may be alarming; the phenomenon is certainly far from new, being a central theme in twentieth-century world history”. Earlier, Muller (1998:33) had argued that, immigration “is likely to be a major concern in OECD countries for decades to come and that, the increase of nativism signals the need for greater understanding of how immigrants can be integrated into host societies.”

Arguably, South Africa is viewed as one of the most culturally diverse nations in modern world (Neocosmos, 2008; Valji, 2003; Handmaker and Parsley, 2001). In the same vein, it is viewed as one of the most socially stratified in terms of economics, education finance and psycho-social settings (Harcort, 2009; Neocosmos, 2008, 2006; Handmaker and Parsley, 2001) Harris (2002:7) made the following observations reported by the media:

- Illegal immigrants from war-torn and poverty-stricken parts of Africa are flooding into most South African (SA) cities (Natal Witness, 94/11);
- Foreign influx: citizens fear for their job prospects after hordes descend on the country from the troubled north (Sowetan, 93/07/29);
- Xenophobia rife as Africans flood SA ... (Sunday Times, 94/08/28);
- As citizens of neighbouring countries flood the home affairs department with applications for legal residence ... (Sunday Independent 96/09/29);
- SA must not develop a hatred of foreigners because of the illegal immigrant problem, Acting President Thabo Mbeki said ... (*Argus* 94/11/03);
- Alien has become almost a swearword in this country, used by xenophobes to describe those who have come to take our jobs, our homes, our women; conmen from Nigeria who've come to steal our money and feed us drugs ... (*Star*, 95/08/14);
- We did not expect national chauvinism and xenophobia as the outcome of the national liberation struggle (*Star* 94/09/27; letter).

These observations carry a negative perception of foreign nationals in which African foreigners are depicted as masses flooding into South Africa. This kind of reporting may promote xenophobic attacks. According to Sontag (1988) the use of terms like 'flood', 'descend' and 'pour' create the impression of an uncontrollable, unstoppable process. A study by FutureFact (*Mail&Guardian* 2008) revealed that, 'Most of the problems in South Africa are caused by illegal immigrants or foreigners.' The percentage rose to 67% in 2006 up from 47% in the previous years. From the question developed by FutureFact 'Immigrants are a threat to jobs for South Africans and should not be allowed into South Africa?' Sixty-nine percent of the respondents agreed. The 1950 Population Registration Act stratifying the South African population categories of Blacks, White, Indians or Coloureds laid the

groundwork for apartheid legislation and helped monitor movement of all people in South Africa whether citizens or not. This practice is currently obtaining in South Africa's immigration law although perceptions and attitudes may have changed (Reitzes, 2009).

5. Management of xenophobia in South Africa

The White Paper translated to the Immigration Act of 2002 provided that "all people are entitled to equal rights, but some are more equal than others." This was an attempt to accommodate a rights based approach to immigration. Undocumented migrants would be afforded a constitutional protection whether they got into the country procedurally or not. The White Paper recognized foreign nationals rights to privacy, due process and social services but these rights were in practice not crafted into a number of policies that were made into law (Reitzes, 2009). The Immigration Act of 2002 and its 2004 amendments provide for more highly skilled immigrants as expressed in the different kinds of work permits namely; general work, quota, exceptional skills, corporate permit, intra-company transfer, visitors, diplomatic, and study among others. The 2002 Act and the 2004 Amendment Act emphasise the promotion of human-rights, the prevention of and countering of xenophobia as well as education of civil society on the rights on foreigners and refugees. However, South Africans are expected to report foreigners to the authorities yet xenophobia is to be countered while upholding human rights. There exists a contradiction. Reporting foreigners alone is construed as xenophobic.

Reitzes (2009) argues that, South African policy is fraught with injunctions that can be interpreted as xenophobic. For instance, those that oblige all South Africans to monitor the legal status of foreigners and those that view migrants as labour units. Reitzes argues that, the tone of immigration policy and enforcement are indicators to citizens of how they must treat and perceive foreign nationals. Such policies cast aspersions on South African's normative commitment to the Bill of Rights. Reitzes (2009:14) aptly concludes, "When government policy leaves immigrants outside its protections, xenophobic violence gains tacit approval."

According to the Open Hearings on Xenophobia and Problems Related To It Report, hosted by the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) and the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs (2004) in Matunhu (2011) the South African Police Service (SAPS), the department of Home Affairs (DHA) and the Lindela Repatriation Centre reflected the highest levels of xenophobia. This was in contravention of the Constitution of South Africa Act 108 of the 1996 which provides for value of human dignity and the advancement of human rights to all the people in South Africa. The SAHRC (1999) reported that, SAPS

members abuse their powers by arbitrarily arresting and detaining of foreigners; destroying of legal documents, bribery, corruption and extortion. The Lindela Centre was also accused of violating Section 35 (1) of the Bill of Rights as its security officers inhumanly treated detainees (SAHRC, 2000).

Moyo (2009) contends that theoretically, South Africa has done well combating xenophobia and racial discrimination to the extent of domesticating international policies to guard against violent attacks. However, in practice the government has failed to protect non-nationals and to extend the freedom and rights as enshrined in the Constitution without discrimination. Xenophobia per se is hate crime. A committee that was established under the auspices of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination made recommendations that South Africa should enact a law which makes it criminal for perpetrators of hate crime by August 2007. This has not yet been done. The government has not declared xenophobia as hate crime, neither has it ratified and domesticated the Convention on Protection of Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families in a bid to protect undocumented migrants.

The media is a crucial arm of press freedom and a pillar fundamental for democracy. As such, it is expected to report accurately, unbiased and accommodating diversity to help the government make informed decisions. Press freedom at the expense of human life is detrimental and an infringement to the human rights. South Africa is well known for a rich history of the media in curtailing violence and promoting peace. This is evident when Chris Hani the gallant fighter was assassinated. Political leaders used the media to forestall political violence that was imminent. The same strategy can be used to forestall eruption of xenophobia or xenophobic tendencies.

6. Conclusion and recommendations

From the foregoing discourse, it remains elusive to determine if at all management of xenophobia is a reality or myth. However, more should be done by the government to prevent or stop both forms of xenophobic tendencies, overt or covert. This could be done through dealing decisively with the perpetrators and weed out completely a seemingly culture of impunity. Proactive strategies that include streamlining domestic law from colonial overtones need to be developed and spare no room for reactive strategies that dent the image of South Africa. International standards and principles should all be signed and ratified if South Africa is to serve as a shining example of democracy on the continent. Efforts to domesticate several international principles by the country should be applauded and an encouragement for enforcement supported. It is motivating that political leaders have publicly pronounced that South Africans are not xenophobes but xenophiles. They have

argued that it is some rogue elements of the society that stir commotion under the guise of xenophobia for personal benefits.

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CAN SOUTH AFRICA CIRCUMVENT A 'TICKING TIME BOMB' OF XENOPHOBIA?

T.S. Masipa

University of Limpopo, South Africa

Abstract

In May 2008, South Africa experienced the gruesome incidents of xenophobic outbreaks that left many people with lot of questions than answers. Black immigrants especially from Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Somalia and Nigeria were attacked, injured and killed. Their homes and businesses were looted and burnt. In 2015, nearly eight years after such horrific pogroms, South Africa once again became a theatre of great dismay. The aim of the paper was to identify the main causes of xenophobia in South Africa. The underlying factors which were found to have caused and can still cause if not addressed are unemployment, poverty, crime and competition over limited resources such as housing, business opportunities, jobs, and public services. These factors are found to be interconnected and cannot be addressed solely. Hence the paper posits xenophobia as a 'time ticking bomb' because if these factors are not urgently addressed, they might lead to another storm of xenophobic attacks. For the government to be able to comprehend and conceptualize xenophobia as a social located crisis, it therefore needs to take into account the aforementioned overarching factors. Furthermore, to understand why people migrate from country to country, migration theories are discussed. The conclusion and recommendations of this paper are centred on the basis of empirical evidence and the literature reviewed. Based on the findings, the paper recommends that the government needs to fast track its programmes to avert future xenophobic outbreaks. More importantly, a fight against xenophobia also requires collective efforts by South Africans, government and the private sector to emphasize that the adversities of unemployment, crime and poverty does not justify violence against migrants. The answer to xenophobia lies in the ability and commitment to create communities and townships where people tolerate and protect one another, including migrants.

Keywords: Xenophobia; Migrants; Crime; Unemployment; Poverty; South Africa.

1. Introduction

In May 2008, South Africa experienced the gruesome incidents of xenophobic attacks which left many people with a lot of questions than answers. Immigrants especially from Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Somalia and Nigeria were attacked, injured and killed. Their

homes and businesses were looted and burnt (Zondi, 2008; Cush, 2008 and Bega, 2010). Nearly eight years after such pogrom incidents, the country once again became a theatre of great dismay, foreign nationals were once again brutalised and their homes and shops were looted. This violence makes it clear that the underlying issues behind the attacks of 2008 have not been addressed and though not with the same intensity as 2008, violence against immigrants continued, as witnessed in 2015.

The imperative question to ask is; why at all did South Africa experience the xenophobic outbreaks in 2008 and 2015? What factors led such a much praised rainbow nation to a state of chaos? Though xenophobic outbreaks are often impossible to predict and complex to comprehend, it is of great importance to ask this question, 'when will xenophobic outbreaks erupt again'? An answer to this question requires an analysis to comprehend the deep root causes of xenophobia. To the best knowledge of the author, a number of researches on xenophobia thus far constitute the xenophobic experiences of foreign nationals in the country and the perceptions of South Africans towards foreigners. It is against this background that this paper attempts to investigate the factors that caused or causes xenophobia in South Africa. This is done with the view to conceptualize what actually triggered or triggers xenophobic violence in South Africa and the role that the government should play to avert future xenophobic outbreaks in the country.

Apart from section one which dealt with the introduction, the remainder of this paper is structured as follows; Section two focuses on the main concepts of the paper, thus xenophobia and immigrants. The section proceeds by analysing the overarching factors that caused or causes xenophobia in South Africa. Section three discusses the migration theories. These theories give some explanation why people migrate from one country to another. The fourth section discusses the response of government to xenophobic outbreaks. The fifth and last section presents the conclusion and recommendations proposed by the paper.

2. Xenophobia and immigrants: A point of clarity

This section departs by defining the important concepts of the paper, thus xenophobia and immigrants. The section proceeds by analysing some of the underlying factors of 'why xenophobic attacks happened at all'. The discussed factors are crime, unemployment, poverty and competition over limited resources. Understanding these factors helps to contextualise xenophobia as a socially located phenomenon.

2.1 What is Xenophobia?

According to Harris (2002), xenophobia may be defined as the hatred and prejudice against “outsiders” or foreigners. Harris (2002) further posits that the concept xenophobia involves the fear or contempt of that which is foreign or unknown, especially of strangers or foreign people. Nyamnjoh (2006) defined xenophobia as the intense dislike, hatred or fear of others perceived to be strangers. Encyclopaedia (2015) shows that the etymological roots of the word xenophobia is from two Greek words, that is, *xenos* meaning stranger and *phobia* meaning fear.

Kollapan (1999) suggests that the term xenophobia must embody action or practice and cannot merely be defined as an attitude. It is not just a dislike or fear of foreigners: it is a violent practice that results in bodily harm and damage. The Consortium for refugees and Migrants in South Africa (CORMSA) termed xenophobia as the ‘hatred or fear of foreigners’ and as such describes attitudes and prejudices that reject, exclude and often vilify specific persons based on the perception that they are non-nationals or outsiders (CORMSA, 2008).

Yakushko (2009) describes xenophobia as a multidimensional and multi-causal phenomenon intricately tied to notions of nationalism and ethnocentrism both of which are based on the belief that one’s ethnic group or nation-state is superior to others. Yakushko (2009) further posits that xenophobia is also closely related to racism and that is a mutually supporting form of oppression and discrimination. Kollapan, (1999) on the other hand relates xenophobia as the process of social exclusion by stating that it is a specific in-group response that uses categorization in the form of stereotypes and prejudices and pursues the goal of enhancing in-group cohesion through discrimination against the out-group.

2.2 Who is an Immigrant?

Swing (2011) is defined as the movement of people from one place to another over a period of time. Migration can be either voluntary or forced. Forced migration as indicated by Swing (2011) happens when people are forced or pushed out of their country of origin due to factors beyond their control. Voluntary migration happens when people willingly decide to move from one place to another either within the same country or move internationally to other countries.

According to Crush (2000), an immigrant is a person who has moved out of his country to go and settle in a foreign country. Immigrants can be divided into two categories, that is, illegal and legal immigrants. Harris (2001) define illegal immigrants as people who are employed or search for employment in another country without possessing the legal right

to do so, engaging in temporary work. Reitzes and Simpkins, (1998) , cited in Harris (2002) note that illegal immigrants are increasingly deemed as attractive to potential employers since their unprotected status makes them more exploitable and vulnerable to xenophobic attacks. In addition, McKnight, (2008), suggests that legal immigrants are people in a country other than their country of origin, with official documentation. He describes illegal immigrant as people in a country other than their country of origin without official documentation.

In South Africa, immigrants especially from other African countries face rejection due to xenophobia and lack of citizenship rights (Morris, 1998). According to Dodson and Oelofse (2000), immigrants suffer from resentment, hostility, verbal and physical abuse by the local people. Dodson and Oelofse (2000) also observed that black immigrants from African countries are nicknamed “Makwerekwere” the term that refers to someone African from outside of South Africa.

For the purpose of this paper, both legal and illegal migrants are collectively referred to as immigrants since the way they are treated by some South Africans does not take their status into consideration. The next section foregrounds the theories why people migrate from country to country.

3. Theories of migration

The degree of freedom that a potential migrant has in deciding on whether to move or stay depends largely on several factors. Migration theories offer an explanation for the degree of variation in terms of the causes of people migrating from one country to another. The below discussed theories offer an explanation why both documented and undocumented foreign nationals migrate to South Africa or any other country.

3.1 The Neoclassical Theory of Migration

The neoclassical theory of migration is probably the most influential theory of migration. This theory focuses on disparities in wages and employment conditions between countries. According to the theory, as noted in Arango (2000), migrants estimate the benefits and costs of migrating before making such decisions; hence migration occurs if their expected return is positive. The factors that influence migration are mainly the expected net returns, factor mobility, wage differentials and the uneven distribution of labour and capital. Arango, (2002), posits that workers tend to move from countries with abundance of labour and low wages to others that are labour-scarce with higher wages - hence the principal motivation for migration is the increased welfare that individuals receive from higher labour income or wages.

However, the theory has fails to explain why few people move in view of existing and high income gaps across countries. One would expect that massive numbers of labour would be migrating across countries that have scarce labour with new information or the perception of higher returns on labour but the reality is that existing barriers such as obtaining travel permits, visas and other documents which intending migrants must have, limits the degree of such exchange of labour across countries.

3.2 Dual Labour Market Theory

The dual labour market theory states that migration is largely demand based and is initiated by recruitment on the part of employers in developed societies or by government acting on their behalf. The theory pays more attention to the receiving end of migration in the destination countries or regions (Arango, 2000). The theory, according to Lucas (2006) does not principally provide general explanations of the factors affecting migration but explains that international migration occurs as a structural demand for foreign workers present in the economic structure of more developed economies. It explains only a part of reality since it suggests that international migration is driven by demand and does not take into account the push factors from sending countries, so it is a one-sided theory. Migration in present times does not result primarily from recruitment practices, now migrants largely come based on their own planning and decision making, not always to occupy existing jobs or openings in the labour market of the destination country.

3.3 Network Theory

Migration studies have posited new explanations for increasing international migration which has been linked to migration networks. A study by Mckenzie and Rapport, (2007) reflects that aside from economic reasons for migrating, migrants also weigh the social effects of migrating to foreign lands. The related costs and risks are seen to be reduced when some form of networks already exist in foreign lands. Lucas (2006) argues that networks rank amongst the most important explanatory factors of migration since it transmit information, provide financial assistance, facilitate some form of employment and accommodation and generally support migrants in various ways. He further posits that migration networks can be seen as a form of social capital so far as they are social relations that permit access to other goods of economic significance such as employment or higher wages.

According to Arango, (2002), many migrants usually move because other migrants with whom they are associated moved before them, hence there is an ensuing multiplier effect, and this serves as a predictor of the increasing role that social networks play in

migration and that such networks play in future as a means of reducing the associated costs, risks and uncertainty of migrating, resulting in the development of enclaves in destination countries.

In summary, the neoclassical theory emphasized the role of economic factors as a major cause of migration. The dual labour market theory states that the pull factors in receiving countries such as the need for foreign workers that more advanced destination countries have are more significant in explaining the causes of international migration. Lastly, the network theory focuses more on network effects and inter-relationships that exist amongst migrants and intending migrants and how such networks encourage more migration.

The above discussed theories give a plausible explanations and reasons why people move from their home country to another country. It can be argued that all the theories of migration discussed have some relevance in describing the migration decisions of foreign nationals to South Africa. In addition to these theories, the next section discusses factors which are perceived to have caused xenophobic outbreaks.

4. The perceived causes of xenophobia in South Africa

The events of xenophobic attacks aroused a great deal of interest in South Africa as analysts, politicians and the public populace seek to explain why a country that is much praised as a rainbow nation has descended into a state of chaos. As a result, scholars, researchers, politicians and scribes alike echoed their voices through various work of research to explore the manifestations of xenophobia in South Africa. These include amongst others scholars such as Zondi, (2008); Gindrey and Landau (2008); Human Sciences Research Council (2008); Marais, (2009); Bega (2010) and Steinberg (2010).

In 2009, Marais asked one fundamental question, “Why South Africa became a State of pogrom in May 2008?”, Marais (2009:16) pointed out that although the violence and scale of the 2008 xenophobic attacks were new but the sensibilities driving them are familiar and not something new. Similarly, Zondi (2008:43) too posed the following question, “How could it be then that these people (foreigners) who had lived for such a long time among the local black population can suddenly become victims of such rage and violence?” These questions beg for answers for the government to understand xenophobia and how it manifests.

According to Gindrey and Landau (2008), South Africa and more particularly the Gauteng Province has become today’s economic centre of Sub-Saharan Africa. Its success has attracted a wide range of domestic and international migrants seeking economic

opportunities or refuge from oppression and a better life. Though various studies gave some form of contextualisation to the whole dilemma of xenophobia, most of them still fall short to offer an explanation as to why the xenophobic attacks have taken place in some parts of the country, particularly in townships such as Alexandra, Diepsloot and Tembisa. Moeletsi Mbeki cited in Li (2008) states that "treating the symptoms won't treat the underlying malaise". In order to treat the symptoms of xenophobia, it is therefore important first to correctly identify the factors that cause xenophobic attitudes. The perceived causes of xenophobia are therefore discussed below.

4.1 Crime

According to the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), xenophobic attacks were also exacerbated by perceptions and in some cases reality that black foreign nationals are responsible for criminal activities. There is a common sentiment among South Africans that the high rate of crime and violence, mostly gun running, drug trafficking and armed robbery are directly related to the rising number of illegal migrants in South Africa (HSRC, 2008).

Steinberg (2008), states that the notion that immigrants are both responsible for crime and are parasites on resources that rightfully belong to South Africans cuts deep in South African society. According to Steinberg (2008) most of the South African citizens residing in townships such as Tembisa and Diepsloot shares the same view, and that the xenophobic attitudes against migrants in such townships is fuelled by the high rate of crime, unemployment and poverty.

Neocosmos (2010) mentions that xenophobia in South Africa is directed by overwhelmingly influx of Africans from all over the continent, e.g. Nigerians, Zimbabweans and Mozambicans who are often associated with illegal activities (drugs and illegal immigration respectively). Similarly, Crush (2008) noted that the 2008 violent campaign named "Go Back Home" was based on foreigners being blamed for increased crime, sexual attacks and unemployment.

However, Majodina (2001) contends that the deliberate association of refugees and immigrants with crime and the continued use of terms such as "bogus asylum seekers" and "illegal aliens" effectively takes away their legal rights and places them outside the ambit of the rule of law. Majodina (2001) further posits that the impression created that every asylum-seeker is a potential criminal makes it difficult for the average South African to distinguish between who is in this country legally and who is not, and consequently, the difference between a migrant, refugee and asylum-seeker becomes obscured.

4.2 Unemployment and Poverty

One of the most repeated reasons given for xenophobic aggression in South Africa is that African foreigners supposedly ‘steal’ jobs meant for South African citizens (Steinberg (2008). Maharaj (2002) argues that there has been a tendency to stigmatise immigrants, particularly those from other African countries as criminals, as people who undermine economic development and take jobs from locals. A report by HSRC (2008) shows that some South Africans reacted to perceived competition from foreigners over resources. African immigrants in particular were perceived as being direct competition for poor people’s jobs and resources. It is clear that xenophobic violence must be regarded through the prism of anger within poor communities. It is not isolated, but is rather a response to unemployment and poverty.

In 2001, The Star newspaper also pointed out that African immigrants flock to the mining and farming industries, two fields that are not popular among South African workers because of poor working conditions and low pay (The Star, 2001). In addition, Steinberg (2008) mentions that in 1998, foreigners especially from Zimbabwe were willing to work for as little as between R4,50 and R6,00 a day, a wage that no South African would ever work for. The 2012 Afro-barometer survey shows that 44% of South Africans disagreed with the idea of providing protection to asylum seekers and 45% agreed that foreigners should not be allowed to live in SA as they take away jobs and benefits from locals. These numbers are significant enough to justify the xenophobic attitudes of South Africans towards foreign nationals (Mataure, 2013).

Steinberg (2008) however contends that foreigners are not stealing jobs but providing valuable service by filling in the huge voids in the country. This assertion is also shared by Nkosi (2010), who confirmed that in 2009 the Limpopo Province alone recruited a massive six hundred Maths, Science and Technology teachers from Zimbabwe because of the scarcity of such qualified educators in South Africa. Furthermore, Mukhwa (2009) also concedes that foreigners are a source of recruitment for rare skills such as artisans, engineers, technical, management, financial, applied professions and IT skills. The Herald (2010; 17) notes that, “Unless we tackle the twin evils of unemployment and poverty, addressing the challenge of xenophobia remains difficult, if not impossible.” Unemployment and poverty are clearly amongst other factors exacerbating tensions between South African citizens and foreign nationals, so it is important for the government to fast track its efforts to

assist with poverty alleviation through skills provision and training especially for the youth in the rural areas and local townships.

4.3 Competition over limited Resources

Competition for limited resources such as water, sanitation and health services together with employment and business opportunities are the key elements for the upsurge of xenophobic attacks especially in townships. This is also noted by HSRC, (2008) and Bega (2010). According to the research conducted by the Gauteng City Region Observatory (GCRO), a disturbingly high percentage of respondent of 70% agreed that foreigners are receiving benefits meant for South Africans. Such a high percentage is considered worrying as the issue does not have proven statistical backing (Bega, 2010). The HSRC (2008) shows that housing is a vital area of conflict, particularly in informal settlement areas, and one of the most consistent causes of friction in South African society. The situation is complicated by locals renting out their homes to migrants to secure regular cash income.

A national public opinion survey found South Africans to be exceptionally xenophobic. The results of HSRC 2008 survey shows that 25% of South Africans interviewed want a total ban on immigration while 45% support strict limitations on the numbers of immigrants. Over half of the respondents opposed offering African noncitizens the same access to housing as South Africans and 61% of respondents believed that immigrants placed additional strain on the economy. Of black respondents, 65% indicated that they would be “likely” or “very likely” to “take action” to prevent people from other countries operating a business in their area (HSRC, 2008).

According to McKnight (2008), many immigrants find shelter in informal urban settlements characterised by high levels of poverty, unemployment and housing shortages. Thus competition for already limited resources is intense. This could explain in part a tendency to place black foreign nationals as the scapegoat for the increasing poverty and unemployment in South Africa. Immigrants are then seen as mere opportunists who are only in South Africa for economic benefits (McKnight, 2008).

Similarly, the Consortium of Refugees and Migrants in South Africa (CORMSA) released an issue brief in 2010 stating that the key trigger of violence against foreign nationals and outsiders in specific locations is localised competition for political (formal and informal) and economic power. Community leaders often mobilise residents to attack and evict foreign nationals as a means of strengthening their personal and political or economic power within the local community (CORMSA, 2010).

4.4 Lack of State Control over Borders

According to Pahad (2008), xenophobia is an inevitable consequence of a failure by the state to control migration. This assertion is also shared by the HSRC, (2008) as it articulates that government must move urgently and effectively to protect South Africa's borders and points of entry. The report states that no migration policy or strategy aimed at alleviating xenophobic tensions can be contemplated if the national borders are porous and people can come and go as they please (HSRC, 2008). In addition, Gwynne (2008:13) reiterates that the "root problem" is with government's policy on immigration and its "refusal to control or even count the number of people arriving in South Africa from other African countries." A survey of 2000 Gauteng residents by Plus94 Research in May 2008 shows that 18% of the participants perceive uncontrollable number of foreigners as the main cause of xenophobia, (Plus94, 2008).

In a media statement released by Inkata Freedom Party (IFP), Buthelezi responded to the Free Movement Protocol (FMP) by stating that South Africa is faced with another threat, and that is the Southern African Development Community (SADC) ideology of free movement of people, free trade and freedom to choose where you live or work. Free movement of persons spells disaster for our country (IFP, 2008). According to Buthelezi, no strategy aimed at alleviating xenophobic tensions can effectively succeed if the national borders are porous and people can come and go as they please. Similarly, Zondi (2008) posits that there is no country in the world that allows 'people' to come and go as they wish. He emphasised his argument by saying that corrupt officials at the borders are also responsible for the upsurge influx of illegal migrants. It is therefore imperative that government act urgently to regulate South Africa's borders.

Simpson (2006) argues that it is notoriously difficult to develop official statistics about the number of foreign nationals living in South Africa, largely because more are undocumented. Lack of documentation makes it impossible to determine not only how many foreign nationals are in the country, but also their reasons for being there. It is therefore important for the government to regulate and control its borders to avoid entrance of illegal migrants into the country. It is however important to acknowledge that the above discussed factors are interconnected and cannot be addressed individually. As Harris (2002: 34) posits, "these factors are not mutually exclusive but offer different levels of explanation for xenophobic attitudes and thus have to be read as intertwined explanations". It should therefore be said that all these factors collectively contributed to or fuel the upsurge of xenophobia in South Africa as witnessed in 2008, and recently in 2015.

On the other hand, Misago (2010) states that what exacerbated the situation of xenophobic attitudes are that more South Africans have limited knowledge about their country's immigration laws and policies. However, Nieftaqodien (2008) argue that any attempt to understand the hostility and violence attitudes towards foreigners should be located in the politics of failed development and service delivery. He emphasises that Alexandra and other townships that experienced xenophobic violence are still the dumping grounds of the marginalized and alienated citizens.

Fine and Bird (2006) state that the South Africa's public has become increasingly xenophobic, due to the media as it shapes the public attitudes with highly emotional media images that portray exceptional South Africa as 'flooded' or 'overrun' by undocumented migrants from the rest of the African continent. In addition to these perceived causes of xenophobia, a number South Africans also voiced their perceptions towards immigrants residing in townships such as Tembisa and Diepsloot South Africa. For instance, an unnamed restaurant manager in Tembisa had this to say: "At first there were a few and there was no problem, but now there are just too many, and they are all in Johannesburg. It will never end; Mugabe could die tomorrow and they will still stay. They will never leave. It's too easy here. That's why I don't get upset when South Africans take it into their own hands to let them know they aren't welcome. If we didn't let them know, they would stay forever. What do you do when your dinner guests refuse to go home for the night? You tell them to go home, and if they don't go, you push them out of your door". (HSRC, 2008: 34).

Another unnamed South African respondent echoed his views regarding migrants and the 2008 xenophobic attacks; "We were against these people from the onset that's when terms like "makwerekwere" (derogatory term for foreigners) came about, we were against them in a light manner but now people are getting angry that is why they beat them up, their numbers are growing and some have babies this side it's as if this is their hometown; this violence happened because people are getting angry, this thing has always been there but it wasn't as strong as it is now. We never said we are happy to live with them but it was a light thing so people resorted to violence because of the realisation that the situation is getting serious, HSRC, 2008: 36)."

These sentiments are reinforced by the study of Gindrey and Landau (2008) who estimated an annual net flow of approximately 78,000 migrants per year in the province. Their results also show that Gauteng Province hosts 46% of the country's total foreign population. Expected to have increased, the exact number of immigrants is unknown today, a significant number of them crossing the border illegally. The 2006 South African Migration Project (SAMP) survey shows that the association of migrants with crime also intensified

(45% in 1999 to 67% in 2006). The proportion of South Africans wanting their borders to be electrified increased from 66% in 1999 to 76% in 2006. Only 2% are strongly opposed to such a policy (SAMP, 2006).

According to Mukhwa (2009), what could have led to such a great inflow of foreign nationals in South Africa is that since the dispensation of democracy in 1994, the country became home to many immigrants and the government played a key role in offering protection and refuge to people who had suffered 'unfavourable' conditions in their respective countries. Mukhwa (2009) argued that a huge number of foreign nationals migrated to South Africa, hoping for a 'better life' that the ruling party, the ANC promised in its manifesto in the democratic elections in 1994. Furthermore, it should be acknowledged that perceptions about the causes of xenophobia in South Africa tend to focus more on unemployment and poverty. However, these perceptions fail to take into account the responsibility and role that the South African government must play in order to curb the upsurge of xenophobic violence in the country.

5. Government's response to xenophobic outbreaks

Majodina, (2010) suggests that there is a substantial chance that another outbreak of xenophobic violence will erupt in the future, perhaps on an even greater scale than the May 2008 attacks. The reluctance or little effort of government to address the plague of xenophobia is therefore disturbing as it might lead or prevent South Africa to become a state of pogrom as witnessed in 2008. South Africa's Immigration Act of 2002 allows immigrants to receive temporary residency status for a number of reasons, including studying, working and joining the family in South Africa (Immigration Act 13, 2002). Section 22 of the Refugees Act 130 of 1998, also requires the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) to issue temporary permits to asylum-seekers or individuals who have applied for refugee status but whose status has not yet been determined. The Refugee Act 130 of 1998 places the responsibility upon the South African government to provide full protection and provision of rights set out in the Constitution; this includes access to social security and assistance. However, the 2008 CORMSA migration report noted that the implementation of rights and services of migrants have lagged, and migrants are likely to be excluded from basic social services.

The other problem with government was noted by HSRC (2008) as it reported that the DHA's inability to document both South Africans and non-nationals. According to the report, there is an enormous backlog of non-nationals who lack documents legalizing their stay in the country because the DHA does not process their applicants each year. Most disturbing, the anti-xenophobia unit known as the People Against Suffering Oppression and

Poverty (PASSOP) have reported allegations of foreign nationals bribing government officials to get their documents

According to Simpson (2006), the other factor that exacerbated xenophobic violence are government officials who were frequently reported in the media making xenophobic statements erroneously blaming immigrants for crime and myriad of other problems facing South Africa. Similarly, Mataure (2013) have noted that there are levels of xenophobia among public officials themselves. For examples, officials repeatedly refer to non-nationals as 'those people' and 'outsiders'. Responding to 2008 xenophobic violence, the former Minister of Home Affairs Buthelezi stated that, "if we as the South Africans are going to compete for scarce resources with millions of aliens who are pouring into South Africa, then we can bid goodbye to our Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)", (Mataure, 2013:38). As a response to the recent xenophobic attacks, President Jacob Zuma launched Operation Fiela. However, the implementation of Operation Fiela has raised various concerns. Many civil society organisations and human rights activists have criticised the operation for targeting foreigners, criticism that the government strongly rejects. Although the use of the army was an appropriate counter-xenophobia measure, it should not become a long-term measure or an excuse for police brutality and human rights abuses. Military deployment should not become a long term solution.

The government needs to revise its immigration policies. Those policies need to address the question of integration. As much as South Africa does not have refugee camps, it also does not have any form of integration policies in place to ensure migrants that arrive in South Africa are integrated into society. More importantly, the strategies implemented by government to fight xenophobia should address the needs of destitute townships. The most pressing needs consist of providing decent housing, job opportunities; water and electricity; skills empowerment, inclusive community policing forum to fight crime, and encouraging community members to become whistle blowers of crime or corrupt activities. Furthermore, there is a need for collective reflection by the government to come up with a sustainable long term solution to xenophobia. Responsible leadership is crucial. South Africa and other African countries need to seriously think about immigration and relations of social interconnection on the continent, especially at a time when immigration is becoming a major security debate both continentally and internationally.

6. Conclusion and recommendations

The aim of the paper was to establish the main causes of xenophobia in South Africa. The four underlying factors which were found to have caused and still have the potential to cause if not addressed are unemployment, poverty, crime and competing for limited resources such as housing, business opportunities, jobs, and public services. The notion of migrants causing unemployment and competing with South Africans over job opportunities which 'rightfully' belongs to South Africa citizens is based on the perceptions of migrants 'stealing' jobs by selling themselves cheap to the South African employers.

Instead of blaming foreign nationals South Africans also need to concede that the problems of unemployment and poverty as a results of the structural challenges and imbalances that the contemporary South Arica is confronted with. Therefore to understand xenophobia as a socially rooted problem, it is important for the government to also realise that the factors fuels xenophobic attitudes are interrelated. Hence, it is necessary for the government to take into account these overarching factors and urgently find a solution to avoid future xenophobic crisis. Furthermore, instead of just naming the xenophobic violence as criminal activities, the government needs to concede that South Africans, particularly those who live in townships such as Alexandra, Diepsloot and Tembisa are faced with the malaise of poverty, crime and high unemployment. The government needs to fast track its programs to address these issues to avoid or limit future xenophobic violence.

A fight against xenophobia cannot just be won through implementation of good policies. It would also require collective efforts and the involvement of all South Africans, private sector and the immigrants to work collectively to create South Africa belongs to all who lives in it. Politicians, public officials and community leaders must lead efforts to emphasize that the adversities of unemployment and poverty does not justify violence against foreign nationals. While a national programme against xenophobia is necessary, local government and community leaders also have a critical role to play.

The government must introduce public awareness to clarify and correct perceptions about immigrants 'stealing jobs' and the number of foreign nationals residing South Africa, as the number is often inflated. Therefore, the answer to xenophobia lies with the responsibility of the government and its people create communities where people would lie in peace ad protect one another, including migrants. This is also noted by the South Africa's Constitution of 108 of 1996 which says that South Africa belongs to all who lives in it.

Lastly, globalisation cannot be ceased since people have the freedom to move and governments can do little to stop people from migrating, especially to where better living

conditions exists. However, to reduce migration between countries especially amongst African countries, there is a need to improve economic and political conditions in such countries. It is however not accurate to expect migration of African migrants to South Africa to stop or slow down in the near future as these factors are not likely to be solved in the short term.

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CHALLENGES FACED BY THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA: IMMIGRANTS AND XENOPHOBIA

L.B. Juta

University of Limpopo, South Africa

Abstract

This is a conceptual paper that seeks to engage the background of xenophobic violence in the democratic South Africa. The immigrations policies in South Africa are being neglected and ignored. The South African government is facing the same challenges that emerged soon after independence. Immigrants are faced with discrimination and even violence. Though much of that problem stemmed from the institutionalised racism by apartheid. This paper is informed by the existing extensive literature on immigration policies and xenophobia (history and current) in South Africa. This paper's debate is based on 'ignorance' and neglect of South Africans about the immigrants. It is also based on the role played by the South Africa government to educate its citizens about other national security in developing the country. The paper concludes with contention that, the existing policies and practices by the citizens and authorities are in conflicts. Education about immigrants in South Africa can bear positive and fruitful results.

Keywords: Democratic government, Economic, Immigrants, Legislation and Xenophobia

1. Introduction

This paper is engaging on the background of xenophobia violence attacks in the current South Africa. However, it is clear from the existing evidence of the current events on xenophobia that many South Africans still have misunderstandings, stereotypes and doubts about the presence of foreigners in the country. An important problem is that many South Africans fail to make any distinction between the different groups of immigrants in the country. Many people tend to classify all foreigners in the same way, be they refugees, illegals, economic immigrants, or unauthorised immigrants. All the different types of immigrants, however, have their own set of rights and entitlements. The responsibilities of government fluctuate according to each group. South African officials dealing with immigrants are not always able to differentiate between the various categories of immigrants with the result that asylum seekers or refugees at times cannot access the services they are entitled to.

The South Africa History (2015), asserted that the history of refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa dates back to the 1980s when the country was home to a number of Mozambican refugees, to an estimated of 350,000, of whom approximately 20% have since returned to their countries. Prior to 1994 South Africa did not recognise refugees up until around 1993 when it became a signatory to the United Nations (UN) and Organisation of African Unity Conventions on Refugees in 1994 (South Africa History, 2015) . South Africa History (2015) further states that the number of refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa has increased in the past years after 1994, puts the total number of cross-border migrants in this category at not more than 150 000. The issue regarding the number of undocumented migrants in the country has proved to be a controversial one in South Africa. Central to this debate is the unquantifiable nature of this group of migrants together with a number of credible myths widely accepted as reality in South African society.

The first Home Affairs minister of the democratic South Africa, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, spent his ten years in office putting in place a strict anti-immigration regime, particularly aimed at keeping low or unskilled African migrants out of the country (Hammerstad, 2011:02). Hammerstad (2011:02) indicated that the tough legislation was escorted by immoderate statements on the threats of African immigrants as stealers of jobs, spongers on welfare, donors of disease and perpetrators of crime, alluring widespread and hostile sentimentalities among the South African population, particularly in the townships and informal settlements most affected by the influx of undocumented African immigrants (Hammerstad, 2011:02). At the same time, South Africa's liberal Constitution imparts rights not only on citizens but also foreign residents documented or undocumented (Hammerstad, 2011:02). Asylum seekers have the right to seek work, education, and healthcare while awaiting the outcome of their application usually two years down the line. Hammerstad (2011:02) further suggest that borders are relatively open and permeable, pass laws are past history, and job opportunities in the informal sector are many. Thus, the immigration system is anti-immigrant in form, but beset with legal and practical gaps. This combination of tough talk and legislation on the one hand, and an inability to stop undocumented immigration in practice, on the other, has provided an ample breeding ground for dissatisfaction and xenophobia in the townships and informal settlements, and among police and immigration officer (Hammerstad, 2011:02). Consequently, after democratisation in 1994, contrary to expectations, the incidence of xenophobia increased. Hammerstad (2011:02) maintains that between 2000 and March 2008, at least 67 people died in what were identified as xenophobic attacks. In May 2008, a series of demonstrations left 62 people dead, although 21 of those killed were South African citizens. The attacks were apparently motivated by xenophobia (Hammerstad, 2011:02).

Hadland (2008) revealed that a number of clarifications have been put forward for the eruption of violence in South African communities where foreign nationals live side-by-side with locals. The explanations have come both from government agencies and through the popular press with differing levels of credibility and social scientific validity. These range from classifications which suggest external manipulation through a third force, criminal instigation, a dislike, fear of foreign Africans, to poverty and the competition for scarce resources in poor communities (Hadland, 2008). Moreover, the attacks, which started in Alexandra in May 2008, subsequently spread to other areas in and around Johannesburg, including Cleveland, Diepsloot, Hillbrow, Tembisa, Primrose, Ivory Park and Thokoza. Reports of xenophobic violence were widespread in other provinces such as Kwazulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, and the Western Cape. In 2015, another nationwide spike in xenophobic attacks against immigrants in general prompted a number of foreign governments to begin repatriating their citizens (Hadland, 2008).

In order to exclusively provide the meaning of this paper, the structure is as follows: the background of xenophobia in South Africa which is detailed discussed in various forms obtainable, the policies and legislation framework of immigration in South Africa and thereafter, conclusion remarks and recommendations are provided.

2. Xenophobia in South Africa

As the unsubstantiated perception that migrants are responsible for a variety of social ills grows, immigrants have increasingly become the target of abuse by South African citizens, the police, the army, the Department of Home Affairs and even the media. Dark-skinned refugees and asylum-seekers with distinctive features from far away countries are especially targeted for abuse (Landau, 2004b; Morris, 2001b). Sichone (2001: 1) suggest that, migrants are subject to more state regulation and open to victimisation of violence. Xenophobia is not just an attitude of dislike but is often accompanied by violence and is racist and ethnic in its application. Victims are predominantly black and are targeted for their very blackness by a society where skin colour has always served as an excuse for whole sequences of discriminatory policies and practices. Xenophobia is prevalent in the townships, where the immigrants are referred to as “_akwerekwere_” (disparaging word for African immigrants). Some South Africans at some point are also often assumed to be “_akwerekwere_” on the basis that they look foreign or are too dark to be entitled to South African and police are supposedly able to identify foreigners. In the frenzy to root out foreigners, they also victimise and arrest their own citizens.

In addition, amongst other common perceptions of xenophobia in South Africa, in particular housing issues were critical trigger of the frustrations and an important element in the violence that took place. Other factors such as poor service delivery, unemployment and poverty were also deemed to be important elements leading to the frustrations felt by people in areas that the attacks took place. With regard to geographical considerations, urban poverty was rapidly increasing while rural poverty was decreasing, suggesting that urbanisation was taking place, which in turn subsequent in increased pressure on housing in urban areas. Therefore, that apparently increased xenophobia sentiments towards foreigners in South Africa almost everywhere. The triggers for violence were therefore identified as being a combination of housing issues, poor service delivery, unemployment and poverty.

3. Xenophobia, economy and corruption in South African

(Maharaj, 2009:05) presumably suggest that xenophobia and the economic exploitation of migrants are not peculiar to South Africa. International literature shows that the South African experience is part of a worldwide phenomenon. A key global trend is that of racism underpinning xenophobia, with black foreigners representing the common victims of violence and hostility. Xenophobia is particularly predominant in countries undergoing transition (Maharaj, 2009:06). Another key global trend, especially within these countries, is a tendency for governments to conflate foreigners with crime and use them as scapegoats for social problems such as unemployment and poverty. Maharaj (2009: 06) suggest that, South Africa communities are of the opinion that the immigrants are parasites which leads to the development of xenophobia and they have increasingly become the targets of violence. It has been argued that xenophobia thrives when there is competition for employment and social problems increase. Immigrants become tempting scapegoats for alienated citizens (Maharaj, 2009:06).

Some human rights violations perpetrated against foreigners are motivated by financial gain and economic exploitation, rather than pure xenophobia, although the climate of xenophobia renders foreigners more vulnerable to such financial exploitation. Without money, there is no service for many seeking to attain and maintain legal status in South Africa. Money and corruption are central to staying in the country. The guise of checking status also creates a space for ongoing economic exploitation and sometimes, violence, at the hands of the South African authorities (Harris, 2001: 12). Even those who hold valid, legal documentation are not exempted from corruption and blackmail. In many cases, the authorities threaten to, and do, tear up documents unless they are paid a certain amount of

money. In these cases, foreigners whether legal or illegal are often arrested and sent to Lindela where they face repatriation, unless they are able to buy their way out of the system (Harris, 2001:12).

Nevertheless, South Africans gradually blame foreigners for corrupting South African officials, thus shifting culpability from the officials to foreigners. Even though the institutional system reduces foreigners vulnerable to corruption and abuse, many play an active role within it. This role is not completely that of victim because corruption benefits those who can afford to pay (e.g. undocumented migrants), whilst simultaneously exploiting those, such as bona fide refugees, who should not have to pay (Harris, 2001).

Landau (2004a: 10-13) provides a detailed overview, to the police and authorities, South African modernity, like its identities, is all about appearances. Being unable to belong as an insider makes immigrants all too vulnerable to excessive criminalisation and primitivisation. They cannot vote or benefit from social services, and immigrants are especially vulnerable to mistreatment by the police, who know that non-citizens are less likely to lay a complaint and if they do, they are not likely to be given a fair hearing especially if they are black. Thus, South African police view immigrants as largely deportable criminals even by the Minister of Home Affairs and the forces of law and order (Landau, 2004a: 13–14). According to the Human Rights Commission (1999a: p.xx) and Human Right Watch (1998: 02) maintain that, on 27 February 2013 in Daveyton, East of Johannesburg, South Africa, eight South African police officers tied the 27 years old man (Mido Macia) Mozambican, to the back of a police van and dragged him down the road. Subsequently, the man died in a police cell after major head injuries. The incident occurred on 26 May 2013. Furthermore, two Zimbabwean men were killed by South Africans mob in xenophobic violence in Diepsloot, Johannesburg, South Africa.

4. Media and racism in Africa

Scholars such as Wilbraham (1994); Fairclough (1995) and Duncan (1996) explain the implication of the media more strong, as a source of disseminating information about foreigners to the public. As its important role of being vessel, it offers a platform for the public to comment on foreigners through letters to the editors, talk-shows and television debates. Nyamnjoh (2006) also highlighted a significant concern which does not contend with (Wilbraham, 1994 et al.), but further suggest that, media offer a platform for the South African public to comment on immigrants through various forms of communication. While immigrants are very absent in public discussions about them and their alleged ills. In results, immigrants are often an absent presence, to be acted upon but not expected to act or react. Apparent essentially as a negation to civilisation, they can be talked at, talked about and

sometimes talked to or for, but rarely talked with. Nyamnjoh (2006) further affirms that, as a collective threat to citizenship and opportunity, immigrants are denied the legitimacy of a voice by the media as the voice of civilisation and legitimacy. Furthermore, Nyamnjoh (2006) indicates that, the media do not simply carry information to the public as a neutral vehicle reflecting the workings of society. They reproduce certain ideologies and discourses that support specific relations of power in accordance with hierarchies of race, nationality, culture, class, and gender (Nyamnjoh, 2006).

Mac and Ghail (1999: 61– 80) affirm that racism, both in its biological and cultural forms is constantly produced and reproduced in South African print media (see also Stolcke 1995; Wright 1998). Pityana (2000) & Glaser (2000) are of the same opinion on what is reported and how it is reported essential for a fair appreciation of the place of the media in creating or reinforcing perceptions of immigrants as they are constructed. (Danso and McDonald 2001: 115–117), asserted that representations of immigrants by the print media in South Africa are largely negative and extremely unanalytical in nature as the majority of the press has tended to reproduce problematic research and anti-immigrant terminology uncritically. Moreover, Miller, 2006; Adebajo, 2007 indicated that, media as one of the forms of communication and the most widely circulated in public, did not only failed to condemn the violence forthrightly but was also found guilty of employing inappropriate and discriminatory terminology to describe black Africans immigrants. They underlined that, there is still little real investment in geographical and cultural knowledge of Africa, despite much political rhetoric to the conflicting, and in spite of the aggressive extension of South African businesses into Africa north of the Limpopo. Subsequence, Duncan (2000) alluded that, much has changed within an extremely short space of time in South African media and society, while much seems to have stayed the same. The rhetoric of transformation does not match realities and expectations, as the media continue to talk left, but act right.

In addition, xenophobic sentiment has been evident in polling in South Africa from before the 1994 democratic elections. It has grown in intensity and breadth though retained a focus on black African migrants over time, moving from a generalised snootiness to a sharp focus on specific groups primarily Mozambicans, Nigerians and Zimbabweans, as well as Somalis and Pakistanis who are seen to have taken our houses, women, jobs or, in the case of Pakistanis and Nigerians, to be central to scams involved falsified marriage papers and fake identity documents (IDs). It has also moved from frustrated admiration at the entrepreneurial skills and better education of foreign-born Africans to a generalised anger and in many cases a deep-seated loathing of their presence in our cities and towns where they take benefits meant for South Africans.

5. Policies and legislation framework of immigrations

Prior to 1994, South Africa recognised the Aliens Control Act, 1991 (No. 96 of 1991) only related to the entry of foreigners into the country. The Act itself informs that the primary aim of government, at the time was to control the entry of aliens into South Africa. It is however very evident that the South African Government's policy before 1994 was largely discriminant. The South African Government's immigration policy was a deliberate and unashamed instrument of white supremacy. Section 4 (1) of the Aliens Control Act stated unambiguously that a person could only immigrate to South Africa if that persons habits of life is suited to the requirements of South Africa. The official definition of an immigrant was therefore that he or she had to be able to be adjusted into the white population. By definition therefore Africans were not considered for immigration. This did not mean that other Africans from neighbouring countries were not allowed into South Africa. However, their entry was highly restricted and they were solely allowed to enter as migrant labourers (Khan, 2007).

As a consequence, racism is a key feature of South Africa's immigration legislation and practice, both historically and, despite the country's transition to democracy and equality, currently. For example, the discriminatory and exploitative two gates policy, which differentiated between black immigrants and white immigrants during the apartheid era, effectively remains legislated in contemporary immigration policy. Beyond the legislation, racism influences on xenophobic practices, with black African foreigners bearing the impact of xenophobic discrimination, both at the hands of the public and at an institutional level (Harris, 2001:06). Corruption and xenophobic discrimination mark the institutional boundary between foreigners and South African officials. These institutions include, according to the literature, the South African Police Service, the South African National Defence Force, the Department of Home Affairs, and the privately administered Lindela Repatriation Centre (Harris, 2001:06).

5.1 Immigration Act, 2002 (No. 13 of 2002)

Since the immigration Act, 2002 (No. 13 of 2002) is the main piece of legislation dealing with the permissibility of foreigners into the Republic of South Africa. This Act, generally suggest that, immigrants who are in a position to contribute to the broadening of South Africa's economic base are welcomed to apply for residence. Similarly applications by skilled workers in occupations for which there is a shortage in the country are encouraged but particularly applications by industrialist and other entrepreneurs who wish to relocate their existing businesses or establish new concerns in South Africa. Anybody who intends to

retire in South Africa may do show if they can show a Net worth of an amount to be determined by the Minister of Home Affairs.

Since immigration Act promotes an exceedingly restrictions immigration policy, in terms of its immigration policy, South Africa has noticeably prioritised that any immigrant coming to South Africa for work will have to show that it is not in an occupation in which there are already sufficient people available to meet the countries' needs. This was done to minimise for a small number of migrants entering South Africa. It is a type of migration that is encouraged by South Africa.

5.2 Refugees Act, 1998 (No. 130 of 1998)

In 1995, South Africa endorsed the 1969 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. In 1996, the 1951 United Nations (UN) Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the United Nations Protocol of 1967 were also complied with (Human Rights Review, 1999). This international legislation underpins the current definition of Refugee Act, 1998. An Act developed from recommendations in the 1997 Green Paper on International Migration to deal specifically with refugees in South Africa. Refugees Act, 1998 (No. 130 of 1998) advocate that, movement of refugees in search of asylum in Africa accounts for a sizable proportion of migration in Africa. These types of migration flows have been affecting a growing number of countries in the continent including South Africa. With the enactment of its Constitution in 1996, South Africa set a very high standard for promoting human rights and human dignity through state action. That standard is reflected in the Refugees Act of 1998 which came into effect in 2000. Furthermore, this Act made it clear that the new South African government was determined on establishing a law which treated refugees as human beings with rights rather than simply housing them for protection.

6. Conclusion

This paper has traced the history of xenophobia in South Africa, expressing the background of xenophobia and the policies of immigration in South Africa. In conclusion, the discussion provided in this paper solely revealed the need for education for South Africans about the whole set of immigrants (documented and undocumented) in the Country. On 21 March 2015, Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini at Pongolo moral regeneration event, KwaZulu Natal Province suggested that foreigners should go back to their home countries because they are changing the nature of South African society with their goods and enjoying wealth that should have been for local people. These are depressed foreigners who have been dealing with outbreak of xenophobic attacks around the country (Hans, 2015).

The fact that immigrants work as cheap labour is not new in South Africa (White paper on International migration, 1999). Prior 1994 immigrants' workers were recruited under agreements between the employing organisation, which in most cases were the big mining conglomerates, and the governments of the supplying countries. Contracts were usually of a limited duration of two years and upon completion thereof the migrants were transported back to their countries of origin as a group, soon after their completion. Immigrants' workers were not allowed to bring in their families while in South Africa and their movement was restricted to the area of work (Farms or mines). Most of the neighbouring countries were suppliers of labour to South Africa. These workers were undocumented migrants and severely restricted and without a doubt a source of cheap labour for the mines and farms (Khan, 2007). Therefore, it can be opposed to the perception that illegal applicants are illegal because they go unobserved, border patrols and controls seem relatively effective in detecting illegal entrants, if not preventing them. While logistical and physical impediments to detection cannot be undermined, it seems that the common call for tightening border patrols will not eradicate illegal entry provided authorities continue to exploit this status to their own ends.

South Africa is confronted with a complex challenge of xenophobic attitudes that is sometimes accompanied by conflict and violence. Thus, the country should condemn xenophobia not only because it is an embarrassment but mainly because it is an insult to South Africa's morality. The South African government should put measures in place to deal with root causes of xenophobia. Most importantly, it appears that ordinary South African citizens would like to have their perspectives seriously considered or their voices heard on how to deal with the issues of the migration of foreigners in the country. This is why government and civil society should continue to organise dialogues, summits and workshops to open space for participation by people at grassroots levels in the discussions around the sources of xenophobia, solutions and management thereof of immigrants, towards the development a co-formulated migration strategies which will have majority buy-in.

Government should seriously increase efforts to protect South Africa's borders and points of entry. No migration policy or strategy aimed at alleviating xenophobic tensions can work if the national borders are porous and immigrants can come and go as they please. Such a lack of control leads to abuse, corruption and intensifies the vulnerability of South African citizens. Additionally, the review and strengthening of the campaign of the South African Human Rights Commission on Roll Back Xenophobia and the allocation of the necessary resources for this purpose is one of the solutions that should be carefully studied and implemented by government. In addition to this, numerous NGOs and other civil society

organizations, including the churches should play a role in maximizing education and awareness within South Africa to combat xenophobic attitudes and actions. The Department of Arts and Culture should continue conducting community dialogues across the country to encourage nation building, social cohesion, and the fight against xenophobia and racism in our communities.

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SOUTH AFRICA'S FUTURE TRAJECTORY FOR INDUSTRIALIZATION: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS FOR SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES

*K.A Mashamaite
K.R Moloto,
University of Limpopo,
South Africa*

Abstract

Socio-economic challenges in South Africa forced the government to establish Industrial Development Zone (IDZ) programme as a development framework that seeks to guide economic growth and development in the country. IDZ programme view manufacturing as a critical element to address social and economic challenges through long-term growth and development. IDZ programme is based on the premise that if countries want to develop they must industrialize. South Africa is one of the developing countries which adopted the IDZ programme in late 2000. This programme is supported by the National Industrial Policy Framework (NIPF) and other legislative prescripts which have a bearing to growth and development of the country such as the New Growth Path (NGP) and National Development Plan (NDP). IDZ puts emphasis on raising the standard of living and attaining sustainable development. The rationale behind this is to create conducive environment for people of the province to be economically active and contribute to local, provincial and national economy. Additionally, IDZ aims to unfurl catatonic employment opportunities through Special Economic Zones (SEZ). SEZ are a geographically designated area of a country set aside for specifically targeted economic activities, which are then supported through special arrangements which may include laws and support systems to promote industrial development. SEZ aims to augment strategies that will concentrate and enhance economic activities in a particular municipality's spatial jurisdictions. Although the intentions of SEZ programme are vividly stated, a close examination by skeptics and researchers indicates myopic understanding of SEZ planning, implementation. The article argues that SEZs are characterized by diversified factors which hinder their implementation. However, the article express that the success of SEZs depends on the credibility of Integrated Development Plan (IDP) as a fundamental strategic planning instrument for municipalities. Therefore, it is within this context that the article seeks to investigate the challenges and prospects of SEZs in South Africa. The article conclude by recommending strategies that will propel economic growth, development and investment opportunities of SEZs.

Keywords: Industrial Development Zone, New Growth Path, National Industrial Policy Framework, Special Economic Zones

1. Introduction

Development trends in Europe and Asia provide valuable lessons in terms of the long-term benefits of industrialization and a strong manufacturing base. The lessons suggest strengthening and expanding the manufacturing industry as an anchor for long-term economic prosperity that can lead to economic growth and development and create much needed jobs (Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), 2012). The long-term benefits of industrialization in Europe and Asia sparked the need for African Union (AU) to position itself strategically for Africa's industrial development. In this respect, the African Union's (AU) Ministries responsible for Trade, Mining and Industry began considering industrialization strategy for Africa and eventually adopted a Plan of Action for Acceleration of Industrialization in early 2008 (African Union (AU), 2008). Subsequently, Resource-based African Industrialization and Development Strategy (RAIDS) was instigated as Africa-wide strategy. RAIDS became central to "African Mining Vision" and AU's Industrialization Strategy.

The significance of RAIDS is to configure, prioritize and promote inter-related infrastructure and large-scale economic sectoral investments in defined spatial capacities to promote trade and investment led economic growth, encouraged value-added processing and enhance the competitiveness of African economies (Thomas, 2009). As private sector-led growth strategy adopted at the continental level, the RAIDS approach envisions acceleration of African industrialization through usage of Special Economic Zones (SEZ). SEZs are a programme of strategic initiatives adopted by the South African government aimed at unlocking the inherent and under-utilized economic activities of specific municipal spatial locations. In order for South Africa to achieve this mandate, the significance of integrated planning should not be neglected when planning for SEZs. This is because Integrated Development Plan (IDP) acts as information center for municipal spatial planning. Importantly, section 26 of the Municipal Systems Act (32 of 2000) requires municipal IDP to incorporate a Spatial Development Framework (SDF) which must include basic guidelines for Land-Use Management System (LUMS) of municipalities. Therefore, the significance of IDP remains imperative when planning for SEZs. Academic reports in different countries indicate that there is limited understanding of the rationale behind SEZs; this certainly seems to be the case in South Africa where spatial planning for SEZs is in paralysis. This article adopts a view that SEZs are characterized by perpetuating interrelated challenges that derail economic growth and foreign direct investment. The article aims to depict South Africa's future trajectory for industrialization and explore the challenges that inhibit the development and successes of SEZs as well as prospects. The article commence by providing an

overview of industrial development zones in South Africa after providing an overview. Secondly, the article conceptualizes SEZs. Thirdly, explore SEZs as key catalysts for economic transformation and further scrutinizes the challenges and prospects for SEZs in section four. Lastly the article concludes by recommending measures for dealing with spatial development disparities.

2. Industrial Development Zones in South Africa

Industrial Development Zone (IDZ) is described as purposely built industrial estate linked to an international port or airport specifically designated for new investment of export oriented industries and related services (DTI, 2008; Zhang & Ilheu, 2014; Zeng, 2015). After the demise of apartheid, South Africa shifted from skewed inward industrialization policy to an outward export-led strategy to integrate into global economy (Chinguno, 2011). Subsequently, the new democratic government adopted IDZ policy framework in 1997 in order to use IDZs as catalysts and stimuli for economic growth, export promotion and job creation. This was in line with the market orientated macroeconomic policy, Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) adopted in 1996. Accordingly, the industrial policy reform was adopted drawing from the experience of other countries, particularly East Asia and Latin America, where industrial enclaves, i.e. SEZs, were adopted as catalysts for transitioning inward looking industrial strategy to export-led growth or as a strategy to switch from traditional to non-traditional exports (McCallum 2011, Farole 2011).

The IDZ is part of a broad National Industrial Policy Strategy designed to enhance manufacturing sector and integrate into the global economy. The post 1994 government could not adopt the generic export processing zones model because of the associated negative perceptions. Moreover, IDZs were linked to severe violation of labour, environmental and other social legislation in countries where they had been adopted earlier. This was not possible in South African context given the alliance between the ruling party-African National Congress (ANC) and the main trade union federation; Congress of South Africa Trade Unions (COSATU). Hence a different name and model had to be adopted to reflect this distinction (Chinguno, 2011). The main focus of IDZs was to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and value-added commodities. However, the programme was limited because IDZs could only be designated adjacent to a seaport or international airport, this excluded other regions in the country which have industrial potential but did not meet the IDZ criteria. This limitation provided the rationale for a more inclusive industrial facilitation model in the form of the SEZs which will utilize a wide range of instruments (DTI, 2012).

3. Conceptualising Special Economic Zones in South Africa

South Africa today is confronted with serious socio-economic challenges including subdued economic growth, high levels of unemployment, inequalities and abject poverty as well as spatial development challenges and regional disparities. In response to these challenges, the South African government has brought forward policy proposals such as the National Industrial Policy Framework (NIPF), New Growth Path (NGP) and National Development Plan (NDP). These key policies advocate for an industrialization trajectory characterized by broad-based participation of the previously marginalized citizens and regions (DTI, 2012). The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) (2013) indicate that African leaders are determined to seize emerging opportunities to foster industrial development as an effective, socially responsible and sustainable means to economic transformation. This could be achieved if countries transform from primary agricultural based economies to manufacturing because sustained growth through manufacturing has contributed significantly to rapid economic transformation in many countries and regions; and the world's most developed countries and regions are achieving high levels of industrialization (ECA, 2013:2). This is because of a concerted wisdom and effort to operationalize SEZs as engines for economic transformation.

SEZ is a concept used to classify a diverse number of specialized industries generally within the broad framework (Scheepers, 2012:20). SEZs are a geographically designated area of a country set aside for specifically targeted economic activities, which are then supported through special arrangements (which may include laws) and support systems to promote industrial development (DTI, 2012; Zhang & Ilheu, 2014; Zeng, 2015). According to Zhang and Ilheu (2014); Zeng (2015), SEZs are regarded as one of the effective instruments to promote industrialization if properly implemented in the right context. Various countries including South Africa have adopted SEZs in their industrialization process in order to attract FDI mostly in the manufacturing sector, creating jobs, generating exports and foreign exchange. SEZs include a wide range of zones such as free ports, free trade zones, industrial parks, enterprise zones, export processing zones and others (Zeng, 2010; Zhang & Ilheu, 2014; Zeng, 2015).

SEZs have been around for approximately 56 years with Ireland being the first country to initiate and implement the programme through Shannon Free Zone in 1959. The success of Ireland's SEZs inculcated countries such as China and Puerto Rico to adopt this programme (Scheepers, 2012). Globally, SEZs are diverse and their main objective is to (Zeng, 2010; Farole, 2011; Nyakabawo, 2014; Zeng, 2015):

- To attract foreign direct investment
- generate sustainable economic growth;
- To create sustainable long term employment;
- To maximize the extent to which private sector investment and lending can be mobilized into the process;
- To harness and foster the potential opportunities that arise from tourism and eco-tourism developments for enhancement of SMME's in order to empower local communities;
- Contribution towards regional economic integration and
- To strengthen business partnerships.

Since the establishment of the first SEZ internationally, there has been a rapid increase in their usage as development instruments, particularly in developing economies (Nyakabawo, 2014). The South African government inevitably adopted this model as a scaffold to unfurl and propel economic growth and development. In South Africa, SEZs were initially conceptualized in the early 1990s to address transition from inward-looking import-substitution economy during the apartheid regime (Thomas, 2009). The rationale behind this was to provide a sensible and pragmatic way to accelerate private sector investment, enhance infrastructure provision, boost productive capacity and to facilitate economic growth and development. Additionally, SEZs focus on export-oriented industrial development in areas close to or along the coast, to maximize on transport efficiencies and position the country to compete in global markets (Thomas, 2009).

The policy review and the new SEZ programme which began in 2007, was also brought about by the developments in national economic policies and strategies such as the National Industrial Policy Framework and New Growth Path (DTI, 2012). Globally, the significant outcomes and sustainability of policies and strategies on SEZs placed the South African government in a confinement to promulgate *Special Economic Zone Act (16 of 2014)*. The Act provides for the designation, promotion, development, operation and management of SEZ in South Africa (DTI, 2015). Importantly, this legislative prescript aims to provide a clear, predictable and systemic planning framework for the development of a wider array of SEZs to support industrial policy objectives, the National Development Plan (NDP) and the New Growth Path (NGP). This is to clarify and strengthen government arrangements and also to expand the range and quality of support measures beyond provision of infrastructure (DTI, 2012).

4. Special Economic Zones as catalysts for economic transformation

Empirical evidence from developed, newly industrializing and emerging economies has shown that sustainable development cannot be achieved on a weak industrial base (Lall, 1999). Additionally, economic literature shows a strong link between the level of industrialization, economic growth and development (Alfro, 2003; Barrios, Gorg & Strobl, 2004). This indicates that industrialization requires concrete plans that encompass integration and a thorough understanding of the holism of development of an area. Therefore, the significance of an Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) should not be neglected in this regard. In order to address the spatial-related challenges in South Africa, Section 26 (c) of the *Municipal System Act (32 of 2000)* prescribes that every municipality should formulate a Spatial Development Framework (SDF) as an integral part of their IDP. This awards the municipal SDF a legal status as part of the IDP process. SDF is a base plan that indicates the desired patterns of land use, directions of growth, urban edges, special development areas and areas that need conservation.

The SDF also guides land development in relation to, provision for development of rural and urban areas; recognition of existing informal land developments; discouragement of urban sprawl and land invasions; equitable access to land; and tenure security. Its content must also cover all the issues as set out in the *Municipal Systems Act, 2000* (Greater-Tubatse Municipality Spatial Development Framework, 2007). SDF provides appropriate guidelines for Land-Use Management System of a municipality. Although legislative imperatives stress the significance of linking development plans, many municipalities in South Africa are still oblivious about this obligation hence they are moving like a manatee towards operationalizing the SEZ programme. This is due to lack of understanding of long-term development and economic planning in the country. The major flaw of the SEZ was in a way the policy was designed and implemented (Nyakabawo, 2014).

According to the Minister of Trade and Industry Dr Rob Davies, the SEZ policy review showed that weak governance, lack of SEZ incentives, poor stakeholder coordination and lack of integrated planning hindered the success of the programme (DTI, 2014). As part of long-term development planning, SEZs provide concrete development and economic growth. Thus, the popularity of SEZs as a tool for economic transformation comes as no surprise, because of their purpose and the significant potential benefit to the host country in the form of increasing FDI, generating employment opportunities, enhancing foreign exchange earnings, developing export-oriented industries, and boosting export growth, as well as expanding government revenue and economic growth (Zeng, 2010; Kituyi, 2013; Lin & Wang 2014; Zeng, 2015). SEZs have contributed significantly to national GDP, employment,

exports, and attraction of foreign investment and new technologies, as well as adoption of modern management practices thereby accounting for about 22% of national GDP, about 46% of FDI, and about 60% of exports and generated in excess of 30 million jobs in China (Zeng 2010:13).

Accordingly, foreign investors speed up the introduction of new technologies, but in order for the host country to benefit, a proper regulatory framework must be in place (von Claus Knoth, 2000: 81). Therefore, the premise of SEZs can be operationalized through credible IDPs, particularly because it provides an integrated approach to spatial planning of municipalities. In addition, IDPs must depict the location of development projects and programmes of a municipality's spatial magnitudes including areas with SEZ potential. The objectives and priorities of SEZ should be aligned with the objectives set out in the IDPs of the host region in order to support long-term development of those industries. Therefore, IDPs are crucial in this process because development is intertwined. Despite the dynamic potential of SEZs as an instruments of sustainable structural transformation, some key challenges exists that threatens these economic catalysts such as legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks; poor business environment; lack of coordinated planning arrangements; lack of strategic planning and demand-driven approach; inadequate infrastructure and zone management and operational know-how among others (Zeng, 2015).

5. Challenges inhibiting Special Economic Zones in South Africa

Globally, SEZs are diverse and each one of them is confronted with unique challenges. The bureaucracies of investing across international boundaries can be a major barrier to the development of international trade, particularly in developing countries. Between 2002 and 2010 approximately 33 thousand jobs were created and 40 investors attracted through IDZs (DTI, 2012). Moreover, more than R3.0 billion worth of investments have been generated in the SEZs, which is below expectations (DTI, 2012). So far, only three IDZs are operational in South Africa, namely Coega in East London, Richards Bay IDZ and OR Tambo International Airport. This is because of the weaknesses of the current IDZ programme which focused exclusively on one type of SEZ. The programme was designed in such a way that only a few economic regions, those with access to an international airport or sea port, could qualify for support. Some regions could not receive support under this programme irrespective of their economic development needs, opportunities or challenges. For example, Gauteng received support, while Limpopo could not. East London received support, while the under-developed region of Mthatha could not receive any support.

Additionally, potential investors face significant challenges and delays in interacting with various government departments and agencies, resulting in government bureaucracy being frequently cited as an obstacle to ease of doing business (DTI, 2014). Another challenge which is pervasive to SEZs is participation of sector departments in development planning processes. As fields of intervention, government departments are commonly linked to specific planning and implementation institutions such as Ministries leading such interventions. Each of these departments has a national and in some cases provincial divisions with policy and programmes that can be considered in the course of planning processes (Maloka & Mashamaite, 2013). Although participation of sector departments is considered important for the success of SEZs, stakeholder management is still a challenge. There is no effective stakeholder engagement strategy for secondary stakeholders, including communications, marketing, interaction workshops, online portal, public relations and customer surveys (DTI, 2015). As part of roles and responsibilities of stakeholder management unit, this information should be part of the SEZs implementation plan for monitoring and evaluation purposes.

Furthermore, challenges such as lack of coordinated planning arrangements; insufficient guidance related to governance arrangements; dependence on government funding; lack of targeted investment promotion measures; insufficient marketing and inadequate coordination across government agencies have been identified as the key constraints to the success of the SEZ programme (Chinguno, 2011; DTI, 2012; Nyakabawo 2014). Another factor which obscures implementation of SEZs is incomplete information presented in the IDPs by municipalities, particularly information regarding spatial planning. For example, in Limpopo Province, the Greater-Tubatse Local Municipality is considered a provincial growth point, but the IDP of this municipality is sketchy on the matter. The IDP does not integrate the objectives of SEZs and the processes how it plans to operationalize SEZ programme. The Municipality is one of the key pillars of the GDP of the Limpopo Province due to dominance of mining activities. Although the municipality is endowed with mineral resources, there are various challenges which limit its growth and development. For example, the municipality is located in a confined mountainous area and mines are situated closer to human settlement. The road infrastructure cannot handle traffic which is experienced on daily basis due to transportation of minerals extracted from the nearby mines. This puts a strain on economic growth and development of the area hence development in this municipality is moving at a snail pace.

