An examination of the incompatibilities of NATO and the African Union Agenda(s) in the Libyan conflict between 2011 and 2012

Abstract

Much of the literature on the recent Libyan conflict is framed through a Westernised lens. This is an epistemic and ontological setback for Africa. Hence, the transition from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to African Union (AU) with the principle of, “African solution to African problems,” seemed to be a plausible one after a number of imported solutions and western powers’ interventions that often left the continent worse off than before. Syria shared a similar situation with Libya but the intervention from the western powers differed significantly. Against this setback, this study employs Afrocentricity as an alternative theoretical lens to examine the incompatibilities of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) involvement in the Libyan conflict within the context of the African Agenda. The objectives of the study were to evaluate the relations between AU and UNSC on the Libyan crisis, how the UNSC Res 1973 was understood and implemented AU and NATO and to reflect on the implications of NATO led military intervention under the pretext of Responsibility to Protect civilians in Libya. The involvement of NATO’s military force sealed not only the fate of Libyans with no long term plan to the resolution of the crisis but also severely restricted and undermined the efforts of AU in Libya. The efforts of AU and its roadmap were completely negated when NATO forces started their air raids. Divisions were clearly evident within NATO members with Germany and Netherlands opposing the motives of NATO. The intervention by NATO facilitated regime change and flooded the region with illicit trade in arms and goods, harboured armed extremists’ groups, and terrorists. The cauldron of all of the above effectively destabilised the region. It also exposed deep divisions within AU members, lack of coordination and the effects of limited resources on operations that could be handled continentally to avoid unsavoury interventions. In relation to the Libyan crisis, AU and NATO had divergent interests and could not cooperate in finding long lasting solutions. AU should in the future be proactive in resolving conflicts with the continent and should be prepared to fund its own operations in order to reduce dependence on foreign assistance in similar situations in the future.