Reflection on the deterrence theory of taxation in the context of revenue collection by municipalities and the South African Revenue Services

Abstract

This paper evaluates analyses and reflects on how the deterrence theory as revenue collection measure can be used in revenue collection. It also focuses on the applicability thereof to the South African Revenue Service and the municipal revenue collection strategies, through increasing the penalties as well as raising of the tax audit or the combination of the two. Revenue collection is critical for the survival and sustainability of government. This is the way of creating space that will enable it to provide the essential public services required by the citizens and as a result thereof reduce the dependency of the government on foreign aids. This paper is theoretical in nature and scope and bases its argument on secondary literature sources. It will evaluate and gain insights into how tax compliance can be attained in the context of how the revenue collecting authorities treat and deal with the taxpayers. This will be achieved by analysing the outcome of the force used in revenue collection versus the willingness of taxpayers to meet their tax obligations. The paper concludes that the deterrence theory is the most applicable in the municipalities and the South African Revenue Service revenue collection strategies as taxpayers and ratepayers do not pay rates and taxes willingly but coerced.