Recently, there has been limited understanding of the rationale behind SEZs, hence continually experiencing perpetuating challenges which hinder their potential to attain

economic growth and development. The ECA (2013) suggests that in order for countries to attain growth and development, countries must move from agricultural economy to industrial economy. This can only be achieved if the necessary conditions are created for SEZs (Lall, 1999). Moreover, it is crucial to understand that industrialization requires ample land availability in order for SEZ to expand and propel different economic activities. This requires a thorough physical planning, licensing, utilities, industrial development incentives, financing and environmental compliance of SEZs. Another hiatus which is pervasive to SEZ programme is political sentiments and corruption, these are major unresponsive hindrances confronting the successful planning and implementation of SEZs. (Nyakabawo 2014) asserts that the decision to establish an SEZ in a particular location must not be driven by political objectives. This is because politics serve as a hindrance for long-term development in the country and defy the purpose of development programmes. Other factors including legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks; poor business environment; lack of strategic planning and demand-driven approach and inadequate infrastructure affect the SEZs (Zeng, 2015). Thus, the success of SEZs to expand economic transformation depends on overcoming these challenges.

6. Conclusion

The paper has demonstrated that SEZs have been a panacea for economic challenges in many countries including South Africa. Thus, SEZs are identified as an important mechanisms to industrialisation trajectory in South Africa through expansion of manufacturing industry, export promotion, job creation and enhanced attractiveness or competitiveness as a potential destination for foreign direct investment. Their usage as engines for economic growth depends on the necessary conditions created for them to thrive. However, challenges such as legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks, poor business environment; lack of coordinated planning arrangements, lack of strategic planning and demand-driven approach, inadequate infrastructure and zone management and operational know-how, different political sentiments, mounting corruption and lack of vision for long term development are the main reasons why strategic planning and implementation of this programme is difficult. Thus, the success of SEZs will depend on whether the necessary conditions are created for them grow and thrive as well as addressing the structural challenges facing SEZs. Additionally, in order for SEZs to attract FDI, processes such as integrated planning should be taken into cognizance because it provides integrated approach to development of an area. Moreover, municipalities must be meticulous about the credibility of information presented in their IDPs because they serve as information centers for investors. Therefore, policy makers need to be dialectical when formulating programmes

such as the SEZ or IDZ; this is to provide a concrete foundation for SEZs to flourish. Laconically, there is a need to develop comprehensive legal and regulatory frameworks to guide the operations of SEZs.

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THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SHIFTING IDEOLOGIES WITHIN THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEMOCRATIC LANDSCAPE: LIBERALISM VERSUS NEOLIBERALISM

M.A. Mamabolo

University of Limpopo, South Africa

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to assess the vulnerability of the South African democratic values of public administration accountability as enshrined in its constitutional founding. The paper is conceptual in nature and it exploits the existing literature to engage on the debate of the implications of shifting ideologies within the South African governance landscape. The argument put forward is that the South African democratic values are being eroded by the conflicting ideological shifts between liberal tendencies and neo-liberal expiation. Generally, liberalism has been accepted as an ideology that is within the political philosophical stance founded on ideas of liberty and equity with emphasis on human rights and dignity. At its core as an ideology it condemns both economic and social inequality throughout the world. It is concerned with individual's rights within an orderly society. Neo-liberalism on the other hand is an ideology of political economic practices that proposes that human-beings can best be advanced through liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within institutional frameworks that are characterised by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade. That in it create a state of inequality within the society and erode the values of accountability as those gaining access to resources tend to accumulate more to the detriment of others. The liberal values of equal opportunities and equity in general fades away to the advantage of neo-liberalism that tends to bring about capitalist market forces into play. The paper concludes that the conflicting ideological shifts in the South African democratic space is compromising the liberal public accountability values with surfacing neo-liberal tendencies that is drowning the country to extreme level of inequality and instability.

Keywords: Ideologies, Liberalism, Neoliberalism, Democracy, Inequality, Accountability

1. Introduction

With every passing day in South Africa it is acknowledged that liberalism has shaped all democratic values in the country. Hence it is accepted as the most important political philosophy in South Africa. It is generally accepted in the country that liberalism emphasise on a free market system in which government regulates the economy with little interference. This brought many debates on the concept and usage of liberalism in both academic and political thought which emphasised on different views. The debate put forward by Egan,

(2012) and Buchanan (2000) on liberalism in the South Africa context and in other countries is that the idea is slowly fading away in the South African scholarship. However according to the argument put forward by van Onselen (2012), is that South Africa operates based on ideologies like any other countries. Therefore it should be understood that arguments which were put forward on ideologies are still questionable in the country. It is accepted that the country operates based on the idea of liberalism and liberal ideas are regarded as the driving forces of democratic peace in a society (Doyle, 1986; Raico, 1992; and Owen, 1994). It can therefore be acknowledge that liberalism stems from democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom as listed in the South African Bill of Rights. Such rights are regarded as the cornerstone of democracy in the country and therefore all these rights should be practiced in a fair and equitable manner.

In the South African history, liberalism is vested upon basic democratic values governing public administration which are listed in the *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 Section 195(1) and in the Bill of Rights* (Egan, 2012). Those include among others, a high standard of professional ethics that should be promoted, public administration that must be developmental-oriented, and most importantly public administration that must be accountable. These are regarded as the founding principles of public administration and it is argued that there are some difficulties between the constitution and the practice of law in the society (Vally, 2007). Therefore it not known as to whether public accountability principles such as transparency, effective and efficient use of resources are practiced in compliance with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa to promote liberal values. For the purpose of this article the debate put forward is on the South African democratic values which are being eroded by the conflicting ideological shifts between liberal tendencies and neo-liberal expiation. The attention of this paper is not basically on democratic rights but is more on exposing the vulnerability of South Africa's values of accountability and emphasis that the more the society shift from liberal thinking, the more inequality is promoted.

CONCEPTUALISATION AND CONTEXTUALISATION OF THE NOTION OF LIBERALISM IN SOUTH AFRICA

Despite the controversial concepts in political analysis, in this paper the meaning of the concept 'Liberalism' is unpacked in order to provide a notion of liberalism in South Africa. Within the concept liberalism, there are rival commitments which this ideology operate based upon. These include among others the ones that are common in the political and academic usage and around the world in general. *Firstly, classical liberalism* which according to (Heywood, 2007; Hayek (nd); and Charvet & Kaczynska-Nay, 2008) is concerned with the means of government and is accepted as the central commitment to individualism based on

the values of liberty and equality. *Secondly, modern liberalism* which extend freedom to minorities and advocates state intervention. However other authors have also stretched this to as far as arguing on other commitments of this ideology such as *political liberalism* (Rawls, 1995; & Galston, 1995), *economic liberalism* (Martinez & Garcia, 2013) and *racial liberalism* (Guinier, 2006; Mills, 2008; & Schickler, 2013) have identified. However for the purpose of this paper only classical liberalism stems the base of the arguments, because it emphasis more on individual values and market values. Various usage of the concept liberalism has been brought forth and the most common accepted concept of liberalism is that 'it is an ideology that is within the political philosophical stance founded on ideas of liberty and equity with emphasis on human rights and dignity'. Meaning that at its core it condemns both economic and social inequality throughout the world and promotes individuals 'rights (Heywood, 2007). However Hayek (nd:1) asserts that since liberalism have various meanings which have little in common it can accepted as an open pool of new ideas. It can be argued that if this is referred to as such then it is therefore questionable as to what will then be a simple definition of *neoliberalism*. Therefore it can be argued in this paper that liberalism in the South African context can only be accepted as an ideology that emphasis on ideas of liberty and equality. Hence liberalism in itself is rarely challenged because of its varieties of meanings. At its core it rather be given different approaches than being challenged as a political philosophy because it promotes individual rights. Heywood (2007: 45) adds that it should be understood that any account of political ideologies must start with liberalism. Hence liberalism is regarded globally as an egalitarian ideology which focuses more on individual rights and freedom of individuals (Mills, 2008). Most arguments which brought forward in political analysis are as to whether liberalism should be viewed as an 'ideology' or a 'political movement' or an 'approach to normative political theory'. This emphasise that liberalism takes many views rather than as an ideological meaning in itself. Charvet and Kaczynska-Nay (2008) acknowledged liberalism as an argumentative doctrines which in it have some core principles and further emphasise on the complications associated with the practice of those doctrines. The other argument of the concept stems from the achievement of enduring or lasting value in a society and liberalism emphasis on promoting such values to the society at large. It is argued that the post South Africa is promoting what is called 'Predatory liberalism' (Andreasson, 2006). Therefore in the South African context the society's values should be seen as foremost in this regard. Hence the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa states all equal rights and public administration accountability values which should be enshrined.

REFLECTIONS OF SOUTH AFRICAN DEMOCRATIC VALUES IN TWO DECADES

Some reflections of the South African democratic values as to whether such values made some remarkable achievement in this two decades are stressed. The reason for such reflections is based on the argument put forward in this paper that the South African democratic values are being eroded by the conflicting ideological shifts between liberal tendencies and neo-liberal expiation. It is acknowledged that South Africa is establishing a democratic society in all areas including among others areas of public accountability and equality (Joubert, Eberson & Eloff; 2010). Therefore the base of the argument is specifically on the fade of liberal values to neoliberalism in the country. At its core liberal values stresses support for individual liberties, a free market economy which is controlled neither by the state nor by a small oligarchy, fiscal responsibility, a rational defence policy, separation of church and state, and restoration of the limitations on government power which have been eroded in recent years. All this values in South Africa are liberal in nature (van Onselen, 2012) and as such liberal values must promote equal opportunities in the society, despite the fact that neo-liberalism also promote equality in the society. It is also argued that founding values of the new democratic South Africa include among other issues of human dignity, the achievement of equality, the advancement of human rights and freedom in the country. With the shift from liberal values to neoliberalism values this emphasis something new. Brown (2003:1) noted that the introduction of neoliberalism brought the end of liberal democracy which emphasise what Owen (1994) referred to as liberal ideas that promote citizens participation in the decision making. Hence it is also argued in this paper that this whole idea of shifting to what is simply referred to as “Neo-Liberalism”. Although it is accepted that countries should introduce new ideas that will assist them in promoting good governance, but such ideas should be referred to as new continuous ideas. This is because there are new ideas that might work best in other countries and they might not work in the South African context. Therefore the critical question which remain is that how best neoliberalism can work in South Africa without compromising the liberal public accountability values with surfacing neo-liberal tendencies that is drowning the country to extreme level of inequality and instability. Liberal public accountability in this regard refers to openness, transparency and accountability of the responsible officials to the society (Rapatsa; 2014).

IMPLICATIONS OF SHIFTING IDEOLOGIES

South Africa is also regarded as a country that operates based on ideological zone (van Onselen; 2012). It is important to note that not all philosophers have accepted that all ideas and ideologies are of vital importance in a society (Heywood, 2003:1). However all ideologies exist to make all political activities to be acceptable in a country. In their

acceptable definition it is acknowledged that Ideologies are accepted as a certain ethical set of ideals, principles, doctrines, myth or symbols of a social movement, institution, class or large group that explains how society should work and offers some political and cultural blueprint for a certain social order (Heywood, 2007). This implies that each political ideology should contain a set of ethics and principles that best assist different societies on how they should be governed. However there are always some implications concerning the shifting of different ideologies in each and every society. It should be highlighted in this paper that South Africa shifted from liberalism to neo-liberalism and that in it creates state of inequality within the society and erode the values of accountability in the country. Since 1994 South Africa has proven to have shifted the ideology by shifting the responsibility for apartheid away from racist ideologies to capitalist profitability.

Liberal values of equal opportunities and equity in general fades away to the advantage of neo-liberalism that tends to bring about capitalist market forces into play. Therefore it can be argued that some complications brought by the shifting of ideologies is that there is one world and having another world it is difficult as others can't live twice. This emphasis that a country with liberalism should be a country that operates based on equity, because two or more ideologies can complicate the governing systems. Therefore this brings out some confusion in it as it draws two dimensions concerning shifting ideologies. For example the conservatives beliefs is that government should be limited and this refers to neo-liberalism because it emphasises on involving the private sector in public service delivery. In this regard the government's role of service provision is slowly being shifted in the hands of the private sector. However in most societies the economy of a society is better only if, it is the government which regulates the economy, while others believe that the role of the government should be to provide people with the freedom that is necessary to pursue their own goals. It should then be understood that when shifting ideologies, societies should shift to different ideas and principles rather than promoting what Andreasson (2006) refer to as a South African predatory liberalism. Hence it is argued in this paper that shifting this ideologies in the South African context will create inequality and instability in the society.

LIBERALISM VS NEOLIBERALISM

Since mid-1970s to 1980s a large number of studies have been conducted on liberalism, specifically on how best this political philosophy can be applied in a society (Hayek, nd; Raico, 1992; & Mills, 2008). It is acknowledged that liberalism it is generally concerned with individual's rights within an orderly society. It can be argued that some of its ideas has been practised while others still left some backlogs such as public accountability. On the other hand Neo-liberalism is an ideology of political economic practices that proposes

that human-beings can best be advanced through liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within institutional frameworks that are characterised by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade (Harvey; 2007: 22). Mudge (2008: 703) brought to attention that neoliberalism is still not welcomed as a concept specifically in the social science. Meaning that the usage of this concept is still misunderstood in the public thought. However in its simplest definition one can argue that the term “*neo*” simply means new. Therefore the most general interpretation of neoliberalism is that it is an ideology that introduced new ideas in South Africa. This is also proven by the concept that was put forward by Thorsen & Lie (nd: 3). They emphasise that due to some confusion in defining what the concept is some even went as far as suggesting the concept as a development of liberal thought. Hence it is argued in this paper that those new thought should draw some similarities in balancing the development of liberal ideas not necessarily to shift the existing ideas by introducing the new ideas that will also create more backlogs in the society. Some comparison with the two is that they emphasises on different values and that in it will create inequality and instability in the country. The reason behind this is that those who operate on the basis of liberalism will keep on emphasising on individual equity and liberty were else those who operate on the basis of neoliberalism will keep on introducing new approaches that only benefits those at the forefront. In this regard neoliberalism will only benefits those who are politically connected and promote them to enter into the capital market and will compromise liberal public accountability values in South Africa. Therefore in order to draw some distinction and a clear understanding between the two, this paper outlines some key points on this two ideologies in a table below:

Table 1: Liberal values vs Neoliberal values

LIBERALISM VALUES	NEOLIBERALISM VALUES
Individualism, putting individuals at the forefront and give them opportunity to construct a society wherein all individuals can participate and develop good abilities that best suit them as the society.	The rule of the market, liberating free enterprise or private enterprise from any bonds imposed by the government despite the cost of social damages.
Tolerance, willingness of people to allow others to think, speak and act in ways of which they disapprove is both a guarantee of individual liberty/freedom and as a means of social enrichment	Cutting public expenditure for social services like education and health care. Reducing the safety-net for the poor and even maintenance of roads, bridges, water supply in the name of reducing government role.
Equity, commitment such as equal equality,	Deregulation, reducing government

legal equality (equality before the law) and political equality (one person, one vote , one value)	regulation of everything that could diminish profits, including protecting the environment and safety on the job.
Constitutionalism, government must maintain order and stability in the society by ensuring that all constitutional mandate are followed/implemented to prevent the danger that government may become a tyranny (rule by one) against the individual.	Privatisation, sell state-owned enterprises, goods and services to private investors. This include banks, key industries, railroads, toll highways, electricity and water.
Freedom, emphasising on freedom under the law to ensure control and resolve conflict that may arise	Eliminating the concept of “the public good or community” and replacing it with individual responsibility. Pressuring the poorest people in a society to find solutions to their lack of health care, education and social security all by themselves, then blaming them if they fail.

Sourced from: Heywood, (2007) and Martinez and Garcia (2013)

It is clearly articulated in the above table that this two ideologies emphasises on different values and this simplify that liberal practices work can claim to work best in South Africa than in other countries. While neoliberalism can be seen as an ideology that works best in the capitalist countries which include among others, the United States of America, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Sweden. It should therefore be understood that mixing the two emphasises on the belief that what work best in other countries would never work best in South Africa. Hence Klees (2014) argued that South Africa has the most progressive constitution in the world as compared to other countries such as Brazil, with its best children legislation. However one can still argue that neoliberalism is the best ideology as it emphasises on changing the fundamental nature of politics (George, 1999). On the other hand Gill (2009) argued that neoliberalism emerged as a means to an end. In the South African context this practice can't work to fight inequality values.

Martinez & Garcia (2013) outlined some most and main critical points of neoliberalism, as eliminating the concept of “the public good or community” and replacing it with individual responsibility and it is also drawn in the comparisons made in the above table. In the South African context this does not really emphasis that neoliberalism is putting away or doing away with liberal values but there are some contradictions with this two ideologies. In contrary to this ideologies, it should be noted that liberalism don't really

emphasis on personal responsibility but focuses on free individual choice. On the other contrary neoliberalism focuses more on personal responsibility (Hursh, 2005:4-5). Tetlock, Viender, Patil & Grant (2013) asserts that with different ideologies accountability is hard to achieve, as there are ideologies that does not believe on accountability because it starts with human nature. And as such the outcomes of accountability whether personal or public might be difficult to achieve with other ideologies. Therefore it is argued that with the introduction of such ideas, liberal values will be eroded to neoliberal tendencies. Hence Schultz (2010) argued on the intervention of the markets and government and outlined one important key reason behind the existence of markets and acknowledged that markets are founded on the bases of government. Meaning they exists because of the positive change that the government make in a society. Therefore neoliberalism should not take over government control, but rather should provide some calculative means to address some backlogs that are left behind by liberalism. The idea should not be new but should be found on the basis of promoting and retaining democratic values and public accountability as stated in the South African Constitution, 1996. This simplify that if those new ideas of neoliberalism are regarded as the best in governance then they should also be stated in the Constitution of the Republic in order to promote personal responsibility as opposed to public accountability. Clarke (2008) is of the view that neoliberalism introduced the theory of new public management in most countries. And in the South African perspective new public management has indeed brought to the commencement of privatisation in government. Hursh (2005) also acknowledged the importance of privatisation and asserts that it is through privatisation wherein markets can operate swiftly. It should therefore be acknowledged that neoliberalism brought the ideas of an effective provision of social services such as education and health care. Hence Harvey (2007) acknowledged privatisation as a special feature of neoliberalism. Therefore it is questionable as to whether privatising public services and goods such as water, electricity, health facilities, telecommunication, roads, and transportation have made some remarkable changes in the country. With the current South African crisis all this still raise some critical concern even with the introduction of so called neoliberal projects. One can then argue that it is better to stick to liberal values of public accountability than to promote equality and instability in a society as neoliberalism does (Coburn; 2000). Hence Larner (2003) adds that the more idea changes the more they stay the same. However with the development of liberal thought things are likely to change for worse in South Africa.

Despite all this arguments this two ideologies are competing as the other one is formed on the basis of democracy while the other one is found on the basis of history. This is because neoliberalism has some unique elements and such elements can be argued to be those of conservatism ideology. Conservatism ideology in this regard resist the pressures

released by the growth of liberalism (Heywood, 2007). For instance human perfection, one of the elements of conservatism emphasis that individuals are morally corrupt because they are tainted/contaminated by selfishness, greed & the thirst for power. Hence Brown (2006:690) asserts the idea of neoliberalism and neoconservatism and some contradictions between the two and acknowledged that the two provide an indifferent to accountability in government. However Larner (2000: 5) acknowledged that neoliberalism is widely used as an idea which promotes the development of political economic governance that is used more than neoconservatism.

Conclusion

The paper concludes that the conflicting ideological shifts in the South African democratic space is compromising the liberal public accountability values with surfacing neo-liberal tendencies that is drowning the country to extreme level of inequality and instability. In the South African context it is acknowledged that a country with liberal policies should be a country that operates based on equity, because two or more ideologies can complicate the governing systems. Therefore the country should revise liberal policies and accept the good that liberalism ideology has brought to the society at large rather than introducing neoliberalism that complicate the South African government. As a result more research should be conducted on how neoliberal policies complicates the country's government.

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HORIZONTAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN SOUTH AFRICA: LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT OF THE EXECUTIVE

S.M. Madue
North-West University, South Africa

Abstract

Democracy has many definitions, implications and consequences, but accountability is one of its fundamental components. Thus this paper is concerned with horizontal accountability, a concept which entails oversight that is performed by infra-state set of institutions designed to constrain illegitimate or arbitrary power, and to discourage abuses and illegalities perpetrated by the executive. These institutions would provide barriers against tyrannical exercise of power, a central concern of modern political theorists, and would eventually recommend and/or provide punishment of authorities' mismanagement or abuses. Without working systems that can provide 'checks and balances' to the overweening power of the executive, democratic regimes tend to remain shallow, corrupt, unconsolidated and vulnerable to authoritarian style of rule. Horizontal accountability is a key element of assessing the quality of democracy and for understanding how legislatures exercise oversight over the executive. Yet, it is taken for granted that horizontal accountability does not play a crucial role in the South African legislative sector as is the case with other democracies. These regimes would lack horizontal accountability due to historical background conditions in many so-called 'delegative democracies', where the executive would eliminate, co-opt or neutralise formal agencies and institutions designed to deepen democracy by generating oversight data and reports. This paper then argues that in South Africa, attempts are continuously made by the executive to weaken horizontal accountability by undermining the oversight reports generated by institutions supporting democracy.

Key words: Democracy, Accountability, legislature, executive, oversight

1.Introduction

In democracies, horizontal accountability is arguably a relevant variable for understanding how the legislature and the executive interact, and therefore a key element for assessing the quality of democracy. However, the concept has not received attention by scholars, especially in South Africa. In this article, the term 'legislature' is used to refer to the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa and the nine provincial legislatures. Moreover, Diamond (2005:7) explains that an elected national legislature, and similar bodies at the provincial level, constitutes an important link in the chain of horizontal accountability. Used in this context, the concept of the legislature resonates with a definition of Parliament cited by Staddon (2008:4) from a Commission to Strengthen Parliament in which Parliament is described as "... a policy-influencing legislature which facilitates accountable, coherent and responsive government, which is, on the whole, effective and stable". This article is partly inspired by Phillippe Schmitter's 2007 article titled "*Political accountability in 'real-existing' democracies: meaning and mechanisms*", in which he states:

“Democracy has many definitions, implications and consequences, but accountability is one of its most important components. Citizen participation, political equality, civic consciousness, self-realisation, decent treatment by authorities, sense of individual political efficacy, respect for constitutional norms, protection of human rights, responsiveness to public opinion, social and economic levelling and, of course, “freedom” have all been associated with this form of political domination – either as a defining feature or a likely product of it – but they are all contingent and vulnerable if citizens cannot reliably hold their rulers accountable for the actions that they take in the public realm” (Schmitter, 2007:1).

While there are several means which the citizens can use to hold the rulers accountable, the most popular means is through the oversight mechanism of the legislature. Thus Hudson (2007:13) stresses that legislative oversight can contribute to ensuring that the relationship between the state and its citizens is one which is characterized by accountability. The legislature works also relies on the reports and findings of the horizontal accountability institutions to hold the executive accountable. The aim of this article is to provide a platform for understanding the basic workings of horizontal accountability relations between the legislature and the executive in the South African Legislative Sector. The article is organised into three interrelated parts. In the first part, a conceptual framework and the theory adopted, that is, deliberative democratic theory, are presented. The second part deals with methodological aspects, the problem statement, empirical study and a discussion of the findings. The last section presents some impediments of horizontal accountability, recommendations and conclusion. Therefore, a natural starting point is a consideration of the conceptual framework.

2. Methodological diction


The traditional convention for structuring research articles includes among others: providing the readers with an overview of the relevant concepts; outlining a contextual framework; and plotting a theoretical framework, as a way of introducing the research problem, and laying the foundation for the later discussions. The starting point of this article is thus the conceptual framework or methodological diction. Babbie (1995:127) stresses the importance of methodological diction as “... to specify particular terms for the purpose of facilitating operation and comprehension. The concepts that are outlined in this article are oversight and horizontal accountability, and deliberation. Igniting the conceptual framework is done through a brief definition of the term ‘accountability’.

2.1 Accountability

Finger pointing and blame are the currency of accountability avoidance (Ray and Elder, 2007:2). Literature suggests that the definitions of accountability are aplenty. Neither is this article aimed at reinstating the definitions nor at attempting to provide a new definition. Most scholars (Schmitter and Karl, 1991; Schedler, *et al.*, 1999; Schmitter, 2007; Staddon, 2008; Madue, 2014) share the view that accountability is a relationship between two sets of actors (most of it is played out not between individuals, but between organisations or institutions) in which the former accepts to inform the other, explain or justify his or her actions and submit to any pre-determined sanctions that the latter may impose. Schmitter (2007:4) stresses that the latter that have become subject to the command of the former, must also provide required information, explain how they are obeying or not obeying the former's commands and accept the consequences for what they have done or not done. In short, when it works, accountability involves a mutual exchange of responsibilities and potential sanctions between citizens and rulers, made all the more complicated by the fact that in between the two are usually a varied and competitive set of representatives. Lapointe (2013) in Madue (2014:863) states that in public administration, particularly in the legislative sector, is stressed in terms of overseeing the executive and government departments.

In this article, the concept 'accountability' is merely highlighted to provide a foundation for the accountability framework as depicted in Figure 1 below, before discussing the concept of 'horizontal accountability', which is the focal point of this article. Schedler *et al.*, (1999:18) remind us that understanding the concept of accountability was driven by ancient political philosophy for several years who were concerned with how to restrain power, prevent abuses, and keep it in line with established rules. They continue to argue that, in contemporary use, the notion of accountability continues to express this concern, attempting to apply checks and balances, oversight and institutional constraints on the exercise of power. In the light of this reminder by Schedler *et al.* (1999), Figure 1 highlights the accountability framework as an important variable of good governance.

Figure 1: The accountability framework



Source: Governance, development and democratic politics, DFID, 2007.

The elements of capacity, responsiveness and accountability form a virtuous cycle of good governance (DFID, 2008:4). These elements are vital for vertical and horizontal accountability. O'Donnell (1999a: 165) argues that accountability runs not only vertically, making elected officials answerable to the ballot box, but also horizontally, across a network of relatively autonomous powers (i.e., other institutions) that can call into question, and eventually punish, improper ways of discharging the responsibilities of a given office. Vertical accountability has been received considerable attention in the literature (O'Donnell, 1996; Lemos, 2007; Fox, 2000; James, 2002) and is explained as the citizens holding the government accountable through the elections. Therefore, this article is concerned with the little attention given to horizontal accountability, especially in the developing democracies' context. Thus the article attempts to contribute to the discourse of horizontal accountability by defining this concept within the parameters of legislative oversight, with specific reference to the South African Legislative Sector.

2.2 Oversight and horizontal accountability

Ogul (1977) has long noted that there is no existing model of democracy that boasts a sophisticated and all-inclusive oversight system. The South African Legislatures'

Secretaries Association (SALSA) (2011:9) defines oversight as “... The proactive interaction initiated by a legislature with the executive and administrative organs ...that encourages compliance with the constitutional obligation on the Executive and administration to ensure delivery on agreed-to objectives for the achievement of government priorities”. This definition resonates with the concept of deliberation which will be discussed later on. SALSA (2011: 14), elaborates that oversight entails the informal and formal, watchful, strategic and structured scrutiny exercised by legislatures ... in respect of the implementation of laws, the application of the budget, and the strict observance of statutes and the constitution.

The concept of ‘oversight’ or ‘control’ is often preceded by a number of adjectives such as horizontal, parliamentary, legislative, political, etc. These all correspond, at some level, to the supervision and oversight of administration’s actions, for which legislatures can count on mechanisms such as hearings, summoning of ministers, resolutions of inquiry, special investigatory committees, and confirmation process, among others (Aberbach, 1990; James, 2002; Staddon, 2008; Madue, 2014). Fox (2000), stresses that oversight is a key feature of executive-legislative relations in which the executive branch owes to the legislative branch certain obligations and/or information. Staddon (2008:2) elaborates that horizontal accountability consists of counterbalancing state institutions which are charged to oversee government – which includes the legislature, an independent judiciary, and other institutional watchdogs reporting to the legislature. In this instance, Waldrauch’s 1998 definition of horizontal accountability becomes relevant. According to Waldrauch (1998:1), horizontal accountability refers to the capacity of governmental institutions including such ‘agencies of restraint’ as courts, independent electoral tribunals, anticorruption bodies, central banks, auditing agencies, and ombudsmen to check abuses by other public agencies and branches of government. All these agencies contribute towards the legislature’s oversight function. Hence Staddon (2008:13) posits that the growth and expansion of the modern state and a wide range of state activities has reinforced the need for a robust system of horizontal accountability with a strong legislature at its centre, sharing the burden of accountability alongside other accountability agencies or ‘constitutional watchdogs’.

From an organisation’s perspective, Ray and Elder (2007:2) posit that horizontal accountability can be defined as the degree to which people communicate across the organization, problem solve with all employees and teams, and build accountability for superior outcomes. Chambers (2003:308) is of the view that accountability is primarily understood in terms of ‘giving an account’ of something, which means publicly articulating, explaining, and most importantly justifying public policy. O’Donnell (1999b:38) defines horizontal accountability as the existence of state agencies that are legally enabled and

empowered, and factually willing and able, to take actions that span from routine oversight to criminal sanctions or impeachment in relation to actions or omissions by other agents or agencies of the state that may be qualified as unlawful. Lemos (2007:4) cites O'Donnell (1998) as stating that "... horizontal accountability encompasses oversight performed by an infra-state set of institutions designed to constrain illegitimate or arbitrary power, and to discourage abuses and illegalities perpetrated by the state itself. These institutions would provide barriers against the tyrannical exercise of power, a central concern of modern political theorists, and would eventually provide punishment of authorities' mismanagement or abuses". Kenney (2000:5) stresses that the capacity to sanction is an essential dimension of accountability, without which accountability exists only in a limited, truncated form.

Horizontal accountability works best when there are densely overlapping realms of oversight and scrutiny (Diamond, 2005:7). According to Ray and Elder (2007:2), the advantage of horizontal accountability is: it facilitates efficient problem solving, goal achievement and less conflict and lower turnover. Another advantage of horizontal accountability: secondary institutions benefit from the 'wisdom of insiders.' That is, those who have worked for or within the administration know more about policy processes, loopholes and inefficiencies in the bureaucracy, and how to muddle through to find information. This expertise might not be routinely available outside of the state apparatus (Lemos, 2007:6). That is the reason why deliberation is such an important factor in the institutionalisation of horizontal accountability.

2.3 Deliberation

In this article, the definition of deliberation is premised on Schmitter and Karl's (1991) definition of 'democracy' when they state that "... democracy is a regime or system of government in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public domain by citizens acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their representatives". This definition stresses an important element of deliberation, that is, 'cooperation'. It is from this view that Chambers' (2003) definition of deliberation is adopted in this article. Chambers (2003:309) defines deliberation as debate and discussion aimed at producing reasonable, well-informed opinions in which participants are willing to revise preferences in light of discussion, new information, and claims made by fellow participants. Some scholars believe that deliberation under the right conditions will have a tendency to broaden perspectives, promote toleration and understanding between groups, and generally encourage a public-spirited attitude (Benhabib 1996; Cohen 1997; Gutmann and Thompson 1997; Dryzek 2000;

Chambers 2003). This tendency is better understood by considering the relationship between horizontal accountability and deliberative democratic theory.

3. Deliberative democratic theory and its relevance to horizontal accountability

This article acknowledges the use of various theories in the study of the legislative-executive relations. The theories that are generally used include the principal-agent theory, Pant's theory and the collective accountability theory. However, a theory that is directly related to this article is the deliberative democratic theory. Deliberative democratic theory is, according to Chambers (2003:308), a normative theory that suggests ways in which we can enhance democracy and criticize institutions that do not live up to the normative standard. In particular, it claims to be a more just and indeed democratic way of dealing with pluralism than aggregative or realist models of democracy. It begins with a turning away from liberal individualist or economic understandings of democracy and toward a view anchored in conceptions of accountability and discussion.

Chambers (2003:309) explains that deliberative democratic theory critically investigates the quality, substance, and rationality of the arguments and reasons brought to defend policy and law. It studies and evaluates the institutions, forums, venues, and public spaces available for deliberative justification and accountability. Gutmann and Thompson (1997) postulate that in designing and proposing deliberative forums, scholars generally have four goals in mind: to augment legitimacy through accountability and participation; to encourage a public-spirited perspective on policy issues through cooperation; to promote mutual respect between parties through inclusion and civility; and to enhance the quality of decisions (and opinions) through informed and substantive debate. Deliberative forums mostly derive their facts from the horizontal accountability institutions, as per the principles of deliberative democratic theory.

Horizontal accountability institutions, also known as 'watchdog institutions' are those in which state entities demand answers from (and sometimes possess the power to sanction) other state entities. Auditors-general, anti-corruption commissions, ombudsman, human rights commission, bureaucratic oversight boards, legislatures (e.g. parliamentary committees and commissions) – these and other bodies stand in for citizens who generally lack the time, expertise, and collective-action resources to monitor the detailed work of their public representatives (Wang, 2005; DFID, 2008). In the South African context, accountability institutions include the legislature, the National Treasury, the Office of the Auditor-General, Office of the Public Protector, the Public Service Commission and the

Provincial Treasuries. Kenney (2000:4) cautions that horizontal accountability must be limited to illegal and unconstitutional acts or omissions. Ray and Elder (2007:7) conclude that horizontal accountability is more than a catchy phrase; it is a process for creating a performance culture. Nonetheless, horizontal accountability as a form of exercising oversight over the executive is often undermined as would be highlighted in the problem statement of this paper.

4. Problem statement

According to the DFID (2008:2), accountability emerged as a core element of the governance agenda in the late 1990s due to a growing concern with its absence in many new democracies, as well as some older ones. Forcing elected officials to make good on their campaign promises – even in terms of actions taken, let alone outcomes produced – proved beyond the capacity of many fledgling democracies. Moreover, it was (and remains) common to see courts in poor countries failing to enforce laws against public officials found to have abused power. Judges were intimidated or spurred to corrupt behaviour through the collapse of accountability mechanisms. Staddon (2008:4) puts it that the ability of the legislature to scrutinise the executive is, however, problematic when the latter has a dominant position not only in relation to the substantive business and proceedings of the legislature, but also in relation to the organisation and operation of the institution.

Waldraugh (1998:1) argues that setting up autonomous institutions of horizontal accountability presupposes insulating them from state officials and from the people as well. He elaborates that such institutions may come to clash with the principles of vertical accountability. Being unaccountable themselves, agencies of accountability are vulnerable to charges that they are undemocratic. Thus it is important not to overlook the ancient question: Who guards the guardian? Furthermore, SALSA (2011: 14) stresses that democracy remains clichéd if those in power cannot be held accountable in public for their acts or omissions, for their decisions, their expenditure or policies. Horizontal accountability is a key element of assessing the quality of democracy and for understanding how legislatures exercise oversight over the executive. Yet, it is taken for granted that horizontal accountability does not play a crucial role in the South African legislative sector, as is the case with other democracies. The continued contestations by the executive around the legality of the findings of horizontal accountability institutions, also known as institutions supporting democracy, remain a conundrum. In addition, commissions of inquiry are often constituted to probe alleged matters of lack of accountability, costing millions of rand, but their findings are mostly challenged. The rhetoric excuse for disregarding the validity of the findings of horizontal accountability institutions is that their findings are not legally binding

but merely recommendations, therefore, they are not enforceable. A result of disregarding the crucial role that horizontal accountability institutions play would mean that initiatives to improve legislative oversight by means of innovative accountability mechanisms are likely to encounter resistance. A growing feature in the accountability discourse in South Africa is the argument of who constitute a legitimate accountability institution. This problem raises a number of questions.

5. Research questions

A number of questions often arise whenever horizontal accountability institutions publish their findings. Flowing from such questions and the above problem statement, this article was set out to respond to the following research questions:

- Why are the findings and recommendations of horizontal accountability institutions contested, in other words, taken for granted in the legislative oversight process in South Africa?
- If the horizontal accountability institutions are the nerves and muscles of exercising oversight over the executive and minimising its power, why would politicians let them function effectively?
- What will ensure the operational autonomy of horizontal accountability institutions?

In the below section, a research methodology adopted to systematically respond to the above research questions is presented.


6. Research methodology

Since this article is concerned with the evaluation of a social dimension, that is, the manner in which the executive responds to the work of the horizontal accountability institutions, the research methodology adopted is qualitative in nature. Neville (2007:33) explains that qualitative research methods are generally associated with the evaluation of social dimensions. In this instance, the deductive approach is used to arrive at logical findings. The choice of the qualitative research methodology was informed by the deliberative democratic theory discussed in the above sections. The data for this exploratory study was mostly obtained from journal articles, books and reports relating to the area of study. Thus the data collection strategy revolved around literature review. The results of this article emanate from a theoretical exploration of the above research questions.

7. Discussion of the findings

The discussion of the findings of this article is anchored by Jelmin's 2012 definition of democratic accountability. According to Jelmin (2012:3), democratic accountability refers to the many ways in which citizens, political parties, legislatures and other democratic actors can provide feedback to, reward or sanction officials in charge of setting and enacting public policy. Well-functioning accountability mechanisms are believed to provide incentives for governments to work in the best interests of citizens. It is from this perspective that Hudson (2009:26) reminds us that legislatures represent, by collecting, aggregating and expressing the concerns and preferences of citizens; make policies, by sanctioning laws that make up the legal framework of a country; and oversee the executive's actions, by keeping an eye on the government's activities and calling it to account. Therefore, it is appropriate to revisit the governance system cycle and the actors concerned before presenting the findings of this article. Figure 2 below could be analysed in relation to Figure 1 presented earlier on in the conceptual framework section.

Figure 2: Governance system and actors in the accountability cycle



Source: World Bank global monitoring report 2006.

Accountability concerns both the governing (executive) and the governed (citizens). In the administrative theories, the relationship between the government and the public is explained in terms of the actors and the agents. Figure 2 above, suggests that nerve of governance and service provision is accountability where horizontal accountability

institutions play a pivotal role. In Figure 2, the horizontal accountability institutions are reflected as the 'checks and balances institutions'. Therefore, the findings of this article reflect on the state of horizontal accountability in the new democracies, with specific reference to South Africa and its experiences carrying out the legislative oversight mandate.

A major finding of this paper suggests that, in South Africa, horizontal accountability is still not fully understood or is deliberately undermined by the legislature, particularly when the findings and recommendations of its institutions call for the sanctions to be imposed on the executive. The findings of the office of the Auditor-General are often met with court challenges by the organs of the state. It is also fashionable in South Africa to see government departments using public funds to institute court case challenges against the office of the Public Protector whenever those departments view its findings and recommendations for remedial actions as negative. It is from instances of this nature that Loney (2008:160) writes that most governments, while they accept scrutiny, do not welcome it. If they are allowed to get away with not providing information to the legislature, then it is unlikely that they will volunteer to do so.

Another crucial finding of this paper is that, there appears to be some deficiencies in the horizontal accountability arrangements in the South African legislative environment. The deficiencies are perhaps, a result of a lack of understanding or rather misinterpretation of the deliberative democratic theory by members of the legislature. However, Waldraugh 1998:1), earlier argued that deficiencies of accountability are often more visible, dramatic, and urgent in new than in long established democracies. But problems of democratic quality are by no means confined to fledgling democracies. The current mood of political disenchantment and cynicism reigning in many established democracies may, at least in part, be traced back to serious failures in securing public accountability.

Furthermore, the experience of exercising oversight over the executive in the South African legislature reveals that horizontal accountability is often violated. Since this violation of horizontal accountability is not a new phenomenon, and not only confined to South Africa, O'Donnell (1999b) has previously singled out two kinds of violations of horizontal accountability: unlawful encroachment by one governmental institution on another; and corruption (unlawfully taking advantage of public office for private profit). A classical encroachment in the South African experience is the passing over of the Public Protector's report on the security upgrades conducted on the private home of the State President to the Ministry of Police. This encroachment undermines the constitutional mandate of the office of the Public Protector as enshrined in Chapter 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South

Africa, 1996. Whereas horizontal accountability institutions are generally viewed as the nerves and muscles of exercising oversight over the executive and minimising its power, the findings of this article suggests that politicians would not let them function effectively. Instead, they rather disband their existence, as experienced by the fate of the then National Directorate of Public Prosecution known as the Scorpions.

In South Africa, a continuing debate on the Nkandla saga centres around the Public Protector Act of 1994. A recent argument by the Council for the Advancement of the South African constitution suggests that a recommendation needs to be made for the amendment of the constitution to give effect to the powers of the Public Protector to ‘take appropriate remedial action’ against those found to have faulted on their mandates. The council argues that the Public Protector Act does not give full and proper effect to a section of the constitution in that it fails to reflect the constitutional powers conferred on the Public Protector to take appropriate remedial action. According to the Sunday Times (27 September 2015), the executive secretary of the Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution, Lawson Naidoo argues in the affidavit of the court papers filed at the High Court in Pretoria that the Public Protector Act was promulgated two years before the 1996 constitution, which, as the supreme law, sought to give the office (of the Public Protector) more bite. The findings of this article reveal that obstacles of horizontal accountability are aplenty.

8. Impediments of horizontal accountability

Conflict avoidance is the biggest roadblock to horizontal accountability. People are very reluctant to share information with others when they perceive it may lead to conflict. They are also reluctant to say anything that might be used negatively by their employers (Ray and Elder, 2007:5). These authors stress that “people are not stupid..... they know that giving feedback can come back to bite them, so they avoid it”. In the South African legislative-executive context, the State President appoints the heads of the horizontal accountability institutions (the Public Protector, the Auditor-General, etc.) which effectively makes him their employer. Thus, weak leaders of the horizontal accountability may tend to shy away from holding the executive accountable, due to the popular career-limiting theory.

Newell and Bellour (2002:2) argue that the challenges of effective horizontal accountability include where to assign and locate responsibility for decisions, how to devise effective mechanisms for answerability and enforcement, and how to prioritise multiple accountabilities. In South Africa, for example, the decision by the legislature to hand over the

report of the Public Protector on the irregularities surrounding the financing of the security upgrades to the Minister of Police, demonstrates this challenge.

Loney (2008) refers to these impediments as the major enemies of accountability. He lists among others the following:

- Executive dominance of the legislature and the party room which in recent years has been exacerbated by the advent of Legislative Secretaries, generally with no direct accountability to the legislature, but increasing the percentage of Members in both the legislature and the party room being committed to, and serving the interests of, the executive;
- The modern tendency of opposition parties to be obsessed with scandal, trivia and the story of the day;
- Media that are more focussed on opinion than analysis and that with few exceptions consider themselves to be players in politics rather than independent observers;
- A lack of respect for the institution of the legislature and its history, practices and procedures which are increasingly becoming secondary to the self-interest of either government or opposition; and
- A lack of understanding by Members of the legislature and the media generally of the difference between accountability and responsibility. If there is to be a strong demand for good accountability throughout the community it must be led by these people. If they fail to understand the concepts then it is likely that the community perception will also be confused (Loney, 2008:157-158).

The above list of impediments of horizontal accountability is in no way exhaustive. Thus Diamond (2005:5) argues that the single most common and crippling flaw in systems of horizontal accountability is an inability to enforce this function free from interference by the highest levels of government. Diamond's lamentation suggests the existence of interference by the executive. Hudson and Wren (2007:4) relate this inability to lack of knowledge when stating that "... often, legislatures lack the knowledge and skills to do their jobs effectively, may be more concerned with retaining their seat than with holding the executive to account, or – if they do seek to vigorously hold the executive to account – may find that they lose their seat before long. And parliaments themselves lack the institutional capacity and resources". The above impediments of horizontal accountability require urgent attention. Thus recommendations of this article are presented in the next section.

9. Recommendations

Undoubtedly, horizontal accountability demands effective scrutiny of the executive by the legislature. The horizontal accountability institutions (constitutional watchdogs) contribute invaluable information in the form of reports to for the legislature to exercise oversight over the executive. However, Diamond (2005:5) cautions that scrutiny is not enough. He elaborates that if credible evidence of wrongdoing emerges, there must be the institutional means to try the suspected offender and impose punishment on the guilty. The horizontal accountability institution, for example, corruption commission should have the ability to prosecute officials who have allegedly violated ethics laws independently. In the South African context, this article recommends a careful alignment of the mandates of the horizontal accountability institutions such as the Public Protector to the prescripts of the 1996 constitution. For example, it is argued that the Public Protector Act of 1994 has not been amended to align some of its sections with the powers of the Public Protector as enshrined in the constitution.

Another recommendation is that a well-structured orientation programme for the members of the legislature and their support staff should have an intensive component of training on the importance of the horizontal accountability institutions in the oversight processes of the legislature. The orientation programme should also enhance the members' deeper understanding of the deliberative democratic theory and other related theories like the principal-agency theory, the collective accountability theory and the network theory. The training might contribute towards the legislature and the executive's appreciation of a network of actors in modern democracies. O'Donnell (1999b) stresses that what is required is a whole network of professionalised, well-equipped, and autonomous bodies, with the judiciary at their centre, cooperating to prevent other governmental institutions from transgressing the limits of their formally defined authority.

10. Conclusion

This article was concerned with the application of horizontal accountability within the context of legislative oversight in South Africa. A point of departure for the article was to provide a conceptual framework which included definitions of the concepts of 'horizontal accountability' and 'deliberation'. While the importance of vertical accountability is acknowledged in this article, the focus was on horizontal accountability. The article agrees with Waldraugh (1998:2) that effectiveness of horizontal accountability also depends on the existence of various forms of vertical accountability, like the media and social organizations.

Deliberative democratic theory was used to provide an overview of the oversight relationship between the legislature and the executive.

Literature on legislative oversight, especially on the executive's appreciation or lack thereof of the importance of the horizontal accountability institutions in South Africa is somewhat scanty, if not absent at all. This article was aimed at igniting a discourse on the use of horizontal accountability institutions in strengthening the oversight role of the legislature in South Africa. The article has argued that in South Africa, attempts are continuously made by the executive to weaken horizontal accountability by undermining the oversight reports generated by institutions supporting democracy. In conclusion, the findings of this article, together with the impediments of horizontal accountability might be used as a starting point for assessing and improving the legislative-executive relations in the application of the deliberative democratic theory.

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ENTERPRISE SKILLS INFERIORITY COMPLEX: A FUEL TO FOREIGN AGGRESSION IN SOUTH AFRICA

S.D. Ndou

University of Limpopo, South Africa

Abstract

Entrepreneurship in South Africa is one of the lacking key aspects of economic growth and sustainability. Enterprising in the South African informal sector has highlighted significantly a common ground for aggression that arose between South African nationals and foreigners who occupy business spaces in major cities and townships. This socio-political aspects of South African relations with Africa, roots itself in the inability or fear of South African nationals to do business in current economic, social and political complex emergencies. The paper is purposed to provide a conceptual analysis of the recent aggression against foreign nations in South Africa, from an enterprise inferiority complex aspect. The paper argues that enterprise inferiority complex, emanates from the poor enterprise education, which yields a society fear of undertaking enterprise activity. As such the society presents a gap and an opportunity for foreign nationals, who through survival strategies occupy the local markets. Therefore enterprise envy by South African local develops potential for aggression, in unclear competition over local markets and job opportunity. The conclusion held in this paper is that the recent aggression taking into account the 2008 attacks, are offspring of inability of government system to redress the misfortunes of the apartheid system, which result in an unskilled and jobless society.

Key words: Enterprise, Inferiority Complex, South Africa, Aggression, foreign

1. Introduction

The complexity and frustration of society caused by economic inabilities has manifested in a complex outbreak of violence in South Africa. South Africa has failed continuously in its democratic regimes to provide sustainable job and enterprise development avenues to its every growing population. Population growth in the country increased exponentially by economic refugees from other African countries under pressure of political, economic and social instabilities (Mwakikagile, 2008; Paton, 2015; The Conversation, 2015). South Africa despite given a number enterprise support institutions, the country remain lagging behind in terms of enterprise appetite and success when compared to any other countries in its economic cluster (Mahadea & Pillay, 2008; SBP, 2009; Omidyar Network, 2012; Kumah, 2014). The xenophobic attacks in South Africa in 2008 and recently

(2015) have both been marked significantly by looting and violence in the informal and foreign kept businesses in the large cities and townships. This violence set to discredit the power position of South Africa in the global SADC, African Union, G20 and BRICS (Allison, 2015; Essa & Patel, 2015; Morand, 2015). Increasing the frustration of the African immigrants who arrived in South Africa to seek for economic and better society in a land where human rights are constitutionally protected and institutionalised. As such the outbreaks cannot be well articulated without setting a conceptual toolbox for understanding xenophobia in the context of South Africa and the African community at large. The paper set out to provide analysis of xenophobic violence, naming it anti-foreign aggression (thus xenophobia and anti-foreign aggression will be used interchangeably) in South Africa, locating it from an enterprise inferiority complex position. This enterprise complex inferiorities, does not replace the other complex phenomena and influencers of the situation, but argued to be one important aspect for the outbreaks of foreign fear in the country (Harries, 2001; United Nations –UN, 2001; South African History online –SAHO, 2015). The paper will set of by providing lacking status of enterprise development in the South Africa, the context of enterprise inferiority complex and foreign aggression in South Africa, use the complexity theory to justify the multiple effect of economically strained society to a nation, the continent and globe, and finally conclude by adding the recent aggression taking into account the 2008 attacks, are offspring of inability of government system to redress the misfortunes of the apartheid system, which result in an unskilled and jobless society.

2. Enterprise development in the South Africa

South Africa has the second largest economy in Africa following Nigeria. It boasts a strong industrial base, a world-class infrastructure and highly sophisticated financial sector of which majority is banking, insurance and the mortgage industry and the stock market (18th largest stock exchange in the world). The country is ranked 53rd out of 148 countries indexed by the World Economic Forums for competitiveness in a 2013-2014 indexing. The World Bank rank South Africa as an upper middle-income country, while when compared with other countries in the Southern Africa, it has by far the biggest GDP. The country is considered an emerging market which is a member of SADC, AU, G20 and the BRICS (Omidyar Network, 2012; OECD, 2013 Kumah, 2014). However given this beautiful picture of industry, South Africa continues to face critical challenges both socially and economically, fuelled by many complex contributors. The countries population count stood at 51.8 million in October, 2011, of which 26.4% were unemployed. The economic growth which is struggling for recovery since the global economic recession of 2008-9, is currently sluggish at 1.3 growth rate conceived by the first quarter of 2015, following a 2.2 growth rate in 2014 (Stats-SA, 2015). Majority of the young people in the country remain unemployed with a great and strange

inequality. There is no doubt that the inner challenges faced by citizen would soon be a complex challenge for government if no radical curve is taken in the economic structural transformation in the country (Choane, Shulika & Mthombeni, 2011; Duncan, 2012; Morand, 2015). The essayist here perceive that foreign aggression has park in the complexities of unemployment, lack of skills, lack of robust agenda for governance, and inabilities found within the continent's leadership. South Africa given its economic viability though Nigeria being the largest, it is more attractive to economic and political immigrants who fled their countries to seek for greener pastures in the land with a strong human protective constitution.

2.1 Enterprise Opportunity, Need and Activity

South Africa remains in need of enterprising individuals and groups to improve its labour absorption that stands at a mere 40% currently, being the lowest in the BRICS economies. This vision to be achieved needs the support and development of SMEs. However the development of enterprise and level of entrepreneurial activity has been extremely low in comparison with other developing markets such as Ghana, Zambia, Brazil and Chile (Kumah, 2014). The sluggish nature of enterprise development has been mentioned to be influenced by factors such as inadequate access to market space, lack of finance, lack of skills and proper institutionalisation of support by government (Omidyar Network, 2012; Acheampong, 2015; Morand, 2015). The focus of the paper however will on lack of enterprise skills, which in this paper is perceived to be a contributor the complex nature of enterprise fear, contributing to foreign aggression in 2008 and recently. Issacs, Visser, Friedrich & Brijlal (2007: 613) have argued that key to the success of establishing a culture of entrepreneurship in South Africa is education (see also: Ncube, nd: 1; Issacs, Visser, Fredrich & Brijlal, 2007; Nicolaidis, 2011; Morand, 2015). This argument undoubtedly contest that there is a challenge of enterprise know-how in South Africa that should be addressed, by South Africans collectively. Lack of entrepreneurs in South Africa has been long associated with lack of business skills and fear of failure by South Africans.

For enterprise to blossom in South Africa an environment full of possible opportunities need to be created through governance partnerships. The current population share of youth and woman presents a great opportunity for enterprise growth in the country. Though there has been a global wave of support to woman and youth development across the globe, and South Africa has taken a stance in doing so, political interference on matters of agency has ran the development agency programmes a myth to young and woman South African business wishers (Issacs, Visser, Fredrich & Brijlal, 2007; Kumah, 2014). The opening for full participation by woman and young people in various programmes of

economic development in South Africa supports the view that country can radically challenge the existing structural impediments of unemployment and poverty. Furthermore this share of population, is in position of good literacy characters, in which educational development can depart from. As highlighted earlier the sluggish economy remains powerless to absorb all of the graduates and school leavers, keeping qualified young people in search of employment for longer periods (Nicolaidis, 2011; OECD, 2013; Duncan, 2013). Providing excellent educational programmes that would focus on enterprise activity capacity of young people in the country is critical to ensure that other support initiatives available in the country are complemented by knowledge of business. Enterprise knowledge and ability to confront enterprise activity challenges significantly confines South Africans into poverty traps, that found to cause discomfort with foreign enterprise survivors the environment.

The society in South Africa is characterised by low enterprise activity when compared with other developing countries. The InvestorWorld (2015) defines enterprise activity as any action undertaken by individuals or companies such as buying, marketing, or investing, for the purpose of generating profits or developing economic opportunities. The lower enterprise activity in South Africa implicates therefore that South Africans has a little undertaking of actions that are aimed at developing economic opportunity or making profit. This lack of enterprise activity result in reduced potential for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and thus a draw-back for economic growth. This lack of enterprise activity disables the country for reducing unemployment and poverty (Dancan, 2013; Qambela, 2013; UNDG, 2013). The importance therefore is within the education sector to establish a culture based on enterprise competence of their graduates, in the sense that a skilled graduate given support and market space would potentially thrive in the complex market South Africa has become. The enterprise activity in South Africa that is not accounted for in the enterprise activity indexing, that which is undertaken by foreign nationals operating in the streets and the rural villages of the country, which has become a battle field and area of victimisation. Most of the business which were operated by South African general dealers are now operated by foreign nationals most from Somalia (Makula) the Salons, and convenient informal markets shared by the other SADC nationals including Nigerians and Congo nationals (Bekker, 2010; Maina, Mathonsi, MccConnel & Williams, 2011). This African migrants establishes survival business, which result in thriving enterprises in South Africa creating a view that South Africans are either incapable or lazy (Karrim, 2009; Sosibo, 2015). While there is insufficient for evidence for these convictions, South Africans lack crucial skills resulting from their colonial history, which is the basis for economic inability which currently seem to be the disability condition causing sluggish economic growth in the country.

Indeed from the view of the enterprise index of South Africa, it clear that South Africa needs a radical structural transformation of its economy. This is not only to accelerate growth, but also to deal with inclusivity, sustainability and equitability in economic beneficiation. The need for Small, Medium and Macro-Enterprises (SMMEs) are thus central to the development of society and a solution to the countries challenges crossing its cultural, social, economic and political systems. Government has recognised the need for development of SMMEs, however it seem the government lack critical enterprise environment development skills. This challenge does not only present itself in South Africa, but also in the other countries from which victims of violence are coming from (OECD, 2013; UNDG, 2013; Kumo, Omilola & Minsat, 2015). The need for SMMEs as recognised by government in South Africa is marked by introduction of economic transformation plans over the twenty years of democracy. It can be cited that in 1995 South Africa has introduced the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), aimed at addressing socio-economic inadequacies created by the apartheid legacy. The RDP intended to create a developmental state to foster development with equity (Bhorat, Hirsch, Kanbur & Ncube, 2013). The RDP was followed by the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) in 1996 within the leadership of former president Mbeki. The focus on GEAR was on creation of employment, income redistribution in favour of the poor and expanded access to social services (Knight, 2001). In 2006 the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA), the New Growth Path in 2010 and the newly adopted National Development Plan (NDP) of 2012 with a vision for 2030. All these national economic policies recognises the need for the development of SMMEs in the country to achieve economic transformation. It is very clear that for twenty years South Africa has nothing significant to claim about enterprise development. There is a need for a new enterprise revolution based on the importance of capability. The conception of enterprise capability should however emanate for the context at which enterprise skills are required by ordinary citizens to become active enterprise dowers in the country (Omidyar Network, 2012). Closing the enterprise skills inferiority that exist among South African requires rehabilitation through collaboration between government and many other stakeholders in industries within South African economy.

2.2 Are South Africans Economic Incompetent?

South Africa though being an economic power house for Africa, it remains challenged with income inequality, with about 50% of its population living below the poverty line. The country's early stage entrepreneurial rates are approximately one-third comparably low to middle income countries (OECD, 2013; UNDG, 2013; Kumo, Omilola & Minsat, 2015). This unbecoming entrepreneurial state of the country can be traced back to the apartheid conduct that hindered the ability of the black majority from participating in meaningful economic

activities of the country. This segregated a high stake of population from having the required experience and skills for thriving in economic complexities (Bhorat & Hirsch, nd: 77; Seekings, 2010). The paper moves here to argue that South Africa, after apartheid continued to be a mother land of economically disabled society that lives with inability to actively participate in meaningful enterprise activity. This therefor resulted in a country with beautiful economic attributes being host of opportunists foreign migrants, who themselves flee from economic, social and political frustration in their home countries. The focus of this part of the paper is to analyse the perceived inability which seems to be a disability for enterprise development that exist among South African nationals.

Besides many of the well-known ill that traps South Africa from being able to deliver an enterprise culture that can cultivate rewards to the economy and social devastations, the country should fix its long term social ills. For South Africa to deal with the challenges of enterprise development, it must first deal with the structural inequality that was engraved by the apartheid system, which created a view that a black South African cannot possibly lead a successful business. The economic inability of the majority black South Africans was not well address by the transition pioneers during the transition period (Valji, 2003; Seekings, 2010; Graan, 2014). This period is marked by a clean deviation from economic freedom to political freedom, which lead to a democracy with some kind of disability. The political freedom without economic power lead to current challenges that include corruption, opportunism, failing health and education system as well as sky rocking crime levels (Sachs & Warner, 1997; Timm, 2013). Though back South African are the majority population of the country they remain a less enterprise active society. Critically one could clearly pick that the racial segregation has negatively contributed to disarm the society with the skills and knowledge of enterprise development. Furthermore the education system is one of the worst, with the basic education conceiving over five curriculum changes in the past twenty years (Zambonini; nd: 1). This system has brought about many integration challenge between basic and higher education which is a result of a split introduced by the Zuma administration. The First National Bank on its report on the state of entrepreneurship in South Africa identify some of the ills which creates economic disability in South Africa. The following are some of which are found to be bounding the enterprise inferiority complex and foreign aggression that sparked South Africa in 2008 and recently:

- *Insufficient respect and recognition of the contribution of entrepreneurs in South Africa's economy and their impact on unemployment and other social tensions.* This has resulted in influx of people from other African countries whom many of has become vibrant entrepreneurs.

- *Underuse of entrepreneurial activity as a driver for economic growth and job creation.* Most competitive nations are those with the highest number of SMEs which are best creators of jobs and wealth within developing economies. This has somehow manifested in foreign nationals taking potential market spaces, making South African national to remain in places where the apartheid system pushed them to.
- *Low entrepreneurial activity* result with a low SMME development rate, which are critical for wealth creation and therefore a buyout of many other social challenges.
- *Lack of support for aspirant and existing entrepreneurs.* This is a result of an unbecoming financial and operating environment, especially in relations to regulations, policies and access to capital. This therefore triggers fear to start and develop enterprise and result in the society being inferior to their foreign counterparts.
- *Severe lack of entrepreneurial skills* remain a critical disability, displaying an inferiority complexity of the South African society. Both formal and informal educational structures do not impart quality entrepreneurial skills in South Africa.
- *Severe concentration on money than economic opportunity.* Entrepreneurs in South Africa focus on making and spending money than exploration of an economic opportunity and sustainable wealth creation. Mostly South African dream of having big capital that can jumpstart them for bigger profit collection. While on the other side foreign nationals will start a business from the little paid by a piece job, to a thriving business that survive their families back home and locally.
- *Low tolerance of entrepreneurial failure.* South Africans do not want to fail and learn from such a process. The society has a high enterprise risk phobia that need to be eradicated by being given the opportunity to have a last hope for which they cannot afford to lose, where failure can only result in a continued re-emergence.

These ills are running the South African society unable to find a meaningful role in the economic activities. This resulted in a white dominated formal sectors, and an economy flooded by foreign nationals mostly in the informal sector. The society is therefore disable and require an entrepreneurial revolution coupled with skills development programmes that can rehabilitate the society from inferiority complexities to a competitive and economic capable society.

3. Enterprise inferiority complex and foreign aggression

The underlying context of anti-foreign attacks in South Africa are complex and require contagious engagement by the academics, civil society and government. This engagement should provide guidelines for the context of understanding the root cause of the African aggression and its culmination. The multiple source identified by the condemnation

discourse of this unwanted event, are by themselves contemporary concepts that are faced by the African continent and other parts of the developed and developing world (Omar, 2009; Polzer & Takabvirwa, 2010; Tshabalala, 2015). As a point of departure it is critical first to simplify the fact that the concept of xenophobia has an inherent complexity that it hold anywhere it occurs. Each country would have its context of xenophobia and there is high probability that “xenophobia” would be raised in any conflict arising from people of deferent geographical demarcations, of which one of them do not belong to the area of conflict by the fault of borders. This is to discontinue the attitude planted by commentators such as Pierre De Vos (2015) who seeded that South Africa displayed un-Africaness in every aspect of attitude. He speaks of his experience and exchange of words he had with his former student, and use the same brush to paint all South Africans. South Africa is a good nation and a home for many African refugee without camps. It maybe because South Africa has no camps such that it can qualify for foreign aid to provide for the many economic and other socio-political refugees it host. South Africa remain the gateway to Africa, a powerhouse and integral part of the African complex society that need positive discourse and deeper understanding.

3.1 The Context of Anti-foreign Aggression in South Africa

Because of the poverty of conception about the phenomena of xenophobia in South Africa it is critical to depart the argument from a specific point. The paper is thus contextualised from an “enterprise inferiority complex” as a fuel to foreign aggression. This is done to provide a comprehensive context of the anti-foreign aggression that struck South Africa in the past two decades with a focus on the 2008 and 2015 outbreaks. A basic understanding of xenophobia requires a provision of the distinction between “xenophobia” as a word, a concept and phenomena. The word explanation would assist in the application of the word in discourse, while the use of it as a concept would assist in establishing contextual tools in which it could be understood as a phenomena that affect a society and at large a continent and its image (Harris, 2002; Bond, Ngwane & Amisi, nd: 3). As a word xenophobia is a dislike and/ or fear of that which is unknown or deferent from one (Fayomi et al, nd: 1). In much simple terms Harris (2002) put it that the term refers to a hatred or fear of foreigners, which is to say in common terms xenophobia is characterise by dislike, negative attitude, fear or hatred for foreigners by members of a recipient nation. The word xenophobia is said to be an offspring of the Greek words “Xenos” meaning “stranger” and “phobos” meaning “fear”. Thus the word xenophobia denotes fear and dislike for foreigners (Harris, 2002; Cherry, 2015). It is within this premise that the paper deal with the outbreak of xenophobia in South Africa from a perspective of fear of enterprise supremacy that foreign nationals are claimed to possess over South African Nationals. However as noted before

there is need to provide the contextual root of the application of such a word in the reality of events that take place differently with a distinct impact on society. As such a universal definition would be very skinny to offer a bearable explanation to the phenomenal context and effect of the anti-foreign outbreak in South Africa.

The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) in a joint statement with civil society organisation in 1998 defined xenophobia as the deep dislike of non-nationals by nationals of a recipient (SAHRC, 1998). Valji (2003:1) argued that though such a definition contains international adequacy, lacked complete comprehension of the context of the anti-foreign violence that continued to perpetuate into the democratic regimes of South Africa. In this view the definition used to describe xenophobia in South Africa as an attitude, whereas it is an attitude accompanied by a troop of activity and consequence (Fayomi, Chidozie & Ayo, nd: 1; Valji, 2003). A year before that Harris (2002) has argued that xenophobia is a new pathology for a new South Africa, adding that there is a political value in his framing of xenophobia as pathology even though there is no psychology in such phenomena. In his attempt for conceptualisation of xenophobia departing from defining xenophobia as an attitude, dislike, fear or hatred of foreigners, Harris adds that such attitudes are not adequate to describe the anti-foreign outbreak in South Africa. This position emanates from the fact that such definition does not provide the context of the consequences or complex emergencies arising from such attitudes.

Given these differences in the conceptualisation of xenophobia in South Africa, the reality is that the attitudes of fear, dislike and hatred for non-nationals has had consequence for both migrants and nationals. The context of xenophobia in South Africa has been coupled with violence that had shaped what others marked as crime towards human rights (Harris, 2002; Bakker, 2008; Polzer & Takabwirwa, 2010). Which in real sense brings another context in which xenophobia can be understood in South Africa. The Anti-foreign aggression in South Africa has thus marked a trans-disciplinary phenomena that requires an integrated discourse that is to bring light to society and policy drivers. The spate of violence against foreign nationals and other unrests such as service delivery are argued to root from unemployment and mounting poverty among South Africans at the bottom of the economic ladder (Fayomi et al, nd: 1; Dodson, 2010). These and other social tensions has provoked fear of competition that skilled and unskilled cheap immigrants presents to the South African Markets. This speaks to the failure for South Africa's governance system to organise its society into socio-economic and politically productive society. This in essence become a subject of governance, society, business, sociology and law. Such multiplicity of the context of xenophobia leaves its scholarly discourse to blames and statistics that are forever in

confusion without a clear meaning of the situation. Bellow here are some of the statistical arguments that are used to picture the consequence of xenophobia in South Africa.

It is documented that anti-foreign aggression in the past two decades and a year (not to mean it has not occur before) began on the last week of 1994 transcending to January 1995, when a gang of youthful people in the Alexandra township adjacent to the luxurious Sontdon City near Johannesburg, destroyed the homes and property of suspected undocumented immigrants. This was engaged in a campaign branded “Buyelekhaya” meaning go back home, which blamed foreigners for crime, unemployment and sexual attacks (Wikipedia, nd: 1 Charman & Piper, 2012). In 1998 reportedly a Mozambican and two Senegalese were violently thrown off a moving train. This violence was carried out by a group of people returning from a rally that blamed foreigners for unemployment, crime and spread of AIDS. In 2000 seven foreigners were reported killed on the Cape Flats over a five-week violent period over fear of foreigners who would possible claim property that belonged to local people (Dodson, 2010a). In 2001 the Zandspruit locals gave Zimbabweans ten days to leave their local, alleging that they were employed while locals remained unemployed. These allegation was coupled with other criminal accusations (Bekker, 2010; Polzer & Takabvirwa, 2010). This was a packing of a complex emerging situation that was soon to get off hand, if was not well handled. Indeed less than a decade of time after that South Africa broke into a battle zone, marked by quarrels of over job opportunities and entrepreneurship that lack contextual ability to suit the damage it has caused. However learning from complexity theory this as it is can cause a long-term damage or devastating harm and instability for South Africa and perhaps the continents as a whole. This will not at its mildest form and in its origin leave out the other parts of the world untouched.

In the late 2007 transcending to the early 2008 attacks on non-nationals increased with a remarkable contempt. This has manifested in an eyebrow lifting for both national and international community. This was a calling for South Africa to take conscience and develop remedial action on socio-cultural interactions among Africans (Danson & MacDonald, 2001; Dodson, 2010a; Dodson, 2010b). On the 8th of January 2008 South Africa experience the beginning of the worst when two Somali shop owners where murdered in the Eastern Cape (Jeffreys Bay and East London). In March 2008 seven foreign people were killed and their businesses were set alight in Atteridgeville near Pretoria. Hardly two months after a series of violence outbreak targeting foreign nationals swept across the township of Alexandra, killing two people and injuring 40 others (Landau, Rajasthan-Keogh & Singh, 2005Nyamnjuh, 2010). Many has reported that such violent attackers were singing the “*Umshini Wami*” (*bring my gun*) song, which popularised Zuma’s campaign against the then President Thabo Mbeki. These May 2008 incidents are reportedly to have claimed about 62 lives of which 21

of the killed were South African citizens. In the same year the global community faced economic meltdown. This global economic complexity increased pressures to cut employment and enterprise activity which are some of the hopes to increase opportunities and reduce conflict.

Years gone by and there has been no angelic action to introduce a structural economic revolution, which would integrate youth and economic active South Africans into potential economic avenues. This is going on simultaneously with growing pressure in the African continent which see most of its people leaving their mother lands to seek opportunity and life elsewhere, in which South Africa is the closest and easily accessible (Danso & MacDonald, 2001). This concluded a system that was soon to be staged between chaos, anarchy and high international diplomacy costs. January 2015 marked itself with a spark of violent attacks that swept across all sorts of media with international responses. These responses threatened South Africa's position in the "global Africa" that is based on hegemonic relations with the "global west" (Nyamnjoh, 2010; Francais, 2015). This period truly marked a contextual revolution of xenophobia in South Africa as it brought a tempest of international condemnation, and conceptions. This translated into the context to include terms such as Afro-Phobia, Hatred for Africans (Just to mention the two). This also seen condemnation that contained trans-cultural and social cohesion hypothetical flavours. One remarkable context of these attacks is that there was someone to be associated with the cause. It is alleged that a speech delivered by the Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini has been a root cause of the recent attacks, when he said "foreigners should pack loads and go back to their countries".

3.2 Enterprise Inferiority Complex: Are South Africans Really Entrepreneurially Inferior?

Of all the positions provided one remarkable reasons provided for the attacks is that foreign nationals were taking jobs and other economic exploits (Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 2015; South African History Online, 2015). The focus of this paper was to point out that enterprise skills have a major contribution to the inability of South Africans to be compete foreign nationals in businesses. However there is also other position such as lower price setting by foreign businesses. A lower prise setting strategy has a potential of draining a large share of a market to almost a monopoly. The strategy of setting low prices and focus on a high turnover over a shorter period of time can be profitable and lead to failure of less competitive business which only focus on high prices over a longer periods a time (Charman & Piper, 2012; Francais, 2015; Tshabalala; 2015; Cronin, 2015). However lack of knowledge on how to develop a surviving strategy would lead to an aggressive

reaction over enterprise by locals. This is evident from reports that shows that of the total working population of South Africa 14% are foreign which amounts to 1.2 million of opportunities occupied by non-nationals (Crush & Ramachandran, 2014; BusinessTech, 2015; Tungwarara, 2015). It is also argued that most of the international migrants are self-employed meaning that they occupy business spaces and local markets (SMMEs). There is enough evidence that South African turnover of entrepreneurship index is relatively low as compared to other African countries. Lack of entrepreneurial experience and expertise has provoked fear of enterprising. South Africans find themselves confronted by complexity of national supremacy confronted by enterprise skills and activity inferiority. This has in the view of the essayist has had a contributing effect on xenophobic outbreaks in South Africa.

4. Conclusion

The enterprise inferiority complex context of the anti-foreign aggression that struck South Africa, significantly in 2008 and 2015, is of a complex nature. The position on business tension does not exclude other social, economic and political influencers which form part of the issues relating to the xenophobic contexts that affect South Africa. It is for this reason that culmination of the situation should be from a trans-disciplinary emergencies that help in the conceptualisation of the challenges of society that have contributed to the outbreak. The paper concludes its argument by adding that the recent aggression taking into account the 2008 attacks, are offspring of inability of government system to redress the misfortunes of the apartheid system, which result in an unskilled and jobless society. The racial segregation has created a majority of people from homelands with poor opportunities for development and success avenues. Today the people are fighting not only based on attitude, but faced with a disability to enterprise and poor access to urban market space.

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XENOPHOBIA: AN INSIGNIA OF WEAKNESS IN AGENT'S PROVISION OF BASIC SERVICES TO THE PRINCIPAL

N.K. Motubatse

Tshwane University of Technology

C.C. Ngwakwe

M.P. Sebola

University of Limpopo

Abstract

Reliant on the premise where municipal officials are agents and citizens are the principals, this paper argues that the failure of agents to fulfil their fiduciary responsibilities prejudice the interest and expectations of the principals and hence the principals may express dissatisfaction in various ways including displaced aggression against immigrants who may want to use the insufficient services. Using a combination of conceptual review and quantitative analysis, the paper applies the agency theory to discuss how the principal-agent relationship is applicable in the public sector provision of basic services to offer further understanding of xenophobia. It also uses basic service data from the Statistics South Africa to show how the agents' responsibility of basic service provision has weakened and hence failed to meet the expectations of the principals. Applying a t-test for means between the agents' expectation of basic service delivery and actual provision of services, the analysis shows a significant weakness in agents' provision of the principals' expectations of basic services. Drawing from the agency theory and eco-system pressure for meagre resources, the paper concludes that the reaction of the citizenry may be analogous to natural involuntary reaction in the eco-system due to insufficient resources that cause pressure and competition and hence survival of the fittest. The paper recommends that curbing feature reoccurrence of xenophobia will inter alia depend on the ability of the agents in providing sufficient basic services to the principals; achieving this would require improved accountability and transparency from the agents.

Keywords: Principal-agency relationship, Accountability, Local government, Eco-system, Competition, Xenophobia, Basic services

1. Introduction

The role of the agents in the local governments is to look after the social needs of communities and to provide a sustainable service delivery. Various strategies have been advanced to strengthen the agency relationship and services to the principal; however, it does appear that avarice and the undermining of the rules of law by the public agents defeat the protection of principals' interest. This paper argues that a somewhat obscured cause of xenophobia amongst others seem to emanate from apparent competition for basic resources (Daily Maverick, 2015), which, are poorly provided (Seedat et al. (2009) by the agents. The Home Affairs is quoted as recognising the competitive tendencies between the citizens and refugees on scarce resources (see e.g. Palmay, 2002: 4). The citizens may be irritated that the little basic services are not enough, let alone sharing with immigrants, hence *"they are accused of..... sponging off basic government services like electricity, running water and*

healthcare" (Ajazeera, 2015: 1). Whilst it is believed that the spirit of goodwill kindles empathy for immigrants, but a lingering unanswered question is whether the needy can afford to feed another needy. It is in the context of a South African citizen being in dire need of insufficient basic services that this paper reasons that xenophobia could arise from the failure of fiduciary responsibility of municipalities in the provision of basic services. The paper draws inferences from agency theory and eco-system pressure for meagre resources and argues that the reaction of the citizenry may be analogous to natural involuntary reaction in the eco-system due to insufficient resources that cause pressure and competition and hence survival of the fittest. Thus given the insufficient provision of basic services, which arise from apparent weakening of agents' fiduciary responsibility, there should be a moderation to apparent sweeping xenophobia blames on the principals. Instead, a balanced view that recognise agents' fiduciary failure as causing pressure and competition in the ecosystem and hence conflict would allow a improved reflection and plan for a lasting solution to curbing xenophobia.

Accordingly, the objective of this paper is to discuss how xenophobia may be linked to a weakening of municipalities (agents in this paper) in the provision of basic services to citizens (principals) and to use this to assuage prevalent sweeping blame on citizens. Therefore, the question that underpins this paper is how the principal-agent relationship may be linked to xenophobia and how this may assuage a sweeping blame on citizens. This paper is organized as follows: after this introduction, the next section uses the principal-agent relationship to discuss how municipalities may be seen as the peoples' (principals) agent. This is followed by the method and analysis section. The next section presents discussion and conclusion.

2. Principal-agency Relationship and the Local Government

Much has been written about the principal and agent relationship as a means to explain agency theory (Zu and Kaynak, 2011; Hannafey and Vitulano, 2012; Mahaney and Lederer, 2011; Lopes, 2012; Basau and Lederer, 2011). Much of the literature about the agency relationship alludes to how the principal-agent relationship may offer services to reduce agency problems. Such problems among others include poor service delivery in the local government. Thus far, literature evidence suggests that the agency relationship between the principals and agents in the South African local governments is weak due to the declining level of basic service delivery. Similar to other countries, local governments in South Africa are mandated to enhance service delivery (Republic of South Africa, 1996). Local governments are therefore regarded as crucial vehicles for delivering basic services (Hefetz, Warner and Vigoda-Gadot, 2015; Soublière and Cloutier, 2015) and to enhance community standards of living (Marques, Kortt and Dollery, 2015). Notwithstanding the trust, some local governments underspent their basic service budgetary allocations, which should be used to provide services and this is often returned to the National Revenue Fund unutilised (National Treasury, 2015).

Agency theory was first conceptualised as the relationship between the principals and agents (Droege & Spiller, 2009; Segal & Lehrer, 2012; Mitchell & Meacham, 2011). Thus the principal-agent relationship is perceived as a contract in which the agent is employed by the principal to provide some services (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However whether the agent may have the interest of the principal at heart and provide relevant services has been

a source of contestation in the literature. Caers, Du Bois, Jegers, De Gieter, Schepers and Pepermans (2006) argue that in the absence of proper control, there is the likelihood that the principals' interest may not receive desirable protection by the agents who may prefer satisfying their self-interests.

Hence, agency theory proposes that the survival of any organisation depends not only on the principal-agent relationships, but also on the assumptions that relevant information is available (Droege and Spiller, 2009). For communities to stay informed about the state of service due to them (Hilvert and Swindell, 2013), the agents must champion timely delivery of agency information (Brown, Evans and Moser, 2009) to offer the principals with complete understanding about processes that affect delivery of services to the principals. Therefore, the agents have an obligation to fulfil the expectations of the local communities. However, some agents may become opportunistic and think about their interests over the principals (citizens) interests (Segal and Lehrer, 2012). Within the agency relationship, local governments can respond to community expectations in which municipalities can increase their public trust through formal reporting, for instance the evaluation of problems affecting the progression to clean audits is a vital tool to monitor the activities and performance of local governments in the provision of services (Cohen and Leventis, 2013). Within the context of public trust, Koma (2010) affirms that audit in the municipalities should be seen as a key element to increase the confidence of the communities (Cohen and Leventis, 2013).

Since therefore the agents (municipalities) are expected to provide services to the principals (citizens), failure to deliver this fiduciary responsibility may have the tendency to cause strife (Akinboade et al. 2014), which could manifest in ugly incidents such as xenophobia (Gordon, 2015). This manifestation may not be voluntary per say, but could arise due to stiff completion for meagre services from the agents as applicable in every habitat within the ecosystem. This paper therefore suggests that given current trajectory of declining basic service delivery in South Africa (Alexander, 2010), it is apparent that the agents (municipalities) are failing in their contractual relationship with the principal (Atkinson, 2007). This should mean that service delivery related conflicts might not be sweepingly blamed on the principals (citizens); the agents should be apportioned greater blame for falling in their fiduciary roles and for planting the root of service delivery conflicts. The next section uses data from the Statistics South Africa to analyse basic service expectations from municipalities and the actual delivery of services. It also compares the level of basic services delivery in 2013 against the level of free basic services offered in the 2014 to ascertain if there is an occurrence of a dwindling trajectory.

3. Method and Analysis

This paper combined the conceptual approach with quantitative analysis to shed light on the need to balance the blame of xenophobia in South Africa. The preceding section discussed how the principal-agent relationship might be applicable to the citizens and the municipalities. This section adds support with an analysis of statistical t-test of difference in means between the number of municipalities required to provide basic services to the citizens and the number that delivered the basic services as expected. Analysis of difference in means is also conducted on the provision of free basic services between 2013 and 2014 to ascertain if any decline in the provision of free basic services has occurred. The t-tests are subsequently supported with bar charts for easy depiction of the differences.

1.1 t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means between number of municipalities and number that provided basic service

Table 1 Number of municipalities in each province that provide basic services: 2013 and 2014

Province	Number of municipalities		Water		Electricity		Sewerage and sanitation		Solid waste management	
	2013	2014	2013*	2014	2013*	2014	2013*	2014	2013*	2014
Western Cape	30	30	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26
Eastern Cape	45	45	23	23	31	31	23	23	39	39
Northern Cape	32	32	27	27	25	25	27	27	27	27
Free State	24	24	20	20	18	18	20	20	20	20
KwaZulu-Natal	61	61	15	15	27	27	15	15	46	47
North West	23	23	18	18	14	14	18	18	16	17
Gauteng	12	12	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Mpumalanga	21	21	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Limpopo	30	30	11	11	17	17	11	11	24	24
South Africa	278	278	168	168	186	186	168	168	226	228

Source: Statistics South Africa (2015) Non-financial census of municipalities for the year ended 30 June 2014, available at:

<http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P9115/P9115June2014.pdf>

Table 2 t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means between number of municipalities and number that provided basic water service

	<i>No. of Municipalities</i>	<i>No. that Provided water</i>
Mean	55.6	33.6
Variance	6292.266667	2262.488889
Observations	10	10
Pearson Correlation	0.981760277	
Hypothesized Mean Difference	0	
df	9	
t Stat	2.054888534	
P(T<=t) one-tail	0.035028692	
t Critical one-tail	1.833112933	
P(T<=t) two-tail	0.070057384	
t Critical two-tail	2.262157163	

Figure 1 Means between number of municipalities and number that provided basic water service




Table 3 t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means between number of municipalities and number that provided basic electricity service

	<i>NoMunic</i>	<i>No that provided electricity</i>
Mean	55.6	37.2
Variance	6292.266667	2775.733333
Observations	10	10
Pearson Correlation	0.994577975	
Hypothesized	Mean	
Difference	0	
df	9	
t Stat	2.117695541	
P(T<=t) one-tail	0.031637007	
t Critical one-tail	1.833112933	
P(T<=t) two-tail	0.063274014	
t Critical two-tail	2.262157163	

Figure 2 Means between number of municipalities and number that provided basic electricity service





Table 4 t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means between number of municipalities and number that provided basic sewerage&sanitation service

	<i>No Municipalities</i>	<i>No that provided sewerage & sanitation</i>
Mean	55.6	33.6
Variance	6292.266667	2262.488889
Observations	10	10
Pearson Correlation	0.981760277	
Hypothesized Mean Difference	0	
df	9	
t Stat	2.054888534	
P(T<=t) one-tail	0.035028692	
t Critical one-tail	1.833112933	
P(T<=t) two-tail	0.070057384	
t Critical two-tail	2.262157163	

Figure 3 Means between number of municipalities and number that provided basic sewerage & sanitation service



3.2 Provision of Free Basic Services – T-test of Mean Difference Between 2013 & 2014

Table 5 Table t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Difference in the Provision of Free Basic Water Service in South Africa Between 2013 & 2014

	<i>2013</i>	<i>2014</i>
Mean	43.57	37.66
Variance	230.2912222	237.9048889
Observations	10	10
Pearson Correlation	0.93083849	
Hypothesized Mean Difference	0	
df	9	
t Stat	3.281370275	
P(T<=t) one-tail	0.004754221	
t Critical one-tail	1.833112933	
P(T<=t) two-tail	0.009508441	
t Critical two-tail	2.262157163	

Figure 4 Mean difference in provision of free basic water services in SA between 2013&2014




Table 6 t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Difference in the Provision Free Basic electricity Service in South Africa Between 2013 & 2014

	2013	2014
Mean	25.27	22.98
Variance	104.4223333	76.83288889
Observations	10	10
Pearson Correlation	0.882402816	
Hypothesized Mean Difference	0	
df	9	
t Stat	1.504146773	
P(T<=t) one-tail	0.083399516	
t Critical one-tail	1.833112933	
P(T<=t) two-tail	0.166799032	
t Critical two-tail	2.262157163	

Figure 5 Mean difference in provision of free basic electricity services in SA between 2013 & 2014





Table 7 t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Difference in the Provision Free Basic Sewerage&Sanitation Service in South Africa Between 2013 & 2014

	2013	2014
Mean	29.81	29.01
Variance	294.8965556	277.9321111
Observations	10	10
Pearson Correlation	0.992897869	
Hypothesized Mean Difference	0	
df	9	
t Stat	1.217474416	
P(T<=t) one-tail	0.127190545	
t Critical one-tail	1.833112933	
P(T<=t) two-tail	0.25438109	
t Critical two-tail	2.262157163	

Figure 6 Mean difference in provision of free basic sewerage&sanitation services in SA between 2013&2014



4. Discussion

The above analysis advances support to the conceptual conjecture that basic service decline in South Africa might trigger strife including xenophobia. The first section of the statistical t-test shows a significant lower delivery of basic services against expectations. It can be seen from Figures 1 – 3 that in 2014, the number of municipalities which delivered basic services (water, electricity, sewerage and sanitation) were lower than anticipated. Similarly, Figures 4 – 6 show that the beneficiaries of free basic services (water, electricity, sewerage and sanitation) in 2014 declined from the 2013 beneficiaries of free basic services. It is therefore imaginable that citizens struggled to cope with the limited supply of basic services in 2014. No doubt, the competition for the limited basic services between citizens and immigrants may have mounted pressure that apparently culminated to the outburst of strife in early 2015 that eventually resulted in xenophobic attacks.

Given the above results which point to weakening provision of basic services by the agents to the principals, this paper therefore argue that rather than sprinkling a sweeping

blame on citizens, it is imperative to think inwards and relate xenophobia to natural ecological and entomological traits inherent in every living creature of which humans are one. Competition for meagre resources have been well expounded in ecology and entomology (Prinzing, 2014; Moseley, 2014), and competition may be overt or covert (Sahney, 2010), xenophobia in South Africa is an apparent case of covert competition for meagre basic services; it is a natural and or involuntary ecological system response that can be rectified with improved provision of services. Natural ecosystem competition for resources has been reported as causative factor for predation. Analogously, since humans cannot prey on each other, one can expect that competition for little basic services may cause an involuntary response that result in conflict, physical attack and at times fatality.

Accordingly from the preceding statistical analysis and discussions that follow, it seems that an obscure incubator of xenophobia may likely emanate from apparent competition for basic resources (Daily Maverick, 2015), which, are poorly provided (Seedat et al. 2009). The Home Affairs was in the past, quoted as recognising the competitive tendencies between locals and refugees on scarce resources (see e.g. Palmay, 2002:4). It is natural for citizens to be irritated admits little basic services that are not enough, let alone sharing with immigrants, hence *“they are accused of sponging off basic government services like electricity, running water and healthcare”* (Ajazeera, 2015: 1). Indeed, it is often said that the spirit of goodwill creates empathy for refugees, but a lingering unanswered question is whether the needy can afford to feed another needy. It is in the context of a South African citizens being in need for inadequate provision of basic services that this paper reasons that xenophobia is a failure of fiduciary responsibility of municipalities in the provision of basic services.

5. Conclusion

This paper applies the principal-agent relationship to argue that the municipalities are agents of the citizens and that the citizens are the principals. Inclining on this premise, the paper reasons that the failure of municipalities (agents) in fulfilling their fiduciary responsibilities would prejudice the interest and expectations of the principals and hence the principals may express dissatisfaction using various means including misplaced aggression against foreigners who may want to use the meagre services. Using a combination of conceptual review and quantitative analysis, the paper uses the agency theory to discuss how the principal-agent relationship is applicable in the public sector. It also uses basic service data from the Statistics South Africa to demonstrate how the agents' responsibility of basic service provision has weakened and hence failed to meet the expectations of the principals. Applying a t-test for means between the agents' expectation of basic services and actual provision of services, the analysis show a significant weakness in agents' provision of the principals' expectations. Drawing from the agency theory and eco-system pressure for meagre resources, the paper concludes that the reaction of the citizenry may be analogous to natural involuntary reaction in the eco-system due to insufficient resources causing pressure and competition and hence survival of the fittest. This paper recommends that municipalities may prevent future reoccurrence of xenophobia by putting effective machinery that will spur effective provision of sufficient basic services to the agents (citizens); however, pragmatic actualisation of this goal would require improved public sector accountability and transparency from the agents.

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AN ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION ON LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

A.P. Tsanwani

University of Limpopo, South Africa

Abstract

Immigration is a complex phenomenon which constitutes a wide array of relocation circumstances. People have been on the move since the first ancestral humans strode out and inside Africa and other continents. Historically, capitalist development in South Africa was based on migrant labour from South and Southern Africa. The movement of people, often caused by globalisation, follows the movement of capital. Immigration may be due to escape from authoritarian regimes, lack of services in areas of social welfare, education and health care in their countries. Globally, people are leaving their countries in search for peace and safety as well as educational and economic opportunities. With the rise of terrorism worldwide, another major concern is the national security of nations that let people cross their borders. This concern often leads to intrusive security searches and tighter visa requirements which can discourage immigration, temporary visitors and even movement of people between countries. Some immigrants may leave their home countries to settle elsewhere permanently. Labour migrants travel abroad to seek work with the hope of someday returning home. Refugees are always afraid of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion and they also seek safety. Since the dawn of democracy in South Africa in 1994, the influx of immigrants has grown rapidly. Using archives and secondary data, the paper aims at determining the reasons behind the huge influx of immigrants in South Africa. The paper also aims to explore the effects of immigration on Local Economic Development and how xenophobia can negatively impact it (Local Economic Development). The paper will propose the measures to effectively regulate immigration in South Africa.

Keywords: Globalisation; Immigration; Xenophobia; Local Economic Development; Socio economic development.

1. Introduction

According to Solomon (1996), world-wide, one in every one hundred and fourteen people is displaced today. Two in almost every world capital population movements are viewed with alarm. In Paris, Bonn, Bern, Vienna and Brussels the large refugee/illegal migrant influx from Eastern Europe and the Third World is cause for great concern. In Washington, DC, there is disquiet over Haitian, Chinese and Cuban boat people. In Japan,

the key concerns revolve around the illegal influx from China and Southeast Asia. These concerns are not only confined to developed countries: in Islamabad, the Pakistani government is desperately seeking ways to induce Afghan refugees to return home. India, meanwhile, is burdened by the growing numbers of undocumented Bangladeshis in Assam and Delhi; while Dhaka is concerned that India may expel them. The Thai government is concerned with the illegal influx of hundreds of thousands of Burmese. The Egyptian government fears that UN sanctions against Libya will lead to the expulsion of thousands of Egyptian migrant workers from Libya.

Solomon (1996) further alluded that meanwhile, on the rest of the continent of Africa, numerous countries have been overwhelmed with the influx of refugees from Rwanda, Angola, Liberia, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan. The growing demand for skilled labour and entrepreneurs will only heighten the country's reliance on people born and educated outside the borders. South Africa has made commitments to all who live in the country, regardless of citizenship, nationality, country of birth.

In keeping with the international trend of growing migration, the country of South Africa has become a magnet for people from other provinces, the African continent and the four corners of the world. As it considers plans for institutional reform and policy, there are strong reasons for including the rights of foreigners among the country's priorities (Landau, Ramjathan-Keogh, and Singh 2005). Immigrants are net contributors not parasites as they draw comparatively less on social welfare and other social services. Many immigrants pay tax and through their entrepreneurship, make a positive injection into local economic development. Facilitating the entry of immigrants into the formal economy and access to formal financial services will both provide added protection and allow the government to tax and regulate their activities. Accepting that migration and economic integration are linked, the promotion of NEPAD (New Partnership for African Development) and similar regional projects will likely increase the numbers of non-nationals living in South Africa and the number of South African living outside the country. This will require a harmonisation of immigration procedures, and easing the movement of people across borders.

2. Immigration policy in South Africa

Ballantine (2012) defines an immigration policy as any policy of a state that deals with the transit of persons across its borders into the country, but especially those that intend to work and stay in the country. Immigration policies can range from allowing no migration at all to allowing most types of migration, such as free immigration. Often, racial or religious bias is tied to immigration policy (for example, a country might only allow commonwealth citizens admission). Ballantine (2012) further states that an important aspect of immigration

policy is the treatment of refugees, more or helpless or stateless people who throw themselves on the mercy of the state they enter, seeking refuge from poor treatment in their country of origin. With the rise of terrorism worldwide, another major concern is the national security of nations that let people cross borders. The belief is that terrorists can come from overseas. There is often pressure on nations to loosen immigration policy or inspections to enable tourism and relocation of businesses to a country, from a destabilized region.

According to McConnel (2009), following South Africa's democratic transition, the Refugee Act took four years to draft and, after eight years of negotiations, the Immigration Act was created. However, the Act was only implemented in 2005. The reasons why it took so long to replace the apartheid regime's Aliens Control Act are that after apartheid's isolation, the idea of migration created a panic in nationals and immigration was seen as undesirable, migration was not considered an opportunity for development but rather an issue of control and exclusion, and lastly, internal politics between the African National Congress and Inkatha Freedom Party significantly delayed any progress. While the Act attempts to be migrant-friendly, it is considered extremely limited and ambiguous. It does very little to support the poor, and the emphasis is almost exclusively focused on attracting highly skilled migrants. The Act suggests that it is committed to rooting out xenophobia in society, but it gives no practical steps on how this will be achieved. In fact the tougher enforcement and community policing of undocumented workers has actually increased xenophobia at the community level. Furthermore, the Act has driven labour migration further underground, leading to unclear statistics especially on undocumented foreigners.

Unregulated human mobility is a threat to the citizenry's economic and physical well-being, an individual's immutable geographic or cultural point of origin continues to determine insider or outsider status (Cornelissen, Cheru, & Shaw 2011). However, policy intent can be undermined by leaks elsewhere, such as corruption in the Department of Home Affairs, lax border control and ad hoc policies. No migration policy or strategy aimed at alleviating xenophobic tensions can be contemplated if the national borders are porous and people can come and go as they please. Such a lack of control leads to abuse and corruption and heightens the vulnerability of people who reside in the country illegally.

3. Reasons for huge influx of immigration in South Africa

In spite of problems of unemployment rate of 23 percent, food prices that have risen sharply and a crime rate that is among the highest in the world, South Africa still remains a magnet that draws a continuing stream of job seekers, and many of these job seekers, or so called economic refugees, often enter the country illegally (Lubbe, 2008). There are large numbers of African immigrants in South Africa. Icelandic human rights resource centre

report (2009) indicates that traditionally, poverty and the inability to earn a decent living are major reasons behind migration from one country to another, as well as war, civil strife, insecurity and persecution arising from discrimination. People come to South Africa in search of better life since there are failed states in Africa that are imploding and falling apart. African immigrants of the failed states come to South Africa being attracted by the stability of the country.

Mcconnel (2009) asserts that South Africa is considered a major foreign migrant receiving country in the region, hosting over five million visitors per year. Department of Home Affairs figures show that between 1990 and 2002 nearly 1.7 million African migrants were deported from South Africa, with total number doubling between 1994 and 1999 from around 90,000 to over 182, 000 per annum. The country is not only facing an influx of illegal immigrants from the region, but also from countries as far as Nigeria, Algeria, Asia and Eastern Europe. In Africa the process of decolonisation contributed to patterns of capital accumulation that have increased African economic dependence on advanced capitalist countries, and increasing impoverishment. South Africa has become Africa's dominant power.

According to Solomon (1996), one of the causes of migration is Economic factor, within Southern Africa; economic variables also play a role in the migration of people from countries such as Mozambique, Lesotho, Angola, and Zimbabwe, to countries such as South Africa, Botswana and Namibia. South Africa, particularly, serves as a magnet to those seeking employment, a higher living standard and brighter economic prospects. The size of the South African economy makes the allure of the country almost overwhelming to many in the region. This relates partially to another legacy of South African history. The discovery of diamonds in the Orange Free State in the 1860s and the subsequent discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand in 1886 gave rise to massive population movements in nineteenth century Southern Africa.

Solomon (1996) further states that the demands of the mining industry resulted in the creation of the migrant contract labour system which criss-crossed the whole of Southern Africa. Neighbouring states became labour reservoirs to feed the hungry demands of South African mining magnates for cheap, unskilled black labour. Increasingly, the economies of South Africa's neighbours became dependent on the migrant contract labour system for foreign exchange. For instance, a survey in 1991 illustrated that almost forty per cent of rural households in Lesotho were dependent on the remittances of migrants working on the mines of the Witwatersrand. However, the latter half of the twentieth century has seen some significant changes in the South African economy. These changes have included an

emphasis on the recruitment of skilled labour and the expulsion and reduced employment of unskilled labour. According to Solomon (1997), in 1991, nearly 200 Zimbabwean doctors settled in South Africa. Therefore, skilled labour and passionate entrepreneurs can add the intellectual and physical juice to an already sluggish economy. Opportunities for trade, selling of expert knowledge, study and visits do bring people from other countries to South Africa.

4. The effects of illegal migration in South African local economic development

There are good reasons why immigration policy in South Africa should be well regulated. The country has a high unemployment rate, even at international levels and there is a history of racialised labour preference that needs to be corrected through affirmative action and other empowerment instrument. The costs of hosting mass immigrants are very high. Hence it can be posited that the large concentration of illegal immigrants in the country, places an inordinate burden on the state, decreasing its capacity to deliver impoverished South Africans from their misery. In other words, the presence of illegal aliens has an adverse effect on the capacity of Local Economic Development programmes to improve the lot of ordinary South Africans. This is made clear by the strain illegal immigrants place on the health services of this country. For example, clinics and hospitals all over South Africa which have been established to serve the needs of South African citizens are overstretched due to the demands placed on them by thousands of illegal immigrants residing in the areas.

Solomon (1996) asserts that since aliens are mostly destitute or come from strife-ravaged areas, they usually need much more attention than local people. This care comes at the expense of South Africa's own citizens and it is also a disturbing fact that illegal immigrants bring with them diseases with epidemic potential, which can be attributed to poverty. The vast majority of these illegal immigrants arrive in poor health and are severely malnourished. Their malnourished bodies have little resistance to illness and disease. Thus aliens are excessively susceptible to diseases such as yellow fever, cholera, tuberculosis and AIDS. On the other hand, state resources which would have been utilised for the local development have to be channelled into the security apparatus of the state. The increasing influx of illegal immigrants also contributes to unlawful squatting in South Africa. Most aliens arrive in South Africa destitute, jobless and homeless. The result is that the vast majority find their way to squatter areas. It is estimated that eighty per cent of illegal aliens reside in informal housing settlements and squatter camps. Illegal immigrants also have a negative impact on the domestic labour market. They generally active in the following economic sectors; agriculture, hotel and restaurant, construction, domestic and informal trading.

5. Impact of immigration in local economic development

Human mobility feed the economy and influence development in the country. The development targets cannot be met without significant migration of skilled and semi-skilled labour. Immigration is a delicate issue, but can produce considerable benefits for the country's development if well managed. According to Banning, Sepulveda, Gudmundsdottir & Chamoun (2004), people have been leaving their homelands in search of work elsewhere. Mobility of labour has been the foundation for economic development in many societies and has contributed to growth and prosperity in both host and source countries. Migrant workers play a vital role in the global economy, and today, one human being out of thirty-five is an international migrant.

According to Lehulere (2008), under globalisation a rapid unification and integration of the capitalist world market takes place. Globalisation causes the collapse of local economies, economic stagnation and a surplus population. This results in the transfer of wealth, the movement of capital from poorer to richer regions; and this systematic impoverishment is the important imperative for the migration of people from poorer to richer regions. Hence the movement of people follows the movement of capital, and this generally affects all social classes. Immigrants bring in capital and goods, and some of them create jobs for local South Africans. In many communities in South Africa, particularly in townships close to the major industrial centres, the immigrant communities have become a formidable if not dominant feature of the local petty trade.

Immigrant traders in many instances in South Africa have replaced local small businesses that have gone under. They have introduced new product lines, they have different business models that locals do not want to adopt, like going door to door, carrying bags of blankets and selling on credit. Many traders from the immigrant communities bring with them a rich trading experience, having operated under very difficult conditions in their own countries for long periods. Many of these traders have had to deal with the impact of structural adjustment programmes and the collapse of local economies brought about by wars and other socio-economic disasters. The immigrant traders sometimes bring with them supply lines that South African traders do not have access to.

According to the research conducted by Mcconnel (2009) the foreign national businesses contribute to almost 25% of the domestic product (GDP) in South Africa. Immigration stimulates job creation. As industries expand and hire new workers, jobs are created to maintain this larger work force and to supply its needs for goods and services. Without new, young workers, certain sectors of the economy will continue to contract. The negative impact of immigration is that uneven migration into an informal settlement that is

inadequately resourced for the existing local community can exacerbate and further strain immediate local resources. Benefits may be accrued by the employers in the area but may not translate, in the short term, into benefits for the local community that hosts the migrant population.

6. Impact of xenophobia in local economic development

Mertens (2014) asserts that an atmosphere of hostility can shape the cultural discourse on immigration and can have detrimental effects on those who are the target of prejudice towards immigrants. Immigrants are likely to be portrayed in very stereotypical way. Contradictory perceptions held by native born individuals often leave immigrants at impossible crossroads of expectations. Xenophobic attacks are barriers or obstacles to achieving peace in the world. It weakens the economy of the country as investors backed away from the currency, fearing the xenophobic attacks could hurt the economy. The xenophobic attacks against migrant workers in South Africa have inevitable negating impact on sporting activities as many foreigners around the world may not travel to the country being afraid of their lives.

Illesanmi (2011) alludes that nations that have been brought into greater contact with South Africa as a result of the positive impact of globalisation are now being threatened to either reconsider the degree of their ties or withdraw their association with her because of the xenophobic attacks and other violence against their nationals residing in the country. This implies that the cooperation in terms of global connectedness associated with economic globalisation and ecological interdependence between South Africa and other African States and the rest of the world may be withdrawn or threatened by the xenophobic attacks and anti-immigrants feelings currently pervading the country. There are foreigners whose shops were looted, and attacked immigrants in general, were forced to relocate to police stations across the country. Because of these incidents the governments of other countries were forced to repatriate their nationals and they also announce that they could evacuate their citizens. The repatriation of nationals has an adverse effect on local economic development.

According to Oloyede (2009), the reality of the implication of xenophobia is very high for South Africa. A few days after the attacks became known to the world, conference organisers from outside the country started asking questions relating to the safety, considering cancellations of events ranging from 10 to 1,000 delegations at a time which they had previously booked for South Africa. This caused stakeholders in the South African tourism industry to quickly meet and jointly denounce the attacks and discuss the way forward. A decline in South Africa's tourism reality and potentials is better imagined than experienced. Patel (2012) asserts that tourism, which is currently one of the biggest growth

industries in South Africa should be promoted for local economic development. This includes developing local tourist sites and facilities, improving security and ensuring that all residents are welcoming of tourists. Migration can benefit both receiving and origin countries. Receiving countries can benefit from some form of brain gain, however, receiving countries may experience pressure on existing resources while countries of origin may experience brain drain. The presence of immigrants in South Africa ensures a counter-trade, as more goods from the country now flow to the rest of the continents, and it also enhance integration in a globalised economy.

7. Conclusion

Migration has become an all-pervasive phenomenon that has also affected the perceptions and increasing aspirations of most people. Migration has enabled households to invest in housing, agriculture, private enterprises and the education of male and female children. The relatively high and stable remittance income improves living standards of households. This generally seems to confirm the hypotheses of the new economics of labour migration. Through household relocation and increasingly urban-based real estate and business investments, international migrant households simultaneously capitalize on, and actively contribute to the accelerated urban growth and concentration of economic activities in urban centres mostly located inside or nearby migrant-sending areas.

South Africa is both a sending and receiving country of migrants. Circular regional migration is a significant factor to consider as international migration and remittances have stimulated social and economic development in many migrant-sending regions. This impact is fundamentally heterogeneous across space and time, as well as across socio-ethnic and gender groups. If migrants are moving to South Africa to seek out a better life, yet contribute to the economy and remain connected to their home country, therefore, appropriate policies should allow the sending country, the receiving country and the migrant benefit reciprocally. On the other hand, instead of a more or less predetermined impact, migration and remittances give migrants and their households the freedom to retreat from, just as much as to invest in local economic activities.

Local community forums should be established and supported by the government. Non- South African citizens need to be encouraged to participate in these forums and all police and immigration officials should be trained on the rights of non-South Africans. Any official who fails to carry out the duties in accordance to the mandate should be hold accountable and effective implementation and enforcement of immigration laws to ensure the protection of non-South Africans should be ensured. The government need to tighten

and more effectively patrol and control the country's borders with neighbouring states for the proper management of immigration.

National Preventive Mechanism should be created to ensure the elimination of discrimination against non- nationals. Local Economic Development programmes such as investment programmes, educational schemes should be put in place. Socio-economic and political conditions in neighbouring states should be stabilised. Business partnerships between foreigners and locals should be encouraged. The foreign shopkeepers should be able to employ locals and engage in capacity-building activities with and for locals. South Africa should always be open for business and remains safe to visit. Skills development programmes for South Africans should be created.

South Africa should also focus on developing and training of locals in sustainable productive activities not only in towns but in rural areas and issues of migration. Migrants should also receive training and education around re-integration. A distinction needs to be made between refugees, asylum seekers and socio-economic migrants. An education module needs to be included in the curriculum that reflects the ethos of the constitution and the human rights charter of South Africa. Foreigners should be encouraged to bring their skills to South Africa. A survey of South African companies is needed around the hiring of foreign nationals with a view to making policy recommendations.

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POST-APARTHEID GOVERNANCE: MEASURING THE INCEDENCE OF URBAN POVERTY IN POLOKWANE CITY

E.M. Mutyeniyoka

University of Limpopo, South Africa

Abstract

This contribution is motivated by the acknowledgement that the scourging incidence of urban poverty in post-apartheid cities aggravates deep entrenched complexities in the conceptualization, quantification and design of concerted interventionist anti-poverty action. The effectiveness of interventionist strategies aimed at ameliorating urban ills is rooted to the ability to adequately, exhaustively and dynamically measure the dimensions and incidence of the plights. With surveys showing that low income households are more vulnerable to urban poverty and that lack of income is more closely correlated to the causes and indicators of poverty, money-metrics earned acceptability as the proxy for welfare. However, there has been widespread criticism about income-based approaches glossing over other indicators which do not necessarily require physical resources to attain a certain standard of living and failure to account for the fluctuation of, especially private and informal income. It is this, invariably prevailing conformist dependency on monetary approaches, regardless of their explicit shortfalls, which prompts the need to theoretically investigate the adequacy of an income-based approach as a principal and often isolated measurement of the incidence of urban poverty in the capital city of the poorest province in South Africa - Polokwane City. This contribution concludes that that income based approaches should be treated as complementary rather than superior to other tools if social, political, environmental and economic dimensions of urban poverty are to be exhaustively accounted and planned for.

Keywords: Urban Poverty, Income-Based Approach, Social Security, South African Governance.

1. Introduction

A combination of rising food prices and accommodation, poverty wages, poor service delivery, reduced public expenditure, redundant formal labour, crime and rampant urbanization collectively compound the scourge of urban poverty in post-apartheid cities (Alem, 2015). The incidence of urban poverty in these cities aggravates deep entrenched complexities in the conceptualisation, quantification and design of concerted interventionist anti-poverty action. The effectiveness of interventionist strategies aimed at ameliorating these and other urban ills is rooted to the ability to adequately, exhaustively and dynamically

measure the dimensions and incidence of urban poverty, especially because the robustness of anti-poverty policies remain diluted by the enduring footprints of ‘separate development’ approach overlapping from the preceding apartheid government (Beall, Crankshaw & Parnell, 2013). With surveys showing that low income households are more vulnerable to urban plights and that lack of income is more closely correlated to the causes and indicators of poverty, income has substantially earned acceptability as the proxy for welfare (Pan & Yang 2011; Cheng, 2014). Subsequently, money-metrics (income-based poverty lines and consumption thresholds) have been conventionally principal measurement tools. However, there has been widespread criticism about income-based approaches glossing over other indicators which do not necessarily require physical resources to attain a certain standard of living (education, social capital, rights, health and security) (Chen & Wang, 2001; Taft, 2013).

It is this invariably prevailing conformist dependency on monetary approaches, regardless of their explicit shortfalls, which prompts the need to test the adequacy of an income-based approach as a principal and often isolated measurement of the incidence of urban poverty in Polokwane City. Based on the assumption that an income-based approach alone, fails to capture all diversities and dimensions of urban poverty in cities, this contribution uses a blend of the 2010 Socio-Economic Impact Assessment Study of the Integrated Development Planning in the Capricorn District Municipality (approved as official data by Statistics South Africa), the Census 2011 and literature review to argue that income based approaches should be treated as complementary rather than superior to other tools if social, political, environmental and economic dimensions of urban poverty are to be exhaustively accounted for.

2. Urban Poverty in Polokwane City

Whilst the incidence of poverty in post-apartheid South Africa gradually became identical between rural and urban contexts, there remain economic, social and environmental plights which are uniquely endured by post-apartheid urbanites (Amis, 1995). Particularly, today’s urbanites are victims to high dependence on income wages (which have consistently nosedived), surging unemployment and spatially spread service delivery backlogs (‘separate development’). Moreover, despite early post-apartheid interventionist efforts being inclined towards the rural poor in former Bantustans, dysfunctional rural economies saw the continuation of the migrant labour system, in a more liberal manner, consequently migrating poverty into urban cores.

Polokwane City is under the Polokwane Local Municipality in the Capricorn District Municipality. A considerably high population of close to 600 000 comprises of a cocktail of

tribes, most dominantly the Pedi, a shrinking white community and rampant influx of ultra - poor migrants, mostly from the bordering Zimbabwe and Mozambique and the northern refugees (Somalians and Ethiopians). Statistics South Africa (2014) reports the Limpopo Province to be the lowest contributor to the Gross National Product (GDP) at 7.2%, second highest unemployment rate estimated at 35% (youth unemployment rate of 44.4%), highest poverty incidence with 70% living under the \$1/day poverty line, and a sorry HIV infection rate around 22%, illiteracy rate at 24% and Social Support Grants cover over 60%. This poverty profiles has been robustly linked to economic frustrations which manifest in the “not-so-recent” xenophobic attacks across the country (Bond, Ngwane and Amisi, 2015). Whilst this poverty profile aggregates the entire provincial indigence, the severity and distribution of certain deficiencies vary between population groups, geographical areas and households. Such enumerative induction poses threat to accurate profiling and addressing poverty (Pan & Yang, 2011).

High degrees of urban poverty in the capital city of this poorest province in South Africa aggravate complexities in the conceptualization, quantification and design of concerted interventionist action (Gyekye & Akinboade, 2003). Whilst most data about the poverty profile of the Polokwane City has been descriptive and overly generalized, the 2010 Socio-Economic Impact Assessment Study of the Integrated Development Planning in the Capricorn District Municipality has gone an extra mile to account for often overlooked dimensions of poverty. Basing on *The Local Government: Municipal System Act (Act 32 of 2000)*, the Polokwane Municipality applies the Basket of Basic Free Services as the threshold and determinant of who is eligible to receive (deserving poor), for free, 60kl of water, 50KWh of electricity, waste collection and sanitation services on a monthly basis. The identification of beneficiaries of the categorized Free Basic Services (FBS) was left to the Income and Expenditure Survey which reported an average of 54% of Blacks, 25% of Coloureds, 8% of Asians and 0.5% of Whites in and around the city living below the contested R1500 monthly income threshold and should be targeted (Gyekye & Akinboade, 2003). This Socio-Economic Impact Assessment Study of the Integrated Development Planning in the Capricorn District Municipality further epitomizes the incessant usage of money metrics as denominators for human welfare and urban poverty. Just like most data and literature, the study shows pitiable documentation of the scourge of incalculable and yet intractable dimensions of urban poverty such as nutrition, child mortality, years of schooling, assets, health and vulnerability in the post-apartheid Polokwane (Gyekye & Akinboade, 2003; Tacoli, 2012). These observations spark queries over the adequacy of an income-based approach as a baseline and often isolated measurement of urban poverty in Polokwane City and beyond. The World Bank and the NGO communities have since

advocated for methodical identification of deprivations and the correlation of the deprivations through a combination of income and non-income based measurement approaches. This has been deemed pre-requisite if the incumbent National Development Plan is to sustainably rescue the poor from the vicious cycle of poverty and take a different route from those taken by preceeding post-apartheid interventionist strategies such as the Reconstruction Development Programme (RDP), the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) and Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative of South Africa (ASGISA).

Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) set at the September 2000 United Nations Millennium Summit as the official global declaration against poverty expire coincidentally in the midst of buzzing local advocacy for the evaluation of progress, or lack therefore, made by various indigenous and exotic anti-poverty strategies twenty (20) years into South African democracy (Hughes, 2014). Whilst South Africa represents an island of substantial economic development and relatively lower levels of urban poverty in the Sub-Saharan region, her strategic bias towards income driven Safety Nets (social grants) has been tossed with cumulative criticism among local and international scholars and researchers. Vivid loopholes in the measurement and profiling of urban poverty embodied in the principal usage of money metrics have sugar-coated the effectiveness of interventionist strategies (Bhorat, Oosthuizen & van der Westhuizen, 2011). This goes to provoke academic discourses on whether Income Based Approaches such as the Child Support Grants, Old Age Grants, Food Parcels and Free Basic Services epitomize ideal short-medium term anti-poverty interventionism in post-apartheid South Africa.

3. Why Income Based Approaches?

The rationale behind the dominant application of Income Based Approaches in the mitigation of urban poverty is, understandably, the fact that as much as non-monetary macro approaches eye long term economic development and the subsequent trickle down to poverty alleviation, income-based micro strategies precisely and more directly transfer resources into the hands of the poor (Okanji, 2012). When the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Bangladesh and Srilankan governments partnered to commission the Pro-Poor Loan Program to provide start-up capital for entrepreneurial livelihoods, the yields proved positive and more importantly, sustainable (World Bank, 2013). Success stories of income driven strategies were also documented in the former Eastern Africa Community (Uganda, Malawi, Kenya and Tanzania), as the region was called by the British colonial regime. In the post-colonial restructuring, these countries reached 'decision points' on the adoption of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) as a statement of intent in poverty amelioration (Ellis & Freedman, 2004). Whilst income and consumption oriented

strategies such as the Social Safety Nets and Food-Based Programmes are central in the respective PRSPs, there has been little articulation of the sustainability of these initiatives and their ability to craft means for medium to long term exit routes for the targeted indigent so as to attain self-reliance and economic freedom.

The post-apartheid Government, just like other developmental states across the world has increasingly committed to a leading role in ameliorating the poverty burden from the most indigent citizenry. As mentioned already, income and consumption thresholds determine the demarcation between the poor and non-poor in South Africa (Arne & Abebe 2011). Without continually contesting the validity and adequacy of the conventional income bias, there remain loud outcries even from within the approach's proponents on the need to increase the ambit of the relief coverage by extending the R1500 monthly income cut-off used to identify beneficiaries of the main mitigation strategies in Polokwane City – thus the Free Basic Services, Social Support Grants, Scholarship Programmes and Food Programmes. The prioritization of these income driven strategies has seen Safety Nets in the form of (conditional) cash transfers, taking prominence in the futile attempt to enhance food security, child health, education and other basic needs of the poor. Being a developmental state, the South African government commits over R120 billion towards Social Support Grants and Free Basic Services which are both informed by the income statuses of individual households. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Finance announced, through the 2015 Budget Speech, an additional R7.2billion as a positive adjustment to the monthly social grants (Republic of South Africa (RSA), 2015). It is such government robust inclinations towards income driven measurement and strategic interventionism which envisage the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to sarcastically question in the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) why proponent countries of the Income Based Approach are mostly the ones with contemporary financial liabilities and the least resource bases to sustain it (IMF, 2015). Perhaps, there is need to put a spotlight on the Income Based Approach so as to highlight its major shortcomings.

4. Shortfalls of Income-Based Approaches

Convolution revolving around the establishment of an adequate, exhaustive and consistent tool of measuring urban poverty was highlighted, among other reports, in the Urban China: Toward Efficient, Inclusive, and Sustainable Urbanization Report (2014). In this compilation the World Bank Group partnered the Chinese government to report that beyond measurement errors and poor accountability for private and informal income and consumption of own-produced food, there were social, political, environmental, and spatial disparities endured by the Chinese urbanites and yet were overlooked by the applied

orthodox money metrics. Moreover, Cheng (2014) further confirmed the palpability of inconsistencies even within the money metric approaches themselves mainly because of dietary, pricing and economic variances between regions, households and individuals within China. Whilst most governments have not hidden their bias towards an income-based perspective (income poverty lines and consumption expenditures) in measuring urban poverty, Unsatisfied Basic Needs Indexes, Asset Indicators, Vulnerability and Participatory approaches are often integrated with money metrics by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) world over including in China, India, Ethiopia and Mozambique. Seldom juxtaposing of results from monetary and non-monetary metrics executed by NGOs and some government surveys consistently produce discrepancies on the profile of poverty both from the same and different samples (Maitra, 2009). Although Arne & Abebe (2011) found that discrepancies between subjective (participatory) or objective (income and consumption) tools cause minimum measurement errors and distortions on poverty profiles in urban Ethiopia, the World Bank (2014) and Alem (2015) have since attributed the failure of anti-poverty initiatives in the same country to rigid, one-dimensional, inadequate and generalized poverty profiles.

Measuring urban poverty in South Africa using, primarily, money metrics is similarly a conventional method regardless of buzzing queries from local and international scholars, aid agents and in some cases, victims of the plight themselves – poor urbanites (Pan & Yang, 2013). Despite higher dependency on cash income by urban residents in satisfying most of their needs, antagonists of the principal usage of an income based approach have pinpointed its underestimation of historical spatial injustices, social exclusion, racism, vulnerability and inequalities endured by post-apartheid urbanites. The Polokwane City, as poor as they it is, is deeply marked by multi-dimensional deficiencies closely linked to low quality, scale and speed of delivering services, safety and security as well as structural and cyclical unemployment and yet the Local Municipality employs predominantly average urban wages and overall level of infrastructure to determine the incidence of poverty in the city (Polokwane Local Municipality, 2012). Moreover, generalised income-based measurements tend to turn a blind eye on unequal entitlement to resources per capita within 'prosperous households' and fail to account for the fluctuation of, especially private and informal income (Baker & Schuler, 2009; Cheng, 2014). Such a trend has not only under-counted the urban poor in Polokwane but has left vast non-monetary elements of urban poverty unaccounted for, consequently drilling loopholes in the design of anti-poverty strategies in the capital city of the most poverty-stricken province in the country (Tacoli, 2012).

As much as Safety Nets offer instant and direct relief as well as averting corruption and incompetence in the process, targeting methods are always information intensive, cash

transfers are fungible and therefore subject to unintended household uses. Moreover, the dent caused by safety nets on the National Treasury remains unsustainable especially with the growing coverage of the indigent beneficiaries and pitiable exit ratios out of the poverty trap (Beall et al., 2013). The Statistics South Africa Household Survey (2015) and the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA, 2015) recorded a mere 3% and 5% graduation rate from dependency on Free Basic Services and Social Grants, respectively, between 2008 and 2014 in Polokwane Municipality. It is those generational overlaps of dependency which can be pinpointed as attributes behind chronic urban poverty and, perhaps, testimony to the failure of income-based approach to substantially lift the boats in Polokwane City. These and other numerous pitfalls of the approaches rekindle the discourse that income-based measurements should be treated as complementary rather than superior to other tools if social, political, environmental and economic dimensions of urban poverty are to be exhaustively accounted for. Vast literature acknowledges the multidimensional nature of urban poverty; however that ostensibly does not translate into recognition of the need to shift measurement approaches and interventionism from solely income and expenditure indicators towards integrative measurement approaches such as the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI).

5. How about the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI)?

The Multidimensional Poverty Index is an exhaustive tool which measures the nature and intensity of poverty, quantifying how many things poor people go without. The index creates a vivid picture of how poverty is being experienced within and across households, communities, countries, regions and the world (Alkire, Roche & Seth, 2013). Whilst health, education and overall living conditions are its umbrella guides, the index uses various specific indicators to identify and account for multidimensional deprivations and correlations between the deprivations. Such indicators use a high lens to assess deprivation in terms of nutrition, child mortality, years of schooling, school attendance, cooking fuel, sanitation, water, electricity, floor and assets. Whilst other tools have been marred by measurement errors and distortion of poverty profiles, the index disaggregates deprivation among population groups (ethnicity, race, age), geographical areas (rural or urban) and constituency (individual, household, community). The Multidimensional Poverty Index goes beyond being multivariate since it produces both the headcount ratios of the people who are disadvantaged (incidence) and the average share of dimensions in which people are disadvantaged (intensity), to complement other approaches in measuring and mitigating urban poverty.

Coverage of poverty profiles using the MPI would be equally inadequate if its indicators turned a blind eye on the Participatory, Vulnerability, Asset and Unsatisfied Basic Needs Indices (Chowdhury & Mukhopadhyaya, 2012). Rather, this multidimensional approach allows participation and the subsequent subjective understanding of deficiency by the perceived victims of poverty, simplifying the identification and prioritization of needs thereto. Participatory appraisals employed in the 2010 Socio-Economic Impact Assessment Study of the Integrated Development Planning in the Capricorn District Municipality produced an unprecedented picture of deprivations varying between individual circumstances, events and social networks. Much raised problems were closely linked to security and vulnerability. To address the latter, the MPI investigates into a household's level of exposure to risk (crime, disaster, evictions, shocks income poverty, disease) and weighed against the capacity of a household to reduce the risk through human capital, physical assets, access to credit, income diversification and participation in the formal safety net (Pen & Yang, 2011, PLM, 2012). In cognisance of how assets are huge determinants in the separation of the poor from the non-poor, the MPI Indicators assess socio-economic status measured by assets and access to utilities and services by a household (car, fridge, television, running water). And finally, Unsatisfied Basic Needs approach forms the basis of the Multidimensional Poverty Index wherein the dimensions of poverty thresholds are used to measure what of the basic needs (water, education, nutrition, and housing) is not satisfied (Santos, 2014).

Whilst it remains contested as to what and how many variables of poverty should be included in which domain (Silber, 2011), evidence of the ideal complementarity between the MPI and other measurement tools (Participatory, Asset, Vulnerability and Basic Needs) including the Income-Based approach itself, is palpable in the data collected in the Socio-Economic Impact Assessment Study of the Integrated Development Planning in the Capricorn District Municipality. Put differently, when the Income-Based Approach was applied complementarily rather than principally in the measurement of indigence, unconventional pictures of detailed poverty profiles were drawn, allowing nuanced understanding and ideal crafting of concerted anti-poverty strategies aimed at ameliorating multidimensional woes in the Polokwane City.

6. Conclusion

Whilst the rationale behind the principal application of income driven strategies in the mitigation of urban poverty revolves around their aptitude to precisely and more directly transfer resources into the hands of the most indigent, this socialist approach unbearably dents government treasuries with no substantial guarantee for long term panacea to poverty. Among their vast shortfalls, income based measurements tend to turn a blind eye on

unequal entitlement to resources per capita within 'prosperous households', fail to account for the fluctuation of, especially private and informal income and, more dreadfully, fail to capture the dynamic nature and dimensions of urban poverty. With literature explicitly adamant about the fact that effective intervention requires a more nuanced conceptualization of the characteristics, causes and the multidimensional nature of urban poverty this contribution has advocated for the integration of the Income Based Approach and the Multidimensional Poverty Index. The Index uses various specific and high lens indicators to identify and account for multidimensional deprivations and correlations between the deprivations, perhaps, an ingredient which has since lacked in incumbent income-based measurements and interventions in Polokwane City and other post-Apartheid cities in South Africa. However, taking into cognisance the conventionality and institutionalization of the Income Based Approach within various governmental and non-governmental policy frameworks, this contribution proposes their integration rather than substitution of the other. The conceptualization and quantification of socio-economic dimensions of deprivations and plights endured by the post-apartheid urbanites, require no unique, principal or alienated tools but rather blends of exhaustive, holistic and complementary approaches with the aptitude to capture multidimensional aspects of poverty and the subsequent design of conversant and concerted anti-poverty intervention in post-apartheid cities such as Polokwane.

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The Limpopo Provincial Employment, Growth and Development Strategy: A development partnership with the Mogalakwena Anglo Platinum mine, and a Local Economic Development perspective

B.K. Sebake
Cape Peninsula University of Technology, South Africa

Abstract

Community development can be achieved in many ways. The utilisation of the mineral resources found in the society has been a Public Administration dilemma with regard to beneficiation. This paper aims at determining the extent to which the mining industry in Mogalakwena Municipality has succeeded in uplifting the lives of the community as part of its contribution towards the Limpopo Employment, Growth and Development Strategy 2009-2014. The role of the private sector plays a pivotal role in changing the living conditions of the community as it relates to *inter alia*:- employment, entrepreneurship opportunities, education, health and infrastructural development. The study attempt to determine the impact of the development partnership with the mining industry and the extent to which it has addressed Local Economic Development as an integral part of the Limpopo Employment, Growth and Development Strategy. The study will reflect on the Research Problematique, Research Methodology, Literature Review on Public Administration with specific reference to aspects of Local Economic Development, Integrated Development Plan, Presentation and interpretation of the research findings (imperial survey), conclusion and recommendations of the findings. The study will provided all the stakeholders with an opportunity to assess the extent of service delivery at the Mogalakwena Municipality, particularly in proving whether Public-Private-Partnerships may be an ideal methodology to community development within the context of Local Economic Development drive.

Keywords: Development partnership, Limpopo Employment, Growth and Development Strategy, Local Economic Development, Integrated Development Plan, Entrepreneurship

1. Introduction

The development of society is generally the responsibility of government, while the private sector, can play a pivotal role through partnerships to develop, contribute and enhance the lesser privileged societies. In South Africa, the majority of the historically disadvantaged communities (African, Coloured, Indian, women and people with disability) experience poverty, *inter alia*, limited infrastructure development, unemployment, lack of education and skills. The latter conditions may be apportioned not totally to the former

Apartheid (Separatist) Regime's total disregard for South Africans of colour. The study focused on the extent to which community development through means of partnership and integrated development had influenced the lives of ordinary community members. An attempt is made to show how some tenets of public administration and private sector initiatives may yield development. An indication will be provided as to the significance of the study and the role of the mine on community development to advance the objectives of the Limpopo Employment, Growth, and Development strategy, as an imperative process on the Mogalakwena Municipality communities.

2. Research Problematique

The research problem is posed in terms of the following main research question: does the Mogalakwena Anglo Platinum Mine contribute to community development in line with the Limpopo Provincial Government Employment, Growth, and Development Strategy, and the Integrated Development Plan "IDP" of Mogalakwena Local Municipality respectively? This issue generated attention midyear 2008 on the basis of a negative publicity that suggested the Mine has contributed nothing on community engagement as part of social corporate investment, but only utilising the mineral resources through mining in the area without improving lives of the community.

3. Research Methodology

This section of the paper reflects on the methodological orientation of the study and Information on research related concepts which includes, among others; quantitative and qualitative research methods, and data collection. While some researchers prefer to adopt a single method of research and not use them both, but however the study has adopted the two *inter alia*: - Qualitative and Quantitative methods, but however the quantitative will only be utilised as a secondary data to support the research findings.

3.1. Research methods and design

Research can broadly be divided into two main categories, being quantitative and qualitative research. The following exposition clarifies these categories and indicates which type of method is utilised to gather information for this project.

3.2. Quantitative research design

Quantitative research is based on observation that is converted into discrete units that can be compared to other units by using statistical analysis. While there may be modification and variations on this general picture of quantitative research, statistics analysis is an essential part of quantitative research (Maykut and Morehouse, 1994:.2). The term

quantitative method is used to refer to methods and techniques of statistics which are applied to concrete problems. The difference between statistics and qualitative methods is that the latter includes practical concerns such as finding solutions to the problems arising from the collection of real data and interpreting the numerical results as they relate to concrete situations (Rachad, 2003:7). This method will only be used where secondary data exist for the research and the following paragraph will clarify why a focus was placed on qualitative research.

3.3. Qualitative research design

Qualitative research is a broad umbrella term that covers a wide range of techniques and research approaches, thus it is not easy to define. In broad terms, qualitative research may involve an approach that allows the researcher to examine people's experience in details, by using a specific set of research methods such as in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, observation, content analysis, visual methods and life histories or biographies (Denzin and Lincoln, 2008b:4). Therefore, qualitative research is used to explore and understand a diversity of social and public policy issues, either as an independent research strategy, or in combination with some form of statistical inquiry (Ritchie and Spencer, 2002, p.305). In this study, the Mine and the Mogalakwena Municipality was targeted for information on the impact and contribution by the Anglo Platinum Mine with regard to community development and the extent to which the community had benefited.

3.4. Data collection

Data collection is the "how" part or the procedure used to collect data. Researchers and practitioners obtain data by asking people questions, observing them or using materials such as case records and statistical data (Mile and Huberman, 1994:7). The information or data is gathered through reports and existing survey's to support the findings of the research.

4. Literature Review on Public Administration

This section of the study analyses the existing literature and related concepts such as public and policy, theories of development, public private partnership as a method to explore community development, Local Economic Development and Integrated Development Planning. These concepts are analysed within the framework of Public Administration as a discipline.

4.1. Public and Policy

The concept policy refers to a relatively stable, purposive course of action followed by an actor or set of actors in dealing with a problem or matter of concern. It focuses on what is actually done instead of what is only proposed or intended, and it differentiates a policy from a decision, which is essentially a choice among competing alternatives (Anderson, 1997: 9).

4.2. Development theories

Development is a process, not a program, since it happens on an on-going basis and gives change to societal phenomena *inter alia*: technology, preferences and choice. Therefore, it is an on-going activity of society as a whole. It can be stimulated, directed or assisted by government policies, laws and special programs, but it cannot be compelled or carried out by administrative or external agencies on behalf of the population. Development strategy should aim to release people's initiative, not to substitute for the will of the people (Jacobs & Cleveland, 1999:1). The two definitions are relevant on the basis that the emphasis captures development as an on-going process that involved the aspiration of the people.

4.3. Entrepreneurship

Hirsch & Peters(1992: 10) defined entrepreneurship as the process of creating something different with value by devoting the necessary time and effort, assuming the accompanying financial, psychic and social risks, and receiving the resulting rewards of monetary and personal satisfaction. It is important for the invoking an operational definition of "Entrepreneurs" as an art to identify opportunities and utilise them for the internal and external environment's benefit. Entrepreneurs have a fundamental positive impact on the economy. New businesses are established that provide not only goods and services to customers, and job opportunities for individuals in various industries.

Public Private Partnership: entrepreneurial perspective

The Department of Treasury's Public Private Partnership Unit, (2010) indicated that South African law defines Public Private Partnership as a contract between public sector institution/ municipality and a private party, in which the private party assumes sustainable financial, technical and operational risk in the design, financing, building and operation of a project. The collaboration is important as defined above on the basis that it provides the basis for making an inclusive approach on community development as a process that involve both the government and the private sector to better the lives of ordinary people. The Mine

as private sector provides an influx of activity in the community, and the significance of its procurement process plays an important role to empower the community.

4.4. Local Economic Development

Over the past decade, Local Economic Development (LED) has assumed major importance as a policy issue in many developed countries of Europe, North America and Australasia (Harvey, 1989; Leitner, 1990; Syrett, 1995; Clarke and Gaile, 1998). Increasingly, the potential for LED is acknowledged as a critical sphere for policy development in the developing world, not least in South Africa (Rogerson, 1995, 1997). In several policy documents and statements, considerable significance is attached by national government to the role of LED in contributing towards reaching the objectives of the reconstruction and development in post-apartheid South Africa (Rogerson, 1999: 511). Although it must be acknowledged that the planning of coherent local economic development strategies (ARE) not generally well-advanced across the developing world (Rogerson, 1995: 513), there have been a number of significant municipal or level government initiatives towards poverty alleviation (Stren and Gombay, 1994; Vanderschueren, 1996). The importance of these municipal approaches to poverty alleviation must be understood against the background of the two conventional policy directions of poverty alleviation through macro-economic growth and approach that center upon specific community level programmes that are targeted at the poor (Wegelin and Borgman, 1995; Wegelin, 1996). Broadly, municipal levels are targeted to strengthen and complement at macro- (national government) and micro- levels (community approaches promoted by NGO's or CBO's). Local Economic Development offers local government, private and non-profit sector and the local community the opportunity to work together to improve the local economy. It focuses on enhancing competitiveness, increase sustainable growth and ensures that growth is inclusive. LED encompasses a range of disciplines including physical planning, economics and marketing. It also incorporates many local government and private sector functions including environmental planning, business development, infrastructural provisioning, real estate development and finance (The World Bank Group, 2011).

4.5. LED in South Africa

The White Paper on Local Government (1998) introduced the concept of "Developmental Local Government", which is defined as "Local Government committed to working with citizens and other groups in the communities to find a sustainable way to meet their social, economic and material needs, and improve the quality of their lives". The Local Economic Development serves as a platform for the environment to engage its stakeholders

in implementing strategies and programs as stated by National framework for LED in South Africa, (2006-2011: 9).

4.5.1. LED challenges

Many South Africans reside in rural areas. These areas still suffer from underdevelopment and the fact that they were previously sustained on non-viable incentives to promote the aims of separate development. Investments in these areas should be based on the new vision of sustainable rural economies and focus on innovative employment generation that requires adult skills development, education and training aimed at improving numeracy and literacy as a basis for participating in local economic opportunities as reflected by National framework for LED in South Africa, (2006-2011:13-14).

4.5.2. Raising revenue for local government to support LED

Todes and Watson, (1985:115) argued that local income tax is preferable from most perspectives, not least because local governments which rely primarily on income taxes tend to have the least severe financial problems. Most local authorities supplement local revenues with loan finance where they have the capacity to do so. Local government may sell commodities such as water and electricity, in South Africa as observed that the extent to which the municipalities are trading entities is often not appreciated (Simkins, 1991, p.48). It is evident that the municipalities in South Africa raise funds through local rates and taxes, and through selling commodities as services rendered in order to support the local economic initiatives.

4.5.3. Participation and representation in the context of LED

Citizens play a number of roles in the local arena: as workers, taxpayers, consumers of services and residents (Muir, 1997:140). In democratic local government, citizens' concerns are formally expressed through elected representatives. Todes and Watson, (1985:79) further reflect that local authorities may themselves attempt to stimulate public participation by establishing organisations or formal structures for specific purposes. This may underpinned by ulterior motives, such as the incorporation or sidelining of pressure groups, or the manipulation of opinion and co-option of leaders behind council policies. The establishment of local government is a process which is formulated out of a political process, and public participation determines the Municipal plan for service delivery through its LED process. As a result of this democratic process, (Todes and Watson, 1985:88) proclaim that the focus of local government depends on the extent of public participation to ensure its relevance.

4.5.4. Developmental role of local government

The essence of LED gives local authorities new responsibility and scope for local development planning, which often involves partnership with the private sector, community organisations, unions or NGO's (Rogerson, 1999: 32). In South Africa, the Constitution of 1996 stipulates that local government is responsible for the social and economic development of communities, and the government has emphasised the need to nurture a new culture of developmental local government (Republic of South Africa, 1998, p.45). The limited financial and human capacity of many local authorities is an obvious constraint, especially in rural areas. It is no coincidence that most of the LED literature refers only to cities, and great reliance on developmental local government could accentuate urban-rural disparities. In some cases the same could be true of urban-urban disparities. For weaker authorities, more government assistance will be required if they are to build up a strong economic bases enabling expansion from below through self-empowerment (Turok, 1999, p.15-21). The above reflected by Turok, (1999) as supported by Shorts, (1993: 106) that the intervention of local government in city economy is not new. In the US, as the commercial elite displaced the old patrician class from the mid-19th century, civic promotion of economic growth through public works grew apace.

4.5.5. Role of the private sector and civil society in LED

Nel *et al.*, (2006) argued that the relatively low levels of collaboration with the private sector are problematic in the attainment of sustainable economic development. The Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Program (ISRDP) study serves as an example in Sekhukhune, where the mines consulted directly with the tribal authorities over the use of land for sites for housing clusters and other mining activities. This weakens the ability of local government structures to manage local development activities (Van Donk, Swilling, Pieterse & Parnell, 2008), further argued that there is no necessarily any pressure on the private sector to be responsible to the community. In Sekhukhune, for example, local communities felt that the mines had little or no impact upon their lives and livelihoods and further argued that strong leadership is needed at local government to prevent political infightings, which is common in many municipalities.

4.6. Municipality Integrated Development Planning (IDP)

Integrated Development Planning (IDP) is a process through which the municipality prepares a strategic plan containing short, medium, and long term developmental objectives, strategies and programmes for the municipal area. The IDP is a principal instrument that guides and informs budgeting, management and decision making related to service delivery

and development in the municipal (Municipal Integrated Development Plan Guide, ISBN: 0-621-35467-8, p.8-9). Communities cannot develop in isolation. For example, if a community needs housing, other related issues also have to be examined, such as roads, schools, electricity, water, and sanitation, etc. this means that not only local government is involved, but also provincial and national government departments. Therefore, the IDP is a process by which the planning efforts of different spheres, sectors of government and other institutions are coordinated at local government level (Geyer, 2006:1). IDP brings together various economic, social, environmental, legal, infrastructural and spatial aspects of the problem or plan.

4.6.1. Why is it necessary to develop an IDP?

The below are the reasons why IDP is so important (Municipal Integrated development plan Guide).

- It allows for making effective use of the scarce resources;
- Speed-up service delivery;
- Attract additional investment;
- Attract additional funds;
- Strengthen democracy and enhance institutional transformation;
- Overcome apartheid legacy at a local sphere; and
- Promote intergovernmental coordination.

On the other hand (Geyer, 2006: 3) reflects that IDP is a constitutional and legal process required of municipalities. However, quite apart from the legal requirements, there are good reasons for municipalities to undertake IDP. Planning in general and IDP in particular, is a critically important management tool to help transformation, growth and development at local government level.

4.6.3. The dilemma of public participation in the context of service delivery and IDP

The notion of participation has always been central to the philosophy of community development, which advanced the idea that, in a representative democracy, both formal and informal structures are needed for ordinary people at the local level to have a voice in the decision-making process. Participation has been central to all forms of community development, from consensus-oriented liberal models to conflict-oriented Marxist models. In third way and neoliberal policy, participation has been reconfigured as choice with responsibility and more accurately denotes user take up of social services. It has led to the construction of new relationships between service users and state services rendering structures (Gaventa, 2004). A great deal of effort has gone into trying to achieve public

participation, not least the Community Development Workers Programme (Mubangizi and Gray, 2009) and the Masakhane- fees-for-services campaign, while the local government uses the IDP process to invite the community to participate in Imbizo's as a way of delivering the relevant service to the community.

4.6.4. The effect of Public participation through Imzibizo's

While the IDP is a process through which communities have input into the planning process and matters related to their municipalities, an *imbizo* (*izimbizos* for plural) is a forum for enhancing dialogue between communities and leaders from various levels of government (Mubangizi & Gray, 2010: 216). An imbizo refers to a gathering convened by traditional leaders, culturally. It is normally convened when there is an issue to be debated or when a traditional leader wants to discuss a pressing issue with his or her subjects, or address problems in the community (Netshitomboni, 2007). (Mbigi, 2004) refer to imbizo as a holistic African developmental approach that is rooted in cultural traditions, values and belief system. The discussions at an imbizo typically highlight problems that need attention, blockages in policy formulation and policy areas that may require reviewing. For example, Presidential imbizo are held when the president, or officials from presidency participates in meetings through extended visits to the provinces and municipalities. The Community members get afforded the opportunity to engage with the presidency in the presence of the provincial and local government delegates. This assists the community to hold three sphere of government accountable and have the opportunity to also influence service delivery. Literature on the impact of Izimbizo is scant and (Buccas *et al*, 2007) noted that while izimbizo attract large numbers of the community, they do not necessarily translate into meaningful participation. It is noted that good organisations and a strong political will are required to change an imbizo from social event into a participatory one. This criticism is not without substance, because an imbizo is usually accompanied by widespread media coverage, copious publicity materials in a form of posters and leaflets, as well as promotional T-shirts and caps (Government Communications and Information System, 2008).

4.6.5. Public- Private Partnership (PPP's) in service delivery

The new public management has changed perceptions on the role of government with regard to the finance and delivery of public services. These are increasingly being provided by private firms and non-profit institutions. This transfer of responsibilities from public to private agencies fits well with trends in public administration towards decentralisation of decision-making to the beneficiaries, or to those nearer and accountable to them such as local authorities, for greater private voice in policy-making, and more transparency in the exercise of government power. The term partnership also refers to the

process and machinery for ongoing consultation and collaboration between public agencies and private sector representatives of government policies, regulations, and procedures or, more broadly, government action to improve the enabling environment for firms and NGO's (Bennett; 1998: 193). The focus will be on benefits of the public-private partnership, and the problematic areas thereof, as integral part of the acceleration of public service delivery in developing countries.

4.6.6. Benefits of partnership (PPP's)

Partners do not necessarily share the same goals and objectives. For instance, governments are concerned with economic growth and with elements of that growth such as output, employment, exports and tax revenue, while private firms, on the other hand, look for profit, including economic rent, and more stable planning environment with less risk of arbitrary changes in government policies (Bennett; 1998: 194). Further identifies the below as the benefits of public-private partnerships:

- Streamlining and rationalizing procedures in both the public and private sectors and greater market efficiency through low transaction costs;
- Wider understanding of government strategies, policies, procedures, and regulations;
- Private sector voice in the determination of strategies, policies, and procedures, which in turn promotes legitimacy, democratic consent, and transparency in the decisions and actions of government;
- Better decisions from better information (field-based organisations, such as many NGO's, bring operating experience to the debate, which acts as a reality check on the conventional wisdom of office based planners and bureaucrats);
- Better coordination of government agencies, particularly where government adopts a team approach in its interface with private partners;
- An appropriate balance between stability and change in government policies;
- Facilitation of investment by the creation of agreed future scenarios and the reduction of uncertainty;
- Synergy from complementarity of core competencies and inputs such as knowledge, energy, funds, and legal authority;

- Reduced individual lobbying, corruption rent-seeking and government patronage, and greater legitimacy and accountability of government; and
- Sharing of costs where there are social benefits as well as private revenue.

4.6.7. Problematic areas in PPP's

While public-private partnership has its own advantages, it also has problematic areas in it as outlined below (Bennett; 1998, p.195):

- **Delay:** collaboration takes longer than less participative styles of management, the more so as the more interests are brought into the process.
- **Problem of representation:** powerful members may manipulate or distort the decision-making, or entirely co-opt the platform for their use.
- **Legal barriers:** There may be legal barriers, such as non- recognition of user groups, or denial of rights to use.
- **Information and education:** Effective participation requires information and sufficient education to use it. There are problems of government secrecy, commercial confidentiality; poor communication and limited “reach” of government.
- **Problem of accountability:** In developing countries governments, accountability for public funds is highly formalized, through often honored more in breach than the observance.
- **NGO's mistrust of government or opposite:** NGO's may fear government authorities, but may see collaboration as an opportunity to get more grants or government may feel being utilize for grant allocation with poor workmanship from private sector.
- **Issues of competition and coordination:** Governments, used to being monopoly providers of public services, tend to believe that NGO's in receipt of public funds should also be monopolies. Quasi-markets have been established in non-profit sectors in several developed countries, e.g. in home care for the disabled in the Netherlands, education in Sweden and primary health care in the UK.

5. Presentation and interpretation of the research findings (imperial survey)

The section below will reflect the findings of the research study briefly in accordance with the regular consultation with the community, infrastructural development, education and health:

5.1. Presentation of findings: Regular engagement forums

The research revealed that the Mine had put in place a number of forums comprising representation from stakeholder groups and from its operations. The forums meet on a regular basis and encourage participation on critical issues regarding the Mine's Community Engagement and Development-matters. The forums at which the inhabitants are encouraged to participate are highlighted below (Anglo Platinum Limited: Mogalakwena Mine SEAT report 2010-2011: 15-16):

- **Ministerial committee:** This committee was established in 2001 to create a forum through which the local communities and the Mine can communicate. This committee includes members of the communities delegated by the traditional authorities and the executive of the Mine.
- **Traditional Councils:** The councils comprise of the Mapela and Mokopane Traditional Councils. Meetings are held with the mine to discuss issues related to the communities that may arise from the operation of the Mine and its processes.
- **Contractors' meetings:** This forum was established to meet monthly. The meetings comprised of representatives of the Mine, the service providers and community leaders from the Traditional Councils to discuss, *inter alia*, policies. The research also revealed that this committee facilitated and identified employment for the local communities as part of its business.
- **Local IDP process:** The Mine participates as a partner in the IDP process of the Mogalakwena Municipality on a monthly basis. The Municipality identified the Mine as an important stakeholder in the IDP partnership.
- **Project Steering committee:** This committee was established by the Mine in partnership with the Mogalakwena Municipality representatives, IDP representatives, contractors' and the Provincial Government which One of its functions is to identify projects and ensure that the community provides feedback on progress.

- **Special forums:** The Mine hosts meetings with the Department of Education at the Provincial sphere on its education programs, and the Department of Health on its health related initiatives.
- **Mokopane Chamber of Business:** The General Manager of the Mine participates in the committee in order to reflect and share views with the businessmen of how to contribute to the economic development of the Local Municipality.
- **Employment Equity Committee:** This committee was established to reflect on the employment equity plan and targets of the Mine, training and development, skill development targets and reports. This committee includes the Mine human resources and the Unions.

5.2. Presentation of findings: Education, health and corporate social investment (CSI)

The Mine's CIS is a major focus of the Department of Community Engagement Development. The research revealed that the projects below were executed in 2009 only as part of the Mine's initiative on education and health in Mogalakwena. The Mine spent approximately R3,2 million as reflected below.

Table: 5.1. Community Engagement and Development project 2009 (APM)

Name of CSI Initiative	Description	Cost
Construction of Ga-Madiba (Mokopane), and Ga-Mabuela	Construction of two clinics	R6,600,000.00
Provision of equipment and future	Provide Mosesetjane clinic maternity section; Sekgagapeng clinic, Day care equipment and furniture to enhance delivery of services	R6,600,000.00
Provision of equipments and furnisher	Provide Ga-Madiba and Ga-Mabuela clinics with equipment and furnisher to enhance delivery of services	R3,000,000.00
Bucket and bowl workshop phase II	Building a workshop which is used to repair buckets and bowls from Mine, which is a BEE project run by the community	R6,000,000.00

Provision of sanitation to schools and crèches in Mokopane and Mapela	Build toilets at identified schools, five females, and five males. Build wash basins and septic tanks that are covered with concrete	R370,000.00
Support of Mokopane Business Linkage Centre (BLC)	LIBSA was used for as BLC to provide entrepreneur training, linking suppliers with tenders from Operation, HDSA database	R1,500,000.00
BEE supplier development forum	BLC to provide training to local suppliers	R291,000.00
Community portable skills	Provide community members and prospective retirees with skills they can use on their own e.g. plumbing, bricklaying, carpentry, welding, electrical training	R800,000.00
Construction of classrooms, administration office and gym at the Centre of Hope	Provision of infrastructure at a centre for the disabled children in Mahlelereng township	R1,700,000.00
Provision of equipments at the Centre of Hope	Provide Centre of Hope with equipment and furnisher to enhance delivery of services	R100,000.00
Supply of Early Learning Centre, Maths Science and Technology Education Programmes	Implementation of eperico programme. This involves training educators who will in turn teach learners to improve literacy and numeracy at Primary school level	Mine benefits from Group allocation of funds (SEAT)
Groenfontein Veggies (Pty) Ltd	Train community on gardening methods and the workings of the pack house, and supply in marketing of their business	R10,000,000.00
Support to the following schools:	Educational support to English medium schools in Mogalakwena	R500,000.00 R600,000.00

Piet Potgieter high		
Mokopane primary school		
Tree planting	Plant tree to mitigate against the dust from the slimes dams and mine dumps	R186,000.00
Total		R38,247,00.00

Source: Anglo Platinum Limited, Mogalakwena Mine SEAT report, (2010-2011, p.14-15)

5.3. Community benefit: Employment opportunities

The Mine, created approximately two hundred employment opportunities at the Groenfontein Veggies farming project in Ga-Pila. This business opportunity was created as part of Mine stakeholder engagements. The report on the resettlement shows that the mine has provided thirty percent (30%) of its workforce to the local community in order to grow the local economy. The Mine currently employs 1658 employees of whom 88% are sourced from the Mogalakwena Local Municipality-area and a further 6.5% from the Limpopo Province. The remaining 5% originate from other provinces in South Africa, with investment of a total labour cost of R356, 324,463.00 during 2009, meaning that 88% of the funds invested for labour cost.

Table: 5.2. Employment statistics of Mogalakwena Platinum mine

Province	Local Municipality	Number of employees	% of employees
Limpopo	Mogalakwena Local municipality	1465	88.36
	Polokwane Local Municipality	102	6.15
	Aganang Local Municipality	7	0.42
Gauteng	Ekhuruleni Local Municipality	39	2.35
North West	Rustenburg Local Municipality	31	1.87

Mpumalanga	Mpumalanga Local Municipalities	14	0.84
Mine community Total		1658	100.00

Source: Provided by Mogalakwena Platinum Mine, HR Department 2011

5. Conclusion

The operations and existence of mining sector has been the talk and dilemma of public administration, and the study concluded the fact that “Public Private Partnership” is an ideal model to achieve the projections of the IDP. The issue of beneficiation also has been proven by the study that the local community benefited a large portion of the economic opportunities of the study. The fundamental challenge has only been the environmental impact of the mine operations that need to be improved in order to protect natural resources.

6. Recommendations

The below recommendation find conformity with the study and are reflected below respectively.

- The Mine should host community imbizo’s to create an awareness of the importance of its existence at the area;
- The Municipality should explore the possibility to establish a business forum, which will be part of the Mayor’s IDP networking opportunity with the business sector; and
- The strategy of the Mine’s activities should be improved to ensure that there are no hazards to the lives of the community and therefore the innovative strategies for mining activities in terms of environmental impact should be in place.

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UNRAVELLING THE CONUNDRUM OF THE BUDGET ALLOCATION PROCESS OF THE LEGISLATURE

*S.M. Madue
M.A. Tsolo
T.C. Ramoabi
North West University, South Africa*

Abstract

The budget process is regarded as a legitimate opportunity for the government to state its policy agenda and priorities with the projected funding necessary. Preparing a budget is a complex process and most legislatures do not have the capacity to effectively undertake it. This paper examines the multiple challenges encountered by the legislature during the Budget Vote process. The central problem that this paper addresses is that the legislative does not determine its own budget. A conundrum that this paper seeks to solve is to determine the rationale for assigning the executive the authority to determine the legislature's budget. The research question that informs this paper is: how can the legislature effectively hold the executive accountable while the latter determines the former's budget? The paper argues that the legislature is at the mercy of the executive as far as the determination of the budget is concerned. Thus, the executive may deliberately underfund the legislature, thereby effectively constraining its ability to carry out its constitutional mandates, especially 'oversight'. The budget process is often prolonged due to delays and contestations between the executive and the legislature. This paper argues that the fact that the executive determines the legislature's budget is an anomaly, since the legislature is constitutionally mandated to oversee the executive. The paper recommends that a rearrangement of budget vote process should be considered whereby the legislature should determine its own budget.

Key words: Budget process, legislature, oversight, power relations

1. Introduction

Democratic governance requires that a government be accountable, responsive, capable and participatory. Legislative oversight responds to this requirement by monitoring the development and implementation of laws and fiscal administration by the government on behalf of the citizens. Monitoring the fiscal administration begins with the reviewing and approval of budget proposals tabled by the executive to the legislature. This paper is concerned with the budget allocation process in the legislative environment, with specific

reference to the legislatures in South Africa. The paper acknowledges that there are ten legislatures in the South African Legislative Sector (the National Parliament and nine Provincial Legislatures). Therefore, the term “legislature” is used in this paper to refer to all the ten legislatures. Public administration scholars, politicians and public officials all have an interest in budget strategies that government departments and entities use to secure public funding.

Public budgeting involves a number of actors (including the executive authority and the legislature) with different spending goals. Therefore, competition among the actors to access resources often leads to politically oriented tactics and strategies. It is from this view that Posner and Park (2007:2) argue that the two most important players in the budget process are the legislature and the executive. The argument of this paper is that the power struggles between the legislature and the executive (the power of the public purse) has resulted in the executive overpowering the legislature during the budget process. Therefore, the legislature ends up having been allocated inadequate funds which stifles its capacity to effectively exercise oversight over the executive. The paper is organised into four key sections (theories of the budget process, the budget process, the budget system model, experiences of the budget process in the legislature), recommendations and conclusion. In the quest for conforming to best practice, the opening section of this paper outlines the research approach adopted.

2. Methodological framework

The focus of this paper is on the challenges that legislature faces during the budget allocation process. The paper draws inspiration from Bailey (1968:131) when who states that “... we cannot improve what we cannot describe”. Therefore, this study has adopted a qualitative research methodology, using descriptive research as an approach of choice. Rosnow and Rosenthal (1996:15) remind us that in descriptive research, the goal of the investigation tends to be the careful mapping out of a situation or a set of events. The research objective is to describe what is happening behaviourally. Thus the paper documents the relationship between the legislature and the executive in determining the budget allocations of the government departments and the other organs of the state, with specific reference to the legislature.

The central thrust of this paper is the contestation of the “power of the public purse” between the executive and the legislature. The problem is that this contestation often leads to the executive determining the budget allocation that the legislature should receive instead of the legislature being the one that determines the allocation of the executive. This study

investigated the power that the executive exerts over the legislature during the budget vote process and its influence on the allocation that the legislature receives to deliver on its mandate of exercising oversight over the executive. The study was set out to respond to the following research questions:

- What are the causes of contestations during the budget process, and why are they experienced on a regular basis?
- How can the legislature effectively hold the executive accountable while the latter determines the budget of the former?

Unravelling the conundrum of the budget allocation process of the legislature might shed some light on how the budget process could be reconfigured to increase the efficiency of the legislatures in exercising their oversight role. In attempting to respond to the above research questions, the study adopted a qualitative approach to document the rationale for assigning the executive the power to determine the budget allocation for the legislature. The study was purely desktop-based and has largely used literature review as the data collection technique. Thus in the following section an overview of the theories of the budget process is provided as a means of laying the foundation for the discussion of the experiences of legislature.

3.Theories of the budget process

Bacharach (1999) defines theory as a statement about relationships in the real world, which is made within the framework of beliefs about how this world works. He describes theory as an analogy drawn for the purpose of answering questions about how, when, why, and for providing researchers with a general model for understanding the nature of reality. The formal budget process and the executive budget provide ... a snapshot of the dynamic interrelationships of these dimensions of the resource allocation process. The structure and environmental relationships of the public organisation, however, provide a locus for viewing their interactions (Gianakis and McCue, 2002:160). Thus there are a number of theories from which the budget process can be studied. In this paper, we acknowledge the existence of a plethora of common budget theories. However, for the purpose of this study, the focus was limited to the principal-agent-theory, the organisation-based theory and the common pool theory.

4. Principal-agent-theory

The relationships within the executive and the legislative branches, between members of these branches, and between actors at different levels of government are profoundly affected by the budgeting process (Forrester, 2002:123). The heartbeat of the

public budgeting process is the relationship between those responsible for delivering services to the public and those who oversee the allocation of resources. Scholars (Baiman, 1982; Forrester and Adams, 1997; Schick, 1998; Madue, 2014) have generally referred to these actors as agents and principals. It is from this perspective that the principal-agent-theory is considered among the relevant theories in understanding the power dynamics in the public budget process. In this context, the executive is viewed as the agent (responsible for delivering services to the public) while the legislature is regarded as the principal (responsible for the allocation of funds and holding the executive accountable for the resources allocated). Forrester (2002:125) elaborates that "... in budgetary relationships, agents are most often government agencies, since they are responsible for actually implementing policies and programmes. Principals, however, tend to vary according to the nature of the government's budget decision making process. Where the executive exercises more power in determining such issues, then the executive may be defined as the budget principal. In both cases, principals are assumed to set the policies and overall goals, and agents the implement programmes intended to address the principal's policy goals".

5. Organisation-based budget theory

One of the organisational purposes of the budget process is to enhance the capacity of the organisation's management to make optimal resource allocation decisions. The government as an organisation derives its resources for the economic base of its jurisdiction, and a basic function of professional public management is to maintain the organisation's flow of resources (Gianakis and McCue, 2002:164). It is from this perspective that the legislature, in determining the government budget, views the government as an organisation that has to make optimum use of its resources. This point of view is highly influenced by the organisation-based budget theory. Yet, the organisational theory seems not to be highly influential when compared to the common pool theory.

6. Common pool theory

Common pool theory is at the heart of inefficiencies in centralised decision making, as locally elected representatives decide on the budget process and also the allocation of spending at the central level which is financed out of a common pool, so that it is largely borne by other jurisdictions. The local representatives often use tactics and incentives to influence the central decision processes for promoting the transfers with an advantageous distributive effect from their country or constituency position (Osterloh, Heinemann and Mohl, 2008: 02). The common pool theory has received a fair share of criticism. Scholars (Velasco, 2000; Khemani, 2004; Lienert, 2010; Krogstrup and Wyplosz, 2010) have mostly put their criticism on its contribution to fiscal indiscipline by subnational governments and other

government departments. They argue that when subnational governments are highly dependent on transfers from higher levels of government, they tend to accumulate budget deficits. Lienert (2010:1) stresses that since the common pool theory is observed at the budget preparation stage within the government and may be large at the legislative approval stage, more active participation by the legislature runs the risk that fiscal discipline deteriorates. In general, the legislature is likely to introduce changes that increase spending or reduces taxes specifically to the legislatures with unrestrained budget amendment authority. Notwithstanding the criticisms levelled against the common pool theory, the budget process in the South African legislatures is informed by this particular theory. Therefore, a discussion on the budget process becomes necessary.

7. The budget process and the role of the legislature

Public budgeting differs considerably across the world. The process depends on the country's legal framework and the organisational structure of government (Guess and Leloup, 2010). Government budgets are about the allocation of financial resources to government departments and other arms to enable the government to adequately respond to the needs of the citizens. The development of the budget is usually the government's single most important activity in any given year. The budget determines who gets what and when, it provides funds to implement new initiatives and sets policy. Government budgets, therefore, reflect the interaction between the legislature and the executive in providing the public with information on:

- How much has been allocated to the government departments and other organs of the state (Appropriation Bills/ Division of Revenue Act);
- Laws and regulations that govern public expenditure (Public Finance Management Act/ Treasury Regulations);
- Reporting on government performance and financial control; and
- Reporting on legislative scrutiny.

The budgetary oversight function of the legislature is part of the checks and balances that promotes good governance and accountability on how public financial resources are being used. That is why it is important for the public to understand the budget process. Ehrhart, Gardner, von Hagen and Keser (1999) define a budget process as a system of rules governing the decision making that leads to a budget, from its formulation, through its legislative approval, to its execution. In the context of the Gauteng provincial legislature, Lienet (2005:22) explains that the purpose of the budget process is to involve and share information with the Gauteng citizens in the twelve months planning, implementation and evaluation stages of government programmes. However, Gustafson (2003:2) cautions that in

most countries, the executive has the upper hand in the budget process, although there is often room for the legislative branch to also play an important role. Posner and Park (2007:5) add that comprehensive budgets which afford maximum control to budget decision makers over allocations and levels provide the greatest opportunities for influence for leaders, whether they are in legislative or executive branches.

Gustafson (2003:1) writes that in almost all political systems, it is generally accepted that the executive has the primary role in developing an annual budget and presenting it to the legislature. The legislature has the right to review, debate, in some cases amend, and approve or reject the spending plan proposed by the executive. Within this broad framework, the actual workings of the budget process vary from nation to nation based on the constitution, laws, legislative rules of procedure, balance of political power, tradition, and expectations of the political actors and the people. Lienert (2010:1) writes that "... for promoting good governance and fiscal transparency, the legislature's active engagement in the budget process is essential". Legislatures in most countries have the constitutional right to oversee national budgets, reviewing whether the government's allocation of resources is consistent with their constituents' demands as well as with the country's developmental objectives, scrutinising government expenditures and revenues (including loans and credits from the international institutions), ensuring that money is allocated to programs with legislative approval, and identifying instances of financial dishonesty and irregularity. Legislatures are expanding their roles and influence in budgeting in several different areas. This is not surprising given the wide variance of legislative activities in budgeting. Legislatures have taken steps to equip themselves with greater capacity and information to carry out these new responsibilities. It should be noted that, while there is a trend toward expanding legislative involvement in budgeting, the reforms themselves proceed from a very low level of involvement. Legislatures have often been given limited roles in the past due to real political, constitutional and technical constraints.

The legislature's main role in the budget process is to review and debate the government's draft *ex ante* budget (including its revenue estimates and spending plans) and authorise spending to implement the annual plan (Lienert, 2010:2). Perhaps the most significant change in legislative roles is the involvement in reviewing and approving overarching fiscal frameworks and targets to complement their traditional roles in enacting detailed appropriations. Stapenhurst and Pelizzo (2002:3), stress that it is important for the legislature to be provided with an opportunity for a pre-budget review of the government's main budget orientations and proposals for the upcoming fiscal years, especially the next year's annual budget strategy and main aggregates. Lienert (2010:2) elaborates that other steps in which the legislature may be involved include: pre-budget debates; review of the

government's medium-term budget strategy; approval of supplementary budgets that modify the initial budget adopted by the legislature; and examination of the report of the Auditor-General. This continuum of reviewing, debating, approving, implementing and reporting is thus referred to as the budget cycle. Figure 1 below serves to depict the budget cycle.

Figure 1: The budget cycle




Figure 1 indicates the generic process that legislatures follow in determining the government budgets. It can thus be deduced that the basic phases of the budget cycle include the following:

- Formulation and submission;
- Debate, approval and adoption;
- Execution; and
- Reporting and scrutiny.

Legislative oversight is nowhere more important than over the budget. The role of the legislature in most countries is to scrutinise and authorise revenues and expenditures, and to ensure that the national budget is properly implemented (Stapenhurst, 2004:1). The key legislative committees such as the Standing Committee on Public Account (SCOPA) and the Audit Committee play a pivotal role in the budget cycle. These committees study the supporting documents submitted by government departments and institutions supporting democracy (e.g., the Office of the Auditor-General; the Office of the Public Protector and the

Public Service Commission) and make some recommendations. The experiences of the legislative budget process differ across the countries. The following section, thus discusses the experiences of a legislature from the South African perspective.

8. Experiences of a South African legislature

According to Santiso (2004:47), the role of legislatures in public budgeting and public finance management has been largely overlooked in the first stage of economic reform. Folscher (2006:12) argues that an effective legislature is a necessary building block in a properly functioning public finance management system. The legislature requires an adequate budget to deliver on its mandates, particularly holding the executive accountable to ensure that laws passed are effectively implemented while ensuring that public funds are used economically and efficiently. It is important for the legislature to have a budget for promoting good governance and fiscal transparency. The importance of the legislature's active engagement in the budget process has been emphasised in the above sections. As the defender of the people's interests, a legislature must have budget to ensure that laws passed are properly implemented, to enhance policy makers to successfully achieve their objectives.

The South African Legislative Sector has, for many years, encountered a number of challenges that revolve around the budget process. The observation of this study suggests that the legislature does not make decisions on its own budget. Furthermore, the time allocated to adopt the budget is inadequate as the budget is mainly made by the executive and the legislature seems to simply rubberstamp. In view of the legislature's budget being determined by the executive, it becomes difficult for it to deliver on its mandates, such as effectively holding the executive accountable. This is a problem because the legislature is in a higher level of authority than the executive is, meaning that it should have powers of determining its own budget and ratifying those of other public departments.

The laws and regulations limit the legislature's authority in the budget process. The executive enjoys dominance over the legislature in the budget process. Gustafson (2003:11) also observed a similar pattern in the other legislatures when he states that "... the executive commonly seeks to concentrate power in its own hands in order to facilitate implementation of its priority policies, strengthen its party's chances of re-election, and simplify the budget process". The legislature often lacks the capacity to manage the process. Legislative oversight of government policies in general, and of the budget process in particular, is important in ensuring that governments carry out their duties efficiently, democratically, and in a fiscally responsible manner. A deduction from the above discussion suggests that there

are some barriers to the legislative budget process that need to be managed in order to enhance the legislature's active involvement in the budget process.

9. Impediments of the legislative budget process

The Westminster model of accountability is built on a foundation of three massive planks. These are the separation of powers, legislative scrutiny of executive actions, and ministerial responsibility (Loney, 2008:158). However, the inability of the legislature and the executive to maintain the separation of powers appears as the first impediment of the budget process. While there are numerous barriers to the legislative budget process, Gustafson (2003) highlights the three most common as follows:

- **Executive dominance:** The most important factor in executive dominance is the level of political support the executive enjoys in the legislature. Governments with supermajorities often are able to achieve legislative approval for their budget proposals essentially unchanged and are much less likely to face the legislature's efforts to modify their budgets. The executive may dominate the budgetary process by characterising legislative initiatives as ill-informed, illegitimate, destabilising, and even paradoxically anti-democratic.
- **Legislative hesitancy to become involved:** In emerging democracies with history of anti-democratic governments, there may simply be no precedent or clear path for legislative assertiveness in the budget sphere. Constitutional provisions may be vague and the rules of procedure for the legislative process may be new, incomplete, or non-existent. Legislatures may be hindered from influencing budget policy as Diamond (1999:98) puts it that "they lack the organisation, financial resources, equipment, experienced numbers and staff to serve as an autonomous point of deliberation in the policy process.
- **External factors:** External groups can have a chilling effect on legislative assertiveness in budgeting, particularly in emerging democracies (Gustafson, 2003:11-13).

Perhaps the above impediments of the legislative budget process have contributed towards the reforms in the legislative budget process as we know them currently.

10. Reforms in the legislative budget process

Legislatures realised that, as budgetary policy shifted to macro frameworks, they would become increasingly irrelevant for resource allocation and influence in ministries if they failed to become relevant in the macro budgetary arena. While the legislature gains new

influence in setting and approving macro targets, its degree of freedom in enacting appropriations may be somewhat diminished as a result.

The legislature's capacity to influence budget decisions is a function of both its authority over executive budget recommendations and its internal processes for decision making. With regard to the scope of legislative authority, Wehner (2004) classifies the legislatures into the following three categories of influence over budgeting:

- Budget-making legislatures have the capacity to amend or reject the budget proposals of the executive and to substitute one of their own.
- Budget-influencing legislatures can amend or reject executive budget proposals but lack the capacity to formulate their own independent budgets. The amending power is often constrained as well: many legislatures may cut but not add to executive budgets, while others may add as long as they find offsetting cuts.
- Legislatures with little or no budget role lack the capacity to reject or amend executive proposals in any substantive way, largely for fear of prompting the fall of the government (Wehner, 2004:50).

The categorisation of the legislatures is highly influenced by the nature of the relationship between the executive and the legislature. In some legislatures, the relationship between the executive and the legislature is very informal.

11. The role of informal executive-legislative relationship

Notwithstanding the potential scope of legislative authority, the extent of legislative modifications to executive proposals appears to be quite modest when examining just the formal record of actions taken in response to executive proposals. However, the extent of formal amendments is only one way to assess the impact of legislatures on budget formulation. Legislative officials often exercise informal influence over executive budgets before they are formally announced. Executive officials have incentives to anticipate and take into account potential legislative views and reactions as they develop their proposals, either through informal negotiation or through anticipatory behaviour. Posner and Park (2007:88) stress that the absence of amendments may reflect effective informal bargaining and negotiations between executive and legislative officials during the formulation process, where consultation effectively heads off legislative opposition.

12. The changing role in budget execution

The role of legislatures in budgeting extends from formulation to the execution of budget authority provided in appropriation acts. The legislature's intent on influencing public

budgeting must retain an abiding interest not only in which programmes and priorities gain funding but also in how they are carried out by executive agencies. Posner and Park (2007:91) postulate that in influencing budget execution, legislatures must strike a balance between the goal of exercising control over agencies' operations and the desire to promote efficiency by letting managers and programme experts administer programmes in accord with professional norms and values.

13. Recommendations

It is useful to conceptualise the overall budget system as a continuing and integrated budget cycle process, with legislatures playing a key role at different stages of the cycle. This cycle includes many institutions which, among others, form a country's governance system, namely, the executive, the public service, civil society and the legislature (Stapenhurst, 2004:2). Countries vary in the extent of their budgetary transactions subject to legislative review. Some countries have certain spending categories that are not voted by the legislature, including spending for certain public authorities. Decisions by some countries have brought a greater share of the budget into the ambit of legislative review and approval (Joyce, 2005:26).

Legislative strengthening is a long-term process. In order to respond to the challenges experienced by the legislature in the budget process, the laws and regulations which contribute to the limitations of legislature's authority within the budget process can be re-established with new laws considering the level of positions between the legislature and the executive. For oversight and effective budget process the legislature can pass a law that gives it the authority to determine its own budget. Furthermore, the creation of legislative budget offices or legislative fiscal divisions might be beneficial to the legislature in reducing the dominance of the executive over the legislature during the budget process. Accordingly, Anderson (2008:22) observes that legislatures have chosen to invest in separate legislative offices that specialise in budgetary reviews, finding that independent units can put the legislature on a more equal footing with the executive. This trend is slowly being introduced in the South African legislatures.

Loney (2008: 162) reports that legislatures founded on the Westminster model have moved towards the creation of independent legislative budget offices. He elaborates that "... in Canada, for example, the legislature has provided its members with support to scrutinise estimates by creating a legislative budget office designed to ensure truth in budgeting' with a legislative budget authority by creating the position of Legislative Budget Officer to provide objective analysis to members of the legislature and committees concerning the state of the nation's finances, trends in the national economy, and the financial cost of proposals under

consideration by the house". As independent office of the legislature, the legislative budget office is meant to assist the legislature to meet its constitutional mandates by providing all the information relating to budgeting and fiscal matters.

13. Conclusion

In developing and transition countries, a substantial number of legislatures are moving towards budgetary activism. In addition, there has been a recent shift in international financial institutions and donor agencies towards participation in setting development goals and strategies of developing countries (Gustafson, 2003:2). Legislatures are beginning to effectively use the budget process as a means of holding the executive accountable. Marshall (1991) writes that checks and balances are necessary to ensure good governance in budgeting in the medium to long term, which requires legislatures the answerability of the executive to the legislature, and the ability of the latter to take appropriate action in cases of poor performance.

The paper has argued, in line with Gustafson (2003) that developing the budget is such a complex process that most legislatures do not have the capacity to undertake this effort. The executive continues to dominate the legislature in the development and adoption of the budget, as well as on the allocation of funds. Legislatures have often found they need help to play credible roles in budgeting. It was noted that the legislature can be overwhelmed by the sheer magnitude of budget documents, their technical complexity, and the years of expertise possessed by executive central budget offices.

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SOCIAL NETWORKS, A PLATFORM FOR PEOPLE TO EXPRESS THEIR OPINIONS ON XENOPHOBIC ATTACKS IN SOUTH AFRICA

M.E. Rasakanya,

M.P. Sebola

University of Limpopo, South Africa

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the manner in which people use social networks to inform and discuss about xenophobic attacks that are taking place in South Africa. Social network is a new type of internet media wherein people are able to connect with others around the globe, be able to express and share their views about certain matters with others, and to communicate with other people instantly. Since social networking allows people to discuss about matters that affect them in their daily lives, people are now talking about xenophobic attacks taking place in South Africa. Data will be collected from different newspapers and articles that are discussing about the matter and be analysed through narration. Some people use social networks positively against xenophobic attacks whereas others use it negatively and promote the violence. These as a result, have both positive and negative impact to the country.

Key terms: Social media, Social networks, xenophobia, Communication

1. Introduction

In the past, people had little platform to communicate with each other since they were using telephones or letters. Gone are those days when people had the only options of sending messages to their friends and relatives using letters and short message services (SMSs) or by calling them. Those days were difficult because if you lost connections with other people, it was difficult to find them if you do not have their addresses or telephone numbers. But currently, a new instant way of connecting with people around the world regardless of their distance have been developed which is social networking. Mazman and Usluel (2011:01) explain that with this social networking, people are able to meet new friends and reconnect with old ones, talk about their daily lives, express their feelings about issues affecting them, share photos and videos; and communities are able to inform their community members about events taking place in their areas. According to Lachapelle (2011: 03) the use of social media and social networking are important as community development tool in that they build relationships, improve communications, share information instantly, informing and reaching large audience which was impossible in the past.

The only thing needed for these social networks to operate is internet and can be used on either cell phones or computers which have access to internet. With social networking, people are able to talk about breaking news happening around them and xenophobic attack is one of the topics being discussed. Ever since the outbreak of xenophobic attacks in South Africa, people are using social networks to inform the world about the seriousness of the violence in their provinces since it is the only platform that is easily accessible and the posts can reach a large number of audience instantly. Some people use these social networks to support the attacks and fuel the violence whereas others use them to be against xenophobic attack and advise others to have “Ubuntu” towards foreigners. Others have created groups to discuss about the effects of xenophobic attacks and in those groups everyone expresses his/her feelings regarding the matter. The problem arises when people post rumours about xenophobic attacks which are not true and this ends up fuelling the attacks. As a result, this paper aims to discover the consequences of social network usage by people to express themselves about xenophobic attacks in South Africa.

2. The concept of social networking and types of social networking sites

Social network is a style of social media to communicate and socialize with a large group of people instantly. Edosomwan, Prakasan, Kouame, Watson, and Seymour (2011) mention that social media and social networking are not the same things. They mention that in The Merriam-Webster dictionary, social media is defined as “forms of electronic communication (as Web sites for social networking and blogging) through which users create online communities to share information, ideas, personal messages, and other content (as videos)”; whereas the same source defines social networking as “the exchange of information or services among individuals, groups, or institutions; specifically: the cultivation of productive relationships for employment or business”. This is indeed the case because Boyd (2008:92) explains that social networks are genres of social media and defines social media as “the set of tools, services, and applications that allow people to interact with others using network technologies”. Zarecki (2014) explains that social networking, social bookmarking, blogs and micro blogs, sharing sites, affinity groups, and mass marketing with modern media are the six genres of social media. Lachapelle (2011: 02) explains that social networks are platforms in which people with common interest come together and build a relationship wherein those interests are discussed. As a result, social media is an umbrella term for these genres of which social network is one of them.

There are different types of social networks and according to Mislove (2009:01) which include: MySpace, Facebook, Orkut, LinkedIn, Flickr, YouTube, Google Video, LiveJournal and BlogSpot. Whatsapp, twitter, instagram and Blackberry Messaging (BBM) also fall under

the category of social networks. Mazman and Usluel (2011:01) explained that from the social networks mentioned, the most commonly used are Facebook, Myspace, Youtube, Flickr, and Linkedn. Twitter and whatsapp are also one of the social networks that are popularly used. The social networks mentioned have the same aim of allowing individuals to interact with a large group of people but they function differently. For the purpose of this paper the only social networks that will be discussed are Facebook, twitter and YouTube. Richter and Koch (2008) define twitter as a micro-blogging service used to send updates which are not longer than 140 characters to other twitter users and users are only allowed to send 10 tweets or messages per day. Mathews (n.d:05) explains that with Facebook one is able to post videos, status updates, photos, join groups and fan pages without being limited on how many characters or status updates one should paste. Terantino (2011:10) mentions that with YouTube people can upload, share and view videos regardless of the type of video being posted. Social networks are easily used and accessible since they cost less as compared to calling, SMSs and Multimedia messages (MMSs) and again, one can communicate with a large number of people instantly and this is why most people opt for them.

3. Xenophobic attacks in South Africa

In Harris (2002)'s view, xenophobia can be understood as a negative attitude, hatred, fear and dislike of foreign nationals by the host countries. Samari (2009:01) defines Xenophobia "as a sensation of fear or phobia toward a person or a given group of people deemed strange or foreign" and this lead to their rejection and not allowing them to do anything positive in their community. As a result, xenophobia can be regarded as hatred that results in a rejection toward foreign nationals.

In South Africa xenophobic attacks were happening since the 1990s up to date. According to Mpofo-Chimbga (2013) the main causes of xenophobia in South Africa are poverty, unemployment, crime, shortage of resources and lack of service delivery. South Africans attack foreign nationals, mainly those from African continent as mentioned by Citizenship Rights in Africa Initiative (CRAI) (2009:12) and they regard foreigners as a threat in their country. According to South Africans, foreigners are the one who commit crime, they are stealing their jobs since they accept low wages and most employers settle for workers who are cheaper; and they charge low prices of goods in their shops and cause a downfall of South Africans' businesses. Even though South Africa has been experiencing xenophobic attacks since 1990s, the one that took place in 2008 was very violent and triggered many people's attentions. Hayem (2013:77-78) explains that the 2008 south African xenophobic attacks started on May 11 in Alexandra and spread to other townships in Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga and Cape Town. Foreigners were brutally attacked and beaten by South

Africans; and their shops were looted and houses were destroyed. By the time the attacks ended in May 30, 62 people were being killed, hundreds were injured and thousands were left homeless.

Another xenophobic attack which was brutal occurred from March to April 2015. These attacks started in KwaZulu-Natal and then spread to Johannesburg and relate to the speech of Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini. His speech insinuated that foreigners should pack their backs and go back to their countries since they enjoy the wealth which is meant for South Africans. These attacks were also violent like the ones of 2008 but this time the violence did not claim many people's lives as it was reported in Winsor (2015) that seven people including three South Africans died, shops and houses of foreigners looted and others injured. Even though not many people died, this attacks frightened foreigners since some of them left the country and according to Mail and Guardian (21 April 2015) they are not willing to come back saying that they rather go back to their countries and be safe than to be killed in a foreign country even though they came to South Africa to search for greener pastures. The BBC (15 April 2015) reported that countries such as Malawi is willing to repatriate its citizens in South Africa for their safety.

4. Youth, social networks and xenophobia

Nowadays many people rely on social media for information especially youth since most of breaking news are also posted on social networks and the news that grab people's attention are the ones that talks about violence and brutality as compared to those that create peace. In many townships, when xenophobic violence starts one find that there are many people available in the setting of the attacks and most of them are between the age of 16 and 35. Those people are not there because they held meetings before and discussed what is going to happen during xenophobic attacks or there were people telling them through loudspeakers that they should start attacking foreigners in different spots. Most of them received messages on social networks which sent information about the proceedings of xenophobic attacks. And as a result, they tend to do what the message is saying. Even though the original writer or source of the message was just lying, other people take it seriously and that is when they start circulating such messages.

Keita (2015) mentioned that in January 2015 there was a report from United Nations stating that hate speech is one of the problems that many continents face and they are mostly transmitted using internet and traditional media. This is the case because even in South Africa many people post hate speech on social networks and this result into violence in which those who are against xenophobia are attacked through comments on different social

network sites. As a result, social media can do more harm than good in spreading violence as compared to building peace.

5. Opinions of people on social networks about xenophobia

Many people tend to social networks in order to express their feeling about xenophobic attacks in the country. Some people post misleading information without proof regarding xenophobic attacks in order to frighten foreigners, whereas others post comments which are against those attacks and therefore willing to protect foreigners in the country. As a result, social networking can have the influence of either spreading violence or decrease it because different people post different posts which are their true feelings about the violence. Others posts “supporting xenophobia posts” and others post “against xenophobia posts”. Those who are in favour of xenophobic attacks come up with ideas to threaten foreigners and then post them on social networks and the moment others see such posts, they share them with other social network users and this is how a misleading information spread.

5.1 Negative images and videos posted on social networks which are not related to 2015 xenophobic attacks

Since the beginning of xenophobic attacks in March 2015 people started talking about it on social networks wherein some posted pictures and videos and others were posting different comments about the attacks. Around different social networks are messages, images and videos of shock circulating for the world to see. There are posts of videos and pictures of people in pain and there are also messages of support for the victims. Social networks such as Facebook and twitter are the most sites which are popularly used to discuss and spread information about the attacks whereas videos were uploaded on YouTube.

Kate Wilkinson reported in van Wyk (2015) that there are images and videos of xenophobic attacks which have been uploaded on social networks and some of them are not even related to 2015 xenophobic attacks. The article in News24 (11 April 2015) explains that there is a video circulating around social networks which according to its posters was about young Zimbabweans being necklaced during the 2015 South African xenophobic attacks. It was then revealed that, that video was not taken during the xenophobic attacks of 2015 and there was no proof that the people being necklaced were foreigners. The footage was from SABC report which was broadcasted on 18 March 2015 about an attack which took place at Sondela informal settlement in Rustenburg wherein a group of men were being accused of murder and for that reason they were then necklaced. There is also an image in van Wyk (2015) which shows a man been engulfed by flames in the presence of two police officers. Van Wyk explains that the image was not about 2015 xenophobic attack but was a picture

taken during the 2008 xenophobic attacks and the victim was a Mozambican national, Ernesto Alfabeto Nhamuave, after he was set alight outside Johannesburg. This image was taken seven years ago but the original posters of the image do not mention that it was a 2008 image. Instead, they claim that the image is a representation of the 2015 xenophobic violence.

The other image was the one which shows the remaining of a burned body which was claimed to be of a foreign national burned in Durban. Van Wyk (2015) uploaded the image to Google image search to track its origin and the results were that the image was of an armed robber and numerous websites were stating different stories about it. There were different results from Google image with different websites. One of the websites (<http://naijagists.com/>) according to van Wyk mentions that the image was taken in Nigeria, Delta State and was published in July 2014 and the victim was a suspected robber that had been burned to death after robbing church members at gunpoint; whereas the other website (<http://urhobotoday.com/>) mentions that it was a news article from January 2013 and the image was showing the remains of a burned suspect who robbed and killed a pregnant women in Warri, Nigeria. An image of a man whose back has been hacked was also circulating on social network claimed to be a victim of 2015 xenophobic attacks. Pikoli (2015) explains that the picture was taken during an incident which took place in Nigeria and the image existed since 2012.

All the images and videos posted on social media which are not related to the 2015 xenophobic attacks indicate that people just post any violent video or image as long as it suits the current status of the violence even though it is not related. They do so just to fuel the violence because the moment foreigners see them, especially the ones that stay in the country of origin of the victims; they will become angry and will want to avenge the lost lives of their fellow citizens. This indicate that people post images, videos and posts on social networks without having full proof of them and as a result, this leaves a bad impact.

6. Negative Posts and comments of xenophobic attacks

In social networks, people do not only post videos and images which are not the true reflection of what is happening during the violence. There are also posts and comments circulating on social networks wherein those posts are just ideas of one individual and spread them to other users and people end up believing them. Evans (2015) mentions that there is a post on social networks that states that there is a transport full of people who are going to attack foreign nationals in certain areas during the xenophobic outbreak which started in March 2015. Again, people have been receiving a post on Facebook, whatsapp and instagram stating that foreigners are given a month to leave townships and if not so,

they will be attacked. A rumour like this is so alarming and will frighten foreigners. As a result, those who do not wish to become victims will run for their lives and also leave the country. Evans (2015) elaborates that the other post circulating was that there were two Malawians whom their heads had been chopped off during the xenophobic attacks. This was just one individual's idea to scare other foreigners and the person who posted this does not have an idea that such posts can backfire on South Africans since Malawians might start attacking them saying that they have killed their brothers.

In Nair (2015) KwaZulu-Natal police spokesman Colonel Jay Naicker states that the information spreading on social networks that Boko Haram is threatening to revenge xenophobic attacks on South Africans which are currently in Nigeria is just a false rumour. Such a rumour was spread on social network sites since it was found in an article from a Nigerian newspaper which according to Lindeque and Whittles (2015) was "incorrect". Nair (2015) further states that in Durban parents were advised to pick their children from schools mentioning that attackers have entered the classrooms. The following day after the circulation of the message most parents did not send their children to school since they received messages explaining that the entire schooling system will be shut down after claims that foreign children and teachers have been attacked in schools. This post has an impact on the education of children in Durban since the children will not be taken to school until the violence is over as they will miss most lessons whereas children in other provinces are going to schools.

6.1 Positive posts and images against 2015 xenophobic attacks

Even though people were promoting xenophobic attacks on social networks, others were condemning it. Regardless of negative rumours, videos and images regarding xenophobic violence; other people were posting positive comments and supporting foreigners in fighting against the violence. On different social networks especially twitter, there were different hashtags that were created to condemn xenophobic attacks. To mention few hashtags, Sithole (2015) listed some of them which were named #NoToXenophobia, #WeAreAfrica, #Loveafrica, #peaceMarch. Many people have been commenting on this hashtags to show solidarity and mentioning that South Africa is one of African countries as a result, South Africans should stop attacking fellow Africans.

There were also organisations that were formed to put actions of "#NoToXenophobia" to practice. William (2015) mentions that twitter rant organizers, Thabang Manyelo and Sandiselwe Gamede circulated messages asking other twitter users to join them in a protest named #SilentProtest at Luthuli house. The protest was to show the government that other South Africans are fighting these attacks and so shall government. The organizers

mentioned that they need government to do something about xenophobic attacks than just making a statement and then sit back. Social media is indeed a powerful tool to spread information as people who responded to the tweets of #SilentProtest were more than hundred and having the same interest of condemning xenophobia.

7. The effects of negative posts or rumours on social networks about xenophobia

The moment a post, either a negative or a positive one, is posted on social network there is no faster way such post can be deleted unless if the original poster decides to remove it. Again, even if the government or ICT decides to remove it, they do so after some time and the damage would have been done and there will be no way to undo it even if the government appeal that the post was just a rumour. Negative posts on social networks about xenophobia have a bad impact on foreign nationals living in South Africa since they will no longer be comfortable in the townships that they are staying and they will at all times be scared that they might be attacked anytime. An example of such posts is the one of a rumour that was circulating on social networks about a transport full of South Africans who will be attacking foreigners in different townships of Gauteng. The time foreigners see such posts, they will fear for their lives knowing that they are in danger, not knowing that the post is not true but is someone's idea to threaten them. As a result, some of them end up walking in the streets with weapons such as pangas, machete and knives to protect themselves in case they are attacked and this was the case as evidenced by an article by Laccino (2015) which had an image of foreigners carrying weapons in the streets to protect themselves.

Social networks have negative impact to other countries when it comes to violence. This is because when negative comments and different images and rumours are posted on social networks, they start circulating and other countries also see them. For example, the video that circulated on social networks claiming to be of Zimbabweans being necklaced will have a bad impact to people in Zimbabwe since they will end up avenging their people by attacking South Africans who are in that country as this was the case that happened in Mozambique when they started attacking South Africans who are currently in that country and stoning vehicles that have a South African number plate and this was mentioned by Smith (2015). In van Wyk (2015) it is mentioned that images and videos which are uploaded on social networks that are not related to 2015 xenophobic attacks have a harmful effect as compared to those that are indeed a reflection of what happened during the 2015 xenophobic attacks and such images and videos should be shared with caution. This is because, after foreigners see such videos and images, they will start to be angry and want to revenge whereas such posts are just lies.

8. Actions taken towards posts of xenophobic attacks on social networks

Negative posts, images and videos spread faster on social networks than the positive ones and the rapid spreading of such information can do more harm in the violence. An article from Workmail website mentioned that YouTube is busy taking down videos and images which were captured during different scenes of violence and uploaded on this site and replace them with the following message “this video has been removed as a violation of YouTube's policy on shocking and disgusting content”.

In Magubane (2015) ministers, including Home Affairs minister Malusi Gigaba and State Security minister David Mahlobo have warned those who are busy sending out fictitious messages about xenophobia that they will be dealt with by the law enforcement agencies. Van Zyl (2015) reports that there is a local internet which is xenophobic and the Minister of Telecommunications and Postal Services, Siyabonga Cwele, urge for this site to be removed based on the Electronic Communications and Transactions (ECT) Act which allow service providers to remove offensive comments on social networks. The minister also urged for any comment that is xenophobic or racist to be taken down.

9. Recommendations

The government should advise the Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) to have an electronic system that automatically detect a violence posts on social network and either erase or block it before it is spread. There should be an education to social network users on the danger of negative use of social networks since such can harm the country at large. The problem with South African government is that when they threaten to do something, they tend to not do anything at all and this makes people to continue doing what was forbidden. As a result, since they mention that there will be consequences for those who post violent images and videos and rumours about xenophobic attacks, those consequences should be put to practice otherwise people will keep on posting such things knowing that the Government will do nothing to them except to threaten them with words.

10. Conclusion

This paper was a discussion of the way in which people use social network to express themselves about matters that affect them in their daily lives. The recent 2015 xenophobic attack is one of the matters being discussed. This xenophobic attack was not an idea of people to start attacking foreigners but was started because of the words of King Zwelithini of Zulu land saying that foreigners should leave the country. This violence spread from KwaZulu-Natal to other provinces in South Africa and this is what made 2015 xenophobic

attack one of the top topics on social networks in which sites like Facebook, YouTube and twitter were popularly used. It was found that different people use different social networks to post different ideas. Some of them post rumours which they are not sure about and those rumours spread faster; and others post comments and updates that are against xenophobia. Those who post rumours do so without realizing the damage that such posts might do to South Africa and to the countries which their citizens are currently in South Africa. With positive posts people were able to voice themselves about how they think the attacks affect the image of the country and also posted posts to advice others to stop xenophobia. The government tried to warn those who are uploading posts without having full facts to post them with caution or else they will face consequences.

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XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE IN DURBAN: A REFLECTIVE ANALYSIS

*B. Naidoo
D.D. Tewari
University of Zululand, South Africa*

Abstract

Poor economic and unstable political environment in various African countries has been a major factor that has led to increase in the inflow of migrants into South Africa thereby placing intense pressure on resources which often leads to tensions and violence. Over the years this tension manifested itself in violence leaving many dead and injured and equally and destruction of property. The current study briefly reviews the xenophobic problems in the Durban Central Business district, with specific focus upon the trigger factors for xenophobic attacks and nature of composition of foreign nationals and their involvement in crime. The paper examines some of the underlying issues leading to Xenophobia in 2008 and 2015. It specifically examines the formal and informal business sector as a contributor to violence. It also examines the different types of business conducted by foreigners in the city centre. It highlights Operation Fiela and some of the actions taken by various role players to address this serious issue of violence

Keywords: Xenophobia, Émigré, Durban, Foreigners, Human rights

1. Introduction

This paper examines the possible reasons for the outbreak of xenophobic violence, which occurred in South Africa in May 2008 and during April 2015. The demographics or profile of the Durban émigré community is one of diversity, with communities emanating from southern, northern and eastern Africa to the Asian countries. Whilst during the apartheid era, the white South African government exercised a level of tolerance to migrant labour communities; it never experienced any xenophobic tendencies because the focus then was to fight against the oppressive apartheid government. “Shortly after the installation of a democratic government, the South African policy changed to one of racial tolerance to members of the African diaspora which encouraged large scale immigration from African Countries to that of intolerance (Crush and Ramachandran, 2010; Morris, 1998; Steenkamp, 2009).

Today many of the émigré community members in Durban have settled as homogenous groups in identified areas and have created a support structure among themselves despite working outside their residential areas. Some recent estimates suggest that some 79 percent migrants now came from the rest of Africa, about 17 percent from Europe and other countries, and only 3 percent from India and other Asian countries (Wilson, 2015). The estimate of illegal immigrants in the country ranges between 3 to 8 million (Adepoju, 2001). According to the United Nations study on international migration, there are two main causes of xenophobia and racism, One, migration has become an international phenomenon; Two, increased competition for limited resources especially among the population living below poverty line (United Nations, 2001). This then leads to the added burden on state resources. Researches have also shown that inequalities and poor economic conditions give rise to tensions and manifestations of xenophobia. Xenophobia undermines the principle of equality, fairness, social justice, international human right and the positive developmental potential of migration (Crush and Ramachandran, 2010). It is worthy of note that despite the increasing acknowledgement of the developmental benefit of migration to the local economy, its contribution to economic development is rarely appreciated (UNDP, 2009; Crush and Ramachandran, 2010).

Hence, this study focuses primarily on the xenophobic sentiments that prompted the recent violent attacks on some foreign national throughout eThekweni Metro area of Durban as there are several other successful foreign owned businesses who were not victims of such aggression. Furthermore, the study also highlighted areas of settlement in the city centre and types of economic activity of each of the diverse émigré community. Furthermore, considering the fact that Durban is a tourist destination as well as hosting city for major world events, the study also highlight the economic implication of xenophobic violence on the Durban.

2. Conceptualisation of xenophobia

The term xenophobia in general involves negative social representations and practices that discriminate against immigrants, refugees and migrants (Rydgren 2004; Roemer & Van der Straeten 2007). However the working definition of the term xenophobia adopted for purpose of this study is perceived to mean as the "deep dislike of non-nationals by nationals of a recipient state" (South African Human Rights Commission 1998). Whilst such a definition is generally adequate internationally, Harris contends that in the South African context this limited definition is misleading, because xenophobia in South Africa "is not just an attitude: it is an activity ... it is a violent practice that results in bodily harm and

damage (Harris2002). It is this pattern of hostility that constitute a violation of gross human rights and undermines the integrity , harmony, ethics and values of the country.

3. Literature review

The literature study sensitised the researcher to the relevant content in the literature. After the research findings have been analysed and interpreted, they can be related to the existing knowledge in the literature about the phenomenon under study (Talbot 1995:430). Therefore this paper is divided into 6 sections. Section 2 gives a brief background of migration into South Africa. Current legislations on South African immigration are outlined section 3. The state of the Durban émigré community is outlined in section 4; the trigger factors and economic competition that foreigner community create are discussed in section 5. The role of foreigners in crimes is discussed section 5. Final conclusions are discussed in section 6.

3.1 Migration into South Africa

Immigration into South Africa is not a new occurrence or a phenomenon. Migrant labourers flowed into the country more than 50 years ago, spanning from Europe to Southern African countries, to provide labour into the mainstream economy of South Africa. During apartheid, choice for both skilled and unskilled migrant labour force was but few and restricted mostly to the mining and agriculture sectors. According to the Maja and Nakanyane (2007), many European migrant labours returned to Europe and only migrant labourers from Mozambique, Swaziland and Malawi continued to work in South Africa. The migration still continues to this day and many of the émigré communities are subjected to hardships such as exploitation and abuse, mostly from the business and the hospitality sectors (Maharaj, 2009). Although the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the South African Government have set certain defining minimum standards for the treatment of foreign nationals, the exploitation of these workers still persists mainly due to the simple economics of demand and supply (Maja and Nakanyane, 2007). During the liberation struggle against Apartheid, many of our freedom fighters left the shores of South Africa and ventured to other countries on the African continent, fighting for the freedom from abroad. They created an international awareness and drew attention to the inhumane treatment in South Africa of the majority of the citizens. It was during this time that many of our citizens were given refuge and political status and hospitality in several African countries. Many of these countries were the target of attacks by overt and covert security agencies but nonetheless they continued to provide support to our countrymen. It is predominately through this hospitality that when freedom was gained, it was incumbent upon our

government to extend its support to these countries as a gesture of reciprocation (Maharaj, 2009).

According to the Maja and Nakanyane (2007), with the advent of democracy, South Africa became a more attractive destination for immigrants seeking employment. The rising unemployment and the unabated civil disorder in this countries made it a dominant feature to seek a better life in South Africa with the hope of returning to their countries when things, progressively, got more encouraging (Maja and Nakanyane, 2007). The opening of the borders, together with the porous nature of our borders, attracted many thousands, seeking refuge from political persecution and economic freedom. Migration is determined by basically two factors; namely the distress that drives one away from his or her country of origin and the benefit that attracts an individual to a certain foreign country (Pillay, 2012).

3.2 South African position on immigration

The current legislation and agreements regulating asylum seekers and refugees can be summarised as follows to which the Republic of South Africa is bound:

- The Universal Declaration of Human Rights as adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on the 15 December 1948.
- The 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
- The 1967 UN protocol Relating to the status of Refugees
- The AU Convention Governing the Specific aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa(1969)
- The UNHCR handbook and guidelines on procedures and criteria for the determining of Refugees
- Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996
- Basic agreement between the SA Government and the UN High Commissioner of Refugees (2000)
- Refugees Act 1998, (Act 130 of 1998 and the Refugee regulations (2000)
- Immigration Act 2002(Act 13 of 2002)
- Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 2000 (Act 3 of 2000)
- Refugee Appeal Board rules 2003.

The South African Government also signed the agreements with “NO RESERVATIONS” clause meaning that: (1) there will be no camps established for the refugees; (2) there will be no restriction of movement placed on the refugees, and, (3) the government will not be responsible for the provision of social assistance (Basic agreement between the SA Government and the UN High Commissioner of Refugees (2000). This effectively means

that each and every refugee is free to undertake and pursue his/her economic advancement in South African society. The brief discussion above indicates the parameters which SA has chosen for herself. On one hand, she allows reasonably free movement of people from other countries. On the other hand, limited resources force her not to provide some basic minimum social assistance.

3.3 The Durban émigré community

The émigré community in Durban comprises of communities from Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Tanzania, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Burundi and Ethiopia from Africa and Pakistan, India, China and Thailand. The unique feature of the groups, particularly from Africa, is to find them living as a group. This enables them to form support structures to access services of mutual benefit. Many of these migrants have been weakened by their unfortunate position and find themselves exploited by employers and landlords and often government officials.

To date, there are no accurate statistics to depict the exact demographics of immigrants in Durban or any other area in South Africa. This is largely due to the free movement, behavioural patterns and covert nature of how undocumented émigré communities operate in the country. In most cases, it is characterised by mistrust of civil and civic services officials whom they view with suspicion, hence reluctant to be enumerated. What is generally known is that they tend to find solace and comfort within other foreign residents in the country. While the numbers of those legally travelling into the country, through approved visas, are determined from the movement control system of the Department of Home Affairs, the same cannot be said about verifying the number of undocumented persons. Unlike undocumented migrants, the refugees can be verified by the Refugee Centre of the Department of Home Affairs; they are enumerated and checked on a regular basis to give information on the status of their application. Statistics South Africa attempted to enumerate the Émigré community in 2011 but found many were not willing to have themselves counted or interviewed. The émigré communities that have settled in Durban are somewhat different from those that have settled in townships areas. Further the non-availability of biometric information made it extremely difficult to verify immigrants and even worse was in the case of death to identify their nationality and next of kin.

The immigrants who reside in the townships have been fully integrated to a large extent with the local communities, while those in the city have found themselves grouped into parts of the city with their own identity. Many have learned the local languages and converse with local people. Some have started families with local communities. The Nigerians have settled themselves in the city centre of the Point area and the Chinese in the

Beachfront and Durban North. The Somalian and Sudanese have settled in the Albert Park Residential complex while most Burundians have moved further west into the Warwick area. The Pakistani group has settled in the Grey Street area and Victoria Street (Hunter and Skinner, 2001). The poorer of the groupings, without employment or income, have found home in the abandoned buildings, under bridges and other open spaces. There are little or no ablution facilities in abandoned buildings and they are forced to defecate and urinate in the open or side of buildings thus contributing in the degradation of the city.

The Ethekwini Municipality, in its quest to rejuvenate the inner city, implemented several programs under the auspices of the Safer City Project. One of the projects was to identify bad, abandoned and unserviceable building and to prosecute owners. To date, 13 buildings were identified in the city. Utilizing the various laws and by-laws, 62 notices of prosecutions were served on landlords. Many of these matters are still pending in court and two buildings were successfully shut down. Through its program of urban renewal, the city has succeeded in ensuring that buildings were compliant in terms of the various building regulations and landlords are now committed to the restoration of their properties. According to Mr Hoosen Moola, the Project Manager of Bad Buildings in Durban said, “Many of the landlords in the city continue to exploit the foreigners by providing sub-standard and unsuitable accommodation to the émigré community. Normal office accommodation without the necessary infrastructure would house about 300 persons on a single floor, which is overcrowded with very limited ablutions facilities. Little respect and privacy is provided for families where the accommodation is open plan” (Moola, 2015).

The inadequate and inferior sewage facilities create a serious health hazard. In many instances, urine and faeces are littered on the steps of the building (Moola, 2015). With no lifts in operation, they utilise a rope to lift groceries up to the higher floors. To their credit, they have developed their own early warning intelligence systems to detect police actions and operations to protect their fellow countrymen against arrest (Naicker, (2015). Due to the extremely high demand for living space, the unscrupulous landlords have resorted to converting shipping containers to living space. The containers are divided into rooms, communal space and food preparation area. The living space in a 40 feet by 40 feet container is divided into three tiers where beds are placed on rent (Moola, 2015). Each tenant paying between R10 and R30 per night depending on the number of hours they wished to rest. Once again the facilities are very restricted and pose a serious threat to fire and health safety. One would shudder to think, what the consequences would be if a fire breaks out in such a facility.

The émigré community, in most instances, finds employment in the city doing meagre labour work and are often classified as parasites, who take away local employment due to the cheaper wages paid by employers. They have been given a derogatory term of “Amakwerekwere”. Most of the foreigners are attached to the informal sector in the building and construction trade.

3.4 Immigrant economy and trigger factors

The foreigners have established themselves well into the economy and have contributed to the economy of Durban. A zone intelligence profile was undertaken to establish the number of business that operated in the city centre. To date they operate vibrant business in the city and employ many local people and foreigners in their businesses. It was noted that in many places, a single shop was divided into three or four trading entities, to operate various types of business (Hunter and Skinner, 2001). This was a rather innovative way to ensure that the rent was affordable. These businesses operate in some instances against the business regulations. For example, a salon, a gold exchange and a clothing shop operated collectively, in a very limited space. In many cases, it was found that building regulations were flouted and posed a serious fire threat. Most of the retail stores in the Grey / Victoria/ Queen/ Albert/ Prince Edward and other streets in the Central Business District were sold or leased by the local communities to foreign business owners (Table 1). Table 1 shows a list of businesses operating in the CBD area of Durban. The data was collected through a physical visit and interview process of each business, including facts such as the owners and nationality.

Table 1: Summary of Businesses Owned by Foreigners in Durban, 2015

COUNTRY	NO	BUSINESS TYPE	ADDRESS OF BUSINESS
BANGLADESH	36	SUPERMARKET, GROCERY, CELLULAR	ALBERT VICTORIA, QUEEN, SOLDIERS WAY, RUSSEL, UMGANI AND WARWICK
BURUNDI	13	CLOTHING, RESTAURANT, SALON	PARK, ST GEORGES, LANCERS AND UMGENI
CAMEROON	2	MIXED GOODS	MUTUAL ARCADE
CHINA	54	CLOTHING, ELECTRONIC	COMMERCIAL, VICTORIA, WEST, ALBERT, FIELD, QUEEN, PINE , BERE A
CONGO AND DRC	44	CLOTHING, SALONS, PUB,	QUEEN, LANCERS ROAD, WILLS ROAD, BEREA RD

		BARS, REPAIRS AND PANEL SHOPS	GILLESPIE AND BEACH ROAD
EGYPT	1	COSMETICS	PRINCE EDWARD ST
ERITERIA	10	CLOTHING AND FOOD	PRINCE EDWARD VICTORIA AND ST GEORGES
ETHIOPIAN	97	CLOTHING, GENERAL DEALER , RESTAURANT, SHOES, TUCK SHOPS, SUPERMARKET	WEST, UMGENI, ST GEORGES, ALBERT PRINCE EDWARD, VICTORIA, QUEEN , UMGENI
GABON	1	GROCERY OPEN FLEA MARKET	WORKSHOP
GHANA	9	HAIR SALON	LANCERS ROAD AND ALBERT STREET
GREECE	2	FOOD OUTLET	PINE STREET
INDIA	10	CELLULAR AND ASSECORIES	FIELD SREET, VICTORIA STREET AND ST GEORGES STREET
JORDAN	1	PERFUMES	COMMERCIAL STREET
KOREAN	3	HAIR PIECES	MURCHIES PASSAGE
MALAWIAN	4	CLOTHING AND SALON	WORKSHOP AREA
MOZAMBIQUE	3	CLOTHING AND HATS AND SEWING	WORKSHOP AND RICHARDS ROAD
NIGERIAN	10 9	HAIR PIECES, BARS, GOLD, EXCHANGE, CLOTHING, DVD, CELLULAR, SALOON	COMMERCIAL ROAD, WORKSHOP, VICTORIA , QUEEN STREET AND LANCERS ROAD, GILLESPIE AND MG ROAD
PAKISTANIT	75	CELLULAR PHONE , CELL REPAIRS AND CLOTHING	SOLDIERS WAY, UMGENI, VICTORIA , QUEEN, PRINCE EDWAD, ST GEORGES AND WEST ST
RWUNDA	2	CLOTHING	QUEEN STREET AND BEREA
SENEGAL	37	CLOTHING	FIELD STREET, WORKSHOP
SIERRA LEON	1	BOTIQUE	COMMERCIAL
SOMALIAN	9	CLOTHING	ALBERT STREE AND FIELD STREET
TANZANIAN	1	FOOD OUTLET	ST GEORGES STREET
UGANDA	2	CLOTHING	ST GEORGES STREET

ZIMBABWE	7	SALON AND SUPERMARKET	LANCERS ROAD AND FIELD STREET
Total	54 8	-	-

Source: Based on Survey by Authors (2015)

The xenophobic violence of 2008 and 2015 was directed mostly at the immigrants from Africa. During this period, many Chinese, Pakistani, Bangladeshi and African migrants conducted their businesses or sought employment in the city. The attacks were only directed at African immigrants and two looting incidents were reported. The members of the Asian community were not attacked. Most of them were easily identified by their accent, although they could speak Isizulu quite well. According to Maharaj and Rajkumar (1997), "COSATU is shocked and disgusted to note the problem of xenophobia violence has grown to unacceptable proportions. What angered COSATU was that the violence was directed at migrants of African origin". The violence once again in April / May 2015 was directed at the African émigré community and not against any other group from the Asian countries. One of the factors advocated by many in the media and social circles is that the cause of the violence is not hatred, but more of intolerable levels of poverty, unemployment and crime. The challenge of fleeing their own country and now finding themselves in similar situations left them vulnerable to exploitation at all levels and sectors.

This has a tendency to make them more determined to stand up and defend themselves which in turn aggravates the situation. Many of them showed open defiance to the locals and indicated that they were willing to defend themselves and be killed rather than return home to experience the same persecution. The attacks against foreign nationals in the EtheKwini Metro took place primarily in the Isipingo, Umlazi, Chatsworth, Clare Estate and Sydenham areas. The trigger for the wave of violence in 2015 was sparked by a labour dispute at the KwaJeena store in Isipingo, where the owner was accused of employing foreigners rather than locals and exploiting them with lower wages (Hunter and Skinner, 2001). The South African families renting out houses and containers for spaza shops and other business were also targeted for attack. Some of the containers and premises were attacked and destroyed. Many of the foreigners who sleep inside the premises and containers were attacked with petrol bombs. Many of the foreigners also armed themselves with machetes, bush knives and petrol bombs. In Durban Central area, the police recovered more than 20 petrol bombs (Naicker, 5 May 2015).

An important feature of the attacks was that it was small by nature but sporadic indicating the possibility that a small group of trouble causers were carrying out the attacks. The pattern and the intervals of the attack would give credence to this assumption. There was no reason to suspect that the attacks were centrally planned and executed. The majority of the local communities were not involved nor did they support attacks against the foreigners. The Asian community was not viewed as threat, as they were not perceived as competition for access to resources. There is no doubt that this has had profound implication for Durban, taking into account that it is a conference hosting and tourist destination. Already the Tourism Indaba in July 2015 resulted in many cancellations and the number of delegates being reduced.

The underlying causes of the violence can be attributed to:

- Competition for resources
- Competition for employment opportunities and other economic activity
- Business rivalry between local and émigré businessmen
- Involvement in criminal activity
- Misinformation spread by the social media groups.

It has been alleged that His Majesty Kings Goodwill Zwelitini's speech, at a public gathering gave rise to the recent violence in the KwaZulu-Natal. This matter was addressed and His Majesty called an Imbizo with his subjects, together with the Honourable Premier of KwaZulu Natal, Premier Senzo Mchunu. The Imbizo was attended by more than 30 000 people, where the speech was clarified (News24, 20 April 2015). The political leadership played a pivotal and constructive role in allaying fears of the entire community, and engaged with all role players to end the senseless attacks. The Premier, in his quest to find answers as to the reasons for the attacks, appointed the Premiers Reference Group headed by Judge Navi Pillay (former UN Commissioner for Human Rights) to investigate the issues surrounding the attacks on the Foreigners. The Mayor of EtheKwini Municipality offered humanitarian services to the affected and displaced foreigners. The city provided shelters at the Ispingo (276) Chatsworth (1000) and Greenwood Park (196), where they provided various meals and accommodation and civic services from the Department of Home Affairs. They were provided 24 hour accommodation and police protection against any threats. They remained at the shelters until they were repatriated to their home country or reintegrated with the local community (Moola, 20 August 2015).

Future problems are said to be the following types:

- The authority of state has been challenged and clear disrespect of laws
- The displacement of law enforcement resources and increase of criminal opportunism
- Reputation damage to the country in the eyes of the community
- Disruption of informal economy
- Weakening of social cohesion and community harmony

Community mobilization is critical, if one is to address the problems experienced in 2008 and 2015. There needs to be constructive engagement with the community and the foreigners. Consultative forums must be established to iron out any problem causative factors and to address the issues at the most earliest opportune time. The communities must be integrated into the community structures such as the Community Policing forums, Ward and Safety Committees. Since the 2008 violence outbreak, several of these groupings discussed the formation of associations and cooperation centres to have some or other negotiating advantages. Since 2008, the Chinese, Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities formed themselves into associations to support their own groups. The African groups formed themselves into one group under the guidance of the Independent Projects Trust in Durban. The groups meet with police and other government structures on a regular basis. They also assist in the early warning intelligence for attacks or pass on information on illegal activities. Complaints of police corruption are brought forward by these associations.

3.5 Immigrant crime

The émigré community has been accused of being the single biggest factor in the commission of crime and crime generators in the city. There is no basis for this claim, since the crime over the past seven years has shown a steady decline in the Durban city centre. (<http://www.dlive> 09 Aril 2014). What is true is that the number of crimes committed by foreigners has shown an increase, but there are, however, no accurate statistical data to authenticate the allegation. A number of operations have been instituted against the escalation of crime in the city of Durban and throughout the country. Through this operation several local and foreigners were arrested. Several operations are aimed at reclaiming buildings that were occupied by homeless people including foreigners.

These operations are fully integrated, that involved cross section of role players such as the Police, Metro Police , City business Units , Home Affairs, Safer Cities, security companies etc. that are aimed at reducing crime in the area.

The recent operation, Operation Fiela, which was launched, caused confusion to many and was perceived to mean it was directed at foreigners only. In actual fact, it was operationalized to bring down the levels of serious crimes. Lawyers for Human Rights, David Cote, said that they will monitor the situation and if necessary approach another court. He said, "Principles behind the operation are very problematic. We are concerned that it is actually feeding into further xenophobia and almost institutionalised violence against foreign nationals, whereas it as initially meant to stop the violence and to ensure everybody is safe in South Africa." This matter was challenged in High Court but was dismissed. The allegation that Operation Fiela was aimed at rooting out foreigners has proved inconclusive.

The number of arrests for illegal foreigners had shown a decline, as can be seen below:

Table 2: Summary of Illegal Foreigners Arrested in Durban, SA in 2015

MONTH	NUMBER OF ARREST
JANUARY	268
FEBRUARY	397
MARCH	282
APRIL	286
MAY	321
JUNE	93
JULY	73

Source: SAPS: Communication Service, KwaZulu-Natal (2015)

This information was extracted from the media reports by issued the Head of Communication for SAPS in KwaZulu-Natal, Colonel Jay Naicker and Captain Elliot Zwane. These figures shown hereunder are Operation Fiela since its inception on the 1 May to 31 August this year. It must be noted that not all of the suspects arrested for these crimes were foreigners. A sizeable amount of them were also found to be South African citizens. A brief summary of data related to foreigners arrested and crimes committed in Durban is given in Table 3.

Table 3: Summary of Foreigners Arrested and Crimes Committed in Durban (May-August, 2015)

ARREST FOR CRIMES	TOTAL NUMBER
Murder and Attempted Murder	39
Rape	17
Assault GBH and Common Assault	172
Possession of unlicensed Firearm and ammunition	86
Possession of Dangerous Weapon	27
Undocumented immigrants	1092
Liquor Act	210
Housebreaking	62
Theft	104
Employment of illegal foreigners	10
Drunken Driving	117
Malicious Damage to Property	26
Gambling	18
Road Traffic Act	154
Camping Act	148
Other crimes less serious crimes	1290
TOTAL	3574

Source: SAPS Communication Service, KwaZulu-Natal (2015)

As can be seen from above the object of the Operation was not to target undocumented persons but rather people who were involved in criminal acts throughout the country. It would appear comments contrary to the objects of this operation is somewhat misplaced.

4. Conclusion

With the advent of a democratic government, the South African policy changed to one of racial tolerance to members of the African diaspora which encouraged large scale immigration from Africa Countries to that of intolerance with incidences of xenophobic violence reported in parts of the country Durban inclusive. There is no doubt that this has had profound implication for Durban, taking into account that it is a conference hosting and tourist destination. The number of delegates to the 2015 Tourism Indaba reduced due to cancellations stemming from incidences of xenophobic attacks. The government was very decisive in their condemnation and in terms of providing aid and civic support to the victims and once again reiterated that no foreigner will be forced to leave the country. They were

however informed that the government will provide all consular support for those wanting to leave. The engagement with the Foreign Governments Agencies was immediate and they were regularly briefed on the status of the victims. The United Nations were consulted on a regular basis and kept abreast of the developments. Municipalities provided several shelters for the victims and engaged communities on the reintegration of the foreigners into their communities. Through the reintegration programme to date almost all of the displaced persons were reintegrated into the community. It must be pointed out that many left their original areas out of fear and were not rooted out by the communities. The Municipality of Ethekewini has engaged with community through a program called Communities in Dialogue to identify trigger and problematic factors and to eliminate as early as possible. Forums should be established with every community and especially to assist the criminal justice system to provide a better service to the foreigners.

It has become problematic at times when police stations and court cannot provide proper service to these foreigners due to barriers in the language. It is hoped that through these forums that we can provide a service as interpreters to the Police and other service units such clinics. The Social media is powerful tool in the hands of people and rather unfortunately it has been extensively used to propagate and create fear among our communities. It was a proven fact that the Police were forced to use threats of prosecution after it was established that file photo material were photo-shopped to create more dramatic picture, which never really existed. This no doubt played a role in exacerbating the tension within the communities both local and foreign. We must continue and strive to open dialogue and ends any form of racism and xenophobic tendencies at premature stages. Throughout the outbreak of violence it became evident and apparent that there exists a large reservoir of goodwill among the entire South African community to find a lasting solution to this problem.

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STREET VENDING AND HOUSEHOLD INCOME POVERTY ALLEVIATION IN SESHEGO TOWNSHIP, POLOKWANE MUNICIPALITY

J. Mokoale

A.A. Asha

T.M. Ramoroka

University of Limpopo, South Africa

Abstract

In South Africa, most households in townships remain under the poverty line as they are faced with challenges of lack of income and employment. The households practise street vending to generate income to meet their basic needs for survival. Shopping centres around townships create an opportunity for people to take advantage and practise street vending thus, generate income to curb the status of income poverty. The purpose of this article is to assess whether street vending effectively and sufficiently acts as a source of income to alleviate household income poverty. The methodology of the study includes a questionnaire and an interview to collect data from respondents. The findings stipulate that street vending is convenient and requires very minimal start-up funding, and that majority of uneducated and less skilled individuals are dominant in the practice of street vending and the informal business is an opportunity to generate income and meet some of the basic necessities of the household. As a result, street vending can be one of the key strategies to alleviate income poverty. Therefore, this paper recommends that local authors should further improve conditions for informal trading and development of proper facilities such as stalls and related services, for street vendors to be in an advantageous environment that is more competitive for income generation.

Key words: Street Vending, Income Poverty, Household, Seshego Township

1. Introduction

Income poverty has ascended to be endemic and as results people are trapped in the conditions of not being able to afford the cost of living (Maneepong & Walsh, 2013). This poverty is mainly the results of economies that are not able to absorb the increasing number of both less trained and unqualified individuals (Ambrosiu & Cuecuecha, 2015). Therefore, street vending ascend to serve as an alternative for creating income that will assist in meeting some of the basic needs of the poor households and to curb income poverty (Brown & Rammidi, 2014). Street vending has historically being the survivalists' strategy of the

majority of black Africans in an attempt to alleviate income poverty (Willemse, 2011). Street vending is a small-scale livelihood activity that is not legally registered, does not pay tax but often operate with legal permit that give the owners the authority to practise. Additionally, the survival of street vending requires low skills and little financial input mostly from the owner's personal experiences and savings. Thus, the practise is mostly adopted by multiple of households due to high rates of unemployment faced in developing countries such as South Africa (Kamath & Ramanathan, 2015). However, South Africa's government has neglected to support the informal sector as a whole, as there are no support policies except the bypass laws that regulate the practise of street vending (Skinner, 2008).

Income poverty is when a household's income fails to meet an established threshold, it is measured with respect to household and not individuals, and it is adjusted for the number of person in the household (Motala, 2002). A traditional measure suggests that a person is experiencing income poverty if he or she is beneath a pre-determined income line (Rojas, 2008). Individuals who are considered to be trapped in income poverty are those who in most cases are not able to afford the cost of living. Therefore, the definition attempts to give a detailed theoretical aspect about people who are confined in the conditions of income poverty. Income inequality is still a key concern that contributes to high levels of poverty in Polokwane Local Municipality. According to the municipal report of 2010, there are high levels of income inequality in the municipality including Seshego Townships which are results of unequal employment and income distribution (Polokwane Municipality, 2013).

Additionally, there are a large number of poor people who are secured from impoverishment through personal remittances, social grants and basic social services from government (Tshuma & Jari, 2013). Evidently, income determine the ability of households to meet some of the basic needs, and for that reason multiple livelihoods are adopted inclusive of street vending (Fenwick, 2010). However, the livelihoods do not assure efficient and sufficient households income which is sustainable to even maintain or invest for the future. The evidence clearly shows that the net effect is that the gap between high and low income earners has not changed much since 2005. Given this context, the purpose of this paper is to reveal if ever street vending does act as an effective and sufficient source of income that could enhance household livelihood.

2. Problem statement

The general notions around the effects of street vending on household income poverty still remain contested amongst scholars (Tshuma & Jari, 2013). People are helpless and trapped in poverty because most of the basic needs have monetary cost and if one cannot afford is likely to remain in the circumstances of income poverty. Therefore, street vending provides

an opportunity to generate income through selling variety of goods and immediate consumption of food (Kharuzzama, Chowdhury, Zaman, Al Mamun, and Bari, 2014). Street vending is a means of employment for most poor households however, the generated income cannot be efficient and sufficient enough to satisfy the needs and also be able to alleviate households' income poverty (Khairuzzaman et al., 2014). Therefore, the purpose of this article is to find out whether street vending effectively and sufficiently acts as a source of income to alleviate household income poverty specifically using Seshego Township Zone 2 street vendors as a case.

3. Literature review

Street vending is an activity which involves selling, supplying or offering to supply of any goods or service for reward mostly in the form of money (Jiyane & Mostert, 2010). Street vendors provide a variety of perishable and non-perishable goods mostly at reasonable prices compared to the once found in the formal enterprises (Obeng-Odoom, 2011). Usually, the practise involves small-scale businesses that require simple technology and very minimal start-up capital. People who are less educated and less skilled seize the opportunity to generate income as it is convenient and easy to start running the business (Jiyane & Mostert, 2010). Furthermore street vending offer different types of street vending which include cooked food items, non-perishable good and rendering of various services, and as such most of them vend the same thing in the sector and to find that the types of street vending dominate the whole sector (Brown & Rammidi, 2014). This is because they prefer to trade things that are convenient and not expensive to vend or provide service for example as fast foods, hairdressing, mobile phones and fruits and vegetables to name few.

In South Africa, street vending was not freely practised during the apartheid era as there were strict laws around pavement payments, fines and confiscation of goods that were employed by the government to prevent the practise (Willemsse, 2013). After the dispensation of the new democratic government that aimed at radical changes to address the imbalances of the past in the country, street vending was given attention. The attention given was through liberating of the practise and giving people rights to engage in street vending with the establishment and adoption of municipal by-laws which are tailor-made for all the municipalities across the country.

Street vending has a great potential of creating jobs and income for most poor people, uneducated, less skilled and people who are laid off employment (Maneepong & Walsh, 2013). Moreover, the high rates of unemployment experienced by many of individuals in the country resulted in the majority of people finding street vending to be a

source of employment and an opportunity to generate income in order to enable them to afford the cost of living. In essence, it is also evident that street vending specifically in South Africa provided jobs for an estimation of 2.2 million people in 2010 Statistics South Africa, (2011). An estimated 46000 people entered into the practise because of the 2010 FIFA soccer world cup that was held in the country and as a result, more people were motivated to engage in street vending(Statistics SA, 2011:VI).

According to Williemse (2011), it has been revealed that 77% of respondents in Cape Town, EThekweni, Johannesburg and Tshwane Municipalities indicated that lack of employment and the need to supplement their other income were the push factors to practice street vending as a means of generating income and supporting their households. The wide spread of street vending is therefore, seen as advantageous to the country because it create an opportunity to generate income and also contributes more in providing additional employment to reduce poverty impoverishment.

Regardless of the contribution that is made by street vending in South Africa's informal economy, the former is a sector that is found to be in a position that lacks stability due to households which do not have a written employment contract within the informal business. Moreover, street vendors are not registered as tax payers and their output are not recorded as part of the Gross Domestic Products (GDP) of the country (Statistics SA, 2011: XVII). This evidence reveals that the sector is not formally recognised to boast the country's economy. There are also fluctuations or rather restricting of trading participation than the facilitation of the practice, which mostly results in increasing income vulnerability to individuals who practise street vending. Furthermore, due to lack of recognition by the government, the practice does not have proper facilities, access to roads and the provision of water and electricity, among other services. Health facilities such as public toilets are very limited which greatly affect the level of income that could be generated because of unhygienic environment that pushes customers away (Willemsse, 2011).

Limpopo Province is one of the poorest provinces in South Africa which is dominated by rural areas (Cardno Agrisystems, 2008). For that reason, it is evident that street vending is increasingly growing and the majority of people who engage in the livelihood are found to be mostly poor women and the illiterate. Thus, street vending provides an opportunity to generate household income for those who have no means of access to any formal employment opportunities to enhance income streams and utilise surplus labour within their households. In the province street vending is regarded as a micro-enterprise that has a success of entering the trading market as it was able to sustain itself for many years (Jiyane & Mostert, 2010). The success of street vendors in most cases is determined by eliminating competition among each other by agreeing on the same pricing of their goods and services, sharing transportation cost to buy bulk purchases in order to assist one another and thus

saving their income of running the livelihood (Rajalaxmi & Ramamathan, 2015). Street vending in Limpopo Province constitute 70% sale of food, predominantly fresh produce and prepared foods and generally sold in small quantities (Rajalaxmi & Rammathan, 2015). The province further marked street vending as a means of survival as it's a predominant source of income to most poor households (Cardno Agrisystems, 2008). Apparently, 273 000 people are recruited to work as staffs, and approximately 46% are involved as owners of vending stands in the trade (Cardno Agrisystems, 2008). It is also estimated that 100 000 owners are able to support 400 000 households to meet basic necessities with an estimated revenue of R100 000 per annum that street vendors are able to make (Cardno Agrisystems, 2008).

4. Methodology

In order to investigate the research problem, this article employed mixed methods approaches which include qualitative and quantitative methods and techniques. The review of literature using journals, books and government documents was conducted in order to uncover existing knowledge on the effects of street vending on household income poverty. Primary data was collected by administering semi-structured survey (n=20) questionnaire, with street vendors at Seshego circle centre and a key informant interview the ward counsellor at ward 17 under Polokwane municipality (n=1) using an interview schedule. Primary data emanating from the survey and interview was analysed using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) and thematic analysis, respectively.

5. Findings

The study was conducted in Zone 2 Seshego with the aim of investigating and discovering empirical evidence and concrete knowledge about the effects of street vending on household income poverty alleviation within household in the township. The findings are accordingly with the objectives of the study. The general findings in Seshego Township, Zone 2 reveals that men are more dominant in the informal business as they constitute 70% of the total population as compared to women. These findings are contrary to the literature that indicates that women dominate the informal sector (Brown & Rammidi, 2014). Additionally, the findings confirm that people who are mostly engaged in street vending do not have adequate education as 75% of the respondents only have secondary education and 3% with tertiary education and thus 10% with no education. The result shows that people do not complete their education and thus the likelihood of household escaping income poverty is limited. According to Willemse (2011) says that informal sector is dominated by less educated and less skilled. To reveal the effects of street vending on

poverty alleviation through household income in Seshego Township, this section will consist of sub-sections as follows: types of street vending practised for income poverty alleviation, street vending operations and management and effects of street vending on income poverty alleviation in the township.

5.1 Types of Street Vending Practised for Income Poverty Alleviation

There are various push factors that people are faced with especially when it comes to getting a sustainable job, being it the illiterate, the less educated and the unemployed individuals. However, the results reveal that 75% were pushed into street vending to seize a business opportunity, 5% want to increase income, and 5% is a family business and 15% for unemployment reasons. More often, street vending is categorised by the kinds of goods sold and services provided which ranges from perishable and non-perishables. The various kinds of street vending that are practised in Seshego Township Zone 2 are found to be in fruits and vegetable (30%), fast foods (25%), hair dressing (10%), clothes and accessories (5%) and other goods and services which make up to 30%. The street vendors sell more or the same things on the streets in a small proportion.

The findings shows that street vending has a positive effect on many households which are engaged in the practise as they agree that it enables them to generate income rather than being at home doing nothing and remaining stuck in poverty. Therefore, 70% of the respondents moderately agree that it keeps them going especially with the lack of employment faced in the province. Only 25% strongly agree that street vending is a source of income indicating that with the income generated they are able to pay for basic needs such as food, water, electricity and pay school fess for their children, whereas 5% disagree saying that the income is not enough although is better than nothing.

5.2 Street Vending Operations and Management in Zone 2

Informal businesses create jobs for most poor, illiterate and less skilled people as they are not absorbed in the formal economy nor have jobs of some sort. Moreover, household are self- employed in the informal sector to generate income and thus alleviate poverty and for that reason, 70% of the respondents who participate in this practise are the owners of the informal businesses whereas the remaining 30% of people are hired within the sector. Street vending is regarded as convenient and easy to start as it requires very minimal capital to get the business up and running. Moreover, household acquire their start-up fund from different sources and for that reason 70% of the street vendors used their own savings, 15% got assistance from relatives, 10% used their retrenchment packages and 5.0% got assistance from loan sharks as most of them do not have the necessary requirement to acquire loans from formal banks. Willemse (2011) indicate that most vendors in the informal

sector cannot acquire financial support due to the lack thereof what is required in the formal banks.

The findings shows that street vendors in Seshego Township are not legally allowed to run their informal businesses as 80% of them do not have legal permits. . However, the majority of the respondents confirmed that the municipality is delaying the process of obtaining the permits as it is a long process. For instance, a person who wishes to trade in food stuffs has to apply to the Licensing Department in the department of Health for a license to trade and the Informal Trade and Small Business Branch for a site permit which is authorised by the municipality across South Africa. The Health Act No.63 of 1977 of South Africa requires that the Health Department issue a certificate of acceptability to a person trading in foodstuffs (Skinner, 2005:10), nevertheless, the municipality gave street vendors the go ahead and the permission to run their business while waiting for formal permits. However, most of the street vendors are concerned with the delay of the permits as they do not feel safe running their businesses without them due to reasons that sometimes fraudsters come and demand their allocated agreeing to Brown & Rammid (2014) stipulate that location of street vending is often characterised as crime scene.

As part of the operations of street vending, 65% of the respondents indicated that they purchase inventory once a week, 15% after two weeks and 20% once a month. The findings indicate that the street vendors know how to keep their business running and their able to use their profits efficiently in order to sustain their as the review of literature confirm that informal businesses are able to be sustained due to its simplicity and inexpensiveness (Smit & Musango, 2015).

5.3 Effects of Street Vending on Income Poverty Alleviation in Seshego Zone 2

The majority of street vendors (35%) confirmed that they generate income of between R501 and R1000 and the least being 10% who earn between R1001 and R1500. About 15% of the respondents revealed that they generate between R0 and R500 whereas the highest income that could be accumulate was above R2500 which only 25% were confident that they able to make that much. The street vendors are able to generate the above mentioned income monthly, where in they should be able to pay the hired workers and remain with profit as they have alluded. The results indicates that there is potential of street vending in being able to meet household half way to reduce income poverty as it is an informal economy against the formal economy that absorbs most poor, illiterate and less educated. From the generated income, the findings shows that 50% of the respondents gain commission from street vending which means that the generated profits are able to support their households and let them save some of the profits. However, 45% alluded that they do not really gain that much because sometimes the business is slow and others go home

without even making any income. Only 5% highly gain from what they are selling or services provided because it's entirely different from what other street vendors are, however according to literature the gain of street vendors depends on the location and the level of economic activities (Ambrosiu & Cuecuecha, 2015).

Thus, the findings show that with the income generated, households are able to meet some of their basic needs. A total of 80% of the respondents are satisfied with what the income is able to meet, whereas 15% are not satisfied because not all their needs can be met. Street vending enable people to generate income even though the income generated cannot be efficient and sufficient enough to meet all the basic needs, and for that reason the results indicate that 25% of the respondent receive social grant that help to compliment the income received from street vending in an attempt to reduce income poverty. Other respondents receive other income apart from street vending from their relationships with men particularly women. The finding shows that respondents agree that street vending is a good strategy that helps them to alleviate income poverty as 100% of the population agree to the statement. Although all the respondents agree that street vending alleviate poverty, evidence suggests that the money generated is not efficient and sufficient enough to alleviate household income poverty. Apparently, the majority of the households who participate in this practise still live under the poverty line. With the money generated, most of the respondents indicated that they financially support about 5 household members on average. Thus, the money generated has to be shared among the five members which leave them living under the poverty line of R26 per day per individual.

6. Recommendations

Accordingly with the analysis and finding in relation to Zone 2 Seshego, the following are the proposed recommended measure to enhance the practise of street vending towards household income poverty alleviation:

- ❖ Street vending at zone 2 seshego run in small proportion but still not that attractive to consumers. The recommendations is that the agencies that give support of skills and development training should take initiative of providing the street vendors with workshops that can enable street vendors to keep their environment attractive and appealing to consumers
- ❖ The difficulties that the street vendors face in terms of acquiring the legal permit from the municipality, it can be recommended that the ward counsellor who is the representative of the vendors create strong grounds with the street vendors in order to voice up as a collections for them to get permits from the municipality.

- ❖ Street vendors are confined to have an advantageous and more appealing sector because of lack of facilities such as proper shelter and provision of services such as water, clean environment to name few, the recommendation is that government should take street vending into consideration and commit financial resources. To provide the vendors with proper facilities and services that are necessary as that can improve the location to be more appealing to consumers and thus be able to generate more income.
- ❖ The location where the street vendors located themselves it's along the road where cars pass on a daily basis, which is not entirely safe because of the traffic that is the during peak times in the evening therefore, the recommendation is to cater a conducive business environment there is an open space next to the centre the municipality can create vendors centre there for the safety of street vendors.
- ❖ The findings clearly showed that most of the street vendors do not have any future plans on how they can grow their business due to lack of finance and support of some sort. Therefore, the recommendation is that agencies such as SEDA(Small Enterprise Development Agency), SEFA(Small Enterprise Financial Agency) and NYDA(National Youth Development Agency) to name few should take an initiative to approach the street vendors and make them aware of their existence and provide knowledge on proper channels on how they can get assistance and also to provide them with skills development training which can assist them to grow and enhance their skills and have the courage to grow their business.
- ❖ It is clear that by pass laws are there to regulate street vending however, there is a need for policy planning in the developmental local government where opportunities can be created for street vendors. The need to organise and understanding the dynamics of street vending so to also be included in the strategic planning of Provincial growth policies and programmes, and also help the municipality to be able to align them with their strategic planning
- ❖ The province and the developmental local government need to integrate street vending within the provincial growth and developmental strategies to create recognition and inclusivity in broader planning.
- ❖ Lastly there should be an existing relationship among street vendors for them to collectively tackle issues that affect them and also to raise their voice as vendors to be heard by the government.

7. Conclusion

Street vending have positive effects on household income poverty alleviation because people who are illiterate and less educated are self-employed within the informal businesses sector and are able to generate income that allows them to meet their basic needs and wants. However, recognition and support of the informal sector by government through the municipalities is compromised. Therefore, this article stands firmly with the recommendations that informal businesses in Seshego Township Zone 2 should be supported by government through policy and spatial planning in order to improve its public image and its ability to attract more consumers with the hope of increasing their income and thus, alleviate household income poverty. Proper public utilities such as water, electricity and sanitation must also be provided in support of the businesses.

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EUROPEAN UNION (EU) MIGRATION TRENDS: DEBUNKING THE AFRICAN MIGRANT INVASION MYTH

E.M. Nkoana

University of Limpopo, South Africa

Abstract

Sub-Saharan African and Muslim immigrants have been the scapegoats for various social ills afflicting European countries. On the contrary, decades of communism and neo-liberal economic policies between European countries had produced economic stagnation for former Soviet Union countries and prosperity for Western European countries. As a consequence, European integration project resulted in mass emigration of Eastern European citizens towards Western European countries in search of economic opportunities. However, recent Mediterranean Sea migrant crisis and xenophobic attacks in South Africa have put immigration in the global spotlight and renewed fears of sub-Saharan Africa immigrants flooding Europe. This fear, linked with terrorist attacks, has put sub-Saharan African and Muslim immigrants at the receiving end of islamophobic and xenophobic discrimination and harassment. In this context, the objective of this study is to verify or falsify European citizens' anxiety over high migration volumes from African countries. This is a desktop study utilising systematic literature review and secondary data analysis. Results show that sensational media reportage on Mediterranean Sea migrant crisis cultivates European fears of 'becoming overwhelmed' by sub-Saharan Africa migrants. Data on migration trends suggests that European citizens' perception of 'becoming overwhelmed' is unfounded and based on a naive comprehension of global migration complexities. These anxieties aid European Union (EU) bureaucrats' rule by fear, or phobocracy. In fact, EU Eastern Enlargement project and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) migration are responsible for the bulk of immigrants living on EU territory, and these figures surpass those of sub-Saharan African migrants.

Keywords: African migration trends, populist immigration discourse, European Union (EU) immigration control, EU Eastern Enlargement, EU phobocrats, Schengen system, Fortress Europe, Irregular migration, Short-Term Visas (STVs)

1. Introduction

"Today's EU citizens are entitled to look for a job in another EU country, work and reside there without needing a work permit, stay there even after employment has finished, and enjoy equal treatment with nationals in access to employment, working

conditions and all other social and tax advantages” (European Commission Home Affairs quoted in De la Rica, Glitz, & Ortega, 2013: 6).

Since its founding, European Union (EU) citizens are again free to migrate internally or intra-migration between EU member states in search of employment and educational opportunities, a higher standard of living, or even a desirable weather (Koikkalainen, 2011) as this was the case with migrant workers prior to 1914. External or extra migration into Europe began with decolonisation and foreign labour recruitment in the post-World War II era ending in the 1970s (De la Rica *et al.*, 2013). Since then, “the history of immigration in Europe has been largely a story of unwanted migration” (Finotelli & Sciortino, 2013: 80) particularly concerning the sub-Saharan Africa migrant invasion myth. This myth purports that apocalyptic masses of sub-Saharan Africa migrants are waiting in North Africa to illegally cross into EU territory and degrade living standards of Europeans. These public fears are cultivated by populist discourse on immigration control, naive comprehension of immigration complexities, and covert national self-interests (De Haas 2008; Van Houton & Pijpers 2007). Public fears over excessive immigration serve to perpetuate the rule of supranational (EU-level) and national political leaders, or the phobocrats, that rule by fear (De Haas, 2008). Aided by these fears, phobocrats have justified the creation and fortification of a gated community known as Fortress Europe, locking African migrants outside. On the contrary, from the late 1980s, following the collapse of the Soviet union, EU governments have consistently developed and enforced restrictive immigration and asylum strategy that ensures the mobility of EU citizens and closure to residents of non-EU countries. Mobility of European citizens was expanded with the 2004 and 2007 EU Eastern Enlargement project that saw ex-communist bloc countries (A-8) join the old EU community (EU-15) (De la Rica *et al.*, 2013). Accession of new member states brought many challenges originating from income differences between old (EU-15) and new (ex A-8) EU member states and a population of 70 million from these new member states (Kahanec, Zaiceva & Zimmerman, 2009). It was public knowledge that decades of communist economic management resulted in economic stagnation for Eastern European countries and neo-liberal economic planning had produced prosperity for Western European countries. However, accession of ex-communist bloc countries was concluded despite this background of known socio-economic disparities between Eastern and Western Europe.

Resultant negative effect was unprecedented east-west flow of Eastern European citizens, mainly economic migrants, to prosperous EU-15 countries. This trend was accompanied by extraordinary regularisation programmes that aided the increase of irregular foreign residents that acquired Short-Term Visas (STVs) from new Eastern European member states and subsequently overstayed their visit. Irregular foreign residents living illegally in the

EU are estimated between 1.9 and 3.8 million (Finotelli & Sciortino, 2013; Kahanec *et al.*, 2009).

Despite this reality, Fiontelli and Sciortino (2013) decry that popular explanation for sizable numbers of unwanted migrants is blamed on poor policing of external EU borders and enduring media images of emergency landings of overcrowded boats on the islands of Lampedusa (Italy) and the strait of Gibraltar (between Morocco and Spain). Media images of emergency landings provide a deceptive picture of immigration in Europe. International media coverage of the perilous journey of asylum seekers escaping the armed Syrian conflict has exacerbated the migration myth. With this background, this paper presents evidence from empirical and theoretical studies on internal or intra-European migration and external or extra-European migration phenomenon in order to debunk the myth that apocalyptic numbers of sub-Saharan Africa migrants are overwhelming EU countries.

- Section 2 outlines the methodology used in this desktop study.
- Section 3 synthesises and discusses findings from empirical and theoretical studies on EU immigration. Figures on internal migration trends are also presented here.
- Section 4 summarises the synthesis and proposes a new discourse or paradigm shift on EU immigration.

2. Methodology

This is a desktop study utilising systematic literature review and secondary data analysis (Onwuegbuzie, Leech, & Collins, 2012). Scientific literature was extracted using Google scholar search engines and academic databases including Ebscohost and Science Direct. These keywords were used in the search: *African Migration Trends*, *European Union Migration Trends*, *European Union Immigration Control*, *European Union Free movement*, *European Union Visa regime*, *Migration and North Africa*, and *Schengen area*. Scientific literature is complemented or contradicted by European Union (EU) Statistics Office (EUROSTAT) reports from between 2001 and 2015. EUROSTAT reports were obtained from the official website of the European Union Statistics Office (accessed at: www.europa.eu/eurostat). Grey literature was gathered from website of global migration think tank solely the Migration Policy Institute (accessed at: www.migrationpolicy.org). Last, backward snowballing approach was also used to identify peer-reviewed journal articles by searching the reference sections of leading articles on African and European migration trends.

3 Synthesis and Discussion

3.1 *African migrant invasion myth and EU phobocracy (government by fear)*

In pursuit of a single market, the EU has liberalised internal mobility, granted visa exemption for Westerners, and heightened policing of airports, seaports and land borders at periphery countries effectively building a gated community known as Fortress Europe (De Haas 2008; Houton & Pijpers 2007). According to Houton and Pijpers (2007: 297), securitisation of EU immigration policy and practice is brought about by Europeans' "fear of becoming overwhelmed". This fear is fuelled by EU phobocrats through populist anti-immigration politics and policies and sensational media reporting invasive armies of desperate non-Western hordes waiting in North Africa to illegally cross into Europe (De Haas, 2008). This fear mongering has legitimised strict border controls, requirement for social integration or assimilation of European culture, categorisation of Europeans and non-Europeans into friendly/fiendish, productive/unproductive, and good/bad, and reference to non-European migrants as guest workers, strangers, aliens, newcomers, and fortune seekers. This perceived apocalyptic invasion by sub-Saharan African migrants has been referred to as a plague with politicians and the media predicting doomsday scenarios as exemplified by former French President Jacques Chirac warning that Africans "will flood the world" (De Haas, 2008: 2). Security concerns post 9/11 (New York and Washington 2001 attacks), 7/7 (London attacks in 2005), and 3/11 (Madrid attacks in 2004) have added fuel to fire, raising Western anxieties over global terrorists attacks thus justifying the fortification of the gated community. Like residents of gated communities in Brazil, South Africa, and the United States, Europeans have developed an attitudes of 'Us' against 'Them' and have looked up to their leaders, the phobocrats, to protect their European paradise against the hell beyond the walls of the fortress (De Haas 2008; Houton & Pijpers 2007). Expectantly, these exaggerated fears rally European citizens around their national and supranational phobocrats as demonstrated by this quotation:

Leaders are successful in uniting the people around security matters more than any other issue-essentially because the appeal to national security is related directly to the issue of protection against a dangerous enemy and involves the physical survival of one's family, friends, and nation. The national threat is translated to reality at the micrological (personal) level (Falah & Newman 1995 quoted in Van Houton & Pijpers 2007: 295).

Consistently, academic researchers on European immigration trends (De Haas 2008; Van Houton & Pijpers 2007) assure us that European citizens' fears of becoming overwhelmed by non-Europeans, sub-Saharan Africa migrants in particular, are misleading, unfounded

and based on naive comprehension of global migration trends (De Haas, 2008). In fact, since the EU's Eastern Enlargement project, east-west flow of migrants has been increasing yearly (Kahanec *et al.*, 2009; Kaczmarczyk, 2014) surpassing the numbers of non-Westerners migrating into Europe (De Haas 2008; Van Houtom & Pijpers 2007). In the same line of evidence, strict border controls have contributed to a decline in the number of sub-Saharan Africans seeking asylum in Europe. It is only recently, with the Syrian armed conflict that asylum seekers' numbers might pick up again. However, bilateral cooperation on border policing and readmission between Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia) and European states have had unintended negative consequences leading to a mushrooming of dangerous trans-Saharan migration routes and trans-Mediterranean crossing points resulting in deaths of African migrants (De Haas, 2008).

Europe's inundation with immigrants is blamed on African migrants thus disregarding the context within which South-North (between Africa and Europe) and East-West (Eastern and Western Europe) global migration occurs. Scientific studies on migration trends show that South-North migration movement is surpassed by East-West migrant flows and immigration from other OECD countries entering EU territory (De Haas 2008; Kahanec 2009; Kaczmarczyk, 2014; Van Houton & Pijpers, 2007).

4. Context of European Union (EU) Internal or Intra-migration and External or Extra-migration

4.1 East-West migration flows: EU Internal or Intra-migration and economic (irregular) migration

Guaranteed free movement of EU citizens is central to the design of a European single market and this has allowed unrestricted intra-European migration (De la Rica *et al.*, 2013). Contemporary migration of citizens between EU member states (intra-EU migrations) has been facilitated by EU's Eastern Enlargement project, European Commission (EC) Directive No. 539/2001 visa exemptions for OECD countries, and the Schengen system.


4.2 EU Eastern Enlargement and post-enlargement economic migration

In May 2004, EU-15 welcomed former Soviet Union states, or A-8 countries (including Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and the islands of Cyprus and Malta) into the European Union (EU-25) (De la Rica *et al.*, 2013, Eurostat 2015a). Bulgaria and Romania joined EU-25 in 2007, making it EU-27. Enlargement created controversy with media estimates of the potential wave of economically motivated migrants from Eastern European countries varying

from 5 million to 40 million people. Dissent was aided by the reality of economic stagnation brought by decades of communist economic planning in Eastern Europe and relative prosperity in Western Europe (EU-15). The media argued that large socio-economic disparities between A-8 and EU-15 countries will act as pull and push factors attracting multitudes of migrants towards the latter countries (Koikkalainen, 2011). To counter this, EU employed various immigration controls to counter mass migration including steady opening of its borders to new member states or graduation using the 2+3+2 model. With this model, a transitional period of seven years (2+3+2 model-see Koikkalainen, 2011: 3) permitted old member states (EU-15) to gradually open their borders to labour from new member states (former A-8 countries). Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom (UK) opened their border immediately followed by Greece, Spain, Portugal and Finland (on 1st May 2006); Italy (27th July 2006); the Netherlands (1st May 2007); Luxembourg (1st November 2007); France (1st July 2008); and Belgium and Denmark (both on 1st May 2009); and later Germany and Austria (Kahanec *et al.*, 2009: 1-2).

From 2004 between 2009, EU-15 countries experienced a substantial increase in numbers of Eastern Europeans, notably Poles and Romanians, migrating westward to ex-EU 15 countries particularly to Ireland and the UK (Poles), and Spain and Italy (Romanians). Ireland, Sweden and the UK received high volumes of Poles and Romanians partly because they opened their border immediately after the 2004 accession of Eastern European countries. It came as no surprise that around 70 percent of migrants from former A-8 countries headed for Ireland and the UK. Poland was the source of the largest number of migrant workers among all new member states (Koikkalainen, 2011). To put this into perspective, in 2001 the total number of Eastern European immigrants living in ex-EU 15 countries was just above 1 million, constituting a mere 6.3 percent of the overall foreign population. Accelerated inflows, facilitated by EU expansion into Eastern Europe, has led to quintupling (to about 5.3 million) in 2011 or 19 percent of the foreign population in the EU (Van Houton & Pijpers, 2007; Kahanec *et al.*, 2009). Figure 1 illustrates a steep upward trend in east-west flow of migrants driven by accession of New Member States (ex A-8 countries) from Eastern Europe.

Figure 1: New Member States (NMS) migrants residing in Old Member States (OMS/EU-15) countries between 2001 and 2007



Source: Author's own elaboration based on European Integration Project, 2009 data. Notes: Austria, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Portugal were excluded due to missing data notwithstanding their EU-15 membership.

4.3 EU Eastern Enlargement, Short-Term Visa (STV) regime and irregular (foreign) migration

Finotelli and Sciortino (2013: 83) reiterate that EU organisations have claimed repeatedly that the establishment of a common visa policy is a 'vital tool in preventing irregular migration towards the EU and potential threats to its security'. Irregular migration referred to an upsurge of large volumes of asylum seekers in the aftermath of socio-political and economic collapse of the Communist bloc. Visa requirements for Eastern Europeans were targeted at preventing arrival of asylum seekers on EU territory and not halting economic migration. Work visas were still provided for Eastern European workers. Because, it was not in the interest of affluent EU-15 countries to stop economic migrants from Eastern European (A-8) countries as they supplied cheap labour to their booming economies. In preparation for accession of A-8 countries, visa restrictions had already been lifted for Eastern Europeans planning short stay travels to EU-15 countries. All of these imply that controlled migration had been happening between A-8 and EU-15 countries, albeit at low volumes, even before the accession of new member states in 2004 and 2007 (Koikkalainen, 2011: 3).

After A-8 accession, internal immigration controls between EU countries remained weak resulting in mass economic migration from former A-8 countries to prosperous EU-15 countries. During accession negotiations, the EU insisted on conditions for A-8 countries joining the common region. These conditions included tightening of physical border controls and increased border policing at EU periphery states and agreements on deportation to countries of entry. These strategies, among others, were hugely successful at curtailing the flow of asylum seekers into EU and this was reflected in a sharp decline of asylum seekers entering European territory (Finotelli & Sciortino 2013: 83). However, these controls did not stem the east-west (A-8 to EU-15) flow of economic and other migrants seeking higher standards of living.

Studies on irregular migration in the EU documented that clandestine border crossing has been practiced by a minority of irregular foreign residents (see Reher *et al.*, 2008; Haas, 2007; Duvell, 2011 cited in Finotelli & Sciortino, 2013: 81). For example, approximately 6 out of 10 immigrants intercepted on Italian territory in subsequent years had legally entered the country with STVs. Visa overstaying has reproduced irregular foreign populations in Europe. With irregular migrants from Eastern Europe concentrated in Germany, Italy, Greece, Austria and new Schengen members. Irregular migrants in France and the Netherlands are more likely to be nationals of North Africa and Asian countries. Spain and Portugal have large shares of Latin American irregular migrants (Finotelli & Sciortino, 2013: 98).

4.4 Short-Term Visa (STV) regime and Positive 'White' List and Negative 'Black' List

In 2001, with the success of asylum controls came tighter visa requirements for non-EU members. This climaxed with legislation of European Commission (EC) Directive 539/2001 (Finotelli & Sciortino 2013: 83) releasing a negative list of third world countries whose national require a visa to enter EU countries, as well as a positive list whose nationals are exempted from visa requirements. The positive and negative lists were drawn up and implemented for economic strategy and geopolitical reasons. On the one hand, and through these lists, the EU blatantly favours Oil-rich countries and regions with large populations of European ethnicity. On the other hand, EU discriminates against national of non-European countries including citizens of Africa, the Middle-East, Asia, Asia pacific islands and most South American states excluding natural resource rich ones. In fact, all 54 African countries are on the negative 'black' list of countries whose citizens require a visa to enter EU territory (EC Regulation No. 539/2001). This immigration control strategy borne out of economic and geopolitical motives and institutional racism has succeeded in curbing third world migration to the EU even from countries with historical colonial ties to Europe.

This securitisation of the visa regime for third world citizens was juxtaposed by massive liberalisation of visa issuing rights by new EU member states (A-8 countries). Other citizens of non-EU member states living in Eastern European region have used new EU member states as springboard to EU-15 countries. This starting gate into EU territory is facilitated by wholesale issuing of STVs by new EU member states (former Soviet Union countries). Once granted, Eastern Europeans use these STVs to enter EU territory and remain there even after their visas have expired. This has immensely contributed to the phenomenon of irregular foreign residents. This unintended consequence of Eastern Enlargement has led certain EU member states, in particular France and the Netherlands, filing proposals targeted at making easier the process of suspending Regulation No. 539/2001 under particular circumstances. This change of heart was brought about by large volumes of economic migrants from Eastern European countries particularly Albanians and Bosnia-Herzegovinians living irregularly in EU-15 countries (Finotelli & Sciortino 2013: 85-86).

4.5 Schengen region and irregular (foreign) migration

Schengen region is one of the major facilitator of movement on EU territory. Schengen Agreement was signed in 1985 and put into law in 1997 through the Amsterdam Treaty. Schengen agreement eliminated internal borders between participating countries and defined common external borders. Schengen region is made up by twenty-seven (27) EU (excluding UK, Ireland, Cyprus, Bulgaria, and Romania) member states and four (4) non-EU member states (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Sweden) (De la Rica *et al.*, 2013). Under this agreement, Schengen area citizens are not required to produce passports or visas when crossing from one participating country to another. Like the EU, Schengen member countries can issue an STV for 90 days that can be used by non-EU citizens for travel throughout the Schengen area. However, the competence of issuing long-term visa remains at national discretion. Liberalisation of internal mobility aided by the Schengen agreement was equally met by securitisation of external borders in an attempt to keep out individuals from the negative 'black' list (De la Rica *et al.*, 2013). Schengen STVs have contributed to irregular foreign migrant population.

4.6 South-North migration flows: EU External or Extra-migration and asylum seekers

Since the 1960, the overwhelming majority of African migrants moving to Europe have originated from the Maghreb region (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia). At the turn of the 21st century, at least 2.6 million Moroccans, 1.2 million Algerians and 700 000 Tunisians (including 2nd generation) were living in Europe. Increased migration control in Europe introduced since the 1973 oil crisis encouraged permanent settlement and family migration

of Maghreb citizens to traditional destination countries including France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany. Since the late 1980s, Maghreb migrants have increasingly moved to Italy and Spain in response to a strong demand for low-skilled labour. Hundreds of thousands of Maghreb migrants have attempted to cross the Mediterranean Sea illegally since Spain and Italy introduced visa requirements (De Haas, 2008: 1305-8).

Under Gaddafi's leadership, Libya was a safe haven for sub-Saharan African migrants from West, Central and the Horn of Africa. These migrants filled local labour shortages and revitalised under-populated desert areas. This arrangement was ended by fatal clashes between sub-Saharan migrants and Libyan citizens. Since then, sub-Saharan Africans have increasingly joined Maghreb migrants in a quest to reach the illusive Europe 'al Dorado' through the Maghreb and Libyan coasts. Between 65 000 and 120 000 sub-Saharan African migrants are estimated to enter the Maghreb yearly, of whom 70% to 80% migrate through Libya and 20% to 30% via Algeria and Morocco (De Haas, 2008: 1308). Contrary to European public perceptions, only several thousand African migrants attempt to cross the Mediterranean Sea into Europe each year, not hundreds of thousands or millions as media reportage suggests (De Haas, 2008: 1308). In fact, prior to the advance of Islamic State of Syria and the Levant/Iraq (ISIL/S), sub-Saharan African migrants regarded Libya as a destination country and not a transit point to Europe. At least 1.5 million sub-Saharan African immigrants live in the Libyan state (De Haas, 2008). Political instability in North Africa pushes sub-Saharan migrants northwards over the Mediterranean Sea. European authorities, the phobocrats, have responded by containing asylum seekers, strategically selecting economically valuable migrants from outside the EU, rejecting 'market-redundant' immigrants, and aggressively fighting illegal migration although failures persists (Van Houtum & Pijpers, 2007). This evidence confirms that sub-Saharan African migrants journeying to Europe represents a drop in the ocean when compared to economic migration from Eastern European and OECD countries.

5. Conclusion

Triple challenges of low birth rates, an ageing population and labour shortage has compelled affluent EU-15 to look east and southwards for cheap labour to fill occupations in the construction, farming, manufacturing, and retail sectors. Opening up their borders to Eastern Europeans was part of their labour recruitment strategy. Eastern Enlargement of the EU has reversed labour shortages but created other problems. After accession, Eastern European migrants flooded the EU-15 labour market. Additionally, newly acceded countries issued STVs on a wholesale scale. Once in their hands, Eastern Europeans entered EU territory and stayed there even after their STVs have expired. This phenomenon of irregular

residents has become a thorny issue on the side of EU authorities. Unfortunately, highly publicised media images of emergency landings of overcrowded boats in the Mediterranean Sea have become the focal point of public attention. Phobocrats have opportunistically rallied their electorate around the fear of 'becoming overwhelmed' by African migrants, particularly by sub-Saharan migrants and Muslims. These anxieties justify the fortification of Fortress Europe that keeps out the backward and dangerous Africans. Fortress Europe has hugely been successful with curbing the number of asylum seekers through border fortification and policing, and discouraging would be (economic) migrants with extensive visa requirements.

Empirical and theoretical studies have consistently showed that Eastern European and OECD immigrants constitute a high share of total migrant population in EU 27 member states. Van Houton and Pijpers (2007) pointed out that definition and enforcement of supranational or national borders is counterproductive in the long term. They propose a rethink of EU immigration management policy and practice focused on cooperation rather than antagonism. Ideally, this paradigm shift would demystify populist immigration discourse and relieve public apprehensions. On the 1st of July 2013 Croatia became the newest members of the European community making it EU-28. This recent development would be interesting to observe from an east-west migration perspective.

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DETERMINANTS OF POOR PERFORMANCE OF LED IN UMHLATHUZE LOCAL MUNICIPALITY

S.A. Olivier

University of Zululand, South Africa

Abstract

Poverty alleviation programmes have established by various government departments and civil organizations in South Africa. Local Economic Development is the strategy that has been used by Local Government to alleviate poverty in the community. The main focus of this paper is to investigate the poor performance of LED in Umhlathuze Municipality. Secondly, the paper will explore the influence of local informal business on the LED process. Open question, does local informal and formal business benefit the community? Thirdly, it will serve to explore the impact of poor performance on LED. LED is a strategy for alleviating poverty. Finally, the paper also seeks to make recommendations how to improve the performance of LED to benefit the community.

Keywords: Determinants, Umhlathuze Municipality, Local Economic Development, Local informal business.

1. Introduction

In South Africa is always problematic to discuss the critical sub-ject of local government. The current state of local government is questionable. Where does it fit, to be more effective. Local Government is the heart of service delivery. The whole of South Africa's local communities depends on local government. To understand local government let us look at the definition. According to Reddy (1999:9), local government is a second or third level of government, deliberately created to bring government to the local populace as well as to give its members a sense of involvement in the political processes that control their daily lives. Binza (2010:242) further suggested that local government is a government of city, country, parish, township, municipality, borough, board, government of the city. district closest to the people, and where people are inclusive in its processes of governance , service delivery and sustainable socio-economic development. Socio- economic development id central in creating jobs for the masses.

The birth of a new constitutional landscape for local government develops when the *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996* was adopted. One of the characteristics of the new local government was participatory governance. Through participatory

governance, the success of development is the main goal and objective. Developmental local governance becomes the reality of public service delivery. Before 1996 service delivery was too complex in non-service delivery (Koma 2014: 41)

Section 153 of 1996 Constitution gives municipalities the authority to structure and manage its own administration, finance and planning processes. The section goes further and states they must give priority to the basic needs of the community. In other words on implementation of municipal policy, firstly and important must be rendering of service delivery to the community. Not any service delivery. It must be effective, efficient and economically(Koma 2014: 41). It must inside the principles of good governance For example a few principles, rule of law, transparency and accountability. It goes hand in hand with Section 152 of 1996 Constitution that instructs and mandates local government to promote the social and economic development of the community and to participate in national and provincial development programmes. Local government is the heart of participatory governance(Zaaijer & Sara 1993: 128).This implies that local government forms the foundation for realisation of growth and national developmental objectives underpinning new development frameworks such as National Development Plan (2011) and other provincial growth and development strategies.

The *Local Government Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000* instructs municipal councils to adopt a single, inclusive and strategic plan for their development of the municipality within a prescribed period after the local government elections. This single, inclusive and strategic is call the Integrated Development Plan (IDP)., which contains broader development priorities and objectives of each elected municipal council and Local Economic Development Plan must be also embodied in within the IDP. LED strategy is there to alleviate poverty in the local community by providing the necessary tools to achieve it. LED have the responsibility create a platform to provide job opportunities. It has to create a healthy economic environment with a lot of opportunities for prosperity. This prosperity will bring forth new economic opportunities for the local community (Van Der Waldt, G 2006:41). The main emphasis of LED is to promote the good life for it citizens. In other words LED will increase income levels of the community broaden the tax and revenue base. Local community will be now able to pay for their basic services. It is contributing to the fact that municipality will able to pay for their services . The main emphasis of the LED policy is addressing the poor of the poor of the community. Through empowerment of the poor to raise sufficient income to meet their basic needs that's crucial for the LED.

2. Local Economic Development in perspective

The global market starts to shape this idea of LED. They start by formulating approving international declaration, namely : the Local Agenda 21, IULA Worldwide Declaration of Self-government, and European Charter for Self-Government. These international declarations make it a point to spell out that municipalities both the developed and developing countries have to play a role in developing their local economies with private institutions operating within their respective jurisdiction. The first and utmost important step is for local government to develop their Local Economic Development Plans. This plans must be goal-orientated and as a guide to improve people's social and economic conditions. The main objective of this is to alleviate poverty. The provision in this international declarations is that municipalities must:

- foster a stable and diversified economy,
- create and sustain municipal employment opportunities,
- improve the living conditions of the communities and sustain quality communities,
- strengthen the skills and qualifications of the local workforce,
- deliver municipal services that best meet local needs, and
- build and maintain quality facilities and infrastructure for LED (Binza 2010:147).

There is a cry out all over Africa for quality, effective and efficient basic service delivery for the local community. In Africa there are problems of inequality, unemployment, growing poverty and limited / non provision of basic service delivery to the local community. Global challenges have played a crucial role of these socio-economic situations. The global market is one of the most influencing tools on urbanisation of local towns (*Local Government WhitePaper 1998*). As the situation worsen in their towns they forces to move to the city for a better life. The rapid changing technological revolution is also an influential force on poor communities; they can't compete with the changing environment due a lack of resources. In other words, they cannot compete against the Global Financial Market (Cooke 2008: 45). The result in this non-competiveness is the failure of markets, markets defects and the lack of entrepreneur's skills. The current South Africa government responds to these crises by established a Ministry responsible for (SMME's). This Ministry is responsible to create a platform for small, medium and macro enterprises. Assist the citizens to start their own businesses in this process the way to elevating poverty by starting their own business.

Through these there is a responsibility of on government to create jobs, alleviate poverty and ensure economic growth (DPLG 2003 : 120).

Municipalities in South Africa are characterised by the high rate of service delivery protests against the poor standard service delivery. The reality is that it is now time that municipalities must think out of the box and start to formulate new innovative policies and strategies to solve these pressing societal problems (Clarke & Gaile 1998 : 120). They must realise that LED is a market tool for international investment. Through investment and starting new businesses, the degree of unemployment will decrease (Bartik 1991 : 123). Local Furthermore, the private sector also plays an important role in the LED process. The private company and municipality must work together to create an attractive environment (Helmsing 2003: 125). When the private companies start to invest in an area, it becomes the responsibility of the municipality. These include access to local transport, serviced sites, communication facilities, waste disposal facilities, access to housing and recreational amenities, to attract and retain staff.

3. Background of Umhlatuze Local Municipality

Umhlatuze Local Municipality is constituted in terms of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 and the *Local Government Structures Act 117 of 1996* as Category B municipality. In terms of the Constitution of South Africa, Section 155 (1), there are three categories of municipalities namely; Category A (metropolitan municipalities), Category B (local municipalities) and Category C (district municipalities). The *Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998* contains criteria for determining when an area must have Category A municipality (Metropolitan), with exclusive legislative and executive authority throughout its area of jurisdiction; and a Category B municipality (Local Municipality that shares executive and legislative authority with Category C municipality (District Municipality)). The City of uMhlatuze (KZ 282) is situated on the north-east coast of the province of KwaZulu-Natal, about 180 kilometres north-east of Durban. The uMhlatuze area covers 795 km² and incorporates Richards Bay, Empangeni, eSikheleni, Ngwelezane, eNseleni, Felixton and Vulindlela, as well as the rural areas under Traditional Councils namely, Dube, Mkhwananzi, Khoza, and Zungu (Madlebe). The population is estimated at 334459 (2011 Census). The municipality borders a coastline that spans approximately 45 kilometres. The N2 highway traverses the uMhlatuze Municipality in a north-east direction towards the Swaziland border and south-west towards Durban. It effectively forms a division between Empangeni and Richards Bay. The R34 Provincial Main Road passes through Empangeni towards Melmoth.

The uMhlathuze Municipality was established on 5 December 2000 after the demarcation process and the local government elections of that date. As such it encompasses the towns of Empangeni, Richards Bay, eSikhaleni, Ngwelezane, eNseleni, Vulindlela and Felixton as well as the Traditional Authority areas under Amakhosi Dube, Mkhwanazi, Khoza, Mbuyazi and Zungu. The uMhlathuze Local Municipality has been divided into 30 municipal wards. There are a number of natural and man-made phenomenon's that have shaped and continue to shape the uMhlathuze Municipality. The area is inundated with a system of wetlands and natural water features such as Lakes Cubhu, Mzingazi, Nsezi and Nhlabane. Major rivers include the Mhlathuze and Nsezi.

The main access into the municipal area is via the N2 in a north south direction and in an east west direction the R34 from Ntambanana. Other significant roads in the area include the MR431 (that provides a northerly entry into Richards Bay from the N2) as well as the Old Main Road that straddles the N2. Railway lines are prevalent in the municipal area but do not provide a passenger service, only a commercial/industrial service is provided. The municipality has the benefit of about 45km of coastline of which about 80% is in its natural state. Linked to its coastal locality is the Richards Bay deep-water port that has been instrumental in the spatial development of the area in the past and will definitely impact on the areas' future spatial development. There is one airport and a couple of land strips in the municipal area.

4. LED vs Umlathuze municipality

The city of uMhlathuze, incorporating the primary core of Richards Bay and the secondary core of Empangeni is one the country's key ports and industrial nodes. Promotion on of LED in the city is undertaken by the local municipality the district municipality and significantly by the various big firms either individually or collectively through supporting development projects run by the Zululand Chamber of Business. While the city has a strong pro-growth orientation, the District Municipality (DM) and the big firms are engaged in various support programmes which have pro-poor implications.

The city has significant industrial and infrastructure resources. It hosts the world's biggest coal export terminal, two aluminium smelters, two heavy metal refineries and several other refineries and several other major enterprises. Small business development appears to be rather constrained despite the presence of major firms, which are capital intensive and have few backward linkages in the local area. The city's LED policy is a pro-growth focused one seeking to promote economic development and job creation. The key focus areas of the LED is, support for clusters, hard and soft infrastructure, tourism, agriculture and business retention. Both municipalities have staff who takes on LED responsibilities while all big firms

have corporate social responsibility departments. In addition a Joint Development Forum has been established to link all role players in the sound management of development of the city.

5. Roleplayers of LED in Umhlatuze

5.1 Local Municipality

In 1998 the then Empangeni Municipality attempted a pro-poor intervention using a pro-poor intervention using an arts and crafts market. The centre has met with only marginal success despite strenuous efforts to support it. More mainstream interventions include CBD renewal in Empangeni and support for the Joint Development Forum.

5.2 The District Municipality (DM)

Umhlatuze falls within a DM covering several municipalities. The rural character of the area and high levels of poverty has led to a targeting of support to agricultural projects and some smaller industrial developments. As the Umhlatuze area is a key contributor of DM's revenue base, the redistribution impact is significant.

5.3 The Private Sector

All of the major firms have significant Corporate Social Responsibility programmes which all support educational and health provision in the area, and selectively support small business development, sustainable environmental management/ conservation, small scale mining and down streaming of aluminium production to small businesses. Collectively they support the Zululand Chamber of Business (ZCB) which provides SMME support, a learning centre, business linkages services and has built and support an 'Aids Village' as a care facility for victims of the disease

6. Methodology and findings

The field research work took place at the offices of Umhlatuze Local Municipality, Kwa-Zulu Natal province. This work also involved a documentary review of various official documents developed by the Municipality, notably, the IDP Final Review 2015/2016, Uthungulu Tourism Plan 2015 and the LED Medium Term Revenue and Expenditure Framework (MTREF) Council Report for 2015/2016. For the purpose of data analysis an MS Excel spreadsheet was used for data coding analysis and presentation

Table 1: Research Sample

Profile of respondents	Number of respondents
Municipal Manager	1
Manager in the office of the executive Mayor	1
IDP and LED officer	2
Members of Mayoral Executive Committee	2
Corporate and Social Investment officer	4
Chairpersons of Community Forums	4
Small business owners	10
Community leaders	10
Unemployed local citizens	10

The profile of these above-mentioned research participants includes the community, small business owners, senior municipal officials, community, Community Forum and Councillors. The Executive Committee consists of a elected councillors from the local community. The Community Forum are responsible for the formulation and the implementation of LED. The interviews were schedule after stake-holders meetings that were arrange by the Office of the Executive Mayor. It was then possible to get 100% response. The only problem was there were 4 community members and 4 small business owners absent with an apology. A focus group was established by researcher direct after the meeting with the permission of the whole group. The group was very excited to participate. The researcher was using the mixed method, quantitative and qualitative method. The respondents were required to complete a self-administered questionnaire which consisted of five closed questions and one open question. This section provides an analysis of determinants of poor performance of LED in Umhlathuze Local Municipality


6. 1 Importance of LED

All research participants were asked how important LED is for the alleviating of poverty for the community. In answering this important question, respondents were provided with two options, very important or important. 100% of the participants respond that is very important (refer to figure 1). It can be concluded from these responses that LED is an important tool for alleviating poverty. The Local Government must create a suitable platform to make the execution of LED an priority. It is a primary role of local government to realise this dream. The research findings further reflect a positive outcome, that all the important role-players internal and external of the municipality acknowledge the importance of LED objectives. It is

now up to the executive authority to put these dreams in reality by adhere to the strategic objectives of the LED policy. The objectives are as follows;

- Economic growth
- Employment creation
- Poverty alleviation

Figure 1: Importance of the LED




1 – 100%

6. 2 Responsibility for implementation of LED

The next question was asked to respondents who are responsible for the implementation of LED in Umhlatuze Municipality. From the response received 60% of the research participants indicated that the IDP and LED unit is primarily responsible for the implementation of the LED policy. This overwhelming response indicates that the LED policy has been approved by the legislature or council and it is the responsibility of this unit as the public officials to execute or to implement it. 25% of the respondents were of the view that both the Municipal Manager and LED unit are responsible for implementation of the policy. Through these results it shows that the respondents feel strongly that the Accounting Officer of the Municipality is the Municipal Manager who must managed LED process with his hands that is the LED unit. This research shows that Municipal Manager must be accountable for the LED process. 15% of the respondents stated that both the LED and civil society (Members of Community Forums, community leaders, small business owners, unemployed community) and LED Unit are responsible for implementation of the LED Policy. Community participation takes the front fort. The respondents feel that the civil society must work

together to execute LED successfully. It's important to use the inclusive approach to ensuring economic growth, employment and poverty alleviation.

Figure 2: Responsibility for LED implementation



1- 60% (IDP and LED unit)


2- 25% (Municipal Manager & LED unit)

3- 15% (LED & Civil Society)

6.3 Benefit of LED to the SMME and informal businesses

The participants were asked whether the LED benefit SMME's and informal businesses. The response was as follows Civil Society respondents stated that LED doesn't benefit SMME's and informal businesses. That is 77% of the respondents. According these findings of the research, it can be seen that the execution of LED by municipality doesn't reach the community, it resulted by poor planning from municipality. The other 23% of the respondents stated that LED is supporting SMME's. Mostly of these respondents are municipal officers who are defending the municipality.

Figure 3 : Benefit LED the SMME and informal businesses




1- 77% doesn't benefit

2- 23% does benefit

6. 4 Determinants for poor performance of LED

Question 4 required participants to reflect on the determinants for poor performance by the LED in Umhlathuze Local Municipality. Respondents were given the option to choose more than one determinant from the survey. Determinants like a lack of intergovernmental grant (finance), political-administration dichotomy, lack of qualified staff, lack of clear LED policy direction, lack of infrastructure, poor communication channels, lack of accountability measures, lack of marketing skills, lack of coordination, lack of project management skills, lack of good governance and lack of information technology and data. A combination of lack of infrastructure, understaffing, poor communication channels, lack of clear LED policy direction and a lack of finance were identified as the major determinants for poor performance of LED. In South Africa its very difficult to appoint, retain and utilize staff due to the lack of financial resources. The province, like Kwa Zulu Natal has to come on board to assist these smaller municipalities to overcome these barriers in poor performance. According to the LED Policy Implementation Guidelines, 2005, province must support provinces.

Figure 4 : Determinants for poor performance of LED



- 1- Lack of infrastructure, understaffing, poor communication channels, lack of finance, lack of clear LED policies
- 2- Intergovernmental grant, understaffing
- 3- Lack of finance, understaffing, lack of marketing skills
- 4- Lack of coordination, lack of project management skills
- 5- Lack of project management skills
- 6- Lack of finance, marketing skilld


6. 5 LED improvement plan for the future

The last and final question to the respondents how we can improve the current LED plan of Umhlathuze. With this question the respondents was to given anything to choose from. The author wants to get their own opinion about how can we improve the LED process. For this purpose for analysis, the author categorised the participant's responses into the following: strong community participation, increase financial resource, improving of human capital, improving good governance, improving communication channels, proper coordination and improving community education. 60% of the participants were of view that a stronger community participation is very important, coupled with improving human capital as well as increase in financial resources. They must uphold the principles of good governance. Participants suggest having an effective human capital, the time is right to implement effective training programmes and retention strategies for an effective implementation of the LED. They further believe that the LED execution will be effective by increasing financial resources. National Government must come on board with an effective Intergovernmental Grant system for LED. 15% of the participants suggest that it is important

to educate community in LED process. 25% of the participants suggest that improving communications channels between all the stakeholders. Through newsletters, e-mails, meetings and press releases and also suggest that coordination is also vital for the implementation of the entire

LED.

Figure 5 : LED improvement plan for the future



- 1- 60% Stronger community participation, improving human capital & increase financial resources.**
- 2- 15% improving community education**
- 3- 25 % improving communication channels**

7. Conclusion

This article observed that the determinants for poor performance of LED is as follows: a lack of intergovernmental grant (finance), political-administration dichotomy, lack of qualified staff, lack of clear LED policy direction, lack of infrastructure, poor communication channels, lack of accountability measures, lack of marketing skills, lack of coordination, lack of project management skills, lack of good governance and lack of information technology and data. It further observed that the LED programme doesn't benefit the community in the street also improve the status-quo of SMME's. It further observed a lack of coordination of the LED program and a gap for quality community education needs to be fill. The article concludes that a stronger community participation system is needed. A strong mandate to improve human capital. The increase of financial resources by government.

Both the literature reviewed and the findings of the study have suggested that Umlathuze municipality initiate a process of pro-poor development for the LED. They must develop the poor, by bringing in all the suggestions of the findings. These will place an impact on image building of the community. By change their social and economic environment to a healthier one. The gap is here, a Joint support from Zululand Chamber of Business is needed, to improve economic environment by assisting small, medium and macro enterprises and provide job opportunities. The gap for further research why is there limited powers of municipalities towards LED. A possible answer can be policy directives and where does LED fit in local government. What are the clear roles of the LED officer? The lessons we have learned is that strong District Municipalities, such as Uthungulu can play a significant role in seeking to address economic imbalances even where there is a strong local municipality like Umhlathuze in the district. Also a useful intervention is to form a Joint Development Forum which can lay a basis for growth coalition

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ATTITUDES OF ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES TOWARDS SOCIAL INTEGRATION IN THE TEES VALLEY AREA, NORTH EAST REGION OF ENGLAND

E.M. Nkoana

University of Limpopo, South Africa

Abstract

Western Europe is experiencing mass immigration from within and outside the European Union (EU). As an EU member state, the United Kingdom (UK) receives asylum seekers from within and outside Europe and it is ranked fourth amongst industrialised nations per head of asylum application. Asylum seekers and refugees are protected under the United Nations Higher Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) 1951 and 1967 resolutions. Despite this international goodwill, supranational and national bodies have responded with disbelief and suspicion towards asylum seekers and refugees invoking the term ‘asylum shopping’. Asylum shopping assumption or theory is the belief by decision makers and the public that asylum seekers and refugees make informed choices to seek asylum in industrialised nations for economic purposes thus confusing them with economic migrants. Unfortunately, these negative assumptions about asylum seekers and refugees have permeated to local communities within which asylum seekers and refugees have settled. Native residents’ anti-immigrant attitudes work against the UK government policy of integrating asylum seekers and refugees into British society. Equally, asylum seekers and refugees might be reluctant to socially integrate due to this backlash. With this background, this qualitative study conducted in 2010 investigated the attitudes of asylum seekers and refugees towards social integration in the Tees Valley area of the North East of England. The researcher conducted eight in-depth interviews using an interview guide/schedule with a representative sample of eight participants (8). Thematic analysis was employed in the data analysis process. Findings reveal that local institutions, mostly Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), support social integration process and government institutions work against it.

Keywords: European Union, United Nations Higher Commission on Refugees, Asylum seekers, Asylum shopping

1. Introduction

Widely publicised xenophobic attacks in South Africa and the migrant crisis in the Mediterranean Sea have put immigration issues in the global spotlight. Yet, immigration into Europe has been happening in the past decades albeit at tolerable levels. An increase in both pull and push factors are responsible for mass exodus into Europe. Pull factors that encourage asylum seekers to choose sanctuary in industrialised countries include shared cultural values with their country of origin, economic opportunities, linguistic similarities, common legislation, quality of education, and perceived human rights and tolerance (Crawley, 2010; UNHCR, 2009). Push factors include armed conflicts, human rights abuses, racial, religious, and gender discrimination, political persecution, political instability (as in Libya), economic collapse (Zimbabwean case), and demeaning cultural practices (such as female genital mutilation and arranged marriages) and so forth.

The United Kingdom (UK) receives immigrants from within and outside Europe and it is ranked fourth amongst industrialised nations per head of asylum application. An influx of immigrants into the UK has been met with resentment and disbelief from decision makers and lay people alike. Resentment and disbelief have led to 'tough talk' on immigration by politicians, the rise of anti-immigration political parties (i.e. British National Party) and grassroots movements (i.e. English Defence League), xenophobic attacks, biased and sensational media reporting on immigration matters, and institutional discrimination against asylum seekers and refugees. In turn, these factors have created a toxic anti-immigration environment that works against the UK government policy of socially integrating asylum seekers and refugees into local neighbourhoods.

Drawing from the above, the question that underpins this paper is the attitude of asylum seekers and refugees towards social integration in the TEES Valley area of the North East of England. Accordingly, the objective of this paper is to examine the attitude of asylum seekers and refugees towards social integration in the TEES Valley area of the North East of England. Section 2, 3, 4, and 5 addresses immigration from global, regional, national, to local contexts. Section 6 presents the methodology. Section 7 presents and discusses findings. Conclusions and implications for practice are presented in section 8.

2. Global, regional, national, and local immigration context

2.1 Global context: United Nations Higher Commission on Refugees (UNHCR)

United Nations Higher Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) is a United Nations (UN) agency tasked with protecting refugees on an international level. UNHCR executes this mandate through resolutions of the United Nations Geneva Convention on the Protection of

Refugees (1951), Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967) and other relevant legal instruments. This mandate includes the protection of refugees including asylum seekers. UNHCR defines refugees as someone who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country." UNHCR's definition does not include aspects of persecution for cultural purpose such as arranged marriages, gender discrimination based on homosexuality, national economic collapse or environmental refugees caused by sea level rise due to climate change. This sought of definition from the UNHCR is outdated and tends to limit the scope of argument when making a case for asylum seekers and refugees. The UNHCR's definition ought to include cultural, gender, and environmental aspects in order to address this shortcoming. Despite this shortfall, the UNHCR's evokes four principles that deal with refugee challenges. These principles are *asylum*, *non-refoulement*, *non-discrimination* and *protection*. *Asylum* principle stipulates that a refugee within the definition of that term under the relevant legal instruments is entitled to seek and enjoy asylum in other states. *Non-refoulement* principle engenders states not to reject refugees at the frontier or return them to countries where they might face persecution. *Non-discrimination* principle requires refugees to be accorded equal treatment. *Protection* principle requires that refugees be treated in line with the standards stipulated in refugee instruments as well as human rights law. Further, member states have evolved two additional principles of burden sharing and solutions (Rutinwa, 2001).

3. Regional Context: European Union (EU)

3.1. EU migration trends and EU integration project

European Union (EU) migration trends should be viewed within the context of the collapse of the former Soviet Union, European integration project. In this context, failure of communist economic planning in the ex-Communist bloc and success of neoliberal economic planning in Western Europe created economic disparities between European countries. 2004 and 2007 accession of Eastern European countries into the EU resulted in massive east-west migration flows (De la Rica, Glitz, & Ortega 2013; Eurostat 2015a; Finotelli & Sciortino 2013). Flooded by unwanted immigrants, EU member states have moved to strengthen border controls and evoke zero tolerance policing to prevent asylum seekers from Africa from entering Europe. This ignores the fact that African immigrants constitute a small number of EU immigration statistics (Eurostat 2015b & 2015c). Asylum seekers and refugees face greater challenges than legal African immigrants do. Unfortunately, securitisation of asylum continues to cultivate anti-immigrant sentiments in Europe, African asylum seekers are at the receiving end.

3.2 EU immigration policy and directives

Since 1999, the EU member states have been developing a common immigration policy for Europe. This agreement is set out in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2009). EU has twelve policies on immigration including the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). CEAS include policy plans on asylum and social integration of non-EU immigrants into EU countries. EU issues directives to member countries to implement these laws. However, EU-wide immigration rules generally apply in 24 out of the EU's 27 countries. For example, Denmark does not apply EU-wide rules, which relate to immigration, visa and asylum policies. Ireland and the UK choose, on a case-by-case basis, whether to adopt EU rules on immigration, visa and asylum policies. The EU cannot guarantee an asylum institution in Denmark, Ireland and the UK.

3.3 Terrorism, Islamophobia, EU financial crisis, and anti-immigrationist politics

According to the Open Society (2015), in recent years, Islamophobia has been fuelled by public anxiety over immigration and the social integration of Muslim minorities into majority cultures in Europe. Islamophobia is a term used to describe irrational hostility, fear, or hatred of Islam, Muslims, and Islamic culture, and active discrimination against and harassment of these groups or individuals within them. In Europe, Islamophobia manifests itself through negative individual attitudes and anti-social behaviours, and the discriminatory policies and practices of organisations and institutions. These include:

- Physical or verbal attacks on property, places of worship, and people,
- Verbal or online threats of violence, vilification, and abuse.
- Policies or legislation that indirectly target or disproportionately affect Muslims, and unduly restrict their freedom of religion,
- Discrimination in education, employment, housing, or access to goods and services
- Ethnic and religious profiling and police abuse, including provisions of counterterrorism policing,
- Public pronouncements by journalists and politicians that stigmatise Muslims as a group and disregard their positive contributions to the communities and countries in which they live in.

These tensions have been exacerbated by the aftermath of the economic crisis of 2007. Aggravated high profile terrorist attacks such as the 9/11 New York attacks, 7/7 London bombing, 3/11 Madrid attacks, and the massacre at *Charlie Hebdo* offices in Paris. The rise of racist and anti-immigrationist movements such as Golden Dawn in


Greece, UK Independence Party (UKIP) and English Defence League (EDL) in the UK, National Front in France, and so forth.

4. National context: United Kingdom (UK)

4.1 UK immigration trends


The UK has become a country of net immigration since the Second World War. Net immigration was a result of post war reconstruction labour needs and an influx of migrants from the New Commonwealth countries. It was during the 1990s that the UK experienced a substantial increase in the numbers of asylum seekers, economic migrants and residence from Commonwealth countries. In 2009, the UK was ranked tenth in Europe per head of population for asylum application and fourth in industrialised nations (UNHCR, 2009). UK immigrants are highly concentrated in metropolis but the central government introduced a centrally coordinated system of dispersing asylum seekers to less concentrated areas such as northern regions and small towns. Figures 1 & 2 below represent the distribution of asylum seekers to various regions of the UK through the centrally coordinated government dispersal programme:

Figure 1: UK distribution of asylum seekers through dispersal programme



Source: North of England Refugee Service (NERS, 2005) (due to absence of recent data the situation might have changed but these areas continue to be government dispersal areas)

Figure 2: North East of England distribution of asylum seekers and refugees through dispersal programme



Source: North of England Refugee Service (NERS, 2005) (due to absence of recent data the situation might have changed but these areas continue to be government dispersal areas).

4.2 Bureaucratisation of the UK asylum system

UK moved towards a centrally coordinated asylum system when Labour Party came into power in 1997. Reasons for this included asylum-shopping assumption, Third Way, Communitarianism, and Multiculturalism theories, religious fundamentalism and terrorism, mass media, social unrests in parts of the UK, and naive sociology on immigration. Zetter *et al.*, (2005) states that introduction of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 put in motion the abandonment of the laissez-faire 'integration' policy, which was implemented by local authorities and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This bureaucratisation became apparent through the introduction of a centrally coordinated system for reception and compulsory regional dispersal of asylum seekers requiring accommodation, away from the greater London area, until their status has been determined. A new government agency, the National Asylum Support Service (NASS) directs the programme; it also provides subsistence for dispersed asylum seekers and funds Regional Consortia of local authorities that provides social and welfare support. The system of dispersal has achieved some goals such as relieving the pressure for housing in South East England (including London) where many asylum seekers used to settle. Regardless, the system has persistent endemic logistical and organisational weaknesses (Audit Commission, 2000a, 2000b; Zetter and Pearl, 1998; Zetter *et al.*, 2005) and works against the government's community cohesion

agenda. To cite an example; the locus of refugee and asylum policy and funding has dramatically shifted from locally driven past patterns, to a centrally coordinated framework. This environment has become difficult for locally based agencies to access and influence (Zetter *et al.*, 2005). This has meant that Refugee Community Based Organisations (RCOs) operate in relatively hostile policy environment in which they have no influence about issues which are very important to their clients. This has left asylum seekers and refugees at the mercy of national bureaucrats who are detached from local neighbourhood realities.

4.3 Asylum shopping assumption

Asylum shopping is an assumption that purports that asylum seekers make conscious decisions and commit resources towards seeking asylum in a particular country including the UK for economic reasons. Of course, this assumption is naive and confuses asylum seekers with economic migrants. Crawley (2010) found that asylum seekers end up in the UK due to these reasons:

- Choice regarding country of destination is often made for asylum seekers by paid agents,
- The practicality and difficulties experienced on the journey to and within Europe can lead asylum seekers to the UK,
- Time available to prepare for the journey,
- Social networks available in countries of destination,
- Availability of economic resources (often money) to fund the journey,
- Perceived respect for human rights within the country of destination, and
- Cultural and historical reasons, linguistic, legislative, and educational similarities with the UK

These challenges are indicative that asylum seekers do not have choices in the country of destination thus rendering the asylum shopping hypothesis null and void.

4.4 UK financial crisis, war on Terrorism, populist anti-immigration politics, and islamophobia

Europe is going through its worst economic recession since the 1930s caused by the 2007 collapse of financial services sector that affected all countries including the UK. Financial meltdown resulted in widespread job losses pushing European unemployment figures to developing countries' levels. Black and Ethnic Minorities (BAME) including Muslims serve as scapegoats during this economic crisis. The war on terrorism, on domestic and foreign fronts, that ensued after 9/11 and strengthen by 7/7 attacks included enactment of anti-terrorism legislations and invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. The UK joined the war effort and enacted domestic anti-terrorism laws including Terrorism Act (2006) and Counter-

Terrorism Act (2008) translated into prevent strategies such as the ‘Stopping people from becoming or supporting terrorists or violent extremism’. Recent recruitment of young Europeans including British teenagers by Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant/Syria (ISIL/S) has added fuel to anti-immigrant sentiments and xenophobia in the UK. These sentiments are propagated by fascist, right-wing, populist, and anti-immigrationist political parties and street movements such as UKIP, BNP, and EDL claiming fear of Islamisation (takeover of Europe by Muslims). EDL describes itself as islamophobic and advocates for violence against immigrants particularly Muslims. UKIP uses its popularity to influence anti-immigration laws in the UK and EU parliaments. Although it has small following, the BNP promotes white supremacy, British and ethnic nationalism that feed anti-immigrant attitudes.

5. Local context: Tees Valley area

5.1 Government dispersal areas and spatial segregation

Darlington, Middlesbrough, and Stockton in Tees Valley are amongst the government’s dispersal areas in the North East region, and, therefore, home to many asylum seekers and refugees. During the process of seeking sanctuary, asylum seekers are housed in Middlesbrough and then moved on to Stockton when they receive refugee status. In Stockton, refugees are kept in an area dedicated to them and away from the host community. This spatial segregation has ensured that the social integration agenda takes the ‘back seat’ for other priorities such as economic survival. Spatial segregation is also cultivating a sense of ‘Them-against-Us’ in Stockton community.

5.2 Government dispersal areas and economic deprivation

Central government strategy on dispersal focuses on forcibly dispersing asylum seekers to already economically deprived areas with insufficient public services to cater for the needs of the host community and newly arrived asylum seekers. Community integration and cohesion is compromised by this environment of scarce resources that encourages competition rather than cooperation. Wherein, large and established groups have access to resources due to their social capital and small and less established group do not have access to similar resources. Inferiority and powerlessness renders asylum seekers and refugees unable to socially integrate within local neighbourhoods (Daley, 2009; Zetter *et al.*, 2005). This depressing situation is further reinforced by government policies that feed negative media and public attitudes.

5.3 Government dispersal areas, counter-terrorism and the right to work

UK government failure to manage immigration humanely has resulted in gross contradictions between immigration policy and practice. For example, UK counter terrorism strategy recognises that vulnerable people are easy recruits for religious extremists. Despite

this, decision makers have taken away the ‘right to work’ from asylum seekers forcing them into limbo, dependency on insufficient government handouts, and constant fear of deportation. During this period, asylum seekers are blamed for stretching social services, increasing crime levels, falsifying arrival documents, increasing tax levels, taking local jobs, and pushing down the minimum wage.

5.4 Local integration, deportation, and repatriation


UNHCR and member states acknowledge that local integration is the final solution that can ensure asylum seekers enjoy basic dignity, security, and self-sufficiency. At the basic level, policy makers, politicians, and academics agree that social integration can be supported and facilitated by learning the local language, getting a job, accessing education, making friends, participating in local decision making and voting and so on. Yet, many asylum seekers are not allowed to work, cannot access education especially higher education, are unable to participate in local decision making such as Local Strategic Partnerships (LSP) which are often sexist, unrepresentative and reserved for the middle class men. In the expert opinion of UNHCR, social integration is seen to be a final solution because deportation to the country of origin and repatriation to a third world country is often complex and unrealistic. Because, asylum seekers fled their countries of origin due to persecution and most third world countries lack resources and expertise to deal with asylum seekers and refugees. UKBA prides itself with deporting an asylum seeker every eight minutes and in 100% of asylum cases heard by the UK only 17% were granted refugee status (Crawley, 2010).

6. Methodology

Purposive and quota samples were drawn from the database of the North of England Refugee Service (NERS), a not-for profit organisation that support asylum seekers and refugees in the North East region only. Participants were purposively selected due to their status as asylum seekers and refugees. Quota sample comprises of eight (8) participants including women, men and young people from different ethnic, religious, country of origin and cultural backgrounds. These participants live, volunteer, work, and study in Middlesbrough town, Stockton on Tees, and Darlington in the Tees Valley areas of the North East of England. Primary data was collected by administering an interview guide/schedule through face-to-face interviews with participants. Secondary data was gathered from scientific and grey literature including EU reports, central and local government reports, peer reviewed academic journals and books, reliable newspaper articles, and other periodicals. The following keywords were used to explore search engines (Google scholar) and academic databases (Ebscohost, Science Direct etc.): ‘Asylum seekers’ AND ‘Refugees’ AND ‘UK’; ‘Asylum seekers’ AND ‘Refugees’ AND ‘EU’; ‘EU Immigration Trends’; ‘UK

Immigration Trends'; 'EU Immigration Laws'; 'UK Immigration Laws'; 'United Kingdom Border Agency (UKBA)'.

Figure 5: The UK with the North East region highlighted



Source: World Atlas (2010)

7. Findings and discussions

7.1 Activities Whilst In The UK

7.1.1 Realised activities

“Means and makers” include employment, housing, education and health and are important in the process of social integration. The majority of the respondents mentioned that they were studying, working, volunteering, and learning about British culture. Typically, respondents are mostly employed by small shop owners and restaurants and volunteer in the not-for-profit sector. Most of these respondents work for salaries that are below the national minimum wage of £6.70 per hour. Respondents indicated that they are enrolled for literacy and numeracy courses at local universities. One respondent was registered for a university degree at a local elitist university.

7.1.2 Aspired activities

Asylum seekers and refugees aspire to study and to learn English through English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL), work and volunteer, and assimilate British culture. This confirms that asylum seekers and refugees want to take an active role in social integration into British life.

7.2 Friendship and Community

7.2.1 Friendship and family

Social connections (social bonds, social links and social bridges) are important in the process of social integration. Respondents were asked about whether or not they have friends and family connections in the UK. All respondents indicated that they have friends but do not have their immediate family in the UK. These friends came from diverse ethnic, racial, national, religious, class and educational backgrounds. This is evidence that asylum seekers and refugee make concerted efforts to socially integrate.

7.3 Sense of Belonging to a Community

A feeling of belonging to a community is associated with feelings of security and safety which are brought about by social connections within a community, and between members of the community, and between communities. Most respondents felt that they are a part of their communities with a few respondents consciously avoiding certain communities for fear of racism. Interestingly, certain asylum seekers and refugees would consciously avoid communities allocated to them by the UKBA. These are their communities of residence but they do not have feelings of belonging in these communities for fear of racial victimisation.

It is noteworthy that respondents who said they felt that they were part of their communities lived in Middlesbrough and Stockton. This is because Middlesbrough and Stockton are more racially diverse and have activities which encourage community integration and cohesion unlike Darlington where the contrary prevails. Racial diversity and integration activities are not the only ingredients to a successful integration effort, the ability to communicate reasonably in the English language and adaptation to culture are equally important.

7.4 Attitudes Towards Asylum Seekers And Refugees

7.4.1 Local attitudes towards asylum seekers and refugees

Majority of the respondents indicated that sensational media reporting, lack of information and misinformation, the bureaucratic government system, far-right political organisations, and a minority of anti-social people have negative attitudes towards asylum seekers and refugees but this is not a representation of general attitudes of British society. It is clear that respondents attribute negative attitudes held by many British people as a consequence of misinformation by the media, politicians, government, and some community organisations. The media is playing a very detrimental role in the integration of asylum seekers and refugees by spreading misinformation that continues to feed stereotypes, racial discrimination, and harassment. The government continue to use its policies to create an impression that asylum seekers and refugees create social problems and have to be controlled. This stance is supported by far right political parties.

7.4.2 Effects of local attitudes on asylum seekers and refugees

Grippingly, all of the respondents said they are affected by negative attitudes held by British people against asylum seekers and refugees. Some respondents said that these attitudes and perceptions affect their physical, emotional and mental health detrimentally. Respondents were reluctant to generalise negative attitudes of certain sections of Britons to the entire population, pointing out that, negative attitudes were conditioned and controlled by sensational media reporting, bureaucratic government, and politicians' 'tough talk' on immigration.

7.5 Negative Experiences Whilst In The UK

All respondents pointed out that they have directly or indirectly encountered negative experiences as either asylum seekers or refugees in the UK. Respondents also mentioned that they knew someone who had encountered negative experiences including xenophobic attacks. The nature of negative experiences can be subdivided into: interpersonal (person-to-person) level, institutional and political level, and legal and political level.

7.5.1 Interpersonal level discrimination and harassment

Person-to-person level discrimination is confrontation between an asylum seeker or refugee and a native resident(s). Often, the native residents are perpetrators and asylum or refugees victims. According to respondents, native residents victimise asylum seekers and refugees with impunity. This assertion is supported by these quotations:

Xenophobic attacks-

“In another incident some lads (boys) banged and smashed my window and shouting racists’ comments and telling me to leave Norton (a place in Tees Valley).”

Participant 3 (Liberian)

7.5.2 Institutional and political level discrimination and harassment

Institutional and political level is discrimination and sometimes harassment of asylum seekers and refugees by government related institutions such as the police, UKBA and the National Health Service (NHS) and politicians. Examples of discrimination and harassment by institutions and politicians are given by respondents in these accounts:

Police discrimination-

“I was wrongly arrested and imprisoned by the police while I was the victim of an assault by British lads (boys) and when I called the police they arrested me and told me to keep quiet as everything I say can and will be used against me in the court of law. When we arrived at the police station they imprisoned me and let the other lads (agitators) go.”

Participant 3 (Liberian)

NHS discrimination-

“Between 2003 and 2004 I was seriously assaulted by racists in Middlesbrough and taken to hospital but the doctor and the nurse did not treat me because they wanted a statement from the police and the police did not keep that statement, so I was not treated.”

Participant 3 (Liberian)

Xenophobic attacks-

“One day when I was walking on the high street in Stockton someone spat in my face and I called the police and they did nothing.”

Participant 3 (Liberian)

Xenophobic attacks and police discrimination-

“One day on a night out in a nightclub I was pointed at with a gun and I called the police and they came and did not want to get involved and they watched us from a distance.”

Participant 3 (Liberian)

7.5.3 Legal and political level discrimination

Legal and political level is a category that recognises the discrimination of asylum seekers and refugees through the asylum system of the UKBA which denies asylum seekers and refugees the right to seek and enjoy asylum in the UK. This is a deliberate neglect of the resolutions of the UNHCR. This denial of the right to seek and enjoy asylum has a political feature that is played out between EU countries and their constant neglect to collective responsibility (i.e. collaboration, cooperation and burden sharing). EU periphery countries have tightened their border controls resulting in the securitisation of asylum system, collapsing sanctuary institutions, and dwindling options for many asylum seekers fleeing persecution. The legal and political aspects of discrimination and denial of asylum is captured by these responses:

“I have been an asylum seeker for a long time and the government refused my application many times and I had to prepare a fresh application.”

Participant 2 (Kurdish from Turkey)

Perpetrators of negative experiences (i.e. hate crimes, xenophobic attacks, institutional discrimination etc.)

Respondents listed media companies, police, central (UKBA, immigration policies, and politicians) and local (mayors, municipality, and council) government, and a minority of anti-social people as perpetrators of negative experiences.

7.6 Positive Experiences Whilst In The UK

7.6.1 The role of social connections (social capital)

Most of the respondents overwhelmingly associated their positive experiences with charity organisations, colleges and universities, their families, and the local community respectively. The respondents have had similar experiences with charity organisations, in the beginning as service users, then volunteers and finally as employees. When answering the respondents mentioned names of charitable organisations that had helped and

supported them throughout their period of seeking asylum and gaining refugee status. Others respondents mentioned employees of various colleges and universities, particularly tutors of English For Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) classes, which many respondents found very supportive and helpful. Others mentioned family members, colleagues, friends and neighbours in their community. This is evidence that the social connections within the community are crucial to the process of social integration and shaping attitudes.

7.6.2 The role of people and institutions

Unsurprisingly, all the respondents said that most or some of the following agencies and institutions encouraged and supported their positive experience: Charities, Colleges, Universities, Family, Friends, and Community members. On observation respondents never mentioned any government office or agency, politicians, or media company. The mention of charities, colleges and universities, families and community members as agents that encourage and support positive experiences makes a strong case for their importance in the process of social integration and building social capital within communities.

7.6.3 Asylum seekers and refugees' attitudes towards the UK government

All respondents felt that the UK government was misinforming its citizens about the plight of asylum seekers and refugees and the situation in their countries of origin. This shows that asylum seekers and refugees are aware of the negative role the UK government is playing in the process of social integration.

7.6.4 Asylum seekers and refugees' attitudes towards the UK general public

The majority of the respondents said that the general public's attitudes and opinions about asylum seekers and refugees are shaped by incorrect information fed to the public by media companies, politicians and the government. Respondents argued that the general public is not to blame for their prejudice and stereotypes towards asylum seekers and refugees.

7.6.5 Asylum seekers and refugees' attitudes towards repatriation to countries of origin

The majority of the respondents said that they would take an opportunity to live in another country. There were only two respondents who said that they would not take the opportunity to move to another country. Those who said that they would take the opportunity wanted to go back to their countries of origin because of their families, their roots, patriotism and nationalism, religion, culture, freedom and the contribution they can make in their

countries of origin. Those who did not want to take the opportunity preferred to remain in the UK.

7. Conclusions and recommendations

Findings in this study confirm that attitudes of asylum seekers and refugees towards social integration are shaped by their positive and negative experiences whilst living in the UK. On the one hand, the findings also confirm that charities, colleges, universities, community members, families and friends are important to social integration because they encourage positive experiences of asylum seekers and refugees. Therefore, these institutions and individuals contribute to social integration of asylum seekers and refugees by building social capital (social bonds, social links, and social connections) within and between communities. Findings also prove that media companies, police, government agencies, central and local governments, political parties and politicians and a minority of anti-social people perpetuate the negative experiences of asylum seekers and refugees. These institutions and individuals are not contributing to the social integration of asylum seekers and refugees and are destroying social fabric of UK communities.

It is clear that asylum seekers and refugees form attitudes according to their experiences in their immediate environment. The implications of the findings are that the general environment of racism, stereotypes, discrimination, harassment and xenophobic attacks condition asylum seekers and refugees to form negative attitudes towards social integration. However, support from charities, colleges, universities, community members, families and friends form a favourable sanctuary that fosters positive experiences for asylum seekers and refugees. Therefore, asylum seekers and refugees that do not have access to these social capital (social bonds, social links, and social connections) will continue to live in a toxic anti-immigrant environment that build up their negative experiences and reinforcing anti-social behaviour that feeds the negative narrative associated with asylum seekers.

The implications for practice that this piece of study presents are the following:

- The charity sector is doing a decent job in supporting and encouraging positive experiences of asylum seekers and refugees thereby supporting their social integration. Findings from this study strongly support the fact that the charity sector should be protected from public sector budget cuts associated with the European financial crisis.

- According to the respondents, there are asylum seekers and refugees who fall between the cracks created by the service gaps in many deprived neighbourhoods and the government should prioritise adequate resources and social infrastructure to these areas, especially in poorly resourced dispersal areas, which are affected by many social problems and tensions have developed over the high competition for limited resources.
- Educational and community activities to engage community members and young people around themes of social integration, multiculturalism and mental health are very important to the process of social integration and building social capital. Government should make more resources available for these activities. These activities are also important in challenging stereotypes, discrimination and harassments of asylum seekers and refugees.
- Irresponsible and sensational media reporting is damaging the process of social integration by portraying asylum seekers and refugees in a negative light. Ideally, media companies should live up to their corporate social responsibility by supporting the process of social integration of asylum seekers and refugees.
- Police and UKBA should adapt their organisational culture of disbelief and suspicion towards asylum seekers and refugees.
- UK Police should be made more accountable to the people they protect including asylum seekers and refugees.
- English language is important to the process of forming an experience in the UK and the respondents said that the government should reform its legislation which would allow asylum seekers to undertake ESOL classes upon their arrival and not have to wait for six months before they can start learning the native language.
- The asylum system should be reformed and made user friendly to asylum seekers and refugees.
- The asylum system should fast track asylum cases within reasonable timeframes.
- UK government should allow asylum seekers to seek employment thus eliminating their dependency on social welfare which is barrier to social integration.

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THE CHALLENGES OF WATER SUPPLY MANAGEMENT: A CASE OF UMDONI LOCAL MUNICIPALITY, KWAZULU-NATAL PROVINCE

N. Gumbi

M.F. Rangongo

University of Limpopo

Abstract

The discourse challenges of water supply management in Umdoni Local Municipality has readily accepted the constitutional developmental mandate and activation of “free basic water”. In South Africa, every person has a right to access basic water and sanitation services. Water is a basic need for human life. It is essential for domestic purposes, industrial and commercial use, as well as agriculture and mining. This means that in all activities undertaken for the survival of human and animal species, water plays a major role. The principles of sustainability, affordability, effectiveness, efficiency and appropriateness should be kept uppermost in supplying water to the community. Despite the improvement of water supply, some communities still encounter immense clean water supply challenges. It goes to the extent of women both adult and young having to walk long distances to find clean drinkable water. This paper outlines the challenges of the community in accessing clean water and brings forth approaches for improving water supplies management. The paper firstly outlines the water supply status in South Africa; the water supply status in Umdoni Local Municipality and then highlights the challenges of water supply management. This paper recommends additions of water plant; building of new reservoirs and upgrades of water pipes especially in Amahlongwa area as a matter of urgency.

1. Introduction

The discourse of the challenges of water supply management in Umdoni Local Municipality has readily accepted the constitutional developmental mandate and activation of “free basic water”. In South Africa, every person has a right to access basic water and sanitation services. Water is a basic need for human life. It is essential for domestic purposes, industrial and commercial use, as well as agriculture and mining. This means that in all activities undertaken for the survival of human and animal species, water plays a major role. Water plays a major role in all activities undertaken for the survival of human and animal species. Based on this premise, the South African Government introduced the Free Basic Water (FBW) Policy in the year 2001 to ensure that all citizens of this country have access to clean water. The policy is also enshrined in Section 27 of the South African Constitution, 1996, which states that everyone has the right to have access to sufficient food and water and that the state must take reasonable legislative and other measures within its available resources in order to achieve progressive realisation of this right (Department of

Water Affairs and Forestry, 2007). At national and provincial levels, water service delivery is undertaken by a comprehensive numerical review trends of access and demand for adequate water supply in all South African Provinces. The expectations of comprehensive delivery to all is that those provinces identified as having the largest backlogs will advance in delivery at the most rapid pace and that the difference between provinces should narrow steadily (Statistics South Africa, 2011).

Nationally, 63.2% of households rated the quality of water-related services they received as “good”. Satisfaction has, however, been eroding steadily since 2005 when 76.4% of users rated the services as good. The percentage of households who received piped water supplies from their local municipalities increased from 78.8% in 2004, with a low point of 75.0% in 2008, to 85.9% in 2013 (Statistics South Africa, 2013). Provinces in which interruptions of water supply were more frequent were less likely to rate water service delivery as “good”. About 63.5% of households in Mpumalanga and 62.1% of households in Limpopo reported having had interruptions. Since 2009, the percentage of households that had reported interruptions increased strongly in the Free State and North West provinces while it decreased in KwaZulu-Natal (Statistics South Africa, 2013). Western Cape province showed the highest proportion of consumer units that benefited from free basic electricity policy (44.3%), followed by Mpumalanga (32.7%) and Gauteng (30.9%). North West (18.6%) followed by Limpopo (12.0%) and KwaZulu-Natal showed the lowest proportion (11.6%). Differences in free basic water services between 2012 and 2013 are partly due to changes in the targeting mechanisms used by municipalities to provide such services, namely technical, geographical, broad-based, self-based, consumption-based, property value, and plot size (Statistics South Africa, 2013).

According to Census 2011, KwaZulu-Natal has 61 municipalities, Eastern Cape 45 municipalities, Northern Cape 32 municipalities, Western Cape and Limpopo 30 municipalities, Free State 24 municipalities, North West 23 municipalities, Mpumalanga 21 municipalities and Gauteng 12 municipalities. According to Statistics South Africa (2013), 11 794 526 households have access to basic services and 5 269 475 households have access to free basic services. In Kwa-Zulu Natal 2 078 601 households are receiving basic water service and 815 938 households are receiving free basic water services. Differences in free basic services between 2012 and 2013 are partly the result of changes in the targeting mechanisms used by municipalities to provide such services namely technical, geographical, broad-based, self-based, consumption-based, property value and plot size. Umdoni Local Municipality is ranked 136 in its population size, it has a total population of 78.875 people and only 40.6% households have access to piped water inside their dwelling

(Statistics South Africa, 2013). There are substantial errors of inclusions in the free basic water programme. Out of 32 million people who received free basic water in May 2005, only 17 million were considered poor by the definition of the Department of Provincial and Local Government. On the other hand, significant numbers of poor people are excluded from receipt of free basic water. The number of people receiving free basic water was not the same as those benefiting from a government subsidy through the “equitable share”, which is calculated using estimates of the number of poor people in each jurisdiction. Where free basic water was supplied through a targeted indigent policy, as in some smaller towns, or through public standpipes in rural areas, where users are overwhelmingly poor and their consumption is self-limited by the distance over which water is carried, unwarranted inclusion is not an issue, although exclusion by administrative decision may be a problem (Muller, 2008).

However, where free basic water is implemented through the stepped tariff system in urban areas benefiting a large number of non-poor households the question of targeting needs to be seen somewhat differently. While Mosdell and Leatt (2005) concluded correctly that on average, the free basic water service is more likely to reach the non-poor than the poor. They state that this is the result of the poor being less likely to receive water services at all. They conclude that the targeting mechanism of this poverty alleviation programme is causing substantial errors of both inclusion and exclusion therefore in need of review and that this error is the result of a failure to consider the broader objectives of the tariff policy, which include the promotion of conservation and sustainable resource use. Durban now called Ethekewini, the only metro with a sizeable population from the former black “homelands”, was seeking a tariff policy that would address the challenges of service delivery in poor peri-urban communities, and had come up with some innovative approaches. It has a population of more than 2.5 million, half a million people were without household connections and used public standpipes; in addition, an estimated 20 000 households had been connected illegally to the piped water network. After initially trying to enforce payment in all communities, the metro weighed the costs and benefits (social and political as well as financial) and decided that it was not appropriate to pursue payment at all costs (Mosdell and Leatt, 2005). A two-fold approach was adopted:

- limiting demand by using small bore pipes together with yard tanks for storage (which, incidentally, helped to reduce the costs of the reticulation system); and
- providing some free water to all users of the restricted access system. This was funded by cross-subsidies from the higher-volume consumers in the formal urban area, and showed that it was financially feasible to provide a basic supply of water, free of charge, in a city like Durban (Muller, 2008).

2. Purpose of the study

This paper is based on the challenges of water supply management in the Umdoni Local Municipality in KwaZulu Natal, South Africa. The paper intends to fulfil the following objectives:

- Identify persistent challenges for Umdoni Local Municipality to access sustainable, fresh drinkable water.
- Highlights the importance of efficient water supply as a sustainable water source for all.

The study area is Umdoni Local Municipality in the Ugu District Municipality in Kwa-Zulu Natal Province. Umdoni Local Municipality is the smallest municipality in Kwa-Zulu Natal. It is located about 50km from the main city of the province, Durban, and 65km from Port Shepstone along the South Coast. It is bordered by the eThekweni Metro Municipality to the north, Umzumbe Local Municipality to the South, Vulamehlo Local Municipality to the West, making it almost halfway from Port Shepstone and Durban. Umdoni Local Municipality has a coastline of approximately 40km and stretches inland as far as Umzinto.

3. Water supply status in south africa

South Africa (SA) does not have abundant water supplies. According to the world rankings, SA is ranked as the 30th driest country in the world as it only receives 500mm of rain per year which is less than the world average of 860mm per year. SA has no more surplus water to support future development. Any future economic development and well-being is going to be constrained by water scarcity (Beires, 2009). Water scarcity is the manifestation of an increase in population growth, which may be as a result of natural growth or due to migration to a specific area. Water scarcity has far reaching implications for economic development, food security, the survival of cities and their citizens. The province of Kwa-Zulu Natal (KZN) has a slight advantage in this regard as it receives about 1000mm of rain per year. However, it is also the most populated province in the country and therefore has a high demand for water usage (Beires, 2009).

There is one unique factor to SA's spatial development plan which is vital to understand when examining SA's water supply. Our major cities are fairly isolated from water sources and it has taken major engineering and technology to mobilize the water needed to sustain industrial and urban areas. The problem with this is sustainability. As these industrial and urban areas grow in size it is going to become more difficult and costly to mobilize greater volumes of water to support the increased demand (Beires, 2009). This

has serious implications on government's plans for economic development, increased service delivery and industrial development as there may just not be the natural water resources available to support such expansion. In future, water is going to become a crucial factor in decision-making regarding the feasibility of certain developments (Beires, 2009). According to Muller (2008), social development challenges are due to consequences of what happened prior 1994. The active discrimination against and political control over the movement of majority of African population. This had left the country with many dysfunctional settlements with little economic base, and skewed communities of largely old people, children and women with few economically active people. The ending of "influx control" saw accelerated urbanization, which put substantial pressures on the city administrations that were responsible for housing and service provision (Muller, 2008).

In South Africa, water infrastructure is well developed in urban areas as opposed to rural areas where the infrastructure to rural communities is usually undertaken through small water treatment plants. These water treatment systems are installed in areas which are not well serviced and which do not normally fall within the boundaries of urban areas. They include water supplies from boreholes and springs which are then chlorinated, treatment plants of small municipalities and establishments such as rural hospitals, schools, clinics and forestry stations (Momba, Obi and Thompson, 2009). According to Momba *et al* (2009), one of the biggest challenges is that most municipalities fail to control and monitor their treatment plants. Lack of maintenance of equipment was noted to be a major problem. Momba *et al*, (2009) believes that the lack of technical skills has been highlighted as one of the major challenges to sustained quality water provision. These challenges underscore the need for upgrading and training of personnel but this has not been actively pursued by small water treatment plants (SWTPs) in all provinces. The need for training is underscored by the inability of plant operators to calculate chlorine doses and calibrate or maintain equipment. Coordinated efforts should equally be put in place to maximise the human resource capacity available in water provision support systems in the provinces (Momba *et al*, 2009).

According to Statistics South Africa (2013), a comparison of the main sources of drinking water used by households were very high proportions of households in Western Cape (98.7%); Northern Cape (96.3%), Free State (96%); and Gauteng (95.9%) that had access to water either in their dwellings, off-site than in other provinces. In Mpumalanga (86.8%), North West (88.4%), Kwa-Zulu Natal (86. 2%) and Limpopo (77.5%) had access to clean potable water (Statistics South Africa, 2013). In 2013, South Africa had estimated that 45.3% of households had access to piped water in their dwellings. A further 26.8% accessed water on site while 15.2% relied on communal taps and 2.6% relied on neighbours' taps.

Although generally households' access to water is improving, 4.2% of households still had to fetch water from rivers, streams, stagnant water pools, dams, wells and springs (Statistics South Africa, 2013). This is a decrease of more than five percentages (5%) points from 9.5% of households that had to access water from these sources in 2002. Even though there have been accrual fluctuations, the percentage of households who receive piped water supplies from local municipalities increased from 78.7% in 2004, with a low point of 75.6% in 2008, to 85.9% in 2013 (Statistics South Africa, 2013). Over 12.8 million households had access to piped water in 2013 compared to less than nine (9) million in 2004. Less than two-thirds (63.2%) of households rated the water services as 'good' in 2013. The percentage of households that rated water services 'poor' decreased slightly from 2012, it is still much higher than in 2005 (11.7% compared to 7.8%). This deterioration in levels of satisfaction is mirrored by an increase over time in the percentage of households who feel that their water is not clean, clear, does not taste good or is free of bad smells (Statistics South Africa, 2013).

Water is not being efficiently allocated in South Africa because the price at which it is being provided does not reflect its true economic value. In 1997 there was a pivotal conference held in Dublin where it was decided that water should be regarded as an economic good. This opened the way for the school of thought that water should be allocated to its best uses by pricing it at its economic value, the same way in which other private goods are allocated through the competitive market. It is this line of thinking that has opened the way for the rapid privatization of water. In 1998 the United Nations (UN) released a statement that "water should be paid for as a commodity rather than be treated as an essential staple to be provided free of cost". In South Africa as water scarcity becomes more of a reality demand side management through efficient pricing of water to reflect its true economic value is being pushed as a measure to curb water demand. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in particular have driven the initiatives of privatizing water utilities around the world and especially in Africa. In 2000, twelve countries in Africa were granted loans from the IMF on conditions that they privatize their water utilities (Beires, 2009).

Several case studies have been done of where privatization has been implemented both in South Africa and in other African countries, and the findings were that it was only the businesses that benefited and the brunt of the system is borne by the poor. This is expected because commercialized companies or corporatized municipalities are driven to maximize profits and therefore do not take responsibility for the health and social costs of inadequate water consumption by the poor. An example in South Africa, August 2000, there was a worst

Cholera outbreak in the country due to water privatization. This was due to prepaid meters being installed and certain areas being cut off to fresh water due to them not paying for it. In a matter of days' Cholera broke out in these communities and spread throughout the country (Beires, 2009).

South Africa and particularly the KZN has a historic basic water and sanitation service backlogs which originate from the apartheid legacy. This legacy has resulted in many abnormalities existing in water distribution in South Africa such as the fact that there are many people who live adjacent to water resource and yet have no access to this water. This is why when the African National Congress [ANC] government came into power in 1994 they introduced the "life-line tariff", which meant that the government would supply 25 litres of water per person a day free of charge. Although this has been implemented its sufficiency and success has been questioned (Beires, 2009). Goldblatt (1996) found that 57% of projects that have been implemented where the 25 litres of water supply was less than 200m away from households were not in operation. His studies also found that those poor households that had been linked up to the government municipal grids have experienced mass disconnections due to their inability to afford water prices. The study found that this disconnection due to affordability affects more than 1.5 million South Africans every year.

The three fundamental objectives for managing South Africa's water resources are:

- (i) **To achieve equitable access to clean water**, that is equity of access to water services, to the use of water resources, and to the benefits from the use of water resources.
- (ii) **To achieve sustainable use of water** by making progressive adjustments to water use with the objective of striking a balance between water availability and legitimate water requirements, and by implementing measures to protect water resources.
- (iii) **To achieve efficient and effective water use** for optimum social and economic benefit.

The purpose of the National Water Resource Strategy (NWRS) is the national framework for managing water resources; the framework for the preparation of catchment management strategies; provision of information, identification of development opportunities and constraints (Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 2008).

Strategic Framework for Water Services (SFWS) sector vision "water is life; sanitation is dignity". In terms of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996, national, provincial and local spheres of government are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated.

According to Nnadozie, Hirschowitz and Okin (1997), South Africa made first attempts in using official statistics, to measure development and living conditions for South Africa households on a relative basis, in the post-apartheid era. Using the October 1994 household survey the study found wide discrepancies in the odds of access to basic services for different demographic segments of South African society. Black African households were found to be more likely to lack access to basic services: housing, water, sanitation and electricity, amongst others.

In 1999, a similar study was conducted, it compared access to basic services on the basis of household income. This study found that access to basic services was closely related to income. Households that belonged to the low-income group were likely to be excluded from access to basic services. The primary focus of various regimes of the new era has been service delivery and infrastructural development for previously disadvantaged communities. More recent studies on the issue of measurement of service delivery and living conditions in South African households confirm that the focus is to deliver to poor households (Nnadozie, 2011). In a study by Bhorat, Van Der Westhuizen and Naidoo (2008), the shift on non-income welfare in South Africa, reveal that the focus of the government welfare services in the post-apartheid era has been pro-poor. Households at the bottom of the expenditure defiles (poorest of the poor) were found to have been benefited more from government services. However, even though delivery seems to have been pro-poor, significant backlogs were noted in these studies among poor households, especially with respect to housing, sanitation and piped water. Hemson and O'Donovan (2006) also observed that substantial progress has been made, but that a lot more effort is needed for universal access to basic services in South Africa. These studies also observed that a major impediment towards reaching service delivery targets for water and other household-based services is the issue of the rapid increase in the number of households in recent years in South Africa, a phenomenon which operates independently of increases in population which has complicated and dramatically added to the numbers demanding access to basic services (Nnadozie, 2011).

4. Water supply status in umdoni local municipality

The Umdoni Local Municipality is experiencing water shortage and disruption of services on a regular basis. The provision of water is the responsibility of the Ugu District Municipality. The Umdoni Local Municipality is assisting in gathering of information and the development of a Consolidated Infrastructure Plan (CIP) to inform the Water Services Development Plan (WSDP) by providing information on backlogs and needs. This will assist the Ugu District to strategize the eradication of backlogs. The service level provision within

the Local Municipality indicated having higher than average level of service provision (Umdoni Local Municipality, 2014). In 2001, 37% households had access to piped water; 12% households had access to piped water on site; 36% households had access to public tap. In 2011, 41% households had access to piped water on site; 12% households had access to public tap and 44% households had access to public tap. The basic services are a challenge as they involve a number of stakeholders, with Umdoni Local Municipality being the recipient for some and the implementing agent for others. Ugu District Municipality is the service provider for the water and sanitation projects, it had since improved the Water Services Development Plan (WSDP) which will address the housing backlog (Integrated Development Plan, 2014).

The Umdoni Local Municipality wants to ensure effective service delivery. Indigent support is governed by a policy with the indigence threshold being two state pensions. The municipality offers the following free basic services; rates, refuse and electricity. During the 2013 financial year, Umdoni Local Municipality was in the process of reviewing the indigent register so as to ensure the accuracy and completeness of the register. Given the level of unemployment within Umdoni Local Municipality, they expected the number of indigents register to increase (Integrated Development Plan, 2014). The municipality had adopted policies of promulgated by-laws to facilitate collection amongst all categories of debt. The municipality currently has approximately R24 millions of grants. Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) expenditure remains one of the key focus areas of the municipality given their limited financial resources. The municipality has minimal loans which had been undertaken. The municipality chooses to fund its projects via internal funding together with grant funding (Integrated Development Plan, 2014).

However, people spend weeks and even months without having access to clean drinkable water. The community struggles and fetch water from the nearby communities always have water. Furthermore, the community depends on vans owned by their neighbours because the municipality truck does not deliver water for them in time of need and this is regarded as discrimination against those who do not have such means of transport (Statistics South Africa, 2013). The gaps in level of services include a rural/urban national design standard; which affects the rural area more because the level of service required in the rural area increases annually and the actual level of service cannot keep up with the demand. This trend will continue until service levels are equalised. The aged water and sanitation infrastructure, lack of capacity of key treatment plants continues to be a challenge resulting in many interruptions and service delivery challenges. The key programmes around this still present challenges for the urban coastal strip namely:

refurbishment of sanitation infrastructure; waterborne sanitation - only 30% reticulated; augmentation of water bulk supply schemes; development of water resources (dams) and sustainable sanitation for low cost housing projects. The major infrastructure for water services in Ugu District Municipality therefore includes the following: eight (8) dams; 6000km pipelines (estimate); 160 reservoirs; 125 pump stations; 16 water treatment works and 18 waste water treatment works (Ugu District Municipality, 2014).

As indicated in the WSDP the existing water infrastructure suggests that the formal urban coastal areas have well developed bulk infrastructure and networks. Historically it was the main focus for Infrastructure Development in the District. The coastal areas remain the highest concentration of the population and are also the main economic centres for the District. Infrastructure development in the rural areas was historically done in a haphazard manner and this resulted in a number of stand-alone rural water schemes that many times are supplied from unsustainable water sources. The Regional Master Planning Initiatives that were completed in 2006 corrected the lack of planning in the rural areas and shifted the focus towards the implementation of more sustainable Regional Water Schemes. The existing and planned future infrastructure in Ugu District has a number of bulk supply sources (water treatment works or external bulk supply sources) that form the basis of the current and future water supply systems in the District. Each one of the bulk supply sources supplies a specific zone that could be ring fenced and used as the basis for further analysis (Ugu District Municipality, 2014).

These supply zones were not always clearly definable, especially in the urban areas where a number of interconnections exist to allow certain areas to be supplied from more than one bulk supply source. An attempt was made to ring fence back-to-back supply zones that cover the entire District. The supply zones also formed the building blocks for the development of the water demand model and the water demands were ring fenced within the supply zones and linked back to the respective bulk supply sources. The water demands could then be compared with the ability of the bulk infrastructure and water sources to meet the current and future water demands. The back-to-back water supply zones that were identified derived from dams, rivers, ground water and bulk purchases from eThekweni and Umgeni Water. The water was then treated at several treatment plants, owned by the District before being distributed to households. Distribution of water was done via more than 42 000 private household connections and over 5 000 communal stand taps which mainly serviced the inland rural areas. The demographics of the Ugu District Municipality vary from dense formal urban settlements to scattered rural settlements and must be dealt with differently when planning for the provision of water services (Ugu District Municipality, 2014).

Different levels of service are appropriate for each settlement category and the CSIR Guidelines for Human Settlement Planning and Design were used as a guideline to determine the water delivery standards per settlement category. The water delivery standards were also used to develop a water demand model for the District; to calculate current and future water demands per supply zone. The current level of basic service within the District comprises predominantly community standpipes at 200m (Ugu District Municipality, 2014).

4. Challenges in water supply

Water services must be provided to all persons in the Ugu District Municipality area on a sustainable basis within the financial and human resources of the Municipality so as to promote a healthy lifestyle; to attract investment and promote economic growth in the region. The South African Constitution, 1996, provides that everyone is entitled to a healthy lifestyle and to water. That is taken further to the Water Services Act of 1997 which, in section 3 (1), states that everyone has a right to access basic water supply and sanitation, both collectively referred to as water services. Basic water supply means to the prescribed minimum standard of water supply services necessary for the reliable supply of a sufficient quantity and quality of water to households, including informal households, to support life and personal hygiene (Nomquphu, Braine and Mitchell, 2007).

The Ugu District Municipality (UDM) will strive to provide water services to all persons who reside, work or visit its area of jurisdiction in a manner that is economically and financially sustainable. In other words, water services will be provided within a framework of fiscal discipline and a balanced budget. UDM is able, from its own resources or by way of grants from other resources, including other levels of government, to provide free basic water services to its poorer communities, it will do so in accordance with the policies of the national government, but always subject to the aforementioned fundamental principle (Ugu District Municipality, 2014).

Ugu District Municipality is 94.4 kilometres away from Umdoni Local Municipality. According to Umdoni Local Municipality's IDP (2014), UDM is responsible for general water supply; planning; implementation; overall decision making and management in Umdoni. However, it would have been much better if the local municipality was responsible for all water related decisions because the District is not within their area and as a result the decision taken by the district mostly disadvantages those who permanently do not have water supply.

Although the district municipality is facing their own problems, the respondents said it was the shortage of water that was the biggest problem. It is the district's responsibility to make sure that they provide water to all the municipal wards and should take responsibility in dealing with their shortfalls. Strategies should be put in place to deal with shortage of water and the community must not suffer just because the municipality fails to take ownership of its responsibilities. Most wards have sufficient water supply and the community is very happy, however there is only one (1) ward which permanently does not have water.

5. Methodology

In this paper, a qualitative paradigm, based on interpretivism, which strives to comprehend how individuals in everyday setting construct meaning and explain the events of their words. The simple random sampling was done, where subjects in the population are sampled by a random process, so that each person remaining in the population has the same probability of being selected for the sample. The actual drawing of the sample involves the generation of a predetermined number – the sample size – of random numbers. The population elements corresponding to these numbers form the sample. The crucial part of this method is that the numbers should be determined randomly (Maree, 2007). Two methods were employed to collect data in the study. The first method involved one-on-one interviews with the participants. An interview guide was used to obtain data pertaining to water supply services from a water services manager, a municipal manager and ten (10) ward councillors. The second method entailed analysis of documents within the municipality.

6. Results and discussions

Life depends on water in order to survive. Everybody needs water for drinking, cleaning and washing. Water shortage means failure to meet the community demands for clean potable water. The Ugu District Municipality, Umdoni Local Municipality has a few success factors in terms of their water supply and management. However, they are still faced with several challenges in terms of meeting the water requirements of their community. Water serves as a basic need to which everybody has the right to. However, in Umdoni Local Municipality water supply is unfortunately disrupted by many factors. The findings in the study for the poor water supply emanate from many factors that include:

- 1.1 The lack of technical skills and appropriate training, inadequate or lack of relevant experience, inadequate funds and personnel are some of the factors that are the end result of insufficient management and/or human capacity experience/expertise and skills. According to Momba, Obi and Thompson (2009), the challenges of water supply are due to lack of appropriate qualifications and training.

- 1.2 Inadequate or lack of community consultation and/or participation where at times decisions, especially those involving prioritisation of needs, are concluded with very little community inputs and as a result, whatever is implemented may not address the immediate needs as seen by the community. Most literature demonstrates a growing awareness of the role of gender in urban service provision and the primary role that women generally play in water collection and management. There is an increased need for local government level participation in decision-making on levels and types of water supply management (Mikkelsen, Yulianti and Barre, 1993).
- 1.3 There is a water service infrastructure that is poor and/or aged in some instances. The lack of maintenance of equipment was noted to be a major management problem. Aging infrastructure often have leaks that result in water loss as it is being transported from water sources to the communities which also results in frequent pipe bursts that further cost the municipality in terms of repairs. Many municipalities fail to manage their infrastructure adequately, they fall short of maintaining an environment that supports the citizens' health, especially the discharge of effluent from waste water treatment plants. They do not monitor the health of their water resources (Hagh, Fox and Davies-Coleman, 2010).
- 1.4 The District has the municipal truck that delivers water in cases when there is no water. However the truck delivers water daily to the wards that already have water and only goes to the needy areas once every third week. Recent studies, states that in the event of water shortage, appropriate emergency plans should be instituted to avert or minimise the effect of the poor water quality. Such plans would initially consist of emergency prevention measures which are mostly related to plant maintenance, strikes and sabotage, natural disasters, equipment failures, ensuring adequate supply of chemicals, and various measures to protect the water treatment and distribution systems (Momba, Obi and Thompson, 2009).

In terms of the National Government's definition of backlogs, households must have access to a formal water supply within 200m walking distance. This implies that only 45% of households in the Ugu District Municipality have been served with a RDP level of service, 50% served with piped water making the backlog of households not receiving satisfactory standards five percent (5%) as per Stat SA Census 2011. In Umdoni Municipality, 44% number of households have been served with a RDP level of service and only 53% served with piped water making the backlog of households not receiving satisfactory standards three percent (3%) as per Stat SA Census 2011 (Ugu District Municipality, 2014).

7. Conclusion

The underlying causes of the water supply problems are based on the basic infrastructure provision of water supply being very poor and dismal across the area. Water serves as a basic need to which everybody has the right to access however, it is unfortunately disrupted by many factors. The findings in the study for the poor water supply emanate from many factors such as management skills, technical challenges and illegal connections. To achieve sustainable water supply and sanitation development requires effective complementary inputs such as community participation, community capacity building and community training. In South Africa it is essential to understand the attitudes and behaviours of developing communities towards water and sanitation.

Strategies should be in place to ensure that the community treat municipal property with respect and dignity, to ensure efficient water services delivery to the community and that the service delivery backlogs would be eradicated. It is mostly women and children that suffer when there is no water. In some instances, children even miss school because their school uniform is dirty and they cannot bath for weeks. This can have a negative effect on the education of children, especially girls. It also poses a health threat especially to young girls at their puberty stage because they need efficient water to keep clean and hygienic at all times.

Most developing communities rely on the government to make sure that their water supply and sanitation projects are sustainable. However, it is necessary for the community itself to contribute to the sustainability of its projects. It is at community level that real decisions on efficient and effective water delivery and water preservation should be made and promoted, but these communities need information to be able to make decisions reflecting their aspirations, desires and needs.

8. Recommendations

This paper recommends:

- Addressing issues such as prioritization of effective water supply for Umdoni Local Municipality and community consultation and participation.
- To attend to capacity constraints skills audit should perhaps be conducted to determine whether the necessary skills for effective water management and supply are available in the municipality or not. Following a skills audit training and/or recruitment can be effected.

- Education and training of the community for them to appreciate the value of water, as well as on challenges the municipality faces in rendering an effective water service and implications of acts of vandalism on realising effective water service delivery to the community. Education can also be in terms of water preservation methods as well as use of traditional water harvesting methods that can perhaps help the community in times when there is water shortage.
- The ward councillors should communicate with the district to ensure that the district municipal truck gives preference to the needy wards thus as a result the needy wards will be catered for in time of need.
- Due to the nature of the identified challenges Umdoni Local Municipality has to encourage community members to participate in community development. The municipality and the community must work in partnership to successfully develop their endeavours in ensuring efficient, effective and sustainable water supply management.

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INFORMATION NEEDS AND INFORMATION SEEKING PATTERNS OF REFUGEES AT THE MUSINA REFUGEE RECEPTION CENTRE, LIMPOPO PROVINCE

*L.A. Makgahlela
M.J. Ntsala*

University of Limpopo, South Africa

Abstract

Understanding the information needs and information seeking behaviour of refugees is the basis for designing and developing information systems and services to adequately satisfy their needs. The purpose of this study was to research the information needs and information seeking patterns of refugees at Musina Refugee Reception Centre. The research has adopted a quantitative approach using questionnaires to collect data from 265 refugees at the Musina Refugee Reception Centre. When respondents were done with the completion of the questionnaire, they immediately returned the questionnaire to the researchers. The refugees immediately returned the questionnaires to the researchers. The researchers employed the convenience sampling method which assisted in identifying demographic information (gender, home country, language and academic qualifications). The study also identified these refugees' information needs, information sources they use and preferred channels of information. The findings of the study indicated that these refugees at the Musina Refugee Reception Centre need information on how to access appropriate documentation; basic social services and employment opportunities. The study also revealed that the refugees rely heavily on family and friends, the Internet and the library for information.

Keywords: Information Needs, Information Seeking patterns, Refugees, Public Library

1. Introduction

South Africa remains one of the immigration destination countries, as it has for many years, with refugees arriving every day from other countries on the African continent. Africa's Statistician General, Pali Lehohla (Statistics SA, 2014); points out that the greatest numbers of people granted permanent residence are from Zimbabwe. This was, and still is, largely due to a special dispensation, which makes it easier for Zimbabweans to obtain residence permits in South Africa, he said (Statistics SA, 2014). According to Deputy Minister Deputy Minister, Fatima Chohan, Zimbabwe is among the 10 leading refugees producing countries in the world, four are situated on the African continent – Somalia producing 1 121 700

refugees, Sudan with 649 300, the DRC with 499 500 and Eritrea with 308 000. Twenty-five percent of refugees come from sub-Saharan Africa (UNHCR, 2015). It is therefore no surprise that, according to 2012 and 2013 UNHCR figures, South Africa is amongst the largest recipients of asylum applicants in the world (UNHCR, 2015).

According to Ramoroka (2014: v), an asylum seeker who enters the Republic of South Africa, either legally through a port of entry or illegally faces many challenges before he or she can reach a refugee reception office. Those who come in through a port of entry face being turned away by Immigration Officers due to lack of documentation. Often, asylum seekers find it hard to reach the refugee reception offices as there is no co-operation between the Immigration Officers, the South African Police Service and the functionaries in the refugee reception offices. To make matters worse, the Immigration Amendment Act 13 of 2011 (Republic of South Africa, 2011) has reduced the days for asylum seekers without valid documentations to reach any refugee reception office, from fourteen to five days. Since refugee reception offices are located only in five cities in the country, these have conditioned asylum seekers and refugees to stay and make their living in those cities as they are required to make frequent renewals of their permits.

Hope (2008:298) portrays refugees as lacking stability and security and, as is often the case, they leave their countries at short notice; and so they can arrive in a host country feeling disoriented and bewildered. It is therefore important to know what refugees' real information needs are. Maepa (2000:13) explains the phrase 'seeking patterns' as concerned with who needs what kind of information, for what reasons as well as how that information is found by the user, evaluated and eventually used. Several factors are at play in the process. These include inter alia, the information-seeker's perception of the information source or provider and confidence in the source or provider. Information-seeking therefore follows the identification of an information need (Maepa, 2000: 13). Developing appropriate interventions to deal with information needs and information seeking patterns of refugees will depend largely on appropriate matching interventions of the information needs of refugees and the pattern that they follow when seeking information.

According to the World Disaster Report (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), 2005) people need information as much as water, food, medicine or shelter. Information is an important resource that can save lives, and yet it is very much neglected. Aid agencies and organizations have focused on gathering information for their own needs and not enough on exchanging information with the people they aim to support. Giving vulnerable people the right information at the right time is a form of

empowerment. It enables people to make the decisions most appropriate for themselves and their families and can mean the difference between being a victim or a survivor.

To apply for refugee status in South Africa, one needs an asylum seekers' permit from a Refugee Reception Office. These offices are located in Pretoria (Marabastad and Tirro), Durban (Greyville) and Musina. These refugees are from various countries in Africa and fewer are from other countries. It is therefore imperative that this research analyses and evaluates the information needs of refugees found at the Musina Refugee Reception Centre.

2. Objectives of the study

The specific objectives of the study were formulated as a guiding tool to ensure that the study remained focused on refugees at Musina Refugee Registration Centre. The objectives of the study were:

- To describe the demographic qualities of the refugees.
- To identify the information needs and information seeking patterns of these refugees.
- To establish the information sources they access and prefer.

3. Significance of the study

The findings of the study will provide useful insights into the nature of information needs, information seeking patterns, information sources and the channels refugees prefer. These insights into information needs will assist library and information services and the non-government organizations to align their services with the information needs and information seeking patterns of refugees. Libraries will be expected to provide materials for multicultural communities. The findings of this study will also assist with policy review as well as changes and open the way for more detailed research into refugees and their information needs as well as designing of better information systems for refugees. Not much research has been undertaken on the information needs and information seeking behaviour of refugees in South Africa, hence the findings of this study will provide significant evidence for the South African government to provide information based on real needs and hence use appropriate channels to disseminate information.

4. Scope of the study

The literature shows that a distinction has to be drawn between refugees and migrants because their situation is covered by different legislations as well as different conventions. Government and refugee advocates often insist that 'refugee' and 'migrant' are separate distinct categories, despite ample evidence that these labels blur in practice. Erika Feller, an Assistant High Commissioner for Protection at UNHCR, wrote in 2005 that

'refugees are not migrants. He continued to say that it is dangerous and detrimental to refugee protection, to confuse the two groups, terminologically or otherwise' (Feller 2005: 27). This study is only confined to refugees who were found at the Musina Refugee Registration Centre at the time of collecting data. There is a possibility that some are migrants yet identify themselves as refugees since they need to stay in South Africa.

5. Literature review

To deepen the understanding of the information needs and information seeking patterns of refugees, literature on the topic was extensively reviewed. No studies have so far been conducted on the information needs and information seeking patterns of refugees in South Africa. Literature searches were conducted using the University of Limpopo library catalogue, the Internet, online databases and e-books. Since there are few studies on refugees in South Africa the researchers depended on studies done in Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Europe, to mention a few.

5.1 Legislative frameworks governing refugees

There are legal frameworks that support the international refugees. South Africa is a signatory to many international conventions, treaties and protocols relating to the protection and promotion of the rights of refugees in particular, and vulnerable groups in general. Unlike migrants who voluntarily chose to relocate to another country and had ample time to prepare their moves, refugees are mainly forced to flee their countries of origin out of fear and without any plan of where they are going. According to Tribe (2002) refugees are usually victims of war, political prosecution and human rights abuse and have probably lost their possessions and loved ones through traumatic experiences.

5.2 United Nations High Commissioners for Refugees (UNHCR)

According to the United Nations High Commissioners for Refugees (UNHCR), protecting refugees is primarily the responsibility of the state. Whether in camps or urban settings, UNHCR considers it particularly important that refugees have secure status, are empowered to become self-reliant and are able to access livelihood opportunities and with provision that they access relevant information. Countries in the Americas and Africa experiencing large-scale displacement as the result of armed conflicts found that the 1951 Convention definition did not go far enough in addressing the protection needs of their populations. Consequently, both Article 3 of the Cartagena Declaration and Article 1(2) of the 1969 OAU Convention extend refugee status to an individual who "owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in

either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.”

5.3 The South African Constitution

Section 9.1 of the South African Constitution provides that everyone is equal before the law and should receive equal benefit and protection under the law (The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). This includes all foreign nationals living in South Africa. From this section in the constitution, it is clear that even foreign nationals are equal before the law and should be provided with equal information services just like the South African nationals.

5.4 The South African Refugees Act No 130 of 1998 (1998)

The South African Refugees Act No 130 of 1998 (1998), established the institutions and procedures to offer protection to those who are fleeing persecution and instability in their home countries. Although prior to 1994, South Africa did not recognize refugees until it became a signatory to the UN and Organisation of African Unity conventions on refugees after the 1994 democratic election. South Africa is part of the international efforts to protect and assist refugees and asylum-seekers, in particular by providing them with access to basic services, health and social services, and educational facilities (Centre for Education Rights and Transformation, 2012:5). South Africa is somewhat unique to the Southern African region as it has a predominantly urban-based refugee population. This means that access to basic services is provided in the same way as it is provided to South Africans, rather than there being specific service delivery to refugees (as would be the case in a refugee camp-based situation). The assumption is, therefore, that refugees will assimilate into South African society and access the services to which they are entitled in the same way as South African citizens. Many basic services to which refugees are entitled, such as housing, sanitation and water are provided at local government level. This means that local governments need to be familiar with the refugee legislation and the services and rights that refugee groups are entitled to as stated in the Refugee Act (Palmyra, 2002).

The Refugee Act of 1998 allows for any person to apply for asylum and states that no person should be denied the right to apply for asylum in South Africa. Whilst this asylum application is being processed, applicants are not allowed to work or access education. This clause has been one of the most controversial in the South African asylum system, as there is no subsistence or welfare support provided for asylum seekers during the time their application is processed (either from UNHCR or the South African government).The SA

government offers no grants to refugees, leaving them to rely on people they know and meet to help find accommodation and jobs (Daily Vox, 2015). If, however, the status of the applicant is not determined within six months, the asylum applicant is entitled to apply for permission to work and receive education (Palmary, 2002). For the refugees to be able to work and access education they will need information which is accessible from electronic sources such as the Internet, friends, the library and many more. South Africa's policy regarding refugees emphasizes integration, where people can meet with families and friends to begin to rebuild their lives within the safety of a social network (Palmary 2002). One may ask, "How are they going to survive if they're not allowed to move around, work, buy food for themselves?"

Palmary furthermore add that the law is silent about whether other public services such as housing or health care can be accessed during the time their application is being processed (2002). There is also no indication whether these services should be delivered under the same conditions that services are delivered to South Africans. For example, it does not state whether primary health care, if available to asylum seekers, would be free, as it is for South Africans.

5.5 The 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.

Subject to Article III, Member States shall issue to refugees lawfully staying in their territories travel documents in accordance with the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the Schedule and Annex thereto, for the purpose of travel outside their territory, unless compelling reasons of national security or public order otherwise require. Member States may issue such a travel document to any other refugee in their territory. Where an African country of second asylum accepts a refugee from a country of first asylum, the country of first asylum may be dispensed from issuing a document with a turn clause. Travel documents issued to refugees under previous international agreements by parties thereto shall be recognized and treated by Member States in the same way as if they had been issued to refugees pursuant to this article. South Africa's national legislation incorporates the basic principles of refugee protection, including freedom of movement, the right to work, and access to basic social services (UNHCR, 2015).

6. Information needs and information seeking patterns of refugees

According to Khoir, Du and Koronios (2014:683), it is important to understand the information needs and information seeking patterns of refugees, and more so to discover where they find information. Addressing information needs among refugees is a complex

undertaking. It requires thorough assessment and tailored responses that take into account diverse issues including language, education levels, the host environment and a tentative time frame of the displacement to ensure that information needs are adequately met (International Media Support, 2014).

A study by Fisher, Marcoux, Miller, Sanchez and Cunningham (2004) shows how refugees are generally perceived to be information poor, meaning they face major challenges with finding and using greatly needed everyday information. In humanitarian disasters, people affected by the unfolding tragedy need more than the physical necessities of life; they also have urgent information need (Lost: Syrian Refugees and the Information Gap, 2013). Giving vulnerable people the right information at the right time is a form of empowerment (IFRC, 2005). Information enables the people to make the decisions most appropriate for themselves and their families and can mean the difference between being a victim or a survivor (Lost: Syrian Refugees & the Information Gap, 2013).

An earlier study by Nkhoma-Uamunze (1988:11) explains that the refugees' immediate needs are shelter, food and clothing; eventually their needs are narrowed down to search for gainful employment and education. For them to get employment they need documents such as Section 22 or 24 permits and also documents relating to recognition of their educational qualifications. Refugees have been shown to experience specific problems entering the labour market due to factors which include lack of recognition of past qualifications or inappropriate qualifications, lack of experience and lack of references from past employers (Allsopp, Sigona and Phillimore, 2014). South African Qualification Authority is responsible for evaluating foreign qualifications.

7. Access to information sources

On evaluating information services provided for refugees, Qayyum, Thompson, Kennan and Lloyd (2014:1) cite Duncan (2007) who explains that services for refugees need to be appropriate, available, adequate, timely, targeted and holistic. However, the literature contains significant criticisms of information services, including a failure to meet the information needs and the information seeking patterns of refugees who have previously experienced trauma.

7.1 Libraries

Refugees like all other people use different sources for information such as libraries institutions, people and Internet. Shillinglaw and Thomas (1988:262) describe the role of a public library as making library venues and facilities available to the community and venues

where topical issues could be discussed. This is based on the South African constitution which guarantees access to information for all.

An International Federation of Library Association (IFLA) /UNESCO Multicultural Library Manifesto (IFLA, 2006) principles recommends that:

“Each individual in our global society has the right to a full range of library and information services. In addressing cultural and linguistic diversity, libraries should:

- Give access to a broad range of materials and services reflecting all communities and needs and special attention should be paid to groups which are often marginalized in culturally diverse societies: minorities, asylum seekers and refugees, residents with a temporary residence permit, migrant workers, and indigenous communities”.

As such, the library’s role would be to provide backup resources and information on employment, education and training opportunities that are available within the country, which agency to get in touch with, what relevant tools are available for extraction of information required, and which counselling services are available (Nkhoma-Uamunze, 1988:11).

7.2 Family, friends

A study by MacKay (2008) shows that majority of the refugees who were unemployed and looking for work had asked their friends and families about jobs. An examination of successful routes to employment shows such a strategy has been more successful than any other job search strategies. In another study conducted in Canada by Hyndman on information sources for refugee claimants, respondents generally agreed that the primary source for information refugee claimants have; when they first become involved in Canada legal proceedings, are compatriots in their countries of origin and friends (2011). In the same study, 34 service providers who expressed an opinion regarding the information sources from which refugee claimants get information, 22 mentioned family and friends. (Hyndman, 2011).

7.3 The Internet

Access to the Internet benefits refugees as it gives them the opportunity to communicate with families and friends on different issues. With the mobile phone refugees may access voice calls, SMSs, call-back, and mobile internet. The use of SMS has the advantage of being at a more reasonable rate, and one SMS can be sent to different persons. Prepaid plans are more flexible as the customer is not locked in a contract. At the

time of waiting for documents refugees may resort to informal employment in order to meet their basic needs.

8. Area of study

The Refugee Reception Office in Musina processes the claims of individuals seeking international protection. Musina has a population of between 20,000 and 40,000. Iron ore, coal, magnetite, graphite, asbestos, diamonds, semi-precious stones and copper are mined in the region. At present, there is a large-scale mixed flow of asylum seekers, unaccompanied minors or separated children alongside other migrants seeking economic and social opportunities in the Limpopo Province of South Africa. This can be attributed to the fact that most of the refugee used Beit Bridge Border Post as the entrance to the country and Musina is the first town after entering the country. Asylum seekers and refugees residing in the Limpopo Province originate from Zimbabwe, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Rwanda, Burundi, and South East Asian countries, such as Bangladesh and Pakistan (UNCHR, 2015).

9. Research methodology

The study adopted quantitative research approach with closed ended questionnaire. This is a quantitative study since it was concerned with the numbers and frequencies of the information needs and information seeking patterns of refugees. According to Gomm, quantitative research approach is the type of research approach which count things, analyse data statistically and quotes its results in numerical form (2004: 7). Flick further explains that a quantitative research approach is driven by the aims of a study in general and by the conditions in the study field (2011).

9.1 Population and sampling

The target participants in this study were refugees who were found at the Musina Refugee Reception Centre waiting for assistance to get their refugee papers between 15 - 26 June 2015. The convenience sampling technique was used to sample the population. Convenience sampling involves a sample taken from a group the researcher has easy access to. The idea is that anything learned from this study will be applicable to the larger population. By using a large, convenient size, one is able to more confidently say that the sample represents the population (Kowalczyk, n.d). Furthermore, the convenient group one is testing should not be fundamentally different from a sample that could be taken from another area. In this study the refugees were conveniently available at Musina Refugee Registration Centre.

9.2 Questionnaire

The researchers used questionnaires to collect data on refugees' information needs and information seeking behaviour. A questionnaire was chosen as a data collection instrument as it allows one to collect data from a large group in a short space. Before the questionnaire was distributed to a large group it was pilot-tested to ensure clarity, comprehension and ease of language used. Being satisfied with the results of the pilot test the refugees at the Musina Registration Centre were given a brief explanation of the purpose of the study. The questionnaire asked closed ended questions as they are easy to analyse.

The questionnaire was written in English, hence only those who understand English were allowed to complete the questionnaire. The questionnaire covered the following themes:

- Demographics (gender, home country, language and qualifications)
- Refugees' information needs
- Access to information
- Preferred information channel

Once the respondents were done with the questionnaires they returned them to the researchers. The idea of collecting the questionnaires immediately was to ensure a high return rate.

9.3 Secondary sources

Since there are only few books and journal articles on refugees in South Africa, the researchers relied on official and non-official reports. Official reports are those from the international organizations such as UNHCR, reports from particular institutions such as Lawyers for Human Rights, Statistics South Africa and various non-governmental agencies responsible for refugees. Moolman (1993:31) warns that in studying official reports the researcher must be aware of the fact that even official institutions can make mistakes with the collection or processing of information. It therefore became imperative to compare reports in order to validate certain issues or inconsistencies.

9.4 Ethical considerations

As a result of xenophobic attacks researchers were careful about which questions to ask the refugees. It was also important to obtain permission from the Department of Home Affairs officials to collect data from the refugees and also to assure the refugees that their names were not going to appear anywhere on the questionnaire.

10. Data presentation and analysis

A questionnaire was used to collect data on information needs and information seeking behaviour of refugees at the Musina Refugee Registration Centre from 15-26 June 2015. A total of 270 questionnaires were distributed and 265 were returned, giving a response rate of 95 percent. The results of the study were therefore considered representative of the refugees available at the Musina Refugee Centre at the period of collecting data.

Table 1: Demographic information on the respondents

Gender	%
– Males	94
– Females	06
Home country	
– Zimbabwe	45
– Malawi	20
– Zambia	12
– Sudan	07
– Kenya, Pakistan, Somalia and Egypt	16
Language	
– Shona	28
– Ndebele	23
– English	40
– Swahili	09
Educational level	
– College education	38
– University education	31
– Secondary school certificate	30

Two hundred and seventy (270) questionnaires were distributed and a total of 265 (98%) were returned. The town of Musina receives more refugees from Zimbabwe. Ninety four percent (94%) of the respondents found at Musina Refugee Registration Centre were males while females constituted 6 % of the total population. Their coming from Zimbabwe was also

supported by the fact that 28 % and 23 % of the respondents speak Shona and Ndebele respectively as their mother tongue, which are two popular languages in Zimbabwe. Another twenty percent (20%) were from Malawi. This is a country in Eastern Africa. Fewer refugees were from Pakistan, Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia. The majority of the respondents (38 %) have college qualifications, while 31 % have university qualifications and 30 % have a secondary school certificate; hence they were able to self-complete the questionnaires.

Table 2: Refugees' information needs

Information needs	%
– Documentation	55
– Employment and business opportunities	30
– Basic social services (housing, sanitation, etc.)	15

From the results of the study it is clear that the majority (55%) of the refugees need information on documentation. A report by a Cape Town Refugee Centre (2015) shows that the main needs of refugees remain: access to documentation; a fair and functioning asylum system; basic social services, being provided for in national legislation and policy; occasional emergency assistance for the most vulnerable, including shelter and food; and social cohesion programmes. The most immediate response by the international community to humanitarian crises tends to address the most urgent survival needs of the affected populations, such as food, clean water, shelter, clothing, sanitation, and medical services and disease control (Aguilar and Retamal, 2009: 3). This was indicated by 15% of the respondents.

Table 3: Where do they access information?

Access to information	%
– Family and friends	77
– Library	20
– Internet	03

As per Table 3, the majority (77%) of the respondents rely on family and friends for their information needs. Family and friends could be those already in South Africa and who have gone through the same process of applying for asylum status. There are two libraries in

Musina. Musina Municipal Library is in town whereas Musina Community Library is at Nancefield Township. The distance between Musina and Nancefield is about 10 kilometers.

Table 4: Channel of information preferred

Preferred channel of information	%
– Electronic	55
– Print	26
– Verbal	19

When respondents were asked to indicate their preferred channel of accessing information, the majority (55%) of them indicated that they preferred electronic information. In this context electronic information encompasses the Internet. Verbal communication takes place between the refugees and their families and friends.

11. Discussion of the results

11.1 Demographics

The demographic data show that the majority of refugees at Musina Refugee Registration Centre are from Zimbabwe. The challenge with the town is that is a very small town with limited basic services and thus obviously unable to cope with the basic needs of refugees. Hence the refugees end up moving to other places in South Africa. Males were in the majority while females constituted a smaller percentage. According to the Department of Home Affairs (DHA), approximately 53,361 new applications for asylum seeker were registered during the year, while the majority of which were men. This study is echoed by Breedts (2013:5) that most Zimbabweans refugees living in South Africa are primarily men. A perception in South Africa that Zimbabwean males reside in South Africa simply as voluntary migrants promotes the belief that Zimbabwean refugees are here only to take advantage of the country's resources (Maneri & Ter Wal, 2005 cited in Breedts, 2013:6).

Since the majority of the refugees were from Zimbabwe it is the reason why most of the respondents speak Shona and Ndebele respectively as their mother tongue, which are two popular languages in Zimbabwe. Another 53 (20%) were from Malawi. Reports show that after the xenophobic attacks a large number of Malawians were repatriated back to Malawi. The refugees from Pakistan use English; as it is their official language; however media reports suggest that the Pakistan government aims to completely replace English as official language with Urdu.

The official language of South Sudan is English. Goldsmith (2011) of BBC news wrote a report on South Sudan's choosing English as its official language. The Ministry of Higher Education, Edward Mokole then told her: "English will make us different and modern. From now on all our laws, textbooks and official documents have to be written in that language. Schools, the police, retail and the media must all operate in English."

The majority of the respondents have a secondary school certificate, college or university education. During February 2009, 292 Zimbabweans living in the UK responded to a survey about their education. Key findings showed that Zimbabwean asylum seekers in the UK have a high level of education and vocational qualification (Doyle, 2009: 4). We know that Zimbabwean asylum seekers have particular characteristics: they speak English and share an education system with common features to that of the UK, she adds.

11.2 Information needs of the refugees

The information needs of one person may be different from those of others. In this study, all participants agreed that job/employment appeared to be the biggest challenge. For example, information about job vacancies, job references, and how to apply for jobs was crucial, particularly when immigrants were not employed on their first arriving. Adler (1997), as cited by Babalola, Sodipe, Haliso and Odunlade (2012:1) posits that upon arrival in the new country immigrants need information that would help them meet their physiological or basic needs such as food and other basic resources.

11.3 Where do refugees access information

As per Table 3, the majority (77%) of the respondents rely on family and/or friends for their information needs. Amongst New Zealand immigrants, the Internet was the main source of information (55%) (Mason & Lamain, 2007). In a study in Ireland, family and friends (43%) and the Internet (35%) were identified as immigrants' two main information sources (Komito, 2011). Studies on job-search methods used by job seekers indicate that asking friends, relatives and acquaintances for information regarding job opportunities is a common and useful practice (Green, de Hoyos, Li and Owen: 2012).

Very few of the respondents use the library. The library is probably used by those with college education, university education and secondary school education who are able to read for various reasons. In providing information to the refugees, libraries must acknowledge the fact that refugees are not homogenous and therefore must accept their diverse information needs. (Nkhoma-Uamunze, 1988:10).

11.4 Channel of information preferred

Participants described access to the Internet as essential for applying for jobs, gaining education and getting other e-services even though it is not clear what information refugees may be looking for on the Internet. Print could include books, magazines and newspapers. For those who are looking for jobs it is best to check newspapers. In Musina newspapers such as the Sowetan is available for five days. The library is another place to read a newspaper for free. Fewer respondents who prefer verbal sources are obviously dependent on family or friends.

12. Findings of the study

The findings of the study are as follows:

The majority of the respondents at the Musina Refugee Registration Centre are from Zimbabwe. They are able to communicate in English and have a range of educational qualifications.

- i) What the majority of the respondents at the centres need is information about documents which will be recognised by the centre. If they have the appropriate documents they may be able to access services in South Africa, including employment.
- ii) Family and friends play a major role in disseminating information to refugees who are entering South Africa for the first time.
- iii) The Internet is preferred by the majority of respondents. The library plays a minor role yet it is expected to give a large amount of information on various documents needed by respondents.

13 Conclusion and recommendations

13.1 Conclusion

Every effort should be taken to ensure that refugees' information needs and information seeking patterns are known so that they can be provided with accurate and relevant information. Information gathering could be a big challenge and an arduous task for the refugees. As revealed from this study, the predominant information needed by refugees is access to documentation and employment opportunities. The results of the study indicated that refugees relied on friends and relatives for information needs. However, these gross methods of getting information are insufficient and unreliable to meet the information needs of refugees. It is for these reasons that this study recommends that public administrators,

politicians and policy maker and librarians work together to provide refugees with reliable and comprehensive information.

31.2 Recommendations

The following are recommendations for the various stakeholders who are entrusted with providing information to refugees:

- To research the information needs and seeking patterns of those refugees without any education or qualifications and who experience problems with English.
- To evaluate the resources of the two libraries in Musina in order to ensure that they cater for the needs of refugees.

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THE ROLE OF POLITICAL LITERACY AS A TOOL TO COMBAT XENOPHOBIA IN SOUTH AFRICA

M.A. Dikotla

M.R. Mahlatji

University of Limpopo, South Africa

Abstract

South Africa (SA) faces a backlash from the rest of the continent over the targeting of immigrants in a wave of xenophobic violence. Some of the countries that blame South Africa are the ones that helped this country during the apartheid era. During xenophobic attacks communities are overloaded with conflicting messages and information from various sources including government, NGOs, political parties, religious groups and many other organisations. Misconceptions occur because large numbers of communities are misinformed and political illiterate. People seem to lack historical and political background and ideas of where this democratic South Africa came from. It is often when there is a challenge that emphasis is put on important dates such as Africa month, International Africa Day and the local communities are reminded about their past under apartheid. Comments such as, “South Africans should consider the role that fellow Africans played towards the democracy”, are always uttered. But one may ask as to how much of this information is South Africans aware of. Lack of awareness and understanding thereof, exacerbate xenophobic attacks in the country. Political literacy seems to be a solution for minimising these xenophobic attacks. It gives people the ability to read issues/ events politically and effectively evaluate the accuracy of political information for their development. Hence, this paper seeks to show how political literacy may contribute to the prevention of xenophobia in South Africa.

Keywords: Xenophobia, political literacy, South Africa, discrimination, information literacy.

1. Introduction

Democracy has brought many changes in many countries. People had to adapt and adjust to these changes. The issue of democracy in any country requires every individual to be more committed and fully participate in the activities of the society. Diamond (1996) stated that, “To improve democracy and make it work, citizens must have not only democratic knowledge and values but also skills and propensities to organise with one another for common ends, to stir one another to action, and to voice their concerns in speech and writing.”

Simon (2001:12) also added that, “ To be a citizen is not just to hold a legal status in relation to a particular nation state; rather is to possess that capacities and have access to the opportunities, to participate with other determination of one’s society. This means being able to take into account the interrelated character of culture, politics and economic”. One may then understand that in a democracy people should possess knowledge and understanding of their role and contribute fully toward the development of the country and the success of democracy thereof.

South Africa, a 21 years old democratic country, had to deal and survive from the changes and challenges brought by democracy. Crush (2002: 103) indicated that South Africa prides itself on having one of the most progressive constitutions in the world. The interpretation of Section 7 (1) of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 which states: This Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa. It enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom. (Njyamjoh, 2006 & Crush, 1998).

The Bill of Rights as guarantees a host of basic political, cultural and socio-economic rights to all who are resident in the country. This suggests that South Africans possess rights that focus on better life. South Africans seem not to have a better understanding of these Rights, and also what will be their role in achieving them. Wimmer (1997) maintained that lack of political information is seen as a prime contribution to xenophobia. Wimmer (1997) further emphasised that in a country where the society is politically literate there should be no intolerance, marginalisation and other challenges such as xenophobia.

The outbreak of xenophobic violence in 2008 and again in 2015 is a concern to African countries and South Africa in particular. Neocosmos (2008: 588) stated that government departments, parliamentarians, police, and the law itself have all been reinforcing on the feelings of the South African people towards foreigners. In some instances there are claims that information and messages from government officials contribute to xenophobia. What becomes crucial is whether South Africans have the skill to interpret and use these messages and information effectively, has a serious impact on xenophobia. One may thus argue that information in general and political information in particular is important in addressing issues of xenophobia. Hence, this paper intends to show the role of political literacy in combating xenophobia in SA. This paper explores the term political literacy, xenophobia and its causes in SA, significance of political literacy in addressing xenophobia, and recommendations on strategies that can be used to improve political literacy of South Africans.

2. What is political literacy?

Political literacy is part of the broader and more general concept of literacy. To have a better understanding of what political literacy is, it is relevant to consider the term literacy in general and information literacy amongst other literacies, and then the Information Needs, Access and Use model.

2.1 Information literacy and Political literacy

Literacy is generally referred to as the ability to read and write. According to Kellner and Share (2007: 4-5), literacy involves gaining the skills and knowledge to read, interpret, produce texts and artefacts, and to gain the intellectual tools and capacities to fully participate in one's culture and society. To the domain of literacy, one could argue that in the democratic era people must develop forms of literacy such as information literacy and political literacy.

Information literacy remains crucial in the day –to-day lives on individuals. In its simplest form, information literacy refers to the ability to access, evaluate and use information in various contexts and forms. The Association of College and Research Libraries (ACRL 2000) offers this straight-forward definition: "Information literacy is a set of abilities requiring individuals to recognise when information is needed and have the ability to locate, evaluate, and use effectively the needed information. Information literate person will be able to make informed decisions, improved lifestyle, and be able to identify quality information from poor one". According to the ACRL (2000) an information literate person:

- Determines the nature and extent of the information needed. (Know)
- Accesses needed information effectively and efficiently. (Access)
- Evaluates information and its sources critically and incorporates selected information into his or her knowledge base and value system. (Evaluate)
- Individually, or as a member of a group, uses information effectively to accomplish a specific purpose. (Use)
- Understands many of the economic, legal, and social issues surrounding the use of information and accesses and uses information ethically and legally. (Ethical/Legal)

Information literacy and political literacy are interlinked. Improving the information literacy and political literacy skills of individuals will empower them to become better citizens who form opinions and make decisions based on appropriate and quality information. Jacobs (2008: 258) indicated that:

As a form of literacy, information literacy also operates within a socio-political context and is thus politically charged. When we limit its potentials to outcomes and standards, we run the risk of minimizing the complex situatedness of information literacy and diminishing –

if not negating – its inherent political nature. This includes understanding the political environment and democracy operates, hence political literacy.

Political literate person possess the skills, knowledge and understanding that enable someone to take an interest and become involved in political events, institutions and ideas (Milner 2002). Political literacy is also referred to as people knowing and learning about and how to make themselves effective in public life through knowledge, skills and values (Davies and Hogarth 2004: 181). The term ‘public life’ is used in its broadest sense to encompass realistic knowledge of and preparation for conflict resolution and decision-making related to the main economic and social problems of the day, including each individual’s expectations of and preparation for the world of employment, and discussion of the allocation of public resources and the rationale of taxation. Such preparations are needed whether these occur in locally, nationally or internationally concerned organizations or at any level of society from formal political institutions to informal groups, both at local or national level (Advisory Group on Citizenship, 1998: 11-13).

At a deeper level, political literacy in a democracy is presented as the capacity for critical reflection upon political institutions and processes, especially in terms of the values engaged by these institutions and processes (Collins 1992). It is thus very crucial that people understand how politics affect their daily lives and acquire the ability to shape them accordingly. Hence, political literate people would have the motivation and knowledge to effectively make decisions and solve problems such as xenophobia.

Too often, the opinion of certain politicians or of particular issues is obtained from second-hand or very poor sources. On the other hand, political literacy allow people to consider relevant information as they select and they would have developed habits of obtaining, evaluating and using information from diverse sources including print, broadcast and online media. Political literate people are able to distinguish popular from properly reviewed and edited sources. Ultimately, there will not be a situation where people are making decisions based on unreliable information.

2.2 Information Needs, Access and Use Model

Definitions of information literacy and information use overlap and vary in interpretation. In seeking a broad interpretation of information use, this paper adopts the Information Needs, Access and Use model (Mtega 2012) which discovers how people go about accessing and using information effectively.

The Information Needs, Access and Use model recognises that information is used primarily for solving day-to-day problems, decision making, correcting and signalling errors, providing

historical evidence, making choices, and improving people's knowledge about their surrounding and environment. According to Weiss, Van Crowder and Bernandi (2011: 185) information is considered as a vital source for the development of people's environment and their selves. Weiss, Van Crowder and Bernandi (2011) further indicated that access to and usage of information is key to successful socio-economic development as such improving the lives of the society.

The Information Needs, Access and Use Model (Mtega 2012) indicates the following:

- Accessed information can only be useful when effectively interpreted.
- There are multiple information sources people can consult.
- Choice of information sources is crucial for effective information usage.
- Decisions about appropriate information use are influenced by the social, economic, and cultural background of the individual.
- Information usage may be limited by accessing irrelevant or poor quality information.
- Literacy levels of information seekers also limit the usage of information (Dorsch 2000).

This paper employed this model and identified how the level of political literacy will impact to effective use of political information to solve xenophobia in South Africa.

3. Xenophobia in South Africa

According to Oxford South African School Dictionary (2013), xenophobia is defined as hatred and/or fear and dislike of people or things from other cultures or countries. The Blackwell Dictionary of Sociology (2015) defines xenophobia as the culturally-based fear of outsiders. Accordingly, xenophobia is defined as negative social representations of immigrants. In particular, social representations of immigrants in public discourse are repeatedly associated with the declining economy, overpopulation, pollution, increased violence, depleted social resources (i.e., medical and educational), erosion of cultural values, and terrorism (Cowan, Martinez, & Mendiola, 1997). One of the most common explanations for xenophobia both locally and globally—is the sense that non-nationals are a threat to citizens' access to employment, grants, and social services. Van Dijk (2001) explained xenophobia as follows:

In particular, xenophobia is defined as a complex social and cognitive system of domination based on racial or ethnic inequality. The social system involves, on the one hand, discriminatory social practices at the micro level and, on the other, relationships of power abuse by organizations and institutions at the macro level. The cognitive subsystem has to do with the perceptions and interpretations of particular events which are mental representations of people and can lead to prejudices and racist ideologies. Accordingly,

through discourse these perceptions and interpretations can be modified, influenced and emphasised or mitigated, because discourse can construct forms of inclusion and exclusion through the different (intentional and strategic) selection of meanings and topics.

Tshitereke (1999) defined xenophobia as an intense tension and violence by South Africans to immigrants. Xenophobia is one of the social problems that resurfaced in South Africa (SA) in recent years. When it occurs, people from neighbouring countries are attacked and in some instances killed. Xenophobic attacks may also be perpetrated by some individuals or groups linked to political parties or movements. During these attacks some criminals cease opportunity to persuade their criminal activities mostly in the name of the so called service delivery protests.

Crush and Pendleton (2004) indicated that xenophobia in South Africa had taken a racial form as it is directed as it is directed to black migrants from elsewhere on the African continent. These attacks were witnessed in South Africa as far back as in 2008. However, it was observed that attacks were also directed at other Pakistanis, Somalians and other African people. Crush and Pendleton (2004) further indicated that xenophobia is mostly direct to SADC citizens.

According to Harris (2002), xenophobia is implicit to the technologies of nation-building and is part of SA's culture of violence. Xenophobia is seen to be multidimensional and multicausal phenomenon (Yakushko 2009). To understand the causes of xenophobia, various scholars had come with various theories regarding the causes of xenophobia. (Morris (1998), Tshitereke (1999), Harris (2002), Petersson (2003), and Yakushko (2009) summarised theories related to the causes of xenophobia in South Africa.

3.1 Scapegoat theory of xenophobia

Harris (2002) stated that scapegoating emerged through sociological theory. It locates xenophobia within the context of social transition and change. Petersson (2003) added that:

Conceptually, scapegoating can be understood as a certain kind of enemy image, and also a negative stereotype. Indeed, there may be a short distance between, on the one hand, embraced and reinforced stereotypes of this variety and hostile action that is perceived as preventive, on the other. Several externalities influence the eventual process of scapegoating. Suffice to say that given existing feelings of frustration, uncertainty and wrath, the presence of scapegoating phenomena might produce a highly explosive mix.

Tshitereke (1999: 41) mentioned that scapegoat in the democratic SA is concerned with unequal and or limited resources of service delivery. Tshitereke (1999: 41) further explains that the anger caused by perceived or real threats from immigrants as it relates to sources,

frustrates South Africans. A frustration is then linked to xenophobia and collective violence. The scapegoat theory states that the foreigners are used as scapegoat, someone to blame for social ills and personal frustrations.

Yakushko (2003) states that both the economic and political power of the in-group is seen to be challenged by the out-group (jobs are given to the out-group). When South Africans do not get jobs, houses, foreigners are scapegoated for taking their jobs, taking their houses and in some instances stealing their women or men. From the theories, foreigners are seen as economic harm more than contributors to economic development. Hence, in some cases one would find the xenophobic attacks in South Africa are mistaken with poor service delivery.

3.2 Isolation theory of xenophobia

Morris (1998: 1125) maintained that one of the key causes of xenophobia is “Isolation”. Morris (1998) indicated isolation theory of xenophobia situates foreignness at the heart of hostility towards foreigners. Tshitereke (1999) and Petersson (2003) agreed that hostility towards strangers in South Africa exists due to international isolation and internal isolation. Moreover, Tshitereke (1999) and Petersson (2003) indicated that the creation of strict boundaries between South African citizens, as well as between the country and other nations contributed to South Africans being unable to accommodate and tolerate difference. Secondly, the isolation theory understands xenophobia as a consequence of apartheid South Africa. Neocosmos (2006) stated that apartheid system had a huge effect on the attitudes of South African citizens. Neocosmos (2006) accepted that in some regards xenophobia can be directly linked to apartheid, in particular the dismantling of migrant labour system and rejection of a notion of group rights. Neocosmos (2006) further indicated that in the post-apartheid South Africans can only see individualistic right as democratic, anything else as a threat to the unity of the nation. Morris (1998) argued that apartheid separated South Africans from nationalities beyond Southern Africa. When borders were opened up; the society was brought into direct contact with the unknown foreigners. As foreigners enter the country they are seen to be a threat to the rights and unity that the apartheid system denied them. Harris (2002) emphasised that the experiences of apartheid in South Africa might have had impact on people’s ability to be tolerant of the unknown or difference.

3.3 Biocultural theory of xenophobia

Xenophobia in South Africa affect foreigners differently. According to Human Rights Commission (1999) some foreigners are at a greater risk than others. African foreigners seem to be particularly vulnerable to violence and hostility. The biocultural theory locates xenophobia at the level of visible difference or otherness, i.e. in terms of physical biological

factors and cultural differences exhibited by foreign nationals in the country (Morris 1998). This relates with symbolic threat theory (Yakushko 2009) which states that value, beliefs, morals, and attitudes are being challenged between citizens and newcomers.

Different countries adapt to different culture in terms of language, attire, beliefs, and values. Morris (1998) explained that some foreigners are at risk of xenophobia because they are visible of the fact that they are different. This explains the reason why xenophobia is mostly directed to other Africans as they are easily and differently identifiable from South Africans. For example, Nigerians are easily identifiable as the 'Other' because of their physical features, their bearing, their clothes, and their inability to speak one of the indigenous languages (accent). This will lead to negative stereotypes and to some extent intergroup challenges. Generally, they are distinct and locals are able to pick them out and scapegoat them.

From the three theories one may deduce that there are three elements that contribute to the crisis of xenophobic violence in South Africa: matters that are implicit (such as culture and attitudes), the circumstances that create a conducive environment (such as slow service delivery, poverty and unemployment) and the specific triggers that catalyse the actual violent action.

4. Political literacy and xenophobia

This paper sought to situate the challenging nature of xenophobia within the context of a need for political literacy. The first, and perhaps easiest to address, obstacle to political literacy for the society involves the sources of their political information. The emphasis will also be on the fact that there are multiple sources that provide political information, and as such the decision about appropriate information sources is vital in understanding and dealing with problems effectively. The authors of this paper acknowledge the fact that South Africans have access to a variety of information sources. When South Africans are exposed to information from various fields and sources, they must be able to evaluate good information and information source/s from amongst other sources.

South Africans access political information from multiple sources. People rely on the media news for information. The media includes newspapers, radio and television. More often media is accused of being bias and influencing xenophobia. Several research studies have shown how the media has uncritically reproduced xenophobic language and statements, time and time again. The media has certainly been complicit in encouraging xenophobic attitudes among the population (Crush, 2008: 42). On whether and how South Africans will be influenced by the media, depend on their political literacy level. Political

literacy will thus assist in the ability to access, evaluate, use information legally and ethically. The reliable and valid source of political information is crucial to receiving quality education.

Secondly, quality information will allow people to use it effectively and efficiently.

Myths and misconceptions travel quickly and as such they dominate informal sector, no data collected, reality vs perception, immigrants are more likely to be employed than South Africans, take jobs South Africans are unwilling to take, not paying tax and rent. Peberdy argued that “migrants do play a positive role in South Africa, the evidence shows that they contribute to African economy by providing jobs, paying rent, providing affordable and convenient goods.

Mokgewu (2005) confirmed that xenophobia is guided by limitations of their thought based on their political information. Mokgewu (2005) argued that South Africans do not have adequate information about people they hate, since they do not know how to deal with those people. The remedy in this case remains political literacy. For example, South Africans might not understand what it means that they had gained their democracy through immigration. This suggest that South Africans need quality political information about what migration is and why it happens. Political information on the causes of migration and the positive impact that foreigners have on South African economy, will assist on ways to deal with these challenges rather that resorting to xenophobic violence. One may even ask, “Do South Africans even understand what is to be African?” Political literacy allows people to understand not only their history and geography, but also their culture, language, current political and socio-economic activities.

Human Rights Watch (1998) had concluded that: ‘in general, South Africa’s public culture has become increasingly xenophobic, and politicians often make unsubstantiated and inflammatory statements that the “deluge” of migrants is responsible for the current crime wave, rising unemployment and even the spread of diseases’ (Human Rights Watch, 1998: 4). Sometimes Politicians and high profile figures in society claim to be quoted out of context. This could be the results of lack of skill and/or understanding of political information. South Africans should be able to differentiate political issues from other issues of the country and the continent. Recently, King Goodwill Zwelithini was accused of having encouraged xenophobia attacks. Political literacy fosters free and open enquiry and thus allowing analytical and informed view on statements made by politicians. Political literacy empowers people to access, evaluate and use information from appropriate information sources to participate in one’s country. People may not rely too extensively on only one source of information. Improved political literacy leads to become more informed and responsible

citizens. This implies that information can be effectively used if correctly interpreted. It takes a political literate person to correctly use information to solve political problems and make proper decision without resorting to hatred or xenophobic attacks.

As already stated, Crush and Pendleton (2004) indicated that xenophobia results from the perceptions that foreigners are in SA to take jobs, commit crime, send their earnings out of the country, use welfare services and bring diseases such as HIV/AIDS.

Most people do not know the difference between asylum seekers, refugees or economic migrants and have no idea what laws/ policies are in place regarding their support. Valji (2003) argues that the ability of average South Africans to make a distinction is limited. Nor did they try to make distinctions about the categories of immigrants: economic immigrants, those with work permits, refugees and asylum seekers, tourists, and those who hold permanent residence in South Africa. As such these very different categories are clumped together into “one indistinguishable group”. Furthermore there is a range of estimates about the number of undocumented immigrants which they print as fact.

South Africa has immigration policy and the Refugee Act No to regulate foreigner in the country and stating the rights. For example, the Immigration Act 13 of 2002 of South Africa states that everyone has a rights irrespective of citizenship so long as they are residents in the country. The Act gives rights to South African the same way as foreigners. Political literate person will be conscious of immigrants and know how to support each other. Possibilities are that mutual relationship between South Africa and immigrants will minimise or curb xenophobia because people will understand the political and economic reasons why foreigners are coming to South Africa.

Carol A & Gabriella (2013) found the treatment of foreigners as a lack of awareness and misconceptions on the part of South Africans of who foreigners are and their purpose in the country. Due to apartheid education system, there is no historical awareness of political conditions in countries beyond their borders. SABC news (2015:1) reporter was quoted as saying, “These people were never told about the history of this country and how this country was liberated. Who helped liberated them. Africans shed their blood. This history is not given back to these people”.

5. Strategies for promoting political literacy

Political literacy will almost certainly produce demands for democratic, participatory structures in the country (Kellner & Share 2007).No account of political literacy can ignore the media- print and online. Social media is another platform where political literacy can be

acquired. This medium allows individuals to discuss issues and offer opinions in a different environment. This media is heavily used by people at all ages and it has the capacity to distribute and educate the mass within limited time. According to Williams, (2015) social media was successfully used by a group of young people came together in an anti-xenophobia silent protest in Johannesburg. To make social media an effective tool for political literacy, political expert should be part of the group discussions. The person is not expected to respond to every posting, but just weave in and out of the discussion to make corrections and clarify important points and arguments. This will help the citizens to become more politically literate, more information literate, and therefore better citizens.

Danso and McDonald (2001) regard print media is another tool for political literacy. Newspapers remain the primary means by which a literate population obtains political information and exchanges political opinion. Precisely because the written word provides a journal of record, the newspapers become the raw material for much other discussion (on radio and TV, in the parliament, in the classroom, on the factory floor, and in the boardroom). Radio and Television also play a role in advocating for democracy and improving political literacy. Kokemuller (2015) stated that “television also offers the greatest creative opportunity among the traditional media. It has visual elements like print and audio like radio, but it also has dynamic movement”. This author goes on to show that, TV, can target emotional connections, incorporate characters that the audience can relate to and offer multi-sensory appeal. On the other hand, radio is typically viewed as one of the lower-cost traditional media and offers the most timely ad placements of any of the traditional media (Kokemuller 2015). Therefore radio and television education programmes and campaigns are necessary to address xenophobia issues. What is required is a multifaceted and highly contextualised approach (Macdonald and Jacobs, 2005: 321). Radio and Television need to focus their programmes on educating people about democracy and xenophobia. This should not be done only when there is a xenophobic attacks but as part of their edutainment and or infotainment.

Community forums are needed to be give a broader focus than xenophobia and should look at activities such as political literacy. Moreover, the duration of political awareness programmes should be tied to the long-term needs of society rather than the short-term priorities of political campaigns for elections.

Schools and universities must have well-designed curriculum crucial to develop political literacy for young South Africans. The South African government had already taken imitative to have History taught as a compulsory subject in schools. History curriculum

should also not just focus on where South Africa comes from, but also culture, current political and socioeconomic issue relating to participation of democracy.

Lastly, the Parliament remains the heart of the domain of political literacy. Parliament as a connection to political literacy has long been its privileged place as a forum of protected speech on all matters. As well as that traditional role of statements in the chamber, there is the new and vigorous function of committee work. For the hearings of parliamentary committees serve an educative function for committee members, but also for the public. They have proven a means for bringing wider voices into the public sphere – hence a tool for political literacy.

6. Conclusion

This paper has attempted to establish a link between political literacy and xenophobia. Political literacy plays an integral part of development and success socially, economically and politically, as they mature into informed and involved citizens. By restructuring political information sources to suit end users. Thus empowering citizens to become more information and politically literate. Too often, information on and about certain politicians or of particular issues is obtained from second-hand or very poor sources. Political literacy enables people to be able to distinguish popular from scientific sources. Moreover political literacy allow people to consider relevant information as they have developed the ability to select, evaluate and use information from diverse sources such as print, broadcast and online media. Ultimately, there will be no situation where citizens make decisions based on unreliable information.

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GOOD GOVERNANCE AT THE CROSS-ROAD: THE CASE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE

P.R. Msaule

University of Limpopo, South Africa

ABSTRACT

The concept of good governance has defied a precise definition. However, certain pillars have been identified as the bedrock of good governance, among others accountability, transparency, effectiveness and efficiency. Good governance is largely depended on good leadership. In the SAPS only one post-apartheid National Commissioner finished his tenure of office. The current National Commissioner has been suspended from the office while her predecessors were fired. This is indicative that in the SAPS there are no measures that foster good governance. This paper argues that the SAPS does not adhere to the principles of good governance. Among the causes for this is the institutionalised culture of closing ranks and of adhering to the instructions from the above despite it being clear to the subordinate that the instruction may be wrong. The SAPS must thus put in place proactive measures to ensure that good governance is adhered to both in theory and practice.

Key words:

1. Introduction

The term “good governance” eludes precise definition. However, the term is more prescriptive than descriptive; it is defined in “what ought to be” instead of what it really “is” (Maserumule, 2014, 963). Accordingly, resort is had to a number of indicators to determine whether good governance exists or not (De Vries, 2013, 2). For instance, Fourie posits that, at least in public service, good governance consists of the “various operational processes and systems which a public organisation requires to deliver services to the public” (Fourie, 2009, 1114). Whilst Aktan and Ozler (2008, 179) view good governance as the exercise of authority by institution for the “common good”. However, the provision of services or the common good to the public, although important, does not in itself definitively define good governance. In order to compensate for the lack of precise definition of the concept scholars have identified a number of pillars which are indicative of the existence or otherwise of good governance. Although there is no universal consensus on these pillars or their significance relative to one another a broader consensus exists that at least the following factors must be present in order to talk about good governance. Not necessarily in order of their significance

these factors are: participation, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, equity, effectiveness and efficiency and accountability (Leftwich, 1993, 610; Aktan and Ozler, 2008, 168).

Against this backdrop this paper intends to investigate whether or not, despite the chequered definition of good governance, the SAPS embrace, at the very least, the basics of this concept. In other words, does the SAPS strive or attempt to live up to the principles of good governance. This question reverberates given that the SAPS has recently leapt from one scandal to another. The methodology employed in this research paper is qualitative or desk research. This involves the collation, review and the synthesis of the primary and secondary sources such as books, journal articles and internet sources (Theletsane, 2014, 350). The paper is organised as follows: (1) this introduction; (2) good governance: theory and practice; (3) the compliance by the SAPS with the principles of good governance; case studies of the SAPS National Commissioners and conclusions.

2. Good governance: theory and practice

This section will investigate the theoretical underpinnings of the concept of good governance and its practical effects. Good governance is generally confused with governance by scholars. This has resulted in the conflation of fact and value in defining this concept. Good governance is a value laden concept whereas governance is fact based (Maserumule, 2014, 963). Although the term good governance entered our vocabulary recently, the equivalent concepts could be traced back to as early as the ancient Greeks. For instance, in the *Republic* Plato spoke of a good society “founded on good principle and grounded on a good leadership...” (Maserumule, 2014, 964-965, 972-973; Aktan and Ozler, 2008, 166). The concept of good governance is universal, transcending boundaries. In this regard Maserumule (2014, 972) posits that “[t]he Western and African philosophies are not necessarily binary opposites.” Thus, according to this thesis it is untenable to speak about exclusively African good governance.

This term was introduced into our lexicon in 1989 by the World Bank report entitled *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable growth - A Long-Term Perspective Study*. At this time the term had strong economic connotations (Maserumule, 2014, 972; de la Harpe, Rijken and Roos, 2008, 14). In this report the World Bank associated the weak economic performance of the countries that received the SAPs on failure by their public institutions and lack of good governance. Good governance, according to this report includes a public service that is efficient, a judicial system that is independent and a functional legal system, respect for the rule of law and human rights as well as a free press among others (Leftwich,

1993, 610). Although no universal definition of good governance exists, eight pillars have been identified as being the bedrock of this concept. These pillars, already alluded to above, are consistent with the three levels of good governance identified by Leftwich and discussed below. Lack of good governance explains why despite being endowed with massive natural resources third world countries remain poor (Seemela and Mkhonto, 2007, 201).

According to Leftwich (1993, 611), good governance can at least be understood at three levels: systemic, political and administrative. In the systemic sense good governance broadly refers to a “*system* of political and socio-economic relations or, more loosely, a regime.” In the second sense good governance refers to a legitimate and authoritative government founded on the separation of state powers and subject to the will of its subjects. Lastly, good governance refers to the efficient, open and accountable state bureaucratic institutions implementing the policies of the state. It is needless to state that in order to achieve the latter goal government requires skills, capacity and resources. It is contended by some that good governance and democracy are intricately linked and are the preconditions for the development of any nation (Leftwich, 1993, 611).

To that end, good governance could be viewed as a conduit for government endeavours to attain the satisfactory quality of life for its citizens. In the context of this contribution good governance requires of public sector managers to be effective and efficient but must also be transparent and accountable, unlike in the private sector where the concern is, or at least has been until quite recently, the bottom line (Fourie, 2009, 1115). In the words of Fourie, “good governance is fundamentally a political imperative and cannot be reduced to a purely public administrative function due to the conflation of the political-administrative roles that need to be fulfilled” (Fourie, 2009, 1115; Seemela and Mkhonto, 2007, 202). Its value is not only to correct the corrupted systems and values of the government but also to ensure sustainability of the functioning systems and processes (Aktan and Ozler, 2008, 166).

This is explained in this country, one might argue, by the number of legislation and policy documents that are geared towards good governance in this country (eg PFMA, MFMA, Treasury Regulations etc). These instruments vest the guardianship of the fulfilment of the principles of good governance on heads of various departments and institutions. These instruments require the incumbents to be accountable and responsive not to the political elite or the majority of the population but to the systems and processes put in place to ensure the achievement of those goals (accountability and responsiveness). It should be remembered that people are fickle and thus measuring good governance against the views of the majority risks opening this concept to the whims of the population at a particular time. This implies that good governance is also dependent on good leadership, a leadership that

is prepared to take unpopular decisions when the need arise (Fourie, 2009, 1118; Seemela and Mkhonto, 2007, 201).

Section 195 of the Constitution enjoins the public administration to be guided by a number of principles which, it is contended, fits well with the concept of good governance. Although service delivery is not the “be and end all” of good governance it is nonetheless an important indicator that at least an institution adheres to good governance. The precise definition of good leadership, like that of good governance, has exercised the minds of scholars from time immemorial. According to Whisenand, the theory of leadership is vexed and not easy to comprehend. It is also defined in a number of attributes that a particular leader possesses. It is as well not acontextual. The learned author posit that “the literature on leadership remains vast, discursive, and without a conceptual framework for shaping the requisite information into a meaningful body of knowledge” (Whisenand, 1979 207; see also Schafer, 2010, 645).

For Schafer (2010, 645) leadership in the context of policing consists in a leader shaping organisational efficacy, subordinate behaviour and both the individual and agencies output. In short leadership includes the ability to influence people to achieve set goals or objectives. They get things done by giving direction to the members of the organisation, provide leadership, and decide how to use organisational resources to accomplish the organisational goals (Theletsane, 2014, 352). Juxtaposed to good governance there seem to be no *real* difference between good leadership and good governance except that good leadership speaks to personality traits of the person leading the organisation and good governance refers to institutional systems and processes in place in an organisation. A good leader, at least functioning under the liberal democratic setting, would put in place good governance measures. Similarly, good governance measures in an organisation largely depend on leadership of an organisation for their successful existence.

Good governance measures may exist in an organisation but without a leader to adhere to and enforce they will remain the paper tigers. In this sense the relationship between good governance and good leadership is symbiotic. However, this should not be taken to mean that everywhere where there is good leadership there is also good governance and vice versa. This is so because good governance cannot be simply decreed by good leadership – it has to be institutionalised and institutionalised good governance does not per se turn bad leaders into good leaders (see Leftwich, 1993, 612). It should be axiomatic that if indeed good governance ensures that quality services are provided to the citizenry then it is worthwhile to investigate whether the SAPS adheres to it, for it is mandated to provide crucial services to the public. The next section investigates, by way of case studies, whether the SAPS embrace the concept of good governance.

3. Does the saps comply with the principles of good governance?

This section investigates the governance and ethical lapses of the National Commissioners of the SAPS. The mandate of the SAPS is derived from the Constitution. Section 205 of the Constitution defines the objects of the police service as being to prevent, combat and investigate crime, to maintain public order, to protect and secure the inhabitants of the country and their property and to uphold and enforce the law. The control of the SAPS is vested on the National Commissioner who must exercise control over and manage the services (s 207 (1) and (2) of the Constitution). It is therefore the responsibility of the National Commissioner to ensure that the SAPS strives for good governance. As already stated, section 195 of the Constitution requires that the SAPS be governed by the democratic values and principles enshrined in the Constitution, including a high standard of professional ethics. It is implicit in the Constitution that the responsibility of ensuring good governance in the SAPS lies with the National Commissioner. It is common cause that not all the pillars of good governance are applicable to the SAPS as it is not a government.

To underscore this constitutional injunction the National Development Plan (NDP) prescribes that the police service must be professional and ethical (390). According to the NDP (390):

“[e]thical conduct should be practised to maintain the public perception of policing as a professional institution.”

Gordon (2001, 64) posits that in countries that are in transition criminal activity tends to spiral out of control. When this happens those in power tend to counter the charges of ineffectiveness by the rhetoric of being tough on crime. This rhetoric, however, tend to fall short of achieving the desired results despite being popular. Relying on the November 1999 public opinion poll conducted by the Human Science Research Council, Gordon (2001, 64) concluded that the tough talk against crime tended to sway the public into believing that government was getting crime under control, however, if the crime report data was to be believed that perception was erroneous.

This (the rhetoric), at least in the eye of the ordinary citizenry, represents effective leadership. This is so because, as Schaffer (2010, 645) has intimated, whether or not organisations achieve their objectives is attributable “at least in part, to leadership or its absence.” Thus in the context of policing, it is often presumed that leadership shapes organisational efficacy, subordinate behaviour, and both individual and agency outputs. Despite the importance of leadership in shaping police outcomes it has been contended that effective leaders are often lacking in organisations...” (Schafer, 2010, 645). The anecdotal evidence suggests that the majority in the country yearn for the return of General Bheki Cele

as the National Commissioner of the SAPS despite the adverse findings made against him by the Public Protector in the procurement of certain buildings for the SAPS (more on this below). When making this observation it would seem that Schaffer had South African Police Service in mind.

It is common cause that leading and managing a complex organisation such as the SAPS is a daunting task. Theletsane (2014, 349) posits that in recent times research shows that public trust in the SAPS is declining due to high level of crime, police brutality, corruption and other things that are going wrong in this organisation. Theletsane terms these wrong things “system failure[s].” System failures are characterised by malpractice, under-performance, negligence, non-transparency, weak command and control and lack of ethical ethos. The SAPS seem engulfed by systemic failures. In order to assess this claim this contribution shall undertake three case studies on the tenure of the two previous and current National Commissioners of the SAPS. It need to be stated beforehand that this contribution shall not investigate how each Commissioner’s systemic failures have or may have affected the moral and the performance of the members of the organisation. Important and worthy of investigation these aspects may be, they are beyond the scope of this paper. Also this paper will not investigate the entire period of the incumbents nor their achievements but will focus on the period(s) when system failures reared their ugly heads.

3. The three national commissioners of the saps

This section will investigate whether the three post-apartheid police commissioners adhered to the principles of good governance and ethical leadership. It is contended in this paper that none of the three passed the test of good governance and ethical leadership.

3.1. Jacob selo selebi (2000-2009)

Jacob Sello Selebi was appointed as the National Commissioner of the South African Police Services in 2000 after his predecessor’s, George Fivaz, resignation. The appointment of Selebi, a civilian, to the helm of the SAPS was largely welcomed by the South African English press despite his lack of policing experience. However, other commentators are of the view that the unsuitability of Selebi for the position should have been apparent from the outset. They cite the following as reasons for that: lack of police experience, he was a political appointee, being in close proximity to then president, Thabo Mbeki, who appointed him among others. With regard to the last aspect Steinberg (2014, 186) posits that Selebi was appointed to be the ears and eyes of Mbeki in the police service. Selebi was amenable to engage the detective services for high functions. By high functions Steinberg (2014, 176) refers to policing aimed at protecting the political elite and political order. Selebi did this by

turning the investigative machinery on the internal African National Congress (ANC) politics (It is common cause that there are internal skirmishes within the ANC).

For instance, Selebi would summon a member of the service to his office and issue instructions that a particular high profile person had to be investigated for no other reason than to bringing him down. Instructively those working in such investigation were picked from different units and were accountable to Selebi for purposes of that investigation and the funding for that investigation was drawn from the slush (secret) fund. The investigation was informal and no record of it was kept (Steinberg, 186 citing a senior police official he interviewed on 21 June 2000).

Selebi, at least, for those involved in policing matters is remembered as the Commissioner who dissolved the specialised investigative units and decentralised them. In view of many that was ill-considered. It has resulted in the curtailment of specialisation resulting in the loss of skills and expertise (Burger http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=34221:iss-the-south-african-police-service-must-renew-its-focus-on-specialised-units&catid=3:Civil%20security (accessed on 29 August 2015)). Members of these units seem to have been dissatisfied by that move (<http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/pretoria-s-elite-police-teams-to-be-disbanded-1.212857#.Vd7znl7vrlU> (accessed on 28 August 2015))

However, the lingering of Selebi's legacy was his conviction for corruption. Many may argue, convincingly so the author submits, that the conviction of Selebi had nothing to do with good governance but everything to do with greed. No law, systems or process can erase human greed. This is indeed so. Selebi was found guilty of a crime, thus the question of good governance does not arise, especially in the sense there are or there are not systems and processes in place. At the very least, the question that could be asked is what impact did his shenanigans had on the overall morale of the organisation. As indicated above, this question is beyond the scope of this contribution.

There are others who may argue that given the nature and functions of the SAPS and the influence that the head of this organisation has by virtue of his position the SAPS must have systems in place to guard the incumbents against themselves. In other words, it is so unlikely that police commissioners could not find themselves being sought after by the criminals in order to influence them, therefore the SAPS must have systems and processes to guard against this before it happens. In other words the SAPS must be proactive. This may be done in the form of vetting the Commissioners family members, relatives and friends. This will be bordering on paranoia and in any event may be violating the incumbents' constitutional rights to privacy and to freedom of association. This goes to prove that

although imperative, systems and processes are not by themselves sufficient to address the malady stemming from human nature.

Be that as it may, it seems as though the SAPS does or at least did not have the mechanisms to detect the malfeasance committed by its head. This is very unfortunate. The suspicion of Selebi's contact with the underworld was fortuitous. After the murder or assisted suicide of Brett Kebble it appeared that the SAPS were unwilling to obtain certain cellular phone records relating to Selebi, Agliotti, the accused in Kebble's murder and Nassif, Agliotti's side kick on the day or before Kebble's murder. As a result, the Director of Public Prosecutions, Gauteng South requested the National Director of Public Prosecutions to involve the Directorate of Special Operations (the scorpions) to investigate the matter. That is how Selebi's can of worms was opened (*S v Selebi*. 2010. paras 133-134). Clearly, good governance principles will require that mechanisms should be in place to deal with such a foreseeable eventuality i.e underworlds attempt to have the Commissioner in their pockets. The SAPS it would seem does not have one in place. Corruption is symptomatic and endemic in the SAPS, a clear sign that there are no mechanisms to deal with it adequately. This, therefore means that the principles of good governance are not adhered to.

3.2 Bheki cele (2009-2012)

Selebi was succeeded by Bheki Cele in July 2009. One of the first things that Cele did after his appointment was the reintroduction of the military ranks in the police service. The critics of this move warned that this may bring back apartheid-style lack of accountability to the police (Hornberger, 2013, 599; Steinberg, 2014, 189). The rationale for that, according to Cele was to "facilitate the enhancement of discipline, instilling public confidence and the upliftment of morale within the police ranks" (<http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/blaming-militarisation-for-police-brutality-issues?sn=Marketingweb+detail>). Accessed on 27 August 2015). Hornberger (2013, 600) argues that there was a yearning to replace "police service" with "police force" but that could not be done as the words police service are in the Constitution. To that end the name of the ministry/department was changed from Safety and Security to Police. Steinberg (2014, 189) argues that the best way to understand Cele's significance in the SAPS is to take a look at the formation of the Tectical Response Team (TRT).

Initially, the purpose of this unit within the uniformed police was fight housebreakings, bank robberies and cash in transit heists. Members of this unit are highly trained and normally armed to the teeth. In the process of "bureaucratic" restructuring the TRT was placed under the Public Order Policing (POP) (Steinberg, 2014, 189). Steinberg locates the placing of the TRT under the POP, like Selebi's dissolution of the specialised units, on the internal dynamics within the ANC. It is a given fact that the ANC enjoys the hegemonic

majority in the country. Many disgruntled members of the ANC are not prepared to leave the organisation but may rather wage their fight from within. This, they do by instigating violent delivery protest, among others. The TRT in this regard becomes a weapon used to quell intra-party conflicts and to target leaders or people playing a prominent role in the organisation of these demonstrations. Bruce singles out the killing of Andries Tatane as the case in point (although Tatane was not a member of the ANC he was playing a prominent role in protestations in his area) (Bruce, 2012; Steinberg, 2014 190). In the same vein the TRT have been accused of high handedness when dealing, even with ordinary citizens who are not suspected of committing any crime.

However, that is not what cost Cele his job. On 02 August 2010, following a publication of newspaper article, Adv P Hoffman SC and Mr PJ Groenewald MP lodged a complaint with the office of the Public Protector against the National Commissioner of the SAPS and the Department of Public Works. The article related to the rental of certain immovable property in the centre of Pretoria. According to the complainants the said rental failed to comply with supply chain management requirements and was thus improper and amounted to maladministration. The Public Protector made adverse findings against Cele (see Public Protector, 2011). As stated already failure to comply with the mandatory provisions of the Constitution may lead to failure to comply with the principles of good governance. Section 197 of the Constitution provides that the procurement of goods and services must be in the manner that is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective.

It is clear from the Report that Cele did not stand to benefit from the rental agreement. In fact the Public Protector stated that she could not make a positive finding that the National Commissioner knew or was known to Roux Shabangu, the proprietor of the impugned buildings. This means that Cele did not commit corruption. Despite this the Public Protector found Cele guilty of maladministration. For the purpose of this contribution it is not necessary to consider in-depth the basis of the Public Protector's conclusions suffice few salient factors. The Public Protector found that although the lease agreement was entered into between the Department of Public Works and the proprietor, Cele had signed the memorandum of understanding authorising the funding for the property. He also signed the needs analysis. Similarly, although the SAPS did not sign the lease agreement its' (the SAPS) involvement in the whole process leading to the signing of the lease went beyond what was statutorily permissible and failed to implement proper controls. This resulted in non-adherence with the Constitution and the relevant prescripts.

It is clear from the Report that Cele was not intensely involved in the lease process. However, as the accounting officer the buck had to stop with him. The Public Protector found, although not in as many words, that the decision of Cele to issue a directive that the

procurement of goods and service above R500 000.00 must be signed by him bizarre. At the time Cele had only about two month in the office. Another significant aspect was that the Cele had failed to inform Treasury and the Auditor General of the fact that the SAPS had deviated from the Treasury prescript that provides that procurement must generally be done by competitive bids. Cele's response to these findings by the Public Protector was to the effect that his work did not extend to the issues of procurement and therefore blame should not be ascribed to him. He stated:

"I respectfully submit that the position of National Commissioner does not necessarily require expert knowledge of the legal and regulatory environment applicable at all departments at national level. Experts and other functionaries provide the necessary support to the National Commissioner. In order to discharge my functions, it is inevitable that I rely on other functionaries and subject matter experts both within the SAPS and other government departments. Such reliance, I venture to suggest, is an inherent attribute of the job.

...

- I am appointed primarily to be responsible for policing and matters incidental thereto;
- It is impossible to discharge my functions without assistance from other functionaries within and outside the SAPS; and
- Such assistance may be secured through delegation and assignment of functions to other officials."

Cele intimated that he had been under the impression an open tender process was followed in acquiring the property.

"It is apparent from this letter that I was kept under the impression that an open, competitive tender process was being followed. In particular I was not informed that any deviations were being sought or contemplated."

In this regard it should be remembered that Cele was the one signing all documents relevant to this process.

In his famous book the *Outliers: Story of Success* Malcom Gladwell (2012, 80) speaks about how teamwork is essential to avoiding calamities. Writing about aeroplane crashes he says they generally do not occur because the pilots are not knowledgeable or lack skill or that they suddenly make a big mistake which cause the plane to crash. He says they happen because pilots tend to ignore minor errors: he says

“But then they make a third error on top of that, and then another and another and another and another, and it is the combination of all those errors that leads to disaster.”

The Public Protector did not make adverse findings against General Cele on the basis of one huge mistake but on the basis of a series of mistakes. To compound matters the police culture of following orders no matter the dangers that lie ahead is an obstacle to achieving good governance in that organisation. In her investigations the Public Protector came across a disturbing trend in the SAPS: that instructions from above are never questioned but followed despite being aware of the flaws embedded therein. Gladwell (80) sums up, in a different context, what may have happened at the SAPS:

“One pilot does something wrong, and the other pilot doesn't catch the error. A tricky situation needs to be resolved through a complex series of steps and somehow the pilots fail to coordinate and miss one of them. ‘The whole flight-deck design is intended to be operated by two people, and that operation works best when you have one person checking the other, or both people willing to participate,’ And for a long time it's been clear that if you have two people operating the airplane cooperatively, you will have a safer operation than if you have a single pilot flying the plane and another person who is simply there to take over if the pilot is incapacitated.”

In the context of SAPS this implies that if the culture in the organisation was one of openness and accountability this calamity might have been easily avoided. As a result of what took place the Public Protector recommended that action be taken against Cele. The President instituted an enquiry as mandated by the South African Police Act to enquire into the fitness of Cele to hold the office of the National Commissioner. The enquiry, headed by a judge, found that he was not fit and the President fired him.

3.3. *Mangwashi victoria phiyega (2012 to date)*

Cele was succeeded by Mangwashi Victoria Phiyega as the National Commissioner. Under her watch South Africa experienced what some refers to as the country's “first post-apartheid massacre”. On 16 August 2012 34 miners were shot dead by the police and scores were injured at Marikana. Hence this incident has been dubbed as the “Marikana massacre”. After this massacre the President established a commission of enquiry under Judge Farlam to investigate matters arising out of the shootings in Marikana, including among others the conduct of the SAPS. Although the National Commissioner did not give the order that the

police must shoot at the miners, as the head of the SAPS she remains ultimately responsible. The issue of the militarisation of police has been dealt with above. In this regard the Commission found it regrettable that more than two years after the NPC Report was given to the President the military ranks in the SAPS remained intact (Farlam Report, 2015, 378). The Commission also commented on the training and skills of the Commissioner (Farlam Report, 2015, 367).

What led to the massacre, it would seem, was the decision to forcibly remove miners from the “koppie”. This decision was taken by Lieutenant General Zukiswa Mbobo, the North West Provincial Commissioner. This decision was endorsed by the SAPS leadership including General Phiyega (Farlam Report, 2015, 183). However, this fact was concealed to the Commission and the impression was created that the decision was taken by the Commanders on the ground (Farlam Report, 2015, 405). The significance of this is that the National Commissioner acquiesced in an unqualified person, in the form of Lieutenant General Mbombo, taking a decision in a complex and difficult situation as the one prevailing at Marikana at the time. At all times, General Mbombo had no experience of commanding a Public Order Police. Her experience was limited to an administrative job (a desk job) (Farlam Report, 2015, 367). It is curious that despite this the National Commissioner allowed General Mbombo to proceed with her decision without the latter having spelt out what it really entailed (Farlam Report, 2015, 183-188) despite it being foreseeable that blood may be shed (Farlam Report, 2015, 193). Given this parlous state of affairs General Phiyega should have requested more information. The SAPS culture of obeying orders that has been alluded to above also comes into the picture in this case. An earlier plan, designed by commanders on the ground, to disperse the miners who had gathered at the koppie had been jettisoned for no apparent reason, despite it being relatively risk free. It is apparent that the police adopted General Mbombo’s decision ill-prepared (Farlam Report, 2015, 194-196). This is made crystal clear from the following passage:

“Colonel Scott, despite the fact that he had the whole morning from after he had finished working on the cordon and search application, at about 08h54, to work on the details of the new plan and to have a document prepared setting out the details for the use of the commanders, had no documents at all to give the commanders and merely briefed them off a single Google Earth diagram on the screen of his laptop” (Farlam Report 196).

This is exacerbated by the fact that after the shooting General Phiyega addressed the police parade and had this to say:

“Whatever happened represents the best of responsible policing. You did what you did, because you were being responsible.” (Farlam Report, 2015, 385)

The Commission found that this statement was inappropriate and may have contributed in the police not being open with the commission (Farlam Report, 2015, 385).

However, what was singularly disconcerting about General Phiyega in relation to this saga was her performance as a witness. The Commission found that General Phiyega was evasive and attempted to conceal some of the crucial information from the commission. In this regard the Commission had this to say:

The leadership of the police, on the highest level, appears to have taken the decision not to give the true version of how it came about that the “tactical option” was implemented on the afternoon of 16 August and to conceal the fact that the plan to be implemented was hastily put together without POP inputs or evaluation. In order to give effect to this, the decision at the NMF was not disclosed to the Commission. An inaccurate set of minutes for the 06h30 meeting was prepared and a number of SAPS witnesses testified before the Commission in support of the incorrect version. There is at least a prima facie case that the National Commissioner and the Provincial Commissioner for the North West Province, who knew the true facts, approved Exhibit L, SAPS presentation which contained the incorrect facts.

In the circumstances, the Commission recommends that steps be taken in terms of section 9 of the SAPS Act to inquire into their fitness to remain in their posts and whether they are guilty of misconduct in attempting to mislead the Commission (Farlam Report, 2015, 515-516).

General Phiyega even disparaged those who failed to kowtow the police line at the Commission. It is reported that she sent an SMS to Raas de Rover which read as follows:

“you seriously misrepresented the SAPS in the Marikana commission. You shall never be able to assist this service. We are disappointed by the subjective approach you adopted and clear focus on your self-enlightened interesrs a real pity indeed...” (Nicolson, 2015)

By sending this unfortunate SMS General Phiyega displayed her lack of appreciation that “[h]eading the police force is about so much more than fighting crime and criminals. It is about maintaining the rule of law” (Thamm, 2015). To make matters worse the Commission

found that political consideration played a role on the decisions taken by the SAPS hierarchy including General Phiyega. As matters stand the President has requested General Phiyega to indicate why she thinks she is fit to remain at the helm of the SAPS.

4. Conclusions

Although good governance defies precise definition it is crucial for the functioning of organisations. With regard to the SAPS there seem to be no systems (or if there are they are not adhered to) in place to ensure that good governance is adhered to. For instance, two previous National Commissioners left their positions under a cloud. The current Commissioner is fighting to keep her job. With regard to Selebi, there were no systems in place to eliminate the possibility of the National Commissioner being in the pockets of the criminals. It has been argued in this paper that that amounts to not adhering to the principles of good governance by being proactive. The same is true with regard to the Cele case. Although systems were in place to ensure that procurement was transparent and cost effective the culture in the SAPS of deferring to the superiors decision despite such decision not being justifiable means that the good governance systems in place are not adhered to. The Phiyega case places this issue beyond doubt. It thus could be concluded that, overall good governance is not adhered to in the SAPS.

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REDUCING DEPENDENCY AND PROMOTING LOCALISED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THROUGH CO-OP MODEL AT CATO MANOR

N. Tshishonga
University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa

Abstract

This paper examines the comparative advantage of co-operative as a socio-economic model towards mitigating adverse effects of soaring poverty, escalating unemployment rate and gross inequalities in places like Cato Manor, a township at eThekweni in South Africa. Despite various government interventions ranging from CMDA (partnership between European Union, KZN Provincial government and Cato Manor Development Association) to Cato Manor -Area based Management (ABM) in the early 2000s, Cato Manor remains socially fragmented and economically vulnerable coupled with the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Despite challenges relating business literacy, transport, and co-op education and training, finding a niche market and marketing itself, the paper found that most co-ops are resilient in terms of reducing the dependency syndrome by working towards interdependency between people themselves, the municipality and the private sector. Evidence from the findings suggest that co-operatives are struggling to embracing the co-op culture and enhancing social cohesion and greater co-operation among co-op members but have been instrumental in mobilising human capabilities to eliminate dependence on government for both social and economic development. Central to rekindling co-operatives as a vehicle to encourage job creation and poverty alleviation, the author recommends that the culture of saving grounded on strong social capital, co-operation and Ubuntu values and principles should be encouraged. For co-ops to be competitive and successful enterprises, education and training should form the co-op development foundation.

Key words: Cato manor, Indigenous people, Dependency, Socio-economic

1. Introduction

Communities either urban or rural are a product of cultures, behaviours, social, economic and political experiences. Under apartheid the traditional heritage of community and its rich cultures were eroded and indigenous people particularly black Africans were relegated to development marginalization and underdevelopment. This paper examines the

comparative advantage of co-operative as a socio-economic model that mitigates adverse effects of soaring poverty, escalating unemployment rate and gross inequalities in South Africa in places like Cato Manor, a township at eThekweni. Despite various government interventions ranging from CMDA (partnership between European Union, KZN Provincial government and Cato Manor Development Association) to Cato Manor -Area based Management (ABM) in the early 2000s, Cato Manor remains socially fragmented and economically vulnerable coupled with the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The author argues that the enactment of Co-operative Act (2005) demonstrates the state's commitment to make use of alternative models to address socio-economic situation on one hand, while on the other hand the success of co-op in localising economic development and growing the local economy would depend on a genuine adherence and application of co-op principles. Contrary to the conventional capitalist economic models and approaches, co-operatives have an advantage over formal businesses especially in advancing local economic justice for the benefit of the poor through their active involvement.

Despite challenges relating to business literacy, finding a niche market and marketing itself, the paper found that most the co-ops are resilient in terms of reducing the dependency syndrome and working towards interdependency between people themselves, the municipality and private sector. Evidence from the findings suggest that co-operatives have not been successful in enhancing social cohesion and greater co-operation among co-op members but have been instrumental in mobilising human capabilities to eliminate dependence on government for both social and economic development. Central to rekindling co-operative as a vehicle to encourage job creation, poverty alleviation and promoting a culture of saving, are the concepts of social capital, co-operation and Ubuntu values and principles.


The author argues that the enactment of the Co-operative Act (2005) demonstrates the state's commitment to make use of alternative models to address a socio-economic situation on one hand, while on the other hand the success of co-op in localising economic development and growing the local economy would depend on the genuine adherence and application of co-op principles. Contrary to the conventional capitalist economic models and approaches, co-operatives have an advantage over formal businesses especially in advancing local economic justice for the benefit of the poor through their active involvement.

2. Historical background of cato manor and its socio-economic profile

Cato Manor is a working class township located approximately seven kilometres from the Durban city centre. Cato Manor came into being after George Cato the first mayor of

Durban was gifted the land in 1865. Cato and his people farmed the land until the turn of the 20th century after which it was sub-divided into smaller farms. Landowners hired out or sold plots to Indian market gardeners (Maharaj and Makhatini, 2004). The natives of Kwa-Zulu came to settle at Cato Manor in the 1920s. In order to sustain themselves, the residents of Cato Manor brewed beer and sold in the streets of Durban to workers. Although the colonial authorities were pleased with the work force in the city they were also scared of the influx of the black population in the city. In order to curb this influx the Durban system was introduced and it required people to have permits to be allowed to stay in the city. In addition the city authorities brought about the Native Beer Act of 1908 which only allowed the municipality to brew and sell beer for self-finance. The idea took off as the municipality reaped huge profit from the sell. This meant that anyone found brewing liquor illegally would be arrested. This caused conflicts between the authorities and residents which led to riots as people were losing incomes (Walker, 2010).

Map 1: Cato Manor



Source: www.catomanormap.co.za

It was between the end of World War 11 and the 1950s when 50 000 people had settled and built shacks along Umkhumbane River that snakes through the area. Most of the settlers were running away from violent and state controlled townships. The massive settlement brought even bigger riots between 1949 and 1950 when the Group Areas Act was passed. This Act led to forceful removals of people to townships such as KwaMashu for Blacks while Indians were relocated to Chatsworth and Phoenix. Many people lost their lives during the 1960s riots, a time when most Africans were murdered by the apartheid government because of the colour of their skin. The riots died around 1964 when the area became deserted as everyone had been moved out. Cato Manor became synonymous with violence during apartheid (Maharaj and Makhatini, 2004).

At the beginning of the 1990s people started to flock back into the area. There was much needed infrastructure in the area as it had been left redundant for a long time. An association was formed, Cato Manor Development Association (CMDA) to assist the area with needed infrastructure. The area is approximately seven kilometres west of the Durban central business district. According to CMDA (2000: 40) “the creation of an efficient and productive city within city’ aimed mainly at the poor and the marginalised... through the provision of affordable housing and security tenure ... and the integration of Cato Manor into the e-Thekwini Municipality-spatially, politically, economically and socially”. People commute to the business district by local taxis and buses which take about ten minutes. Cato Manor’s proximity to the city centre is important in terms of integrated development which means that people do not have to travel long to get to their places of work.

Map 2: Aerial view of Cato Manor



Source: SA Census 2002.

Cato Manor lies on 1800 hectares with an estimated 300 000 residents (SA Census 2002). The population is almost 100% African, represented by a rich diversity of ethnic groups and cultures dominated by Zulus, followed by Xhosa, Sotho, Ndebele and other nationalities (refugees) from many parts of Africa. Before CMDA Cato Manor was a site of violence, crime and chaos. Residents utilized the land whichever way they thought fit and built houses and shacks wherever they felt comfortable despite the dangers of floods from the nearby river, the landslides and unhygienic and inhabitable sites. Cato Manor graduated from being an informal settlement to a peri-urban community mixed with complex informal settlements. Despite the area being targeted for development in the early 1990s was one of

the first flagship projects. Cato Manor redevelopment was anchored on a vision of “a place where people like to live and work in a distinctly urban environment, where one can enjoy a full lifestyle and reach most parts of the metropolitan area without needing to own a car” (Greater Cato Manor Development Forum 1992:13). In the past years the area of Cato Manor has been experiencing huge problems in terms of service delivery. Some of the development projects and strategies have been showing success in improving some people’s standards of living through the creation of job opportunities and providing people with other basic needs; however; it worth mentioning that the majority of such development projects were not inclusive, and besides that there has been little progress in terms of infrastructure; and issues of poor management, lack of resources and deprivation of other community members to participate in the decision-making process as well as in the identification of their needs as community members seemed to be the challenge that slowed down the process of service delivery in the area (<http://www.fad.co.za/Resources/Cato/cato.htm>). Mkhumbane is one such community whose heritage was stripped off by the apartheid laws. Consequently, Tshishonga (2011) argues that Cato Manor is masked by unemployment, poverty and growing inequality which are further aggravated by the escalating HIV/AIDS pandemic and increasing informal settlements. Therefore any development intervention to entrench development and transformative change, a paradigm shift is necessary. This type of change is driven by social and economic interventions coupled with institutional development that is holistic and integrated in nature.

3. Understanding of co-operatives

The concept of co-operative is derived from the Latin word co-operative derives from the word ‘co-operari’, which means working together to reach a common goal (Kanyane, 2009). The concept of co-operative is further grounded on cooperation as opposed to competition as part of human nature and existence. Cooperatives in Africa draw their inspiration from both individual and collective collaboration philosophies of life such as Ubuntu, Ujamaa in Tanzania and Harambee in Kenya. Ubuntu according to Campbell (2010: 8) means ‘cooperation’ and as a philosophy seeks to create a balance between self and others, as well as between the internal and external. Ubuntu is grounded on the principles of love, sharing, solidarity; human and environmental interdependency and the Archbishop Tutu sums up the concept as a principle of caring for each other’s well-being and a spirit of mutual support (cited in Battle, 2007). As a philosophy Ujamaa is anchored on the principles of self-reliance and interdependence which according to Nyerere has three traditional values such as respecting for others people, common property and the obligation for everyone to work (cited in Rist, 1997: 132). Kenyatta).

The concept of co-operative from a traditional perspective has got its roots as deliberated on the African philosophies and values of Ubuntu, Ujamaa and Harambee. In Europe the notion of co-operative movement could be traced back to the planned cooperative community of Robert Owen in the early 19th century and particularly the establishment of the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers in 1944 (Melnyk, 1985 & Craig, 1993 cited in Tesoriero, 2010: 172). Cooperative in its contemporary form is designated as a voluntary organisation formed by a group of people with a common need they want to address jointly thus a group of people who want to create employment for themselves (Department of Trade and Industry, 2005).

A co-operative is internationally defined as ‘an association of persons who have voluntarily join together to achieve a common end through the formation of a democratically controlled organisation, making equitable contributions to the capital required and accepting a fair share of the risks and benefits of the undertaking, in which the members actively participate’. In South Africa, a co-op as conceptualised by the Co-operative Policy (Act 14 of 2005) is an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly owned and democratically controlled enterprise’ thus co-operative (including its values and principles) as Simmons & Birchall (2008: 2) indicated could ‘provide built-in advantages for poverty reduction’. Kanyane (2009: 1124) adds that a co-operative model can serve as a ‘best social security intervention strategy especially in combating the scourge of unemployment and in particular, poverty in South Africa’.

Co-operatives are often guided by a set of values and principles which distinguish them from other business ventures. The co-operative values and principles are the pillars and building blocks of a viable and strong movement. On one hand, co-operative values are self-help, self-responsibility, democracy, equality, equity and solidarity. On the other hand the co-operative is underpinned by seven principles (see table 1 below).

Table 1-Co-operatives values & principles

Co-operatives Values	Co-operative Principles
• Self-help • Self-responsibility • Democracy • Equality • Equity • Solidarity	1. Voluntary & open membership 2. Democratic member control 3. Member economic participation 4. Autonomy and independence 5. Education, training & information 6. Cooperation among co-operatives 7. Concern for community

Source: The international joint project on Co-operative Democracy, 1995: 10-11

The voluntary and open membership principles allow all people who are able to make use of their services and are willing to accept the responsibilities of membership without discrimination on the basis of gender, race, and religion, social or political affiliation. The second principle allows members to have democratic control by participating in decision making and determining policies. The third principle is member economic participation whereby co-operative members contribute equitably to and democratically control the capital and running of their co-operative (The international joint project on Co-operative Democracy, 1995: 10-11). Autonomy and independence is encouraged to render co-operatives as autonomous, self-help organisations as the fourth principle. Education, training and information is the fifth principles guiding the co-operatives and as such members are subjected through rigorous education and training aimed at informing them on how co-operatives function. Cooperation among co-operatives is promoted in which co-operatives are encouraged to effectively strengthen the co-operative movement through collaborating together via local, national, regional and international structures (Davis & Donaldson, 1998: 133-134). The seventh and last principle is concern for community in which co-operatives and their members are rallied to work for the sustainable development of their communities through policies approved by their members (Muthuma, 2011: 10).

4. Research methods

The data for this paper was obtained through the use of secondary sources (documentation, reports and submissions) and face-face interviews primarily with Cato Manor officials; official and ordinary members from the co-operatives themselves. The paper is sampled on ten (10) co-ops situated at Cato Manor.

Table: 2

Co-op Projects at Cato Manor		
Name	No of members	Sector
1. Thubelihle Consumer	5	Sewing
2. Neliseka Cooperative Limited	9	Embroidery
3. Xoshindlala Cooperative	100	Agriculture
4. Andisa Cooperative	10	Construction
5. Zimele Cooperative	12	Grass cutting & building
6. Umkhumbane Security	9	Security & construction
7. Bhekimpilo Support group	8	HIV Counselling
8. Vikindala Cooperative	13	Painting
9. Abanisezwe Cooperative	7	Cleaning steams and Drains
10. Masisebenze Cooperative	10	Laundry

Source: Urban-Econ eThekweni Cooperative Survey (2010: 68)

The cooperatives selected for this study take into account the different sectors such as construction, agriculture, painting and laundry among others. In addition the data elicited from the cooperatives was gathered through structured questions which included the length of membership, what they did before they joined the co-op and the reasons for joining the co-op., challenges and opportunities presented by a co-op as well as support.

5. Findings and discussions

5.1. *Linking social to economic development*

Co-operatives in a socially fragmented society play a pivotal role not only as an economic vehicle for the people to generate income but also when people are gathered together to use such forum to share their social problems and seek alternative ways of dealing with them. One of the co-operators in agricultural sector stated that:

Unlike individually run initiatives, co-operatives bring like-minded people together which is important especially in brainstorming ideas and strategies that help us to co-operate more in producing more vegetables, expanding our market and generate more money

In terms of production chain, social capital at both bonding and bridging level could afford co-operators to network and forge social as well as economic networks in order to broaden and unlock their creativity and innovations. Linking social and economic development is also underpinned by an integrated grounded development intervention where development does not only prioritise economic growth but also look at other dimensions such as social, political and cultural aspects of development. Most of the co-operators were explicit in sharing that their involvement in co-operative enterprises have been helpful in enhancing social cohesion and greater co-operation among co-op members but also have been instrumental in mobilising human capabilities to eliminate dependence on government for both social and economic development. This was further re-emphasised by Cato Manor LED officer who articulated that:

Central to rekindling co-operative as vehicle towards encourage job creation, poverty alleviation and promoting a culture of saving, are the concept of social capital, co-operation and Ubuntu values and principles.

In the case of Cato Manor, Cameron, et al, (2004: 324) argue that development had to deal with complex legacy of social, economic and political exclusion. Based on structural deprivation, it is therefore not surprising that on one hand, CMDA was established with the vision of anchored primarily on the other hand, Area-based Management and Development programme (ABMDP) was initiated according Cameron, et al, (2004: 325) to integration. It has become evident from the interviews that, if given financial and capacity building support, co-operatives in the midst of growing poverty and unemployment are regarded as

community-based economic enterprises that could generate and recycle financial resources within communities on an on-going basis. Viewed within the generic term of community enterprise (Pearce, 1993), co-operatives turn to be a practical ways of mobilising local action and resources in the local economy for the benefit of the people as managers and owners and the entire community. In essence, the application of co-operatives values and principles could place them at an advantage to regenerate the local community, deliver local services while at the same time tackling social problems.

5.2. Challenges faced by Co-operatives at Cato Manor

Despite challenges relating business literacy, finding a niche market and marketing itself, the paper found that most the co-ops are resilient in terms of reducing dependency syndrome and working towards interdependency between people themselves, the municipality and private sector. Cato manor like any other apartheid created townships, group centred enterprises such as co-operatives are faced with massive economic restructuring and unemployment or underemployment, millions of South Africans are discovering the potential of the **workers co-operative**, a collective entrepreneur model (rather than that of an individual entrepreneur) that provides decent and sustainable employment and a democratic workplace. This is certainly the goal of co-op development. But it is far from the current reality. In tackling severe and worsening urban and rural unemployment, poverty and inequality problems, co-operatives are seen as the best alternative. The unemployment and underemployment related challenges are characterised by features such as the labour market imbalances which are due to the relative inability of the formal sector to absorb the rapidly increasing numbers of the labour force entrants; widespread underemployment which is distinguished by limited utilization of productive potential- available technology and human resources. With regard to the future of co-operatives in the economy, Bundon Group (1991: 8 in International Joint Project on Co-operative Democracy, 1995: 289) argues that it will be determined largely by their ability to distinguish their form of economic players and to achieve wide public acceptance of that role. These economic players include the state, private sector, organs of civil society and communities as well as people themselves.

5.2.1. Producing poor quality

One of the challenges highlighted by the co-operators, which was also observed by the author is the lack of creativity and innovation when it comes to production side. Poor quality of production and services has a negative bearing on marketing such products both internally or externally. To optimize productivity, in order to compete with other producers on

price, collective production also generally requires some degree of division of labour, and some differentiation of skills – and hence of wages. In this case, Phillip (2003) argues that many co-ops start with an assumption that equal pay for equal work means equal pay.

Poor quality within the co-op sector is also associated with the notion of poverty and unemployment driven and motivated. Poverty driven businesses in most cases are triggered by the people whom the majority suffer from low level of education including business skills and competencies. As revealed from this paper, poverty driven projects are prone to recycle socio-economic deprivations and poverty thinking. The lack of creativity and innovations has negative consequences as it results into poor quality, poor marketing, low income and the combination of these factors lead towards demoralising co-operators as well as project fragmentation. In reality, an organisational marketing strategy is determine by the (bad) quality of the product hence Phillip (2003: 19) argues that marketing strategy can no longer rely on local knowledge or support, but has to compete for market share within a complete supply chain

5.2.2. *Marketing and transport*

There is an intrinsic link between quality production and marketing. Poor quality result into poor sales and poor sales generate no or less financial resources for project members. Indeed marketing is a specialised field of study which in the contemporary business environment, technology plays a pivotal role. The reality is that co-operatives do not operate in a vacuum, but their existence is underpinned by social, economic, political and cultural environments. It is therefore important for co-operators to have a sound understanding and harnessing these environments, since it from these environments that co-operators including other enterprises exist to respond to challenges embedded in it and at the same time such environments turn to become a market. The problem of market and the lack of it therefore is widespread in the co-op industry. A research done by Phillip (2003: 19) highlighted that many co-ops remain locked into the constraints of local market and consequently find themselves in a vicious cycle without business viability. She went on to argue that:

External and higher-value markets demand higher levels of product quality, packaging and design; introduce greater costs and complexity at the level of procurement and distribution and distribution logistics; a need for more business formality, and more complex financial management (Phillip, 2003: 19).

Another problem confronting co-operatives at Cato Manor is the lack of transport without it; it becomes almost impossible to collect raw materials and distributing finished products. There is dire need for transportation of goods especially those specialising in sectors such as catering, manufacturing, agriculture and construction. The need for transportation was

further highlighted by a research conducted in 2006 done by Urban-Econ Report (2006: 31) where people involved in cooperatives indicated that they needed help with the transporting goods.

5.2.3. *Crime and vandalism*

The issues pertaining to crime, vandalism and theft in places such as Cato Manor remain unresolved. Despite efforts demonstrated by the workers in producing a variety of products towards securing livelihoods, there is fear that their goods could be stolen is high and create business uncertainty. One of the female co-operators involved in agricultural sector stated:

We work hard to make a living which entail tilling the land in order to produce crops-vegetables, due to theft you wake up early in the morning only to find that most of your crops are gone. And as an emerging co-operative, we are unable to provide security to our project.

Considering the high unemployment and poverty rate in the Greater Cato Manor, especially among the youth, criminal activities such as mugging, pick-pocketing and house breaking are common.

5.2.4. *Business illiteracy*

Despite poor productivity, crime and marketing related challenges, business illiteracy hampers co-operative progress and development. In a study conducted by the Cato manor Office, the co-operators raised the concern that they have been awaiting to receive capacity building on co-operative operations and functioning. The Cato Manor-ABM Report (2006: iii) has recorded 33 cooperatives and further revealed that 28 close corporations are registered under the auspices of Cooperative Development Forum.

Table 3: Cooperatives and Close Corporations

Legal Entity	Number of C-Ops & CCs in Cato Manor			Total number of individuals involved	Average number of individuals involved
	Registered	Not Registered	Total		
Co-operatives	2	31	33	448	14
Close Corporations	3	25	28	58	2,1
Total	5	56	61	506	8,3

Source: Cato Manor-ABM Report (2006: iii)

The problem relating to business illiteracy and illiteracy in general pose a detrimental challenge to the unhealthy status of cooperatives at Cato Manor in particularly and conventional businesses in general. The mere fact that there is a lack of understanding especially in differentiating between cooperatives and close businesses demonstrate poor conceptualisation of what cooperatives are and how they are distinct from other business initiatives.

Sensitive to healthy of cooperatives, co-operators desperately indicated the urgent need for skilling and upgrading their general skills and in particular skills and knowledge relating to co-operatives. The cooperative members drawn in for the purposes of this study indicated the need for certain skills in order to improve and grow their cooperatives. However, within the municipal-wide, the eThekweni Co-operative Development Strategy (2011: 25) revealed that while some members hinted the dire need for training especially on cooperative development, others were explicit and reported that they do not require any training. Contrary those who did not need training, the Cato Manor AMB Report (2006: iv) argues that co-operators at Cato manor, in their quest to outgrow their businesses, indicated that they need training in business and funding for equipment and business assets

5.2.5. *Grounding co-op formation on cooperative training and education*

The fact that the formation and subsequently the mushrooming of co-operatives in the KwaZulu-Natal province was spearheaded by the campaign launched by the premier without laying the educational background on what co-operatives are, their values and principles including the environment as well as how they function different for other normal conventional businesses. The failure by government to educate the people about the cooperatives has far implications for their staggering growth and demise. From the interviews, most of the co-operators have displayed a limited knowledge on how co-operatives work while financial resources were pointed out as one of the stimuli towards their formation. The lack of knowledge pertaining to co-operatives weakens and turns to undermine the potential of co-operatives to be viable business ventures capable of dealing with poverty and unemployment issues.

Most of the co-operatives indicated that they have received education and training offered by the KZN Provincial Department of Economic Development. The training provided to co-operatives was mainly on business skills and management. Instead of offering co-operators with co-op related skills, knowledge to build their competencies, people were made to undergo training in general management, budgeting, and marketing and basic

financial literacy related skills and knowledge. On one hand, the generalised training provides people with valuable knowledge while on the other hand such repertoire of training does not prepare to run and manage co-operative enterprises grounded on co-op values and principles. The need for co-operators to possess co-op related skills, qualification and knowledge aimed at improving and growing their cooperatives. A study done by Urban-Econ eThekweni cooperative Survey (2010) identified the following skills:

Table 4: Skills

General skills Needed	Specific Skills Needed	Extreme Poles
1. Project management skills	1. Grass manufacturing skills	• All training needed
2. Marketing skills	2. Grass cutting skills	• No training is needed
3. Tender forms and proposal skills	3. Agricultural & organic farming skills	
4. Book keeping skills	4. Advanced cooking skills	
3. Business management	5. Butchery management skills	
6. Computer skills	6. Baking skills	
7. Financial skills	7. Wiring skills	
8. Entrepreneurial skills	8. Plumbing & building skills	
	9. Craft work skills	
	10. Tour guiding skills	
	11. Events management skills	
	12. Chemical training for cleaning	
	13. Needle work skills	

Source: Urban-Econ eThekweni Cooperative Survey (2010: 25)

Table 4 above reflects two extreme poles, general skills needed on one hand and specific skills on the other hand. In this regard, Cato manor LED officer said:

There is lack of communication between the provincial government and the municipality as an added challenge hence the training offered by the province did not offer much assistance to co-ops. Most of the co-operatives who often visit our office, lack basic understanding on what is co-op including its values and principles as well as how such entities operate especially in alleviating poverty and providing sustainable employment.

This implies that as much as general management and business skills and knowledge are imperative, education and training should prioritise capacitating co-operators with co-op basic competencies.

13.1. *Opportunities available for Co-operates at Cato manor*

The eThekweni municipality through the Cato Manor-AMB office seems to show interest in supporting the co-operatives not only in terms of financial support but also offer capacity building to co-operative enterprises. There are beliefs that co-operative success can relieve the government budgetary and fiscal pressure regarding human development. In other words there are no sufficient government funds to spend on empty, dry policy compound such as post-apartheid redistributive policies. The redistributive policies are pressurized by the neo-liberal free market policy that demands the government to reduce its social spending and reduce interference with economy. But the government financial assistance to business enterprise activities is justifiable because that is where the local people are utilizing their human resources to balance economic gains. In other words poor people participate in co-operative socio-economic development using their business enterprise and such activities could contribute to economic development of the country. Poor people could also survive social risks and poverty from using the co-operatives as their socio-economic development (Kanyane, 2009). It is clear that the co-operatives are becoming more entrusted as new models to combat social exclusions, poverty and unemployment. The favourable stance towards co-ops is recognized by the International labour Organization (ILO) and International Co-operative Alliance (Beesley, 2010: 37 and 39 and Kate, 2003: 300).

13.2. *Application of Co-operative values and principles: Comparative advantage*

Co-operatives are often differentiated from other business ventures through their values and principles. The strategic and pragmatic implementation of these values and principles are in themselves a strength which could serve as both comparative and competitive advantage for co-ops to thrive. There is an intrinsic relationship between values and principles guiding and governing the co-operatives. Through voluntary and open membership, members are encouraged to democratically manage and control by participating economically. As autonomous and independent entities, co-op members are subjected to thorough education and training on how co-ops work in creating wealth and gaining themselves social and economic independence or interdependence. The fact that co-ops are unique in their approach and share common virtues, cooperation among co-ops

themselves is encouraged without losing their vision of addressing the concerns arising from the respective communities.

The proper understanding and interpretation of values and principles underpinning co-ops could work towards building a culture of savings, investment which in turn can enable co-ops to expand. The **1st principle** demands that co-ops should be voluntary and open to anybody who is willing to join and importantly those aspired to be guided by the co-op values and principles. Opening as opposed to restricting members to join can work towards their detrimental, since membership itself could be strength in itself. For instance, increasing the membership in savings and credit could also increase the money being invested. **The 2nd principle** demands that co-operatives take control of their enterprises thereby partaking in decision making processes especially in developing policies, relevant education and training programmes geared towards building and strengthening co-op movement in both urban and rural areas. **The 3rd principle** is anchored on the reality that co-op members should be at the steering wheel more in particularly in participating in economic processes of the businesses since co-op are member control and managed. **The 4th principle** is the lifeblood of co-operatives since it is through upholding the principle of autonomy and independence which render co-operatives unique and distinction. The radical implementation of this principle requires on one hand that co-operatives skilled themselves and act like businesses with professionalism while on the other hand reducing unnecessary dependency on the outside help. **The 5th principle** equips both old and new members with grounded education and training. It is evidenced from the co-operators interviewed that the less prioritisation of this fundamental principle is a contributory factor to the staggering growth or even the decline of most co-operatives at Cato Manor. Both the **6th and 7th principles** are vital since without co-operatives cooperating amongst themselves it would be impossible to cater for their members as well as the needs of the entire community.

The advantage of co-ops in comparison to other conventional businesses is that they can be both competitive and comparative provided the cooperation value is entrenched among co-operators and professionalism is exercise in all their operation. Despite that the South African state through the DTI and Cato Manor-ABM LED office enabling conditions via financial, regulatory and technical support (Satgar & Williams (2011: 203), for co-ops to survive the socio-economic turmoil atmosphere, they need to be more organised and not solely depend on the external help. Thus exercising co-op ownership and maintaining autonomy and independence can only materialise if and only when co-op members are able to exercise social responsibility through Co-op values. Co-operatives should be understood as businesses with a unique culture different from other businesses. The co-ops'

comparative advantage is rooted in the principle of economic democracy and equality. According to Satgar & Williams (2011: 206-7) economic democracy refers to the practice in which all decisions about production, distribution, and the redistribution of surplus are made democratically by all members of the cooperatives. Co-operatives scholars such as Cockerton & Whyatt (1986: 16) remind us that apart from these fundamental principles underlying the day to day operation of any principle, it should be remembered that co-ops are still businesses which have to function efficiently in order to survive in the same competitive commercial environment as other businesses. They went on to warn co-operators that the formation of co-operatives should not be regarded as the soft option nor an excuse for adopting slipshod business practices.

14. Reducing dependency and promoting localised economic development through co-op model?

Fundamental to this study has been the question of whether or not co-operatives have the potential to reduce dependency by providing job opportunities for the impoverished and unemployed people. The reality is that due to with formal sector's failure to absorb the unemployed people thus including skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled, people resort to informal sector for their socio-economic survival. Since 1994, government through the enactment of Co-operative Act (2005) and Co-operative Development Unit at DTI, government recommit itself to support co-operatives as a strategy to alleviate poverty and ultimate creating jobs and job opportunities.

Co-operatives are promoted either by government (Act and DTI) or as a social movement in order to create a conducive environment for people to create jobs for themselves as opposed to solely depending on the government. In essence, co-operative enterprises should be understood within the entrepreneurial spirit and framework. In this regard, Weavind (2012: 1) argues that economic growth in South Africa will come from entrepreneurs. In advancing this debate, he further indicated that people should be encouraged to start up small businesses as one important ways to counter unemployment while at the same time growing the economy. Government is viewed to be creating jobs through initiatives such as infrastructure development which Weavind (2012) views them as temporary jobs on one hand. In the private sector on the other hand, there is downsizing, subcontracting and resizing or taking on bigger staff complement is rare. In Cato Manor, Co-ops are still at the infant stage and as a result they are vulnerable. Their vulnerability is further aggravated by the lack of management and technical skills, knowledge and competencies needed to run co-ops as group related initiatives aimed at addressing the problems of poverty, unemployment and income inequality. In this regard, Davis (1997)

posits that for co-op organisations to be effective there is the need to harness professional management skills to co-op values and principles. As demonstrated by case studies throughout the world, especially in Europe and Kenya, co-operatives can be a vehicle to reduce dependency while at the same time mitigating effects of poverty, unemployment and underdevelopment.

Evidence from this study show that lack of co-operative related skills and basic knowledge as well as lack of innovation and creativity from the side of co-operators puts coops under a lot of pressure to reduce dependency and therefore dealing with bread and butter issues. The success of co-ops should be measured by its readiness to take more social responsibility for economic justice than the market place currently demands. In general and Cato Manor in particular, Prickett & Treacy (1992: 215) strongly advise that co-ops as economic organisations should be in the forefront when it comes to producing and distributing goods and services of higher quality at low cost.

15. Concluding remarks

All the cases have demonstrated the interest shown and role played by both the colonial/apartheid and post-colonial and apartheid regimes in establishing and using co-operative as an economic model to deal with socio-economic challenges. According to Kanyane (2009: 1135) the co-operative model in Africa and in South Africa in particular was adopted as a form of social security intervention for poverty alleviation, employment creation. Despite the state interventions being regarded as noble interventions and support for the development and growth of cooperatives, co-ops are not completely free from political interference which in turn creates the dependency syndrome and their independence snatched as people's social enterprises. Socially, cooperatives at Cato Manor mushroomed with good intentions but in practice they have failed to fulfil their socio-economic mandate. The study revealed that cooperatives formed without basic understanding and training did not only create expectations but it also perpetuated the dependency syndrome. In addition the study acknowledged that the financial and technical provided mainly by KZN provincial department of economic development built the foundation of coops in the province in general including the study site.

One of the lessons drawn from the case studies is that the state-led cooperatives on one hand could lead to the sector not only losing its independence but also deviating and persuaded to operate similarly to conventional capitalist business values and principles underpinned by competition. On the other hand, the co-operators themselves should fight to

defend the distinct identity of co-operatives sector upon which co-op model is based on, thus a business ventures based on values and principles. The study therefore; recommends that to maintain cooperative status, they have to organise themselves and invest in savings and credit unions in order to be financially viable.

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ASSESSING THE CRITERIA FOR FINANCING REFUGEE CAMPS IN SOUTH AFRICA: A CASE OF XENOPHOBIC ATTACKS

*P.S. Maoba
D.D. Mofokeng
E. Nemasitoni
K.S. Chirwa
L.B. Mzini*

North West University, South Africa

Abstract

This paper assesses the criteria for financing refugee camps in South Africa with reference to the Gauteng province in the Emfuleni Local Municipality. Refugee camps forms part of the humanitarian aid initiatives. The paper emanates from the attention drawn from the rise of xenophobic attacks and the placement of foreign nationals in South Africa. A question asked in this paper seeks to understand the criteria applied for funding the refugee camps. It also evaluates revenue sources for funding refugee camps. A qualitative approach is undertaken to understand the concept of refugee camp funding. A semi-structured interview was held with the public sector in the Emfuleni Local Municipality and the South African Police Service branch in Vereeniging both in the Gauteng province. Refugee camps remain urgent and require funds to serve the humanitarian aid for assisting the people in need. The study informs that the financing of refugee camps was found useful as funds are allocated based on the scale of needs. Furthermore it was noted that the process for allocating funds across global crises varies considerably amongst the donors considered in this analysis. However, the study found that funding choices remain skewed by other priorities.

1. Introduction

The paper draws attention on the context of humanitarian funding and focuses on refugee camps. The criteria for financing refugee camps in South Africa is assessed; and the discussions emanates from the attention drawn from the rise of xenophobic attacks and the placement of foreign nationals in South Africa. Despite the waves of media releases, governments are obliged to ensure that there is placement for the affected communities. Such placement is often offered in a form of refugee camps, which is a temporary settlement built to accommodate refugees. Refugee camps are usually built and run by a host government, local and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as the United Nations and the Red Cross. Generally, the camps are designed as a safety net in the

emergency phase and to meet basic human needs for only a short time. The state provides health services; clean water and sanitation; education; and emergency kits; and targeted emotional and educational support for women and children in the camps to thousands of displaced population. The camps remain urgent and require funds to serve the mandate. However, humanitarian operations may have insufficient funds to provide essential services for the care and protection of encamped populations. Governments have an obligation to continue to provide financial support for the refugee camps.

The paper determines the extent of support on refugees as well as the determination of the strategy being followed by governments to allocate resources as well as the creation of a safer environment during xenophobic attacks. The discussions begin by defining the humanitarian context in relation to refugee camp funding. An understanding of the process involved in funding the refugee camps is discussed. The paper concludes by providing an overview of revenue sources for funding refugee camps is also provided.

2. Research methods

The authors selected the Emfuleni Local Municipality situated in as the location for this paper. The Emfuleni Local Municipality is one of the three local municipalities found in the Sedibeng District Municipality of the Gauteng Province in South Africa. The municipality was selected because of the previous exposure of xenophobic attacks which was experienced in its locations in 2013, 2014 and 2015, where foreign nationals were displaced. A qualitative approach was undertaken to understand the criteria used for funding and refugee camps. Data was obtained from the books, articles and from the government and humanitarian reports published and made accessible to the public domain. Such reports made it easier for the authors to understand the content and to analyse the activities undertaken especially when such information is not published on the new headlines. The study found that a lot of articles have been published on the subject matter in various academic journals and reports. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with the Disaster Management Unit in the Emfuleni Local Government. Another interview was also conducted with the Colonel in the South African Police Services, Vereeniging branch. The interviews aimed to identify the role played by the South African government in financing refugee camps arising from xenophobic attacks. Ethical considerations are applied whereby the names of the participants and the confidential information are not publicised in this article.

4. Refugee context in South Africa

A refugee is any person who is outside his or her country of origin or habitual residence and who is unwilling or unable to return to the country of origin because they fear persecution, violence and serious threats to life (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2015a). This includes people who are forced to flee their country of origin as a result of external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events that seriously disrupt public order (UNHCR, 2015a). *Refugees are categorised in the context of humanitarian aid.* Buston and Smith (2013:11) define the context of humanitarian aid as an assistance and action designed to save lives, alleviate sufferings, maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of emergencies to refugees and asylums. Table 1 illustrates data of refugees in Southern Africa as at December 2014. Refugees require humanitarian assistance. A person only becomes recognized and protected as a refugee after their status has been verified and until then, they are known as asylum-seekers (UNHCR, 2015b:2). The Refugees (Act 130 of 1998) guides on how immigrants can apply for refugee status upon arrival in South Africa. The processing and application of refugee status is administered by the Department of Home Affairs. A refugee in South Africa can apply for permanent residence after five years residing in the country, only after the date of asylum has been granted to them and this applies only to recognised asylum seekers.

Table 1: UNHCR sub-regional operations profile: Southern Africa (As at December 2014)

Countries	Refugees from	Refugees in	Internally displaced (IDPs)
Angola	9,507	15,474	0
Botswana	237	2,645	0
Comoros	581	0	0
Lesotho	17	44	0
Madagascar	281	11	0
Malawi	360	5,874	0
Mauritius	94	0	0
Mozambique	58	4,536	0
Namibia	1,253	1,767	0
Seychelles	25	0	0
South Africa	424	112,192	0
Swaziland	161	515	0
Zambia	316	25,578	0
Zimbabwe	22,494	6,079	0

Source: UNHCR, 2015

Stoppard (2003:1) and Steinberg (2005:3) outlines that refugees are entitled to the same constitutional rights as South Africans which embrace the human rights as contained in the Constitution of the Republic South Africa (Act of 1996). However, refugees are not entitled to social grants issued by the Department of Social development (International Marketing Council of South Africa (IMC), 2004:2).

4.1 Refugee camps

The Government of South Africa supports international efforts to protect and assist refugees and asylum-seekers, in particular by providing them with access to health facilities, schools and social services” (UNHCR, 2014:2). Refugee camps exist on a temporary basis due to outbreaks of xenophobic attacks (UNHCR, 2014:2-3); and it is regarded as a precautionary measure (SABC, 2015a) as it is established for ensuring safety to displaced immigrants in the host country. In terms of location, they are situated far away from war zones. In 2008, 2013, 2014 and 2015, the South African government witnessed a high volume of xenophobic attacks throughout the country. Some of the incidences force immigrants to seek shelter in police stations, hospitals, schools and churches. Generally refugee camps are sites where displaced persons are temporarily sheltered. Displaced communities mostly require shelter for safety and survival. Refugee camps are managed within the level of global strategic priorities. Global strategic priorities concentrate on ensuring: favourable protection environment; fair protection processes and documentation; security from violence and exploitation; basic needs and services; community empowerment and self-reliance; and durable solutions (UNHCR, 2015b:16).

Many refugee camps have places for refugees to collect water, bathing areas, often separated by gender, cemeteries or crematoria, latrines, locations for solid waste disposal (UNHCR, 2015b:16). The Refugee Act (Act 130 of 1998) states that all refugees are entitled to health care, to seek employment and to education, in the same way as South African citizens. At the end of the day basic services (i.e. accommodation, food, clothing, water and sanitation) is allocated to the persons in the refugee camps. Some seek protection with the school going children who also need access to education services.

4.2 Opening of refugee camps

A refugee transit camp was set up in Mayfair, Johannesburg, for people displaced by attacks on foreign nationals in Isipingo, Chatsworth, Greenwood Park, Phoenix and Verulam near Durban (SABC, 2015b). On the 13th April 2015, the SABC (2015b) reported that the eThekweni municipality opened refugee camps that were going to cater and keep the foreign nationals safe from the attacks by locals. The Citizen (2015) reported that there were more

than 5000 displaced foreign nationals, who occupied the camps, when were opened by the local church and the city of Durban (Middleton, 2015). The city of Durban also had a financial assistance from the provincial's government in the department development and other non-Governmental organisations such as the Gifts of the Givers who were the main stake holders in helping nationals and some private business who came on board to assist.

4.3 Refugee camp governance and its actors

Orchard and Miller (2014:11) reported that million people have fled the civil war in their respective countries and registered as refugees in the host countries. This can be attested by Table 1 above as it presented data of the figures issued by the UNHCR sub-regional operations profile in Southern Africa. The South African Refugees Act, (Act 130 of 1998) established the institutions and procedures to offer protection to those who are fleeing persecution and instability in their home countries. The state closely controls camps through specific structures. Many actors play a role in the governance of refugee camps such as the local government, South African Police Service, Health Department and Education. The local government provides basic services (shelter, sanitation, water and electricity) to the camps. The Department of Health provides refugee health services. In terms of education, few efforts are made to enable refugees to support themselves and develop self-sustaining livelihoods.

The roles of these institutions vary in importance from camp to camp and from area to area. In refugee camps throughout the world, the host state usually takes the role of policing the camp. Police address all kinds of disputes inside the camp. However, this is often done in cooperation with refugee-organized security forces (Hanafi, 2010:44). For safety reasons the SAPS is mandated to escort displaced immigrants to the respective police stations and also stabilise violent attacks in the township especially when the shops that belong to foreign nationals are being broken into and looted (SABC, 2015a). Police station is a means of law enforcement and are often situated at the entrance of the camp, that serve areas both inside and outside the camp (Hanafi, 2010:44). The role of SAPS includes among others forming safety forums that are meant to come up with strategies to curb an outbreak of such violence and also protect these foreign nationals from the angry locals. For example, the eThekweni Municipality hired private security to guard in the camps that included the South African police service, who were always alert during the process and would normally patrol to the camps after minutes until the closure of all the camps situated in eThekweni Municipality.

The Department of Home Affairs is the main structure as it controls and manages the immigration issues. It has a role to play in documenting displaced persons and issue identity cards in accordance to section 31.2(b) of the Immigration Act (Act 13 of 2002) which is valid for 6 months and they have to protect the displaced from the risk of deportation. NGOs also exist and are committed to improving the quality and effectiveness of aid for vulnerable populations suffering from conflict, disasters and climate change (Development Assistance Research Associates (DARA), 2011:6). Notable NGOs responsible for assisting displaced victims of xenophobia in South Africa is the Red Cross and the Gift of the Givers. The United Nations also brought along their employees to help during the Xenophobia attacks. The provincial government officials and volunteers also assist during these events.

Communication plays an important role in these camps to understand and monitor an emergency over a period of time. A satellite is normally used to track the activities in the refugee camps. Refugee camps are temporary structures, despite the duration funds must be allocated towards the management of the camps. Most of the displaced leave behind their belongings as they are being attacked. All these needs are to be financed. As it is indicated that the camps are temporary structures, the state must also transport them to their local residences. Funding is also be used for, repatriation or relocation in the long run. The next sections will provide the criteria in which refugee camps are funded.

4.5 The closure of the refugee camps and its challenges

The number of displaced foreign nationals kept on increasing instead of decreasing (Khoza, 2015). This happened after people thought of going back to the camps. Gaps in the delivery of humanitarian response include:

- A lack of respect for humanitarian principles and space;
- Increased encroachment of political and military actors on the humanitarian domain;
- Unpredictable and uneven funding among crises;
- Increased financial controls and reporting obligations that inhibit risk-taking and flexibility among operational agencies; and
- Insufficient attention to the role of local actors in delivering humanitarian response (DARA, 2015).

One of the implications that xenophobia has played especially in KwaZulu-Natal was the fleeing of the foreign nationals from their respective homes that led the xenophobia issue being uncontrollable and unsustainable (Baruti, Bond, Cele & Ngwane, 2010:4-6). Other challenges were that foreign nationals who did not see themselves relocating back to the townships where they were living before demanding the government to take them to their

home countries, especially people from Burundi, Somalia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. The last camp was closed the 30th of June 2015, where it was reported that the community there were living in accepted the foreign nationals back, meaning the reintegration of affected and displaced foreigners was successful (Harper, 2015).

The closure of the three camps came after the eThekweni Municipality Head of Communication announced the closure after assessing the conditions and conducting extensive community dialogue through the provincial department of community safety and liaison. He further added that the city was pleased with the situation which was normalised and that will mean the camps should therefore close to operate. Foreign nationals were given options either to be reintegrated back into the townships they once lived in while others requested to repatriated to their home countries of origin. The reintegration was of a challenge mainly because the donors were now withdrawing to sponsor the refugee camps since the Xenophobia attacks decreased and ceased. Other reasons that led to the closure of the camps were that of donors, NGOs, and various stakeholders started to withdraw their services to the camp, as they saw there was no longer violence directed to the foreign nationals in communities (SABC, 2015b). The next section presents the results of the study undertaken.

5. Results

The interviews conducted with the Emfuleni Local Municipality and the SAPS aimed to obtain clarity on how the institutions fund the refugee camp activities. The responses from the two institutions are discussed below.

5.1 Response from the SAPS

The Colonel from the SAPS informed that the department has a budget for safety and security services. The fund allocated from the SAPS is used to purchase assets required for rendering law enforcement services. The Colonel further informed that police officers are issued with equipment's on personal inventory. Police officers respond to duty calls whilst at home; therefore they are allocated extra protective clothing that will enable them to perform their duty anywhere. As a result they readily have their firearms, rounds, magazines, bullet resistant vests, tonfas, flash lights, reflective jackets, and helmets at home. The budget is also approved for overtime schedules, since xenophobic outbreaks occur unexpectedly.

It was informed that the SAPS have two types of overtime, namely: the planned overtime and the unplanned overtime. The Colonel also informed that funds are allocated for unplanned overtime whereby police officials are required to respond to emergency situations. Unplanned overtime is applied 48 hours after police officers have worked the overtime supported with a motivation. Both overtimes can only be authorised by the Cluster commander at Major General's rank. The overtime is calculated according to the number of hours worked, based on the salary notch and whether it is a normal day or Sunday/holidays.

5.2 Response from the ELM

It was informed that there is a limited budget streamlined for the refugees in the municipality. However in a case of a dire need to intervene during the attacks, the municipality uses a contingency budget in order to prioritise the xenophobic occurrences. The funds are allocated for campaigns against Xenophobia. The ELM reported that there are partnerships with the provincial government for undertaking such measures. For example the Department of Arts and Culture together with Disaster Management Unit of the ELM has joint programmes for rendering awareness activities on xenophobia. During the Heritage months there is a budget allocated to render xenophobic awareness campaigns. The recent campaign was held in Sol Tsoetsi sports complex in Sebokeng, where communities were invited to participate. This justifies that the municipality within its limited budget, it has decided to use the ad hoc/miscellaneous budget to assist with the aid of refugees within the municipality.

According to News 24 (2015), the eThekweni Mayor informed that an amount of R 10m has been pledged to assist with aid to the victims of xenophobic attacks in Durban. This is prompted by the fact that the attacks have dented the country's reputation in the world. Furthermore the mayor informed that there is a need for concerted efforts to ensure that the country do not destroy the relationships they have with countries abroad, especially the African counterparts. This has got an implication that though the municipalities have limited resources but in case of emergencies, the municipalities have a way to streamline some of its budget to assist with aiding refugees. Furthermore it can be said that the xenophobic attacks has far reaching implications on economic and social and relations on the global context. Therefore it is crucial for the South African government to ensure that its mandate is fulfilled as in accordance with the international principles. The following section discusses the procedure undertaken for financing refugee camps.

6. Discussions: Criteria for financing refugee camp

Refugee camp governance has need of funds in order to save the lives of the displaced and the destitute communities. Funding is developed for supporting refugees and asylums in the host country (UNHCR, 2015a). Humanitarian assistance emphasises on funding emergency responses for:

- material relief assistance and services (shelter, water, medicines);
- emergency food aid (short-term distribution and supplementary feeding programmes); and
- relief coordination, protection and support services (coordination, logistics and communications) (Buston & Smith, 2013:11).

Evidence of material relief assistance and services was seen in 2008, 2013 and 2015 in South Africa when xenophobic attacks erupted in Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal provinces. Displaced communities were provided with tents to live. Medical services are also rendered to those who are physically attacked in the clinic and in the place of safety/refugee camps. Food insecurity is common among those seeking place of safety. So the managers are required to provide food to the displaced communities. The funds are used to purchase basic food items that will feed the helpless victims of xenophobia. Safety and security is essential towards stabilising any sort of conflicts. More funds are required to maintain law and order in the country. The police role was observed during such episodes as more police were deployed to various locations in the country (Buston & Smith, 2013:11).

The criteria for financing refugee camps is undertaken by considering various aspects to ensure that funds are allocated appropriately at all times. Three activities are identified as criteria for funding refugee camps, namely: pillars of donor practice; indicators; and funding allocation process. Funding may be derived from different stakeholders and the process is guided by pillars of donor practice. Different indicators are also applied for disbursing funds and the authors of this paper learned about the vulnerability index for funding refugee camps. Furthermore, the authors read about the funding allocation process to embark on a well-organized procedure. The three activities are discussed in the sections below.

7. Pillars of donor practice

Governments have a special role and responsibility to ensure that aid money is used efficiently, effectively and for the greatest impact for the millions of people affected by crisis each year (DARA, 2011:6). Such funds can be managed by realising the pillars of donor practice as it concentrates on: responding to needs; prevention, risk reduction and recovery;

working with humanitarian partners; protection and international law; and learning and accountability (DARA, 2011:6).

7.1 Responding to needs

As indicated above refugee camps are temporary structures and managers are required to respond to the needs of the affected populations. Failure to put human safety and empowerment at the centre of responses will undermine the effectiveness of relief efforts. The United Nations office of the Coordination Humanitarian Affairs (UNCHR, 2015a) identified the following process for allowing decision making process when responding to refugee needs, namely: needs assessment and analysis; strategic response planning; resource mobilization; implementation and monitoring; and operational review and evaluation. Such decisions are based solely on the evaluation of the needs of the people receiving it (Buston & Smith, 2013:11). Humanitarian needs are evaluated at field level (European Commission (EC), 2008:3).

An analysis of needs is presented and considered in the relation to the available funding and relative scale and severity of needs across global crises (United Nations office of the Coordination Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), 2015). On arrival in the camps, refugees are registered, receive medical screening, are assisted with food, shelter, and are provided access to water and sanitation, education, psycho-social and other services (UNHCR, 2015b:3). So, the funds are allocated based on the needs that evolve. Refugee camps require money for emergency food aid, therefore responding to needs will allow managers to develop and measure needs in food security, livelihoods and nutrition (DARA, 2011:6). The assessment and understanding the needs relieves institutional pressure on services and resources and maintain protection space.

7.2 Prevention, risk reduction and recovery

Xenophobic attacks may be harmful and out of control and such circumstances compels the managers to develop measures to prevention of future crises and long-term recovery. Successful implementation of the humanitarian programme cycle is dependent on effective emergency preparedness, effective coordination with national/local authorities and humanitarian actors, and information management (UNOCHA, 2015). Funding refugee camps compel managers to be cautious of the risks that may hamper service delivery. Risk identification and allocation is a key component for financing projects. Humanitarian project may differ and it is essential to pay special attention to interruptions that may arise. The ability of donors to fund according to assessed needs is sometimes constrained by the

limited availability of objective and comparable evidence about humanitarian needs (Poole & Primrose, 2010:1).

7.3 Working with humanitarian partners

Refugee camp governance consists of different stakeholders that facilitate efficient funding decision-making process towards ensuring safety for the displaced communities. Refugee camp governance is under the leadership of the government and coordinated by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2015b:2). Table 2 illustrates the humanitarian assistance given, the top 5 donor's g during 2012 and how the funds are distributed.

Table 2: Humanitarian assistance

Humanitarian assistance given		
<pre> graph LR A["International humanitarian response US\$17.9 billion (2011 US\$19.4bn)"] --> B["Governments US\$12.9 billion (2011 US\$13.8bn)"] A --> C["Private voluntary contributions US\$5.0 billion (2011 US\$5.7bn)"] B --> D["DAC donors US\$11.6 billion (2011 US\$13.0bn)"] B --> E["Non-DAC donors US\$1.4 billion (2011 US\$0.8bn)"] </pre>		
Top 5 donors (2012)	Top 3 most generous donors Humanitarian assistance % GNI (2012)	How does it get there? (2011)
Sweden (US\$784 million) Turkey (US\$1.0 billion) United Kingdom (US\$1.2 billion), EU institutions (US\$1.9 billion) United States (US\$3.8 billion)	Luxembourg (0.16%) Sweden (0.14%) Turkey (0.13%)	Red Cross 6% Multilateral organisations 56% NGOs 26% Public sector 7%
Where does humanitarian assistance go?		
Ethiopia, 1West Bank & Gaza Strip, Afghanistan, Somalia million) (US\$1.4 billion).		

Source:(Buston & Smith, 2013:4)

Refugee response is a collaborative effort between the donor community, the three spheres of government, foundations, community-based organizations, international and national non-governmental organisations (NGOs), companies, and individuals (local and refugees) as well as military and security forces (Buston & Smith, 2013:4). A municipality may cooperate with the Red Cross organisation in a quest for safeguarding the lives of the community. Red Cross offices are also found in the townships such as Evaton in the ELM. Working with humanitarian partners helps to ensure that there are policies and practices to support the work of humanitarian organisations together. It also helps to budget for single items without duplicating the activities. Development assistance activities for 2006 amounted to between US\$363 million and US\$475 million, or 0.18 per cent of GDP. Assistance is not formally tied; however, most projects rely on South African inputs (skilled labour and technology), which form integral parts of project activities (Braude, Thandrayan & Sidiropoulos, 2008:3).

7.4 Protection and international law and learning and accountability

Fraudulent activities always arise; therefore funds must be used for the right reasons. The pillar for learning and accountability allows all funding institutions to contribute to transparency, accountability and learning in humanitarian action. Learning and accountability further include principles, standards and accountability frameworks guiding response; efforts to increase transparency; the use of technology to empower beneficiaries; and a focus on resilience (Buston & Smith, 2013:11). Accountability is used for measuring instruments ensuring that the principle of independence is applied. In addition, it allow rapid ex post control of the allocation of resources to the most vulnerable people in countries where need is greatest. Finally, they ensure the credibility and transparency of the humanitarian aid vis-à-vis the citizen (EC, 2008:3).

8. Resource mobilisation

Refugee response funds are designed to respond in different emergency scenarios. Funds are also allocated according to a democratic, inclusive and transparent process and supports chronic needs and funding gaps which require more long-term support (Poole & Primrose, 2010:1). These activities are funded from pooled funds to provide life-saving assistance to refugees, namely: the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and Country-based Pooled Funds (CBPFs) (UNOCHA, 2015). Pooled funds enable humanitarian organizations to provide the most urgently needed to fill critical gaps in the response in countries with large, on-going humanitarian operations (UNOCHA, 2015). Funds may also

come from voluntary and contributions private donors. Private donors are thought to have provided more than a quarter of all humanitarian assistance over the past years, largely in the form of voluntary contributions from the public to NGOs (Buston & Smith, 2013:12).

CERF has three objectives:

- promote early and coordinated action and response to save lives;
- enhance response to time-crucial requirements based on demonstrable needs; and
- Strengthen core elements of humanitarian response in under-funded crises (UNOCHA, 2015).

CERF consists of cash transfer and voucher programmes and disaster prevention and preparedness programme. Cash transfer and voucher programmes are implementing to enable people to make choices about their own needs and to boost local markets (Buston & Smith, 2013:7). In terms of disaster prevention and preparedness programmes the governments of countries hit by emergencies are often the first to respond, especially in the first critical 72 hours. Domestic response covers both a government's emergency response to a crisis in-country as well as national government investments in prevention and disaster risk reduction (Buston & Smith, 2013:34).

CBPFs allocate funding based on identified humanitarian needs and priorities (UNOCHA, 2015). CBPFs use two modalities to allocate funds, namely: standard allocations and reserve allocations. Allocations go to UN agencies and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and Red Cross organizations. Decision making plays an important role when funds are allocated. Decision making enables the managers to avoid duplication and ensure a complementary use of available CBPF funding. Four principles underpin the use of CBPFs, inclusiveness, flexibility, timeliness, and efficiency (UNOCHA, 2015). Inclusivity allows the stakeholders to participate in CBPF processes and receive funding to implement projects addressing identified priority needs. Refugee camp needs vary in context, and so managers are required to be flexible and adapt to changing priorities and allow humanitarian partners to identify appropriate solutions to address humanitarian needs in the most effective way (UNOCHA, 2015). Refugee camp responses are not planned therefore funds are allocated as need emerges. Management of all processes related to CBPFs enables timely and strategic responses to identified humanitarian needs (UNOCHA, 2015).

9. Conclusion

The study can conclude that humanitarian funding is allocated in proportion to needs. Humanitarian financing on refugee camps was found useful as funds are allocated based on the scale of needs. Hosting countries have the primary responsibility to protect their people and such progress was showcased by the contents in Table 2. The process for allocating funds across global crises varies considerably amongst the donors considered in this analysis. The need for refugee camp financing remains high throughout the world as more countries require increasing supplies of public utilities and infrastructure. In recent years, project finance schemes have become increasingly common in South Africa, Syria, Germany, Jordan and in the Asian countries. Despite the significant achievements noted above, a number of challenges remain. The study found that funding choices remain skewed by other priorities including the registration of immigrants and the deportation process. The ability of donors to fund according to assessed needs is also constrained by the limited availability of objective and comparable information on needs.

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ASSESSING THE STATE OF READINESS OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION FOR XENOPHOBIC PREVALENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA

L.N. Tshibalo

M. Mariga

S.L. Mokoena

L.B. Mzini

North West University, South Africa

Abstract

The paper aimed to discover how the xenophobic prevalence affects the process of resource allocation in the public services in the Gauteng province. A qualitative approach is used to solicit data and also considered for assessing the state of readiness on resource allocation for xenophobic prevalence in South Africa. This was realised by means of literature review on the resource allocation and the role of the state for managing xenophobic incidents in South Africa. Xenophobic occurrences are uncertain incidences. The paper revealed that the state is more than ready to manage these incidences. Various programmes for supporting and controlling xenophobic attacks were implemented by the three spheres of government. Furthermore, it was discovered that there intergovernmental relations plays an important role when resources are allocated for controlling xenophobic incidences. The authors associate resource allocation with the project management process; a process which require discrete multistage decision process. Public institutions are found to be constrained when resources are limited. Limited resources require public managers to consider decision variables for effective allocation of resources. The paper proposes that the allocation of limited resources can be overcome by implementing sub-project programming, two-level concept of management control evaluation, and by approximation in policy space.

1. Introduction

This paper studies the effects of xenophobic prevalence on resource allocation for enhancing community safety in South Africa. Resource allocation focuses on the management of assets that supports an organisation's strategic goals. Resource allocation encompasses balancing competing needs and priorities. It also determines the effective usage of such resources in order to maximise the effective use of limited resources and gain the best return on investment. Furthermore, resource allocation has to do with competition for scarce resources. The prevalence of the attacks on foreign nationals has brought a lot of challenges to service delivery programmes. Stabilisation of the cases requires the South African Police Service to be on high alert and to increase deployments of police officials to render community safety.

In terms of research methodology a qualitative approach is used to solicit data. The paper selected the City of Johannesburg as a source of information and for assessing the situational analysis. The paper seeks to discover how the resources allocated in a quest to control xenophobic violence in South Africa. Sources such as the books, articles and report were analysed for obtaining an understanding about the subject matter. The reports were found to be of great assistance as they contained various programmes and activities implemented for combating xenophobic attacks. Participant observations were also considered for this study as it contributes to comprehend the content of the study. Participant observation is also supported by media report and news headlines viewed from the television. These instruments also assisted understand the concept of resource allocation.

The paper convenes by providing an exposition of the overview for the state of xenophobia in South Africa. The context of resource allocation is also discussed. The types of resource allocation; the resource allocation process and strategies and the factors affecting resource allocation are discussed. Furthermore the paper reports on the findings that elaborates about the state readiness for allocating resources to combat xenophobic incidents. The paper concludes by arguing that the South African government has the capability to plan and allocate resources; however it's organising must be linked to project management in order to realise the set objectives.

2. Overview of the state of xenophobia in South Africa

Presently, xenophobia is a phenomenon that has not received a lot of attention especially on the experiences and emotions of African immigrant entrepreneurs residing in metropolitan cities (Chinomona & Maziriri, 2015:20). A review of contemporary scholarship on xenophobia and of media reports on the attacks reveals a number of elements that shows the effects of xenophobia (Human Sciences Research Council, 2008:6). Xenophobia relates to any hostility or negative attitude or behaviour shown towards foreign nationals and immigrant entrepreneurs (Chinomona & Maziriri, 2015:20). Khosa and Kalitani (2014) explain that xenophobia is widespread in the townships, where immigrants are referred to as "*kwerekwere*" a disparaging word for African immigrant. Xenophobic expressions range from discriminatory attitudes and remarks to institutional or social exclusion, harassment and overt forms of interpersonal and collective violence (Misago, Freemantle & Landau, 2015:70). Xenophobia can also include exclusion by service providers, even when migrants are entitled to the service as well as hostility experienced by migrants in their interactions with South Africans (Crush & Williams, 2005:16).

Xenophobic attacks have recently occurred in Gauteng, KZN and Eastern Cape. More than 50 people have died and tens of thousands of people have been displaced as a result of 'xenophobic' violence in South Africa during 2008 (Human Sciences Research Council, 2008:6). The April 2015 xenophobic attacks on immigrants have brought South Africa to shame globally. African immigrants within Johannesburg (especially informal street traders) face police harassments, anti-foreigner violence and invisible discriminations in the labour markets on a daily basis (Landau & Jacobsen, 2004). Violent conflict rarely erupts spontaneously or even at short notices (European Commission, 2008). Xenophobia threatens the lives and livelihoods of refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants and other locally defined 'outsiders' including domestic migrants and ethnic minorities (Misago, Freemantle & Landau, 2015). Furthermore, xenophobia hampers the business operations of African immigrant entrepreneurs (Crush & Williams, 2005:16). Johannesburg has become the main destination for most African immigrant entrepreneurs from the Southern African region and the African continent in general. Migration is one of the defining issues of the 21st century, and is an essential, unavoidable and potentially beneficial component of the economic and social life of countries and regions (Kalitanyi & Visser, 2010:378). The question should, therefore, no longer be whether or not migration should be accepted. Instead, how to deal with it and manage it effectively, so that the benefits it has to offer could be fully exploited and its negative effects reduced or minimised (McKinley, 2006:1).

3. The context of resource allocation

A resource is anything that is required to accomplish an activity or used to fulfil human needs. The three most basic resources are identified: land, labour and capital. A resource can be considered to be factor of production, which is something used to produce goods or services (Grimsley, 2015). Typically resources are materials, energy, services, staff, knowledge, or other assets that are transformed to produce benefit and in the process may be consumed or made unavailable (Miller & Spoolman, 2011). A resource is characterised by utility, limited availability, and potential for depletion or consumption. Resources are used to execute projects and activities in the public and private sector. Resource allocation is a process and strategy involving a company deciding where scarce resources should be used in the production of goods or services (Grimsley, 2015).

Resource allocation forms part of economics which is the area of public finance. Resource allocation can also be used in strategic planning. So the resources allocated must be planned in order to achieve goals for the future. Resource allocation concentrates on the scheduling of activities and the resources required for implementing the planned activities while taking into consideration both the resource availability and the project time. Resource

allocation can be implemented by means of basic allocation decision and contingency mechanisms. Basic allocation decision enables the manager to choose the items to be funded in the institutional plan. It also allows identifying the level of funding to be received by the institution or department and for the item as compared to people (Skinner, 2007:50). Resource allocation always bears a competing nature. Institutions manage various projects which share a pool of constrained resources, taking into account other objectives in addition to time (Lova, Maroto & Tormos, 2000:408). Contingency mechanisms focus on priority ranking of items in the departmental plan. It enables managers to show which items to fund in a case where there are limited resources (Skinner, 2007:50).

4. Types of resource allocation

The public sector consists of a diverse workforce which requires different resources for delivering services to the community. Therefore the resources allocated will exist for different purposes. Resources must be allocated in a fair manner. The University of Illinois (2015) identified four types of resource allocation, namely: allocation by merit, allocation by social worth, allocation by need and allocation by equal or random assignment. Allocation by merit focuses on rewards system, whereby rewards are distributed according to productivity, effort, or demonstrated ability. This can serve to empower staff members and for performing departments. Allocation by social worth tends to take a practical view toward resources, directing them toward those who appear most likely to contribute to the common good. This view suggests that resources should move in directions that ultimately do the greatest good for the largest number of people. Criteria for social worth can include age, seniority, rank, and expertise (The University of Illinois, 2015).

Allocation by need tends to view resources in terms of basic human rights. This view suggests that every person has the same right to some minimal level of a given resource. Obvious examples include food, shelter, and clothes. This fits well during the xenophobic incidents experienced in the country, whereby resources must be allocated to vulnerable and displaced communities as they require the state protection. Immigrants tend to lose their belongings such as shelter and clothes. Different mechanism are involved as to ensure that they are protected, and different stakeholders such as the government departments, community development workers, police, social workers, religious leaders all come together to give aid to address the needs of the displaced community. Allocation by equal or random assignment takes the view that no rational, unbiased way can be found to distribute resources. This is the default allocation method when no other allocation method works. Allocation by random assignment breaks down when each portion of a resource is simply too small to do any good. For example, two big tents are allocated to accommodate large

number of displaced communities. One tent is often used to accommodate males and the other one is used to place women and kids during an epidemic phase. The space that is provided is too limited and the benefits are minimal to the affected (The University of Illinois, 2015).

5. Resource allocation process and strategies

Resource allocation is undertaken in terms of decisions. Grimsley (2015) identifies the three main features of allocating resources, namely: strategic planning, budgeting and logistical management. Resource allocation begins at strategic planning when an institution formulates its vision and goals for the future. The vision and strategic goals are accomplished through achievement of objectives. Once an institution has set its objective, it will need to allocate sufficient resources to accomplish it. Each department may take its budgeted funds and allocate those resources for more specific purposes, such as hiring employees, commissioning marketing studies, and buying raw materials and components (Grimsley, 2015). Resources are further moved to where they need to be in order to accomplish the company's objectives that will bring it closer to its strategic goal. Logistics is the process by which an organisation manages the flow of resources coming into the organisation, flowing inside the department, and flowing out of the company (Grimsley, 2015).

With the spate of xenophobic attacks experienced in South Africa managers are forced to apply a contingency mechanism to allocate resources, whereby resources are allocated as a priority ranking as the resource items are required for stabilising the incident were not planned. Osiński, Piecyk and Stolarski (2015) identifies the following steps to make resource decisions in a rational way, whereby a manager must:

- identify/design alternatives ;
- identify and structure the organization's goals and objectives;
- prioritize the objectives and sub-objectives;
- measure each alternative's contribution to each of the lowest level sub-objectives; and
- find the best combination of alternatives, subject to environmental and organizational constraint.

Furthermore, resources are allocated in a structural system. Two structures are identified, namely: functional organizational structure and a matrix organizational structure for reporting. In a functional organizational structure, an organization's reporting relationships

are grouped based on specialty, or functional area. Institutions have different departments that serve different needs of the community. All these departments report directly to the municipal manager or to the head of department who is the accounting officer. A matrix organizational structure is a structure in which the reporting relationships are set up as a grid, or matrix, rather than in the traditional hierarchy. Employees have dual reporting relationships generally to both a functional manager and a product manager. A matrix organization structure enables resources to be used efficiently, since experts and equipment can be shared across projects' and products and projects are formally coordinated across functional departments.

6. Factors affecting resource allocation

Institutions can have a planned decision process, a robust structure and enough resources which can lead to under-expenditure but there are always hindrances that can affect the allocation of resources. Resource allocation can be influenced by internal (remuneration for overtime) and external (crime and xenophobic attacks) barriers (Hall & Kehoe, 2013). Channel relationship, communication, participation, and feedback also impact resource allocations (Anderson, Lodish, & Weitz, 1987:85). Managers require an efficient system design that will optimize the process and they can propose different resource allocation schemes and strategies. In South Africa, xenophobia continues to threaten the lives and livelihoods of foreign nationals while generating enduring fear and insecurity.

Misago, Freemantle and Landau (2015:75), identified following indicators for the implementation approach and process combat xenophobic incidents, where the state must:

- identify the most important areas of intervention through community needs assessment;
- mobilise resources for interventions;
- establish a clear vision, setting reasonable timeline expectations;
- develop realistic objectives, outputs and indicators;
- assemble and building the proper project team;
- develop a comprehensive project plan;
- implement the programme, reducing risks and addressing challenges during the implementation phase;
- monitor the implementation progress;
- conduct the impact assessment for narrative and financial reporting; and
- provide individual support to victims.

The abovementioned indicators were used to discuss the findings reported in the following sections.

7. Findings: Responding To Xenophobia in South Africa and resource allocation interventions

Xenophobic episodes manifest in various forms, ranging from discrimination, harassment, assault, and looting in the foreign national shops normally established in the townships (European Commission, 2008:1). The effects of xenophobia include injury to people, loss of property, death, displacement of victims, loss of jobs, women being raped, political instability, violation of innocent people, children's rights being abused, businesses being destroyed and the country's image being tarnished (Chinomona & Maziriri, 2015:20). Short and long term actions are crucial to ensure stability and secure living environments in all parts of South Africa. Such occurrences have put the country on the global agenda and negotiations have been achieved to put a stop to xenophobic attacks. Various activities have been implemented and this is witnessed by a sequence of activities carried out to respond to the outbreaks. The government is involved in different interventions to stop the violence, mitigate its effects and prevent future occurrences (Misago, Freemantle & Landau, 2015:25). The respective commitments by the government are discussed in the sections.

7.1 Early efforts by the government towards xenophobia

One of the conundrums of post-1994 South Africa, given the country's stated commitment to Human rights and diversity as well as its African identity, is the rise in levels of xenophobia which largely targets African non-nationals (Crush & Williams, 2005:28). In 1997, the South African Human Rights Commission identified xenophobia as a major source of concern to human rights and democracy. The government has, subsequently, publicly challenged xenophobic attitudes (Crush & Williams, 2005:16).

Early efforts by the government included the following activities conducted prior 2008 relating to the resource allocation for responding to xenophobia in South Africa:

- World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (WCAR) held in Durban in 2001 and
- Roll Back Xenophobia (RBX) Campaign December 1998 (Misago, Freemantle & Landau, 2015:25).

The above initiatives have been under discussion for many years and extend to the current day in 2015. The WCAR was spearheaded by the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development as a need to translate the objectives of the Durban Declaration

into a practical and workable plan. The RBX Campaign was launched in response to the rising levels of xenophobia particularly targeted at African migrants and refugees in South Africa. Post-May 2008 government response During the May 2008 violence, the government called on specialized units, created *ad hoc* committees and designated task teams in parliament, ministries, provincial and local governments, and the police (Misago, Freemantle & Landau, 2015: 25). All these interventions have to do with resource allocation in which capital, land and human capital is planned for minimising the outbreaks. The following paragraphs also identify the readiness of government for the allocation of resources to reduce xenophobic incidents in the City of Johannesburg.

7.2 Resources allocation by City of Johannesburg in addressing xenophobic attacks

Xenophobia seriously impacted on the service delivery to the community of Johannesburg and to all affected areas in South Africa. Xenophobic incidents erupt randomly and it is regarded as a priority subject. As a result there is no itemised budget allocated for the said xenophobic events and intervention. However, resources are allocated from a contingency budget in order to address xenophobia attacks. It was discovered that the City of Johannesburg (thereafter a City) budgeted estimated R30 million annually to fight xenophobia attacks. The City has developed Action Plan to deal with xenophobia. The City also convened the migration advisory panel, a committee set up to advice the City around issues of migration to discuss the spate of xenophobic violence.

7.3 Communication

The City has partnered with cell phone giant Vodacom to set up an electronic system in which foreigner nationals can log a distress call 24 hours a day by dialling*134*422# and their cell phones will be assisted when attacked. The system also assists civilians to report incidents of xenophobia and looting in an efficient way and will enable those affected by the violence to get in touch with their loved ones in case of emergencies. A joint operations centre has been set up in the inner city to help those displaced by the xenophobic violence. There is also Migrant Helpdesk to assist foreigner nationals on the matter. This Helpdesk assist them on information related to socioeconomic opportunities, education, housing, healthcare and non-governmental services. Through the above initiative more than 300 people in April 2015 were arrested, only seven died and 300 were displaced in Johannesburg alone. The City assisted those displaced by integrating them back to the community and provided them with temporary shelters.

7.4 Awareness campaigns

The City organised free benefit concert in Newtown to mobilise people and publicly deride the violence. The City also organised fun walk to denounce xenophobia and issue of

an impassioned plea for unity among Africans. The City also organised silent vigil against xenophobia at Constitutional Hill in Braamfontein, Johannesburg. Different stakeholders are involved in these processes as a form of participatory decision making. Religious leaders are also included in these campaigns as the City organised interfaith prayer services at Ellispark Stadium where Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa gave a key note address on xenophobia. All cities host the Africa Day held on 24 May and the Africa Day 2015 concert emphasised more restoring the nation and the musicians called for unity against xenophobia.

7.5 Safety and security

Since passing the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act of 1996, the government has continued to spend on basic public services and on public order and safety. The prevalence of xenophobia is problematic in communities and calls for additional measures that may upset strategic planning carried out with regard to resource allocation. The prevalence of xenophobia calls for a greater police and security force presence at all times to ensure the safety of the community. In addition government departments in South Africa have recently taken on increased responsibility for policing. The municipal police services are particularly responsible for the policing of municipal by-laws although municipal policing agencies have been required to intervene in cases of xenophobic conflict between South Africans and foreigners (Palmary, 2003). The increased policing and security services disrupts to the allocation of resources. During March and April 2015 there was an upsurge in attacks on foreign nationals which started in Durban and spread to Johannesburg and in April 2015. It was noted that 338 soldiers at a cost of 4.2 million were deployed to assist police in halting the xenophobic violence. It is clear the greater need for police and security force presence to halt xenophobic violence affects resource allocation and diverts resources that could have served other purposes.

Another issue besides increased police presence is the issue of camps set up for victims of xenophobia who are displaced from their communities. Displaced foreign nationals who are victims of xenophobia flee xenophobic attacks and need to be cared for by the establishment of settlement camps. This exercise can be costly and requires the deployment of personnel at the camps despite donations and assistance from Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO's) and civil society.

7.6 Reintegration process

The reintegration process after xenophobic attacks is also of great detriment to the planned allocation of resources. There is need for extensive consultation and discussion before victims of xenophobia are reintegrated in to their communities. There are consultative

meetings with South Africans and the foreign nationals to determine the cause of the xenophobic violence and also to find ways of addressing the issues that are brought forward. The process of reintegration also includes sensitising the South Africans to the plight of the foreign nationals and to encourage empathy and tolerance towards each other within the community. The Department of Home Affairs facilitates the process to ensure that the causal factors are attended to and to curb future attacks.

7.7 Repatriation

The Refugee Act, passed in 1998 provides for the needs of the forcibly displaced persons coming to South Africa in search of asylum. It entitles refugees to seek employment and also entitles them the rights enshrined in chapter two of the constitution such as safety and dignity with the exception of political rights such as voting. The South African government has worked well in ensuring that displaced and illegal immigrants are kept safe by embarking on the repatriation process which allows government to send-off foreign nationals to their country of origin. Foreign nationals are deported after they are found to have gained entry into the country unlawfully. Repatriation of foreign nationals is also a resource intensive exercise. The process requires a place of safety and basic service delivery for the concerned group. The Department of Home Affairs manages the deportation process and the statistics are made available on the website and the website provides limited access to these figures.

Foreign nationals that are to be repatriated are either kept by the police or by other government departments in settlement or refugees camps until they are taken to the Lindela repatriation centre while awaiting determination of their legal status in South Africa. Lindela repatriation centre was opened to address the ever increasing burden on South African Police services (SAPS) holding cells and lack of detention capacity. Foreign nationals at Lindela repatriation centre are provided with accommodation, food, recreation and healthcare. The Department of Home Affairs is legally and administratively responsible for all matters pertaining to the apprehension, holding, processing, repatriation and release of illegal immigrants at the Lindela repatriation centre. While waiting for their repatriation to be processed, the legally mandated limit of stay is two weeks. Foreign nationals are repatriated to their countries on a daily basis by the South African government by train, bus or by plane to border posts or at OR Tambo International Airport and Lanseria Airport.

7.8 Operation Fiela project

Xenophobic violence is triggered by many factors including crime and looting in the shops owned by foreign nationals. The first duty of any government is the security of its citizens and everyone within its borders (Rantao, 2015). The violence was mitigated by the launch of the Operation Fiela project which served as a relief measure to minimise xenophobic attacks in South Africa. Operation Fiela is a national project by government aimed at eradicating crime and includes the army and the Department of Home Affairs' immigration services (The Citizen, 2015). In terms of resource allocation the operation has made widespread use of soldiers and police officials in Johannesburg, Cape Town and KwaZulu-Natal (de Wet, 2015) in order to restore peace and community safety.

7.9 Community Development Workers on Xenophobia

Community members have been involved in providing humanitarian assistance to the victims of the violence. Others have launched interventions aimed at preventing the recurrence of such a violent conflict by promoting 'social cohesion (Misago, Freemantle & Landau, 2015: 27). Community Development Workers (CDWs) were established to offer assistance. CDWs play an important role in the self-imagination of South African communities. A positive coexistence with foreign nationals is an integral part of such self-imagery through which communities unify and develop. The Department of Public Service and Administration stated that CDWs are expected to ensure that the lives of people in communities are better and improved (Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA), 2007:14). Furthermore Raga, Taylor and Gogi (2012:236) mention that "the CDW programme (CDWP) aims to improve service delivery for the people, facilitate community development and work jointly towards sustainable economic and social upliftment". Therefore in order to achieve this there need to be harmonious coexistence amongst foreign nationals and South African citizens within a community. Section 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, provides for every human to have their dignity sustained and respected. The CDWs have a crucial role of ensuring that dignity and respect is promoted in every community.

It is important to note that many of the foreign nationals come to South Africa as refugees seeking help. The Refugee Act of 1998 aims to protect the basic human rights of all refugees. In this regard CDWs are expected to protect foreign national against xenophobic attacks and ensuring better lives of all citizens. The CDWs aim to promote the constitutional values of human dignity provided in chapter 2 of the Constitution of South Africa. Solomon and Kosaka (2013:6) concisely state that xenophobia is a violation of human rights, decent living, good governance and the ability of people to live in unity. In light of this articulation,

Swanepoel and De Beer (2011:52) argue that “empowerment also includes information or knowledge, but then in service of the people’s responsibility to make wise and informed decisions”. According to Mubangizi (2009:442), CDWs provide community members with information and help to empower them individually and as a community.

The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) report (2010:38) states that violent communities are those with poor government structures, leadership and relationship between residents and government officials. Furthermore, part of the CDWs’ responsibilities is to link government services to communities which they serve (DPSA, 2003:16). However, according to an interview with inspector Ronald Greef contained in the SAHRC report (2010:37), foreign nationals feel excluded from community structures. Raga *et al.* (2012:240) mention that CDWs have an important role of ensuring public participation and connecting citizens to government structures and services. Therefore CDWs have a responsibility of ensuring the exclusion of foreign nationals from government services is prevented through support, assistance and information provision. These actions by CDWs will ensure a reduction in the occurrence of xenophobic attacks on foreign nationals and ensure effective social cohesion.

8. Conclusion

Systemic and deeply entrenched xenophobic attitudes and behaviour in South Africa are clear evidence that responses and interventions must be designed to address the root problems experienced. SAPS’s role is highly acknowledged as they are charged with protecting all residents of South Africa from physical harm. The paper found that civil society response plays a meaningful role for combating the respective incidents. The above statements show that CDWs play an educational role during the xenophobic attacks so as to educate South African citizens about refugees, immigrants and asylum seekers. This form of empowerment by CDWs fights against the misconception about immigrants; it protects their human rights and enables a positive attitude towards them. Moreover, when CDWs inform communities it encourages social cohesion and discourages xenophobia. Xenophobic prevention activities can be designed before and after the attacks. The authors found that there is a need for a revised and more relevant agency-wide strategy and guidance to address xenophobia in community safety operational areas for ensuring stability and safety of foreign nationals. Incorporation of new partners for enhancing stakeholder relations is also crucial for promoting active integrated citizenry in combatting xenophobia. The paper also found that the allocation of resources for these activities was awkward and puts a lot of pressure to the state as more funds are required. Therefore it is recommended that it would be best for the state to understand the current socio-political and socioeconomic conditions

in order to avoid the behavioural changes experienced in the country. Furthermore the state can enhance the monitoring processes, provide training for educating the community about the importance of immigration.

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